# The Global Cold War

*Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*

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# Contents

# Abbreviations

| | |
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| AIOC | Anglo-Iranian Oil Company |
| ANC | African National Congress (South Africa) |
| ARAMCO | Arabian-American Oil Company |
| ASEAN | Association of South East Asian Nations |
| BOSS | Bureau of State Security (South Africa) |
| CC | Central Committee |
| CCP | Chinese Communist Party |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency (US) |
| Comintern | Communist International |
| CPP (m-1) | Communist Party of Philippines (Marxist-Leninist) |
| CPSU | Communist Party of the Soviet Union |
| CWIHP | Cold War International History Project |
| DCI | Director of Central Intelligence (US) |
| DPK | Democratic Party of Kurdistan |
| DPRK | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| ELF | Eritrean Liberation Front |
| EPLF | Eritrean People's Liberation Front |
| EPRP | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party |
| FAPLA | Forças Armadas Popular para Libertação de Angola (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) |
| FLN | Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria) |
| FMLN | Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation, EI Salvador) |
| FNLA | Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) |
| FRELIMO | Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambiquan Liberation Front) |
| FRETILIN | Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor) |





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| FSLN | Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front, Nicaragua) |
| GDR | German Democratic Republic |
| GRU | Glavnoie razvedivatelnoie upravleniie (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff; USSR) |
| IBRD | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| ICP | Iraqi Communist Party |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| ISI | Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan) |
| KGB | Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security; USSR) |
| KhAD | Khadimat-e atal'at-e dowlati (State Information Service [Security]; Afghanistan) |
| MCP | Malayan Communist Party |
| MFA | Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement; Portugal) |
| MIT | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| MNC | Mouvement National Congolais (Congolese National Movement) |
| MO | Mezhdunarodnyi otdel (International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU; USSR) |
| MPLA | Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) |
| NAM | Non-Aligned Movement |
| NIEO | New International Economic Order |
| NLF | National Liberation Front (Vietnam) |
| NPA | New People's Army (Philippines) |
| NSC | National Security Council (US) |
| OAS | Organization of American States |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OPEC | Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| PAIGC | Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) |
| PDPA | People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan |
| PDRE | People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia |
| PDRY | People's Democratic Republic of Yemen |
| PGT | Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (Guatemalan Workers' Party) |
| PKI | Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) |

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| PLO | Palestinian Liberation Organization |
| PMAC | Provisional Military Administrative Council (Ethiopia) |
| POMOA | Provisional Office for Mass Organizational Affairs (Ethiopia) |
| PRC | People's Republic of China |
| PRI | Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party; Mexico) |
| SACP | South African Communist Party |
| SALT | Strategic Arms Limitation Talks |
| SED | Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party; GDR) |
| SpetsNaz | Voiska spetsialnogo naznacheniia (special purpose forces; USSR) |
| TANU | Tanganyika African National Union |
| TPLF | Tigray People's Liberation Front |
| UAR | United Arab Republic |
| UNITA | União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola) |
| USSR | Union of Socialist Soviet Republics |
| VWP | Vietnam Workers' Party |
| WSLF | Western Somalia Liberation Front |

# 3 The revolutionaries: anticolonial politics and transformations

From the mid-nineteenth century up to 1920 more than 450 million people in Africa and Asia came under direct colonial rule.[1] Britain, France, Russia, the Netherlands, and Portugal – the old European colonial powers – were followed by the newly formed Germany and Italy, by Belgium, and, in a somewhat hesitant manner, by the United States. Even Japan – itself a victim of imperialist expansion at the beginning of the epoque – joined the club of aggressors. While the capacity for expansion arose from the changes in technology, organization, and communication that took place in the nineteenth century, the motives varied from the search for markets and raw materials to religious zeal and national pride. By the early twentieth century most people in the capitalist countries had stopped asking for motives: imperialism to them had become the natural order of things, just like the Cold War would be two generations later.[2]

In spite of the vigorous defense put up in many Third World areas, it often took decades after the attacks before the victims were able to organize comprehensive resistance to colonial rule. The brutality of the invasions and occupations were fearful – one recent estimate is that the direct and indirect death toll from the colonial wars was around five and a half million. In addition, as Mike Davis has shown, famines set off by global droughts reached catastrophic proportions in Asia and Africa in the late nineteenth century in part because the attacks had undermined social structures that in times past might have ameliorated the suffering. The new colonial territories were vast and the population – even before decimation – was usually sparse. When the occupiers began imposing some form of order, the colonies they established often did not match the colonized peoples' own states, identities, or organizations, something that gave plentiful opportunities for "divide and rule." Organized counterattacks were also held back by the many varieties of colonial government, as we have already seen in the American and Russian cases, from enforced cultural assimilation to extermination and genocide.[3]

The period of successful resistance against colonial rule began in the aftermath of World War I, just as the Cold War was in its infancy. In the

1920s and 1930s the struggles between empires and their opponents was also a battlefield for ideas of social revolution or capitalist development. As the powers in Europe completed their self-destruction in World War II, most revolutionary movements in the Third World were coming of age. And the revolutions that gave most Third World countries their freedom happened after World War II, when the Cold War had already become a fully-fledged international system. In other words, the forming of anti-colonial revolutionary movements and of new Third World states is inextricably linked in time to the Cold War conflict and to Cold War ideologies. Though the processes of decolonization and of superpower conflict may be seen as having separate origins, the history of the late twentieth century cannot be understood without exploring the ties that bind them together.

## Colonialism and its effects

One of the key objectives of colonization was the destruction of established worldviews among the colonized peoples. The claim to racial superiority that was built into the imperialist project meant that those subject to colonization were intended to see themselves as having less value than their superiors and to believe that their indigenous cultures were doomed to extinction. The proof of the proposition was in the European takeover of the colonial territories themselves: *because* the colonizers possessed such a surplus of arms, technology, and organization they had succeeded in taking control of the world, and their possessions – both material and territorial – showed their supremacy. As if power was not enough, the colonized were subjected to relentless propaganda – often through Christian missions – about the justness of the new order and the bankruptcy of their own ideals and beliefs.

The degree to which this intended destruction of indigenous culture and organization succeeded in the Third World is still hotly debated. Depriving a group totally of its previous identity usually took projects of mass extermination, such as in the cases of the American Indians or the Australian Aborigines. In most cases, what began emerging at the end of the nineteenth century – at least at elite levels – were indigenous and colonial hybrids, with a distinctly modern twist. The initial cooptation of non-European administrators and the advent of colonial education meant that groups emerged that were as dedicated to such staples of modernity as technology and systematization as were the colonial authorities themselves. To administer the colonies without these intermediaries would have been impossible, since the number of foreign administrators was miniscule compared to the vastness of the territories they were



supposed to control. Later on, as we shall see, it was often from this group of intermediaries – or rather their sons and daughters – that the first nationalist organizations emerged.

The colonial projects that had developed during the nineteenth century were extremely diverse in character. While the British were often happy to rule through non-European forms of organization and therefore allowed a wide variety of local systems to emerge, the French (and later the Americans) were much more assimilationist, attempting to spread their own culture and institutions to the peoples they had conquered. The presence or absence of European colonists also played a crucial role in shaping the colonial systems – bringing such groups in or allowing them to settle intensified the conflict between the imperial center and the colonized peoples, as the Southern African or Algerian cases show. Finally, the minor colonial powers – such as Belgium and Portugal – had neither the instruments nor the resources to impose an effective administration or other aspects of modernity on the territories they controlled. Their rule therefore remained crudely exploitative – more similar to the defunct Spanish empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than to the French or British of the late nineteenth and early twentieth.

The state organizations that colonized peoples encountered at home were therefore not of a kind and led to different responses as the anti-colonial resistance took shape. The general characteristics they did have in common were a lack of local legitimacy, a fear of subversion, and a predilection for big projects. The colonial state was always the representative of the imperial center and of the colonists, never of any indigenous group, however collaborationist such a group may be. As such, the state therefore emerged as something extraneous to indigenous peoples, even at the elite level. The "foreignness" of the state led to a constant need for policing at all levels, even in the most assimilationist of colonies. And the lack of local knowledge, the availability of labor, and the abundance of resources led to the inauguration (but not always the completion) of grand projects, intended both to deliver raw materials to the empire and to show the indigenous peoples the efficacy and superiority of the colonial state. It is no wonder that the colonized often described their existence as living within a giant prison.

The height of the colonial era, around 1900, coincided with a period of reform within many of the imperialist powers themselves. Just as criticism intensified over the exploitation of workers at home, over the lack of hygiene and education, and over corruption and inequality in state services, the attacks on standards in the running of the colonies also grew. The result was, on the one hand, an increase in education and in health

services available to non-Europeans, and, on the other, attempts at extending the reach of the colonial state into areas in which it had so far had little control. Whole new educational institutions were set up in the imperial centers to train a better sort of future colonial administrator, including an increasing number of young men from the indigenous elites.[4] Upon their arrival in Africa or Asia, these representatives of the colonial project were charged with penetrating geographical regions or areas of society into which the early colonial system had barely reached. Instead of raw materials and trade, the new slogans of imperialism at around 1900 were progress and development, both for the imperial powers and for the colonies.

Most enterprises that the authorities undertook or supported toward the end of the colonial era were carried out on an even bigger scale than before, in part because the vastness of the new colonial territories invited "big thinking" and in part because many of the social and ecological complexities of the territories they controlled simply were not visible to the foreign heads of administration. Projects such as the Suez and Panama Canals, the Gezira irrigation scheme in Sudan, or the Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique demanded massive amounts of labor, drawing tens of thousands of workers into a new economy. In some cases, such as the equally massive agricultural projects undertaken from the late nineteenth century on, labor had to be imported from other colonies in order to make up for an indigenous shortfall. Almost always based on one cash crop, such as tea, sugar, or tobacco, these schemes not only replaced local polycultural growing patterns but also transformed the demography of some colonies, bringing, for instance, Indians to Fiji and Chinese to Malaya (where the new immigrants in both cases came to make up around half the population).

However multiform the structures of the colonial protostates were, their central fact for the colonized was that they were blatantly constructed to represent the interest of the imperial power and, in some cases, the colonists, not those of the colonized peoples themselves. In spite of the advantages sometimes given to the local elites, the colonial state could never be fully *their* state – it represented a foreign power whose local legitimacy continued to be based on force, not on consent. After 1900, when larger numbers of young people from Africa, Asia, or the Caribbean began traveling to the imperial centers – mostly for education – they naturally began contrasting their and their parents' lack of influence at home with the gradual expansion of public participation in government within the imperialist countries. If European workers could have the vote, organize parties, and aspire to political influence, why were they themselves without political rights in their home countries?



