

The Global Cold War

*Third World Interventions and the Making
of Our Times*

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Abbreviations

AIOC	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
ARAMCO	Arabian-American Oil Company
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BOSS	Bureau of State Security (South Africa)
CC	Central Committee
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
Comintern	Communist International
CPP (m-1)	Communist Party of Philippines (Marxist-Leninist)
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CWIHP	Cold War International History Project
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence (US)
DPK	Democratic Party of Kurdistan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRP	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
FAPLA	Forças Armadas Popular para Libertaçāo de Angola (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola)
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria)
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation, EI Salvador)
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertaçāo de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertaçāo de Moçambique (Mozambiquan Liberation Front)
FRETILIN	Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor)

FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front, Nicaragua)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GRU	Glavnoie razvedivatelnoie upravleniie (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff; USSR)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICP	Iraqi Communist Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
KGB	Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security; USSR)
KhAD	Khadimat-e atal'at-e dowlati (State Information Service [Security]; Afghanistan)
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MFA	Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement; Portugal)
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MNC	Mouvement National Congolais (Congolese National Movement)
MO	Mezhdunarodnyi otdel (International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU; USSR)
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertaçāo de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NLF	National Liberation Front (Vietnam)
NPA	New People's Army (Philippines)
NSC	National Security Council (US)
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PDRE	People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PGT	Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (Guatemalan Workers' Party)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)

PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PMAC	Provisional Military Administrative Council (Ethiopia)
POMOA	Provisional Office for Mass Organizational Affairs (Ethiopia)
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party; Mexico)
SACP	South African Communist Party
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party; GDR)
SpetsNaz	Voiska spetsialnogo naznacheniiia (special purpose forces; USSR)
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UAR	United Arab Republic
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola)
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
VWP	Vietnam Workers' Party
WSLF	Western Somalia Liberation Front

Introduction

"We look into history from motives of two kinds," says the Oxford classicist Jasper Griffin. "There is curiosity about the past, what happened, who did what, and why; and there is the hope to understand the present, how to place and interpret our own times, experiences, and hopes for the future."¹ As with the history of antiquity, the best contemporary history is usually driven by both kinds of motives; those that see the past as past and those that see the past as present. In the spirit of Professor Griffin's injunction, this is a book about the creation of today's world, about how the mightiest powers of the late twentieth century – the United States and the Soviet Union – repeatedly intervened in processes of change in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and through these interventions fuelled many of the states, movements, and ideologies that increasingly dominate international affairs. In its choice of topic it is, in other words, an unabashedly presentist book, even though it is also an historical account, written by a historian.

The volume grew out of my interest in the motives and decisions of the Cold War superpowers in their Third World policies, which I felt needed to be reinvestigated now that archival materials from both sides are available for the first time. During the research, however, the subject of the book turned into something broader: I found it impossible to understand Moscow's and Washington's decisions without exploring both the ideological origins of their Cold War interventionisms and the transformation of Third World politics that precipitated the superpower involvement. What had started out as a book about interventions increasingly became one about Third World processes of change. Its perspective shifted south.

Such a shift may not have been presaged exclusively by the historian's curiosity. It was also, undoubtedly, a residue of having spent much time in Africa and Asia in the late 1970s and early 1980s, where – as a very young man – I was an excited witness to the social and political changes taking place. I sympathized profoundly with those who attempted to achieve a more just and equitable society, and with those who defended their communities against foreign interventions. (As I am writing this, I still recall walking home from a political rally in Maputo on a night some

twenty-five years ago, astonished at the courage and determination shown by ordinary Mozambicans in the face of poverty and war.) This sympathy and fascination still remains with me, even though I hope by now to have been weaned off easy political solutions to complex social problems. It certainly made it impossible for me to write a book about the Cold War in the Third World from a superpower perspective only.

A friend of mine, who studies language, noted with more than a touch of friendly irony how chronologically well attuned my choice of conceptual terms for this book is to the topic covered: Both “Cold War” and “Third World” are late twentieth-century neologisms, employed for various purposes and in various cultural settings to create some of the most fundamental hegemonic discourses of the era. My linguist friend is of course right. Neither of these terms existed prior to World War II, and the ways in which they have been used are signals for which side you were on in the last great conflicts of the century. “Cold War” was first used by George Orwell in 1945 to deplore the worldview, beliefs, and social structure of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and also the undeclared state of war that would come to exist between them. “The atomic bomb,” Orwell found, may be “robbing the exploited classes and peoples of all power to revolt, and at the same time putting the possessors of the bomb on a basis of equality. Unable to conquer one another they are likely to continue ruling the world between them.”² Although a critical term at first, the term “Cold War” in the 1950s came to signal an American concept of warfare against the Soviet Union: aggressive containment without a state of war. The Soviets, on their side, never used the term officially before the Gorbachev era, since they clung to the fiction that their country was “peaceful” and only “imperialism” was aggressive, in a way similar to how US (and Western European) leaders used the “Cold War” to imply a Soviet threat.

The concept “Third World” came into being in the early 1950s, first in French and then in English, and gained prominence after the Bandung conference of 1955, when leaders from Asia and Africa met for the first large postcolonial summit. With its French connotations of *tiers état* – the “third estate,” the most populous but least represented of the French prerevolutionary social groups – the term “Third World” implied “the people” on a world scale, the global majority who had been downtrodden and enslaved through colonialism, but who were now on their way to the top of the ladder of influence. The concept also implied a distinct position in Cold War terms, the refusal to be ruled by the superpowers and their ideologies, the search for alternatives both to capitalism and Communism, a “third way” (if that expression can be decoupled from present-day Blairite hypocrisy) for the newly liberated states.

My use of these terms may therefore be seen to point in two opposing directions: the term “Cold War” signals Western elite projects on the grandest of possible scales, while the term “Third World” indicates colonial and postcolonial processes of marginalization (and the struggle against these processes). Some critics have claimed that by positioning one “in” the other I do violence to their separateness – I implicitly subsume one discourse under the other. Having reread the literature that was written on the Cold War in the Third World towards the end of the Cold War era, I can sympathize somewhat with this position: the greater amount of these mostly American writings attempted to delegitimize domestic Third World revolutions or radical movements on the grounds that they were Soviet-inspired or Soviet-sponsored.

Still, the argument that the Cold War conceptually and analytically does not belong in the south is wrong, mainly for two reasons. First, US and Soviet interventionisms to a very large extent shaped both the international and the domestic framework within which political, social, and cultural changes in Third World countries took place. Without the Cold War, Africa, Asia, and possibly also Latin America would have been very different regions today. Second, Third World elites often framed their own political agendas in conscious response to the models of development presented by the two main contenders of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union. In many cases the Third World leaders’ choices of ideological allegiance brought them into close collaboration with one or the other of the superpowers, and led them to subscribe to models of development that proved disastrous for their own peoples. The latter aspect of the Cold War in the Third World is the least explored, perhaps because it is the most difficult for both former Cold Warriors and their opponents to accept.³

For the purpose of this volume my definitions of the key terms are rather straightforward. “Cold War” means the period in which the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international affairs, roughly between 1945 and 1991. “Third World” means the former colonial or semicolonial countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that were subject to European (or rather pan-European, including American and Russian) economic or political domination.⁴ “Global” means processes that took place on or toward different continents at roughly the same time. “Intervention” means any concerted and state-led effort by one country to determine the political direction of another country. These are brief, operational definitions that make sense in the particular context in which they are used here (but that are obviously open to challenge in any broader context).

In a study that aims both at discussing the origins and the course of Third World revolutions and the superpower interventions that

accompanied them some hard choices obviously had to be made in order to avoid the text spilling over into two or three volumes. The focus of the book is on the 1970s and the early 1980s, when superpower conflict in the Third World was at its peak and when developments in the Third World had most significance for the wider conduct of the Cold War. As will be shown later, this is, of course, not to say that the Third World was unimportant for the Cold War conflict in earlier periods, but only that by the 1970s the conditions in the Third World and the capabilities of both superpowers had reached a stage that made events in Africa, Asia, and Latin America central to international affairs. Likewise, not all Third World conflicts in which the superpowers were involved are given equal weight in the chapters. Instead, conflicts in which foreign interventions set both the framework and the course of events are given priority, meaning, for instance, that the Arab-Israeli or the Indo-Pakistani wars (which were governed more by their very specific regional rationale than by their Cold War context) are treated in less depth than they would have been if the purpose was to provide a general survey. Such limitations have made it possible to opt toward inclusivity on other issues, such as the tracing of the historical development of superpower interventionist ideologies and postcolonial Third World politics in the first three chapters.

While serving as comfort for nervous editors concerned with length, the geographical exclusions also serve as useful reminders to the reader that while the Cold War is a central discourse in the international history of the late twentieth century, it is by no means the full story. Other major discourses with geneeses that are in part separate from the Cold War – such as the economic rise of East Asia or the upsurge of political Islam – have histories of their own, which for some time existed in parallel to the superpower conflict (and which in the end, as I have argued elsewhere, came to overtake it as the fulcrum of international affairs). The Cold War is a separate, identifiable part of a much richer spectrum of late twentieth-century history, but one that gave shape to a recognizable international system based on two opposing versions of European modernist thought.

This book argues that the United States and the Soviet Union were driven to intervene in the Third World by the ideologies inherent in their politics. Locked in conflict over the very concept of European modernity – to which both states regarded themselves as successors – Washington and Moscow needed to change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies, and the elites of the newly independent states proved fertile ground for their competition. By helping to expand the domains of freedom or of social justice, both powers saw themselves as assisting natural trends in world history and as defending their own security at the same time. Both saw a specific mission in and for

the Third World that only their own state could carry out and which without their involvement would flounder in local hands.

It is easy, therefore, to see the Cold War in the South as a continuation of European colonial interventions and of European attempts at controlling Third World peoples. I have little doubt that this is how historians of the future will regard the epoch – as one of the final stages of European global control. The means and the immediate motivations of Cold War interventions were remarkably similar to those of the “new imperialism” of the late colonial era, when European administrators set out to save the natives from ignorance, filth, and the consequences of their own actions. In both the early and the late twentieth century the European ideological rationale was that the path toward the future had been discovered by them and that they had a duty to help Third World peoples along that road. Throughout my research I have been astonished at the sense of duty and sacrifice that advisers on both sides showed in aiding friends or opposing foes in, for them, faraway places. The Cold War ethos – for those who accepted it – was at least as alluring and evocative as the imperialist ethos that it replaced, both for Europeans and for their collaborators. (While interviewing leaders of long-forgotten Third World people’s republics, I have often been reminded of the Indian writer Nirad Chaudhury’s dedication of his autobiography to the memory of the British empire, by which “all that was good and living within us was made, shaped, and quickened.”⁵)

One crucial comparative distinction needs to be made, however. It is to me less meaningful to talk about patterns of US or Soviet domination as “empires” than to describe them in a specific temporal sense. Different from the European expansion that started in the early modern period, Moscow’s and Washington’s objectives were not exploitation or subjection, but control and improvement. While this distinction may be rather ethereal seen from the receiving end, it is crucial for understanding the Cold War discourse itself: while imperialism got its social consciousness almost as an afterthought, in the Cold War it was inherent from the very beginning. Both US and Soviet criticisms of early twentieth-century European imperialist practices were genuine and deeply held ideological views. Indeed, some of the extraordinary brutality of Cold War interventions – such as those in Vietnam or Afghanistan – can only be explained by Soviet and American identification with the people they sought to defend. Cold War interventions were most often extensions of ideological civil wars, fought with the ferocity that only civil wars can bring forth.

The need to understand the Cold War in light of the colonial experience has influenced the way this book has been structured. The first three chapters deal with the ideological and political origins of the Cold War in the Third World by exploring the motives of American, Soviet, and

postcolonial leaders in an historical perspective. Chapter 1 discusses the development of US thinking on non-European peoples and their relationship to American identity and foreign policy. It argues that discourses on liberty, progress, and citizenship already in the early years of the republic's existence set an ideological pattern of involvement with the Third World that has persisted up to this day. Chapter 2 deals with the origins of Russian discourses on the Third World, from the creation of the empire up to the post-Stalin era. It shows how the Bolsheviks took over many of the problems of the past, and how they tried to transform them through their emphasis on a collective form of modernity, which via the Comintern and Soviet foreign policy they tried to spread to other parts of the world. Chapter 3 concludes this overview of the historical origins of mindsets and ideologies by focusing on Third World resistance against European colonialism and on the development of different forms of anticolonial revolutionary movements. It explains how anticolonial movements interacted with the early Cold War conflict and how some Third World leaders chose to align themselves with one or the other of its competing ideologies, while others defined themselves in opposition to both.

Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the interrelationship between the growing success of the anticolonial resistance and the creation of US Cold War interventionism. Chapter 4 argues that in the period between 1945 and 1960 the United States, through its policies toward Africa, Asia, and Latin America, helped to create the Third World as a meaningful concept in international politics, symbolizing resistance against Western domination. Chapter 5 looks at the foreign policy of Cuba and Vietnam in opposing US control, and at how they provided foci of inspiration for revolutionary movements elsewhere (although mostly in the form of creative misunderstandings, rather than straightforward lessons).

Chapters 6 to 8 deal with key cases of intervention and revolutionary transformation in the Third World during the late Cold War. Chapter 6 provides an overview of the international aspects of the struggle against apartheid and colonialism in Southern Africa, while focusing on the Angolan civil war and the Cold War interventions that accompanied it. Chapter 7 discusses the Ethiopian revolution and its links both with the United States and, especially, with the Soviet Union, and looks at how the Ethiopian-Somalian war helped to undo both the prospects for socialism in the Horn of Africa and also the brief period of *détente* between the superpowers. Chapter 8 shows how the growth of Islamism in both Iran and Afghanistan helped to destroy the modernization enterprises of the regimes, and how the Soviet Union decided to intervene in order to recreate a modernizing, socialist regime in Kabul.

The final two chapters and the conclusion provide a discussion of the Cold War in the Third World in the 1980s and its effects up to our own time. Chapter 9 outlines the Reagan offensive against left-wing revolutionary regimes and against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Angola, and Central America. It also discusses the global economic and ideological changes that made the offensive succeed. Chapter 10 shows how Mikhail Gorbachev, after a brief period of euphoric engagement, decided to withdraw the Soviet Union from intervening in Third World conflicts and how he attempted, unsuccessfully, to build an international order around principles of the self-determination of states. The conclusion evaluates the impact the Cold War had in the Third World and how it fuelled continued resistance against foreign domination. It also discusses how interventionism weakened both the Soviet Union and the United States and how it continues to bedevil US foreign policy ideology today.

The literatures on superpower interventions and on Third World revolutions are enormous, and I am indebted to a multitude of scholars for their insights, many more than can be mentioned in the acknowledgments or even in the notes. Strangely enough – and to the detriment of students – these two literatures have so far been mostly unconnected in an intellectual sense; they seem to speak past each other rather than engage across intellectual boundaries in addressing issues that are of consequence to both. An important reason for this deficiency is that the most important research into each field have been divided by disciplines: while historians and international relations experts have been concentrating on aspects of interventions, sociologists and social anthropologists have been studying Third World revolutions and their consequences. It has been my aim to draw insights from all these disciplines on their objects of study (even though the limitations of my own discipline are bound to shine through from time to time).

For me, as an historian, the core reason why this book could be written at all is the extraordinary extension of access to archives in the (former) First, Second, and Third World. While historians of the Cold War up to the last decade had only meager access to archives outside the United States and Western Europe, we can now make use of Soviet and East European archives, as well as an increasing range of collections from countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This increased access to source material carries the promise of changing the field profoundly – both, I hope, in terms of its overall approach and interpretations and also in terms of making it more relevant to a larger number of people as a field of study. The present volume is an attempt at furthering both of these processes.

1 The empire of liberty: American ideology and foreign interventions

In the 1890s, as the United States for the first time prepared to colonize peoples outside the North American continent, the debate over whether a republic could also be an empire raged intensely. When accepting the Democratic nomination for president in 1900, William Jennings Bryan castigated the American colonization of the Philippines, claiming that such policies undermined the essence of republicanism: "Our whole history," Bryan said, "has been an encouragement not only to the Filipinos, but to all who are denied a voice in their own government ...

While our sphere of activity has been limited to the Western hemisphere, our sympathies have not been bounded by the seas. We have felt it due to ourselves and to the world, as well as those who were struggling for the right to govern themselves, to proclaim the interest which our people have, from the date of their own independence, felt in every contest between human rights and arbitrary power.¹

In the century that followed Bryan's doomed battles for the presidency the complexity of his sentiments was to be often repeated at key moments of making decisions in US foreign policy: could Americans, jealous of their own freedoms, govern others? And, if not, what form should that "interest" in the world that Bryan proclaimed take? Was liberty for Americans enough to satisfy the promise of America, or was the agenda of American liberty the world? If America's mission stopped at its shores, how could the United States in the long run defend its own liberties? And if that mission extended *ad infinitum*, how could American power protect the United States and build global freedoms at the same time?

Historians, with their sense of dichotomies, have often seen the 1890s and Bryan's defeats as a struggle between the republican preoccupation with liberty and the Republicans' preoccupation with money and interests – a contest that the latter decisively won. But, at least in terms of foreign policy, the turn of the nineteenth century could as well be seen as a particularly intense moment in a continuous creation of a distinct American

ideology, a process that extends back to the eighteenth century and forward to the twenty-first. When Thomas Jefferson in 1785 praised the *principle* of an America concentrated on perfecting freedoms at home, he himself added that avoiding war may be "a theory which the servants of America are not at liberty to follow." The problem, Jefferson found, was in the very foundations of the nation – "our people have a decided taste for navigation and commerce."² In the creation of the American state in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "theory" and "tastes" competed for primacy, while becoming increasingly entwined and mutually adjusted.

By the mid-twentieth century both liberty and interests – "theory" and "tastes" – had natural and integrated places in US foreign policy ideology, welded together as symbols and key perceptions in a universalist understanding of America's mission. During the Cold War what set the function of these ideas apart from those of "normal" states within the Western state system was how American symbols and images – the free market, anti-Communism, fear of state power, faith in technology – had *teleological* functions: what is America today will be the world tomorrow. While American universalism and teleology go back to the revolutionary origins of the state, their ideological manifestations developed more slowly, often as much needed compromises between divergent ideas. As historian Michael Hunt has observed, the outer form of these symbols all go back to the revolutionary era, while their content can be strikingly contemporary.³ It therefore makes sense to speak of an American ideology that goes back two hundred years, but it is an evolving ideology into which generational experiences are interpreted and perceptual conflicts solved.

The history of America's interventions in the Third World is very much the history of how this ideology developed over time and how it framed the policies of the US foreign policy elite. Although there were periods of strong domestic opposition to the policies pursued, the Cold War era stands out as a time when there also was, by American standards, a remarkable consensus as to the immediate aims and means of US policy abroad. This relative lack of political controversy has sometimes made scholars oversimplify the relationship between ideology and practice in how Washington has conducted its international policies. But as the genesis of America's relations with the world shows, the Cold War consensus developed out of profound conflicts in the past over the role and the means a democratic republic could take up when influencing others.

"In every contest"

From its inception the United States was an interventionist power that based its foreign policy on territorial expansion. Its revolutionary message – free

men and free enterprise – was a challenge to the European powers on a continental scale. Even for those few who in the early nineteenth century did not believe in divine providence, the core ideas that had led Americans to nationhood were the same ones that commanded them to seize the vastness of America and transform it in their image. Together these ideas formed an ideology that motivated US élites in their relations with the outside world from the federal era to the Cold War.

First among these core ideas was the American concept of *liberty*, with its particular delineations and extensions. Liberty for its citizens was what separated the United States from other countries; it was what gave meaning to the existence of a separate American state. American freedom was, however, sustained by a human condition that was different from that of others. The American, Jefferson argued in the wake of the French Revolution,

by his property, or by his satisfactory situation, is interested in the support of law and order. And such men may safely and advantageously reserve to themselves a wholesome control over their public affairs, and a degree of freedom, which, in the hands of the *canaille* of the cities of Europe, would be instantly perverted to the demolition and destruction of everything public and private ... But even in Europe a change has sensibly taken place in the mind of man. Science has liberated the ideas of those who read and reflect, and the American example has kindled feelings of right in the people. An insurrection has consequently begun ... It has failed in its first effort, because the mobs of the cities, the instrument used for its accomplishment, debased by ignorance, poverty and vice, could not be restrained to rational action. But the world will recover from the panic of this first catastrophe.⁴

To the third president, and his successors, liberty could not exist without private property and the dedication to an ordered society that followed from that particular right. Liberty, therefore, was not for everyone, but for those who, through property and education, possessed the necessary independence to be citizens of a republic. Already during the federal period it was widely accepted that most Europeans could achieve such status if they were enlightened by the American example, and, in ethnic terms, the circle of possible enlightenment widened in the twentieth century. Up to the Cold War, however, most of the world's population – including the internal African colony the Europeans had brought to America – was *outside* that circle. Native and Latin Americans were also excluded. "I join you sincerely, my friend," Jefferson wrote to de Lafayette in 1813, "in wishes for the emancipation of South America.

