

Index

Insurrection 1NC 5

Perm Answers

Perm Answers 16
A2 Perm – State bad 17
Welfare → Co-option 18

Uniqueness 19

Links

Demand Link 20
Disaster relief/Crisis Link 22
Ecology Link 23
Family Link 24
Food Stamps Link / A2 Starvation Impact Turn 25
Growth Bad Link 26
Growth Bad Link 27
Ideology Link 28
Labor Link 33
NGO Link 34
Organization links 35
Pomo/radicalism link 36
Reform Link 37
Security Link 39
Unemployment/Workers Rights links 40
War on Poverty Link 41
Welfare Can't Solve Cap – Critical Aff Ans 42
Welfare Links 44
Work Links 63

Impacts

Impact Extensions 64
Capitalism = War 66
Capitalism Kills the Planet 67
Capitalism = Genocide/Nuke War 72
Cap → Poverty 80
Cap → Poverty – Econ Crisis 81
Cap → Poverty – Enviro Collapse 82
Cap → Poverty – Marginalized Groups 83
TERRORISM IMPACTS/A2 HEGEMONY IMPACT TURNS 84
ECOLOGY IMPACTS/A2 LEWIS IMPACT TURNS 86
A2 CAP KEY TO TECH 88

Index

Alternative

Alternative – Communist Ethics	89
The Multitude Alt	91
ALTERNATIVE SOLVENCY	93
ALTERNATIVES	94
COMMONS ALT SOLVENCY	97
Alternative Solvency	100
Alto Solvo.....	101
Poor = Revolutionary class.....	102
Class Consciousness Key	104
Alt Goes Global	105
Alt Spillover.....	106
ALT SOLVES	107
ALT EMPIRICALLY SOLVES	108
Alt Solves Eugenics.....	109
Insurrection/militant alt	110
A2 you don't defend a specific alternative system	112
A2 the multitude is not a revolutionary class	113
ALT SOLVES SOCIAL ANTAGONISM	114
Alt Solves Welfare	115
Alt Solves Sovereignty	116
Alternative - Sabotage	117
Small group/Sabotage Solvency	118

Answers to Args

A2 Schmitt/Rev = Dictatorship	119
A2 REV IS VIOLENT/GENOCIDAL	121
A2 USSR Failed	122
A2: DOMINATION INEVITABLE	124
A2 Rev Not Democratic	125
A2 Police Crackdown.....	126
A2 Violent State Backlash/Army	127
A2 We are Socialism	128
A2 Cap Too Strong.....	129
A2 Cap is Stable/Sustainable.....	130
A2 Marx oversimplify history/not class struggle	131

Index

Aff Answers

Aff Ans Permutation – Demand Aff	132
Aff Ans Permutation – Demand Aff	133
Aff Perm	134
Aff Ans – Demand Solves	135
Aff Answers.....	136
Aff Answers.....	137
Aff Answers.....	138
Aff Answers.....	139
Aff Answers.....	140
Aff Answers.....	141
Aff Answers.....	142
Aff Answers.....	143
Aff Answers.....	144
Aff Answers.....	145
Aff Answers.....	146
Aff Answers.....	147
Aff Answers.....	148
Aff Answers.....	149
Aff Answers.....	150
Aff Answers.....	151
Aff Answers.....	152
Aff Answers.....	153
Aff Answers.....	154
Aff Answers.....	155
Aff Answers.....	156
Aff Answers.....	157
Aff Answers.....	158
Aff Answers.....	159
Aff Answers.....	160
Aff Answers.....	161

Insurrection 1NC

A. SUBPOINT: SOMETHING IS STIRRING IN THE HEARTS OF THE OPPRESSED. THE MUFFLED CRIES OF HUNGER AND SUBORDINATION ARE RESONATING ON AN INCREASINGLY GLOBAL SCALE. MACHINES OF AMPLIFICATION LIKE FACEBOOK, TWITTER, TRANSNATIONAL DIASPORA, GLOBAL LABOR MIGRATION, ARE EMERGING FROM THE RUBBLE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. THE INSURGENCY IS COMING. THE QUESTION IS WHAT TACTICS WILL THE STATE USE IN RESPONSE. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEMAND IS THE FIRST VOLLEY IN THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY, A SLY MANEUVER OF CO-OPTATION, COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN THE NAME OF MODERATED CAPITALISM.

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 4-10]

Everyone agrees. It's about to explode. It is acknowledged, with a serious and self-important look, in the corridors of the Assembly, just as yesterday it was repeated in the cafés. There is a certain pleasure in calculating the risks. Already, we are presented with a detailed menu of preventive measures for securing the territory. The New Years festivities take a decisive turn – “next year there’ll be no oysters, enjoy them while you can!” To prevent the celebrations from being totally eclipsed by the traditional disorder, 36,000 cops and 16 helicopters are rushed out by Alliot-Marie1 – the same clown who, during the high school demonstrations in December, tremulously watched for the slightest sign of a Greek contamination, readying the police apparatus just in case. We can discern more clearly every day, beneath the reassuring drone, the noise of preparations for open war. It's impossible to ignore its cold and pragmatic implementation, no longer even bothering to present itself as an operation of pacification.

The newspapers conscientiously draw up the list of causes for the sudden disquiet. There is the financial crisis, of course, with its booming unemployment, its share of hopelessness and of social plans, its Kerviel and Madoff scandals. There is the failure of the educational system, its dwindling production of workers and citizens, even with the children of the middle class as its raw material. There is the existence of a youth to which no political representation corresponds, a youth good for nothing but destroying the free bicycles that society so conscientiously put at their disposal.

None of these worrisome subjects should appear insurmountable in an era whose predominant mode of government is precisely the management of crises. Unless we consider that what power is confronting is neither just another crisis, nor a series of more or less chronic problems, of more or less anticipated disturbances, but a singular peril: that a form of conflict, and positions, have emerged that are explicitly not manageable.

Those who everywhere make up this peril have to ask themselves more than the trifling questions about causes, or the probabilities of inevitable movements and confrontations. They need to ask how, for instance, does the Greek chaos resonate in the French situation? An uprising here cannot be the simple transposition of what happened over there. Global civil war still has its local specificities. In France a situation of generalized rioting would provoke an explosion of another tenor. The Greek rioters are faced with a weak state, whilst being able to take advantage of a strong popularity. One must not forget that it was against the Regime of the Colonels that, only thirty years ago, democracy reconstituted itself on the basis of a practice of political violence. This violence, whose memory is not so distant, still seems intuitive to most Greeks. Even the leaders of the socialist party have thrown a molotov or two in their youth. Yet classical politics is equipped with variants that know very well how to accommodate these practices and to extend their ideological rubbish to the very heart of the riot. If the Greek battle wasn't decided, and put down, in the streets – the police being visibly outflanked there – it's because its neutralization was played out elsewhere.

There is nothing more draining, nothing more fatal, than this classical politics, with its dried up rituals, its thinking without thought, its little closed world.

The Invisible Committee continues below.

Insurrection 1NC

The Invisible Committee continued from above.

In France, our most exalted socialist bureaucrats have never been anything other than shriveled husks filling up the halls of the Assembly. Here everything conspires to annihilate even the slightest form of political intensity. Which means that it is always possible to oppose the citizen to the delinquent in a quasilinguistic operation that goes hand in hand with quasi-military operations. The riots of November 2005 and, in a different context, the social movements in the autumn of 2007, have already provided several precedents. The image of right wing students in Nanterre applauding as the police expelled their classmates offers a small glimpse of what the future holds in store.

It goes without saying that the attachment of the French to the state – the guarantor of universal values, the last rampart against the disaster – is a pathology that is difficult to undo. It's above all a fiction that no longer knows how to carry on. Our governors themselves increasingly consider it as a useless encumbrance because they, at least, take the conflict for what it is – militarily. They have no complex about sending in elite antiterrorist units to subdue riots, or to liberate a recycling center occupied by its workers. As the welfare state collapses, we see the emergence of a brute conflict between those who desire order and those who don't.

Everything that French politics has been able to deactivate is in the process of unleashing itself. It will never be able to process all that it has repressed. In the advanced degree of social decomposition, we can count on the coming movement to find the necessary breath of nihilism. Which will not mean that it won't be exposed to other limits.

Revolutionary movements do not spread by contamination but by resonance. Something that is constituted here resonates with the shock wave emitted by something constituted over there. A body that resonates does so according to its own mode. An insurrection is not like a plague or a forest fire – a linear process which spreads from place to place after an initial spark. It rather takes the shape of a music, whose focal points, though dispersed in time and space, succeed in imposing the rhythm of their own vibrations, always taking on more density. To the point that any return to normal is no longer desirable or even imaginable. When we speak of Empire we name the mechanisms of power that preventively and surgically stifle any revolutionary becoming in a situation. In this sense, Empire is not an enemy that confronts us head-on. It is a rhythm that imposes itself, a way of dispensing and dispersing reality. Less an order of the world than its sad, heavy and militaristic liquidation.

What we mean by the party of insurgents is the sketching out of a completely other composition, an other side of reality, which from Greece to the French banlieues 2 is seeking its consistency. It is now publicly understood that crisis situations are so many opportunities for the restructuring of domination. This is why Sarkozy can announce, without seeming to lie too much, that the financial crisis is “the end of a world,” and that 2009 will see France enter a new era. This charade of an economic crisis is supposed to be a novelty: we are supposed to be in the dawn of a new epoch where we will all join together in fighting inequality and global warming. But for our generation – which was born in the crisis and has known nothing but economic, financial, social and ecological crisis – this is rather difficult to accept. They won't fool us again, with another round “now we start all over again” and “it's just a question of tightening our belts for a little while.” To tell the truth, the disastrous unemployment figures no longer provoke any feeling in us. Crisis is a means of governing. In a world that seems to hold together only through the infinite management of its own collapse.

What this war is being fought over is not various ways of managing society, but irreducible and irreconcilable ideas of happiness and their worlds. We know it, and so do the powers that be. The militant remnants that see us – always more numerous, always more identifiable – are tearing out their hair trying to fit us into little compartments in their little heads. They hold out their arms to us in order to better suffocate us, with their failures, their paralysis, their stupid problematics. From elections to “transitions,” militants will

The Invisible Committee continues below.

Insurrection 1NC

The Invisible Committee continued from above.

never be anything other than that which distances us, each time a little farther, from the possibility of communism. Luckily we will accommodate neither treason nor deception for much longer.

The past has given us much too many bad answers for us not to see that the mistakes were in the questions themselves. There is no need to choose between the fetishism of spontaneity and organizational control; between the “come one, come all” of activist networks and the discipline of hierarchy; between acting desperately now and waiting desperately for later; between bracketing that which is to be lived and experimented in the name of a paradise that seems more and more like a hell the longer it is put off and flogging the dead horse of how planting carrots is enough to leave this nightmare.

Organizations are obstacles to organizing ourselves. In truth, there is no gap between what we are, what we do, and what we are becoming. Organizations – political or labor, fascist or anarchist — always begin by separating, practically, these aspects of existence. It's then easy for them to present their idiotic formalism as the sole remedy to this separation. To organize is not to give a structure to weakness. It is above all to form bonds – bonds that are by no means neutral — terrible bonds. The degree of organization is measured by the intensity of sharing – material and spiritual.

