



CRABGRASS FRONTIER

*The Suburbanization
of the United States*

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The Baby Boom and the Age of the Subdivision

What the Blandings wanted . . . was simple enough: a two-story house in quiet, modern good taste, . . . a good-sized living room with a fire place, a dining room, pantry, and kitchen, a small lavatory, four bedrooms and accompanying baths . . . a roomy cellar . . . plenty of closets.

—ERIC HODGINS,

Mr. Blandings Builds His Dream House (1939)

No man who owns his own house and lot can be a Communist. He has too much to do.

—WILLIAM J. LEVITT, 1948

At 7 P.M. (Eastern time) on August 14, 1945, radio stations across the nation interrupted normal programming for President Harry S. Truman's announcement of the surrender of Japan. It was a moment in time that those who experienced it will never forget. World War II was over. Across the nation, Americans gathered to celebrate their victory. In New York City two million people converged on Times Square as though it were New Year's Eve. In smaller cities and towns, the response was no less tumultuous, as spontaneous cheers, horns, sirens, and church bells telegraphed the news to every household and hamlet, convincing even small children that it was a very special day. To the average person, the most important consequence of victory was not the end of shortages, not the restructuring of international boundaries or reparations payments or big power politics, but the survival of husbands and sons. Some women regretted that their first decent-paying, responsible jobs would be taken away by returning veterans. Most, however, felt a collective sigh of relief. Normal family life could resume. The long vigil was over. Their men would be coming home.¹

In truth, the United States was no better prepared for peace than it

had been for war when the German *Wehrmacht* crossed the Polish frontier in the predawn hours of September 1, 1939. For more than five years military necessity had taken priority over consumer goods, and by 1945 almost everyone had a long list of unfilled material wants.

Housing was the area of most pressing need. Through sixteen years of depression and war, the residential construction industry had been dormant, with new home starts averaging less than 100,000 per year. Almost one million people had migrated to defense areas in the early 1940s, but new housing for them was designated as "temporary," in part as an economy move and in part because the real-estate lobby did not want emergency housing converted to permanent use after the war. Meanwhile, the marriage rate, after a decade of decline, had begun a steep rise in 1940, as war became increasingly likely and the possibility of separation added a spur to decision-making. In addition, married servicemen received an additional fifty dollars per month allotment, which went directly to the wives. Soon thereafter, the birth rate began to climb, reaching 22 per 1,000 in 1943, the highest in two decades. Many of the newcomers were "good-bye babies," conceived just before the husbands shipped out, partly because of an absence of birth control, partly because the wife's allotment check would be increased with each child, and partly as a tangible reminder of a father who could not know when, or if, he would return. During the war, government and industry both played up the suburban house to the families of absent servicemen, and between 1941 and 1946 some of the nation's most promising architects published their "dream houses" in a series in the *Ladies' Home Journal*.²

After the war, both the marriage and the birth rates continued at a high level. In individual terms, this rise in family formation coupled with the decline in housing starts meant that there were virtually no homes for sale or apartments for rent at war's end. Continuing a trend begun during the Great Depression, six million families were doubling up with relatives or friends by 1947, and another 500,000 were occupying quonset huts or temporary quarters. Neither figure included families living in substandard dwellings or those in desperate need of more room. In Chicago, 250 former trolley cars were sold as homes. In New York City a newly wed couple set up housekeeping for two days in a department store window in hopes that the publicity would help them find an apartment. In Omaha a newspaper advertisement proposed: "Big Ice Box, 7×17 feet, could be fixed up to live in." In Atlanta the city bought 100 trailers for veterans. In North Dakota surplus grain bins were turned into apartments. In brief, the demand for housing was unprecedented.³

The federal government responded to an immediate need for five mil-

lion new homes by underwriting a vast new construction program. In the decade after the war Congress regularly approved billions of dollars worth of additional mortgage insurance for the Federal Housing Administration. Even more important was the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, which created a Veterans Administration mortgage program similar to that of FHA. This law gave official endorsement and support to the view that the 16 million GI's of World War II should return to civilian life with a home of their own. Also, it accepted the builders' contention that they needed an end to government controls but not to government insurance on their investments in residential construction. According to novelist John Keats, "The real estate boys read the Bill, looked at one another in happy amazement, and the dry, rasping noise they made rubbing their hands together could have been heard as far away as Tawi Tawi."⁴

It is not recorded how far the noise carried, but anyone in the residential construction business had ample reason to rub their hands. The assurance of federal mortgage guarantees—at whatever price the builder set—stimulated an unprecedented building boom. Single-family housing starts spurted from only 114,000 in 1944, to 937,000 in 1946, to 1,183,000 in 1948, and to 1,692,000 in 1950, an all-time high. However, as Barry Checkoway has noted, what distinguished the period was an increase in the number, importance, and size of large builders. Residential construction in the United States had always been highly fragmented in comparison with other industries, and dominated by small and poorly organized house builders who had to subcontract much of the work because their low volume did not justify the hiring of all the craftsmen needed to put up a dwelling. In housing, as in other areas of the economy, World War II was beneficial to large businesses. Whereas before 1945, the typical contractor had put up fewer than five houses per year, by 1959, the median single-family builder put up twenty-two structures. As early as 1949, fully 70 percent of new homes were constructed by only 10 percent of the firms (a percentage that would remain roughly stable for the next three decades), and by 1955 subdivisions accounted for more than three-quarters of all new housing in metropolitan areas.⁵

Viewed from an international perspective, however, the building of homes in the United States remained a small-scale enterprise. In 1969, for example, the percentage of all new units built by builders of more than 500 units per year was only 8.1 percent in the United States, compared with 24 percent in Great Britain and 33 percent in France. World War II, therefore, did not transform the American housing industry as radically as it did that of Europe.⁶

Levittown

The family that had the greatest impact on postwar housing in the United States was Abraham Levitt and his sons, William and Alfred, who ultimately built more than 140,000 houses and turned a cottage industry into a major manufacturing process. They began on a small scale on Long Island in 1929 and concentrated for years on substantial houses in Rockville Center. Increasing their pace in 1934 with a 200-unit subdivision called "Strathmore" in Manhasset, the Levitts continued to focus on the upper-middle class and marketed their tudor-style houses at between \$9,100 and \$18,500. Private commissions and smaller subdivisions carried the firm through the remainder of the prewar period.⁷

In 1941 Levitt and Sons received a government contract for 1,600 (later increased to 2,350) war worker's homes in Norfolk, Virginia. The effort was a nightmare, but the brothers learned how to lay dozens of concrete foundations in a single day and to preassemble uniform walls and roofs. Additional contracts for more federal housing in Portsmouth, Virginia, and for barracks for shipyard workers at Pearl Harbor provided supplemental experience, as did William's service with the Navy Seabees from 1943 to 1945. Thus, the Levitts were among the nation's largest home builders even before construction of the first Levittown.⁸

Returning to Long Island after the war, the Levitts built 2,250 houses in Roslyn in 1946 in the \$17,500 to \$23,500 price range, well beyond the means of the average veteran. In that same year, however, they began the acquisition of 4,000 acres of potato farms in the Town of Hempstead, where they planned the biggest private housing project in American history.⁹

The formula for Island Trees, soon renamed Levittown, was simple. After bulldozing the land and removing the trees, trucks carefully dropped off building materials at precise 60-foot intervals. Each house was built on a concrete slab (no cellar); the floors were of asphalt and the walls of composition rock-board. Plywood replaced $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch strip lap, $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch double lap was changed to $\frac{3}{8}$ -inch for roofing, and the horse and scoop were replaced by the bulldozer. New power hand tools like saws, routers, and nailers helped increase worker productivity. Freight cars loaded with lumber went directly into a cutting yard where one man cut parts for ten houses in one day.