That they will be liberated from foreign subjection I have little doubt. But the result of my enquiries does not authorize me to hope they are capable of maintaining a free government. Their people are immersed in the darkest ignorance, and brutalised by bigotry & superstition.

Jefferson still held out hope for the Latin Americans, though: "Light will at length beam in on their minds and the standing example we shall hold up, serving as an excitement as well as a model for their direction may in the long run qualify them for self-government."⁵

Central to the American ideology was its *anticollectivism* – the independent individual can be a republican, the *canaille* cannot. The collective symbolized all the fears American eighteenth-century revolutionaries had for the corruption of their republic. Outside the United States the essence of non-liberty consisted in being controlled by others, through feudal bondage or, as in the case of the French revolution, through seduction by a party or a movement. In America – and gradually elsewhere – the countermeasure to this enslavement was in education and "rationality" through science. But there remained, echoing through generations, a risk that if America did not tend and defend its own liberty, then history could move in the opposite direction; that American freedom could be undermined by imported collectivist ideas or by uneducated immigrants who clung to cultural identities US élites did not recognize.

Most Americans of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century shared a reluctance to accept *centralized political power*. Indeed, much of the ideological discourse in first two hundred years of the American republic centered on ways of *avoiding* a strong state. In order to have the nation's constitution commonly agreed upon in the late eighteenth century, for instance, a number of powers – including the power to declare war – had to be taken away from the executive. One hundred years later this anticentralism prevented America from using the state as an instrument of social reform along European lines, and cast suspicion, in ideological terms, on those countries that followed such a path. During the twentieth century, in spite of occasional attempts at state-led reform and also in spite of the immense growth, in absolute terms, of the federal state, these attitudes were still important in how American élites saw the world and their role in it.

Science as the progenitor of "rational action" underpinned American faith in the new state's universal significance from the very beginning. The United States was the first country created on the "scientific principles" of the Enlightenment. This meant the new state was a pioneer of other states to come – "the light that will bear in on their minds," in Jefferson's terms. But it also meant that an American identity, during the nineteenth century, became connected with the very concept of *modernity*, closely linking technology with the existing social order in the United States. The only way of becoming modern would be to emulate the American example, to "liberate" productivity and innovation from "ancient" (later "traditional") cultures and

ideologies. By the twentieth century the only framework of reference for Americans was America – the completion, one may say, of the self-fulfilling prophesy made at the beginning of the American republic's existence.

Part of the “rational action” of early America was *the market* – the exchange of products and services based on their value in money alone, unfettered by patronage or by need. As we have seen, even Thomas Jefferson – who along with large numbers of nineteenth-century Americans cherished the self-sufficient farmer as the ideal citizen – recognized his countrymen’s “taste for navigation and commerce” enough to, as president, send naval forces to North Africa to protect American shipping. As the United States industrialized in the late nineteenth century, the capitalist market became a reality for all Americans, and the participation in that exchange, in one form or another, became a symbol of belonging to America. And as American exports grew at around the turn of the century, so faith in the market transformed itself into a self-serving belief in open international markets, where American companies – more often than not the strongest competitors – could bring their money-making skills and their business organization. Even though this conviction was not always brought to bear on *foreign* access to *American* markets, the free market had become a part of American foreign policy ideology – as an idea, a logical extension of the virtues of capitalism and universal liberty.

Having successfully defended their access to international trade in the war of 1812, American elites of the early nineteenth century turned their attention to the expansion promised at the inception of their state. Up to the end of the century the aims of that expansion were primarily continental – the existence of European colonial empires on American soil was intolerable to liberty as constituted in the United States. During Jefferson’s presidency the United States consisted of roughly 800,000 square miles – by 1848 the figure was 3 million square miles, and in 1867, after the acquisition of Alaska from Russia, it was more than 3.5 million. Only the latter can be said to have happened, in historian Bradford Perkins’s phrase, as a “freely negotiated transfer.” The others – Louisiana, Florida, Texas, the Northwest, the 1848 conquests from Mexico – all resulted either from war or the threat of war. The image that made possession of the continent America’s “manifest destiny,” a term first used in 1845, expressed as myth what in reality was a rather concrete imperialist program.⁶

But by far the most important US interventions of the nineteenth century took place against Native American nations. In the name of rationality and progress, the American government attempted to control



Map 1 The contiguous continental expansion of the United States up to 1914.

and in some cases exterminate all the nations who had settled in what became the United States before the seventeenth century. These interventions – against those who, in spite of competing imperialist claims, in the early part of the nineteenth century were in still in command of most of the continent – set the framework for dealing with countries that for reasons of low levels of “rational action” could not receive liberty as a gift from America. “Control” became the favored method for extending American’s aims beyond the seas, to where liberty as yet was not an option.⁷

The issue of control of those not yet worthy of the levels of liberty accorded to white Americans was also crucial for the treatment of the internal African colony that had come with the Europeans. While at least in the nineteenth century slavery was increasingly abhorrent to most Americans, blacks still had to be controlled for fear that their lack of “rational action” could disturb the progress of America. After the reconstruction era, Southern racism and Northern plans for “betterment” effectively disenfranchised the black population up to the late twentieth century, delivering, as we shall see, both techniques of control to be employed abroad and, eventually, an ideological challenge to American concepts of liberty.

In the late nineteenth century, at the same time as the issue of the United States as a transoceanic imperialist power first emerged, the dual

face of foreign immigration also became increasingly apparent to many Americans. On the one hand, Americans then – as during the Cold War and today – recognized that increasing immigration was the confirmation of America's success. On the other hand, Northern whites grew increasingly concerned over the threat to “American values” that could come out of the entry of “unassimilable strangers.” From 1870 to 1920, as the United States received 26 million new immigrants, racial and ethnic stereotyping came to determine their initial “placing” in American society, and, in some cases, who should rather be kept out. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first of a series of laws, campaigned for by organizations such as the Immigration Restriction League, which attempted to keep out “racially inferior” peoples. Such exclusion was important, it was claimed, because free immigration would prevent America from living up to its global promise. “We believe,” said a Wyoming delegate to the United Mine Workers of America in 1904,

that Americans today, as in 1776, stand for independence and the noblest manhood; the Japanese laborer, as we find him in our mines and other industries, stands for neither. The Jap, like the Chinaman, works for whatever the company is pleased to pay him, and returns a portion of his earnings regularly to a Japanese agent, who is called a “boss,” doubtless to evade technically the law prohibiting contract labor.⁸

As the concept of manifest destiny fastened its grip on Americans' perceptions of their country's role, the question of where this destiny ended was becoming increasingly controversial. Could an ideology that was in its essence universal and teleological end its applicability at the shores of North America? In the early part of the nineteenth century interventions further afield limited themselves to political support and, in a few South American cases, supplies for favored groups or movements. The United States, John Quincy Adams argued in 1821, had to distinguish between extending sympathies and using military power:

Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benediction, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.⁹

By the final decades of the century, however, an increasingly strong argument was being put forward that the United States had a duty to assist in the “freedom and independence” of others outside its new borders. There were several reasons for this shift. The successes of American industrialization and the reordering of society along capitalist lines after the civil war increased the confidence of the elites in the international relevance of their message. The takeover of North America

had been carried through as far as possible without incorporating inferior Latinos in Mexico or risking conflict with the British empire over Canada. The European imperialist land grabs in Africa and Asia posed the challenge of how “advanced” countries should interact with lesser developed nations. American missionaries had begun carrying the nineteenth-century campaigns for social control and social betterment abroad. And, finally, American commercial expansion led to hopes of new foreign markets, or at least to a fear that such markets, were they to exist, could become the domain of others.

It would still be wrong to see the American occupation of Hawaii (1897) and the occupation of the Philippines and Cuba in the wake of the Spanish-American War (1898) as too radical a departure in US foreign relations. The American involvement with East Asia, both in commercial and political terms, goes back to the 1840s – it was US naval vessels, after all, that forced Western trade on Japan in 1854. The Mexican War of 1846–48 – in which Matthew Perry of later Japanese fame had served with distinction – also brought the United States into closer contact with the Caribbean and Central America. In 1855 the American William Walker set himself up as the ruler of Nicaragua, and numerous other adventurers in the late nineteenth century attempted to follow his example.¹⁰ And, as we know, American interventionism in the Caribbean did not end with Cuba: between 1898 and 1920 US Marines were used on at least twenty separate occasions in the region.

What does set the late 1890s apart, though, was the willingness of the American federal state under McKinley and Roosevelt to take political responsibility for the overseas peoples under its control. In a way historians have been right in seeing the establishment of an American trans-oceanic empire as an aberration – a short-term reaction to the culmination of European imperialism and an attempt at conforming to the global system it created. By taking up “the white man's burden” – as Kipling had implored it to do in his poem – the United States found a place as one among the Western great powers. The problem for the American imperialists was, however, that America was already fast becoming something more than one among many: in terms of its economic and military power, it did not need to conform or to take on a role that, in ideological terms, was foreign to it. Rather than being *one* imperial power, the United States was fast becoming the protector and balancer of a capitalist world system.

It was that role that America formally assumed – even with regard to Europe itself – during World War I. To Woodrow Wilson and many of his contemporaries, the decision for war meant that America could begin to reshape a world in which there were so many wrongs that needed to be put right and where the American experience could serve as a pattern.



Intervention, Wilson had concluded by 1917, was the only way of achieving “a reasonable peace settlement and the reconstruction of the world order.”¹¹ What Wilson felt to be good for the world – as in his Fourteen Points – would also, necessarily, be good for America.

“Foreigners” and anti-Communism

In the overall American approach to global affairs, World War I symbolized first and foremost a reduction of Europe and its main powers almost to the level of nonrational charges. Europe, wherefrom the light that Jefferson spoke of had originally gone forth, had debased itself through an orgy of blood and hatred. It was up to America – a victor in the war and, when it ended, undoubtedly the strongest power in the world – to set things right. President Woodrow Wilson, an interventionist reformer at home and abroad and a (political) scientist who saw America’s mission as creating an international order that prevented war between the great powers in the future, focused on two main problems: nationalism and revolution. Understanding his approaches to this twin challenge is crucial for understanding American foreign policy discourse right up to the end of the twentieth century.

Wilson saw nationalism (self-determination, in his terms) as the only mechanism by which stable states could be created, which then, with American aid, could be set on the way to democracy. But, as the war had shown, nationalism also had another face, filled with those wild and vulgar features that had characterized Germany’s fate on the road to disaster. As the president had noted already during the war, a very thin line divided “positive longings” from “anarchy” (perhaps Wilson’s favorite term of opprobrium), and the postwar situation in Europe gave him plenty of examples of the latter. While Wilson’s support for national self-determination helped numerous nationalist projects to become reality on the ruins of war in Central and Eastern Europe, he withheld American support from many others, especially where he feared that radicalism or socialism were the driving engines. Wilson’s fear of disorder – inherited from his early years in Reconstruction Virginia – led to an acceptance of the French and British governments’ emphasis on stability, rather than on popular will, in the European peace settlements.

For the world outside Europe it was the negative results of European colonialism that presented a challenge after World War I. Instead of uplifting their charges to higher levels of civilization, European colonialists had exploited and mistreated them, thereby creating potential hotbeds of chaos and anarchy. Even for the British colonies such as India – often seen in the nineteenth century as a star example of

benevolent colonial rule – American opinion in the interwar period turned increasingly critical. But, from its the very beginning this renewed anticolonial critique ran into problems in terms of alternatives. Since the Europeans had so often failed in their civilizing mission, real independence for the colonies would only lead to more instability and suffering. The Mexican revolution, unfolding on America’s very doorstep, was to Wilson a terrible example of what such instability would produce.

By the early 1920s the fear of what instability and ignorance could result in was made worse by the Russian revolution and its effects. At first, in 1917, the collapse of the tsar’s government was welcomed by many Americans, who saw tsarism as the most reactionary form of rule in Europe and hoped that the new regime’s policies would follow a trajectory not unlike that of the American revolution. But the authoritarian collectivism of the Bolsheviks, and their emphasis on the permanence and internationalism of their revolution, soon drove away any goodwill that may have existed among American elites. On the contrary, over the years that followed Soviet Communism came to be seen as a deadly rival of Americanism, because it put itself forward as an alternative modernity; a way poor and downtrodden peoples could challenge their conditions *without* replicating the American model. Already by 1918 the US government had joined the other imperial great powers in a military intervention against the Bolsheviks.

America’s postwar unwillingness to take the lead in the international organizations Wilson had constructed is often written down to a US sense of political betrayal after Europe spurned US positions at the peace conferences. But the so-called “isolationism” of the 1920s and 1930s had deeper roots than concern over diplomatic negotiations. As the United States became the world’s primary industrial power, immigration had increased manifoldly, reaching its peak in the years immediately preceding World War I. While in principle accepting the need to import labor in order to keep up with the productivity (and the export potential) of American industry, many Americans were concerned about what “new” groups of immigrants could signify in ideological terms – could the principles of liberty withstand the influx of Latin, Slavic, or Asian immigrants; peoples who in racial terms were not seen as possessing the virtues needed for rational behavior? Could America’s involvement with the world quite literally be polluting the idea of liberty at home?

In post-World War I America – the period in which most US Cold War leaders grew up – the idea that Europe and the world had shown themselves not ready for American order, organization, and concepts of rights merged with concern over the effects of immigration. In ideological terms it could be argued that the two perceptions were mutually reinforcing; if

foreign countries had not yet reached the necessary levels of civilization needed to receive the American message, what then about the masses from these very same countries who were coming to the United States? Immigration could overwhelm American democracy and defeat it in ways foreign powers were no longer capable of doing. And the way to refute that internal challenge was through limiting immigration by “less civilized” peoples and Americanizing the foreigners who were already inside.

The main obstacle to the process of Americanizing foreigners at home were the ideas with which they were contaminated before arriving on American shores. By the 1920s the most threatening of these were Communism, both because of its revolutionary collectivism and because it purported to represent a version of modernity more advanced than that presented by America. As seen by elites in the United States, the latter claim was not only wrong in essence, but was also a declared challenge to the universalism and teleology embedded in their ideology. There was simply no room, within or without the United States, for a universalist ideology that constructed a world operating according to different principles and with a different endpoint from that of their own images. Communism – and, by implication, collectivism in all of its forms – in this view had to be grouped with the traditionalist and antimodern traits of Europe that had so disastrously manifested themselves in World War I.

The existence of an American Communist Party, from 1921, therefore became an ideological manifestation out of proportion with the very limited following that party came to command. To many Americans, the very existence of such a party (alongside other ills, such as organized crime) proved the need for Americanization and vigilance at home. At the same time, the existence of an American Communist Party did become, for a brief moment during the Depression, a signal to some of those whom Americanism had disenfranchised that other methods for organizing society could be envisaged, even in America. The author Richard Wright, who briefly joined the party after his escape from institutionalized racial oppression in the South, wrote depreciatingly of

our too-young and too-new America, lusty because it is lonely, aggressive because it is afraid, insists upon seeing the world in terms of good and bad, the holy and the evil, the high and the low, the white and the black; our America is frightened of fact, of history, of processes, of necessity. It hugs the easy way of damning those it cannot understand, of excluding those who look different, and it salves its conscience with a self-draped cloak of righteousness.¹²

The great majority of Americans, however, viewed the growth of authoritarian collectivist ideologies in Europe during the Great Depression with suspicion and fear. Although Communism had in

many ways been the original challenge, it was not difficult to see similarities between the Communist faith – especially in its Stalinist form – and other contemporary political directions, such as fascism or national socialism. They all represented a challenge to America. “In a world of high tension and disorder, in a world where stable civilization is actually threatened,” Franklin Roosevelt said in his 1938 State of the Union address, “it becomes the responsibility of each nation which strives for peace at home and peace with and among others to be strong enough to assure the observance of those fundamentals of peaceful solution of conflicts which are the only ultimate basis for orderly existence.”¹³

Although the perceived lessons of World War I led the American administrations of the 1920s and 1930s to question the value of direct military intervention, as such the interwar period in US foreign relations can barely deserve the label “isolationist.” On the contrary, these two decades were the breakthrough for America as the center of the global economy, especially with regard to the Third World. In Latin America, the United States replaced Britain as the key economic power, and the American share of exports to East Asia almost tripled between 1920 and 1940. In a world where the Great Depression forced many minds to begin to consider new models for their nations, American ideas followed American products to an extent that few Americans – in their fear of outside challenges – realized. This influence was far more profound than just American models for production or management. In urban popular culture, in Europe and in the Third World, America established itself as the epitome of modernity, conveying ideas that undermined existing concepts of status, class, and identity.

The dichotomy that existed between the domestic elite view of the United States as being under pressure from within and without, and the international view of America as superabundant and expanding, was replicated from the 1930s onwards in the fissures that the Great Depression created in American politics. Roosevelt’s New Deal and the state-led reforms that followed were greeted by some as a necessary concession to collectivism, while others feared the administration’s initiatives and saw them as confirming the political, cultural, and moral decline that had been forced on America by “foreign” influences. Both directions “liberal” and “conservative” – were anti-Communist, but the latter was considerably more skeptical to direct military intervention in the 1930s and through most of the Cold War. Both saw international affairs as an extension of their interpretation of America’s domestic role, with the conservatives accusing their opponents of being “soft on Communism” and the liberals claiming that the conservatives were unwilling to pay the price of “making the world safe for democracy.”

While the responses to the Great Depression were the main progenitors of America's Cold War visions of the world, it was the Second World War that formed its strategies. The Japanese attack in 1941 confirmed that interventionism and global reform were key to America's survival – the "monsters" would have to be destroyed if the United States was ever again to feel secure. It was the liberal interpretation of American foreign policy ideology that made World War II and its aftermath a laboratory for global reform. Like Wilson during World War I, Franklin Roosevelt believed in "positive nationalisms" as the best guard against authoritarian ideologies, but with the crucial difference that America this time could and should assist in finessing the *content* of these nationalisms and the reforms they envisaged for their countries when liberated from the enemy menace. As in America, educated reform could guide the energies of those who had dreamt of revolution in a "modern" direction. Referring to the aftermath of World War I, Franklin Roosevelt in October 1944 promised that "we shall not again be thwarted in our will to live as a mature nation, confronting limitless horizons. We shall bear our full responsibility, exercise our full influence, and bring our help and encouragement to all who aspire to peace and freedom."¹⁴

The American wartime involvement in China is the best example of how Washington attempted to guide allied regimes deemed deficient in talent, education, and moral strength toward reform. While the Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) saw his alliance with the United States as a marriage of convenience directed, first, against Japan and then, after Tokyo's defeat, against the Chinese Communists, many in Washington viewed Sino-American cooperation as a blank check to reform Chinese society and the state. When Jiang proved himself unwilling to be educated by the Americans, rather than withdrawing, the United States attempted to have the Chinese leader replaced by other anti-Communists who would be more willing to listen to American advice. Although ultimately unsuccessful in China, this was a pattern of intervention that would be repeated elsewhere in Asia later in the century.

The way World War II ended, with the unconditional surrender of its enemies, proved that America could defeat evil on a global scale. But it also proved to most Americans that the world wanted Americanism – through its products and through its ideas. What Americans abroad had seen in Europe, not to mention in China, Korea, or Iran, were peoples who needed to be set free from age-old forms of social and ideological oppression, people whose lives were so different from those experienced in the United States that their very existence formed a challenge to America's global mission. And the two world wars had shown what could happen in such societies if they were *not* exposed to the American

form of progress, but rather were hijacked by false forms of modernity – German imperialism or Nazism, Japanese militarism. Other countries, in Harry Truman's phrase concerning Greece and Turkey in March 1947, must be aided before "confusion and disorder" spread.

The wartime alliances with the Soviet Union and Great Britain had remarkably little influence on how US leaders saw the world. Conservatives did criticize the Roosevelt administration for being "naïve" in its relations with the Soviet Union – in part a way to attack reform at home – but with limited success. Roosevelt and his main advisers seem to have been convinced that their very participation on the side of the United States in the war would pull both of its main allies in a more "democratic" and "progressive" direction, since the United States was, by far, the most powerful of the three. Victory in World War II was therefore a victory not just for an alliance, but also for the American way of life itself. It had outproduced and outgunned its enemies; now the time had come to transform both enemies and friends in one's own image.

Beyond Europe

The origins of America's interventions in the Third World form part of the origins of the American state. When Thomas Jefferson intervened against pirates on the North African coast – in the American image, the precursors of twenty-first-century terrorists – the aim was both to secure American commerce and to impose American standards of behavior. It was also to declare to the outside world that the United States was prepared to impose its will abroad. The need for such a declaration – later to be repeated as dogma for Latin America in the Monroe Doctrine – grew out of the visible contrast between building empires overseas, such as the West European powers were doing, and constructing a continental or even "inner" empire, such as Americans did through the twin processes of westward expansion and slavery.