From now on, to materially organize for survival is to materially organize for attack. Everywhere, a new idea of communism is to be elaborated. In the shadows of bar rooms, in print shops, squats, farms, occupied gymnasiums, new complicities are to be born. These precious connivances must not be refused the necessary means for the deployment of their forces. Here lies the truly revolutionary potentiality of the present. The increasingly frequent skirmishes have this formidable quality: that they are always an occasion for complicities of this type, sometimes ephemeral, but sometimes also unbetrable. When a few thousand young people find the determination to assail this world, you'd have to be as stupid as a cop to seek out a financial trail, a leader, or a snitch.

Two centuries of capitalism and market nihilism have brought us to the most extreme alienations – from our selves, from others, from worlds. The fiction of the individual has decomposed at the same speed that it was becoming real. Children of the metropolis, we offer this wager: that it's in the most profound deprivation of existence, perpetually stifled, perpetually conjured away, that the possibility of communism resides.

When all is said and done, it's with an entire anthropology that we are at war. With the very idea of man. Communism then, as presupposition and as experiment. Sharing of a sensibility and elaboration of sharing. The uncovering of what is common and the building of a force. Communism as the matrix of a meticulous, audacious assault on domination. As a call and as a name for all worlds resisting imperial pacification, all solidarities irreducible to the reign of commodities, all friendships assuming the necessities of war. communism. We know it's a term to be used with caution. Not because, in the great parade of words, it may no longer be very fashionable. But because our worst enemies have used it, and continue to do so. We insist. Certain words are like battlegrounds: their meaning, revolutionary or reactionary, is a victory to be torn from the jaws of struggle.

Deserting classical politics means facing up to war, which is also situated on the terrain of language. Or rather, in the way that words, gestures and life are inseparably linked. If one puts so much effort into imprisoning as terrorists a few young communists who are supposed to have participated in publishing The Coming Insurrection, it is not because of a “thought crime”, but rather because they might embody a certain consistency between acts and thought. Something which is rarely treated with leniency. What these people are accused of is not to have written a book, nor even to have physically attacked the sacrosanct flows that irrigate the metropolis. It's that they might possibly have confronted these flows with the density of a political thought and position. That an act could have made sense according to another consistency of the world than the deserted one of Empire. Anti-terrorism claims to attack the possible future of a “criminal association.” But what is really being attacked is the future of the situation. The possibility that behind every grocer a few bad intentions are hiding, and behind every thought, the acts that it calls for. The possibility expressed by an idea of politics –

The Invisible Committee continues below.

Insurrection 1NC

The Invisible Committee continued from above.

anonymous but welcoming, disseminate and uncontrollable – which cannot be relegated to the storeroom of freedom of expression.

There remains scarcely any doubt that youth will be the first to savagely confront power. These last few years, from the riots of Spring 2001 in Algeria to those of December 2008 in Greece, are nothing but a series of warning signs in this regard. Those who 30 or 40 years ago revolted against their parents will not hesitate to reduce this to a conflict between generations, if not to a predictable symptom of adolescence. The only future of a “generation” is to be the preceding one, on a route that leads inevitably to the cemetery. Tradition would have it that everything begins with a “social movement.” Especially at a moment when the left, which has still not finished decomposing, hypocritically tries to regain its credibility in the streets. Except that in the streets it no longer has a monopoly. Just look at how, with each new mobilization of high school students – as with everything the left still dares to support – a rift continually widens between their whining demands and the level of violence and determination of the movement.

From this rift we must build a trench. If we see a succession of movements hurrying one after the other, without leaving anything visible behind them, it must nonetheless be admitted that something persists. A powder trail links what in each event has not let itself be captured by the absurd temporality of the withdrawal of a new law, or some other pretext. In fits and starts, and in its own rhythm, we are seeing something like a force take shape. A force that does not serve its time but imposes it silently.

It is no longer a matter of foretelling the collapse or depicting the possibilities of joy. Whether it comes sooner or later, the point is to prepare for it. It's not a question of providing a schema for what an insurrection should be, but of taking the possibility of an uprising for what it never should have ceased being: a vital impulse of youth as much as a popular wisdom. If one knows how to move, the absence of a schema is not an obstacle but an opportunity. For the insurgents, it is the sole space that can guarantee the essential: keeping the initiative. What remains to be created, to be tended as one tends a fire, is a certain outlook, a certain tactical fever, which once it has emerged, even now, reveals itself as determinant – and a constant source of determination. Already certain questions have been revived that only yesterday may have seemed grotesque or outmoded: they need to be seized upon, not in order to respond to them definitively, but to make them live. Having posed them anew is not the least of the Greek uprising's virtues: How does a situation of generalized rioting become an insurrectionary situation? What to do once the streets have been taken, once the police have been soundly defeated there? Do the parliaments still deserve to be attacked? What is the practical meaning of deposing power locally? How to decide? How to subsist? how to find each other?

Insurrection 1NC

B. Links

B1: THE IDEOLOGY MACHINE:

WELFARE AND SOCIAL SERVICES ARE NOT BENIGN FORMS OF CHARITY IT IS THE PRIMARY IDEOLOGICAL MACHINE OF CAPITALISM. SELF-IDENTITY AND ACCEPTANCE OF CAPITALISM ARE PRODUCED THROUGH THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT. THE STATE CANNOT WIN THE CLASS WAR WITHOUT THIS WEAPON IN THE ARSENAL OF CAPITALIST COUNTER-INSURGENCY.

MYERS, Prof. of Political Science @California State University, '02

[Jason, , Historical Materialism, Vol. 10 Iss. 2, 2002]

To this extent, beyond its existence as the object of different ideological tendencies - loved by some: loathed by others - the welfare state was itself an ideological apparatus: it welded together a fractious society, reproduced the legitimacy of capitalism, and made possible the stunning rebound from the inter-war years of catastrophe to the post-war years of seemingly limitless abundance. Seen from this perspective, the welfare state was responsible, in the first instance, for the strategic management of belief. For Habermas and Przeworski, ideology in the welfare state was a political instrument: its effects traceable to the hand of a purposive author. Yet, the way in which life in the market-dominated world might come to appear as 'accidental' suggests the possibility of a somewhat different form of ideology present in and through the welfare state - one having pervasive effects on consciousness, but lacking a clear signature identifying its source. This sort of ideology is much like Marx's later commodity fetishism model in which, as human relations and activities increasingly found expression only as commodities, commodities themselves would appear to possess uniquely human attributes.²⁶ Ideology, in this sense is not a particular interpretation of events offered to us by this politician or that news anchor. It is, instead, the sense of the world generated by the structures through which everyday life is lived. This is not to say, however, that an instrumental model of 'the purchasing of consent' is inaccurate, only that it fails to fully capture the full scope of the ideological dynamics at work in the welfare state. Instrumental and spontaneous models of ideology (as I have argued elsewhere) should not be regarded as mutually exclusive definitions, but as distinct moments in the same process.²⁷ Thus, the law in bourgeois society - in its instrumental instance - creates and defines concrete persons as individuals. As those persons then live out their lives in and through institutions defined by the law, the ideological image of 'the individual' will appear seemingly spontaneously.

What this might mean for ideology in the welfare state is suggested by a piece of poll data recently cited by sociologist William Julius Wilson. In surveys conducted in 1990, a vast majority of Americans held individual factors (lack of effort, thrift, or ability) to be the most significant causes of poverty. An equally large majority of Europeans found structural causes, such as social injustice or technological change, to blame.²⁸ Such findings should come as no surprise to anyone who has spent much time in both the United States and Western Europe. What they reveal, however, is an ideological phenomenon much like Marx's model of commodity fetishism, Lukacs's concept of reification, or their brilliant restatement by Margaret Thatcher: under capitalism, there appears to be no such thing as 'society'. To the extent that the world treats us and forces us to live as individuals, the social relations underpinning everyday life become increasingly difficult to recognise.

Insurrection 1NC

B2. BEFORE THE LAW:

SOCIAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR DO NOT IMPROVE THE CONDITIONS OF MARGINALITY. EACH ACT OF GENEROSITY IS USE TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT FOR CAPITALISM AND FURTHER OBSCURE THE ELITE CONTROL OF THE REFORM AND THE LAW.

White, Prof. of Law University of Colorado-Boulder, in '05

[Ahmed, Arizona State Law Journal, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 759]

To explain the demise of rule of law norms, as this Article does, in terms of a shift in the dominant mode of social control, speaks to several important issues. First, as anticipated at the outset, this argument calls into question the dominant view of the welfare state as the most significant impediment to the realization of rule of law norms. Instead, the welfare state's retrenchment, intertwined as it is with the expansion and intensification of social control functions in the criminal justice context, is shown to give a greater account of this problem. Second, the argument developed here speaks more broadly to the rule of law's dilemma in modern society. The underlying challenge for the rule of law is to realize its norms in the context of an enduring commitment on the part of the modern state to respond to the problem of social marginality with an agenda of social [*830] control. That response may be more or less coercive, and more or less corrosive of rule of law norms, but even in its softer, welfarist form, this response inevitably runs afoul of those norms. It is for this reason, among others, that this Article should hardly be taken as a call to resurrect the welfare state. Not only does that project create significant, if more muted, problems for the rule of law, but it is also, as we have seen, increasingly untenable given the realities of capitalism and a political economy defined by neo-liberalism and fiscal crisis.

What, then, can be done? Whether with welfare or prison, the state's response to social marginality seems inevitable. The risks in the form of unrestrained disorder and deviance are simply too great to expect it to do nothing; and no other institution seems to fit the bill. This suggests that the root problem for the rule of law - the real impediment to realizing its norms in modern society - is the problem of social marginality. This phenomenon must be substantially abolished for there to be any hope of achieving a system of governance that does not systematically offend the rule of law. And of course, as we have also seen, marginality does not drop out of the sky; it has its origins in the class structure of contemporary society and in the dynamics of exploitation that underlie this. Ironically, this realization exposes capitalism itself - the rule of law's historical progenitor; as its contemporary adversary. Can capitalism be transcended? The very thought is utopian, of course, as it must contend with the same factors that have cast the modest aims of the welfare state in an impossibly radical light. But utopian or not, this perspective at least tests the viability of the rule of law against the social reality in which we find ourselves. In this respect it is vastly more realistic than the tendency to await the rule of law's salvation at the hands of a more educated public, more enlightened legislators and administrators, more conscientious judges, or other captives of history.

Insurrection 1NC

B3: BLOOD MONEY:

THE FUNDING FOR YOUR WELFARE INITIATIVE IS BLOOD MONEY. YOU TAX AND DRAIN MORE SURPLUS VALUE FROM THE WORKING CLASS TO CONSOLIDATE THE ECONOMY AND STATE POWER UNDER THE GUISE OF AN UNQUESTIONABLY COMPASSIONATE GIFT, WELFARE. THIS IS THE PERVERSE KEYNESIANISM OF NEO-LIBERALISM THAT MAINTAINS CAPITALISM NOT A CHALLENGE TO THE SYSTEM.