Reporting on the wealth and energy of the imperial capitals, many young Third World travelers naturally began suspecting that some of this pan-European exuberance was the result of imperialist exploitation. But they also deplored conditions within their own societies, which they saw as standing in the way of modern progress. One of the founders of the Indonesian nationalist movement, Sutan Sjahrir, wrote in his biography *Out of Exile*:

> For me, the West signifies a forceful, dynamic, and active life. It is a sort of Faust that I admire, and I am convinced that only by a utilization of this dynamism of the West can the East be released from its slavery and subjugation. The West is now teaching the East to regard life as a struggle and a striving, as an active movement to which the concept of tranquility must be subordinated ... Struggle and striving signify a struggle against nature, and that is the essence of the struggle: man's attempt to subdue nature and to rule it by his will.[5]

At the top of the ladder – reached through incessant struggle – were the imperial megalopolises, where all the force and dynamism of imperialism had solidified into a system of power, stability, and permanence. Walking toward London's Hyde Park sometime in the 1920s, the Indian writer Nirad Chaudhury had "an impression of solidity so strong that if I had had a hammer in my hand I should have walked along unconsciously tapping the houses with it, and in a mood of impatience, which endless rows of bricks and stone often generate, I should have involuntarily thought of a battering ram."[6] European expansion, and the ideologies this expansion produced, furnished ideas of transformation and resistance in roughly equal amounts.

Within the colonies themselves resistance against colonial occupation continued from the moment of the invasion up to the end of the colonial empires. After the shock of the first defeats subsided, rebellions and disobedience campaigns were commonplace and increasingly well organized. Already from the mid-nineteenth century onwards the diffusion of technology meant that non-European groups were able to defend themselves better against the imperialists. The problem was often the lack of a *united* resistance – there was a constant possibility that the colonial power could mobilize one ethnic or religious group against another, since Third World contenders for power were always aware of the strategic value of having well-armed foreigners on their side. There was also the divide between the rural and the urban, between indigenous elites and the common people, who often had distinctly different experiences of the colonial process. While for most groups the fight against colonialism was a desperate struggle to avoid being conscripted, plundered, or taxed, and thereby to protect the minimal surplus that for subsistence farmers was

the difference between life and death, many of the elites, as we have seen, slowly began subscribing to the ethos of progress that was inherent in the late colonial project.[7]

These splits in colonial society made what Karl Deutsch refers to as "social mobilization" – the creation of organizations, movements, identities – very difficult, at least until parts of the elites started appealing to legitimacy from below in order to challenge the colonial state. In those Third World countries that avoided formal colonization, the divides were as visible as within the empires themselves, but in these cases the indigenous elites could appeal at least to the toleration of their countrymen in order to better resist colonial aggression. It was probably this toleration that enabled a diverse group of states, such as Japan, Thailand, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia, to begin defensive modernizations that, together with their fighting skills, kept them out of the grasp of the imperialist powers. China in the early twentieth century also came up with the minimum of societal cohesion and military ability to avoid being carved up fully, although the large areas that were under imperialist control in or around the foreign concessions, or in Manchuria, meant that the most populous country on earth was kept in a form of semicolonial status.

While more than half of Asia was under direct colonial rule around 1900, and more than 90 percent of Africa, less than 30 percent of Latin America was formally colonized. In economic terms, however, most of the continent was dominated by European or US capital, in forms that varied from total economic control – as in the case of Central America – to exceptional influence, such as in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia. Although the major South American countries experienced high economic growth in the first part of the twentieth century, their economies and their trade became increasingly bound up with the United States, in ways that gave the US government substantial influence on their politics and the decisions of their governments. For many Latin Americans, resistance against the Giant of the North took the form of anticolonialism, in spite of the lack of a formal empire to resist.

The new imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created a world in which, for the first time, actions taken by the main European states had truly global consequences. As ideas of reform and progress became key parts of the colonial ethos, increasing numbers of local elites were drawn into the protostates that the imperialists were establishing, while the basic political injustice of the colonial projects began appearing in a sharper light than ever before. In part as a response to this contradiction, the late colonial regimes became, as the anthropologist James Scott has pointed out, sites of extensive experiments in social engineering, in many ways similar to the revolutionary



regimes that were to succeed them. The ideology of "welfare colonialism," combined with the authoritarian power inherent in colonial rule, encouraged ambitious schemes to remake Third World societies, both through grand projects and through general policies of resettlement and mechanization.[8]

## The anticolonial revolutions

World War I signified the starting point for the modern resistance movements against colonial rule and semicolonial oppression. The carnage that European powers engaged in on their home turf – and to a lesser extent in the colonies – was observed by large numbers of non-European conscripts (1.4 million from India alone), and undermined any faith they, or the indigenous elites, may have had in European superiority. The Great War was an acute crisis in the colonial system, especially since it came at the end of a period of rampant imperialist expansion, in which some 8.6 million square miles in Africa and Asia had been acquisitioned by Europeans in the name of "progress" and "humanity." No wonder that members of the indigenous elites – often emerging from within the colonial systems – believed that the time had come to build a non-European alternative to imperial rule. With European self-esteem in tatters, these leaders wanted to conquer modernity for themselves.

As during the Cold War, some Third World leaders saw the European war as an opportunity for support from their enemies' enemies. Germany, and later the Soviet Union, stood out as such options, as did – for a short period – the United States, not least because of President Woodrow Wilson's rhetoric about self-determination and democracy. One anticolonial leader whom we have already met, the young M. N. Roy, chided the Americans for not understanding why some supporters of Indian independence opted for an alliance with Germany:

> Germany could be for India what France was for the American colonials. The rebellious colonials of North America addressed themselves to France in their search for help because, in spite of the apparent peace, France was the potential enemy of England. In the present conflict, the Indian people saw in Germany an ally whose interests were identical and in harmony with their own. In the same way as your ancestors sent the Franklin mission to France in order to make an alliance, we have tried to arrive at an agreement with the power that could serve our interests and immediate needs. To blame us for exercising our legitimate right when we proceeded in this way would mean to condemn the conduct of your great patriots, Washington, Jefferson and Adams.[9]

After the Russian revolutions of 1917, and especially after the bitter disappointments many anticolonial leaders felt when the victorious

powers refused to honor the slogans of self-determination at the postwar peace conferences, the new Soviet Union became a focus for Third World attention. Not only did the Bolsheviks condemn colonialism and offer alliances to those who resisted it, but they also showed the way, it was believed, toward a nonexploitative form of modern society. Roy's countryman Jawaharlal Nehru noted in 1919 that

> today the spectre [of Communism] has materialised and is holding the western world in its grip. Russia and Hungary have ended the age-long domination of the capitalist and the owner of property ... Horrible excesses are ascribed to the Bolshevists in Russia ... But if this is so then it is difficult to imagine how millions of human beings should prefer this terror and degradation and should voluntarily labour to bring it into existence ... We are a communal people and when the time comes perhaps some form of communism will be found to suit the genius of the people better than majority rule. Let us prepare for that time and let our leaders give thought to it.[10]

For India and for the Third World at large, Roy and Nehru could symbolize the two main ideological directions of the anticolonial resistance – Communism and nativism (albeit in Nehru's case a nativism tinged, as the years passed, with a remarkable degree of Anglophilia). They are also typical of the generation and background many anticolonial leaders came out of. Born in 1887 and 1889 respectively, Roy and Nehru both came from prominent families within their communities, and from an early age came to think of themselves as leaders of their people.[11]

Mahabhendra Nath Roy first studied in a local English-language school and then at the Bengal Technical Institute in Calcutta.[12] He joined a Bengali revolutionary group at 18 and in 1915 fled abroad to seek German support for Indian independence. From 1916 to 1918 he lived in the United States, where he married a Stanford graduate and began his interest in Marxism. In 1918, claiming police harassment, he left for Mexico, where he cofounded the Mexican Communist Party and became its delegate to the first congress of the Comintern and later – as we have seen – a key operative in the Communist International. For Roy, the key element in the Indian revolution was rapid social change, and he believed strongly that without a socialist revolution, Indian independence would be an empty shell.

Coming from a much wealthier background, Nehru studied at Harrow and at Trinity College, Cambridge, became a lawyer and served in the colonial high court in his home town of Allahabad. In 1918 he joined the Indian National Congress, which he, together with Mahatma Gandhi, formed into the main Indian independence party. Imprisoned several times by the British, Nehru remained an admirer of the Soviet Union, even though he as India's first postindependence prime minister argued



for reform-oriented domestic change and a nonaligned foreign policy. In development policy Nehru was a state-oriented pragmatist who argued that

> [the] idea of unrestricted private enterprise is out of date ... The State has to come in the picture in a big way. We cannot with our limited resources allow people just to go in any direction they like. We have to plan and planning has to include both the public and the private sector, leaving a great deal of room to private enterprise. The Plan is a national plan of all our activities, public or private.

Nativists and Marxists in the resistance movement were divided by their views of their countries' pasts as well as their futures. While the Marxists generally saw little to admire in the precolonial era and – on the whole – blamed the "treason" of indigenous elites for the ease with which the imperialist countries had taken over, the nativists thought their history and, often, their religion, were weapons against colonialism that would also determine their peoples' future direction after the struggle for independence had been won. For most anticolonial leaders, these constructed pasts mirrored their imagined futures. The nativists saw rebuilding the economic, social, and military strength of their countries as the key objective, which could be achieved by honoring indigenous traditions and by strong leadership. The Communists saw the strong state as a product of social revolution and wanted to copy models directly from the only successful noncapitalist power, the Soviet Union.

Both trends of thought were modern, in the sense that their leaders wanted to conquer new technologies and new organizational methods for their own purposes. Even those who saw the word of God as the basic message of liberation – such as the powerful Islamic anticolonial resistance – did not want to return to a society without the material advances that were available to increasing numbers of people within the colonial centers. In many cases, just as in the European and American phases of intense social transition in the nineteenth century, idealized images of the past became a framework for envisioning new and thoroughly modern societies, in which the return to "the roots" (or "the scriptures") showed a new preoccupation with social justice, "national" organization, or racial uniqueness. Ironically, those who worked for a revolution in the colonies were often helped by European "orientalist" images, which sought to impose a "tradition" on colonized societies in order to better separate them from their own supposedly more advanced civilizations. Eventually, these largely imaginary "traditions" could be turned against the oppressors and help the revolutionary movements recruit adherents based on concepts of identity or nation.