The construction process itself was divided into twenty-seven distinct steps—beginning with laying the foundation and ending with a clean sweep of the new home. Crews were trained to do one job—one day the white-paint men, then the red-paint men, then the tile layers. Every possible part, and especially the most difficult ones, were preassembled in

central shops, whereas most builders did it on site. Thus, the Levitts reduced the skilled component to 20–40 percent. The five-day work week was standard, but they were the five days during which building was possible; Saturday and Sunday were considered to be the days when it rained. In the process, the Levitts defied unions and union work rules (against spray painting, for example) and insisted that subcontractors work only for them. Vertical integration also meant that the firm made its own concrete, grew its own timber, and cut its own lumber. It also bought all appliances from wholly owned subsidiaries. More than thirty houses went up each day at the peak of production.¹⁰

Initially limited to veterans, this first “Levittown” was twenty-five miles east of Manhattan and particularly attractive to new families that had been formed during and just after the war. Squashed in with their in-laws or in tiny apartments where landlords frowned on children, the GI’s looked upon Levittown as the answer to their most pressing need. Months before the first three hundred Levitt houses were occupied in October 1947, customers stood in line for the four-room Cape Cod box renting at sixty dollars per month. The first eighteen hundred houses were initially available only for rental, with an option to buy after a year’s residence. Because the total for mortgage, interest, principal, and taxes was less than the rent, almost everyone bought; after 1949 all units were for sale only. So many of the purchasers were young families that the first issue of *Island Trees*, the community newspaper, opined that “our lives are held closely together because most of us are within the same age bracket, in similar income groups, live in almost identical houses and have common problems.”¹¹ And so many babies were born to them that the suburb came to be known as “Fertility Valley” and “The Rabbit Hutch.”

Ultimately encompassing more than 17,400 separate houses and 82,000 residents, Levittown was the largest housing development ever put up by a single builder, and it served the American dream-house market at close to the lowest prices the industry could attain. The typical Cape Cod was down-to-earth and unpretentious; the intention was not to stir the imagination, but to provide the best shelter at the least price. Each dwelling included a twelve-by-sixteen-foot living-room with a fireplace, one bath, and two bedrooms (about 750 square feet), with easy expansion possibilities upstairs in the unfinished attic or outward into the yard. Most importantly, the floor plan was practical and well-designed, with the kitchen moved to the front of the house near the entrance so that mothers could watch their children from kitchen windows and do their washing and cooking with a minimum of movement. Similarly, the living room was placed in the rear and given a picture window overlooking

the back yard. This early Levitt house was as basic to post World War II suburban development as the Model T had been to the automobile. In each case, the actual design features were less important than the fact that they were mass-produced and thus priced within the reach of the middle class.¹²

William Jaird Levitt, who assumed primary operating responsibility for the firm soon after the war, disposed of houses as quickly as other men disposed of cars. Pricing his Cape Cods at \$7,990 (the earliest models went for \$6,990) and his ranches at \$9,500, he promised no down payment, no closing costs, and "no hidden extras." With FHA and VA "production advances," Levitt boasted the largest line of credit ever offered a private home builder. He simplified the paperwork required for purchase and reduced the entire financing and titling transaction to two half-hour steps. His full-page advertisements offered a sweetener to eliminate lingering resistance—a Bendix washer was included in the purchase price. Other inducements included an eight-inch television set (for which the family would pay for the next thirty years). So efficient was the operation that *Harper's Magazine* reported in 1948 that Levitt undersold his nearest competition by \$1,500 and still made a \$1,000 profit on each house. As *New York Times'* architecture critic Paul Goldberger has noted, "Levittown houses were social creations more than architectural ones—they turned the detached, single-family house from a distant dream to a real possibility for thousands of middle-class American families."¹³

Buyers received more than shelter for their money. When the initial families arrived with their baby strollers and play pens, there were no trees, schools, churches, or private telephones. Grocery shopping was a planned adventure, and picking up the mail required sloshing through the mud to Hicksville. The Levitts planted apple, cherry, and evergreen trees on each plot, however, and the development ultimately assumed a more parklike appearance. To facilitate development as a garden community, streets were curvilinear (and invariably called "roads" or "lanes"), and through traffic was shunted to peripheral thoroughfares. Nine swimming pools, sixty playgrounds, ten baseball diamonds, and seven "village greens" provided open space and recreational opportunities. The Levitts forbade fences (a practice later ignored) and permitted outdoor clothes drying only on specially designed, collapsible racks. They even supervised lawn-cutting for the first few years—doing the jobs themselves if necessary and sending the laggard families the bill.¹⁴

Architectural critics, many of whom were unaccustomed to the tastes or resources of moderate-income people, were generally unimpressed by the repetitious houses on 60-by-100-foot "cookie cutter lots" and re-

ferred to Levittown as “‘degraded in conception and impoverished in form.’” From the Wantagh Parkway, the town stretched away to the east as far as the eye could see, house after identical house, a horizon broken only by telephone poles. Paul Goldberger, who admired the individual designs, thought that the whole was “an urban planning disaster,” while Lewis Mumford complained that Levittown’s narrow range of house type and income range resulted in a one-class community and a backward design. He noted that the Levitts used “new-fashioned methods to compound old-fashioned mistakes.”¹⁵

But Levittown was a huge popular success where it counted—in the marketplace. On a single day in March 1949, fourteen hundred contracts were drawn, some with families that had been in line for four days. “I truly loved it,” recalled one early resident. “When they built the Village Green, our big event was walking down there for ice cream.”¹⁶

In the 1950s the Levitts shifted their attention from Long Island to an equally large project near Philadelphia. Located on former broccoli and spinach farms in lower Bucks County, Pennsylvania, this new Levittown was built within a few miles of the new Fairless Works of the United States Steel Corporation, where the largest percentage of the community’s residents were employed. It was composed on eight master blocks, each of about one square mile and focusing on its own recreational facilities. Totaling about 16,000 homes when completed late in the decade, the town included light industry and a big, 55-acre shopping center. According to Levitt, “We planned every foot of it—every store, filling station, school, house, apartment, church, color, tree, and shrub.”¹⁷

In the 1960s, the Levitt forces shifted once again, this time to Willingboro, New Jersey, where a third Levittown was constructed within distant commuting range of Philadelphia. This last town was the focus of Herbert Gans’s well-known account of *The Levittowners*. The Cape Cod remained the basic style, but Levitt improved the older models to resemble more closely the pseudo-colonial design that was so popular in the Northeast.¹⁸