Though much of the American discourse on non-Europeans originated with the colonial encounters with Native Americans, it is through the institution of slavery that the new republic formed its main images of the world beyond Europe. It is therefore doubly wrong to see American Third World policies as a kind of afterthought to US foreign affairs, as some historians have done. Africa was at the heart of the new republic's policies both at home and abroad during the first hundred years of its existence, and Africans for much longer than that. It was through battles over the institution of slavery that much of American foreign policy ideology took shape and the form of liberty that the United States was to stand for in the twentieth century was defined.

Out of the nineteenth-century conflicts over slavery and Reconstruction in the South came two key images for the development of twentieth-century American Third World policies: those of *emancipation* and *guidance*. The first relates to the need to remove the stigma of slavery from American ideals of liberty. *Emancipation* came to symbolize the removal of the causes of slavery, which were taken to be not primarily American economic need but rather the “ignorance, poverty, and vice” of those societies from which the slaves had originated. As such, it was an indictment of most non-European peasant societies and a stipulation that only the removal of the present form of these societies could prevent the conditions of slavery from reemerging. In such a sense, emancipation had a global agenda that was particularly urgent because slavery had existed in America itself and had come to be seen as a direct threat to its liberties, particularly as antislavery Northerners felt the double transformation of wage labor – often referred to as “wage-slavery” – and mass immigration threaten their own personal independence.

The concept of *guidance* and its object, *the ward*, were prominent in American images of African Americans before and during the Civil War, but became issues of key concern during the era of Reconstruction. Because of their wants, former slaves were seen as being incapable of controlling themselves. Even more than recent immigrants, they therefore fell easy victim to a return to the ways of their “underdeveloped” peasant societies of old, or, even worse, to the lures of new collectivist ideologies such as socialism – competing for influence. The Reconstruction project, and African Americans’ intense struggles for equality and justice, proved to many Americans that they were in need of guidance. In the South white elites disenfranchised blacks through political violence and terror. In the North it was often reformers – those who sought to eradicate poverty and vice in the cities – who crushed black aspirations through their insistence on making African Americans conform to white society a condition for their eventual “assimilation.”

But the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries zeal for reform was not only a key to American politics, it also put its stamp on the activities of Americans abroad, especially through the expansion of religious missions. After the United States had forced access to China and Japan at midcentury, American missionaries had spread there and gradually elsewhere, including Africa. While they were hugely important in bringing the “gospel of modernity” – health, education, and consumerism – the missionaries’ relative lack of success in spreading the gospel of Christ troubled their audience at home, even though exaggerated figures of souls saved were reported. In the 1910s and 1920s many Americans began to

see the “heathen natives,” especially in East Asia, as being “ungrateful” for what was offered them through American missions.

The themes of “ungratefulness” and “wasted opportunities” also marked early twentieth-century US views of Latin America, and especially of Cuba, which the United States had taken from Spain in the war of 1898 and later given a ward-like status of semi-independence. In the 1920s and 1930s American commentators repeated much of the nineteenth-century discourse of Latin peoples’ unsuitability for true republicanism, but with the added twist that “democracy” in the Cuban case had been subverted from within, after the best American efforts at implanting the seeds of freedom on the island. Instead of taking their cue from the United States’ example, Cuban and other Latin American leaders had adopted the worst practices of their former colonial masters. In doing so, they had scuppered the offer of liberty and progress that Washington had presented to them. “If the United States has received but little gratitude,” a State Department instructor told new envoys in the mid-1920s,

this is only to be expected in a world where gratitude is rarely accorded to the teacher, the doctor, or the policeman, and we have been all three. But it may be that in time they will come to see the United States with different eyes, and to have for her something of the respect and affection with which a man regards the instructor of his youth and a child looks upon the parent who has molded his character.¹⁵

The only country in the early twentieth century where the United States could impose its model of development through colonization was the Philippines. Like Cuba, the Philippines had been taken over after the Spanish-American War, but unlike the island in the Caribbean, the Southeast Asian islands were kept under direct American control as a dependency. The possession of the Philippines gave the United States an opportunity to experiment with the transposition of American ideals to a culture regarded as alien. In spite of the initially fierce resistance by the Philippinos to the American colonial project, by the mid-1930s many Americans were convinced that enough progress had been made for the colony to gain its independence within a decade. An alliance in Washington between trade protectionists, New Deal reformers, and fiscal conservatives secured a timetable for decolonization, on the clear understanding that the United States would keep its military bases and most of its political influence intact. The Philippines was seen as a triumph for American reform: it had brought a “new day of freedom” to an Asian people who earlier could have entertained no hopes for such a future.¹⁶

Much of the postwar agenda for US intervention in the Third World was therefore set from well before 1945 (or 1941, for that matter). What the results of the Second World War offered were new opportunities and requirements: as the main victor, the United States had the possibility, many in Washington believed, to remake the world. But in doing so it faced a challenge from the Soviet Union, the other main power left after the war, over the very content of the American mission. Within Europe, American aims centered on economic rebuilding through the Marshall Plan and security through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both of these approaches aimed at combating Communism, and – in different forms – later came to form key elements of American policy toward the Third World.

Still, it was the restructuring of Japan that formed the main model for future American initiatives outside Europe. Although there were disagreements among US advisers as to how radical the restructuring of Japan should be, the basic direction was not in dispute: it was only through becoming more like the United States that Japan – the only non-European economic and military power – could be redeemed. The key to success was not only the rebuilding of Japanese institutions, but also the remolding of “the Japanese brain.” “Our problem,” according to an 1945 instructional film for the occupation forces, “is in the brain inside of the Japanese head. There are seventy million of these in Japan, physically no different than any other brains in the world, actually all made from exactly the same stuff as ours. These brains, like our brains, can do good things or bad things, all depending on the kind of ideas that are put inside.”¹⁷

The mix of coercion, enticement, and appeal to the popular will that the occupation authorities used to put ideas into Japanese brains emphasized the new role that the state had come to occupy in American policy at home and abroad. In the beginning phase of the restructuring of Japan – just as in the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe – it was veterans of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs who set the aims, and in doing so they reflected a much more positive view of what the state would be able to do than had been usual in American policy abroad. Even though the Cold War soon saw New Dealers lose influence within the occupation regime and in US foreign policy in general, all postwar American administrations up to Ronald Reagan were much more willing to use state power for social development purposes than any of their predecessors had been.

State power meant, usually, a set of programs carried out by the local government under US guidance. While the experience in Japan set many of the *aims* of US Third World policies, the European Recovery Program

defined the means. As Paul Hoffman – a key Marshall Plan administrator – put it in 1951: “We have learned in Europe what to do in Asia, for under the Marshall Plan we have developed the essential instruments of a successful policy in the arena of world politics.”¹⁸ Those instruments were the political and cultural seduction of local elites, access to local markets, and military aid and training. Together, these measures were aimed at creating states that could both be successful in their own development *and* be part of American containment policies against the Soviet Union and its allies.

Although many historians have exaggerated the domestic pressures President Truman faced after World War II for an American withdrawal from an evil world, it is clear that the support many Americans gave to permanent military engagements abroad and to a policy of intervention in the Third World could only come as a result of the rivalry with Soviet Communism. The immense rise in Soviet power as a result of World War II – in which it was the other major victorious state – would have posed a challenge to any great power engaged in Europe or Asia. But it was the American ideological insistence that a global spread of Communism would, if not checked, result from the postwar extension of Soviet might that made the rivalry between the two powers into a Cold War. To elites in the United States, the rise of the Soviet Union as a world power also meant the rise of an alternative form of modernity that America had been combating since 1917. Any compromise with the great power that embodied Communist ideals would have been unlikely in the late 1940s. But the Soviet form of messianic modernism was particularly unfortunate in reaching the peak of its influence just as the United States removed the last limits to its global mission. “What indeed,” asked the State Department official Joseph Jones in 1955, “are the limits of United States foreign policy?

The answer is that the limits of our foreign policy are on a distant and receding horizon; for many practical purposes they are what we think we can accomplish and what we think are necessary to accomplish at any given time ... [The Marshall Plan experience shows] not the limits but the infinite possibilities of influencing the policies, attitudes, and actions of other countries by statesmanship in Washington.¹⁹

But the US move to global interventionism did not happen without intense political debate at home as to the methods that America could use. Especially after the success of the Chinese Communist revolution and the attempt by Korean Communists to reunify their country by force, New Deal liberals came under attack from the Right for their failure to extend interventionism early and decisively enough. To Senator Joseph

McCarthy and his political allies, the determined resistance Jiang Jieshi had shown to American pressures for reform was not reason enough to limit assistance to his regime when faced with a Communist onslaught. In an extreme form of wishing a world of ideological allies, McCarthy attacked the New Dealers for not *exclusively* focusing on the defeat of Communism in the postwar period:

In one area of the world the plan was fight international communism with economic aid: in another area it was to fight international communism with military aid; and in the third area [Asia] it was to turn everything over to the Communists ... We know that at Yalta we were betrayed. We know that since Yalta the leaders of this Government by design or ignorance have continued to betray us ... We are more free than they wish us to be, and we are ready to fight for what we know is right, but we must not fight under the leadership of perfumed, dilettante diplomats.²⁰

Although his confrontational rhetoric in the end defeated him, McCarthy would have recognized many of his aims in the policies that the Eisenhower administration implemented toward the Third World in the 1950s. By the end of the Korean War it was abundantly clear to General Eisenhower that there were limits to the sacrifices most Americans were willing to make in order to extend Americanism abroad. His policies of using covert interventions combined with alliances with local elites – rather than US military forces – proved successful in toppling moderate left-wing governments in Iran and Guatemala. The foreign aid that the United States provided to the Third World was primarily military – 95 percent of all aid in 1954 and more than 50 percent in 1960 – and the intention was both to prevent left-wing governments from coming to power and to help local elites resist Soviet pressure (more than half of all aid went to “frontline states” up to 1961).

In terms of American ideology, the wave of decolonization that began in the late 1940s and was mostly completed by the mid-1970s led in two different directions. On the one hand, American elites welcomed the breakup of the European colonial empires because it meant opportunities for extending US ideas of political and economic liberties. It also meant that the European elites – much reduced in stature after the two world wars – could concentrate on defense against Communism and reform at home. As Secretary of State Marshall had commented after discussions on NATO in 1949, “when we reached the problem of increasing the security of Europe, I found all the French troops of any quality were all out in Indochina, and I found the Dutch troops of any quality were out in Indonesia, and the only place they were not was in Western Europe.”²¹

Decolonization meant that the future direction of the Third World was becoming an American responsibility, not a European one.

On the other hand, however, decolonization increased the threat of collectivist ideologies getting the upper hand in the Third World. The Chinese Communist revolution, the US-supported wars against Communist guerrillas in Vietnam, Malaya, and the Philippines, the radical orientation of the postindependence regimes in Indonesia, India, and Egypt, and even the successful interventions in Guatemala and Iran convinced the Eisenhower administration that the Third World may not be ready for democracy – the ingratitude shown by Chinese and Indonesians to US efforts to secure their freedom during and after World War II signified a lack of appreciation for the principles America was attempting to further. If that was the case, then a covert strategy for influence would make more sense than open attempts at gaining friends through aid and trade.

If the United States had been a less dynamic society – and had its ideological foundations been different – then the Eisenhower approach to the Third World challenge may have continued for another decade or more. But the same reform impulses that extended American democracy at home in the late 1950s and early 1960s led to an increasing emphasis on reform abroad. To an impatient postwar generation, the containment of Communism in the Third World was not enough. While arguing for the extension of democracy to African Americans and other previously disenfranchised groups, it was increasingly difficult to maintain that peoples of the Third World were not ready for democracy. And if they were, then America had to help them reach that goal. Both Left and Right in American politics emphasized the need for increased American involvement – while the Left deemphasized the Soviet threat and stressed the need for aid, the Right pressed for a more aggressive form of containment and the need to win allies. Both strains came together in the “battle for hearts and minds” in the Third World constructed by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Ironically, it was the failure of that joint approach in Vietnam that created much of the critique of American interventionism. But at a time when US foreign policy ideology had turned radically interventionist, that critique centered not on motivations and world views, but on themes of economic exploitation abroad and business dominance at home.

“The world as a market”

To some, American capitalism has always been the centerpiece of US foreign policy. In their view, only through a more profound

understanding of its expanding economic role can the political aspects of US foreign affairs be grasped. In the twentieth century there were basically two directions within this school of thought. One was a radical populist and sometimes isolationist direction, which saw the influence of particular business interests as hijacking US foreign policy from the late nineteenth century onward, determining how America's relations with the world should develop. The other was a Marxist critique, which viewed the US state itself as an expression of the interests of the bourgeois class, representing that class in the international arena of competition for market shares. Given the increasing preponderance in international markets of US trade and investments, and the overall growth of its economy, it is not surprising that economic factors – be they seen as conspiratorial or structural – have been placed at the center of critical interpretations of America's global role.

Around 1900, in the 1920s, and in the 1960s – periods when US interventionism faced sustained criticism at home – the key to much of that critique was the undermining of American ideals through the influence of markets. Instead of seeing the role of the market in US foreign policy as part of a comprehensive ideology, many of those who opposed the occupation of the Philippines, Wilson's interventions, and the war in Vietnam saw the pernicious influence of businessmen as steering the direction of foreign policy. Bryan, in 1900, castigated "the commercial argument. It is based upon the theory that war can be rightly waged for pecuniary advantage and that it is profitable to purchase trade by force and violence . . . Imperialism would be profitable to the Army contractors; it would be profitable to the shipowners, who would carry live soldiers to the Philippines and bring dead soldiers back; it would be profitable to those who would seize upon the franchises."²² In the 1962 Port Huron statement, Students for a Democratic Society regretted – in a very Bryanesque way – the fact that "foreign investments influence political policies in under-developed areas – and our efforts to build a 'profitable' capitalist world blind our foreign policy to mankind's needs and destiny."²³

Both before and during the Cold War there have been occasions when concrete business interests have had a direct and decisive role in American interventions, but the historical record shows that these were few and far between. Normally, presidents – from Jefferson to Reagan – have had little patience with businessmen promoting their self-interests, at least *after* they themselves have been elected to the White House. Those bankers, investors, and exporters who have come to the Oval Office pleading the case of their companies have more often than not received short shrift, somewhat similar to the way Soviet political theorists,

scientists, or heads of friendship associations were treated in the Kremlin when they made suggestions on foreign policy.

But this is in no way to say that the capitalist market has played a negligible part in the formation of American foreign affairs. In a way, the Marxists seem to be right in arguing for a *systemic* role for business interests: throughout its existence, the American elite has argued – though in very diverse ways – for the promotion of free market exchanges as being at the core of US "national interest" abroad. While denying individual capitalists, no president has moved away from seeing the protection of such exchanges as a core duty. As Woodrow Wilson put it when he was still a political scientist rather than a practitioner: "Since . . . the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of nations which are closed against him must be battered down. Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process."²⁴

The astonishing growth rates of the US economy in the nineteenth century – so far unparalleled in history – made America an economic superpower well before it took on that role militarily and politically. With growth averaging 3.9 percent per year between 1774 and 1909, by the beginning of World War I the United States was by far the largest producer of goods and services in the world. Its aggregate annual output was greater than that of the three main European powers – UK, Germany, and France – combined. While only a small percentage of the American economy then (and today) was engaged in foreign trade and investments, US exports have long been a significant part of world trade, constituting 13 percent of world total exports in 1913 and growing to 20 percent in 1950. A net importer of capital in the nineteenth century, by 1918 the United States was the world's largest capital exporter, a position it would keep until 1981.²⁵

The influence of the American economic behemoth on the rest of the world has, of course, been substantial, and not just in terms of trade. In the 1890s and early 1900s the New York–London link created the first real international capital market, engaging American capital worldwide through British and other foreign companies. Between 1897 and 1914 total US investment abroad rose fivefold, and a significant part of these investments were connected to the Third World through European companies engaged in colonial exploitation and through direct investments in Mexico, Cuba, Central America, and to a smaller extent elsewhere in Latin America.²⁶ Although the relative size of US Third World investments never again reached their pre-World War I levels, after World War II the pattern broadened significantly to include a larger number of

countries, industries, and products. By the late 1940s, when the United States produced a full half of the world's manufactured goods, it makes good sense to speak of an American capitalist world system, in which all major economic decisions influenced and were influenced by the US market.

But in spite of its economic and financial preponderance during the Cold War era, the United States has proven itself a reluctant economic imperialist. During every decade – except, perhaps, the 1970s – the huge domestic market always had the upper hand in attracting capital: it was all the outside world (and especially the Third World) was not – rich, socially and geographically mobile, and politically stable. And even though the hope of greater returns always kept American capital coming to the Third World, very few of those investments and trade links turned out to be highly profitable. During the Cold War the government always wanted private companies to increase their investments abroad – and especially in the Third World – in order to create influence and “development” – but with limited success. One of the main reasons why Washington had to turn to direct and indirect aid to Third World countries in the 1950s and 1960s was the lack of a willingness to invest on the side of US business.²⁷

Equally problematic for those who wanted to enlist capitalism for America in the Cold War was the question of tariffs. As we have seen, a key component of US ideology is the concept of an unrestricted exchange of goods. But in American history the slightly broader concept of *free trade* has been a domesticated term: it was good for trade within the United States and for American access to foreign markets. But it was *not*, overall, admissible for foreign exports to the United States. Arguing that foreign imports threatened American freedoms, because products made by “unfree” workers abroad did away with jobs and profits for its citizens, the United States used massive import substitution and prohibitive tariffs – first on textiles, then on steel and related products – to stimulate its economy in the nineteenth century (the very same measures which the International Monetary Fund has tried to deny Third World countries today).²⁸ During the Cold War such measures were supported by a majority in Congress up to around 1980, in spite of attempts by successive administrations to gain access for Third World countries to US markets.

During the Cold War it was not the importance of the Third World to the US economy, but the importance of the United States to most Third World economies that counted; and even then, not as much as mutual trade and foreign investments than as products and patterns of production. For people in the Third World, the United States was where advanced goods came from, where machines had done away with much

of the drudgery of production, and where productive companies were headquartered. For Americans who traveled or worked abroad, the persistence of US products and the admiration that US living standards and technology met among others were powerful confirmations of the superiority of Americanism, and raised genuine hopes that the American experience could be replicated locally. For those “locals” of some stature who did not believe in the replication of the American dream in the place they knew, there was increasingly another way out. In the mid-1960s Congress abolished the racist national origins quota system for immigration to the United States, replacing job skills for race as the main criterion for admission, and thereby opening up for a flood of new immigrants from Latin America and Asia. In a pattern that had been established in agriculture in the nineteenth century, unemployment was part of the reason why these immigrants came to the United States, since local production had been outcompeted by imports.²⁹

The wish to make the world safe for capitalism – and the disappointingly low interest among US capitalists to personally contribute to that process – led US Cold War administrations to embark on extensive aid programs for the Third World from the mid-1950s. It was still the experience in postwar Japan and Western Europe that formed these initiatives: aid was linked to the recipient's acceptance of market access and export of profits, as well as to administrative restructuring and the exclusion of Communists and left-wing socialists from government. The purpose of the aid – often put with remarkable frankness to the recipients – was to reform the states and societies of the countries that received it. As the US Agency for International Development put it, “successful efforts to influence macro-economic and sectoral policies are likely to have greater impact on growth than the added capital and skills financed by aid.”³⁰ In other words, it was the *structure* of society that mattered, rather than capital or training.

The deification of the market in the 1950s was a rather extreme version of the capitalist element in American foreign policy ideology. It came about for two reasons. One was the right-wing's political campaigns against the New Deal's extension of the US federal state. The other was the international collectivist challenge, which by the mid-1950s was more pronounced than ever in the Third World and from the Soviet Union. “I have become personally convinced,” Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote in 1954, “that it is going to be very difficult to stop Communism in much of the world if we cannot in some way duplicate the intensive Communist effort to raise productive standards.”³¹ Both the domestic campaign and the international challenges led to a reaffirmation of the market in US foreign policy, but more as ideology than as exploitative practice.

Gradually, during the first part of the Cold War, the United States took on a *systemic* responsibility for the world economy, attempting to define its shape both with regard to Europe and the Third World. Ideology blended well with strategy in this mission: the Third World had to choose the market, in part because the periphery had to sustain the former imperial centers – Western Europe and Japan – through trade, and thereby both contain Communism *and* reduce the need for increased access to US markets. Aid to the Third World was one answer to all of these challenges. In the period 1956–60 – in spite of the fear of Soviet advances – only slightly less than 90 percent of all official aid to the Third World came from advanced capitalist countries, and between 60 and 70 percent of that percentage came from the United States.³² As an increasing number of Third World countries gained their independence in the 1950s and early 1960s, the availability of such aid set rather crude questions of principles and priorities before their leaders.

On the American side – behind issues of strategy and alliances – lay a conviction that what had worked for the United States would also work for the world. Without the slightest hint of irony given their own practices of tariffs and embargos, “global development education” meant teaching the world to open its markets and encourage the growth of local private capital. Development was a matter of choice, and the model was the United States and its free enterprise. In its exhibitions abroad, its products were proof of America’s success, showing, in the words of one reporter, “the freedom offered by washing machines and dishwashers, vacuum cleaners, automobiles, and refrigerators.”³³ It was clear to American observers that just as trade carries products, products carry ideas.