Callinicos, Director of the Centre for European Studies at King's College, in '04

[Alex, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, 2004 pg. 194-195]

The other major alteration in the structure of capitalism has been the growth of the role of the state. Although even in the 19th century the state never played the 'nightwatchman' role to which liberal ideologists sought to confine it, its activities were then largely concerned with providing what Engels called the 'external conditions' of capital accumulation—army, police, the courts, the Poor Law. Today, however, the state is itself a large-scale capitalist, producing commodities through the nationalised firms that it owns. At the same time, it employs a large proportion of the workforce, namely the providers of services such as health, education and welfare. Finally, the government has overall responsibility for the management of the economy. These developments were hailed by Strachey in particular as the triumph of 'controlled capitalism', in which workers could use their political power through the vote to direct the economy in their interests. Once again, such claims seem much less credible in the 1980s than they did in the 1950s. Then it was believed that the state, through Keynesian demand management techniques, could keep the economy on an even keel. Now national states seem impotent in the face of world recession, and a political and ideological reaction against state intervention has thrust right wing populists such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher into office. The growth of the state's economic activities is closely related to the development of monopoly capitalism. The immense expansion in the size of individual firms has created the need for effective coordination of their activities. The nationalisation of unprofitable but essential industries such as coal, rail and steel effectively transferred surplus value from less efficient to more efficient capitals. And the need for a comparatively well educated and healthy workforce has been provided by the expansion of the welfare state (itself largely financed, in Britain at least, out of workers' wages, which have suffered increasingly heavily from taxation since the 1950s).

Insurrection 1NC

C. IMPACT:

THE CHOICE IS REVOLUTION OR NUCLEAR ARMAGEDDON. VOTING NEGATIVE IS THE ONLY WAY TO PUT AN END TO THE SOCIAL ANTAGONISM THAT DRIVES INTERSTATE COMPETITION AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON THE POOR. 800 MILLION PEOPLE ARE STARVING THE “3RD WORLD” RIGHT NOW AND 30 MILLION ARE ROTTING ON WELFARE FUNDED WITH THE BLOOD MONEY OF LABOR EXPLOITATION AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION.

Callinicos, Director of the Centre for European Studies at King's College, in '04

[Alex, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, 2004 pg. 196-197]

Capitalism has not changed its spots. It is still based on the exploitation of the working class, and liable to constant crises. The conclusion that Marx drew from this analysis, that the working class must overthrow the system and replace it with a classless society, is even more urgent now than in his day. For the military rivalries which are the form increasingly assumed by competition between capitals now threaten the very survival of the planet. As Marx's centenary approached, the fires of war flickered across the globe—in Lebanon, Iran and Iraq, Kampuchea, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and the South Atlantic. The accumulation of vast armouries of nuclear destruction by the superpowers, missilerattling in the Kremlin, talk of 'limited' and 'protracted' nuclear war in Washington—these cast a shadow over the whole of humanity. Socialist revolution is an imperative if we are to change a world in the grip of economic depression and war fever, a world where 30 million rot on Western dole queues and 800 million go hungry in the Third World. To that extent, Marx's ideas are more relevant today than they were 100 years ago. Capitalism has tightened its grip of iron on every portion of the planet since 1883, and is rotten-ripe for destruction, whether at its own hands through nuclear war, or at the hands of the working class. The choice is between workers' power or the 'common ruination of the contending classes'—between socialism or barbarism. Many people who genuinely wish to do something to remedy the present state of the world believe that this stress on the working class is much too narrow. The existence of nuclear weapons threatens everyone, whether workers or capitalists or whatever. Should not all classes be involved in remedying a problem which affects them all? What this ignores is that what Edward Thompson has called 'exterminism'—the vast and competing military apparatuses which control the arms race—is an essential part of the working of capitalism today. No sane capitalist desires a nuclear war (although some insane ones who believe that such a war would be the prelude to the Second Coming now hold positions of influence in Washington). But sane or insane, every capitalist is part of an economic system which is bound up with military competition between nation-states. Only a class with the interest and power to do away with capitalism can halt the march to Armageddon. Marx always conceived of the working class as the class whose own self-emancipation would also be the liberation of the rest of humanity. The socialist revolution to whose cause he devoted his life can only be, at one and the same time, the emancipation of the working class and the liberation of all the oppressed and exploited sections of society. Those who accept the truth of Marx's views cannot rest content with a mere intellectual commitment. There are all too many of this sort around, Marxists content to live off the intellectual credit of Capital, as Trotsky described them. We cannot simply observe the world but must throw ourselves, as Marx did, into the practical task of building a revolutionary party amid the life and struggles of the working class. 'The philosophers have interpreted the world,' wrote Marx, 'the point, however, is to change it.' If Marxism is correct, then we must act on it.

Insurrection 1NC

D. ALTERNATIVE:

CONQUER THIS DEBATE SPACE AS A COMBAT POSITION IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CAPITALISM. ONLY INVEST IN THE HOPE A WORLD WITHOUT SOCIAL ANTAGONISM CAN SET FREE THE TRULY PRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF LIFE. THE FATE OF HUMANITY IS COLLECTIVE WE ALL LEARN TO LIVE TOGETHER EQUALLY OR WE WILL ALL FACE THE EQUALITY OF NUCLEAR EXTINCTION. THE INSURGENCY IN THE NAME OF ALL OF HUMANITY IS THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY FOR DISARMAMENT AND COEXISTENCE.

Marcuse, German Philosopher and Professor at Columbia and Harvard, in '69

[Herbert, member of the Frankfurt School, An Essay on Liberation, p. 85-91]

economy" and the mobilization of the people in the national interest. Moreover, as the common Enemy of all capitalism, communism promoted the organization of a common interest superseding the intercapitalist differences and conflicts. Last but not least, the opposition within the advanced capitalist countries has been seriously weakened by the repressive Stalinist development of socialism, which made socialism not exactly an attractive alternative to capitalism.

More recently, the break in the unity of the communist orbit, the triumph of the Cuban revolution, Vietnam, and the "cultural revolution" in China have changed this picture. The possibility of constructing socialism on a truly popular base, without the Stalinist bureaucratization and the danger of a nuclear war as the imperialist answer to the emergence of this kind of socialist power, has led to some sort of common interest between the Soviet Union on the one side and the United States on the other.

In a sense, this is indeed the community of interests of the "haves" against the "have nots," of the Old against the New. The "collaborationist" policy of the Soviet Union necessitates the pursuance of power politics which increasingly reduces the prospect that Soviet society, by virtue of its basic institutions alone (abolition of private ownership and control of the means of production: planned economy) is still capable of making the transition to a free society. And yet, the very dynamic of imperialist expansion places the Soviet Union in the other camp: would the effective resistance in Vietnam, and the protection of Cuba be possible without Soviet aid?

However, while we reject the unqualified convergence thesis, according to which -at least at present -the assimilation of interests prevails UPOII the conflict between capitalism and Soviet Socialism, we cannot minimize the essential difference between the latter and the new historical efforts to construct socialism by developing and creating a genuine solidarity between the leadership and the liberated victims of exploitation. The actual may considerably deviate from the ideal, the fact remains that, for a whole generation, "freedom," "socialism," and "liberation" are inseparable from Fidel and Che and the guerrillas -not because their revolutionary struggle could furnish the model for the struggle in the metropoles, but because they have recaptured the truth of these ideas, in the day-to-day fight of men and women for a life as human beings: for a new life.

What kind of life? We are still confronted with the demand to state the "concrete alternative." The demand is meaningless if it asks for a blueprint of the specific institutions and relationships which would be those of the new society: they cannot be determined a priori; they will develop, in trial and error, as the new society develops. If we could form a concrete concept of the alternative today, it would not be that of an alternative: the possibilities of the new society are sufficiently "abstract," i.e., removed from and incongruous with the established universe to defy any attempt to identify them in terms of this universe. However, the question cannot be brushed aside by saying that what matters today is the destruction of the old, of the powers that be, making way for the emergence of the new. Such an answer neglects the essential fact that the old is not simply bad, that it delivers the goods, and that people have a real stake in it. There can be societies which are much worse – there are such societies today. The system of

Marcuse continues below

Insurrection 1NC

Marcuse continued from above

corporate capitalism has the right to insist that those who work for its replacement justify their action. But the demand to state the concrete alternatives is justified for yet another reason. Negative thinking draws whatever force it may have from its empirical basis: the actual human condition in the given society, and the "given" possibilities to transcend this condition, to enlarge the realm of freedom. In this sense, negative thinking is by virtue of its own internal concepts "positive": oriented toward, and comprehending a future which is "contained" in the present. And in this containment (which is an important aspect of the general containment policy pursued by the established societies), the future appears as possible liberation. It is not the only alternative: the advent of a long period of "civilized" barbarism, with or without the nuclear destruction, is equally contained in the present. Negative thinking, and the praxis guided by it, is the positive and positing effort to prevent this utter negativity.

The concept of the primary, initial institutions of liberation is familiar enough and concrete enough: collective ownership, collective control and planning of the means of production and distribution. This is the foundation, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the alternative: it would make possible the usage of all available resources for the abolition of poverty, which is the prerequisite for the turn from quantity into quality: the creation of a reality in accordance with the new sensitivity and the new consciousness. This goal implies rejection of those policies of reconstruction, no matter how revolutionary, which are bound to perpetuate (or to introduce) the pattern of the unfree societies and their needs. Such false policy is perhaps best summed up in the formula "to catch up with, and to overtake the productivity level of the advanced capitalist countries." What is wrong with this formula is not the emphasis on the rapid improvement of the material conditions but on the model guiding their improvement. The model denies the alternative, the qualitative difference. The latter is not, and cannot be, the result of the fastest possible attainment of capitalist productivity, but rather the development of new modes and ends of production "new" not only (and perhaps not at all) with respect to technical innovations and production relations, but with respect to the different human needs and the different human relationships in working for the satisfaction of these needs. These new relationships would be the result of a "biological" solidarity in work and purpose, expressive of a true harmony between social and individual needs and goals, between recognized necessity and free development -the exact opposite of the administered and enforced harmony organized in the advanced capitalist (and socialist?) countries. It is the image of this solidarity as elemental, instinctual, creative force which the young radicals see in Cuba, in the guerrillas, in the Chinese cultural revolution.

Solidarity and cooperation: not all their forms are liberating. Fascism and militarism have developed a deadly efficient solidarity. Socialist solidarity is autonomy: selfdetermination begins at home -and that is with every I, and the We whom the I chooses. And this end must indeed appear in the means to attain it, that is to say, in the strategy of those who, within the existing society, work for the new one. If the socialist relationships of production are to be a new way of life, a new Form of life, then their existential quality must show forth, anticipated and demonstrated, in the fight for their realization. Exploitation in all its forms must have disappeared from this fight: from the work relationships among the fighters as well as from their individual relationships. Understanding, tenderness toward each other, the instinctual consciousness of that which is evil, false, the heritage of oppression, would then testify to the authenticity of the rebellion. In short, the economic, political, and cultural features of a classless society must have become the basic needs of those who fight for it. This ingress of the future into the present, this depth dimension of the rebellion accounts, in the last analysis, for the incompatibility with the traditional forms of the political struggle. The new radicalism militates against the centralized bureaucratic communist as well as against the semi-democratic liberal organization. There is a strong element of spontaneity, even anarchism.

Marcuse continues below

Insurrection 1NC

Marcuse Continued from above.

in this rebellion, expression of the new sensibility, sensitivity against domination: the feeling, the awareness, that the joy of freedom and the need to be free must precede liberation. Therefore the aversion against preestablished Leaders, apparatchiks of all sorts, politicians no matter how leftist. The initiative shifts to small groups, widely diffused, with a high degree of autonomy, mobility, flexibility.