If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then William Levitt has been much honored in the past forty years.¹⁹ His replacement of basement foundations with the radiantly heated concrete slab was being widely copied as early as 1950. Levitt did not actually pioneer many of the mass-production techniques—the use of plywood, particle board, and gypsum board, as well as power hand tools like saws, routers, and nailers, for example—but his developments were so widely publicized that in every large metropolitan area, large builders appeared who adopted similar methods—Joseph Kelly in Boston, Frank White in Portland, Louis H. Boyar and Fritz B. Burns in Los Angeles, Del Webb in Phoenix, Wil-

liam G. Farrington in Houston, Franklin L. Burns in Denver, Wallace E. Johnson in Memphis, Ray Ellison in San Antonio, Maurice Fishman in Cleveland, Waverly Taylor in Washington, Irving Blietz and Phillip Klutznick in Chicago, John Mowbray in Baltimore, and Carl Gellert and Ellie Stoneman in San Francisco, to name just the more well-known builders.²⁰

FHA and VA programs made possible the financing of their immense developments. Title VI of the National Housing Act of 1934 allowed a builder to insure 90 percent of the mortgage of a house costing up to nine thousand dollars. Most importantly, an ambitious entrepreneur could get an FHA "commitment" to insure the mortgage, and then use that "commitment" to sign himself up as a temporary mortgagor. The mortgage lender (a bank of savings and loan institution) would then make "production advances" to the contractor as the work progressed, so that the builder needed to invest very little of his own hard cash. Previously, even the largest builders could not bring together the capital to undertake thousand-house developments. FHA alone insured three thousand houses in Henry J. Kaiser's Panorama City, California; five thousand in Frank Sharp's Oak Forest; and eight thousand in Klutznick's Park Forest project.²¹

Characteristics of Postwar Suburbs

However financed and by whomever built, the new subdivisions that were typical of American urban development between 1945 and 1973 tended to share five common characteristics. The first was peripheral location. A Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of home building in 1946–1947 in six metropolitan regions determined that the suburbs accounted for at least 62 percent of construction. By 1950 the national suburban growth rate was ten times that of central cities, and in 1954 the editors of *Fortune* estimated that 9 million people had moved to the suburbs in the previous decade. The inner cities did have some empty lots—serviced by sewers, electrical connections, gas lines, and streets—available for development. But the filling-in process was not amenable to mass production techniques, and it satisfied neither the economic nor the psychological temper of the times.²²

The few new neighborhoods that were located within the boundaries of major cities tended also to be on the open land at the edges of the built-up sections. In New York City, the only area in the 1946–1947 study where city construction was greater than that of the suburbs, the big growth was on the outer edges of Queens, a borough that had been largely un-

developed in 1945. In Memphis new development moved east out Summer, Poplar, Walnut Grove, and Park Avenues, where FHA and VA subdivisions advertised "No Down Payment" or "One Dollar Down" on giant billboards. In Los Angeles the fastest-growing American city in the immediate postwar period, the area of rapid building focused on the San Fernando Valley, a vast space that had remained largely vacant since its annexation to the city in 1915. In Philadelphia thousands of new houses were put up in farming areas that had legally been part of the city since 1854, but which in fact had functioned as agricultural settlements for generations.

The second major characteristic of the postwar suburbs was their relatively low density. In all except the most isolated instances, the row house completely lost favor; between 1946 and 1956, about 97 percent of all new single-family dwellings were completely detached, surrounded on every side by their own plots. Typical lot sizes were relatively uniform around the country, averaging between $\frac{1}{5}$ (80 by 100 feet) and $\frac{1}{10}$ (40 by 100 feet) of an acre and varying more with distance from the center than by region. Moreover, the new subdivisions allotted a higher proportion of their land area to streets and open spaces. Levittown, Long Island, for example, was settled at a density of 10,500 per square mile, which was about average for postwar suburbs but less than half as dense as the streetcar suburbs of a half-century earlier. This design of new neighborhoods on the assumption that residents would have automobiles meant that those without cars faced severe handicaps in access to jobs and shopping facilities.²³

This low-density pattern was in marked contrast with Europe. In war-ravaged countries east of the Rhine River, the concentration upon apartment buildings can be explained by the overriding necessity to provide shelter quickly for masses of displaced and homeless people. But in comparatively unscathed France, Denmark, and Spain, the single-family house was also a rarity. In Sweden, Stockholm committed itself to a suburban pattern along subway lines, a decision that implied a high-density residential pattern. Nowhere in Europe was there the land, the money, or the tradition for single-family home construction.²⁴

The third major characteristic of the postwar suburbs was their architectural similarity. A few custom homes were built for the rich, and mobile homes gained popularity with the poor and the transient, but for most American families in search of a new place to live some form of tract house was the most likely option. In order to simplify their production methods and reduce design fees, most of the larger developers offered no more than a half-dozen basic house plans, and some offered half that number. The result was a monotony and repetition that was

especially stark in the early years of the subdivision, before the individual owners had transformed their homes and yards according to personal taste.

But the architectural similarity extended beyond the particular tract to the nation as a whole. Historically, each region of the country had developed an indigenous residential style—the colonial-style homes of New England, the row houses of Atlantic coastal cities, the famous Charleston town houses with their ends to the street, the raised plantation homes of the damp bayou country of Louisiana, and the encircled patios and massive walls of the Southwest. This regionalism of design extended to relatively small areas; early in the twentieth century a house on the South Carolina coast looked quite different from a house in the Piedmont a few hundred miles away.

This tradition began eroding after World War I, when the American dream house became, as already noted, the Cape Cod cottage, a quaint one-and-a-half-story dwelling. This design remained popular into the post World War II years, when Levittown featured it as a bargain for veterans. In subsequent years, one fad after another became the rage. First, it was the split-level, then the ranch, then the modified colonial. In each case, the style tended to find support throughout the continent, so that by the 1960s the casual suburban visitor would have a difficult time deciphering whether she was in the environs of Boston or Dallas.

The ranch style, in particular, was evocative of the expansive mood of the post-World War II suburbs and of the disappearing regionality of style. It was almost as popular in Westchester County as in Los Angeles County. Remotely derived from the adobe dwellings of the Spanish colonial tradition and more directly derived from the famed prairie houses of Frank Lloyd Wright, with their low-pitched roofs, deep eaves, and pronounced horizontal lines, the typical ranch style houses of the 1950s were no larger than the average home a generation earlier. But the one-level ranch house suggested spacious living and an easy relationship with the outdoors. Mothers with small children did not have to contend with stairs. Most importantly, the postwar ranch home represented newness. In 1945 the publisher of the *Saturday Evening Post* reported that only 14 percent of the population wanted to live in an apartment or a “used” house. Whatever the style, the post-World War II house, in contrast to its turn-of-the-century predecessor, had no hall, no parlor, no stairs, and no porch. And the portion of the structure that projected farthest toward the street was the garage.²⁵

The fourth characteristic of post-World War II housing was its easy availability and thus its reduced suggestion of wealth. To be sure, upper-income suburbs and developments sprouted across the land, and some

set high standards of style and design. Typically, they offered expansive lots, spacious and individualized designs, and affluent neighbors. But the most important income development of the period was the lowering of the threshold of purchase. At every previous time in American history, and indeed for the 1980s as well, the successful acquisition of a family home required savings and effort of a major order. After World War II, however, because of mass-production techniques, government financing, high wages, and low interest rates, it was quite simply cheaper to buy new housing in the suburbs than it was to reinvest in central city properties or to rent at the market price.²⁶