Modernization, technology, and American globalism

With the postwar extension of American higher education and a rapid increase in the number of foreigners who came to study in the United States, it was not surprising that much work was set in to provide a theoretical model of Americanism to rival that of Communism. Both academic and government authorities stressed the need for such a model in education at home and in work abroad. Third World elites, underlined the Social Science Research Council in 1957, were looking for a new concrete form for their states and societies, and it was the duty of American social scientists to produce one.³⁴ The need was felt to be urgent: instead of the clear-cut Marxist theory of social change, the Western experience was a messy, drawn-out series of unheroic social processes, with few concrete points of reference that could enflame

young Third World intellectuals. In order to learn, one had to observe the political systems of the “developing areas” and compare them with development in the West. The result, said Princeton professor Gabriel Almond, would not only be a prescriptive tool, but “a major step forward in the nature of political science as science.”³⁵

As an intellectual enterprise, what came to be called “modernization theory” has many of the same positivist traits as Marxism, with which it self-consciously draws a comparison. Indeed, it could be argued that both constitute a form of “high modernism” that emphasize, in a deterministic form, the unity of all modern development, centered on industry and technology. The Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons, whose 1937 book *The Structure of Social Action* inspired most of the postwar modernization theorists, had claimed that an integrated and stable transition to industrial society could only be achieved through changes in political and cultural values. But, unlike Marx, Parsons believed that it was the opportunities for the individual to fit into the structures of society that determined the course of history, not economic developments alone. For Parsons, for MIT’s Daniel Lerner, and for Walt Whitman Rostow – the Harvard professor whose 1960 *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* later became a key text for modernization theory – the form of transition that they described had already taken place, in America. But there were enough “unsuccessful modernizations” – Germany, the Soviet Union, China – to necessitate the search for a grand theory of the road from “tradition” to “modernity.”

Rostow’s first major attempt at influencing policy-making came with a 1957 book he wrote with his MIT colleague Max Millikan, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy*. In it, Millikan and Rostow argued that global challenges to the United States were momentous and immediate. “We are in the midst of a great world revolution,” they wrote. “For centuries the bulk of the world’s population has been politically inert. Outside America and Western Europe, and even in parts of the latter, until recently the pattern of society remained essentially fixed in the mold of low-productivity rural life centered on isolated villages. The possibility of change for most people seemed remote.” But two world wars, decolonization, and improvements in communication had given “previously apathetic peoples” a chance to improve their lot. Unfortunately,

the danger is that increasing numbers of people will become convinced that their new aspirations can be realized only through violent change and the renunciation of democratic institutions. The danger . . . is greatly increased by the existence of Communism – not because of any authentic attractions in its ideology but because the Communists have recognized their opportunities to exploit the revolution of rising expectations by picturing communism as the road

to social opportunity or economic improvement or individual dignity and achievement of national self-respect.

But, according to Rostow and Millikan, the United States could offset the threat of Communism in the Third World through positive intervention. "American society," they wrote, "is at its best when we are wrestling with the positive problems of building a better world. Our own continent provided such a challenge throughout the nineteenth century . . . Our great opportunity lies in the fact that we have developed more successfully than any other nation the social, political, and economic techniques for realizing widespread popular desires for change without either compulsion or social disorganization." The two social scientists wanted "to give fresh meaning and vitality to the historic American sense of mission – a mission to see the principles of national independence and human liberty extended on the world scene."³⁶

In spite of being obsequiously self-referential, the US-led attempt at understanding the causes of Third World social and political change went far beyond simple apologia and the construction of global hierarchies. At its best, "developmentalism" was plainly intended as a wake-up call for America to take the global problems of hunger and social dislocation seriously and employ its enormous resources to improve the world condition. Designed to accompany the campaigns for social reform and the extensions of American democracy of the 1960s, the great majority of the US Third World programs aimed at improving education and health care, and to show that development intervention was an *alternative* to military intervention. As Millikan and Rostow had concluded, "we need the challenge of world development to keep us from the stagnation of smug prosperity."³⁷

In the 1960s the United States saw administrations that eagerly responded to that challenge. John F. Kennedy – and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson – both firmly believed that international development was an integral part of an American national security strategy. Kennedy, who made Walt Rostow head of the State Department's Policy Planning Council (he later served as Johnson's National Security Adviser), fervently believed that Americans could not escape, as he told Congress in 1961, "our moral obligations as a wise leader . . . our economic obligations as the wealthiest people in a world of largely poor people . . . and our political obligations as the single largest counter to the adversaries of freedom.

To fail to meet those obligations now would be disastrous; and, in the long run, more expensive. For widespread poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism

into every weak and unstable area . . . We live at a very special moment in history. The whole southern half of the world – Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia – are caught up in the adventures of asserting their independence and modernizing their old ways of life.³⁸

For Kennedy and his advisers the key to what America could do to help avoid breakdown in the Third World was held by its technological success. Money in itself could not do the job – only the diffusion of technology and the accompanying know-how could bring Third World countries swiftly across the period of uncertainty in which Communism threatened. Likewise, the receptivity of Third World countries to US technology implied an acceptance of the American leading role in the global drive toward modernity. In an age when even some Americans had begun to doubt that US technological superiority would last, such acceptance was refreshing. "Starting from a position of substantial inferiority in almost all areas, the Soviet Union has caught up with and surpassed us in more categories than are comforting," noted Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor whose early views of development very much overlapped with those of Rostow and Millikan. Kissinger's 1960 recipe for success was to combine massive increases in US foreign aid with assistance in constructing "enlightened political institutions" in the recipient countries. Noting that "economic assistance is a form of intervention," Kissinger believed that "to offer nothing but bread is to leave the arena to those who are sufficiently dynamic to define their purpose."³⁹

Kennedy and Johnson had more to offer than bread alone. Initiatives such as the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress were intended to stimulate political as well as economic development. In announcing the Peace Corps – an organization that, by 1965, had sent more than 13,000 Americans to work as volunteers in Third World development programs – Kennedy had promised that "our young men and women, dedicated to freedom, are fully capable of overcoming the efforts of Mr Khrushchev's missionaries who are dedicated to undermining that freedom."⁴⁰ The Alliance for Progress, set up to provide economic, technical, and educational assistance to Latin America, had a similar aim. Kennedy's adviser, the Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger, reported after a tour of the continent that coincided with the launch of the Alliance in the spring of 1961, that the administration had to engineer "a middle class revolution where the processes of economic modernization carry the new urban middle class into power and produce, along with it, such necessities of modern technical society as constitutional government, honest public administration, a responsible party system, a rational land system, an efficient system of taxation."⁴¹ In other words, only by becoming more like the United States could Latin America develop.

In some Third World areas, where Communists or left-wingers had already staged attempts at gaining political power, civilian development had to be accompanied by military development, thorough US assistance programs aiming at establishing a “modern” army capable of fighting the counterinsurgence wars that would keep their opponents at bay. The combination of training and technology would enable the soldiers to hold the ground while the political and economic forces of modernization took hold of society, removing it from the danger of a Communist take-over. Meanwhile, through US education local officers themselves would become an important part of the modernizing middle class that Schlesinger saw emerging. For many of the young military commanders in Third World states it was therefore not only US support for their armies that mattered. Their own fascination with American technology also played a key role in defining the relationship. After Kennedy told General Joseph Désiré Mobutu, the de facto ruler of the Congo, that “there was nobody in the world that had done more than the General to maintain freedom against the Communists,” Mobutu’s reward, at his own request, was six weeks of parachute training at Fort Benning and at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, and the delivery of a US military command aircraft for his use in the Congo.⁴²

The problem for the theory of limited intervention that accompanied the ideas of modernization was that the international enemy, Communism, was seen as increasingly aggressive and dynamic, while one’s own side had doubts about direct military engagements, even of limited nature. In the war in Vietnam this problem was visible to US policy makers from the beginning of the 1960s. Rostow, who thought Vietnam a particularly suitable country for showing the relevance of modernization to foreign policy, argued to Kennedy already in November 1961 that

without the troop commitment, the Communists (who have been reading of our fears of white men in Asia ...) will believe that they have plenty of room for maneuver and continue infiltration ... If we move without ambiguity – without the sickly pallor of our positions on Cuba and Laos – I believe we can unite the country and the Free World; and there is a better than even chance that the Communists will back down and bide their time. This we should cheerfully accept; because the underlying forces in Asia are with us, if we do not surrender and vigorously exploit them.⁴³

The emphasis on technology as a means of successful intervention abroad is embodied in Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. Having come to the Pentagon from the Ford Motor Company, at which he had become a director at the age of 30, McNamara firmly believed that the advantage that the United States had

over Communism was primarily related to knowledge and the means of processing that knowledge into instruments of policy. That meant, for instance, ordering the right kind of weapons and tactics for the circumstances. But it also meant joining social science with military science: the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam was an attempt at removing the civilian population from an area so that they would be less exposed to Communist propaganda and give anti-Communist forces a chance to wipe out their opponents militarily without risking high civilian casualties. But McNamara also saw the program as having wider aims. “Hard analysis,” he explained to Kennedy, showed that hamlet construction gave “individuals an identity as citizens of a community” and promoted general trends of development through centralization and standardization.⁴⁴

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the numbers of Third World students who came to the United States for part of their education continued to increase. Successive administrations were very aware that these students, on going home, constituted a massive resource for the United States to draw on in its quest to influence and reform Third World countries. Having been confronted with the wealth and the products of America, its educational and jobs opportunities, its communications, ease of travel, and its youth culture, many returning students wanted to achieve modernity for their own countries, although not always, as it turned out, in a form recognizable to their American mentors. For most, the aim became to construct a modernity that in material terms offered the same potential they had witnessed in New York, California, or Ohio, but in a form that could be reconciled with social and ideological trends in their own countries or cultures. In some cases, the visitors turned against the dominant American ideological message and began identifying themselves with different forms of critique of US modernity and especially the US role abroad.

A significant part of the critique of US foreign policy that inspired these students (and many who had never visited) came from within the United States itself. During the 1960s, as a result of the failing war in Vietnam and the civil rights revolution at home, some of the chief ideological tenets of American thinking about the Third World came under attack. Although the criticism was diverse in background and in intention, some of the most sustained critiques came from civil rights leaders who identified their own struggle with that of Third World leaders opposed to US foreign policy. Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1967 spoke of telling the angry young men of the African-American ghettos

that Molotov cocktails and rifles would not solve their problems ... But they asked – and rightly so – what about Vietnam? They asked if our own nation

wasn't using massive doses of violence to solve its problems, to bring about the changes it wanted . . . I knew that I could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today – my own government.⁴⁵

Three years earlier, Malcolm X had castigated the United States as a colonial power, internationally and domestically. “There is no system,” Malcolm said, “more corrupt than a system that represents itself as the example of freedom, the example of democracy, and can go all over this earth telling other people how to straighten out their house, and you have citizens of this country who have to use bullets if they want to cast a ballot.”⁴⁶

The extension of democracy in America that began in the mid-twentieth century led the debate over US Third World policies in two different directions. Within the foreign policy elites the answer was to intensify engagements abroad through the Cold War, vowing to extend America’s freedoms there as well as at home. But for many minorities the beginning successes in the battle for status and equality at home meant sympathy for those abroad who fought US power for the same purposes. Though always a minority voice and never politically influential, this persistent critique opened up visions of an America that concentrated on solving its own domestic problems, while engaging in a dialogue with the new countries of the Third World.

For official foreign policy, though, the universal Cold War became the proper symbol of America’s aims. It was a globalist vision that fitted the ideology and the power of the United States in the late twentieth Century, while being symmetrical with the character of its Communist enemy, an enemy that also portrayed itself as popular, modern, and international. The Cold War provided an extreme answer to a question that had been at the center of US foreign policy since the late eighteenth century: in what situations should ideological sympathies be followed by intervention? The extension of the Cold War into the Third World was defined by the answer: *everywhere* where Communism could be construed as a threat.

2 The empire of justice: Soviet ideology and foreign interventions

Like the United States, the Soviet state was founded on ideas and plans for the betterment of humanity, rather than on concepts of identity and nation. Both were envisaged by their founders to be grand experiments, on the success of which the future of humankind depended. As states, both were universalist in their approaches to the world and the majority of their leaders believed that friends or enemies on the international stage were defined by proximity or nonproximity to the specific ideological premises on which each of these Powers had been founded. During the Cold War both Soviet and American leaders came to define the potential for such proximity by any country’s distance from the other superpower in its foreign policy and domestic political agenda.

In historical terms, much of the twentieth century can be seen as a continuous attempt by other states to socialize Russia and America into forms of international interaction based on principles of sovereignty. In these efforts there were some successes, but many failures. The successes have mainly been connected to crises within the international system that could directly threaten Moscow or Washington themselves. For the United States, as we have seen, the Great Depression, the Second World War, and the end of the Vietnam War all led to a greater degree of accommodation to the interests of other states. For Russia, the period between the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, the aftermath of the German attack in 1941, and the Gorbachev–Yeltsin era signaled such accommodation. But the periods in which both powers have been poised to intervene unilaterally *against* the gradually developing norms of international interaction have been much more prevalent. Given the form that American and – at least during its Soviet period – Russian policy took during the twentieth century, it is reasonable to assume that the two projects – one of state sovereignty and another of global ideological predominance – cannot be reconciled, even though both Cold War superpowers at least in form came to accept alliances and international organizations.

While this chapter will argue that most of the interventionist impulses in Soviet foreign policy were unique to that specific form of a Russian state, the Communists when taking power in Russia of course became successors to an old expansionist empire, in much the same way as the American revolutionaries developed out of the British empire. In both cases the ideologies that justified intervention had developed from concerns that were formed in earlier centuries, under different regimes. For the Russian Communists, this meant that not only did they inherit a multicultural space in which Russian was spoken by less than half the population, but they also took over a state in which the tsars for at least two generations had attempted a policy of Russification and modernization of their non-Russian subjects. Many Russians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including some who became Communists, believed that their country had been endowed with a special destiny to clear the Asian wilderness and civilize the tribes of the East.

In the first decade of the twentieth century Vladimir Illich Ulianov – also known as Lenin – created a party that believed in a form of Marxist modernity that would drive away backwardness from European Russia and set the Asian peoples of the empire on the path to modern development. The Bolsheviks – later known as the All-Russia Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – placed the liberation of the productive potential of the people at the core of the political process. To Lenin, as a Marxist, that liberation meant their transformation from peasants to modern workers, but without the oppression that capitalist systems had inflicted on the industrial proletariat in other European countries. The small Russian proletariat could, the Bolsheviks believed, free itself from the capitalist stage of development if led by a revolutionary vanguard – the Communist Party. The party represented the proletariat and would direct Russia's historical development from a peasant society to a society of industrial workers.

While US and Soviet ideologies had much in common in terms of background and project, what separated them were their distinctive definitions of what modernity meant. While most Americans celebrated the market, the Soviet elites denied it. Even while realizing that the market was the mechanism on which most of the expansion of Europe had been based, Lenin's followers believed that it was in the process of being superseded by class-based collective action in favor of equality and justice. Modernity came in two stages: a capitalist form and a communal form, reflecting two revolutions – that of capital and productivity, and that of democratization and the social advancement of the underprivileged. Communism was the higher stage of modernity, and it had been given to Russian workers to lead the way toward it.

The Russian empire and its revolutions

After the fall of the Soviet Union there was – for a time – a commonly held view that Russia had been a normal European state before the Communist experiment (and that it would return to being one after the end of Communism). The first part of that judgment is certainly untrue. The Russian empire, until the very end of its development, had very little in common with the other main European powers in terms of ideology or state structure. The prerevolutionary Russian elite of the nineteenth century was intent on overcoming what they saw as an age-old exclusion of Russia from the continent through recreating European culture under new and better circumstances. What the Europeans saw as backwardness was in reality, it was argued by many, a virgin opportunity to create a more genuine and unpolluted Christian civilization in the east, which, in time, would become the redeemer of a decadent and declining continent. Meanwhile, Russia remained an autocratic state, in which much of the elite's legitimacy was built on continuous continental territorial expansion, especially, in the nineteenth century, towards the east and the south.

Russian territorial expansion had begun in the sixteenth century and had gone into high gear in the early eighteenth century during the reign of Peter the Great. After the Napoleonic Wars Russia's incorporation of its Western neighbors was at an end, and its imperialist designs were turned increasingly toward the Caucasus, Siberia, and Central Asia. By the end of the nineteenth century less than half the empire's subjects were Russians and only around two-thirds were Slavs. The rest, inhabiting around three-quarters of what had been declared Russian territory, consisted of around seventy major ethnic groups, stretching from the Norwegian to the Korean borders. The largest and best organized of these groups outside European Russia were the Muslims of the Central Asian and the Caucasus regions. Although most of the early conquest in Asia had taken place by force, the enormous distances between center and periphery and the lack of qualified imperial administrators had meant that in most places the empire at first had been content with using local elites to administer on behalf of St. Petersburg. In some regions the Crown had even subsidized Islamic proselytizing as a means of "civilizing" heathen parts of the empire.

Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, however, as concepts of Russian uniqueness came together with improved communications to create a much more self-confident imperial elite, the cultural autonomy of distant regions began coming under pressure. In the 1830s, as the final push to conquer all of the Caucasus got under way, the Imperial Council declared that the region would "be connected to Russia as one limb on the

same body, and the peoples who live there will be made to speak, think and feel Russian.”¹ Such a mission meant that expansion became a necessary part of the imperial state, even for those who wanted reform at home. As the liberal foreign minister Aleksandr Gorchakov framed the dilemma in 1864: “The Russian situation in Central Asia is similar to that of all civilized states that come into contact with half-wild, unsettled peoples who lack a stable social organization. In such cases, both security and trade interests always demand that the civilized state exercise a certain authority over those of its neighbors that create disturbances because of their wild and impetuous habits.” But the duties of civilized government were then extended, according to Gorchakov, because the effects of that “authority” meant that the half-wilds would change their behavior and gradually become more civilized, a process which in turn exposed *them* to raids by their neighbors. “And so a state must decide: either to give up this constant task and give its outer borders over to chaos . . . or to penetrate ever further into the wild countries.” When the latter road is chosen, Gorchakov notes, “it is very difficult to stop ever again.”²

Faced with resistance to the project of extending civilization, Russia’s wars in Asia in the mid-nineteenth century turned genocidal. In the Caucasus large numbers of Muslim noncombatants were killed or driven into exile, their villages and fields taken over by Slav migrants. By the 1860s the empire faced a question that the United States had to deal with in the very same generation: which peoples could be integrated into the state and which could only be controlled or, at worst, exterminated? Because of the way it saw its own mission, the Russian elite’s main answer was a massive Russification campaign, which sought to give as many as possible of the empire’s inhabitants the opportunity to become Russian and thereby assist in the spreading of civilization. The best way of convincing others of Russian superiority was through letting them take part in the spiritual and material project of extending the empire. “The Russian conquest of Turkestan brought about an immense alleviation in the lot of the common man,” Count Konstantin von der Pahlen argued in the early twentieth century, when on an inspection tour of the immense areas over which the empire had taken control.³ The count believed that seeing the advantages of Russian rule would help Muslims become a part of the imperial project and thereby save themselves from the extermination that noncompliance would lead to.

Increasingly, in the nineteenth century, the project of building the world’s largest contiguous state became linked with the debate over reform at home. This debate often centered on the fate of the Russian peasants, most of whom up to Alexander II’s Edict of Emancipation in 1861 were held as serfs. Russian serfs had more in common with

nineteenth-century American slaves than with European peasants; indeed, it makes sense to speak of them, as the historian Dominic Lieven does, as a form of *inner colony* within the empire.⁴ Without property rights and bound to provide service for the *barin*, or master, the serfs by the mid-nineteenth century stood in the way of developing the workforce a modern capitalist economy needed. But even after emancipation, reformers saw the traditions of the “backward” Russian countryside as a barrier against creating a modern state. Some hailed the capitalist market as one means of redemption. The market, Lenin wrote while exiled to Siberia for revolutionary activities in 1897,

is in all respects progressive, that it is breaking down routine, disunited, small-scale hand production which has been immobile and stagnant for ages; that it is increasing the productivity of social labour, and thereby creating the possibility of higher living standards for the working man; that it is also creating the conditions which convert this possibility into a necessity – namely, by converting the “settled proletarian” lost in the “backwoods,” settled physically and morally, into a mobile proletarian, and by converting Asiatic forms of labour, with their infinitely developed bondage and diverse forms of personal dependence, into European forms of labour.