The Marxist and nativist labels used here are of course only crude and imprecise pointers to movements that emerged on different continents and among widely varying cultures. While Chinese Marxism had something in common with Marxism, say, in Cuba, there was also much that separated them. Worse, from an analytical point of view the two general trends were often present in the same people at different points in their careers – for instance, Nehru was a Hindu particularist who at Bandung became a spokesman for Third World internationalism, while Roy was a Communist who later became an individualist and a humanist. And, finally, there is the uneasy equilibrium that for generations existed between the opponents of colonialism and its collaborators. Based on their personal position, indigenous leaders often passed from representing the colonial power *vis-à-vis* the colonized to representing their own people *vis-à-vis* the metropolis, or the other way around. Were these people adherents or infiltrators, revolutionaries or counterrevolutionaries? In the colonial situation, ideological or organizational identities were often as fluid and uncertain as the framework for the colonial protostate itself.[13]

Still, declaring oneself a revolutionary took not only considerable personal courage, but also a strong faith in possessing an alternative that one's "people" would choose over the existing colonial reality. In most cases, of course, it was a losing proposition – most revolutionaries in most places of rebellion against an established state (colonial or not) ended up either dead or in prison. What drove them seems, as in most cases of human endeavor, to have been a mix of the push and the pull: witnessing state violence or the repeated humiliation of themselves, relatives, or friends because they belonged to the "wrong" ethnic group or class pushed people into organized opposition. Brutal imperial interventions into the affairs of a Third World country could win even those who admired European culture over to the role of revolutionaries. In convincing a person to confront a mighty state that could do untold damage to oneself, one's family, and one' s community, the sense, as the sociologist Jeff Goodwin has put it, of having *no other way out* must have played a key role. But there was also, as we have seen, the attraction of revolutionary ideologies and the growing understanding, especially after World War I, that local elites could do better than foreigners in solving the many problems that confronted Third World societies.

Combined, these incentives led many leaders born around the turn of the century to turn to revolution as their instrument for changing their countries (and the world). Within a colonial setting, it was almost given that some form of revolutionary change was necessary if colonialism was to be abolished; imperialist control, by its very nature, refuted any



legitimate change of government, and – until after World War II – offered no opportunities for indigenous leaders to rise to the top of the local political leadership. But even in countries that were not colonized – such as China and most of Latin America – the rhetoric of anti-imperialism furnished key ideas and concepts to those who wanted to change their societies and their states. "Since the great call for world revolution, the movement for the liberation of mankind has pressed forward fiercely, and today we must change our old attitudes toward issues that in the past we did not question, toward methods we would not use, and toward so many words we would have been afraid to utter," the 25-year-old schoolteacher Mao Zedong – not yet a Marxist – noted in 1919. "Question the unquestionable," he exhorted his countrymen. "Dare to do the unthinkable. Do not shrink from saying the unutterable. No force can stop a tide such as this."[14]

For the young Ho Chi Minh, three years Mao's senior, the years immediately after World War I were crucial for his future course. Having appealed in vain for US support for democratic freedoms and political autonomy in Vietnam at the Versailles Peace Conference, the 30-year-old photo retoucher living in Paris became bitterly disappointed with Wilsonian diplomacy and turned toward Marxism as a solution to his country's ills.[15] "The hydra of Western capitalism has for some time now been stretching its horrible tentacles toward all corners of the globe, as it finds Europe too restricted a field of action, and the European proletariat insufficient to satisfy its insatiable appetite," Ho explained to the congress of the French Socialist Party at Tours in 1920.[16] Criticizing the French socialists for not doing enough for the liberation of the colonies, Ho voted for the party to join the Communist International, and later became an itinerant agent for the Comintern in many countries in Europe and Asia before leading the Vietminh – the Communist-led Vietnamese resistance movement – in the 1940s.

Like Ho Chi Minh, the Indonesian leader Sukarno spent time in prison for his efforts to liberate his country from colonial rule. At his trial in 1930, Sukarno had explained why he had not become a Marxist. "We are nourishing that fervor for freedom," the 29-year-old Sukarno told his judges, "[but] we promote it not so much through class consciousness ... [as] through an awareness of nationality through nationalism ... In the colonial country it is not primarily the resistance of the laborer to the capitalist or a class conflict which we experience. It is the conflict between black and white, East and West, colonizer and colonized."[17] For a nativist like Sukarno, the "old" values – Islam included – of the new country he wanted to create would also guide the future state after liberation. At his trial, the future Indonesian president's key point of defense was that the best in

Fig. 2 Sukarno the orator: addressing supporters in 1950.

Indonesian traditions were in line with the European values of democracy and liberalism. By putting him on trial, Sukarno argued, the Dutch were judging their own political system more than his revolutionary movement.

As much as in Asia and Africa, Latin American revolutionaries of the interwar period directed their rhetoric against outside forces, and not just against problems in their own societies. The fact that most of their countries were *not* formal colonies contributed to the need to identify a foreign oppressor. For the Nicaraguan revolutionary leader Augusto César Sandino – like Sukarno a nativist, not a Marxist – it was US economic control and its repeated military interventions that were responsible for his country's predicament. In the florid language of Latin American revolution, Sandino declared his willingness to fight US influence to the death (which he eventually achieved in 1934, aged 39, at the hands of the US-supported Somoza dictatorship):

> I am not Mary Magdalene, to beg on bended knee forgiveness from my enemies, the enemies of Nicaragua, because I believe no one on earth has the right to be a demigod. I will await you, standing firmly on my own feet at the head of my patriot soldiers, unconcerned with your number. But remember that when that happens the destruction of your grandeur will shake the Capitol in Washington, and the dome that crowns the famous White House, the den where you plot your crimes, will be reddened with your blood.[18]



The personal experiences of many of those who became leaders of Third World revolutions were formed through long periods in prison or exile. Much of their concept of the organizational methods they wanted to use and the states they wanted to create was formed through reading or through conversations with people far away from their homelands. Their sense of responsibility for their own communities was usually strengthened by the personal sacrifice they had to make and by seeing members of their immediate family or close friends being tortured or killed for the sake of their common cause. In many cases, the feeling of purpose and urgency that such experiences created made Third World revolutionary leaders willing to take great risks on behalf of gaining power or of securing the rapid development of their new states. They believed strongly in their mission, and knew that success, whatever its ultimate cost, would not come cheap.

To many revolutionary leaders, the violence committed against them and their countries by the European powers justified a willingness on their own part to use violence to rid the Third World of foreign domination.[19] The Martiniquan Frantz Fanon, who trained as a psychiatrist before becoming a key supporter of the Algerian liberation struggle, went as far as to argue that "violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect."[20] Fanon's countryman Aimé Césaire also attacked the Europeans' attempts at conquering the moral high ground for the themselves in the conflict with Third World revolutionary movements:

> They talk to me about progress, about "achievements," diseases cured, improved standards of living. I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out. They throw facts at my head, statistics, mileages of roads, canals, and railroad tracks ... I am talking about millions of men torn from their gods, their land, their habits, their life – from life, from the dance, from wisdom ... I am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been cunningly instilled, who have been taught to have an inferiority complex, to tremble, kneel, despair, and behave like flunkeys.[21]

Even those who rejected a socialist revolution and wanted to see forms of capitalist development take hold in their countries – leaders such as Syngman Rhee (born 1875) in Korea, Mustafa Kemal (born 1881) in Turkey, or the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (born 1919) – emphasized the need for their countrymen to shake off their sense of inferiority and build a new self-confidence based both on an understanding of the past achievements of their countries and of the weaknesses in

their past economic, cultural, and political behavior that had led to these countries falling under foreign domination. In terms of the future direction they wanted to take their countries in, these antisocialist nativist leaders were as revolutionary as their socialist or Marxist opponents. Mustafa Kemal – later known as Atatürk (the father of the Turks), the general who headed the first modern and secular Turkish state and who saw the name of his first party, the Young Turks, used the world over as synonymous with a new generation of modernizing elites – argued that in the new Turkey one "should judge the measure of time not according to the lax mentality of past centuries, but in terms of the concepts of [the] speed and movement of our century.

> We shall raise our country to the level of the most prosperous and civilized nations of the world. We shall endow our nation with the broadest means and sources of welfare. We shall raise our national culture above the contemporary level of civilization ... We shall perform greater tasks in a shorter time ... because [we] hold the torch of the positive sciences.[22]

The late colonial era endowed the Third World with a set of profound processes of change that were all carried over into the post-World War II construction of new decolonized countries. First and foremost, it could be said that colonial rule created Third World nationalisms through providing both their subject – the nation – and their primary object – the modern state. Many features of the colonial protostate were to be found in the successor regimes, not least the predilection for big projects, mass mobilization, and the basic concept that continuous economic development is possible and desirable. But while the empires taught local elites to think big, they also left a legacy of warped, one-sided economies, rigid social stratification, and racism. And, as in an evil circle, the effectiveness and legitimacy of the new states that had to deal with these problems were often hampered, more than anything, by their very origins in the colonial system.[23]

### Creating new states

As World War I had helped to create the local resistance movements against colonial rule in the Third World, so World War II helped to destroy the colonial system as such. While it could be argued that much of both the ideological and the economic justification for having colonies had come under pressure in the metropolis during the interwar crisis years, there is little doubt that it was the second war in Europe that destroyed both the will and the ability of European elites to keep their colonial possessions. The processes of decolonization – in some cases,



forced through bloody wars; in others through simple and quick withdrawals – began in the 1940s and lasted up to the 1970s. But already in the immediate postwar years, as the Cold War became the dominant international feature, the *direction* of future developments was becoming increasingly clear: the era of colonial rule in the Third World was quickly coming to a close.

From the perspective of the colonized elites, the fact that the Europeans for a second time in a generation were engaged in fratricidal warfare was yet more proof of their unsuitability to rule others. But at the start of World War II, in addition to the renewed indignities that Europeans were capable of inflicting on themselves, there were also the defeats the Western empires suffered at the hands of Japan – the only non-European power to have developed a strong and independent military force. The fall of Singapore – the citadel of British imperial power – and the subsequent Japanese takeover of all the British, French, American, and Dutch colonial possessions in Southeast Asia in one grand sweep in early 1942, convinced many Asians that European colonialism was on its last leg, whatever the outcome of the war. In spite of the general image of Japan in Asia as a colonial oppressor in the worst style of the Europeans, there were among some nationalists the somewhat naïve idea that Japan would grant independence to the colonies if it won the war against the West. Much more widespread, though, was a certain pride that the Japanese, after all, were Asians too, and that their victories against the Europeans showed what Asian arms, organization, and dedication could achieve. The majority of Asian nationalists, especially of the nativist kind, simply saw the Japanese expansion as another potential ally against the colonial power that oppressed them – in the style of "my enemy's enemy is my friend." When war broke out, the Indian leader Subhas Chandra Bose – prominent in the Indian National Congress alongside Gandhi and Nehru – went first to Germany and then, in 1943, to Japan, where he set up a government-in-exile and raised a 40,000 strong Indian army to fight alongside the Japanese against the British in Burma and eastern India.