The fifth and perhaps most important characteristic of the postwar suburb was economic and racial homogeneity. The sorting out of families by income and color began even before the Civil war and was stimulated by the growth of the factory system. This pattern was noticeable in both the exclusive Main Line suburbs of Philadelphia and New York and in the more bourgeois streetcar developments which were part of every city. The automobile accentuated this discriminatory "Jim Crow" pattern. In Atlanta where large numbers of whites flocked to the fast-growing and wealthy suburbs north of the city in the 1920s, Howard L. Preston has reported that: "By 1930, if racism could be measured in miles and minutes, blacks and whites were more segregated in the city of Atlanta than ever before." But many pre-1930 suburbs—places like Greenwich, Connecticut; Englewood, New Jersey; Evanston, Illinois; and Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts—maintained an exclusive image despite the presence of low-income or minority groups living in slums near or within the community.²⁷

The post-1945 developments took place against a background of the decline of factory-dominated cities. What was unusual in the new circumstances was not the presence of discrimination—Jews and Catholics as well as blacks had been excluded from certain neighborhoods for generations—but the thoroughness of the physical separation which it entailed. The Levitt organization, which was no more culpable in this regard than any other urban or suburban firm, publically and officially refused to sell to blacks for two decades after the war. Nor did resellers deal with minorities. As William Levitt explained, "We can solve a housing problem, or we can try to solve a racial problem. But we cannot combine the two." Not surprisingly, in 1960 not a single one of the Long Island Levittown's 82,000 residents was black.²⁸

The economic and age homogeneity of large subdivisions and sometimes entire suburbs was almost as complete as the racial distinction. Although this tendency had been present even in the nineteenth century, the introduction of zoning—beginning with a New York City ordinance

in 1916—served the general purpose of preserving residential class segregation and property values. In theory zoning was designed to protect the interests of all citizens by limiting land speculation and congestion. And it was popular. Although it represented an extraordinary growth of municipal power, nearly everyone supported zoning. By 1926 seventy-six cities had adopted ordinances similar to that of New York. By 1936, 1,322 cities (85 percent of the total) had them, and zoning laws were affecting more property than all national laws relating to business.

In actuality zoning was a device to keep poor people and obnoxious industries out of affluent areas. And in time, it also became a cudgel used by suburban areas to whack the central city. Advocates of land-use restrictions in overwhelming proportion were residents of the fringe. They sought through minimum lot and set-back requirements to insure that only members of acceptable social classes could settle in their privileged sanctuaries. Southern cities even used zoning to enforce racial segregation. And in suburbs everywhere, North and South, zoning was used by the people who already lived within the arbitrary boundaries of a community as a method of keeping everyone else out. Apartments, factories, and "blight," euphemisms for blacks and people of limited means, were rigidly excluded.

While zoning provided a way for suburban areas to become secure enclaves for the well-to-do, it forced the city to provide economic facilities for the whole area and homes for people the suburbs refused to admit. Simply put, land-use restrictions tended to protect residential interests in the suburbs and commercial interests in the cities because the residents of the core usually lived on land owned by absentee landlords who were more interested in financial returns than neighborhood preferences. For the man who owned land but did not live on it, the ideal situation was to have his parcel of earth zoned for commercial or industrial use. With more options, the property often gained in value. In Chicago, for example, three times as much land was zoned for commercial use as could ever have been profitably employed for such purposes. This overzoning prevented inner-city residents from receiving the same protection from commercial incursions as was afforded suburbanites. Instead of becoming a useful tool for the rational ordering of land in metropolitan areas, zoning became a way for suburbs to pirate from the city only its desirable functions and residents. Suburban governments became like so many residential hotels, fighting for the upper-income trade while trying to force the deadbeats to go elsewhere.

Because zoning restrictions typically excluded all apartments and houses and lots of less than a certain number of square feet, new home purchasers were often from a similar income and social group. In this re-

gard, the postwar suburbs were no different from many nineteenth-century neighborhoods when they were first built. Moreover, Levittown was originally a mix of young professionals and lower-middle-class blue-collar workers.

As the aspiring professionals moved out, however, Levittowns became a community of the most class-stratifying sort possible.²⁹ This phenomenon was the subject of one of the most important books of the 1950s. Focusing on a 2,400-acre project put up by the former Public Housing Administrator Phillip Klutznick, William H. Whyte's *The Organization Man* sent shudders through armchair sociologists. Although Whyte found that Park Forest, Illinois, offered its residents "leadership training" and an "ability to chew on real problems," the basic portrait was unflattering. Reporting excessive conformity and a mindless conservatism, he showed Park Foresters to be almost interchangeable as they fought their way up the corporate ladder, and his "organization man" stereotype unfortunately became the norm for judging similar communities throughout the nation.

By 1961, when President John F. Kennedy proclaimed his New Frontier and challenged Americans to send a man to the moon within the decade, his countrymen had already remade the nation's metropolitan areas in the short space of sixteen years. From Boston to Los Angeles, vast new subdivisions and virtually new towns sprawled where a generation earlier nature had held sway. In an era of low inflation, plentiful energy, federal subsidies, and expansive optimism, Americans showed the way to a more abundant and more perfect lifestyle. Almost every contractor-built, post-World War II home had central heating, indoor plumbing, telephones, automatic stoves, refrigerators, and washing machines.

There was a darker side to the outward movement. By making it possible for young couples to have separate households of their own, abundance further weakened the extended family in America and ordained that most children would grow up in intimate contact only with their parents and siblings. The housing arrangements of the new prosperity were evident as early as 1950. In that year there were 45,983,000 dwelling units to accommodate the 38,310,000 families in the United States and 84 percent of American households reported less than one person per room.

Critics regarded the peripheral environment as devastating particularly to women and children. The suburban world was a female world, especially during the day. Betty Friedan's 1968 classic *The Feminine Mystique* challenged the notion that the American dream home was emo-

tionally fulfilling for women. As Gwendolyn Wright has observed, their isolation from work opportunities and from contact with employed adults led to stifled frustration and deep psychological problems. Similarly, Sidonie M. Gruenberg warned in the *New York Times Magazine* that "Mass produced, standardized housing breeds standardized individuals, too—especially among youngsters." Offering neither the urbanity and sophistication of the city nor the tranquility and repose of the farm, the suburb came to be regarded less as an intelligent compromise than a cultural, economic, and emotional wasteland. No observer was more critical than Lewis Mumford, however. In his 1961 analysis of *The City in History*, which covered the entire sweep of civilization, the famed author reiterated sentiments he had first expressed more than four decades earlier and scorned the new developments which were surrounding every American city:

In the mass movement into suburban areas a new kind of community was produced, which caricatured both the historic city and the archetypal suburban refuge: a multitude of uniform, unidentifiable houses, lined up inflexibly, at uniform distances, on uniform roads, in a treeless communal waste, inhabited by people of the same class, the same income, the same age group, witnessing the same television performances, eating the same tasteless pre-fabricated foods, from the same freezers, conforming in every outward and inward respect to a common mold, manufactured in the central metropolis. thus, the ultimate effect of the suburban escape in our own time is, ironically, a low-grade uniform environment from which escape is impossible.³⁰

Secondly, because the federally supported home-building boom was of such enormous proportions, the new houses of the suburbs were a major cause of the decline of central cities. Because FHA and VA terms for new construction were so favorable as to make the suburbs accessible to almost all white, middle-income families, the inner-city housing market was deprived of the purchasers who could perhaps have supplied an appropriate demand for the evacuated neighborhoods.³¹

The young families who joyously moved into the new homes of the suburbs were not terribly concerned about the problems of the inner-city housing market or the snobbish views of Lewis Mumford and other social critics. They were concerned about their hopes and their dreams. There were looking for good schools, private space, and personal safety, and places like Levittown could provide those amenities on a scale and at a price that crowded city neighborhoods, both in the Old World and in the new, could not match. The single-family tract house—post-World War II style—whatever its aesthetic failings, offered growing families a private haven in a heartless world. If the dream did not include minori-

ties or the elderly, if it was accompanied by the isolation of nuclear families, by the decline of public transportation, and by the deterioration of urban neighborhoods, the creation of good, inexpensive suburban housing on an unprecedented scale was a unique achievement in the world.

ing approval in a public referendum before subsidized housing could be built in a community.

22. Bauman, "Safe and Sanitary," 116-25.

23. Quoted in Fisher, *Twenty Years of Public Housing*, 96.

24. For the legislative background of the Housing Act of 1949, see Mark I. Gelfand, *A Nation of Cities: The Federal Government and Urban America, 1933-1965* (New York, 1975), 105-56.

25. *Congressional Record*, April 21, 1949, 4840-52.

26. Between 1969 and 1974, President Richard M. Nixon frequently affirmed that he would not use financial leverage to compel suburbs to accept low-income housing projects against their wishes.

27. When New York's civil rights-minded Mayor John V. Lindsay attempted to force a public housing project on middle-class Forest Hills in Queens, a huge rhubarb resulted. Even though a compromise was reached, the project did result in an accelerated white flight to the suburbs. Thomas M. Gray, "Daley News: Chicago's Public Housing Fiasco," *The New Republic* CLXIV (April 3, 1971), 17. See also, *New York Times*, October 1, 1973 and April 16, 1976.

28. Interviews with black youths who defined the ghetto as the projects were conducted in conjunction with the exhibit, "Ruins and Revivals: The Architecture of Urban Devastation," by Camilo J. Vergara and Kenneth T. Jackson, which opened at the Municipal Art Society in New York in September, 1983.

29. The negative results of these huge public housing concentrations were analyzed by Oscar Newman, *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design* (New York, 1973).

30. Application H-163, letter of Henry B. Immel, Mail and Files Division, Public Works Administration, Record Group 196, National Archives.

31. Chester Hartman, "The Limitations of Public Housing," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, XXIX (November 1963), 283-85.

CHAPTER 13: *Sewers, Services, and Schools*

1. I use the term "men" because in World War II the armed forces were overwhelmingly male.

2. The best study of this phenomenon is Barry Checkoway, "The Politics of Postwar Suburban Development" (Childhood and Government Project Working Paper #13, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, 1977).

3. Mark I. Gelfand, "Cities, Suburbs and Government Policy," in Robert H. Bremner and Gary W. Reichard, eds., *Reshaping America: Society and Institutions, 1945-1960* (Columbus, Oh., 1982), 112-38.

4. John Keats, *The Crack in the Picture Window* (Boston, 1956). See also, Edward P. Eichler and Marshall Kaplan, *The Community Builders* (Berkeley, 1967).

5. In 1942 the National Housing Agency was set up to centralize government efforts to provide wartime shelter. Of the nine million persons who migrated to arms factories, about half were taken care of by the "Share Your Home" program. Only 1,206,000 permanent units were added to the American housing inventory during the conflict. National Housing Agency, *Fourth Annual Report* (Washington, 1946), 2-3, 26-27. See also, Barry Checkoway, "Large Builders, Federal Housing Programs, and Postwar Suburbanization," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, IV (1980), 21-44.

6. The best analysis of this question is Mark Alan Willis, "The Effects of Cyclical Demand on Industry Structure and on the Rate of Technological Change: An International Comparison of the Housebuilding Sectors in the United States, Great Britain, and France" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1979). See also, *Fortune*, CII (November 3, 1980), 15.

7. There is no biography of William Levitt or his company. The best study is John T. Liell, "Levittown: A Study in Community Development and Planning" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1952), which was based on questionnaires sent to every sixth person, supplemented by interviews. An objective look at Levittown as a sociological phenomenon in transition is William M. Dobrin, *Class in Suburbia*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963). See also, Joseph M. Guilfoyle and J. Howard Rutledge, "Levitt Licks the Housing Shortage," *Coronet*, September 1948, 112-16; "Levitt Delivers \$6,990 House," *American Builder*, June 1947, 96-97; Harold L. Wattel, "Levittown: A Suburban Community," in William M. Dobrin, ed., *The Suburban Community* (New York, 1958), 287-313; and a work of fiction, Charles Mergendahl, *It's Only Temporary* (Garden City, N.Y., 1950). Autobiographical accounts include William J. Levitt, "More Houses and Better Values," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, IX (June 1948), 253-56; Alfred S. Levitt, "A Community Builder Looks at Community Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, XVII (Spring 1951), 80-88; and William J. Levitt, "What! Live in a Levittown," *Good Housekeeping*, July, 1958, 47, 175-76.

8. The earliest printed reference to the Levitts I have found is Boyden Sparks, "They'll Build Neighborhoods, Not Houses," *Saturday Evening Post*, October 28, 1944, 11, 43-46.

9. To the best of my knowledge, no single builder has yet surpassed the Levittown, New York, total. New communities that will ultimately be larger, such as Reston, Columbia, and Irvine, are being built by many separate housing contractors.

10. For example, lumber came from the Levitt-owned Grizzly Park Lumber Company of Blue Lake, California; appliances were purchased through the Levitt-owned North Shore Supply Company on Long Island; and parts were preassembled in a Levitt factory in Rosslyn. The development of prefabricated houses is covered in Albert F. Bemis, *The Evolving House* (Cambridge, 1936); and Burnham Kelly, *The Prefabrication of Houses* (New York, 1951). See also, Willis, "The Effects of Cyclical Demand," 2-3.

11. *Thousand Lanes*, I (November 1951), 3. See also, Eric Larrabee, "The Six Thousand Houses That Levitt Built," *Harper's Magazine*, CXCVII (September 1948), 79-88; and John T. Liell, "4000 Houses a Year," *Architectural Forum*, XC (April 1949), 84-93.

12. Levitt and one of his homes appeared on the July 3, 1950 cover of *Time*. For an explanation of why Levitt felt that the Cape Cod style was particularly efficient, see "The Cape Cod Cottage," *Architectural Forum*, March 1949, 98-106.

13. *New York Times*, April 2, 1981.