“The European manner of thought and feeling is no less necessary . . . for the effective utilisation of machines than steam, coal, techniques,” the young Lenin added.⁵


By the late nineteenth century members of the Russian intellectual and economic elite were charging that political and military leaders did not take the project of reforming the state seriously enough, and that they thereby let down all the “new” peoples in the empire, be they Asians or emancipated serfs. While the revolutionaries, such as Lenin, were a distinct and rather isolated minority, the debate between “Westernizers” and “Slavophiles” showed a widespread sense that the empire had lost its direction. Both groups believed that part of Russia’s purpose was to fulfill its duty toward non-European peoples, but the first saw salvation in selective learning from the West, while the latter saw Russia’s future in an idealized image of its past. While some accepted capitalism as a necessary evil, most increasingly saw a contradiction between the strengthening of the state, which they sought, and the development of free markets. As Russia began to industrialize this contradiction became more acute and created a widespread sense that the empire was being let down by its traditional elites.⁶

The response to the perceived crisis – which was underway well before the empire lost its wars of 1904–05 and 1914–17 – united many Westernizers and Slavophiles in a reconstructed faith in Russia’s special mission. While believing in the need to create a new Russia that was



Map 2 The Russian empire in 1914.

representative of its real elite – the intelligentsia – many politicians and writers underlined the fact that their country had to put technology and progress into the service of the people and thereby help create a more just social system. A significant group of reformers turned toward anticapitalism, claiming, as did the philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev, that “to be a bourgeois is ... to be a slave of matter and an enemy of eternity. The perfected European and American civilizations gave rise to the industrial-capitalist system, which represents not only a mighty economic development but the spiritual phenomenon of the annihilation of spirituality.”⁷ No wonder that Sergei Bulgakov, a Russian Marxist later turned Orthodox priest, saw the Russian intellectual as defined by his “otherworldliness, his eschatological dream about ... a coming empire of justice.”⁸



What gave the reformist vision of the empire's role its chance in Russian politics – and eventually drove its more extreme elements to the forefront – were the wars of expansion that the traditional elites had begun losing by the beginning of the twentieth century. Already in the late 1850s the wars in the Caucasus had taken up one-sixth of the state income. When confronted with Japanese and German expansionism, the Russian imperial project simply did not have enough readily available resources to compete. Between 1905 and 1917 legitimacy in the political debates began shifting to those who had a more representative and a more inclusive version of the Russian mission to offer. Among these stood the Bolsheviks – a revolutionary party that mixed visions of radical democracy with elitist achievement, and that promised Russians a key role in the future reordering of the world.

It would be unfair on Lenin's party to see its policies – as many Western observers have – as being a direct continuation of Russian expansionist

ideology: eternal Russia disguised as proletarian internationalism. Much of the party's nationalist rhetoric – before the revolution and after – was indeed merely propaganda, and was misleading in terms of the party's real internationalist aims. Lenin had no time for Berdiaev's spiritualist Russian exceptionalism; "Marxism," Lenin said, "is materialism. As such, it is relentlessly hostile to religion."⁹ The leader of the Bolsheviks – constituted as a separate party from 1912 – also stressed their enmity toward Russification and the oppression of minorities: "Complete equality of rights for all nations; the right of nations to self-determination; the unity of the workers of all nations" were among the slogans Lenin put forward on the eve of the outbreak of World War I, the war that would break the back of the Russian empire and give the well-organized Bolsheviks their chance to take power through a coup in November 1917. But Lenin also warned:

In this situation, the proletariat of Russia is faced with a twofold or, rather, a two-sided task: to combat nationalism of every kind, above all, Great-Russian nationalism; to recognise, not only fully equal rights for all nations in general, but also equality of rights as regards polity, i.e., the right of nations to self-determination, to secession. And at the same time, it is their task, in the interests of a successful struggle against all and every kind of nationalism among all nations, to preserve the unity of the proletarian struggle and the proletarian organisations, amalgamating these organisations into a close-knit international association, despite bourgeois strivings for national exclusiveness.¹⁰

The Bolsheviks shared with the elites within the Russian empire a conviction that their country would eventually become the center of a new world civilization that would be both modern and just. Lenin believed that having been the first country that experienced a socialist revolution, Russia could do much to help revolutionaries in other countries – it could function as a base area and rear guard for the revolutions in the more advanced countries of Europe, which, Lenin believed, would follow soon. But in spite of the country's social and technological backwardness, Lenin believed that the organization of its proletariat through the Communist Party had given Russia the edge – and that it could teach the lessons of the October Revolution to other proletarian parties. "To wait until the working classes carry out a revolution on an international scale means that everyone will remain suspended in mid-air," Lenin said in May 1918.¹¹ The very fact that the main imperialist powers had intervened against the new Soviet state in the civil war that followed the October Revolution proved to the Bolsheviks how crucial their section of the front against imperialism was.

Having taken power in the main cities and begun – however slowly – to extend their territory through civil war and to construct their own state,



Fig. 1 Bolshevik soldiers in 1917: the Russian revolution inspired many Third World leaders.

the Bolsheviks soon found themselves the inheritors not only of Russia, but also of its empire. In the immediate wake of the 1917 revolution all of the major nationalities within the empire had broken away to set up their own administrations. But whenever the principles of national sovereignty came into conflict with those of the strategic needs of the new Soviet state – the latter representing the needs not only of proletarians within Russia but also worldwide – the Communist Party opted for the latter. In the case of the Ukraine, Lenin told its parliament (Rada) in an ultimatum as early as December 1917, that "even if the Rada had received full formal recognition as the uncontested organ of supreme state power of an independent bourgeois Ukrainian republic, we would have been forced to declare war on it without any hesitation, because of its attitude of unexampled betrayal of the revolution and support of ... the bitterest enemies of the national independence of the peoples of Russia, the enemies of Soviet power and of the working and exploited masses."¹² In 1921 – having for all practical purposes won the civil war – the Communists even invaded and occupied Georgia, a former Russian colony where a socialist regime had come to power through its own revolution a few years earlier. Josif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili – a veteran Georgian Bolshevik calling himself "Stalin" after the pattern of the great leader – declared that the former socialist regime in Tbilisi had been "a vehicle of bourgeois influence on the proletariat" and that

"in view of the utter hostility of the capitalist states toward the Soviet countries, the totally isolated existence of Soviet Georgia, or of any other Soviet country, is inconceivable both from the military and from the economic point of view. The mutual economic and military support of the Soviet states is a condition without which the development of these states is inconceivable."¹³

As the new Soviet Commissar for Nationalities, Stalin exerted a key influence on Communist policy toward the non-Russian peoples within the "Red Empire." Himself a Russified Georgian, he strongly believed that modernity could only come to the more backward peoples within the union through the extension of the influence of the Russian working class. A crude but dedicated Marxist, Stalin saw development as a set of hierarchies, fashioned throughout by the greater or shorter distance from the existence of a class-conscious proletariat directed by a Communist Party. Similar to some of the Russian imperialists of the nineteenth century, he felt that Russia, being on the periphery of Europe, was in a better position to work with non-European peoples than were other advanced nations. As Lenin lay dying in 1922, even he – who had sanctioned the forced integration into the Soviet Union of the former colonies and the brutal crushing of their nationalist leaderships – sensed that Stalin's centralism might conflict with the party's Marxist creed. "Stalin's haste and his infatuation with pure administration," Lenin wrote in a comment on the Sovietization of Georgia, could hinder the processes of natural social development toward socialism not only in the colonies, but also within Russia itself. "The infinitesimal percentage of Soviet and Sovietized workers will drown in that tide of chauvinistic Great-Russian riffraff like a fly in milk," the leader predicted with characteristic hyperbole.¹⁴

In the short term, however, the many young Russian Bolsheviks who set out to remake the Asian parts of the new Soviet Union proved their founding father wrong. They were driven not so much by chauvinism as by complete dedication to the Communist ideals of social justice and technological development. Their message was different from that of the former colonial administrators in stressing that colonized peoples had rights, and that the most downtrodden of them – those who had been exploited both by the colonial authorities and by the local elites – were the natural allies of the new regime. Only through profound social change – stimulated by Russia but carried out by the minorities themselves – could their peoples become little wheels in the great machine that would produce Soviet socialism. As would happen later elsewhere in the Third World, the Communist recipe for change was certain to split whole societies apart – on the one hand, a small group of committed local

followers wanted to move their countries rapidly toward the common goal, and, on the other, large groups of wavers or resisters whose loyalties lay with their communities or with other ideals. In the Soviet Union none of these could be tolerated. By the mid-1920s all of those who opposed the Communists – anarchists, left-socialists, liberals, tsarists – were driven into exile, imprisoned, or executed, while the wavers had learnt to keep their doubts to themselves. Only among the Muslims of Central Asia did armed resistance continue into the 1930s, in groups that the Bolsheviks called *Basmachi* (bandits), and whose name and ferocious reputation anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan would take up as badges of honor two generations later.¹⁵

The Comintern and the Third World

It was not only inside the Soviet Union that Communism had to expand in order to fulfill its promise of social justice for all. Very few of Lenin's followers saw a sharp distinction in terms of political activity between what had been the Russian empire and countries outside it – indeed, to Lenin the main purpose of his revolution had been to prepare the ground for other revolutions to come; first, in the developed capitalist countries of Europe and then, as their social conditions allowed for it, in the colonial territories. In order to assist and promote such revolutions the Bolsheviks in 1919 set up the Communist International, or Comintern, a world-wide organization headquartered in Moscow, to which all workers' parties were invited as members. Lenin's aim for the Comintern was also to help "Bolshevize" the main socialist parties, but in most cases the opposite result followed – in their eagerness to join the new International, Lenin's supporters abroad found themselves marginalized and often excluded from the mainstream organizations and forced to set up new Communist parties, or, as the Soviets liked to think of them, new local chapters of the Comintern.

From its nineteenth-century origins Marxism had concentrated its analysis and predictions on Europe and America, and had had little time for or interest in those countries in which capitalism had not yet been established as the main vehicle of exploitation. Like his later adherents in Russia, Karl Marx had seen the world as organized in a hierarchy of development, in which the existence of an industrial working class was the key distinguishing factor – those countries that had a proletariat would also be the first to advance toward socialism, through a process that grew directly out of the specific forms of capitalist exploitation that European and American workers lived within and, ultimately, rebelled against. Asia and Africa, Marx conceded, had in the past gone through a

different development from Europe – from an historical perspective, the journey of these continents toward capitalism had only just begun. What Marx called the Asiatic mode of production was distinguished by isolated peasant communities vaguely connected to a despotic and inefficient state – a social system that forced people into an “undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life.” Under these circumstances imperialism was an agent for progress, in spite of Marx’s sympathy with its victims. “England,” he concluded as Britain was crushing the Indian Mutiny in 1853, “has a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating – the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia.”¹⁶

As a profoundly unorthodox Marxist, Lenin’s thinking – especially toward the end of his life – had begun awarding a much broader tactical role to Marx’s “semibarbarian societies.” In his key work *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, written directly before the 1917 revolution, Lenin argued that the intense conflict between European states over colonial possessions in the late nineteenth century had changed capitalism as a system and advanced its decay.

To the numerous “old” motives of colonial policy, finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for spheres of influence, i.e., for spheres for profitable deals, concessions, monopoly profits and so on, economic territory in general. When the colonies of the European powers, for instance, comprised only one-tenth of the territory of Africa (as was the case in 1876), colonial policy was able to develop – by methods other than those of monopoly – by the “free grabbing” of territories, so to speak. But when nine-tenths of Africa had been seized (by 1900), when the whole world had been divided up, there was inevitably ushered in the era of monopoly possession of colonies and, consequently, of particularly intense struggle for the division and the redivision of the world.¹⁷

The intensity of capitalist imperial rivalries gave new possibilities and new significance to the anti-imperialist struggle of people in the Third World, according to Lenin, especially after the European revolutions that he had predicted after World War I had failed to materialize. While never openly contradicting Marx’s belief in stages of development, Lenin thought that the Russian revolution had shown that some of these stages could be very brief indeed, and began bringing Third World socialists to Moscow already in the immediate aftermath of the 1917 Communist coup. In November 1919, in a speech filled with missionary exhortations, Lenin told one such gathering that their “task is to arouse the working masses to revolutionary activity, to independent action and to organization, regardless of the level they have reached; to translate the true Communist doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the

more advanced countries, into the language of every people.”¹⁸ Two years later Lenin had concluded, in desperation, that “the destiny of all Western civilization now largely depends on drawing the masses of the East into political activities.”¹⁹

The first opportunity the Bolsheviks got to implement their credo outside their own borders was in Mongolia, where China had lost control of the government after 1911. A small group of Mongolian revolutionaries, having come into contact with Bolsheviks who had fled there during the Russian civil war, began seeing Communism as incorporating both independence and modernity, and therefore as an ideal vehicle for escaping Mongolia’s nomadic and Buddhist past. In 1921 Russian and Mongol Bolshevik soldiers occupied Urga, the winter quarters of the last living Buddha, and made it the capital of a Mongolian People’s Republic under the name of Ulaanbaatar (Red Hero). As the first People’s Republic, Mongolia became a testing ground for much of Communist policy in the Third World: methods of education, cultural work, collectivization, and antireligious propaganda that would appear later in other countries on other continents were first introduced by Soviet advisers in Mongolia, who ran the country on behalf of its Communist rulers. The young Soviet advisers were in a hurry, not least because support for Mongolia was a drain on scarce resources at home. The Comintern representative instructed the leaders in Ulaanbaatar:

Within ten years we must have built up socialism in Mongolia. In order to fulfill the instructions ... to completely end the importation of flour from the USSR, it is urgently required to develop agriculture. It is required to overfulfill the meat procurement plan. As the external situation of Mongolia is unstable, it is necessary to kill, arrest, and imprison feudal lamas and noblemen.²⁰

The Comintern was to be the vehicle through which the Communists should set off rebellions against colonialism. For many of those in the Third World who opposed foreign domination, the Russian revolution had been a signal event: not only did the Bolsheviks want to set up a new state of their own that did away with colonial oppression and ethnic domination, but they also promised to support all movements worldwide that had the same aim. And most important of all – as we will see in the next chapter – the Communists had both a model for how to overthrow the former regime and a pattern for a new state that was just and modern at the same time. The image of the October Revolution that Comintern propagandists spread worldwide was one that many young organizers and intellectuals found immensely attractive as a future for their own countries. No wonder, then, that by the early 1920s Communist parties had been set up in most of the key states in the Third World – China,

India, Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran all saw Communist parties established in 1920 or 1921. The leaders of these parties – those who had not already been arrested or shot by the regimes in power – congregated in Moscow for the Comintern congresses, as did European Communist leaders. The records of the meetings show not only how diverse the early Communist movement was, but also how difficult the encounters between the Russians and Marxists from other backgrounds turned out to be.

The Soviets had expected opposition (and not a little condescension) from Western European Marxists who attended the first Comintern congresses. What surprised them more was the ability and willingness of Third World Marxists to stake out independent positions on the understanding of social developments and the political course of Communism. While in no way presenting a uniform critique of Soviet socialism, the voices of these leaders described some of the difficulties that would prove impossible to overcome in their Third World policy for later generations in the Kremlin. The young Indian Communist Mahabendra Nath Roy, for instance, criticized Lenin at the Second Comintern Congress for being too reluctant to give Third World Communist parties a leading role in the anticolonial revolutions in their countries. While agreeing with the Soviet leader that the Communists had to ally with the local (or “national”) bourgeoisie against the colonial power, Roy believed that the Communists had to propagandize independently among and recruit from all social layers for their own party, which would form a “vanguard of the working class,” even in areas where that class was very small relative to the peasant masses. Claiming that an alliance with the Soviet Union could help Third World countries avoid capitalist development altogether, Roy saw the possibility, at least in some areas, of Communist parties coming to power before the working class was fully developed, and therefore having to carry out both “petty bourgeois reforms, such as the division of land” and the construction of proletarian power simultaneously.²¹

Even worse from a Soviet perspective was the critique voiced by the Bashkir Communist Mirsaid Sultan Galiev. Born in 1892 into an ethnic group that had been colonized by Russia, Galiev argued for the revolution as first and foremost meaning the liberation of enslaved peoples. As founder of the “Militant Tatar Organization of Socialists-Internationalists,” Galiev had already in 1914 called on Tatar and Bashkir soldiers in the tsar’s army to rebel, since the cause of the war was that “Russians, not content to have conquered the Tatars, Bashkirs, Turkestanis, the [peoples of the] Caucasus, etc., wanted to conquer the Turks and Persians as well.”²² Galiev joined the Bolsheviks in Baku in 1917, and soon became the most prominent party leader with a Muslim

background. As Stalin’s deputy as Comissioner for Nationalities, the Bashkir Communist argued that “all colonized Muslim peoples are proletarian peoples” without strong class contradictions, and that the liberation of the colonies was an essential precondition for revolutions in the West. “So long as international imperialism … retains the East as a colony where it is the absolute master of the entire natural wealth,” Galiev stressed, “it is assured of a favorable outcome of all isolated economic clashes with the metropolitan working masses, for it is perfectly able to shut their mouths by agreeing to meet their economic demands.”²³ Understandably, as Stalin’s star rose within the government, Galiev’s fell. He was expelled from the party in 1923, accused of wanting to organize a separate anticolonial International and for claiming a progressive role for Islam in the liberation of Asian peoples.²⁴

As Stalin’s hold on the Soviet party increased in the 1920s, dissident voices from the Third World were stifled both within the Soviet Union and within the Comintern. Roy was sacked from his leading position in the international Communist organization in 1928 because of his support for a more independent role for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) within the nationalist alliances that Stalin had ordered it to join. In his last and final battle with Trotsky, Stalin in 1926–27 had made an issue of the need for the CCP to join with the Chinese nationalist party – the Guomindang – in opposing foreign imperialism and in constructing a new Chinese state. Against Trotsky’s concept of a permanent revolution, in which the capitalist stage of development could be a very brief period between the bourgeois and socialist revolutions, Stalin saw these transitions in all cases to be processes in which a fully-fledged capitalist social system came into being before the working class could successfully challenge the bourgeoisie for power. Confronted with Chinese requests to establish its own Communist armed forces, the Soviet leader declared that “we need the [Guomindang] Right. It has capable people who still direct the army and lead it against the imperialists.”²⁵ While Stalin won the political battle in Russia, his advice to the Chinese Communists proved disastrous for the recipients. In April 1927 the Guomindang army under Chiang Kai-shek crushed the Chinese party and arrested or murdered its main leaders. Communism was finished as a main political force in China for almost a decade. But people such as Roy – who claimed that what they had requested for the Chinese was nothing more than what Lenin had done in Russia in 1917 – drew no benefit from having been right.