To be sure, within the repressive society, and against its ubiquitous apparatus, spontaneity by itself cannot possibly be a radical and revolutionary force. It can become such a force only as the result of enlightenment, education, political practice -in this sense indeed, as a result of organization. The anarchic element is an essential factor in the struggle against domination: preserved but disciplined in the preparatory political action, it will be freed and aufgehoben in the goals of the struggle. Released for the construction of the initial revolutionary institutions, the antirepressive sensibility, allergic to domination, would militate against the prolongation of the "First Phase," that is, the authoritarian bureaucratic development of the productive forces. The new society could then reach relatively fast the level at which poverty could be abolished (this level could be considerably lower than that of advanced capitalist productivity, which is geared to obscene affluence and waste). Then the development could tend toward a sensuous culture, tangibly contrasting with the gray-on-gray culture of the socialist societies of Eastern Europe. Production would be redirected in defiance of all the rationality of the Performance Principle; socially necessary labor would be diverted to the construction of an aesthetic rather than repressive environment, to parks and gardens rather than highways and parking lots, to the creation of areas of withdrawal rather than massive fun and relaxation. Such redistribution of socially necessary labor (time), incompatible with any society governed by the Profit and Performance Principle, would gradually alter society in all its dimensions -it would mean the ascent of the Aesthetic Principle as Form of the Reality Principle: a culture of receptivity based on the achievements of industrial civilization and initiating the end of its self-propelling productivity.

Not regression to a previous stage of civilization, but return to an imaginary temps perdu in the real life of mankind: progress to a stage of civilization where man has learned to ask for the sake of whom or of what he organizes his society; the stage where he checks and perhaps even halts his incessant struggle for existence on an enlarged scale, surveys what has been achieved through centuries of misery and hecatombs of victims, and decides that it is enough, and that it is time to enjoy what he has and what can be reproduced and refined with a minimum of alienated labor: not the arrest or reduction of technical progress, but the elimination of those of its features which perpetuate man's subjection to the apparatus and the intensification of the struggle for existence -to work harder in order to get more of the merchandise that has to be sold. In other words, electrification indeed, and all technical devices which alleviate and protect life, all the mechanization which frees human energy and time, all the standardization which does away with spurious and parasitarian "personalized" services rather than multiplying them and the gadgets and tokens of exploitative affluence. In terms of the latter (and only in terms of the latter), this would certainly be a regression -but freedom from the rule of merchandise over man is a precondition of freedom.

The construction of a free society would create new incentives for work. In the exploitative societies, the so-called work instinct is mainly the (more or less effectively) introjected necessity to perform productively in order to earn a living. But the life instincts themselves strive for the unification and enhancement of life; in nonrepressive sublimation they would provide the libidinal energy for work on the development of a reality which no longer demands the exploitative repression of the Pleasure Principle. The "incentives" would then be built into the instinctual structure of men. Their sensibility would register, as biological reactions, the difference between the ugly and the beautiful, between calm and noise, tenderness and brutality, intelligence and stupidity, joy and fun, and it would correlate this distinction with that between freedom and servitude. Freud's last theoretical conception recognizes the erotic instincts as work instincts -work for the creation of a sensuous environment. The social expression of the liberated work instinct is cooperation, which, grounded in solidarity, directs the organization of the realm of necessity and the development of the realm of freedom. And there is an answer to the question which troubles the minds of so many men of good will: what are the people in a free society going to do? The answer which, I believe, strikes at the heart of the matter was given by a young black girl. She said: for the first time in our life, we shall be free to think about what we are going to do.

Perm Answers

_____ We are already living in collapse of civilization, anything besides insurrection is a waste of energy. It is pointless to get involved in existing politics of legal reform, social movements, or community efforts. They only reproduce the power of the state.

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 63-4]

We can no longer even see how an insurrection might begin. Sixty years of pacification and containment of historical upheavals, sixty years of democratic anesthesia and the management of events, have dulled our perception of the real, our sense of the war in progress. We need to start by recovering this perception. It's useless to get indignant about openly unconstitutional laws such as Perben II. It's futile to legally protest the complete implosion of the legal framework. We have to get organized. It's useless to get involved in this or that citizens' group, in this or that dead-end of the far left, or in the latest "community effort." Every organization that claims to contest the present order mimics the form, mores and language of miniature states. Thus far, every impulse to "do politics differently" has only contributed to the indefinite spread of the state's tentacles. It's useless to react to the news of the day; instead we should understand each report as a maneuver in a hostile field of strategies to be decoded, operations designed to provoke a specific reaction. It's these operations themselves that should be taken as the real information contained in these pieces of news. It's useless to wait—for a breakthrough, for the revolution, the nuclear apocalypse or a social movement. To go on waiting is madness. The catastrophe is not coming, it is here. We are already situated within the collapse of a civilization. It is within this reality that we must choose sides. To no longer wait is, in one way or another, to enter into the logic of insurrection. It is to once again hear the slight but always present trembling of terror in the voices of our leaders. Because governing has never been anything other than postponing by a thousand subterfuges the moment when the crowd will string you up, and every act of government is nothing but a way of not losing control of the population. We're setting out from a point of extreme isolation, of extreme weakness. An insurrectional process must be built from the ground up. Nothing appears less likely than an insurrection, but nothing is more necessary.

A2 Perm – State bad

— We must always reject the state because it is an illegitimate appropriation of exploited labor for the purpose of organizing the relations that constitute capital and discipline the relations between classes.

Negri, Marxist philosopher, in '9

[Antonio, "Communism: some thoughts on the concept and practice", March 14,
http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm]

2) Being communists means being against the State. The State is the force that organises, always normally yet always exceptionally, the relations that constitute capital and discipline the conflicts between capitalists and the proletarian labour force.

This being against the state is directed against all the modes of organisation of private property and the private ownership of the means of production, as well as the private exploitation of labour power and the private control of capitals' circulation. But it also against the public, that is, the state and national configurations of all these operations of alienation of the power [potenza] of labour.

Being communist entails the recognition that the public is a form of alienation and exploitation of labour - of common labour, in our case. So what is the public? As the great Rousseau said, the public is the enemy of private property, what 'belongs [itself] to nobody' (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Second Discourse on the Origin of Inequality). But it is just sophism to attribute to the State what actually belongs to everyone. The State says: 'The common does not belong to you, despite the fact that you made it, produced it in common, and invented it and organised it as common'. The State's manumission of the common, i.e. what we all produced and thus belongs to us, will go under the name of management, delegation and representation ... the implacable beauty of public pragmatism.

— Producing revolution requires a complete break from the history of the state.

Negri, Marxist philosopher, in '9

[Antonio, "Communism: some thoughts on the concept and practice", March 14,
http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm]

Being against the State means, first of all, expressing the desire and ability to manage the entire system of production, including the division of labour and the accumulation and redistribution of wealth, in a radically democratic way - as a 'democracy of all'.

Here it is worth providing new definitions. Historical materialism is also an 'immanentism of subjectivity'. It declares that not only there is no 'outside' to the world we live in, but also that 'from inside' this world the workers, citizens and all subjects are ever-present elements of singular resistance and moments in the construction of a different form of common living.

They are present even when the most grievous and dreariest historical lull is suffocating us. Multitude is a class concept and the singularities that compose it are always nuclei of resistance in the relation of subjugation imposed by capital. The singular obeys because he must do so and cannot do otherwise, but always as a resistance, there, inside the power relation. The breaking of this relation is always a possibility, just as much as the maintenance of the relation of command. Here, outside of any philosophy of history, inside this common phenomenology, we perceive how central and essential the possible indignation against power, its order and abuses and the refusal of wage labour (and/or of labour subjected to the end of reproducing capitalist society) are to the formation of another model of society and the extent to which they point to the present virtuality [virtual presence] of a different order, another prospect of life. These push towards rupture, and can do so because the rupture that is always possible can become real, or rather necessary (and we will come back to the characters of this rupture). There can be revolution.

Welfare → Co-option

Welfare will be used by the state to survey and discipline the poor, preventing them from mobilizing and co-opting any resistance potential.

Schram, teaches social policy and social theory in the Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr College, in '3

[Sanford F., "The Praxis of Poor People's Movements: Strategy and Theory in Dissensus Politics", Symposium Vol. 1/No. 4]

John Gilliom addresses a contemporary issue at the other end of the organizing spectrum. He details a welfare system that so thoroughly regulates the lives of welfare recipients that the issue is not whether they will be organized too much but whether they will remain isolated. Welfare has been "reformed" into an invasive system of monitoring and surveillance under the guise of a more therapeutic approach to the problem of "dependency." The single mothers on welfare that Gilliom's researchers talked to dissent, but their politics is limited in the face of the all-encompassing bureaucratic oppressiveness of the new welfare regime.³¹ At best, recipients can undertake everyday acts of resistance and employ what James Scott has called the "weapons of the weak."³² Welfare recipients today face obstacles of isolation and individuation that make difficult even the fluid protest politics of PPM. The pervasiveness of surveillance in the newly medicalized regime of reformed welfare antiquates the very idea of mass action in the public sphere. The public sphere as a realm of freedom and political expression is imperiled when publicity becomes nothing more than a prerequisite for monitoring and control.³³ When public action is anticipated, dissected, and suppressed, mass organizing becomes even more questionable and organized social groupings of marginal persons are at greater risk of being assimilated into the disciplinary practices of the welfare state.³⁴

Under these conditions, can a "politics of survival"—where people cope individually with their own oppression—ever promote a "politics of social change" dedicated to transforming the systemic roots of society's inequities? The public, collective politics of protest risks collapsing into fragmented, private forms of everyday resistance. These may provide some relief to oppression in individual circumstances but do not lead to the structural transformations needed to further achievement of any particular social justice agenda. A poor people's movement that only helps individuals extract immediate concessions may actually become its own form of cooptation, preventing the poor from mobilizing on behalf of more dramatic collective action and more substantive changes. Ultimately, what good is a politics of dissent if it only encourages resistance that is not informed by a positive program for change?

Uniqueness

Capital is in crisis- its antagonisms are accelerating uncontrollably.

Antonio **Negri**, former professor of state theory @ University of Purdua. Trans. Noura Wedell. The Porcelain Workshop. 2008. p. 63-5.

When considering this series of phenomena, we must return to the hypothesis-central to this seminar-according to which it is necessary to emphasize the crises of all the laws and forms of measure of capitalist development. At stake is not simply the crisis of the law of value, and of the relations developing between the working class and the state in advanced capitalist countries. We must also grasp the quality of this crisis, often interpreted according to alternatives proposed by Third World countries, and during anticolonial revolutions. Enlightenment reason was crushed beneath the weight of a close link to the development of capitalism and burdened by accumulation founded on exploitation. Today, this stands opposed to a biopolitical reason linking development to reclaiming and reaffirming community values, extra-European forms of civilization, or those desires not yet subjected to Western consumerist monopoly. We must be careful, however: this opposition, this alternative to capitalist development will inevitably affect the West itself. Globalization reveals the limits of imperialist action on the part of nation-states; work and production are becoming social and claiming the fundamental elements of life, needs, and desires. Historically speaking, we find ourselves perhaps today at the heart of the transformation and homogenization of the crises of the law of value, and of capitalist enlightenment reason.
The crux of our discussion lies in this idea of the crisis of measure, or, more precisely, the idea of the possibility for capital and its elites to measure development. The concepts we have expounded until now- globalization, development, modernity and “another” modernity, dependence and interdependence- place us at the heart of postmodernism. But this transformation is also an explosion, the sign of a basic mutation, a paradigmatic shift. The crisis of the idea of meaning has qualitative, irreversible, and enormously important effects that imply the impossibility of ascribing a stable and complete figure to processes of government on the field of globalization. It is in this crisis of measure, control and government that tendency towards Empire, namely the constant push towards global government, also enters a state of crisis.