14. Howell Walker, "Long Island Outgrows the Country," *National Geographic*, March, 1951, 279-326. For an analysis of the much-touted community spirit, see Ralph G. Martin, "Life in the New Suburbia," *New York Times Magazine*, January 15, 1950, 16, 40-42. See also *New York Times*, April 18, 1972.

15. *New York Times*, April 2, 1981; and Keats, *The Crack in the Picture Window*, 55. The seminal architectural critique of the 1950s suburban house is Serge Chermayeff and Christopher Alexander, *Community and Privacy* (Garden City, 1963).

16. *New York Times*, April 18, 1972.

17. The Levittowns have fallen in status and prestige over the past three decades, especially as original residents moved out and were replaced by working class families.

18. Herbert J. Gans, *The Levittowners: Ways of Life and Politics in a New Suburban Community* (New York, second edition, 1982).

19. In 1968 William J. Levitt sold his original construction concern, Levitt and Sons, to International Telephone and Telegraph for \$92 million. The consulting contract that ensued stipulated that he was not to re-enter the American housing field before 1977. In 1978 he assumed the rights to a 3,100 acre site near Orlando, Florida, and began building the first of a planned nine thousand units, about three thousand of which were to be apartments. *New York Times*, January 25, 1981.

20. The nation's dominant builder within a single city is Ray Ellison, who was accounting for about 45 percent of the San Antonio market's housing starts in 1984. *USA Today*, June 14, 1984. See also, "A New Method of Merchant Building," *Architectural Forum*, XCI (September 1949), 75-77; and "Park Forest Moves Into 1952," *House and Home*, I (March 1952), 115.

21. The strongest argument against Title VI financing, as Eric Larrabee has noted, was that it gave a builder a contingent profit for which he had not paid and that he secured a stake in a project in which he had made no personal investment. Larrabee, "The Six Thousand Houses That Levitt Built," 79-88. See also, Michael Sumichrast and Sara A. Frankel, *Profile of the Builder and His Industry* (Washington, 1970); and Alfred Steinberg, "FHA: Profits Before Housing," *The Nation*, CLXVIII (January 1, 1949), 11-13.

22. In the New York Metropolitan Region, the suburbs accounted for only 42.5 percent of new homes in 1946-1947.

23. Matthew Edel, Elliott D. Sclar, and Daniel Luria, *Shaky Palaces: Home Ownership and Social Mobility in Boston, 1870-1970* (New York, 1984); and David Halle, *America's Working Man: Work, Home and Politics Among Blue-Collar Property Owners* (Chicago, 1984); and John B. Lansing and Gary Hendricks, *Automobile Ownership and Residential Density* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan, June 1967).

24. My information on Swedish-American comparisons comes from David R. Goldfield, whose most recent publications on the subject include "National Urban Policy in Sweden," *APA Journal*, Winter 1982, 24-38; and "A Metropolitan Vision: Planning and Social Equity in Sweden and the United States," *Human Environment in Sweden* (New York: Swedish Information Service Paper No. 21, December, 1982), 1-8.

25. Most regional patterns in housing resulted either from climate or from the comparative cost of competing materials. In California, for example, the popularity of stucco-exterior walls initially stemmed from the fact that it was a relatively inexpensive surfacing material that was similar in appearance to early Spanish adobe construction. In the North Central and Southern regions brick homes predominated; in the heavily forested Northeast, wood was the most commonly used exterior-wall material. See, Charles Moore, Gerald Allen, and Donlyn Lyndon, *The Place of Houses* (New York, 1974), 70-74. See also *Saturday Evening Post Urban Housing Survey* (Philadelphia, 1945), 11.

26. I base this assertion on the selling price of the house and lot, which in the fifteen years after World War II was typically under \$10,000 in most suburban tract developments. By contrast, the average cost of a similar type dwelling was almost as high in the 1920s, and, in real terms, was even higher in the 1890s. Similarly, the real cost of housing in the 1980s (median new home price of about \$75,000 in 1983) is substantially higher than it was three decades ago.

27. The typical pattern in these turn-of-the-century elite suburbs was for the service people and minority citizens, who were essential to the functioning of the substantial homes and whose presence in no way diminished the social prestige of the town, to live

within a half mile of the railroad station, while the wealthier inhabitants lived on much larger plots farther from town. Another reason for a large servant and minority population within many communities was their status as live-in employees. The new post-World War II affluent suburbs contain relatively few full-time domestic servants and no slum districts. Howard L. Preston, *Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 1900-1935* (Athens, Ga., 1979), 96-110.

28. This pattern had changed markedly by 1980, when 38 percent of Levittown, New Jersey, was black. Gans, *Levittowners*, introduction to the second edition. See also, Ron Rosenbaum, "The House That Levitt Built," *Esquire*, December 1983, 378-90.

29. Many early Levittowners on Long Island went on to significant career successes, but at the time of their residence in the community they shared the general socioeconomic characteristics of their neighbors.

30. Gwendolyn Wright, *Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America* (New York, 1981), 220-39; Sidonie M. Gruenberg, "Homogenized Children of New Suburbia," *The New York Times Magazine*, September 19, 1954, 14; Lewis Mumford, *The City in History* (New York, 1961), 486; and Mumford, "The Wilderness of Suburbia," *The New Republic*, September 7, 1921, 44-45.

31. The best analysis anywhere of the process of inner-city neighborhood decline as it relates to the suburban housing market is James T. Little, Hugh O. Nourse, R. B. Read, and Charles L. Leven, *The Contemporary Neighborhood Succession Process: Lessons in the Dynamic of Decay from the St. Louis Experience* (St. Louis: Washington University Institute for Urban and Regional Studies, 1975), 79-81, 180.

CHAPTER 14: Drive-in Culture

1. The thesis that road-watching is a delight and that the highway might be a work of art is expressed in Donald Appleyard, Kevin Lynch, and John R. Myer, *The View From the Road* (Cambridge, 1964). See also, Paul W. Gikas, "Crashworthiness as a Cultural Ideal," *Michigan Historical Quarterly*, XIX (Fall 1980), 704. An unconvincing strident defense of the automobile and the expressway system is David Brodsky, *L.A. Freeway: An Appreciative Essay* (Berkeley, 1982).

2. Schaeffer and Sclar, *Access for All: Transportation and Urban Growth* (London, 1975), 39-41. See also, Jean-Pierre Bardou, Jean-Jacques Chanaron, Patrick Fridenson, and James M. Lauk, *The Automobile Revolution: The Impact of an Industry* (Chapel Hill, trans., 1982); Joel A. Tarr, *Transportation Innovation and Changing Spatial Patterns: Pittsburgh, 1850-1934* (Pittsburgh: Transportation Research Institute, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1977); James J. Flink, *The Car Culture* (Cambridge, 1975); and James R. Dunn, Jr., *Miles to Go: European and American Transportation Policies* (Cambridge, 1981). The leading authority on the "car culture," James J. Flink, is now working on an ambitious international history of the automobile age.