In the 1930s, as Stalin’s real and imagined opponents disappeared into labor camps or killing fields, Soviet Communism created a set of key myths about the October Revolution, all designed to help Stalin’s claim to power and his dogmatic views about the Marxist laws of historical

development. According to these myths, 1917 was a workers' revolution carried out by the most advanced groups of the industrial proletariat under the direction of the Communist Party. Since the emphasis was on *advanced*, numbers almost did not matter – it was the “objective” role of the Petersburg coup-makers to represent the working class as a whole. What they carried out a revolution against was a bourgeois state that had gradually come into being since 1905, and which had manifestly been in power since February 1917. That way Stalin could emphasize that the Bolsheviks had “in a natural manner” followed the laws of development by replacing a bourgeois regime with a proletarian one (even if the bourgeoisie had only had the blessing of their own state for about eight months). The reason why there could be such a brief period of transition in Russia was *not* a permanent revolution, but the organizing abilities of the Russian Communists, led by Lenin and Stalin. By instituting these myths as an integral part of what now became known as Marxism-Leninism, Stalin emphasized his own role and that of the party, but he also effectively kicked away the ladder that could help impatient Third World Communists climb rapidly toward socialism. “One cannot trifle with the laws of historical development,” Stalin said accusingly after the Chinese debacle.²⁶

The major internal transformation in Stalin's Soviet Union – and the foundation for the Communists' claim to have modernized Russia – was the collectivization of agriculture. For seven years, between 1929 and 1936, a war was raging in the Soviet republics between Communist officials and peasant resistance, leading to famine and devastation. The battlefield moved back and forth – in March 1930 58 percent had been forced into collectives, by June 1930 more than half of them had escaped. Gradually, by using terror – confiscation of land and supplies, mass arrests, deportations to labor camps, executions – the Bolsheviks turned the tide of opposition. Stalin's purpose was simple: he wanted to create a modern state by liquidating the internal colony that serfs had been in imperial Russia. The only way to achieve this aim, Stalin and his supporters thought, was to do away with the individualistic and localistic “peasant mentality” and to streamline agriculture, like the rest of the economy, under central state control. To the Stalinists, this was the greatest revolution ever and an example of how socialist transformation could happen elsewhere. Making the peasants create the state-controlled surplus that was necessary for jump-starting an industrial economy was a way in which even backward countries and societies could aspire to modernity.²⁷

While the Comintern went through several hair-curling twists in its general policies between 1928 and 1941 – from the intensely anti-Social

Democratic “third period” between 1928 and 1933, to “popular front” alliances between 1934 and 1939, to the moribund defense for Stalin's alliance with Hitler – its policies toward the Third World stayed relatively stable. Throughout the prewar period Stalin refused to believe that Africa, Asia, or Latin America had any short-term potential for socialism, because the historical conditions for the creation of proletarian Communist parties did not yet exist there. Although the Soviet leader never quite gave up on Lenin's faith in “backward countries” moving rapidly toward socialism, Stalin was always very willing to use the “non-skipping of stages” to explain Communist setbacks in the Third World, setbacks that often came out of policies he himself had devised. Overall, the Comintern's influence in the Third World declined between 1928 and 1943, with several of the key parties decimated politically or physically by their opponents. In India in the early 1930s, for instance – after the Sixth Comintern Congress had declared war on “Gandhi'ism” because of its “religious conceptions” and “most backward and economically reactionary ways of living” – the Communist Party was reduced to some twenty members (0.000006 percent of the population, as historian Ken Post points out).²⁸

The Comintern's importance, and that of the organizations it controlled, was through the many future leaders of the anti-Western resistance who passed through their ranks. For Communists such as Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh or Brazil's Luis Carlos Prestes, their work for the Comintern confirmed a lifetime's dedication to seeing socialism as unified and international. For anticolonialists such as Indonesia's Tan Malaka, who went from the Communist Party to set up an Indonesian nationalist regime with Japanese support, or India's Jawaharlal Nehru, who had been a delegate to the February 1927 Brussels Congress of Oppressed Nationalities organized on Comintern orders, the encounters with Communism and the Soviet Union provided succinct ideas about how to construct their movements and their states. The thousands of activists who studied at schools and universities in the Soviet Union – such as Moscow's Sun Yat-sen University, set up primarily for Asian students – were impressed with their Soviet comrades' dedication to and absolute faith in their cause. Even non-Communists or those who later broke with Communism often continued to believe in the Soviet Union as a progressive country and a model for emulation as a state. The Afro-American leader W. E. B. Du Bois, who first visited in 1928, found “that Russia is a victim of a determined propaganda of lies. And that whether the present Russian Government succeeds or not, the thing that it is trying to do must and will be done sometime if the world continues to progress.”²⁹

Within the Soviet Union itself, all attempts at devising policies that reflected its own multinational form as a state drowned – quite literally in blood – during Stalin's purges. Most of the early leaders of the minority peoples within the Soviet state perished between 1935 and 1941, to be replaced by a mixture of Russian and local Stalinists. Stalin – the man these new leaders called their *vozhd* (boss) – in November 1937 gave his inner circle a lesson in his views on the role of ethnicity:

The Russian tsars did a great deal that was bad. They robbed and enslaved the people. They waged wars and seized territories in the interests of the landowners. But they did one thing that was good – they amassed an enormous state, all the way to Kamchatka. We have inherited that state ... We have united the state in such a way that if any part were isolated from the common socialist state, it would not only inflict harm on the latter but would be unable to exist independently and would invariably fall under foreign subjugation. Therefore, whoever attempts to destroy that unity of the socialist state, whoever seeks the separation of any of its parts or nationalities – that man is an enemy, a sworn enemy of the state and of the peoples of the USSR. And we will destroy each and every such enemy, even if he was an old Bolshevik; we will destroy all his kin, his family. We will mercilessly destroy anyone who, by his deeds or his thoughts – yes, his thoughts – threatens the unity of the socialist state.³⁰

The ruthlessness of Soviet Stalinism and its inability to work with other parties of the Left was shown most clearly in the Spanish Civil War, the main Soviet foreign intervention between the 1920–21 war against Poland and the Hitler–Stalin Pact. The Spanish events are highly important in order to understand later Soviet interventions in the Third World: not only was it the first long-distance intervention directed by Moscow, but it also provided the personal experience that many leaders of the Cold War period fell back on to plan or execute involvements abroad. While most Spanish Republicans saw their state as having been defeated by Franco's armies in part because of Communist sectarianism and Soviet perfidy, Moscow's lessons were quite different. Stalin and his colleagues saw the failure in Spain as resulting from the "carelessness" and "undue haste" of the Spanish Republicans themselves, including many members of the Communist Party. If an "isolated" struggle like the one in Spain was to succeed in the future, it would have to be directed by Soviet officers, even if the aim was defensive rather than offensive. Only if the Soviet experience was brought directly to bear on the local situation, Stalin decreed, could such struggles have any chance of succeeding.

By 1941 the Stalinist regime in Moscow had removed much of the early Communist emphasis on revolution in the Third World. While crushing the aspirations of Soviet minorities for their own autonomous developments, Stalin had focused on building an authoritarian noncapitalist state

with his own role and that of the party at the center. While many anti-colonial leaders on other continents continued to see the Soviet party and state as an inspiration – as we shall see in the next chapter – Moscow's direct involvement in Third World affairs had declined precipitously already by the mid-1930s, when Stalin began concentrating on a coming war in Europe. Until Hitler disabused him of the notion in June 1941, Stalin believed that World War II was "between two groups of capitalist countries – (poor and rich as regards colonies, raw materials, and so forth) – for the redivision of the world ... We see nothing wrong in their having a good hard fight and weakening each other ... Next time, we'll urge on the other side."³¹ The Soviet leader did expect that the colonies would attempt to rebel during a war between the imperialists, but did not think that any country outside Europe was developed enough to successfully defend such a revolution unless given direction and aid by the Soviet Union.

Defining intervention: Iran, China, Korea

The German attack in 1941 meant a complete redirection of Soviet foreign policy and of Stalin's instructions to international Communism. The Stalinist regime was fighting for its survival against both foreign and domestic enemies, and it now needed to spend all its resources on the war against Hitler and those within the Soviet Union who saw the German attack as a welcome opportunity to rid themselves of Stalin's terror. It also desperately needed allies, and much effort was spent on developing the relationship with Britain and the United States into a firm wartime alliance. While never imagining that such an alliance would much outlast the war, Stalin believed that the two capitalist powers needed an understanding with the Soviet Union as long as the war was still on and, probably, through the initial phase of postwar reconstruction.

Soviet planning for the postwar world began as soon as the German offensive ground to a halt in 1942. Stalin wanted to extend Soviet influence in Europe – crucially, along its western borders, but also, if possible, into Central Europe and Germany itself. But the Soviet leaders had to be very careful with predicting the precise outcome of the war. While convinced from 1942 on that Germany could not win, Stalin expected the capitalist powers to seek peace with Germany after the collapse of Hitler's regime. Fearful that such a separate peace would leave Germany free to continue its war against the Soviet Union, Stalin needed, on the one hand, to minimize friction with his allies and thereby reduce their temptation to throw him to the wolves, while, on the other hand, also to minimize the chances for a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union in the

east, an attack that Stalin knew would mean the end of the Soviet state. Moscow therefore had to downplay any revolutionary aims to come out of the war. Communist parties in the Third World were ordered not to engage in anti-imperialist propaganda, but to support the allied war effort. In 1943 the Comintern was formally dissolved, in part as a gesture toward London and Washington, though its *apparat* was kept intact and later, as the core of the international departments of the Soviet Communist Party, came to play a key role in developing its Third World policies.³²

Toward the end of the war – and finally convinced that his allies were not aiming for a separate peace – Stalin began choosing between the different Marxist perspectives that had been offered to him through Soviet wartime planning. His appetite increased by the Soviet victories on the Eastern Front, the Soviet leader now foresaw a security belt along its western border consisting of states whose foreign policies depended on the Soviet Union. But he also expected postwar Germany – the big prize in terms of Europe's future development – to move toward socialism and an alliance with Moscow. Through attacking a weakened Japan, the Soviet Union would secure its influence on the postwar settlements in China and Korea. Elsewhere in the colonies, the Soviet Union would also stake its claims in the redivision that would follow the war. Stalin based these optimistic perspectives on the continued competition among the main imperialist powers – Britain and the United States – in the coming battle for spoils. While the imperialists continued their rivalry, the Soviets could – through a mix of diplomacy and force – become a socialist world power.

Only gradually, between 1944 and 1947, did it become clear to Stalin that the prediction of intense imperialist rivalries for the redivision of the postwar world was wrong. Instead of powers competing, the weak European states, including Britain, sought protection of their security and the interests of world capitalism as such from the United States. To see this new, unipolar capitalist world was a hard-won realization for the Soviet leaders. It did not fit any of the Marxist maps that had been offered during the war, and it had to be explained as a temporary phenomenon, brought about by the West European capitalists' need to import American capital and technology. What was clear to Stalin was that a world dominated by the United States was much more dangerous for the Soviet Union than a system in which one could play imperialist powers off against each other. The advent of a capitalist hegemony meant that a concerted strategy for strangling the socialist state was in the making, Stalin thought.

The imposition of Communist regimes in the Eastern European countries under Soviet military control, carried out between 1945 and 1948,

was to a great extent a response to these new and more pessimistic perspectives on what the postwar world would look like. In processes that later would form important lessons for Soviet thinking about the Third World, Moscow helped plot strategies for Communist control in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, while helping to set up a separate socialist state in the part of Germany that had been occupied by Soviet troops. Stalin made it clear to the East European Communists that their political strategies could only succeed if supported by the Soviet Union and by its Red Army. Doubtful about the political qualities of the local Communist leaders, the *vozhd* argued to his inner circle that the Soviet steps had been taken more for security than for the sake of immediate social revolution – just like in Russia's outlying provinces after 1917, the Communists and the Soviet Army were needed to hold the line *until* the local society and party were ready to embark on a true revolutionary path – patterned, of course, on that of Russia. Meanwhile, the local Communists set about constructing new states in the only way they and their Soviet advisers knew: through terror and the destruction of all independent opposition.

The change of perspectives that muddled Soviet foreign policy in Europe in the immediate postwar period also hurt its aims in the Third World. Toward a state like Turkey – where Stalin, ironically, saw no hopes for a revolution because of the dominance of Turkish bourgeois nationalism in a multiethnic state – Soviet aims were dominated by security concerns, first and foremost for control of the entrance to the Black Sea. Promising to “drive the Turks into Asia,” Stalin had asked rhetorically already in 1940: “What is Turkey? There are two million Georgians there, one and a half million Armenians, a million Kurds.”³³ In 1945 the Soviets demanded naval bases at the Straits of Hormuz and border “readjustments” in eastern Turkey, but encountering Turkish determination to defend its possessions – supported by the United States – Stalin already in the fall of 1946 decided that continued pressure on Ankara was not worth the price. The lesson, the Soviets thought, was that the Turkish nationalists were planning to create “an anti-Soviet Eastern bloc” in response to Turkey's own “political and economic crisis and its high level of dependence on American political and military backing.”³⁴ That the Turkish crisis had been provoked by Soviet policies found no place in Moscow's analysis.³⁵

Stalin's postwar appetite for Soviet influence in the Third World also extended to the colonies of the defeated Axis powers, both in Africa and in Asia. The Soviet leaders thought that Tripolitania, the western half of the former Italian colony of Libya, was a particularly appropriate spot for Soviet expansion – there “we could establish a firm foothold in the

Mediterranean basin," Maksim Litvinov told the Politburo in June 1945.³⁶ According to the perspective of a world dominated by post-war imperialist rivalry, the former Commissar for Foreign Affairs told the leadership that a Soviet "presence in North or East Africa will not be opposed by the United States; on the contrary, it will rather be encouraged as an way of weakening English influence."³⁷ As the United States sided with Britain in blocking the Soviet claim, Stalin made sure that Molotov held to the rather ridiculous line at the Allied Foreign Ministers' meetings that "the Soviet government considered the future of Tripolitania as of primary importance to the Soviet people, and they must press their request to assume trusteeship of that territory."³⁸ But, again, by the end of 1946 Stalin had concluded that a direct role in North Africa was eluding his grasp because of hardening US policies. While instructing his diplomats to give up on the Soviet demand, he expected them to let the British and the Americans know that "those days when the USSR could consider itself as an insignificant state regarding all kinds of mandate territories, have passed." Justifying his retreat, he added that

we should not be more leftist than the leaders of these territories. These leaders ... in their majority are corrupt and care not so much about the independence of their territories, as about the preservation of their privileges regarding the population of these territories. The time is not yet ripe for us to clash over the fate of these territories and to quarrel over their future with the rest of the world, including their corrupt leaders themselves.³⁹

In Iran, the Soviets' biggest neighbor to the south, the problems in Stalin's postwar Third World policy were connected to much higher stakes than in his Libyan adventure. In 1941 the Soviet Union had – in agreement with its Western allies – occupied the northern part of the country to keep it from German control, while Britain had taken over the south. Meanwhile, the British had engineered the ousting of the Iranian emperor – the shah – and replaced him with the young Crown Prince, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Within Iran, the shattering experience of foreign occupation had thrown the door open for new political groups and ideas, which challenged not only the traditional authoritarian monarchy, but also the social and religious fundaments for the shah's power. The Communist-led People's Party, or Tudeh, had become the country's largest and best-organized political group, and the voice of a growing movement of industrial and agricultural trade unions. Leaders of the ethnic minorities – Azeris, Kurds, and Arabs – had started agitating for autonomy or outright independence. And in Qum – Iran's leading religious center – young clergymen, among them Ruhollah Khomeini, had begun calling for resistance to the foreign powers and to their agent, the shah.⁴⁰

The sense of national humiliation brought on by the great power occupation intensified political competition in Teheran. The 1943 elections to the national assembly showed strong support for liberal and leftist candidates, although the majority of representatives were still unaffiliated with any party. And although the young shah, helped by the British, managed to appoint a succession of conservative premiers over the next two years, the political initiative in the national assembly, the Majlis, gradually passed to liberal nationalists such as Ahmed Qavam and Mohammad Mossadeq.

While the Tudeh in its messages to Moscow stressed the immediate potential for a revolutionary uprising in Iran, Stalin strongly disagreed with that perspective. His main preoccupations were defensive – denying the imperialists access to the oil resources in northern Iran and securing a treaty with the leftist bourgeois nationalists in Teheran. In 1944, as the Soviet demand for an area of 216,000 sq km in the north to be set aside for joint Soviet–Iranian oil exploration enraged nationalists of all kinds in Iran, Stalin's thinking turned to using northern ethnic separatists rather than the Iranian Communists to reach his aims.⁴¹ The *vozhd* took up a proposal made by the party leader in Soviet Azerbaijan, Mir Bagirov, instructing him to "organize a separatist movement in southern Azerbaijan and other provinces of northern Iran" and to "create a democratic party in southern Azerbaijan under the name 'Azerbaijani Democratic Party,' founded by reforming the Azerbaijani branch of the People's Party of Iran and attracting all supporters of the separatist movement from all layers of society."⁴² The Azeri nationalist Bagirov may have hoped for the unification of Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan, but Stalin obviously intended to use the threat of Soviet support for the disintegration of Iran to pressure the Iranian bourgeoisie into striking a deal with Moscow for oil and influence.⁴³ The Teheran Communists were understandably furious. "If the enemies of the USSR had created a plan against it, they could not possibly invent anything better than what is taking place at the present time," they wrote to Stalin in September 1945.⁴⁴

But Stalin and Bagirov were not discouraged. All through 1945 and early 1946 the Soviets continued to direct and build an autonomous regime in Iranian Azerbaijan, based in Tabriz, while warning the Tudeh against any attempts at carrying out a revolution.⁴⁵ Even in Azerbaijan and the Kurdish areas – where the Soviets supported the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) – the reforms had to be moderate: "You have been told many times that we do not want to spark a civil war or class struggle among the Azerbaijanis. All forces ... must be used against those who disturb us in our battle for the autonomy of Azerbaijan and

northern Kurdistan," Bagirov warned his comrades south of the border.⁴⁶ To some extent the Kurdish nationalist regime in Mahabad was more to the Soviets' liking than that of Pishevari's socialists, especially since the DPK president Qazi Mohammad – a well-read and broad-minded Islamic judge – understood that the occasional use of radical slogans would help in enlisting Soviet support and got the help of Kurds who had studied in Teheran to make up a list for official use.⁴⁷

The Iranian elite in early 1946 started realizing that there was a real danger that their country could split apart and that a military conflict with the Soviet Union may be approaching. The Majlis turned to Ahmad Qavam, a wealthy 76-year-old landowner from northern Iran with a record of political radicalism, as the new prime minister. Qavam wanted to reform politics and social affairs in Iran and defeat the challenges from the northern separatists, the Tudeh, and the royalist right wing. The new prime minister was hated by the British, with whom he had clashed on several occasions during his long political career, and was distrusted by the Americans, who viewed him as a shifty and intriguing old-style politician.⁴⁸ The Russians regarded him as a "bourgeois democrat and nationalist," who realized that he would have to seek support for his reform plans either from the United States or the Soviet Union. Qavam wanted a compromise on Soviet oil concessions, and might support "reforms" in Azerbaijan, but could not grant autonomy to the Azeris and survive in power, Moscow noted.⁴⁹

The Soviet–Iranian negotiations in Moscow in February–March 1946 showed the limitations of Stalin's approach to the Third World. Stalin and his foreign minister Molotov wanted Qavam to agree to oil concessions – together with a series of connected "rights" – and some form of self-rule for Azerbaijan. Any of these two measures would give Moscow control of northern Iran, a fact which left Molotov free to be "flexible" on the Azeri question. Some form of compromise could be found, according to Molotov, whereby real military and political power in the north would remain with the Teheran government. Pishevari "could die or become ill."⁵⁰ But a solution to the Azeri question, and a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, both depended on Qavam granting Moscow the economic concessions Stalin wanted.⁵¹

Qavam would not accept Stalin's and Molotov's Cold War logic. He suggested a compromise in which he, in return for a Soviet commitment to withdraw, would propose to the Majlis limited self-rule for the Azeris and comprehensive talks with Moscow on political and economic relations. But Molotov was not impressed. "The Soviet government wants to expedite the oil issue," the foreign minister said, and if Qavam was in no position to grant oil concessions, the Soviets would discuss the issue with the

government in Tabriz.⁵² Then Molotov presented his own proposals: a limited self-rule scheme for Azerbaijan – which clearly signaled Moscow's disinterest in the overall fate of Pishevari's regime – and the immediate start of negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union on a concession in northern Iran for a joint oil exploration and production company, 51 percent of which was to be owned by Moscow. "Soviet troops," Molotov wrote, "will be completely withdrawn from Iran as soon as the Iranian government liquidates all enemy and discriminating measures in its relations with the Soviet Union, establishes peaceful conditions in northern Iran, and introduces a friendly policy toward the Soviet Union."⁵³

Encountering such demands, and such a negotiating strategy, there is little wonder why Qavam turned to the Americans for support and to crafty diplomacy for time. As US pressure increased for the Soviets to withdraw the Red Army from northern Iran, the Iranian prime minister promised Stalin a treaty on oil concessions to ease the Soviet departure. He also took three members of the Tudeh into his new government after the last of the Soviet soldiers had left at the end of May 1946. Himself confronted by the West and still believing that Qavam and the bourgeois nationalists would have to come to an agreement with Moscow to stave off Western pressure, Stalin decided to drop the Azerbaijani separatist regime. The Tabriz leadership was understandably dejected. As Pishevari told Bagirov during a secret meeting in April 1946:

I having turned the Shah's government against ourselves, we cannot go on our knees before them ... No matter how much I might want to, I just cannot do it. I am prepared to die on the fields of battle in the interest of the people, but I can't sell them out ... With your help, we democrats and leaders followed a path in violation of Iran's constitution, breaking it, discrediting it ... After all that, how can Qavam ever forgive us? Even in the middle of our work ... there were moments when I had my doubts about you, and whether you would help us to the end ... and now, all the more, I don't believe you at all. Comrades, I repeat, I don't believe you anymore.⁵⁴

Stalin, however, would not let the Azerbaijani leaders fall without giving them a final lecture on Marxism. In May 1946 he wrote to Pishevari:

You here want to emulate Lenin [by calling for revolution]. This is very good and laudable ... However, the situation in Iran today is totally different. There is no profound revolutionary crisis in Iran. There are few workers in Iran and they are poorly organized ... We decided to withdraw troops from Iran and China, in order to seize this tool from the hands of the British and Americans, to unleash the liberation movement in the colonies and thereby render our liberationist policy more justified and efficient.

Qavam, Stalin stressed, remained a progressive bourgeois. The Communist aim, in Tabriz, Teheran, and Moscow, should be to "wrench concessions

from Qavam, give him support, isolate the Anglophiles.”⁵⁵ But by the end of 1946 the shah’s armies had retaken all the northern areas, where they wreaked a terrible revenge on the Azeri and Kurdish separatists. Conveniently for Stalin, Jafar Pishevari died in a car crash after having fled to the Soviet Union in 1947. With both the Azeri regime and the Red Army gone, the Majlis saw no reason to ratify the Soviet oil treaty. The Communists were soon forced out of the Teheran government, and Ahmad Qavam was dismissed by the shah in December 1947. Two years later, the Tudeh was banned and its leaders driven underground or into exile, as the shah drew increasingly close to the United States.