Bose died in a plane crash in Taiwan in August 1945, as the Japanese empire itself was coming crashing down under the weight of American military might. But for other Asian nationalists, be they nativist or Marxist, August 1945 – when Japan's power was gone and the European powers seemed unable to resurrect their empires – was the moment of opportunity. Sukarno, who had spent two years in a Dutch jail and more than eight years in exile after his trial, had hailed the Japanese as liberators and promoted himself as their chief adviser on Indonesian affairs. On the 17 August 1945, on the steps of his house in Jakarta, Sukarno




Map 3 Decolonisation in Africa and Asia since 1945.



unilaterally declared Indonesia's independence. Two weeks later, Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam's independence in Hanoi. Ho began by quoting from the 1776 American Declaration of Independence:

> "All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness" ... In a broader sense, this means: all the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and free.[24]

For a Marxist revolutionary, it was a rather surprising performance. But then Ho and all other rebels against the colonial order knew that the only country that could effectively aid their enemies in the postwar period was the United States, which together with the Soviet Union was the main victor of World War II, both in Asia and in Europe.

The main transfers of power from colonial to indigenous rule took place during the first two decades of the Cold War. Both in the cases of Sukarno and Ho Chi Minh, as well as those of numerous other independence leaders, there was no easy walk to freedom – the colonial powers often attempted to come back from the grave to reassert themselves in the immediate postwar era, as we will see in the next chapter. France, the most assimilationist of empires, tried perhaps for that very reason longer than others to cling on to its colonies by force. Already on the very day that France celebrated its own liberation from Germany, 8 May 1945, French forces fired on an independence rally in the town of Setif in Algeria, killing hundreds of civilians.[25] By the time the last French soldiers withdrew from North Africa, in 1962, more than half a million people had been killed, almost all on the Algerian side. In Vietnam, the French had continued to fight against the Vietminh forces up to 1954.

For the Vietnamese, the Algerians, and all others who attacked the colonial system after 1945, the existence of two superpowers, who both were eager to disassociate themselves from European colonialism, opened up new possibilities for aid and support. Very different from the nineteenth-century system of states and from the process of colonial expansion, the Cold War was bipolar to the point of exclusivity, meaning that if one's enemies were supported by *one* superpower, there was always the chance of getting aid from the other. As we will see, the availability of powerful outside backers later became a key element of instability within Third World states – it helped to create lasting rebellions and insurgencies after decolonization. But in those relatively few cases where the road to independence was a long and open war, military aid – most often from the Soviet Union and its allies – became vital during the 1950s and 1960s.

For the great majority of colonized areas, especially in Africa, liberation was a stunningly quick process. In the five years from 1957 to 1962 alone,

twenty-five new states were created, in most cases after only a few years of preparation. Very often the postcolonial elite moved directly into the state that the colonial power had set up; as the historian David Abernethy puts it, government, the shelter the colonists had built, was for the first time available for new occupants.[26] Institutions and practices transferred directly from the metropolis during the colonial era were at the heart of these new states after independence, often with a functioning indigenous bureaucracy inherited from the past, such as in India or in Nigeria. The whole entity that the new leaders were trying to fill with their own content was a colonial construct: its borders, its capital city, its official language. It was from the beginning, as the French sociologist Bertrand Badie has pointed out, an "imported state."

The problem, of course, for the new leaders was their sense that the empires had not only been oppressive and unjust, but that they had failed in bringing the kind of modernity to the Third World that local elites aspired to. The colonial state, which they had inherited, was therefore a symbol of failure to many of them, and constrictive in terms of the new and bold programs that they envisaged. There was also the suspicion – quite correctly held, in some cases – that the colonial bureaucracy still served two masters; that the officials who had been appointed by the old regime served as agents for the political and economic interests of the former metropolis. Since the colonial power often attempted to keep some of its key investments – especially in the exploitation of raw materials – after decolonization, the reconstruction of the functions of the state stood near the top of the priority list of all the new Third World countries.

The main capital on which the postcolonial leaders could bank was the almost boundless enthusiasm of the younger urban generation. "The day of independence," one young Kenyan intellectual recalled, "was unforgettable. When I saw the flag, I broke down crying. This was what we had waited for, what we had fought for, during so many long and hard years. For the first time ever I felt like a complete human being, because from now on we would no longer be ruled by others, but by ourselves only."[27] Few of the supporters of independence had any doubt that in all respects they could do better than the Europeans within their own countries. And many outside observers tended to agree with that conclusion, at least as far as long-term development was concerned, especially in those many new countries where plentiful natural resources could be harvested by a large generation of young people who were willing to work hard under the guidance of the new authorities.

As we have already seen, a reconstructed and powerful state remained the main aim of the postcolonial elites, whatever their political background, during the struggle for independence. The reason for emphasizing



the state was the sense that only through a massive mobilization of manpower and resources could Third World countries break out from what was increasingly, in the 1950s, termed "underdevelopment" – an economic and social situation under which countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were less productive and therefore had less to offer their citizens in material terms than the European countries. "Once freedom is gained," the new leader of the former British colony the Gold Coast, Kwame Nkrumah, told his countrymen, "a greater task comes into view.

> The dependent territories are backward in education, in agriculture, and in industry. The economic independence that should follow and maintain political independence demands every effort from the people, a total mobilisation of brain and manpower resources. What other countries have taken three hundred years or more to achieve, a once dependent territory must try to accomplish in a generation if it is to survive. Unless it is, as it were, "jet-propelled," it will lag behind and thus risk everything for which it has fought.[28]

This "jet propulsion" into modernity that Nkrumah hoped for in the new country he called Ghana turned out to be elusive, not just in West Africa, but all over the Third World. While in 1950 Western Europe's real gross national product per capita was five times greater than that of Africa and Asia, by 1970 – toward the end of the decolonization process – the gap had grown to about 8:1 for Africa and 8.5:1 for Asia.[29] The struggle for development proved an uphill battle for many Third World countries, primarily – it could be argued – because they were forced to compete within an international system that was geared to the interests of the former colonial centers. As a result, Third World leaders found that they would need an ever more intensive effort within their countries to break through what they themselves by the late 1960s had begun referring to as "the development barrier."

As the buoyant optimism of the first years of independence began to wane, many Third World leaders concluded that they needed a more radical approach in order to reach their aims. Within the state, colonial holdovers would have to be replaced as officials by "new" men who were politically trustworthy, while the political leaders would need to get more authority at all levels. And in society at large the state would need to obtain an ever increasing role in organizing production in order to better make use of the scarce resources available. Since the foreign investments that many new Third World governments were hoping for did not generally materialize – often for the very good reason that the new regimes were busy nationalizing the foreign investments that already existed – economic planning often turned toward self-sufficiency and import

substitution. According to Nkrumah, who had learnt much of his political creed from Harold Laski at the London School of Economics,

> Capitalism is too complicated a system for a newly independent nation. Hence the need for a socialistic society. But even a system based on social justice and a democratic constitution may need backing up, during the period following independence, by emergency measures of a authoritarian kind. Without discipline true freedom cannot survive.[30]

A key reason for the radicalization of many Third World regimes in the 1960s was their leaders' discovery of the immense poverty in which most of their countrymen lived. Those who had not spent time in rural base areas during a war for liberation – a Nkrumah, say, compared to a Ho Chi Minh – often discovered the depth of destitution in the countryside when touring the country in their official cars after independence. On the one hand, having spent most of their lives in the cities, in exile, or in prison, they were genuinely shocked by what they saw and felt a need to improve the lot of their countrymen. But social justice was also, for most leaders, a promise built into the decolonization process itself: they had appealed for the support of the peasants in creating a nation, and – at least believing that they had received it – they now needed to deliver on their own promises of a better life for all.

Because of the global distribution of power and because of the Cold War ideological division, there were two hegemonic models of development on offer when the new states were being created. One, symbolized by the United States, promised intensive urban-based growth in both the private and the public sectors, the import of advanced consumer products and the latest technology through joining a global capitalist market, and an alliance with the world's most powerful state. The other, that of the Soviet world, offered politically induced growth through a centralized plan and mass mobilization, with an emphasis on heavy industry, massive infrastructural projects, and the collectivization of agriculture, independent of international markets. The US model was tainted by the association of US capitalism with the capitalism of the colonial oppressors. The Soviet model suffered from the image of the Soviet Union as the "secondary" superpower and from what was often seen as second-rate Soviet products and technology. Both, however, offered a road to high modernity through education, science, and technological progress.

While, as we have seen, Soviet political alliances with Third World countries developed only slowly, the Soviet model of development became increasingly influential as Third World regimes were forced to the left in the first years after independence. The main reasons for the leftward trend was the sense that the Soviet model was more in line with



the state-centered and justice-oriented ideals they themselves had for the development of their new countries, allied with a belief that the Soviet Union was advancing more rapidly than the United States. While the number of Marxist-led states remained a small though growing minority, countries from Zambia to Algeria, and from Syria to Indonesia, were headed by leaders who believed in learning from the Soviet experience. India's Nehru, while battling the Communist Party at home at independence, told a visiting Soviet delegation in 1947 that

> For many years past we have looked with very great interest toward the Soviet Union for many reasons, but more especially because of the tremendous achievements of the Soviet Union during the last quarter of a century or so ... You have been pioneers in many fields and you have transformed the vast tracts of your country before our eyes with a speed that has astonished humanity. Inevitably, when we want to produce great changes in India, we want to learn from your example. We want to know what you have done and how you have done it. Among the many things that you have done is this tremendous flowering of science in the Soviet Union and the application of that science to the betterment of human beings who live in those vast territories.[31]

Science and education were at the heart of the project to build modern states in the Third World, not least since thirty-four of the new chief executives had themselves been trained at universities in the former metropolis.[32] Through government programs, the postcolonial countries went through an education revolution in which the rate of secondary school enrollment more than quadrupled, while higher education figures on average increased more than sevenfold from 1960 to 1990. Even the poorest countries sent thousands of students to study abroad, to the United States, Europe, or the Soviet Union. But in many cases the investment in education seemed not to pay off in terms of economic development, and often highly qualified students returned to low-paid government jobs or to unemployment. While there is no clear direction in terms of the political ideas that this postcolonial generation picked up while abroad – some who trained in Western Europe or the United States returned as Marxists, while quite a few of those who went to the Soviet Union became critical of Soviet Communism – there is a clear connection between radicalization and returning to un- or under-employment at home. Many of the radical regimes of the late 1960s and 1970s, especially in Africa, were fuelled by the visions of disgruntled intellectuals with too much time on their hands.

The building of industry was another great aspiration of the postcolonial regimes, and one where the differences in outcome between different countries was most striking. Already in the 1960s a great gulf had started appearing between the few Third World states that had some existing

domestic industrial and capital base, that targeted and gained access to international markets, and that carried out concerted export-oriented industrial, trade, and technology policies, and the countries that did not. While some East and Southeast Asian economies began to grow fast, the growth in the states that emphasized self-suffiency and import substitution, especially in Africa, was much slower. There are, of course, a whole host of reasons in addition to domestic policy choices why some economies grew faster than others – a few of these causes, such as the availability of US support, depended to a high degree on the Cold War – but the main issue for our purpose is that by the late 1960s there was a growing sense in many Third World countries that the first postcolonial leaders had failed in their development efforts. This argument contributed to increased political instability and, in some cases, to a total rejection of the political institutions that had been set up at independence.