3. Willard Morgan, "At Last—A Place to Park," *American Builder*, July 1929, 58-60; and *New York Times*, May 22, 1979.

4. Ed Cray, *Chrome Colossus: General Motors and Its Times* (New York, 1980), 326.

5. Cray, *Chrome Colossus*, 356-58. The best study of the origins of the Interstate Highway system is Mark H. Rose, *Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1941-1956* (Lawrence, Ks., 1979).

6. Robert A. Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* (New York, 1974), passim.

7. James J. Flink, "The Automobile Revolution in Worldwide Comparative Perspective" (Paper presented at the Detroit Historical Society Conference on the Automobile and American Culture, Wayne State University, Detroit, October 1, 1982). Kenneth T. Jackson, "The Crabgrass Frontier: 150 Years of Suburban Growth in America," in Raymond A. Mohl and James F. Richardson, eds., *The Urban Experience: Themes in American History* (Belmont, Ca., 1973), 196-221. See also, Rose, *Interstate*, 75-79.

8. An excellent recent study of Los Angeles suburbanization is Fred W. Viehe, "Black Gold Suburbs: The Influence of the Extractive Industry on the Suburbanization of Los Angeles, 1890-1930," *Journal of Urban History*, VIII (November 1981), 3-26.

9. United States Bureau of the Census, *Census of Housing, 1950*, Volume I, chapter 1, table 32. Since 1975 downtown Los Angeles has begun to revive, especially as large corporations like Atlantic Richfield, the Bank of America, and Wells Fargo Bank have built major skyscrapers there. More importantly, recent residential complexes have added a 24-hour atmosphere to the once-desolate nighttime scene. The lively Mexican quarter along Broadway also gives diversity to the central business district. In terms of residential density, Los Angeles suburbs are typically more closely packed than the post-World War II automobile suburbs of Eastern cities like Philadelphia, New York, Washington, and Boston. Partly because of extraordinarily high land prices, partly because of the absence of rainfall, partly because of the large amount of undevelopable land, and partly because of a Spanish tradition that emphasizes enclosed space rather than open lawns, average lot sizes even in exclusive L.A. suburbs like Palos Verdes were less than one-fifth of an acre in 1980. By contrast, equivalently located and priced homes in the eastern cities just mentioned were typically located on at least one-half of an acre and often much more.

10. The best work on the garage is Folke T. Kihlstedt, "The Automobile and the Transformation of the American Home, 1910-1935," *Michigan Historical Quarterly*, XIX (Fall 1980), 555-70. See also, Charles Moore, Gerald Allen, and Donlyn Lyndon, *The Face of Houses* (New York, 1974), 183-87; and J. B. Jackson, "The Domestication of the Garage," *Landscape*, XX (Winter 1976), 10-19.

11. The first book exclusively devoted to the problem of sheltering automobiles was Dorothy and Julian Olney, *The American Home Book of Garages* (Garden City, N.Y., 1931). See also, *New York Times*, October 11, 1984.

12. A 1922 *New York Times* advertisement for the Kindred-McAvoy homes in Long Island City in Queens promised "two 7-room apartments, with 20 windows each and a 4-car garage."

13. Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour, *Learning From Las Vegas* (Cambridge, 1972).

14. Paul Lancaster, "The Great American Motel," *American Heritage*, XXXIII (June-July 1982), 100-8. In 1925 Florida alone registered 178 tourist courts.

15. An outstanding study of automotive tourism is Warren James Belasco, *Americans on the Road: From Autocamp to Motel, 1910-1945* (Cambridge, 1979). See also, David L. Lewis, "Sex and the Automobile: From Rumble Seats to Rockin' Vans," *Michigan Historical Quarterly*, XIX (Fall 1980), 518-28; and *This Fabulous Century*, 272-73.

16. Lewis, "Sex and the Automobile," *passim*.

17. By 1972, when there were approximately 43,500 motels in the United States, there were approximately twice as many motels as hotels in the country. *New York Times*, February 23, 1972.

18. *New York Times*, October 19, 1975; and *New York Times*, July 19, 1981.

19. According to a *New York Times* article on May 30, 1982, Hollinshead opened the drive-in in 1934 on the back wall of his machine-parts shop in Camden, New Jersey.

The number of drive-in theaters peaked at 4,063 in 1958 and was down to 3,484 in 1976, when Texas led all states with 264 and Alaska was last with only one.

20. *New York Times*, November 7, 1983.
21. The best-illustrated and most thorough study of the service station is Daniel I. Veyra, *Fill'er Up: An Architectural History of America's Gas Stations* (New York, 1979), especially 1-14.

22. Two excellent short essays on the gas station appeared by William K. Stevens and Paul Goldberger in *New York Times*, February 7, 1982. See also, Gary Herbert Wolf, "The Gasoline Station and the Evolution of a Building Type as Illustrated Through a History of the Sun Oil Company Gasoline Stations" (Thesis, University of Virginia, 1974); K. Lonberg-Holm, "The Gasoline Filling and Service Station," *Architectural Record*, LXVII (June 1930), 561-68; *Louisville Courier-Journal*, December 11, 1983; Alexander Guth, "The Automobile Service Station," *The Architectural Forum*, XLV (July 1926), 33-56; Bruce Lohof, "The Service Station in America: The Evolution of a Vernacular Building Type," *Industrial Archeology*, XI (Spring 1974), 1-13; and Henry Ozane, "The Service Station," *Architectural Record*, XCV (February 1944), 70-82.

23. Willard Morgan, "At Last—A Place to Park," 58-60. On the deconcentration policies of Sears, Roebuck and Company, see Arthur Rubloff, "Shopping Center Development and Operation," *The Appraisal Journal*, XXX (1962), 75-77; Boris Emmet and John E. Jeuck, *Catalogues and Counters: A History of Sears, Roebuck and Company* (Chicago, 1950); and Leonard Z. Breen, "A Study of the Decentralization of Retail Trade Relative to Population in the Chicago Area, 1929-1948" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1956).

24. Blaine A. Brownell, "The Automobile and Urban Structure" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Studies Association, San Antonio, Tx., November 6, 1975); and Brownell, "A Symbol of Modernity: Attitudes Toward the Automobile in Southern Cities in the 1920's," *American Quarterly*, XXIV (March 1972), 20-44. See also, Howard L. Preston, *Automobile Age Atlanta: The Making of a Southern Metropolis, 1900-1935* (Athens, Ga., 1979).

25. J. C. Nichols, "The Planning and Control of Outlying Shopping Centers," *The Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics*, II (January 1926), 17-22.

26. My list of early shopping centers is partly borrowed from John B. Rae, *The Road and the Car in American Life* (Cambridge, 1971), 230. For a quantitative analysis of the spread of this merchandising concept, see Yehoshua S. Cohen, *Diffusion of an Innovation in an Urban System* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Department of Geography Research Paper No. 140, 1972). See also, James Simmons, *The Changing Pattern of Retail Location* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Department of Geography Research Paper No. 92, 1964).

27. For example, in 1979, the percentage of metropolitan retail trade taking place outside the city was 70 percent in Boston, 67 percent in St. Louis, and 68 percent in Hartford. John C. Van Nostrand, "The Queen Elizabeth Way: Public Utility Versus Public Space," *Urban History Review*, XII (October 1983), 1-23.