Stalin’s actions in Iran and the dogmatic view of social and political development on which they were based helped defeat the Iranian Left. Although it would have been suicidal to openly question the *vozhd*’s views within the Soviet party, we know that some leaders in Moscow and in Baku were skeptical at least as to the outcome of Stalin’s policies and wondered if the Soviet Union could not do better in its competition with the imperialist powers. But for the vast majority of Soviet officials the Iranian debacle was a result of the West’s increasingly aggressive policies against the Soviet Union and against socialism. “In all of the Near and Middle East one can observe an intensification of American activity,” one intelligence summary noted, “from which rises the smell of oil, military sea- and air-bases, the preparation of an aggressive war. Behind the talks on dollar loans, ‘emergency help,’ ‘control activities’ of military and civilian personnel is hidden the ... increased penetration of American imperialism into these countries with the goal of turning them into its military-strategic launching pads.”⁵⁶

China – Stalin’s old nemesis – was the only major Third World state contiguous to the Soviet Union in which the *vozhd* did not manage to wreck the perspectives of the local Communists on behalf of Soviet security. The main reason why the Chinese Communists succeeded where the Iranians failed was Mao Zedong’s determination not to risk his own party’s future by following each and every instruction he might be getting from Moscow. While believing in Stalin’s strategic genius and in the need to emulate the Soviet experience in China in a concrete form, Mao chose to ignore the Boss’s orders to make peace with the Chinese Nationalists, Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang (GMD), after Chiang had attacked the Communist troops in 1946. As in Iran, Stalin had tried to negotiate a treaty with the Nationalist government in China after the end of World War II, intending to exclude imperialist influence and secure Soviet control of the border areas, but – as in Iran – the government had turned to the United States to successfully resist Soviet pressure. However, unlike the governments of Turkey or Iran, Chiang’s regime

in China had been significantly weakened by the war and – to make matters worse for itself – began taking on all of its domestic enemies at once in the postwar period. As a result, the Communists not only survived the initial military onslaught, but were gradually able to turn the situation on the battlefield to their advantage. By 1948, as it became clear that the GMD could not defeat Mao’s forces and that the Americans were unwilling to bail Chiang’s government out of its economic and military predicament, Stalin began a significant program of support for the Chinese Communists. As the GMD armies broke down, Communism finally seemed set to make a major advance in the Third World.

But even in victory Stalin’s dogmatic adherence to the Marxist patterns of development shone through. In 1948–49, as Mao’s forces were preparing their final push to the south, Stalin warned the Chinese Communists not to put socialism on the agenda:

some representatives of [opposition] parties will have to be incorporated in the Chinese people’s democratic government, and the government as such [will have] to be proclaimed as coalition ... It should be kept in mind that after the victory of the people’s liberation armies of China – at least, in a postvictory period for which the duration is difficult to define now – the Chinese government, in terms of its policy, will be a national revolutionary-democratic government, rather than a Communist one. This means that nationalization of all lands and cancellation of the private ownership of land, confiscation of properties from the whole, major and petty, industrial and trade bourgeoisie, confiscation of properties from not only large, but middle and small landowners, who live together with their hired labor, cannot be effected yet.⁵⁷

Even during the victorious Mao Zedong’s visit to Moscow in 1949–50 Stalin persisted in treating the Chinese Communists as representatives of a “national revolutionary-democratic government, rather than a Communist one.” Uncertain about the long-term viability of a Communist leadership in Beijing, Stalin aimed at getting a treaty that was conducive to Soviet security, rather than an alliance between two Communist-led states. It took concerted and courageous intervention by his key advisers to get him to offer the Chinese something that would give them the recognition they craved as revolutionaries from the head of the world Communist movement. But even after the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed, on 14 February 1950, Stalin kept his doubts about the authenticity of the Chinese Communist leaders. If they were genuine Communists, the *vozhd* explained to his coterie, they would not last long in power in a country at China’s level of development. If the Beijing government seemed secure, that in itself was evidence of its non-Marxist character.

Stalin's last Third World adventure, the Korean War, testified to how far down the road toward theoretical tautologies the Boss came during his final years. Seeing socialism in only the northern part of Korea as unviable in the long run, in spite of the new Democratic People's Republic of Korea under Kim Il Sung being contiguous to the Soviet Union and receiving aid from it, Stalin by early 1950 claimed that "the South was determined to launch an attack on the North sooner or later and it was important to forestall this aggression." In giving Kim the go-ahead to attack the US-supported regime in South Korea, Stalin also pointed to "the significant strengthening of the socialist camp in the east: the victory of the Chinese revolution, the signing of an alliance between the USSR and the PRC, and the USSR's acquisition of an atomic bomb," as well as "the obvious weakness of the reactionary camp: the shameful defeat of America's intervention into Chinese affairs, Western troubles in Southeast Asia, and the inability of the South Korean regime and its American masters to improve the social, economic, and political situation in South Korea." For Stalin, indirect support of Kim's war would also be a way of getting back at "the dishonest, perfidious, and arrogant behavior of the United States in Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and especially its decision to form NATO."⁵⁸

It was pessimism and not optimism about the future of the Korean revolution that led Stalin to accept Kim's plan for reunification by military force. As many of the Communists who were in charge of Soviet foreign policy realized, the Korean War showed that Stalin had left behind any hope that social processes in the Third World by themselves would lead toward socialism. Even under the best of geographical and political circumstances – such as in North Korea – the primary objective of Third World Communism should be to serve Soviet purposes in the global Cold War, because the defined circumstances under which they themselves could carry out a successful social transformation were so narrow as to be almost nonexistent. It was as if Stalin – having started the climb toward socialism in one country – was deliberately kicking away the ladder for others to follow.

The Soviet rediscovery of the Third World (1955–60)

Stalin's last known in-depth comments on Third World problems are in his secret instructions to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) from January 1951. After having criticized the Indonesian party for their "leftism" both during the failed 1948 rebellion against the nationalist independence movement under Sukarno and during the subsequent gradual reestablishment of the party under Chinese tutelage, the Boss

went on to show the impossibility of an Indonesian Communist revolution. Even building on the Chinese model would not work:

they [the Chinese] at last found a good way out, when they moved to Manchuria and found a solid rear [base] in the friendly Soviet state. Characteristically, only after [the] Chinese comrades got a solid rear base in Manchuria and after they began leaning against the USSR as against their own rear, the enemy lost the chance to encircle them and the Chinese Communists found an opportunity to wage a planned offensive against Chiang Kai-shek's army from north to south. Can we suppose that the Indonesian comrades, after they have gained a guerrilla-liberated area, will have the opportunity, as the Chinese comrades did, to lean against frontiers as against their own rear [base] and thus deprive the enemy of the opportunity to encircle them? No, we cannot say that, as Indonesia represents a group of islands encircled by seas, and the Indonesian comrades could not lean anywhere.⁵⁹

To the Soviet Communists who took over after Stalin's death in March 1953, the Boss's Third World policy seemed self-defeating. In spite of serious disagreements as to the future of socialism, they all agreed to end armed interventionism, such as in Korea, and to emphasize the government-to-government links that could be built not only with self-declared socialist regimes – such as China – but also with radical bourgeois regimes ("Jacobins," in Comintern terms), such as Sukarno's Indonesia, Nasser's Egypt, or Nehru's India. The new party leader, Nikita Khrushchev, underlined the new policies by making a trip to Beijing in 1954, his first major visit abroad, and by traveling to India, Burma, and Afghanistan the following year. During his trip to South Asia, the new first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (renamed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CPSU, in 1952) stressed Soviet willingness to cooperate with the "national development" of nonsocialist countries in the Third World both in economic and military terms. The common enemy, the Soviets stated, was colonialism and imperialism on a worldwide scale.

For Khrushchev – an intelligent but unschooled peasants' son who had made his way up Stalinism's slippery slope by boundless enthusiasm for hard work – visiting India was just the beginning of a much broader campaign for gaining influence in the Third World. As he solidified his grip on power within the Soviet state, Khrushchev attacked Stalin's policies toward Asia, Africa, and Latin America in two different directions. On the one hand, the *vozhd* had neglected the Third World, by focusing too narrowly on those national-bourgeois movements that by themselves had sought friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, and by not attempting "actively" to forge links with others. On the other hand, Stalin had failed to see that transitions to socialism could take many different forms, and that more assistance to Third World workers' parties was needed, even if some of these parties had no chance of gaining power

on their own in the short run. Khrushchev's big fear was that Stalin's policies had nearly made the Soviet Union miss the train in the new and historical departure away from colonial empires and toward the establishment of independent states. In 1956, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev – after sensationally condemning Stalin's general behavior as "vile," "monstrous," and "terrorist" – declared that

The new period that Lenin predicted in world history when peoples of the East take an active part in settling the destinies of the whole world and become a new, powerful factor in international relations, has arrived ... In order to create an independent national economy and to raise the living standards of their peoples, these countries, though not part of the world socialist system, can benefit by its achievements. They now have no need to go begging to their former oppressors for modern equipment. They can obtain such equipment in the socialist countries.⁶⁰

Typically for Khrushchev's regime, the new leadership – while condemning Stalin – were unable to move away from much of the dogmatism that the Boss had bequeathed to Soviet ideology. In its Third World policies, this meant that the narrow thinking about "stages of development" was still in place, as was the Soviet-centrism of Moscow's perceptions of the outside world. What did improve was Soviet knowledge about the Third World, through a full-scale revamping of the institutions that provided the information upon which the leadership could act. In its self-criticism after the twentieth party congress, the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies declared that its work had "been greatly harmed by a failure to understand the nature and the depth of the contradictions existing between the forces of imperialism and internal reaction, on the one hand, and those of national progress in the nonsocialist Eastern countries on the other."⁶¹ The institute's work was expanded, and new institutes for the study of Africa and Latin America were set up in 1960 and 1961 respectively. The Soviet intelligence services were reorganized, and both the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, KGB) and military intelligence (Glavnoie razvedivatelnoie upravlenie, GRU – Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) were given specific geographical briefs relating to Third World information gathering. Most important of all, the Central Committee reorganized its international work, setting up two new departments, the International Department (Mezhdunarodnyi otdel, MO) and the Department for Relations with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries (later called the International Liaison Department). Both departments were under the control of Comintern veteran Boris Ponomarev, who was also made a member of the Secretariat.⁶²

Of all the big tasks Khrushchev foresaw for the Soviet Union in the Third World, building the alliance with China was by far the most important. Not just the First Secretary, but the whole party leadership was convinced that the socialist transformation of the most populous country on earth was a task that the Soviet Union had to engage in – it not only confirmed their Marxist worldview, but also highlighted the universal centrality of the Soviet experience in building socialism. The assistance program carried out under the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty was the Soviet Union's Marshall Plan – already in May 1953, two months after Stalin's death, Moscow agreed to increase aid to China sevenfold over two years, and the total cost of the program up to 1960 was about twenty billion roubles in export prices, something which the historian Sergei Goncharenko estimates as equaling 7 percent of Soviet national income for the period. It was a massive attempt at stamping Soviet socialism on China – in every department of every ministry, in every large factory, in every city, army, or university there were Soviet advisers, specialists, or experts who worked with the Chinese to "modernize" their country and move their society toward socialism. Their achievements changed the Chinese economy forever and – unbeknown to the Soviet experts or their Chinese comrades – were to lay the foundation for the Chinese capitalist revolution of the 1980s and 1990s.⁶³

Out of the increasingly close cooperation, Khrushchev saw developing a future international socialist community – with the Soviet Union at the center – that replicated many of the functions the capitalist world economy had (*sans capitalism*, of course). International distribution networks would supply standardized and unified production lines from Berlin to Shanghai, research and training would be shared between socialist countries, as would innovations in technology, defense, and planning, and ideological questions would be decided at international congresses. In the Chinese case, however, the problem with increasing integration was that the basic acceptance of the Soviet model – which underpinned all of Khrushchev's project – was beginning to be questioned by the late 1950s. Mao Zedong wanted "more, faster, better, and cheaper" socialism, and by designing "The Great Leap Forward" in 1958 he broke decisively with all Soviet advice about caution and stages. At the same time, through its conflict with India and its criticism of Soviet *détente* with the United States, China broke with the key concept of Moscow setting the tune for the "socialist camp" in international affairs.

By 1959 the Sino-Soviet relationship was in crisis. The personal diplomacy that Khrushchev engaged in by visiting Beijing had little effect. Mao Zedong saw the Soviet slogan of "peaceful competition" with the West as class treason, and Moscow's alliance policies with nonsocialist Third

Capitalism

World regimes as directed against China. Khrushchev tried to defend his new line as tactics – “Nehru,” he said, “may go over to the United States. He is among our fellow travelers who go with us when it is to their advantage. When we delivered assistance to Nasser, we knew that he might turn against us. Had we not given him this credit, Nasser would have ended up in America’s embrace.”⁶⁴ But Mao could not be mollified, and in the summer of 1960 Khrushchev reacted to the steady pinpricks of criticism coming from Beijing by abruptly withdrawing most Soviet experts from the PRC. The First Secretary and those working with him failed to understand that for Mao Zedong the real issue was the future of the Chinese revolution – by sticking too closely to the advice the Soviets gave, the rapid advance toward socialism that the Chairman envisaged would simply not be possible. By 1962 Khrushchev had condemned the Chinese as careless, ungrateful, and chauvinist peasants, and although it took up to 1965 for the final remnants of the alliance to vanish, the increasingly heated public polemics between Moscow and Beijing convinced the Soviets of the future problems the confrontation with Chinese socialism would pose.

The difficulties with China presented the Soviet leaders not only with new security issues and with increased competition for influence in the Third World. It also posed a formidable challenge to Soviet foreign policy ideology. The relationship to China had been lauded as the ultimate proof of socialism’s applicability to the Third World, and, up to 1958, Soviet experts had held the People’s Republic of China up to the North Vietnamese and the North Koreans as the near perfect application of Marxist political theory in “oriental” countries. With the alliance in tatters, Moscow had to explain what had gone wrong and to stake out the road ahead. On the one hand, the wrecking of the supposedly irreversible gains made in China was explained by the wrongheadedness of the “Mao-clique,” which had come to power due to the Chinese party’s lack of “proletarian experience.” On the other hand, the combination of immense disappointment and no proper cause for failure led many Soviet leaders to racist explanations: the Soviet effort in China was failing because of the inborn deviousness and selfishness of the Chinese.

Just like the United States in the 1950s, the Soviet Union in the 1960s made no attempts to learn from its failure in China. On the contrary, the former alliance became a taboo area of Soviet foreign policy, rarely touched on in official or unofficial discourse. The many advisers who had served in China, and whose experience could have benefited future Soviet Third World policy, instead became the “lost generation” in foreign affairs, rarely allowed near international relations in any form again. Those who were put in charge of what Khrushchev envisaged to be a

full-scale attempt at competing with the United States in the newly liberated countries in Africa and Asia were mostly young people with very little experience abroad. Their main frame of reference was *not* China but the successes the Soviet Union had had in technology and production in the 1950s. It was Soviet modernity that would win people for Communism abroad, as socialism – freed from Stalin’s shackles – showed its full productive potential. Two key projects that would inspire Soviet assistance to the Third World were the Virgin Lands campaign and the space program. The attempt at bringing into cultivation 32 million acres of previously uncultivated land in Kazakhstan and southwestern Siberia, begun in 1954, was a flagship of the new and intensive growth phase that the Soviet Union claimed to have entered. Using massive amounts of irrigation and chemical fertilizers to develop the barren plain, Khrushchev’s leadership assumed that they had devised a new way of intensifying food production. The launch of the first space vessel, the Sputnik, in 1957 and the first manned space flight by Iurii Gagarin in 1961 convinced most Soviets that they had the upper hand over the West in technology and science. Together, Soviet know-how in agriculture and industry would revolutionize production at home and make it possible for countries moving toward socialism to move faster and with fewer concessions to the West. In his speech to the United Nations in 1960, Khrushchev saw the joining of national liberation in the Third World with socialism’s productive potential as symbolizing the future:

Everyone knows that the economics of the colonies ... are at present subordinated to the mercenary interests of foreign monopolies, and the industrialization of these countries is being deliberately impeded. Imagine that the situation has changed and that these countries and territories, having become independent, are in a position to make ample use of their rich natural resources and to proceed with their industrialization, and that a better life has begun for their peoples. This would ... no doubt have a beneficial effect, not only on the economic development of the countries of the East but also on the economies of the industrially developed countries of the West.⁶⁵

To his audiences within the party and the international Communist movement, such as at a closed meeting on political theory and propaganda in January 1961, Khrushchev stressed the same idea in more ideological terms:

Bourgeois and revisionist politicians claim that the national-liberation movement develops independently of the struggle for socialism waged by the working class, independently of the support of the socialist countries, and that the colonialists themselves bestow freedom on the peoples of the former colonies. The purpose of these fabrications is to isolate the newly independent states from the socialist

camp and to try to prove that they should assume the role of a “third force” in the international arena instead of opposing imperialism. Needless to say, this is sheer humbug. It is a historical fact that prior to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the peoples failed in their attempts to break the chains of colonialism. History proves that until socialism triumphed in at least a part of the world there could be no question of destroying colonialism.⁶⁶

By the early 1960s Soviet ideology had already reached a stage where the competition for influence in the Third World was an essential part of the existence of socialism. As in the United States, the Soviet elites saw their mission as part of a world-historical progression toward a given goal. Their view of their own role in that process was conditioned not just by Marxist-Leninist political theory but also by Russian exceptionalism and by the experiences of the Soviet leadership since 1917. In spite of setbacks and retreats the Soviet elite firmly believed that socialism would replace capitalism as the main international system within a generation. Stalin’s successors held that the transition could be managed without global war only if the imperialists became convinced that they could not successfully intervene against social revolution outside their own borders. The Soviet Union’s role was to help make the world safe for revolution and thereby to assist in the progress of humankind.

INTRODUCTION

1. Jasper Griffin, "It's All Greek!," *New York Review of Books*, 18 December 2003. The study of the ancient world may have more to offer Cold War historians than most of us think. When reviewing the role of local elites in the Cold War (see chapter 3), I am reminded of the people of Corcyra's message to the Athenians, offering one of the superpowers of the Greek world a fateful alliance in about 433 BCE: "Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance you will congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to you. First, because your assistance will be rendered to a power which, herself inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly, because all that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of good will which will ever keep alive the gratitude you lay up in our hearts" (Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960], ch. 2, § 33).
2. George Orwell, "You and the Atomic Bomb," *Tribune*, 19 October 1945.
3. See for instance the furious debate over *Tiermondisme* (Third-Worldism) in France in the late 1980s and early 1990s reflected in Claude Liauzu, *L'enjeu tiersmondiste: débats et combats* (The *Tiersmondiste* Stakes: Debates and Battles) (Paris: Harmattan, 1987). For the historical background, see Denis Pelletier, *Economie et humanisme: de l'utopie communautaire au combat pour le tiers-monde: 1941-1966* (Economy and Humanism: From Communitarian Utopia to Struggle for the Third World) (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1996).
4. I am borrowing Immanuel Wallerstein's use of the term; see his "Cultures in Conflict? Who are We? Who are the Others?", Y. K. Pao Distinguished Chair Lecture, Center for Cultural Studies, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 20 September 2000.
5. Nirad Chaudhury, *Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (London: Macmillan, 1951).

1 THE EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: AMERICAN IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS

1. William Jennings Bryan, "Imperialism," in *Under Other Flags: Travels, Lectures, Speeches* (Lincoln, NB: Woodruff-Collins Printing Co., 1904).

2. Jefferson quoted in Bradford Perkins, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, vol. I, *The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 93.
3. Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).
4. Jefferson to John Adams, 28 October 1813, in Joyce Appleby and Terence Ball, eds., *Thomas Jefferson: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 190.
5. Jefferson to the Marquis de Lafayette, 30 November 1813, *ibid.*, pp. 191-192.
6. The 1781 Articles of Confederation explicitly reserved a place for Canada in the new state.
7. The genocide against the Native American nations was, Frederick Hoxie argues convincingly, as much a result of US greed for land and resources as it was a consequence of the ideology that positioned them as enemies; see Frederick Hoxie et al., eds., *Native Americans and the Early Republic* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1999).
8. Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2000), p. 83.
9. Adams, 4 July 1865, cited in *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), vol. III, pp. 149-150.
10. As Frye Jacobsen notes, Walker was eventually overthrown, not by Nicaraguan guerrillas, but by Cornelius Vanderbilt, whose shipping interests Walker had crossed (*Barbarian Virtues*, p. 39).
11. Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace* (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1979), p. 117.
12. Richard Wright, *Black Boy* (New York: Library of America, 1991 [1943/1944]).
13. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address 1938, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. VII (New York: Random House, n.d.).
14. Roosevelt, speech to the Foreign Policy Association, 21 October 1944, in *Vital Speeches*, 11 (1 November 1944), p. 38. For more on the perceptual links between the two world wars, see John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), especially pp. 35-43.
15. Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 386.
16. Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom* (New York: Norton, 1998), p. 134. In the 1950s Aguinaldo, who died in 1964, wrote a book in which he praised American freedom; Aguinaldo with Vicente Albano Pacis, *A Second Look at America* (New York: R. Speller, 1957). As late as 1952 the Philippines were still the largest recipient of US aid in the Third World.
17. US Army film, 1945, quoted in John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 2000), p. 215.
18. Paul G. Hoffman, *Peace Can Be Won* (New York: Doubleday, 1951), p. 130.
19. Robert E. Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), p. 1.