Demand Link

DEMANDS ON THE STATE ONLY SERVE TO LEGITIMATE THE SPECTACLE OF DEMOCRACY WHILE MARGINALIZING THEIR PARTICIPANTS. EVEN IF THE REFORMS ARE SUCCESSFUL, THE DEMAND'S FOCUS ON REFORM WILL EVAPORATE THE MOVEMENT WITHOUT DISRUPTING THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM.

El Kilombo Intergalactico, collective based in Durham North Carolina, and Hardt, American Literary theorist and political philosopher@ Duke University, in '8
[Michael, "Organizing Encounters and Generating Events"
<http://inthemiddleofthewhirlwind.wordpress.com/organizing-encounters-and-generating-events/>]

EK: This recognition is important in determining the possibilities and limitations for protest politics in the US, such as the upcoming demonstrations against the Republican and Democratic National Conventions this summer. For us, it is first important to clarify what these protest events should not be about. We need to disinvest from making demands toward political parties and the State, because the problems we are facing run much deeper than the party system – which from our perspective is now a product of media simulation and the spectacularization of politics. In that sense, we shouldn't be waging protest as a plea or appeal to these parties, or as an appeal to the media. It is through media spectacle that the politics of the politicians is legitimated: through the circulation of images, the polling of 'public opinion,' political partnerships with civil society, and the permission and even encouragement of "dissent" which supposedly signals a healthy democracy. The imagery of public protest in and of itself doesn't challenge this schema, but can in fact play an integral role in this game of simulation that has replaced representation (as limited as this concept already is) as the substance of electoral politics.

This shouldn't suggest, however, that there is nothing to be gained through the organization of these protests. If the focus is not outward and upward – aimed at the politicians, the parties, the media – but is oriented inward, for and among those of us struggling against capitalism in a multiplicity of ways, these gatherings can become productive spaces of encounter. By this we mean the meeting and exchanging of struggles, getting to know people, projects, and organizations with which we might otherwise never connect. Yet these extraordinary encounters in and of themselves are not sufficient for establishing an alternative to our current situation. The space of protest is a temporary one, and the type of encounter it can provide is all too brief. However, it would be a mistake to falsely oppose the brevity of such encounters with the constancy of organizations. A careful examination of these protests will always show the prior existence of extensive organization, while all organizational efforts necessarily come about through a series of unplanned encounters. Therefore, rather than oppose these phenomena or fix them into a model of supercession (i.e., from protest to organization), what we need is a politics that opens each to the other in a constant relation of mutual regeneration – as the continuous articulation, embodiment, and renewal of our own collective political desires. The potential of the events planned for the summer lies exactly in the opportunity to enact this other kind of politics.

Demand Link

CONTINUED...

EK: Just to clarify, we're not trying to avoid discussion with these institutions or these parties for the sake of revolutionary purity. That would be ridiculous. But we still need to have a discussion about the effectiveness of political action towards reform. So we have to constantly question the effectiveness of the way demands are posed and the tie of organizational structure to those forms of demands. For example, the effective provision of education by the autonomous communities of Chiapas has had way more of an impact on Mexican nation policy on education than if the Zapatistas had gone to the national government and made demands that there should be educational reform, because in a way, the national government is then forced to attempt to occupy that issue by addressing the underlying demand. Or, another example, the Black Panther Party here in the US didn't say, "we want a national breakfast program," instead, they built a breakfast program that fed tens of thousands of children. J. Edgar Hoover identified these programs as the greatest weapon in the hands of the Panthers and subsequently the federal government stepped in to create free breakfast programs in public schools. The same thing took place with the Panthers' sickle cell anemia project.

MH: So it is more a question of what forms of organization are best for gaining reforms, the effectiveness of political action in that sense, because, after all, any real reforms are oriented toward revolution. In Italy recently, some of the most successful political activity has been really broad, "multitudinous" organizing campaigns against large public works, which are bad for the environment and bad for the local residents, and then most recently the most inspiring struggle has been against the expansion of a U.S. military base in Vicenza. And I would say the actual object of these struggles – stopping the expansion of the base for instance – is itself important, but it turns out to be secondarily important compared to the lasting organization that's been built in Vicenza, of the different groups that came together that hadn't been working together before but discovered new possibilities for organization. So I wouldn't say that stopping the base doesn't matter, it's important, even if it is secondary to the connections and the new forms of organization that have emerged and the construction of a model for organizing that is being repeated elsewhere.

EK: So, in a way we're back to where we began, saying that that these protests are important to the extent that they provide us all a base for constructing encounters and new organizational forms. But it still might be useful for us to distinguish the effectiveness of achieving reforms from the goal or intent of reform; so if we establish an autonomous institution, and that causes a certain response or some kind of reform, then it has been an effective action, but reform was never the goal. So it is still important from our perspective to maintain a distinction between organizations that set out for reforms, and organizations that achieve reforms.

MH: You can tell the difference between the two by the fact that in that in the first model, once the reform is achieved, everybody goes home and never sees each other again; while in the other model, the achievement of the reform is just one step in a much larger process that continues on.

EK: Absolutely, and nobody should deny the importance of achieving those reforms, so in a way we're saying the same thing; and for us what is most urgent right now is building the organizational power that gives us the power to force useful reforms.

Disaster relief/Crisis Link

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 79-80]

"So it must be said, too, that we won't be able to treat the entire French population. Choices will have to be made." This is how a virology expert sums up, in a September 7, 2005 article in *Le Monde*, what would happen in the event of a bird flu pandemic. "Terrorist threats," "natural disasters," "virus warnings," "social movements" and "urban violence" are, for society's managers, so many moments of instability where they reinforce their power, by the selection of those who please them and the elimination of those who make things difficult. Clearly these are, in turn, opportunities for other forces to consolidate or strengthen one another as they take the other side. The interruption of the flow of commodities, the suspension of normality (it's sufficient to see how social life returns in a building suddenly deprived of electricity to imagine what life could become in a city deprived of everything) and police control liberate potentialities for self-organization unthinkable in other circumstances. People are not blind to this. The revolutionary workers' movement understood it well, and took advantage of the crises of the bourgeois economy to gather strength. Today, Islamic parties are strongest when they've been able to intelligently compensate for the weakness of the state — as when they provided aid after the earthquake in Boumerdes, Algeria, or in the daily assistance offered the population of southern Lebanon after it was ravaged by the Israeli army. As we mentioned above, the devastation of New Orleans by hurricane Katrina gave a certain fringe of the North American anarchist movement the opportunity to achieve an unfamiliar cohesion by rallying all those who refused to be forcefully evacuated. Street kitchens require building up provisions beforehand; emergency medical aid requires the acquisition of necessary knowledge and materials, as does the setting up of pirate radios. The political richness of such experiences is assured by the joy they contain, the way they transcend individual stoicism, and their manifestation of a tangible reality that escapes the daily ambience of order and work.

e border and where we aren't afraid to build a cancer research center on the former site of a nitrogen fertilizer factory that has been condemned by the EU's industrial safety agency, we should count less on "natural" crises than on social ones. It is usually up to the social movements to interrupt the normal course of the disaster. Of course, in recent years the various strikes were primarily opportunities for the government and corporate management to test their ability to maintain a larger and larger "minimum service,"²⁶ to the point of reducing the work stoppage to a purely symbolic dimension, causing little more damage than a snowstorm or a suicide on the railroad tracks. By going against established activist practices through the systematic occupation of institutions and obstinate blockading, the high-school students' struggle of 2005 and the struggle against the CPE-law reminded us of the ability of large movements to cause trouble and carry out diffuse offensives. In all the affinity groups they spawned and left in their wake, we glimpsed the conditions that allow social movements to become a locus for the emergence of new communes.

Ecology Link

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/thecominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 52-4]

Ecology isn't simply the logic of a total economy; it's the new morality of capital. The system's internal state of crisis and the rigorous screening that's underway demand a new criterion in the name of which this screening and selection will be carried out. From one era to the next, the idea of virtue has never been anything but an invention of vice. Without ecology, how could we justify the existence of two different food regimes, one "healthy and organic" for the rich and their children, and the other notoriously toxic for the plebes, whose offspring are damned to obesity. The planetary hyper-bourgeoisie wouldn't be able to make their normal lifestyle seem respectable if its latest caprices weren't so scrupulously "respectful of the environment." Without ecology, nothing would have enough authority to gag any and all objections to the exorbitant progress of control. Tracking, transparency, certification, eco-taxes, environmental excellence, and the policing of water, all give us an idea of the coming state of ecological emergency. Everything is permitted to a power structure that bases its authority in Nature, in health and in well-being. "Once the new economic and behavioral culture has become common practice, coercive measures will doubtless fall into disuse of their own accord." You'd have to have all the ridiculous aplomb of a TV crusader to maintain such a frozen perspective and in the same breath incite us to feel sufficiently "sorry for the planet" to get mobilized, whilst remaining anesthetized enough to watch the whole thing with restraint and civility. The new green-asceticism is precisely the self-control that is required of us all in order to negotiate a rescue operation where the system has taken itself hostage. From now on, it's in the name of environmentalism that we must all tighten our belts, just as we did yesterday in the name of the economy. The roads could certainly be transformed into bicycle paths, we ourselves could perhaps, to a certain degree, be grateful one day for a guaranteed income, but only at the price of an entirely therapeutic existence. Those who claim that generalized self-control will spare us from an environmental dictatorship are lying: the one will prepare the way for the other, and we'll end up with both. As long as there is Man and Environment, the police will be there between them. Everything about the environmentalist's discourse must be turned upside-down. Where they talk of "catastrophes" to label the present system's mismanagement of beings and things, we only see the catastrophe of its all too perfect operation. The greatest wave of famine ever known in the tropics (1876-1879) coincided with a global drought, but more significantly, it also coincided with the apogee of colonization. The destruction of the peasant's world and of local alimentary practices meant the disappearance of the means for dealing with scarcity. More than the lack of water, it was the effect of the rapidly expanding colonial economy that littered the Tropics with millions of emaciated corpses. What presents itself everywhere as an ecological catastrophe has never stopped being, above all, the manifestation of a disastrous relationship to the world. Inhabiting a nowhere makes us vulnerable to the slightest jolt in the system, to the slightest climactic risk. As the latest tsunami approached and the tourists continued to frolic in the waves, the islands' hunter-gatherers hastened to flee the coast, following the birds. Environmentalism's present paradox is that under the pretext of saving the planet from desolation it merely saves the causes of its desolation. The normal functioning of the world usually serves to hide our state of truly catastrophic dispossession. What is called "catastrophe" is no more than the forced suspension of this state, one of those rare moments when we regain some sort of presence in the world. Let the petroleum reserves run out earlier than expected; let the international flows that regulate the tempo of the metropolis be interrupted, let us suffer some great social disruption and some great "return to savagery of the population," a "planetary threat," the "end of civilization!" Either way, any loss of control would be preferable to all the crisis management scenarios they envision. When this comes, the specialists in sustainable development won't be the ones with the best advice. It's within the malfunction and short-circuits of the system that we find the elements of a response whose logic would be to abolish the problems themselves. Among the signatory nations to the Kyoto Protocol, the only countries that have fulfilled their commitments, in spite of themselves, are the Ukraine and Romania. Guess why. The most advanced experimentation with "organic" agriculture on a global level has taken place since 1989 on the island of Cuba. Guess why. And it's along the African highways, and nowhere else, that auto mechanics has been elevated to a form of popular art. Guess how. What makes the crisis desirable is that in the crisis the environment ceases to be the environment. We are forced to reestablish contact, albeit a potentially fatal one, with what's there, to rediscover the rhythms of reality. What surrounds us is no longer a landscape, a panorama, a theater, but something to inhabit, something we need to come to terms with, something we can learn from. We won't let ourselves be led astray by the one's who've brought about the contents of the "catastrophe." Where the managers platonically discuss among themselves how they might decrease emissions "without breaking the bank," the only realistic option we can see is to "break the bank" as soon as possible and, in the meantime, take advantage of every collapse in the system to increase our own strength.