The most contested area of policy making in postcolonial states was generally land reform. The key promise that the elites who led the anticolonial movements had made to the peasants in order to mobilize them for a "national" struggle was their acquisition of land as soon as the struggle had been won. Land reform was therefore both about paying back political debts as much as it was a part of the search for increased productivity, social justice, and alleviation of rural poverty. In many cases, however, the promises turned out to be difficult to keep without disastrous effects for the economy. In North Vietnam, where most farmers with anything more than holdings of a few acres saw their land confiscated in 1955–56, the result was a stream of refugees to the south and a loss of productivity for the Communist government.In Egypt a much more moderate reform instituted in 1952, touching only about 12 percent of arable land, still had significant consequences, because it reduced the commercial output in agriculture by up to 50 percent through abolishing the larger and most productive farms. For most Third World regimes themselves, however, the economic effects were less important than the political: land reform was good, the new leaders thought, because it destroyed "feudalism" while securing support among poor peasants for the new government and the state it was creating.[33]

While it could be argued that most land reforms could have brought a generally beneficial effect over time – at least in those cases where the peasants' pride of ownership had not been destroyed by forms of collectivization and lack of investment – it is more difficult to see much long-term good coming out of the nationalities policies of most new regimes. The fiction that an inclusive "nation" existed within the mostly haphazardly drawn borders created by the colonial powers led to untold misery for those who did not recognize themselves as part of that entity. In Iraq,



Kurds and Shia Muslims found no place within the new Baathist state. In Algeria, the Berbers resisted the Arabification of the postcolonial regime. In Zimbabwe, the minority Ndebele were forced to accept a state based on the interests of the majority people, the Shona.And in Rwanda and Burundi – the most unsuccessful of all states created in the postcolonial Third World – different state- and nation-building projects led to genocidal wars between the main population groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi.

The need to create an effective and integrationist state – which in some cases substituted for the nonexisting "nation" – led many Third World leaders to exacerbate preexisting ethnic tension instead of relieving it. The extension of the reach of the state beyond what was seen in colonial times led to resistance – mostly by peasants – against attacks on their identities and, often, their religions. But for most new regimes this often brutal extension was a necessity for the kind of modernity they wanted. The leaders felt that the odds were against them at independence, because of poor communications, illiteracy, and – as they saw it – colonially induced apathy. They also feared – rightly in some cases – that the imperialist powers would use forms of separatism to destroy their government. Creating a nation was a trial of strength that had to be won. Julius Nyerere, founder of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and first president of independent Tanzania, used to say that while some nations were trying to reach the moon, TANU was still trying to reach the villages.[34]

The battle against the influence that religion had on people's lives was a key postcolonial enterprise. While science and organization were the foundations of the "good" state, "religion" and "tribalism" were the evils of the past. Religion – both in the form of "imported" and "native" forms of belief – was a particularly pernicious enemy, since it competed with the new state for the loyalty of its citizens. Kemal's new Turkish state was aggressively secular, to the point of refusing Muslims the right to wear religious garb outside of mosques and madrasas. For Mao Zedong, his country's religious beliefs were the very symbol of China's backwardness. For the leader of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), Amílcar Cabral, the influence of religion was a question of power – its practices were attempts by feudal and *petit bourgeois* leaders "to reestablish their complete cultural and political domination of the people."[35]

The battle to gain ideological control of one's population was made more difficult by what postcolonial leaders saw as their continued economic dependence on the West through foreign control of the exploitation of raw materials, thorough foreign loans, or through development

aid. In many cases, such as the Congo (minerals), Nicaragua (coffee), or Iran (oil), big European and American companies clung on to the giant profits they were making in extracting the wealth of the Third World, often by trying to buy the political and economic collaboration of the local regimes. Nationalizing these businesses – as often happened – made sense politically, but led far too often to a sharp decline both in productivity and profitability, since Third World states lacked the technological skills and the knowledge of international markets that were needed to make nationalized businesses successful. By the mid-1970s most Third World regimes had become massively indebted to international lending institutions and to corporate banks – countries such as Egypt and Tanzania owed sums well above half of their annual GDP. Since the loans had been taken out by the state, and the state's income was crucial both to jobs and welfare in most Third World countries, many regimes weakened themselves politically by having to siphon off money directly from their budgets to scheduled debt repayments.

During the Cold War the availability of aid from one of the superpowers or their allies was therefore a welcome rescue package for many Third World countries. But very little aid – *none* in the case of the Soviet Union and the United States – came without strings attached. While some Third World leaders became experts in political coat-turning, dependent on where the aid was coming from, most felt that the foreign countries that provided the aid were out to interfere with the domestic and international direction their state moved in. The "experts" that most often came with the aid were resented because they created a social sphere over which the recipient country had little control, even when they came from countries with which the regime had close relations, such as Soviets in Angola or Americans in Iran. Furthermore, the aid packages turned out to be too much of a quick fix for some states, since they delayed the need for Third World leaders to begin questioning their own ideological motives in domestic development or governmental system.

The difficulties in constructing viable states led to increasing political instability in the Third World in the first two postcolonial decades. The opposition to the first postcolonial governments came mainly – though not exclusively – from the Left, and often from Marxist or Marxist-inspired movements. Domestic development problems contributed significantly to the process. Another key reason was the on-going struggle for decolonization in some areas, such as the Portuguese-held territories in Africa, in Zimbabwe, or in South Africa – the internationalism inherent in Marxism appealed to many young people in the postcolonial states. Meanwhile, Vietnamese resistance to US intervention reminded many of their own anticolonial revolutions, and helped make domestic forms of



Western capitalism seem even more unattractive than before. And, for some movements, there was the increasing availability of Soviet support, as Moscow turned its attention to the Third World.

In spite of the obvious causes of dissatisfaction, it would be completely wrong to see the creation of a new generation of Third World revolutionaries as disassociated from the general leftward trend of the 1960s. As historian Jeremi Suri has pointed out, on a global scale the decade saw many different rebellions against established orders, and these rebellions in many cases sought both moral and intellectual sustenance from each other. For African, Asian, and Latin American revolutionaries the general leftist trend among intellectuals in Europe and the United States in the 1960s contributed significantly to convince them of the righteousness of their cause. With the explosion in communications and travel during that decade, the discourses of North and South began to blend, in ways that often took little notice of the social and economic situations the intellectuals operated in. Often, Third World students brought back new and big ideas to their home countries, where they found confirmation of their faith among radical First World voluntary aid workers.

## Bandung and the Nonaligned Movement

For the new Third World states, there were as many problems with finding one's way in international affairs as there were with creating successful domestic development strategies. To begin with, domestic difficulties clearly dominated the policy agenda – very few of these countries had much of a clear foreign policy when they came into being. There were, however, foreign policy orientations and sentiments that had been created during the anticolonial struggle. In some cases these were ideologically based connections with other countries, through politics or culture. In most new states, however, it was more a sense of Third World internationalism that had been created by the colonial enterprise itself (or, in the case of Latin America, the sense of having common problems in confronting the United States). The Barbadian writer George Lamming's 1953 novel *In the Castle of My Skin* shows how someone from his islands, after witnessing anticolonial protests elsewhere in the Caribbean, "starts to think of Little England [Barbados] as a part of some gigantic thing called colonial."[36] If the revolutionaries who had defeated the colonial enterprise were a diverse lot, they at least had in common the problems left behind by the imperialists.

That the new states were offered membership in different forms of organizations set up by the former colonial power, such as the British Commonwealth or the French Union, did little to reduce the overall

sense of Third World solidarity. While the Commonwealth succeeded – after initial difficulties – in creating at least a forum for discussion between the former metropolis and its former colonies, the French version failed, mainly because it was set up in 1946 as a blatant attempt at staving off full-scale decolonization by agreeing only to limited sovereignty. Its successor, the French Community (La Communauté, created with the Fifth Republic in 1958) fell into oblivion during the 1970s, again largely because of French attempts at keeping a right to interfere in the domestic or regional affairs of the former colonies. Some new states – such as Guinea in West Africa and Burma – refused to have anything at all to do with the imperialist powers, within or without the commonwealth-type organizations.

The sense of community among Third World countries was reinforced by attempts by the former colonial masters to get them to choose sides in the Cold War, as British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan did in his famous "Wind of Change" speech in Cape Town in 1960. Most Third World leaders saw such efforts as aimed at diluting their independence, and resisted them vigorously, in spite of their political sympathies. Already in the immediate postwar years some had begun fearing that their countries would become future pawns in the Cold War, as the Tunisian leader Habib Bourguiba made clear in 1946: "North Africa is one of the best [assets] in the eyes of the Anglo-Saxon world: key to the central Mediterranean and an ideal base of operations against a Europe on its way to Bolshevization. It is not therefore for our beautiful eyes that the Anglo-Saxons interest themselves more and more in our fate."[37]

Already in the first part of the twentieth century there had been several attempts at forging international ties between the anticolonial movements – some, as we have seen, through the Comintern, and others through pan-African or pan-Asian conferences.[38] The first pan-African conference was held in London in 1900, and four more were held between 1919 and 1927, with prominent African Americans – such as W. E. B. Du Bois – as key organizers. The fifth pan-African conference, held in Manchester, England, in 1945, had ninety delegates, with twenty-six from all over Africa, including Nkrumah, Hastings Banda (later president of Malawi), and Jomo Kenyatta (later president of Kenya). The conference stressed that the liberation of Africa, of the Caribbean colonies, and of African Americans were part of the same struggle. It also underlined that all African liberation struggles were connected and should be supported collectively by all Africans, until full independence had been gained by colonized territories everywhere. In spite of being held outside Africa, the Manchester conference pointed toward the All-African People's



Conference in Accra in 1958 and the founding of the Organization of African Unity in 1963.

The April 1955 Asian–African conference in Bandung, Indonesia, had its origins in an initiative taken by the leaders of five Asian states – Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka – but during its preparation the conference developed into the biggest and most influential gathering of Third World leaders held during the colonial era. Part of the importance of the Bandung conference was its timing: coming right after the French withdrawal from Indochina and at a time when several African countries seemed headed for independence, the conference caught the moment of greatest hope and expectation in the anticolonial struggle. It also came at a point in the Cold War when the Soviet Union – after Stalin's death and the end of the Korean War – was engaging in a major offensive for peace and *détente*. The latter changes allowed China – a close ally of the Soviets at the time – to participate in the conference alongside leaders whom Mao had earlier denounced as lackeys of imperialism. The new optimism in superpower relations also set part of the agenda for the conference – as Nehru and Sukarno underlined, the countries represented at Bandung, with their population of more than 1.5 billion people, had a responsibility for making the European powers see sense in their relations among themselves.