20. *Major Speeches and Debates of Senator Joseph McCarthy Delivered in the United States Senate 1950–1951* (New York: Garden Press, 1975).
21. Marshall quoted in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 558.
22. *Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention Held in Kansas City, Mo., July 4, 5 and 6, 1900* (Chicago, IL: McLellan Printing Co., 1900), pp. 205–227.
23. “Statement of Students for a Democratic Society, National Convention Meeting in Port Huron, Michigan, June 11–15, 1962,” on <http://www.coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~lhst306/documents/huron.html>.
24. Jacobsen, *Barbarian Virtues*, p. 46.
25. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States*, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 4–6; Robert E. Lipsey, “US Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments, 1800–1913,” *ibid.*, pp. 685–732. See also Irving B. Kravis, “Trade as a Handmaiden of Growth: Similarities between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” *Economic Journal*, 80 (1970): 850–872.
26. Lance E. Davis and Robert J. Cull, “International Capital Movements, Domestic Capital Markets, and American Economic Growth, 1820–1914,” in Engerman and Gallman, eds., *Cambridge Economic History of the United States*, vol. II, pp. 733–812.
27. The importance of new foreign markets seems to have been mainly to provide higher “price elasticity” for US goods; when technology increases production, a slump in prices at home could be avoided through exporting the surplus; see Lipsey, “US Foreign Trade,” pp. 700–732.
28. Bennett D. Baack and Edward John Ray, “Tariff Policy and Comparative Advantage in the Iron and Steel Industry, 1870–1929,” *Explorations in Economic History*, 11 (1974): 103–121.
29. On new immigration laws and their connection to the Cold War, see Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, pp. 281–282.
30. Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis*, p. 124.
31. Dulles to C. P. Jackson, 24 August 1954, Jackson Papers, quoted from H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 108.
32. Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis*, p. 70.
33. Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, p. 271. See also Robert W. Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997) and Karal Ann Marling, *As Seen on TV: The Visual Culture of Everyday Life in the 1950s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
34. *Social Science Research Council Annual Report 1956–1957* (Washington, DC: SSRC, 1957), pp. 19–20.
35. Gabriel Almond, “Introduction,” in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Study of Developing Areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3–4.

36. Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), pp. 2–8.
 37. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
 38. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (hereafter PPP-US), John F. Kennedy, vol. I (Washington, DC: US Printing Office, 1962), pp. 204–206, John F. Kennedy, special message to Congress on foreign aid, 22 March 1961.
 39. Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960). Kissinger devotes a chapter to his views “On Political Evolution: The West, Communism, and the New Nations,” in which he combines a modernization theory approach with considerable pessimism about America’s ability to face up to the challenge of Third World transitions. “A Russian seeing the growth of the Communist empire over the past fifteen years would not naturally come to the conclusion that its system of political organization was basically wrong,” he writes. “If the issue is simply the relative capacity to promote economic development, the outcome is foreordained [in favor of Communism].”
 40. Quoted in Gerard T. Rice, *The Bold Experiment: JFK’s Peace Corps* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), p. 15. See also Elizabeth Cobbs Hofman, “Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Foreign Policy of the Peace Corps,” in Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss, eds., *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2001), pp. 123–153.
 41. Schlesinger to Kennedy, 10 March 1961, quoted in Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and Nation-Building in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 81.
 42. Memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and Mobutu, 31 May 1963, in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter FRUS), 1961–1963, vol. XX, pp. 858–863.
 43. Rostow to Kennedy, 11 November 1961, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. I, pp. 574–575.
 44. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*, p. 189.
 45. Martin Luther King, Jr., speech at Riverside Church, New York City, 4 April 1967, in *I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World* (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 1992), pp. 138–139.
 46. Malcolm, speech at Palm Gardens, New York, 8 April 1964, in *Malcolm X Speaks* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1965), p. 50.
- ## 2 THE EMPIRE OF JUSTICE: SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS
1. Quoted in Andreas Kappeler, *Russland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Russia as a Multiethnic Empire: Formation, History, Collapse) (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1992), p. 146.
 2. Quoted *ibid.*, p. 163.
 3. Quoted in Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals* (London: John Murray, 2000), p. 218.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
5. Lenin, "The Heritage We Renounce," in *Collected Works*, 4th English edn. (Moscow: Progress, 1972), vol. II, pp. 493–534.
6. By far the most comprehensive examination of the causes of Russian revolution is Richard Pipes's *The Russian Revolution 1899–1919* (New York: Knopf, 1990). For a comparative view of the structural causes, see Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
7. Nikolai Berdiaev, "Materialism Destroys the Eternal Spirit," on <http://www.cjd.org/paper/roots/rmateri.html>.
8. S. N. Bulgakov, "Geroizm i podvizhnichestvo" (Heroism and Martyrdom), in *Vekhi: sbornik statei o russkoi intelligentsii* (Landmarks: A Collection of Articles about the Russian Intelligentsia) (1909; Moscow: Novosti, 1990), p. 33; see also Robert English's fascinating overview *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 23.
9. Lenin, "The Attitude of the Workers Party to Religion," May 1909, in *Collected Works*, vol. XV, pp. 402–413. Interestingly, Lenin's article was written in part as a response to Anatoli Lunacharskii's *Marxism and Religion* (1907), in which the future church-burning Culture Commissar drew analogies between the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the struggle for a Kingdom of God – the three wise men, Owen, Bakunin, and Marx, bow down at the manger of the newly born proletariat.
10. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," in *Collected Works*, vol. XX, pp. 393–454. This article was written between February and May 1914 and was serialized in the journal *Posveshchenie* (see nos. 4–6, April–June 1914).
11. Lenin, "Report on Foreign Policy, Delivered at a Joint Meeting of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Moscow Soviet," 14 May 1918, in *Collected Works*, vol. XXVII, pp. 365–381.
12. Lenin, "Manifesto to the Ukrainian People, with an Ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada," 3 December 1917, in *Collected Works*, vol. XXVI, pp. 361–363.
13. Stalin, "The Immediate Tasks of Communism in Georgia and Transcaucasia: Report to a General Meeting of the Tiflis Organisation of the Communist Party of Georgia," 6 July 1921, in *Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), vol. V, pp. 90–102, quote on pp. 95–96, originally published in *Pravda Gruzii*, 108 (13 July 1921).
14. Lenin, notes dictated 20 December 1922, in *Collected Works*, vol. XXXVI, pp. 593–611.
15. Reinhart Eisener, "The Emergence of the Ferghana Basmacis," on <http://www.yeniturkiye.com>.
16. Karl Marx, "The Future Results of the British Rule in India," *New York Daily Tribune*, 22 July 1853.
17. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline* (1917; London: Pluto, 1996).
18. Lenin, "Address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East," 22 November 1919, in *Polnos*

- sobranie sochinenii (Collected works) (5th edn; Moscow: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1960–70), vol. XXXIX, pp. 318–331.
19. Lenin, "Letter to the Propaganda and Action Council of the Peoples of the East," December 1921, in V. I. Lenin, *ibid.*, vol. XXXIXIV, p. 282.
20. Chernomordyuk to Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party leaders, n.d., quoted in Babaar, *Twentieth-Century Mongolia*, ed. C. Kaplonski, trans. D. Sühjargalmaa et al. (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 1999), p. 304. For an overview, see Irina Morozova, *The Comintern and Revolution in Mongolia* (Isle of Skye: White Horse Press, 2002).
21. See Kai Schmidt-Soltau, *Eine Welt zu gewinnen! Die antikoloniale Strategie-Debatte in der Kommunistischen Internationale zwischen 1917 und 1929 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Theorien von Manabendra Nath Roy* (A World to Gain! The Debate over Anti-Colonial Strategy in the Communist International between 1917 and 1929, with Particular Attention to the Theories of Manabendra Nath Roy) (Bonn: Pahl Rungenstein, 1994).
22. Sultan Galiev quoted in Ayse Azade Rorlich, "Mirsaid Sultan Galiev and National Communism," on <http://www.yeniturkiye.com>.
23. *Zhizn natsionalnostei* (Nationalities Life), 38 (5 October 1919).
24. Sultan Galiev was arrested in 1928 and shot in prison in 1941. For a good overview, see Rorlich, "Galiev and National Communism." See also Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Qelquejay, *Sultan Galiev, le père de la révolution tiers-mondiste* (Paris: Fayard, 1986) and *Les mouvements nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie*, 2 vols. (Paris: Mouton, 1960, 1964); Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 191–254; Hélène Carrère d'Encausse and Stuart R. Schram, *Marxism and Asia: An Introduction with Readings* (London: Allen Lane, 1969), pp. 178–180. Galiev's writings have recently been published in Tatarstan: see *Statei, vystupleniya, dokumenty* (Articles, Speeches, Documents) (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe, 1992) and *Izbrannye trudy* (Selected Works) (Kazan: Gazyr, 1998); see also B. F. Sultanbekov and D. R. Sharafutdinov, comps., *Neizvestnyi Sultan-Galiev: rasskrychennye dokumenty i materialy* (The Unknown Sultan Gailiev: Declassified Documents and Materials) (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe, 2002).
25. Ken Post, *Revolution's Other World: Communism and the Periphery, 1917–39* (Hounds mills: Macmillan, 1997), p. 79.
26. Yang Kuisong, *Zhong gong yu Mosike de guanxi, 1920–1960* (The Relations Between the Chinese Communists and Moscow, 1920–1969) (Taibei: Dongda, 1997). Key texts for understanding the Stalinist view of the world are *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): A Short Course* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1939) and Joseph Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism* (New York: International Publishers, 1932).
27. By far the best overview of this crime is Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (London: Pimlico, 1986, 2002), but see also Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Anne

- Applebaum, *GULAG: A History of the Soviet Camps* (London: Allen Lane, 2003), and for harrowing testimony, Viktor Danilov et al., eds.-in-chief, *Tragediya sovetskoi derevni: kollektivizatsiya i raskulachivanie: dokumenty i materialy, 1927–1939* (The Tragedy of the Russian Village: Collectivization and De-Kulakization, 1927–1939), three vols. to date (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999–).
28. Post, *Revolutions's other World*, p. 136.
29. The Labor-Defender (November 1928), quoted from *The Complete Published Works of W. E. B. Du Bois* (Millwood, NY: Kraus-Thomson Organization, 1982), vol. II (1910–1934), p. 302. Du Bois, an admirer of the Soviet Union, finally applied to join the US Communist Party in 1961 at the age of 91.
30. Georgi Dimitrov, diary entry for 7 November 1937, in Ivo Banac, ed., *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 65.
31. Georgi Dimitrov, diary entry for 7 September 1939, *ibid.*, p. 115.
32. The new CC organizations were first known as the Department of International Information, then (from 1946) the Department of Foreign Policy, and from 1958 the International Departments. See Iurii A. Poliakov, “Posle rospuska kominterna” (After the Dissolution of the Comintern), *Novaia i noveishaiia istoriia*, 1 (2003): 106–116.
33. Georgi Dimitrov, diary entry for 25 November 1940, in Banac, ed., *Diary of Dimitrov*, p. 137.
34. Report to the Central Committee by the All-Russian Society for Cultural Relations with Turkey (1946), quoted in Artiom Ulunian, “Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945–1958,” *Cold War History*, 3.2 (January 2003): 40.
35. According to the Central Committee, “the justifiable nature of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Government is provided by centuries-long historical experience, which has clearly shown how important it is for the Black Sea Powers to guard the access to the Straits. The joint defense of the Straits by Russia and Turkey, as was the case during the Napoleonic Wars, corresponds fully to the interests of both states and would provide real security for their Black Sea possessions.” K. V. Bazilevich, “On ‘the Black Sea Straits’: The History of the Question,” minutes of a public lecture given in Moscow on 18 October 1946, quoted in Ulunian, “Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece,” 40.
36. Litvinov to Molotov, 22 June 1945, *Arkhiv vnesheini politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation; hereafter AVPRF), f. 0431/1, op. 1, pa. 5, d. 33, pp. 8–19; see also Sergei Mazov, “SSSR i sudba byvshykh italianskikh kolonii (1945–1950 gg.)” (The USSR and the Fate of the Former Italian Colonies), in N. Komolov, ed., *Rossiia i Italia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1998), pp. 211–241, and a slightly different version in *Cold War History*, 3.3 (April 2003); Apollon Davidson and Sergei Mazov, eds., *Rossiia i Afrika. Dokumenty i materialy. XVIII v. – 1960* (Russia and Africa. Documents and materials. The Eighteenth Century – 1960), vol. II, 1918–1960 (Moscow: IVI RAN, 1999).
37. Litvinov to Molotov, AVPRF, f. 0431/1, op. 1, pa. 5, d. 33, pp. 17–18.
38. AVPRF, f. 0431/1, op. 1, pa. 5, d. 33, p. 45. Much later, Molotov admitted that “it was a difficult argument” (Feliks Chuev, *Sto srok besed s Molotovim*

- [One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov] [Moscow: TERRA, 1992], p. 103).
39. Stalin to Molotov, 20 November 1946, quoted in Vladimir Pechatnov “The Allies are pressing on you to break your will . . .,” *Foreign Policy Correspondence between Stalin, Molotov, and other Politburo Members, September 1945–December 1946*, Cold War International History Project (hereafter CWIHP), Working Paper 26 (1999), p. 22. Litvinov's original proposals saw no such barriers in confronting British imperialism: Eritrea and Italian Somalia could be of interest as “intermediate bases between the Black Sea and the Far East, as well as an instrument of influence on the neighbouring Arab countries and Abyssinia.” Somalia's ports were “naval (and air force) bases, threatening four important sea routes, having a lot of significance for England: the one around South Africa, the Suez-Bombay, Suez-Colombo and Zanzibar-Bombay routes.” Eritrea's strategic significance was defined as follows: “(1) the gate to Abyssinia; (2) a potential bridgehead for military actions against Abyssinia, Somalia, British Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Aden; (3) controls the sea routes across the Red Sea and the Bab el Mandeb Strait” (Litvinov to Molotov, AVPRF, f. 0431/1, op. 1, pa. 5, d. 33, pp. 9–13, quoted from Mazov, “SSSR i sudba byvshykh italianskikh,” 52).
40. For Khomeini see Hamid Algar, “Religious Forces in Twentieth-Century Iran,” *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. VII, *From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 752. Khomeini wrote *Kashf al-Asrar* (The Unveiling of Secrets) in 1944, in which he argued that the prophets, while fully absorbed in the contemplation of God, had fought to bring about transformations in the social and political conditions of men. He also condemned rule by foreign powers and their agents, like the Shah.
41. Beria to Stalin, 16 August 1944, *Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation; hereafter APRF), f. 6, op. 6, pa. 37, d. 37, pp. 15–18.
42. VKP(b) CC, Politburo to Mir Bagirov, 6 July 1945, quoted from Fernande Beatrice Scheid, “Stalin, Bagirov and Soviet Policies in Iran, 1939–1946,” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 2000, pp. 259–60.
43. See Natalia I. Yegorova, *The “Iran Crisis” of 1945–46: A View from the Russian Archives*, CWIHP, Working Paper 15 (1996), p. 11. For Bagirov's aims, see Scheid, “Stalin, Bagirov,” p. 253.
44. Tudeh CC to VKP(b) CC, (11?) September 1945, *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii* (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History; hereafter RGASPI), f. 17, op. 128, d. 819, p. 182; see also report by representatives of Tudeh, 11 October 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 819. The Soviets received detailed reports from Ardashir Ovanessian, a member of the Tudeh Politburo, on the political reactions among Iranian Communists to Stalin's Iranian policies; see letters dated 21 September to 5 October 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 819, pp. 32–88.
45. In August 1945 officers close to the *Tudeh* rebelled and seemed ready to march on Teheran, but the uprising collapsed after the Soviets had made their displeasure clear to the Iranian Communists.

46. Bagirov to Atakishiev, 15 November 1945, quoted from Scheid, "Stalin, Bagirov," p. 285.
47. William Eagleton Jr., *The Kurdish Republic of 1946* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 43–62, 103; for Qazi Mohammad see pp. 34–35.
48. For the British view of Qavam, see Sir Clarmont Skrine, *World War in Iran* (London: Constable, 1962), pp. 231–237.
49. Soviet notes on Qavam in AVPRF, f. 94, op. 37e, pa. 362a, d. 1, pp. 10–13.
50. Record of conversation between Qavam and Molotov, 23 February, 1946, AVPRF, f. 94, op. 37e, pa. 362a, d. 1, p. 27.
51. The full records of the talks are in a special collection in the AVPRF: "Sovetsko-iranskie peregovori v Moskve i Tegerane v fevrale-aprele 1946g – kratkaia spravka," AVPRF, f. 094, op. 37e, pa. 362a, d. 1. For the Tudeh's reaction to the talks, see record of conversation with Ardasher Ovanessian, Tudeh Politburo member, 15 February 1946, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 848, pp. 11–12.
52. Record of conversation between Qavam and Molotov, 25 February 1946, AVPRF, f. 094, op. 37e, pa. 362a, d. 1, p. 37.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 40–42.
54. Record of conversation between Bagirov and Pishevari, 4–5 April 1946, quoted from Scheid, "Stalin, Bagirov," p. 335.
55. Stalin to Pishevari, 8 May 1946, quoted from Yegorova, "Iran Crisis," pp. 23–24.
56. Intelligence summary for the Politburo, 23 June 1947, quoted from Scheid, "Stalin, Bagirov," p. 353.
57. Stalin to Mao, 20 April 1948, APRF, f. 39, op. 1, d. 31, p. 28.
58. Stalin's remarks to Kim Il Sung during conversations in Moscow, April 1950, quoted from *DPRK Report* (Moscow), no. 23 (March–April 2000).
59. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 313, pp. 13–14, quoted from Larisa Efimova, "Stalin and the Revival of the Communist Party of Indonesia," unpublished manuscript. As to Indonesian proposals for "the overthrow of the domination of the inner reactionaries who are serving the imperialists" and "their replacement with a democratic coalition government," Stalin exclaimed: "Wrong!" The same was Stalin's reaction to the call for "the union with the USSR, China and the states of people's democracy."
60. Khrushchev, "Speech to a Closed Session of the CPSU Twentieth Party Congress," 25 February 1956, in Thomas P. Whitney, ed., *Khrushchev Speaks!* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 259–265.
61. *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie*, 1 (1956): 6–9.
62. When referring to these CC departments I will use the abbreviation MO for both, since in reality they functioned as one unit under Ponomarev's leadership.
63. See Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).
64. Record of conversation between Khrushchev and Mao, 2 October 1959, APRF, f. 52, op. 1, d. 499, pp. 1–33.
65. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Fifteenth Session, pp. 68–84.

66. Khrushchev speech, 6 January 1961, in Whitney, ed., *Khrushchev Speaks!*, pp. 52–61.
- ### 3 THE REVOLUTIONARIES: ANTIcolonIAL POLITICS AND TRANSFORMATIONS
1. The total colonial population at the outbreak of World War II was around 800 million (Mary Evelyn Townsend, *European Colonial Expansion Since 1871* [Chicago, IL: J. P. Lippincott, 1941], p. 19).
 2. Good surveys of the colonization of Africa and Asia in the nineteenth century are Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), John D. Hargreaves, *West Africa Partitioned* (Hounds-mills: Macmillan, 1974, 1985), Ronald Oliver and G. N. Sanderson, eds., *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. VI, *From 1870 to 1905* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and Nicholas Tarling's aptly titled *Imperialism in Southeast Asia: A Fleeting Passing Phase* (London: Routledge, 2001). For a superb general overview, see David B. Abernethy, *The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), especially pp. 81–104.
 3. Davis also supports the view that the famine conditions made colonial penetration easier in parts of the Third World; see Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño and the Making of the Third World* (London: Verso, 2001), pp. 117–210 for more detail on this argument. The lack of sustained and organized resistance during the first period of colonization is, of course, not the same as a lack of opposition, which in some cases was very successful, such as the Chechen and Maori in the 1840s, the Zulu at Isandlwana (1879), and the Ethiopians at Aduwa (1896).
 4. One of these universities is the London School of Economics and Political Science, where I teach. Founded in 1895 to further "education, economics, efficiency, equality, and empire," the LSE today provides plentiful opportunities to mull over the postcolonial situation.
 5. Sutan Sjahrir quoted from Abernethy, *Dynamics of Global Dominance*, p. 386.
 6. Nirad Chaudhury, *A Passage to England* (London: Macmillan, 1959), p. 19.
 7. The British colonial historian Christopher Bayly believes the beginnings of the diffusion of technology to be the cause of the many anticolonial uprisings of the mid-nineteenth century – namely, the Xhosa and Maori wars, as well as major rebellions in China, India, Jamaica, and the Caucasus. (See C. A. Bayly in Robin Winks, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. V, *Historiography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 54–72).
 8. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 97.
 9. M. N. Roy, "Open Letter to His Excellency Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, 1917," in M. N. Roy, *Selected Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987–), vol. I, p. 25.
 10. Nehru, incomplete review of Bertrand Russell's *Roads to Freedom* (1919), quoted from S. Gopal, gen. ed., *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. I (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), pp. 140–144.