Family Link

Family relations and the resurrection of marriage is an attempt to save the last bastion of social relations in a world defined by capitalist alienation. We should let these relations die with the rest of the social, allowing for experimentation in alternate ways of living, enabling becoming autonomous

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 26-7]

To call this population of strangers in the midst of which we live “society” is such an usurpation that even sociologists dream of renouncing a concept that was, for a century, their bread and butter. Now they prefer the metaphor of a network to describe the connection of cybernetic solitudes, the intermeshing of weak interactions under names like “colleague,” “contact,” “buddy,” “acquaintance,” or “date.” Such networks sometimes condense into a milieu, where nothing is shared but codes, and where nothing is played out except the incessant recomposition of identity. It would be a waste of time to detail all that which is agonizing in existing social relations. They say the family is coming back, that the couple is coming back. But the family that’s coming back is not the same one that went away. Its return is nothing but a deepening of the reigning separation that it serves to mask, becoming what it is through this masquerade. Everyone can testify to the rations of sadness condensed from year to year in family gatherings, the forced smiles, the awkwardness of seeing everyone pretending in vain, the feeling that a corpse is lying there on the table, and everyone acting as though it were nothing. From flirtation to divorce, from cohabitation to stepfamilies, everyone feels the inanity of the sad family nucleus, but most seem to believe that it would be sadder still to renounce it. The family is no longer so much the suffocation of maternal control or the patriarchy of beatings as it is this infantile abandon to a fuzzy dependency, where everything is familiar, this carefree moment in the face of a world that nobody can deny is breaking down, a world where “becoming self-sufficient” is a euphemism for “having found a boss.” They want to use the “familiarity” of the biological family as an excuse to eat away at anything that burns passionately within us and, under the pretext that they raised us, make us renounce the possibility of growing up, as well as everything that is serious in childhood. It is necessary to preserve oneself from such corrosion.

The couple is like the final stage of the great social debacle. It’s the oasis in the middle of the human desert. Under the auspices of “intimacy,” we come to it looking for everything that has so obviously deserted contemporary social relations: warmth, simplicity, truth, a life without theater or spectator. But once the romantic high has passed, “intimacy” strips itself bare: it is itself a social invention, it speaks the language of glamour magazines and psychology; like everything else, it is bolstered with so many strategies to the point of nausea. There is no more truth here than elsewhere; here too lies and the laws of estrangement dominate. And when, by good fortune, one discovers this truth, it demands a sharing that belies the very form of the couple. What allows beings to love each other is also what makes them lovable, and ruins the utopia of autism-for-two.

In reality, the decomposition of all social forms is a blessing. It is for us the ideal condition for a wild, massive experimentation with new arrangements, new fidelities. The famous “parental resignation” has imposed on us a confrontation with the world that demands a precocious lucidity, and foreshadows lovely revolts to come. In the death of the couple, we see the birth of troubling forms of collective affectivity, now that sex is all used up and masculinity and femininity parade around in such moth-eaten clothes, now that three decades of non-stop pornographic innovation have exhausted all the allure of transgression and liberation. We count on making that which is unconditional in relationships the armor of a political solidarity as impenetrable to state interference as a gypsy camp. There is no reason that the interminable subsidies that numerous relatives are compelled to offload onto their proletarianized progeny can’t become a form of patronage in favor of social subversion. “Becoming autonomous,” could just as easily mean learning to fight in the street, to occupy empty houses, to cease working, to love each other madly, and to shoplift.

Food Stamps Link / A2 Starvation Impact Turn

They have food security backwards—hunger is not a distribution problem, everyone has enough—even the United States has millions starving

Magdoff, Professor of plant and soil science at the Vermont, in '04

[Fred, "A Precarious Existence: The Fate of Billions?" Monthly Review, Vol. 55, No. 9. <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0204magdoff.htm>]

Why Are So Many Hungry?

It is commonly believed that hunger is confined to the periods when drought, floods, or war disrupt the normal production and distribution of food, resulting in heartbreaking famines. However, hunger and food insecurity (not knowing where your next meal is coming from) are the normal situation for a large portion of humanity. While not as visible and dramatic as famine, chronic malnutrition has disastrous results in terms of the poor physical and mental development of children, difficulty in learning, increased susceptibility to diseases, and so on. The UN estimates that about 840 million people—including 10 million in the core industrialized countries—suffered from undernourishment during the period 1999–2001. According to the UN, there has been an increase in the number of undernourished people, with about 18 million more in the period of 1999–2001 than in 1995–1997. However, many more people than the UN estimates are living under food insecurity, in various degrees of hunger—perhaps as many as 3 billion. Even if the number is “only” 840 million, it is still shocking!

While hunger certainly exists in the countryside it can be an even more challenging problem in cities. Removed from the land, people can't grow their own food and must find some income source. When economic development doesn't provide sufficient jobs for those forced into the cities, people try to scrape by in the “informal economy”—frequently purchasing items and reselling them in smaller quantities—or resort to crime.

There is enough food produced globally to meet the basic nutritional needs of the world's people. The same is true within most countries. Chronic malnutrition and food insecurity are caused mainly by poverty and not by lack of food production. One has to go no further than the United States to see that hunger can exist side-by-side with an agricultural system that produces more than enough food to nourish the entire population adequately. Twelve million U.S. families are considered “food insecure” and in close to 4 million families—containing over 9 million people—someone skipped meals because of lack of food. The United States Conference of Mayors reported that “..during 2002 requests for emergency food assistance increased by an average of 19 percent, with 100 percent of the cities registering an increase” (A Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness in America's Cities 2002, <http://www.usmayors.org>). Even in my state, Vermont, with a relatively low official unemployment rate, the requests for food from various private charities have skyrocketed in recent years. Eighty percent of the new families seeking food assistance have someone that is working. The director of one of the food assistance programs commented, “I've seen an increasing number of parents who will say they have not eaten for a day or two to feed their children.”

The coexistence of surplus food and hunger also occurs in the third world. India is one of the success stories of the “green revolution,” where a combination of improved varieties and a number of agronomic techniques led to much greater national food production. However, India now has “excess” food at the same time that it has widespread hunger. A newspaper headline tells it all, “Poor in India Starve as Surplus Wheat Rots” (New York Times, December 12, 2002). This surplus food rots, is eaten by rats, or is exported at low prices while people in India go hungry.

In general, people are chronically hungry because they are poor and don't have enough money to buy food. It is as simple as that! Under capitalism, food is just another commodity—like a pair of shoes, a television, or an automobile. People have no more legal right to food than they have to any other commodity.

Growth Bad Link

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 45-7]

And yet there is no doubt that we are cut out for the economy. For generations we were disciplined, pacified and made into subjects, productive by nature and content to consume. And suddenly everything that we were compelled to forget is revealed: that the economy is political. And that this politics is, today, a politics of discrimination within a humanity that has, as a whole, become superfluous. From Colbert¹⁵ to de Gaulle, by way of Napoleon III, the state has always treated the economic as political, as have the bourgeoisie (who profit from it) and the proletariat (who confront it). All that's left is this strange, middling part of the population, the curious and powerless aggregate of those who take no sides: the petty bourgeoisie. They have always pretended to believe that the economy is a reality—because their neutrality is safe there. Small business owners, small bosses, minor bureaucrats, managers, professors, journalists, middlemen of every sort make up this nonclass in France, this social gelatin composed of the mass of all those who just want to live their little private lives at a distance from history and its tumults. This swamp is predisposed to be the champion of false consciousness, half-asleep and always ready to close its eyes on the war that rages all around it. Each clarification of a front in this war is thus accompanied in France by the invention of some new fad. For the past ten years, it was ATTAC¹⁶ and its improbable Tobin tax—a tax whose implementation would require nothing less than a global government—with its sympathy for the “real economy” as opposed to the financial markets, not to mention its touching nostalgia for the state. The comedy lasts only so long before turning into a sham. And then another fad replaces it. So now we have “negative growth”¹⁷. Whereas ATTAC tried to save economics as a science with its popular education courses, negative growth preserves the economic as a morality. There is only one alternative to the coming apocalypse: reduce growth. Consume and produce less. Become joyously frugal. Eat organic, ride your bike, stop smoking, and pay close attention to the products you buy. Be content with what’s strictly necessary. Voluntary simplicity. “Rediscover true wealth in the blossoming of convivial social relations in a healthy world.” “Don’t use up our natural capital.” Work toward a “healthy economy.” “No regulation through chaos.” “Avoid a social crisis that would threaten democracy and humanism.” Simply put: become economical. Go back to daddy’s economy, to the golden age of the petty bourgeoisie: the 1950s. “When an individual is frugal, property serves its function perfectly, which is to allow the individual to enjoy his or her own life sheltered from public existence, in the private sanctuary of his or her life.” A graphic designer wearing a handmade sweater is drinking a fruity cocktail with some friends on the terrace of an “ethnic” café. They’re chatty and cordial, they joke around a bit, they make sure not to be too loud or too quiet, they smile at each other, a little blissfully: we are so civilized. Afterwards, some of them will go work in the neighborhood community garden, while others will dabble in pottery, some Zen Buddhism, or in the making of an animated film. They find communion in the smug feeling that they constitute a new humanity, wiser and more refined than the previous one. And they are right. There is a curious agreement between Apple and the negative growth movement about the civilization of the future. Some people’s idea of returning to the economy of yesteryear offers others the convenient screen behind which a great technological leap forward can be launched. For in history there is no going back. Any exhortation to return to the past is only the expression of one form of consciousness of the present, and rarely the least modern. It is not by chance that negative growth is the banner of the dissident advertisers of the magazine Casseurs de Pub¹⁸. The inventors of zero growth—the Club of Rome in 1972—were themselves a group of industrialists and bureaucrats who relied on a research paper written by cyberneticians at MIT. This convergence is hardly a coincidence. It is part of the forced march towards a modernized economy. Capitalism got as much as it could from undoing all the old social ties, and it is now in the process of remaking itself by rebuilding these same ties on its own terms. Contemporary metropolitan social life is its incubator. In the same way, it ravaged the natural world and is driven by the fantasy that it can now be reconstituted as so many controlled environments, furnished with all the necessary sensors. This new humanity requires a new economy that would no longer be a separate sphere of existence but, on the contrary, its very tissue, the raw material of human relations; it requires a new definition of work as work on oneself, a new definition of capital as human capital, a new idea of production as the production of relations, and consumption as the consumption of situations; and above all a new idea of value that would encompass all of the qualities of beings. This burgeoning “bioeconomy” conceives the planet as a closed system to be managed and claims to establish the foundations for a science that would integrate all the parameters of life. Such a science threatens to make us miss the good old days when unreliable indices like GDP growth were supposed to measure the well-being of a people—for at least no one believed in them. “Revalorize the non-economic aspects of life” is the slogan shared by the negative growth movement and by capital’s reform program. Eco-villages, video-surveillance cameras, spirituality, biotechnologies and sociability all belong to the same “civilizational paradigm” now taking shape, that of a total economy rebuilt from the ground up. Its intellectual matrix is none

Growth Bad Link

other than cybernetics, the science of systems—that is, the science of their control. In the 17th century it was necessary, in order to completely impose the force of economy and its ethos of work and greed, to confine and eliminate the whole seamy mass of layabouts, liars, witches, madmen, scoundrels and all the other vagrant poor, a whole humanity whose very existence gave the lie to the order of interest and continence. The new economy cannot be established without a similar selection of subjects and zones singled out for transformation. The chaos that we constantly hear about will either provide the opportunity for this screening, or for our victory over this odious project.