The African American writer and former Communist Party member Richard Wright was among those who witnessed the opening of the conference.

> I'd no sooner climbed into the press gallery and looked down upon the vast assembly of delegates, many of them clad in their exotic national costumes, than I could sense an important junction of history in the making. In the early and difficult days of the Russian revolution, Lenin had dreamed of a gathering like this, a conglomeration of the world's underdogs, coming to the aid of the hard-pressed Soviets ... [But] from a strictly Stalinist point of view, such a gathering as this was unthinkable, for it was evident that the Communists had no control here ... Every religion under the sun, almost every race on earth, every shade of political opinion, and one and a half thousand million people from 12,606,938 square miles of the earth's surface were represented here.[39]

The image of the torch of civilization being passed to new continents outside Europe was omnipresent among the Third World leaders at Bandung. Nehru, especially, spoke of responsibility and sacrifice in ways that lent as much credence to his years at a British public school as to his new position as India's prime minister.[40] But at the heart of the efforts of the nativist leaders at Bandung lay an attempt to create some form of common ideology which, eventually, could supersede the Cold War system, at least as far as the Third World was concerned. In his great

opening speech at the conference, Sukarno globalized his own aim of integrating nationalism, Islam, and Marxism into a new, moral ideology within Indonesia:

> Perhaps now more than at any other moment in the history of the world, society, government and statesmanship need to be based upon the highest code of morality and ethics. And in political terms, what is the highest code of morality? It is the subordination of everything to the well-being of mankind. But today we are faced with a situation where the well-being of mankind is not always the primary consideration. Many who are in places of high power think, rather, of controlling the world.[41]

The only way, Sukarno claimed, in which morality could be regained within international relations was through the efforts of the Third World, which, having suffered the indignities of colonialism, could understand such aims better than the European societies. But such efforts demanded Third World unity:

> All of us, I am certain, are united by more important things than those which superficially divide us. We are united, for instance, by a common detestation of colonialism in whatever form it appears. We are united by a common detestation of racialism. And we are united by a common determination to preserve and stabilise peace in the world ... Relatively speaking, all of us gathered here today are neighbours. Almost all of us have ties of common experience, the experience of colonialism. Many of us have a common religion. Many of us have common cultural roots. Many of us, the so-called "underdeveloped" nations, have more or less similar economic problems, so that each can profit from the others' experience and help. And I think I may say that we all hold dear the ideals of national independence and freedom. Yes, we have so much in common. And yet we know so little of each other.[42]

But in order for the Third World countries to fulfill their destiny of getting to know each other and thereby putting the world in better shape, avoiding nuclear war between the superpowers was crucial.

> What can we do? We can do much! We can mobilise all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Yes, we! We, the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilise what I have called the *Moral Violence of Nations* in favour of peace. We can demonstrate to the minority of the world which lives on the other continents that we, the majority, are for peace, not war, and that whatever strength we have will always be thrown on to the side of peace.[43]

Finding ways of dealing with the Cold War also dominated the sessions of the Bandung conference. While agreeing that the superpowers were states that in their essence had "sprung from Europe," as one delegate put it, the delegates also understood that both Washington and Moscow were



special forms of European powers, which in both cases ideologically had a troubled relationship to colonialism. In his opening speech, Sukarno quoted Longfellow's poem "Paul Revere's Ride" and his own conviction that the global anticolonial struggle had begun 180 years ago in America.[44] Nehru, on the other hand, resisted attempts by Western-oriented Third World states – led by the Baghdad Pact countries Iraq, Iran, and Turkey – to condemn the Soviet Union for colonialism in Eastern Europe. "However much we may oppose what has happened to countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, it is not colonialism ... It seems to me rather extraordinary that we should discuss nations as such whose people we have recognised in the capacity of sovereign nations and then say that they are colonial territories."[45]

Being forced to spend a great amount of time at the conference dealing with Cold War issues probably pushed the main nativist states closer together in their determination to create principles of nonalignment. The attitude of the Chinese delegation, headed by Premier Zhou Enlai, helped by seeing nonalignment and the revived Communist slogan of peaceful coexistence as highly compatible.[46] Zhou told the conference that

> the Chinese delegation has come here to seek common ground, not to create divergences ... The great majority of Afro-Asian countries and peoples have suffered and are still suffering from the disasters of colonialism. If we unite in order to do away with these sufferings, then it will be very easy for us to achieve mutual understanding and respect.[47]

In a speech to a closed session of the conference, Nehru formulated what to him was the core of the nonalignment principle:

> So far as I am concerned, it does not matter what war takes place: we will not take part in it unless we have to defend ourselves. If I join any of these big groups I lose my identity; I have no identity left, I have no view left ... If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would be the result? The inevitable result would be war. Therefore every step that takes place in reducing that area in the world which may be called the "unaligned area" is a dangerous step and leads to war. It reduces that objectivity, that balance, that outlook which other countries without military might can perhaps exercise.[48]

To the majority of delegates at the Bandung conference the unfinished struggles for liberation formed key parts of their concern. Many of the liberation movements were represented, and, though stopping short of endorsing armed struggle, the meeting called on France to recognize the right of the North African peoples to self-determination and independence. It also called for an end to racial discrimination in South Africa and the implementation of the UN resolutions on Palestine. But the delegates could not agree on much in terms of practical support for those territories that were still under colonial domination.

Neither did the meeting spend much time discussing what "freedom" meant in terms of political rights for the citizens of the countries represented. Instead, Nehru used the poorly developed safeguards for personal liberties within many Third World states as an argument to avoid criticizing the lack of freedom in the socialist countries – "if we examine the state of freedom, the state of individual or national freedom, the state of democratic liberties or democracy itself in the countries represented here, well, I feel many of us are lacking, terribly lacking."[49] Knowing full well the limited legitimacy of many of the governments represented at Bandung, Nehru did not want debates on democracy to overwhelm the fragile unity he and the other organizers had created. It was a move that would return to haunt the nonaligned movement throughout its existence.

The main focus of the conference's final communiqué, passed by the twenty-nine states represented, was on economic and cultural cooperation. There were high hopes that the more technologically advanced Third World countries could help the others reach their development aims, so that dependence on "outside forces" could be reduced. The communiqué particularly stressed Third World cooperation on raw material exports, and recommended, for instance, that "common policies" be adopted on "matters relating to oil" – an initiative that led to the creation of OPEC in 1960. But the main significance of the statement was the ten basic principles listed at the end that were intended to govern the relations between Third World states:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small.
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
6. a. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.
   b. Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
8. Settlement of all international disputes, by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration of judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.
10. Respect for justice and international obligations.[50]



In his final speech at the conference, Nehru appealed to the superpowers to respect the principles of the Bandung declaration and start to formulating similar rules for their own interaction. "We have," the Indian prime minister told his audience,

> this great opportunity, [this] unique opportunity of playing a constructive, peaceful role in the world today in a friendly way. Not that we like everything that happens in the Soviet Union or in America. [But] we should not increase the feeling of dislike and hatred. If you do things in the right manner, people will respond, and you will have good results ... [even though] the results may not be there immediately ... I submit therefore that the policy that this Conference should pursue is that of friendly coexistence.[51]

While inspiring a new sense of closeness among African and Asian countries, the Bandung conference raised grave concerns both in Washington and Moscow. To the Eisenhower administration the meeting symbolized the drift toward the Left among the neutral countries, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles toyed with the idea of a US-sponsored "reverse Bandung" conference, in which the Western-oriented Third World countries would have the upper hand. In all, the Secretary concluded, the newfound ability of Third World countries to act in unison meant that "the scene of the battle between the free world and the Communist world was shifting."[52] In Moscow, Khrushchev welcomed the general political trend of the conference, but many of his key aides worried that too much independent international organizing among Third World leaders could make it more difficult for both the Soviet Union and local Communist parties to gain influence. In other words, while nonalignment was good if it meant breaking away from imperialism, it was bad if it meant the preservation of bourgeois rule –as in the case of the host country, where Sukarno's emphasis on Third World solidarity effectively sidelined the Indonesian Communist Party.[53]

Soviet worries increased in the summer of 1956, when Nehru, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito met at the island of Brioni in the Adriatic.[54] Although Khrushchev was doing his best to woo Tito back into the international Communist movement (from which he had been ejected by Stalin in 1948), the Soviet party chief knew that the Yugoslavs were set on a course that implied both political and ideological independence from Moscow. As one key aide put it, "the idea of having a whole set of Titos running the Third World was not very palatable from the Kremlin's perspective."[55] From a Third World perspective, however, the Brioni meeting was first and foremost a sign of how the personal relationships

between its leaders were developing: when the young Egyptian leader had stopped in New Delhi on his way back from Bandung, he and Nehru had spoken not just of international affairs but also about how to deal with issues of governance and legitimacy. In his account of the meetings, the Indian prime minister had noted, with a tinge of regret, Nasser's question "What exactly was this democracy?

> In most of the Arab countries where there were parliaments and the like, there was complete corruption ... What then was he to do? It was perfectly true that at present the government of Egypt consisted of ten members of the revolutionary group. They could do what they liked, within reason of course, because the army was supporting them. He realised that this was not a satisfactory state of affairs and he would like to change it. But he just did not see what change he could bring about without a reversion to all the evils of the past ... Colonel Nasser thought that as soon as parties came in, they would be bought up by foreign powers and financed by them as they used to be financed previously. Newspapers were similarly financed by foreign powers and also individuals.[56]

One of the big disappointments in the period following Bandung was that so little happened in terms of trade and economic cooperation between Third World countries. In spite of many political attempts by governments to get such exchanges going, there were three main reasons why little came of these efforts. One was the similarity, rather than the complementarity, of most Third World economies. What these countries wanted to import was mostly available in the industrialized countries, not in other Third World states. Second, there was little obtainable credit for trading with other countries in the South, since all the main international banks centered on trade involving the capitalist countries of the North. And, third, governments themselves hindered South–South trade by insisting on barter agreements, so as not to deplete their limited reserves of hard currency. Together these and other factors made economic links between Third World countries have only limited influence on their relations during the Cold War.

Making certain that Third World states had the necessary power to defend themselves against attack and help others liberate their countries became a key issue after the 1956 Suez Crisis, which we will hear more about in the following chapter. Nasser's July decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was already discussed during the Brioni meeting, and although the precipitating event for the timing of his action seems to have been the British and American reversion of an earlier promise to finance the Aswan Dam, there is no doubt that for the Egyptian leadership the takeover of the canal was a matter of nationalist pride. The Egyptians were particularly enraged that the Western decision on the



Aswan Dam came in response to Nasser's weapons' supplies from the Eastern Bloc. The failed British, French, and Israeli invasion that followed the nationalization of the canal further underlined to many Third World leaders the need to be prepared for future imperialist interventions, if need be by seeking weapons from the Soviet Union and its allies.