28. During the 1979 gasoline shortage, the customer bases of the largest regional malls shrunk from a thirty-mile radius to a ten-mile radius, and weekend and social trips to the malls were also curtailed. On the changing image and size of Tyson's Corner, see Megan Rosenfeld, "Tyson's Corner: An Example of Suburbia's Future," *Washington Post*, February 20, 1977. See also, *New York Times*, November 10, 1981.

29. Quoted in the *New York Times*, February 5, 1971. Although the main shopping and business districts in European areas tend to be in the center of the cities, American-style malls are gaining popularity. Skarholmen Center, southwest of Stockholm, is sur-

rounded by the largest parking lot in Scandinavia and is similar to the regional shopping centers of the United States.

30. Anthony Zube-Jackson, 104-5. See also, *New York Times*, November 10, 1981; Ross J. McKeever, *Shopping Centers: Principles and Policies* (Washington: Urban Land Institute Technical Bulletin No. 20, 1953); Homer Hoyt, "The Current Trends in New Shopping Centers: Four Different Types," *Urban Land*, XII (1953), No. 4; and *New York Times*, December 31, 1982.

31. The published material on the history of mobile homes is very spare. The social aspects of the subject are covered in Donald Olen Cowell, *Mobile Homes: A Study of Trailer Life* (Philadelphia, 1941). The most comprehensive treatment is Carleton M. Edwards, *Homes for Travel and Living: The History and Development of the Recreational Vehicle and Mobile Home Industry* (East Lansing, privately printed, 1977). On the conversion of trucks into residences, see Jane Lidz, *Rolling Homes: Handmade Houses on Wheels* (New York, 1979). See also, *New York Times*, June 27, 1982.

32. Although the practice was already a decade old, beginning in 1969, Congress officially authorized the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to issue government-insured mortgages for mobile home park sites. In April 1979, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that mobile homes were real property and could be taxed as such. An examination of late 1970s attitudes toward trailering and mobile homes is Michael Aaron Rockland, *Homes on Wheels* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1980).

33. A mobile home, unlike a modular structure, has a metal undercarriage that remains even when the house is in place on blocks. A modular home can be set up on a site in a few days; a prefab home may take several weeks of on-site labor to put together. Partly for reasons of prejudice and partly for reasons of preference, black Americans occupy only a disproportionately small percentage (2 percent in 1960, for example) of mobile home units.

34. A campaign is presently underway to give landmark status to the earliest existing McDonald's hamburger stand, which is located in Downey, California. The Pointe Coupee Funeral Home in New Roads, Louisiana began the drive-in funeral practice in 1976 with rather substantial fanfare. James G. Huneker, *New Cosmopolis: Book of Images* (New York, 1915), 76-77, 82; Lewis, "Sex and the Automobile," 524; and Paul Hirshorn and Steven Izenour, *White Towers* (Cambridge, 1979); *New York Times*, January 15, 1984.

35. The most complete information about Schuler's drive-in church comes from *The Story of a Dream*, a 28-page booklet available at the church bookstore for one dollar. Free walking tours of the grounds are provided free of charge every half hour. See also, *Decision*, XII (March 1971), 6; Thomas Hines, "Designing for the Motor Age: Richard Neutra and the Automobile," *Oppositions: A Journal for Ideas and Criticism in Architecture*, XXI (Summer 1980), 35-51; and Judith and Neil Morgan, "Orange, a Most California County," *National Geographic*, December 1981, pp. 750-79.

36. Quoted in the *New York Times*, May 30, 1971.

37. Although Santa Clara County was the envy of civic boosters around the United States, in 1979 it instituted measures to curtail industrial development. Susan Benner, "Storm Clouds Over Silicon Valley," *Inc.*, September 1982, pp. 84-89.

38. Both the 1970 and the 1980 federal censuses contain detailed information on the journey-to-work of a selected sample of Americans. See also, Marion Clawson, *Suburban Land Conversion in the United States: An Economic and Governmental Process* (Baltimore, 1971), 232-34.

39. Leon Moses and Harold F. Williamson, "The Location of Economic Activities in Cities," *American Economic Review*, LVII (May 1967), 214-15; Kenneth T. Jack-

son, "The Effect of Suburbanization on the Cities," in Philip C. Dolce, ed., *Suburbia: The American Dream and Dilemma* (Garden City, 1976), 89-110; *New York Times*, August 15, 1981.

40. The most sensible voice on this topic is that of the Regional Plan Association, and especially its vice president for research, Boris Pushkarev. See, for example, Pushkarev, "Transportation Crawling Towards Consolidation," *New York Affairs*, V (1978), 75-90. Two fine scholarly analyses are Peter O. Muller, *The Suburbanization of Corporate Headquarters* (Washington, Conn., 1978); and Barry Bluestone et al., *Corporate Flight* (Washington, 1981).

41. *Intercorp*, February 7, 1984, p. 26; *New York Times*, February 20, 1984. A British study in 1976 found that 800 businesses had moved from London to new and expanded towns between 1966 and 1974. *New York Times*, June 30, 1977.

42. Lewis Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects* (New York, 1961), 505.

43. John Keats, *The Insolent Chariots* (New York, 1958).

44. Lewis, "Sex and the Automobile," 518-28. The argument that the automobile will continue to dominate urban transportation for the foreseeable future is forcefully made by Mark S. Foster, "The Automobile in the Urban Environment: Planning for an Energy Short Future," *The Pacific Historian*, II (Fall 1981), 23-31.

CHAPTER 15: *The Loss of Community*

1. This chapter is based upon an article which appeared earlier as Kenneth T. Jackson, "The Effect of Suburbanization on the Cities," in Philip C. Dolce, ed., *Suburbia: The American Dream and Dilemma* (Garden City, 1976), 89-110.

2. Two good examples of the literature on urban imperialism are Richard C. Wade, *The Urban Frontier: The Rise of Western Cities, 1790-1830* (Cambridge, 1959); and Robert R. Dykstra, *The Cattle Towns* (New York, 1968).

3. Mel Ziegler, ed., *Amen: The Diary of Rabbi Martin Siegel* (New York, 1970), 20; or Mel Ziegler, "Diary of a Suburban Rabbi," *New York Magazine*, IV (January 18, 1971), 24-33.

4. Quoted in Kenneth T. and Barbara B. Jackson, *Two Cities: A Comparison and Analysis of White Plains and Newark* (unpublished manuscript, 1974).

5. Paul A. Stellhorn, "Depression and Decline: Newark, N.J., 1929-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1983).

6. The New York data are included in TABLE A-4 in the Appendix. Additional journey-to-work information may be found in TABLES A-7, A-8, A-9.

7. See, for example, Brett W. Hawkins, *Nashville Metro: The Politics of City-County Consolidation* (Nashville, 1966).

8. The argument that most problems of American urban government are due to the failure of large cities to expand their boundaries is made most effectively by William G. Colman, *Cities, Suburbs, and States: Governing and Financing Urban America* (New York, 1975).

9. The District of Columbia, which was originally one hundred square miles in area, was reduced to sixty square miles with the loss of the Virginia sections in the nineteenth century.

10. Stellhorn, "Depression and Decline," chapters 2 and 3.

11. *The Wall Street Journal*, October 15, 1982.