GROWTH DOESN'T SOLVE POVERTY- IT EXACERBATES IT.

El Kilombo Intergaláctico, actual communist collective based in Durham North Carolina. “The Fourth, the Sixth, the Other, and US” <<http://inthemiddleofthewhirlwind.wordpress.com/15/>>. 2007.

We want to talk first about a country where severe poverty has reached a three decade high, where roughly 37 million poor people are dropping ranks at a rate of 26% over the last 5 years to swell the level of deep or severe poverty to 16 million [1]. It is now estimated that 60% of the population will spend part at least of their lives poor by official standards, and 40% will live an extended period in poverty[2]. Among the top 10 states affected by this exponential growth are not the states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, or Guerrero, historically known on the North American continent to be poverty-stricken, but rather the states of North Carolina, New Mexico, and Louisiana[3]. This is the United States in the 21st century, which, parallel to what we normally consider “developing” nations, has, at the mercy of neoliberal policies, **experienced that once curious and now commonplace combination of statistical economic expansion on a national scale and falling wages and decreasing job growth for the great majority of the population**. The benefits of US economic expansion and globalization do not benefit substantially even the top 10% of the US population, but rather the top 1%. And while that 1% has enjoyed a salary growth of 87% in the last 30 years, the top 0.1% has enjoyed 181% increase and the top 0.01%, a 497% increase[4]. Meanwhile, the average wage over roughly the same period of time, adjusted for inflation, has grown a total of one-half percent[5].

Along with a growing unemployment rate and an increase in the “precariousness” of labor—short-term, part-time, subcontracted work—we are seeing the salaries of the university-educated slide downward, urban rents rising more than 50% since 1995, health care premiums up 78% since 2001[6] with 47 million people without any health insurance at all[7], and the rise of a “boomerang” generation of post-college kids now returning to live with their parents due to slim-salaried employment options and crippling student debt. Foreclosure rates are the highest they have been since the Great Depression and continue to rise[8], disproportionately affecting people of color who have collectively lost \$164 billion to \$213 billion over the past eight years, in what has been the largest transfer of wealth from families and communities of color to brokers, lending institutions, and Wall Street in the history of the country[9]. (Adding to the sense and reality of crisis, we saw the extent of the willingness and capacity of local and federal governments to aid communities of color after Hurricane Katrina.) Another US statistic: job satisfaction is dropping consistently, hovering now below 50% among workers of all ages and across all income brackets, with only 14% claiming to be “very satisfied.” Forty percent feel completely disconnected from their employers, 66% are unmotivated by their job objectives, and almost all are unsatisfied with bonus plans, promotion policies, health plans, and pensions—misery can’t be measured strictly with political economic indices.

But neither is increasing wealth disparity and a sinking social safety net a US phenomenon; while Bill Gates currently holds the title of richest man in the world, he will, if current patterns and predictions continue, be surpassed shortly by Carlos Slim, Mexican business mogul[10]. There are 10 Mexican billionaires on the Forbes’ richest list now, their combined income doubling the Mexico’s entire foreign national debt; and the country presumably poised to appreciate the rather non-globalized benefits of globalization, the richest country in the world, now finds a surprising commonality with its neighbor to the south. In addition to shared population—the 28 million people of Mexican origin living in the US—the US and Mexico share the rank, accompanied worldwide only by Russia, of having the least and least effective anti-poverty programs[11]. Neoliberalism, as the Zapatistas say, doesn’t turn many countries into one country; it turns each country into many countries.

Ideology Link

ACCEPTANCE OF CAPITALISM IS PRODUCED THROUGH SUBTLE TACTICS OF IDEOLOGY AND SUBJECT FORMATION. GLOBAL REVOLUTION IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF WE ATTACK THE ENTIRETY OF THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUS.

Althusser, Professor of Philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris, in '70

[Louis, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in *Lenin and Philosophy and other essays*, p. 97-106]

As a first moment, it is clear that while there is one (Repressive) State Apparatus, there is a plurality of Ideological State Apparatuses. Even presupposing that it exists, the unity that constitutes this plurality of ISAs as a body is not immediately visible.

As a second moment, it is clear that whereas the unified – (Repressive) State Apparatus belongs entirely to the public domain, much the larger part of the Ideological State Apparatuses (in their apparent dispersion) are part, on the contrary, of the private domain. Churches, Parties, Trade Unions, families, some schools, most newspapers, cultural ventures, etc., etc., are private.

We can ignore the first observation for the moment. But someone is bound to question the second, asking me by what right I regard as Ideological State Apparatuses, institutions which for the most part do not possess public status, but are quite simply private institutions. As a conscious Marxist, Gramsci already forestalled this objection in one sentence. The distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its 'authority'. The domain of the State escapes it because the latter is 'above the law': the State, which is the State of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private. The same thing can be said from the starting-point of our State Ideological Apparatuses. It is unimportant whether the institutions in which they are realized are 'public' or 'private'. What matters is how they function. Private institutions can perfectly well 'function' as Ideological State Apparatuses. A reasonably thorough analysis of any one of the ISAs proves it.

But now for what is essential. What distinguishes the ISAs from the (Repressive) State Apparatus is the following basic difference: the Repressive State Apparatus functions 'by violence', whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function 'by ideology'

I can clarify matters by correcting this distinction. I shall say rather that every State Apparatus, whether Repressive or Ideological, 'functions' both by violence and by ideology, but with one very important distinction which makes it imperative not to confuse the Ideological State Apparatuses with the (Repressive) State Apparatus.

This is the fact that the (Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression (including physical repression), while functioning secondarily by ideology. (There is no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus.) For example, the Army and the Police also function by ideology both to ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the 'values' they propound externally.

In the same way, but inversely, it is essential to say that for their part the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic. (There is no such thing as a purely ideological apparatus.) Thus Schools and Churches use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc., to 'discipline' not only their shepherds, but also their flocks. The same is true of the Family.... The same is true of the cultural IS Apparatus (censorship, among other things), etc.

Is it necessary to add that this determination of the double 'functioning' (predominantly, secondarily) by repression and by ideology, according to whether it is a matter of the (Repressive) State Apparatus or the Ideological State Apparatuses, makes it clear that very subtle explicit or tacit combinations may be woven from the interplay of the (Repressive) State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses? Everyday life provides us with innumerable examples of this, but they must be studied in detail if we are to go further than this mere observation.

Nevertheless, this remark leads us towards an understanding of what constitutes the unity of the apparently disparate body of the ISAs. If the ISAs 'function' massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies their diversity is precisely this functioning, insofar as the ideology by which they function is always in fact unified, despite its diversity and its contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which is the ideology of 'the ruling class'. Given the fact that the 'ruling class' in principle holds State power (openly or more often by means of alliances between classes or class fractions), and therefore has at its disposal the (Repressive) State Apparatus, we can accept the fact that this same ruling class is active in the Ideological State Apparatuses insofar as it is ultimately the ruling ideology which is realized in the Ideological State Apparatuses, precisely in its contradictions. Of course, it is a quite different thing to act by laws and decrees in the (Repressive) State Apparatus and to 'act' through the intermediary of the ruling ideology in the Ideological State Apparatuses. We must go into the details of this difference – but it cannot mask the reality of a profound identity. To my knowledge, no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses. I only need one example and proof of this: Lenin's anguished concern to

Ideology Link

revolutionize the educational Ideological State Apparatus (among others), simply to make it possible for the Soviet proletariat, who had seized State power, to secure the future of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition to socialism.[10]

This last comment puts us in a position to understand that the Ideological State Apparatuses may be not only the stake, but also the site of class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle. The class (or class alliance) in power cannot lay down the law in the ISAs as easily as it can in the (repressive) State apparatus, not only because the former ruling classes are able to retain strong positions there for a long time, but also because the resistance of the exploited classes is able to find means and occasions to express itself there, either by the utilization of their contradictions, or by conquering combat positions in them in struggle.[11]

Let me run through my comments.

If the thesis I have proposed is well-founded, it leads me back to the classical Marxist theory of the State, while making it more precise in one point. I argue that it is necessary to distinguish between State power (and its possession by ...) on the one hand, and the State Apparatus on the other. But I add that the State Apparatus contains two bodies: the body of institutions which represent the Repressive State Apparatus on the one hand, and the body of institutions which represent the body of Ideological State Apparatuses on the other.

But if this is the case, the following question is bound to be asked, even in the very summary state of my suggestions: what exactly is the extent of the role of the Ideological State Apparatuses? What is their importance based on? In other words: to what does the ‘function’ of these Ideological State Apparatuses, which do not function by repression but by ideology, correspond?

On the Reproduction of the Relations of Production

I can now answer the central question which I have left in suspense for many long pages: how is the reproduction of the relations of production secured?

In the topographical language (Infrastructure, Superstructure), I can say: for the most part,[12] it is secured by the legal-political and ideological superstructure.

But as I have argued that it is essential to go beyond this still descriptive language, I shall say: for the most part, it is secured by the exercise of State power in the State Apparatuses, on the one hand the (Repressive) State Apparatus, on the other the Ideological State Apparatuses.

What I have just said must also be taken into account, and it can be assembled in the form of the following three features:

1. All the State Apparatuses function both by repression and by ideology, with the difference that the (Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology.

2. Whereas the (Repressive) State Apparatus constitutes an organized whole whose different parts are centralized beneath a commanding unity, that of the politics of class struggle applied by the political representatives of the ruling classes in possession of State power, the Ideological State Apparatuses are multiple, distinct, ‘relatively autonomous’ and capable of providing an objective field to contradictions which express, in forms which may be limited or extreme, the effects of the clashes between the capitalist class struggle and the proletarian class struggle, as well as their subordinate forms.

3. Whereas the unity of the (Repressive) State Apparatus is secured by its unified and centralized organization under the leadership of the representatives of the classes in power executing the politics of the class struggle of the classes in power, the unity of the different Ideological State Apparatuses is secured, usually in contradictory forms, by the ruling ideology, the ideology of the ruling class.

Taking these features into account, it is possible to represent the reproduction of the relations of production[13] in the following way, according to a kind of ‘division of labour’.

The role of the repressive State apparatus, insofar as it is a repressive apparatus, consists essentially in securing by force (physical or otherwise) the political conditions of the reproduction of relations of production which are in the last resort relations of exploitation. Not only does the State apparatus contribute generously to its own reproduction (the capitalist State contains political dynasties, military dynasties, etc.), but also and above all, the State apparatus secures by repression (from the most brutal physical force, via mere administrative commands and interdictions, to open and tacit censorship) the political conditions for the action of the Ideological State Apparatuses.

CONTINUED...

In fact, it is the latter which largely secure the reproduction specifically of the relations of production, behind a ‘shield’ provided by the repressive State apparatus. It is here that the role of the ruling ideology is heavily concentrated, the ideology of the ruling class, which holds State power. It is the intermediation of the ruling ideology that ensures a (sometimes teeth-gritting) ‘harmony’ between the repressive State apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses, and between the different State Ideological Apparatuses.