The Suez intervention also sparked a much more direct Egyptian involvement in the liberation struggles in North Africa in the late 1950s. As historian Matthew Connelly has put it, the Algerian War – in part because of its international dimensions – constituted a "diplomatic revolution," in the dual sense that a liberation movement, the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), became treated as a de facto government by much of the Third World, and that even in Europe the discourse about colonialism and state control began to shift from its previous emphasis on power, rationality, and progress to a new underlining of self-determination and human rights. At a time when the Soviets were doubtful about a direct involvement – both because Moscow did not rate the FLN's chances highly and because of it hoped to woo France in a more neutralist direction in Europe – Ahmed Ben Bella and the other leaders of the FLN found that most of their support came from Egypt and that country's newfound friends among the nonaligned, including Yugoslavia.

By 1960 the war in Algeria had become the primary symbol of Third World unity and, for many Third World leaders, a clear sign that the West was not willing to accept the full liberation of their continents from imperial domination. As Nasser explained to Tito at Brioni, there were always the best areas, the juiciest pieces of Africa and Asia – such as Algeria, Southern Africa, and Malaya – that the imperialists hoped to hang on to. During the 1960s the key task of the newly liberated countries would be to show solidarity with the countries still "imprisoned by imperialism." For leaders such as Nasser, Sukarno, and Nehru the future of the territories still under colonial control was first and foremost an issue for the Third World itself – they would welcome support from elsewhere, but it was Third World solidarity with the local resistance that in the end would force the imperialists out. The theme of solidarity with oppressed peoples also echoed in the younger generation of Europeans, especially among intellectuals and students, who were eager to make up for Europe's colonial past and thought they could do so through identifying themselves with a Third World that seemed new, vigorous, exciting, and socialist. In his preface to Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre saw Europe – through the lens of the Algerian War – as a "fat, pale continent." The future, Sartre argued, belonged to the Third World.[57]

During the 1960s the idea of the Third World as the future – in political and moral, if not economic, terms – linked the European and American "New Left" to the politics of Africa, Asia, and – increasingly – Latin America. Dubbed *tiermondiste* (thirdworldist) in French, the approach did much to internationalize both the liberation struggles and the debates over development. Its primary function, though, was as a mirror for the criticisms that some young Westerners had of their own countries as undemocratic, racist, and elitist. What they particularly were looking for in the Third World was a sense of unity of purpose, of mobilization from below, and – first and foremost – of radical action. The Cold War stability of the countries of the North disgusted them – even the Soviets were criticized for being slow, dull, and very white, especially when it came to their perceived failure in assisting Third World liberation movements effectively enough. The Port Huron statement, issued by the US Students for a Democratic Society in 1962, held up the Third World as an example: "While weapons have accelerated man's opportunity for self-destruction, the counterimpulse to life and creation are superbly manifest in the revolutionary feelings of many Asian, African and Latin American peoples. Against the individual initiative and aspiration, and social sense of organicism characteristic of these upsurges, the American apathy and stalemate stand in embarrassing contrast."[58]

After the new Algerian state was set up in 1962, its capital Algiers became a focus point for Third World radicals and for the African liberation movements, which all set up offices there. In some cases the new Algerian government, under Ben Bella's leadership, also offered weapons and military training facilities to these movements. When FLN troops had marched in victory through their main foreign base in Morocco in 1962, Nelson Mandela had been there to see them. And when those same troops had entered Algiers in triumph, Yasser Arafat had been cheering among the crowd. Both the ANC and al Fatah would later draw significant support from independent Algeria, as would the liberation movements in Angola and Guinea Bissau. Ben Bella became a key spokesman for Third World unity. At the founding meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa in 1963, journalists described his vow to participate in an all-out effort to liberate Africa:

> Pushing his notes aside, pounding the podium with both hands, very pale, the Algerian leader made an impassioned appeal in a breathless voice for aid to the Angolan rebels, reminding the assembly that Algeria's experience showed that only shared sacrifice would force open the gates of freedom. His homage to the Tunisians, Moroccans, and Egyptians who had died for Algeria provoked an emotional response ... I do not think that I have ever had such a profound sense of African unity as when I listened to Ben Bella, tears in his eyes, visibly moved, urge his listeners to rush to the assistance of the men dying south of the equator.[59]



Alongside India, Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana, and Yugoslavia, Algeria became a key member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in Belgrade in 1961 on the principles of self-determination, mutual economic assistance, and neutrality outlined at Bandung. Twenty-five countries participated at the first conference, but by the second head-of-state meeting, in Cairo in 1964, that number had almost doubled.[60] The key political content of the Belgrade meeting was to underline the solidarity of the member states, to warn the superpowers against spreading the Cold War into the Third World, and to appeal to all countries to forego war as a means of settling international disputes. The preamble to its first declaration concluded: "Aware that ideological differences are necessarily a part of the growth of human society, the participating countries consider that peoples and Governments shall refrain from any use of ideologies for the purpose of waging cold war, exercising pressure, or imposing their will."[61] Meeting in Belgrade as the 1961 Berlin Crisis was peaking, all heads of state present sent identical personal letters to Khrushchev and Kennedy, in which they warned against the threat of war and appealed for a peaceful solution. Lecturing the superpowers on the conduct of international relations was a powerful sign that the Third World was coming of age.

In spite of the continued organizational growth of the Non-Aligned Movement, 1962 – the year when Algeria finally won its independence – also saw the beginning of the unraveling of the spirit of Bandung. The Sino-Indian border war was a devastating blow to the Bandung promise of peaceful negotiations, and removed much of the authority India had had as a Gandhian arbiter of international disputes. Its war with another founding member of the NAM, Pakistan, over Kashmir three years later meant that Moscow and Washington had to step in as peace brokers, and that India increasingly leant toward the Soviets for its security needs. The 1967 Middle East crisis was another setback for the nonaligned idea – while Nasser had hoped that Third World solidarity would strengthen his hand, it was Soviet support that he had to fall back on as his armies were crushed by the Israelis. By the end of the 1960s all the initiators of Bandung were gone from the scene; Nehru died in 1964, Sukarno, Ben Bella, and Nkrumah were overthrown in military coups in 1965/66. Nasser died, with his hopes of Arab and Third World unity unfulfilled, in 1970. That same year the NAM finally was able to arrange its third conference, in the Zambian capital Lusaka, but with much of the initial optimism long gone.

By the late 1960s the lack of representativeness and the economic difficulties that produced domestic political instability also frustrated the work that the NAM and the OAU had pledged to do in support of the liberation movements. The leaders of some of these movements, such as the PAIGC's Amílcar Cabral, began claiming that many new regimes were instruments of "neocolonialism"; more preoccupied with their good relationship with European and American bankers and investors than in mobilizing the masses for revolutionary action at home or abroad. In his speech at the deposed Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah's funeral in Guinea in 1972, Cabral cited Nkrumah's work *Neocolonialism – the Last Stage of Imperialism*, published the year before he was overthrown, as evidence of how the father of African nationalism had turned toward Marxism in his later years. "How much of the [army's] successful betrayal of Ghana was linked to questions of class struggle, contradictions in social structure, the role of the Party and ... the armed forces?" Cabral asked.[62] His own answer was clear: these were the links that counted, and Nkrumah – in spite of his heroic stature – had discovered them too late. Only through the instruments of Marxism–Leninism could a new generation of Third World leaders set up states that were truly independent, internationalist, and economically viable.[63]

By the late 1960s much of the wind had left the ideological sails of the Bandung generation's radical nativist elite. Either they had been kicked out by the military forces they themselves had been so eager to establish – such as in Ghana, Indonesia, or Algeria – and replaced by authoritarian and mostly nonideological dictatorships. Or their native forms of socialism had come under pressure from a new and more radical generation with Marxist ideals, such as in Julius Nyerere's Tanzania. In some states, as we will see in later chapters, parts of the military itself was radicalized in a Marxist direction. This turn toward Marxism in some Third World states was possible because of the practical failings of the *tiermondiste* approach (which even so was able to hold out as an ideal in Europe and to a lesser degree in America well into the 1970s) and because Marxist theory was offering exactly those qualities that the person-oriented, charismatic, and amorphous *tiermondisme* was seen as lacking. In the eyes of many in the postindependence generation, Marxism, in its Leninist form, was valuable because it was structured, defined, and first and foremost scientific.

The turn toward Marxism among some Third World elites and within the liberation movements had significant implications for the Cold War. While the Soviet rediscovery of the Third World in the late 1950s and early 1960s had been based on limited but strategically important alliances with nationalist forces, some of the new relations that were developing between Moscow and the Third World from 1970 on were based on a common political theory, and were therefore intended to be more comprehensive and pervasive. The broader ideological developments in the Third World were, of course, not the only background to this turn; as we shall see, the US war in Vietnam and the international effects of the Cuban revolution also played significant roles. But the overall disappointment with the paths chosen by the first postindependence leaders both domestically and internationally was a key reason why so many of the new power holders, especially in Africa, turned toward the Soviet model in the 1970s.

66. Khrushchev speech, 6 January 1961, in Whitney, ed., *Khrushchev Speaks!*, pp. 52–61.

## 3 THE REVOLUTIONARIES: ANTICOLONIAL POLITICS AND TRANSFORMATIONS

1. The total colonial population at the outbreak of World War II was around 800 million (Mary Evelyn Townsend, *European Colonial Expansion Since 1871* [Chicago, IL: J. P. Lippincott, 1941], p. 19).
2. Good surveys of the colonization of Africa and Asia in the nineteenth century are Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), John D. Hargreaves, *West Africa Partitioned* (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1974, 1985), Ronald Oliver and G. N. Sanderson, eds., *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. VI, *From 1870 to 1905* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and Nicholas Tarling's aptly titled *Imperialism in Southeast Asia: A Fleeting Passing Phase* (London: Routledge, 2001). For a superb general overview, see David B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), especially pp. 81–104.
3. Davis also supports the view that the famine conditions made colonial penetration easier in parts of the Third World; see Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño and the Making of the Third World* (London: Verso, 2001), pp. 117–210 for more detail on this argument. The lack of sustained and organized resistance during the first period of colonization is, of course, not the same as a lack of opposition, which in some cases was very successful, such as the Chechen and Maori in the 1840s, the Zulu at Isandlwana (1879), and the Ethiopians at Aduwa (1896).
4. One of these universities is the London School of Economics and Political Science, where I teach. Founded in 1895 to further "education, economics, efficiency, equality, and empire," the LSE today provides plentiful opportunities to mull over the postcolonial situation.
5. Sutan Sjahrir quoted from Abernethy, *Dynamics of Global Dominance*, p. 386.
6. Nirad Chaudhury, *A Passage to England* (London: Macmillan, 1959), p. 19.
7. The British colonial historian Christopher Bayly believes the beginnings of the diffusion of technology to be the cause of the many anticolonial uprisings of the mid-nineteenth century – namely, the Xhosa and Maori wars, as well as major rebellions in China, India, Jamaica, and the Caucasus. (See C. A. Bayly in Robin Winks, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. V, *Historiography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 54–72.
8. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 97.
9. M. N. Roy, "Open Letter to His Excellency Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, 1917," in M. N. Roy, *Selected Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987–), vol. I, p. 25.
10. Nehru, incomplete review of Bertrand Russell's *Roads to Freedom* (1919), quoted from S. Gopal, gen. ed., *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. I (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), pp. 140–144.

11. Samaren Roy, *The Restless Brahmin: The Early Life of M. N. Roy* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1970).
12. His original name was Narendranath Bhattacharya.
13. At the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party in July, at least three out of thirteen delegates were police agents. See vol. I of Chen Yongfa, *Zhongguo gongchan geming qishi nian* (Seventy Years of Chinese Communist Revolution) (Taibei: Lianjing, 1998).
14. Stuart R. Schram, *Mao's Road to Power; Revolutionary Writings, 1912–1949*, vol. I, *The Pre-Marxist Period, 1912–1920* (Armonk, NY: W. E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 318, "Manifesto on the Founding of the Xiang River Review (14 July 1919); original in *Mao Zedong Zaoqi Wengao* (Mao Zedong Youth Manuscripts) (Changsha: Hunan, 1995).
15. To show how fluid the colonial situation was at the beginning of the twentieth century, nine years earlier, on first arriving in France, Ho had sent a letter to the French president requesting admission to a training school for colonial administrators. "I would like to become useful to France in relation to my compatriots," Ho wrote, "and would like at the same time to help them profit from the benefits of instruction" (quoted from Sophie Quinn-Judge, *Ho Chi Minh: The Missing Years* [Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002], p. 32).
16. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
17. *Indonesia Accuses!: Soekarno's Defence Oration in the Political Trial of 1930*, ed., trans., annotated, and introduced by Roger K. Paget (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 78.
18. Political Manifesto, 1 July 1927, quoted from *Sandino without Frontiers: Selected Writings of Augusto César Sandino on Internationalism, Pan-Americanism, and Social Questions*, ed., annotated, and introduced by Karl Bermann (Hampton, VA: Comoita Publishing, 1988), pp. 48–51.
19. The counterexample is, of course, Mahatma Gandhi, who in his *Experiments with Truth*, vol. I (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1927) claimed that "peace will not come out of a clash of arms but out of justice lived and done by unarmed nations in the face of odds."
20. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, preface by Jean-Paul Sartre (1961; New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), p. 73.
21. Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 21–23.
22. Kemal, "Speech on the Tenth Anniversary of the Founding of the Republic," 1 November 1932, on http://www.columbia.edu/cu/tsa/ata/onuncuyil.html.
23. See the excellent summary of the effects of colonialism in Abernethy, *Dynamics of Global Dominance*, pp. 363–386.
24. Ho, Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, 2 September 1945, on http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietdec.htm.
25. Boucif Mekhaled, *Chroniques d'un massacre: 8 mai 1945, Sétif, Guelma, Kherrata* (Paris: Syros, 1995). More than a hundred French colonists were killed in the fighting that followed, while the estimates of Algerian dead vary from more than one thousand up to six or seven thousand. In March 1947 there was a similar anticolonial uprising against French rule in Madagascar, with more than ten thousand dead. See Solofo Randrianja, *Société et luttes anticoloniales à Madagascar: de 1896 à 1946* (Paris: Karthala, 2001).
26. Abernethy, *Dynamics of Global Dominance*, p. 167.
27. Quoted from "Independence," program number 22 in the BBC series *The Story of Africa*, first broadcast in the United Kingdom on 18 January 2002.
28. The US-educated Nkrumah, born in 1909, had spent two years in British prison before steering the Gold Coast through a peaceful decolonization from Britain in 1957. The quote is from his aptly entitled early memoirs, *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (Edinburgh: T. Nelson, 1957), p. x.
29. Abernethy, *Dynamics of Global Dominance*, p. 164.
30. Nkrumah, *Autobiography*, p. x.
31. "Response to the speech of the leader of the Soviet delegation to the Indian Science Congress," 7 January 1947, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, second series, vol. I (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984), pp. 380–381.
32. Abernethy, *Dynamics of Global Dominance*, p. 334.
33. See also James Scott on the Tanzanian example. The land reform strategy was undoubtedly most successful in Taiwan, where the state compensated landlords in bonds that could be used to buy shares in industry and services.
34. See Tom Molony and Kenneth King, eds., *Nyerere: Student, Teacher, Humanist, Statesman* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).
35. Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane Memorial Lecture delivered at Syracuse University, New York, on 20 February 1970; quoted from Amílcar Cabral, *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings* (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 146.
36. Lamming's later work, especially his essay collection *The Pleasures of Exile* (London: Michael Joseph, 1960), examines Caribbean politics, race, and culture in an international context..
37. Quoted from Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 47.
38. In his opening speech at Bandung, Sukarno cited two key precedents: the 1928 Brussels conference and the 1949 consultative meeting in New Delhi.
39. Richard Wright, *The Colour Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference*, foreword by Gunnar Myrdal (London: Dobson, 1956).
40. The prime minister's concern for the state of public facilities during the conference presumably also had something to do with his upbringing. He instructed his ambassador to Indonesia that "we cannot take the slightest risk of lack of adequate arrangements ... we cannot afford to have everything messed up because they [the Indonesians] are sensitive. The harm to Indonesia will be very great indeed if all the world sees that they cannot organise the conference or organise it very badly ... Above all, one fact should be remembered, and this is usually forgotten in Indonesia. This fact is an adequate provision of bathrooms and lavatories, etc. People can do without drawing rooms, but they cannot do without bath rooms and lavatories" (Nehru to B. F. H. B. Tyabji, 20 February 1955, quoted from *Selected Works* second series, vol. XXVIII, p. 99).
41. Sukarno speech, 18 April 1955, quoted from *Let a New Asia and a New Africa Be Born!* (Jakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1955).

42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*
44. "A cry of defiance and not of fear, / A voice in the darkness, a knock at the door, / And a word that shall echo for evermore ..."
45. Speech in the closed session of the Asian–African Conference, Bandung, April 1955, quoted from Nehru, *Selected Works*, second series, vol. XXVIII, p. 100.
46. The term was first used by Lenin in an 18 April 1920 interview with the *New York Evening Journal*: "Our plans in Asia? The same as in Europe: peaceful coexistence with the peoples, with the workers and peasants of all nations."
47. Li Qi et al., comp., *Zhou Enlai nianpu* (Chronology), vol. II (Beijing: Zhongyang wenjian, 1997). See also Xiang Huayuan, *Zhou Enlai chu deng shijie wutai* (Zhou Enlai Begins to Ascend the World Stage) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin, 1999).
48. Speech in the closed session of the Asian–African Conference, Bandung, 22 April 1955, quoted from Nehru, *Selected Works*, second series, vol. XXVIII, p. 108.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
50. Quoted from *Bandung 1955* (Colombo: Government Press, n.d.), pp. 30–31.
51. Speech in the closed session of the Asian–African Conference, Bandung, April 1955, quoted from Nehru, *Selected Works*, second series, vol. XXVIII, p. 124.
52. Quoted from Connelly, *Diplomatic Revolution*, p. 96.
53. Mikhail Kapitsa, former Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister, author's interview, 8 September 1992.
54. For the preparation of this meeting, see record of conversation between Nehru and Kardelj, 5 July 1955, Arkhiv Srbije i Crne Gore (Archives of Serbia and Montenegro; hereafter ASCG), A CK SKJ IX, 42/V-13.
55. Oleg Troianovskii, former Soviet UN ambassador, author's interview, 14 September 1992.
56. Record of conversation between Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1 May 1955, quoted from Nehru, *Selected Works*, second series, vol. XXVIII, p. 219.
57. See James D. LeSueur, *Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics During the Decolonization of Algeria* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).
58. Statement of Students for a Democratic Society, Port Huron, 15 June 1962, on http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html.
59. Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 39.
60. Today the NAM has 116 member states.
61. Declaration of the First Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State, Belgrade, September 1961, on http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm.
62. Cabral, "Speech given on the occasion of the day dedicated to Kwame Nkrumah, 13 May 1972," in *Unity and Struggle*, p. 116. Nkrumah died from cancer in a Bucharest hospital on 27 April 1972.
63. For the clearest statement of the reasons for his own turn towards Marxism, see Cabral, "The Weapon of Theory", speech delivered on behalf of the peoples and nationalist organizations of the Portuguese colonies to the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Havana, 3–12 January 1966) in the plenary session on 6 January, quoted from *Unity and Struggle*, pp. 119–137.



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1. See Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 2001).
2. "NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 14 April 1950, in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), *1950*, vol. I, pp. 237–286.
3. NSC 51, US policy towards Southeast Asia, 1 July 1949, Declassified Documents Reference Service (hereafter DDRS), on http://www.ddrs.psmedia.com.
4. CIA report, "Consequences of Dutch 'Police Action' in Indonesia, 27 January 1949," DDRS.
5. Record of conversation between Acheson and Stikker and van Kleffens, 31 March 1949, in *FRUS, 1949*, vol. IV, pp. 258–261. See also Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–49* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 293.
6. According to the reminiscences of the then coordinator of the State Department working group on Indonesia, Frederick Nolting, "Sukarno was regarded, in those days, rightly or wrongly, as a genuine nationalist – untainted by an education in Moscow, untainted by charges of being a Communist. This changed later on, but in those days he was regarded as a genuine, popular nationalist" (oral history interview with Frederick Nolting, Charlottesville, Virginia, June 1975, by Richard D. McKinzie, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO (hereafter HSTL), p. 7). Nolting later served as US ambassador to Vietnam in 1961–63.
7. Van Oss to Acheson, 4 December 1951, Kuala Lumpur Consulate General, confidential file, 1950–52, Record Group (RG) 84, US National Archives, College Park, MD (hereafter NA-CP).
8. Lutkins to Baldwin, 25 January 1952, Kuala Lumpur Consulate General, confidential file, 1950–52, RG 84, NA-CP. See also Thor-Egil Eide, "Outside the Perimeter? An Inquiry into US–Malayan Relations, 1948–1957," hovedfag dissertation, University of Oslo, 1998.
9. Edward Lansdale, journal no. 17, 24 August 1947, Manila, Lansdale Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA.
10. Bohannan, quoted in Michael McClintock, "Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940–1990," on http://www.statecraft.org/chapter4.html. See also the official US Army history of the operation, Lawrence M. Greenberg, "The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946–1955," on http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/coldwar/huk/huk-fm.htm.