We are thus led to envisage the following hypothesis, as a function precisely of the diversity of ideological State Apparatuses in their single, because shared, role of the reproduction of the relations of production.

Indeed we have listed a relatively large number of Ideological State Apparatuses in contemporary capitalist social formations: the educational apparatus, the religious apparatus, the family apparatus, the political apparatus, the trade-union apparatus, the communications apparatus, the ‘cultural’ apparatus, etc.

Ideology Link

But in the social formations of that mode of production characterized by ‘serfdom’ (usually called the feudal mode of production), we observe that although there is a single repressive State apparatus which, since the earliest known Ancient States, let alone the Absolute Monarchies, has been formally very similar to the one we know today, the number of Ideological State Apparatuses is smaller and their individual types are different. For example, we observe that during the Middle Ages, the Church (the religious Ideological State Apparatus) accumulated a number of functions which have today devolved on to several distinct Ideological State Apparatuses, new ones in relation to the past I am invoking, in particular educational and cultural functions. Alongside the Church there was the family Ideological State Apparatus, which played a considerable part, incommensurable with its role in capitalist social formations. Despite appearances, the Church and the Family were not the only Ideological State Apparatuses. There was also a political Ideological State Apparatus (the Estates General, the Parlement, the different political factions and Leagues, the ancestors of the modern political parties, and the whole political system of the free Communes and then of the Villes). There was also a powerful ‘proto-trade union’ Ideological State Apparatus, if I may venture such an anachronistic term (the powerful merchants’ and bankers’ guilds and the journeymen’s associations, etc.). Publishing and Communications, even, saw an indisputable development, as did the theatre; initially both were integral parts of the Church, then they became more and more independent of it.

In the pre-capitalist historical period which I have examined extremely broadly, it is absolutely clear that there was one dominant Ideological State Apparatus, the Church, which concentrated within it not only religious functions, but also educational ones, and a large proportion of the functions of communications and ‘culture’. It is no accident that all ideological struggle, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, starting with the first shocks of the Reformation, was concentrated in an anti-clerical and anti-religious struggle; rather this is a function precisely of the dominant position of the religious Ideological State Apparatus.

The foremost objective and achievement of the French Revolution was not just to transfer State power from the feudal aristocracy to the merchant-capitalist bourgeoisie, to break part of the former repressive State apparatus and replace it with a new one (e.g., the national popular Army) but also to attack the number-one Ideological State Apparatus: the Church. Hence the civil constitution of the clergy, the confiscation of ecclesiastical wealth, and the creation of new Ideological State Apparatuses to replace the religious Ideological State Apparatus in its dominant role.

CONTINUED...

Naturally, these things did not happen automatically: witness the Concordat, the Restoration and the long class struggle between the landed aristocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie throughout the nineteenth century for the establishment of bourgeois hegemony over the functions formerly fulfilled by the Church: above all by the Schools. It can be said that the bourgeoisie relied on the new political, parliamentary-democratic, Ideological State Apparatus, installed in the earliest years of the Revolution, then restored after long and violent struggles, for a few months in 1848 and for decades after the fall of the Second Empire, in order to conduct its struggle against the Church and wrest its ideological functions away from it, in other words, to ensure not only its own political hegemony, but also the ideological hegemony indispensable to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production.

That is why I believe that I am justified in advancing the following Thesis, however precarious it is. I believe that the Ideological State Apparatus which has been installed in the dominant position in mature capitalist social formations as a result of a violent political and ideological class struggle against the old dominant Ideological State Apparatus, is the educational ideological apparatus.

This thesis may seem paradoxical, given that for everyone, i.e. in the ideological representation that the bourgeoisie has tried to give itself and the classes it exploits, it really seems that the dominant Ideological State Apparatus in capitalist social formations is not the Schools, but the political Ideological State Apparatus, i.e. the regime of parliamentary democracy combining universal suffrage and party struggle.

However, history, even recent history, shows that the bourgeoisie has been and still is able to accommodate itself to political Ideological State Apparatuses other than parliamentary democracy: the First and Second Empires, Constitutional Monarchy (Louis XVIII and Charles X), Parliamentary Monarchy (Louis-Philippe), Presidential Democracy (de Gaulle), to mention only France. In England this is even clearer. The Revolution was particularly ‘successful’ there from the bourgeois point of view, since unlike France, where the bourgeoisie, partly because of the stupidity of the petty aristocracy, had to agree to being carried to power by peasant and plebeian ‘journées révolutionnaires’, something for which it had to pay a high price, the English bourgeoisie was able to ‘compromise’ with the aristocracy and ‘share’ State power and the use of the State apparatus with it for a long time (peace among all men of good will in the ruling classes!). In Germany it is even more striking, since it was behind a political Ideological State Apparatus in which the imperial Junkers (epitomized by Bismarck), their army and their police provided it with a shield and leading personnel, that the imperialist bourgeoisie made its shattering entry into history, before ‘traversing’ the Weimar Republic and entrusting itself to Nazism.

Hence I believe I have good reasons for thinking that behind the scenes of its political Ideological State Apparatus, which occupies the front of the stage, what the bourgeoisie has installed as its number-one, i.e. as its dominant Ideological State Apparatus, is the educational apparatus, which has in fact replaced in its functions the previously dominant Ideological State Apparatus, the Church. One might even add: the School-Family couple has replaced the Church-Family couple.

Ideology Link

Why is the educational apparatus in fact the dominant Ideological State Apparatus in capitalist social formations, and how does it function?

For the moment it must suffice to say:

1. All Ideological State Apparatuses, whatever they are, contribute to the same result: the reproduction of the relations of production, i.e. of capitalist relations of exploitation.

2. Each of them contributes towards this single result in the way proper to it. The political apparatus by subjecting individuals to the political State ideology, the ‘indirect’ (parliamentary) or ‘direct’ (plebiscitary or fascist) ‘democratic’ ideology. The communications apparatus by cramming every ‘citizen’ with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism, moralism, etc, by means of the press, the radio and television. The same goes for the cultural apparatus (the role of sport in chauvinism is of the first importance), etc. The religious apparatus by recalling in sermons and the other great ceremonies of Birth, Marriage and Death, that man is only ashes, unless he loves his neighbour to the extent of turning the other cheek to whoever strikes first. The family apparatus ...but there is no need to go on.

3. This concert is dominated by a single score, occasionally disturbed by contradictions (those of the remnants of former ruling classes, those of the proletarians and their organizations): the score of the Ideology of the current ruling class which integrates into its music the great themes of the Humanism of the Great Forefathers, who produced the Greek Miracle even before Christianity, and afterwards the Glory of Rome, the Eternal City, and the themes of Interest, particular and general, etc. nationalism, moralism and economism.

4. Nevertheless, in this concert, one Ideological State Apparatus certainly has the dominant role, although hardly anyone lends an ear to its music: it is so silent! This is the School.

It takes children from every class at infant-school age, and then for years, the years in which the child is most ‘vulnerable’, squeezed between the Family State Apparatus and the Educational State Apparatus, it drums into them, whether it uses new or old methods, a certain amount of ‘know-how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology (French, arithmetic, natural history, the sciences, literature) or simply the ruling ideology in its pure state (ethics, civic instruction, philosophy). Somewhere around the age of sixteen, a huge mass of children are ejected ‘into production’: these are the workers or small peasants. Another portion of scholastically adapted youth carries on: and, for better or worse, it goes somewhat further, until it falls by the wayside and fills the posts of small and middle technicians, white-collar workers, small and middle executives, petty bourgeois of all kinds. A last portion reaches the summit, either to fall into intellectual semi-employment, or to provide, as well as the ‘intellectuals of the collective labourer’, the agents of exploitation (capitalists, managers), the agents of repression (soldiers, policemen, politicians, administrators, etc.) and the professional ideologists (priests of all sorts, most of whom are convinced ‘laymen’).

Each mass ejected en route is practically provided with the ideology which suits the role it has to fulfil in class society: the role of the exploited (with a ‘highly-developed’ ‘professional’, ‘ethical’, ‘civic’, ‘national’ and a-political consciousness); the role of the agent of exploitation (ability to give the workers orders and speak to them: ‘human relations’), of the agent of repression (ability to give orders and enforce obedience ‘without discussion’, or ability to manipulate the demagogic of a political leader’s rhetoric), or of the professional ideologist (ability to treat consciousnesses with the respect, i.e. with the contempt, blackmail, and demagogic they deserve, adapted to the accents of Morality, of Virtue, of ‘Transcendence’, of the Nation, of France’s World Role, etc.).

Of course, many of these contrasting Virtues (modesty, resignation, submissiveness on the one hand, cynicism, contempt, arrogance, confidence, self-importance, even smooth talk and cunning on the other) are also taught in the Family, in the Church, in the Army, in Good Books, in films and even in the football stadium. But no other Ideological State Apparatus has the obligatory (and not least, free) audience of the totality of the children in the capitalist social formation, eight hours a day for five or six days out of seven.

But it is by an apprenticeship in a variety of know-how wrapped up in the massive inculcation of the ideology of the ruling class that the relations of production in a capitalist social formation, i.e. the relations of exploited to exploiters and exploiters to exploited, are largely reproduced. The mechanisms which produce this vital result for the capitalist regime are naturally covered up and concealed by a universally reigning ideology of the School, universally reigning because it is one of the essential forms of the ruling bourgeois ideology: an ideology which represents the School as a neutral environment purged of ideology (because it is ...lay), where teachers respectful of the ‘conscience’ and ‘freedom’ of the children who are entrusted to them (in complete confidence) by their ‘parents’ (who are free, too, i.e. the owners of their children) open up for them the path to the freedom, morality and responsibility of adults by their own example, by knowledge, literature and their ‘liberating’ virtues.

I ask the pardon of those teachers who, in dreadful conditions, attempt to turn the few weapons they can find in the history and learning they ‘teach’ against the ideology, the system and the practices in which they are trapped. They are a kind of hero. But they are rare and how many (the majority) do not even begin to suspect the ‘work’ the system (which is bigger than they are and crushes them) forces them to do, or worse, put all their heart and ingenuity into performing it with the most advanced awareness (the famous new methods!). So little do they suspect it that their own devotion contributes to the maintenance and

Ideology Link

nourishment of this ideological representation of the School, which makes the School today as ‘natural’, indispensable-useful and even beneficial for our contemporaries as the Church was ‘natural’, indispensable and generous for our ancestors a few centuries ago.

In fact, the Church has been replaced today in its role as the dominant Ideological State Apparatus by the School. It is coupled with the Family just as the Church was once coupled with the Family. We can now claim that the unprecedently deep crisis which is now shaking the education system of so many States across the globe, often in conjunction with a crisis (already proclaimed in the Communist Manifesto) shaking the family system, takes on a political meaning, given that the School (and the School/Family couple) constitutes the dominant Ideological State Apparatus, the Apparatus playing a determinant part in the reproduction of the relations of production of a mode of production threatened in its existence by the world class struggle.

Labor Link

____ The aff's mapping out and measuring of labor is the critical lynchpin of capitalist reproduction.

Antonio **Negri**, former professor of state theory @ University of Purdua. Trans. Noura Wedell. The Porcelain Workshop. 2008. p. 43-4.

Within the new figure of the capitalist relation, excess enables the constitution of spaces of selfvalorization that capital cannot entirely reabsorb. At best, these can only be recovered through a kind of permanent "wild chase" of this mass of autonomous labor, or, more precisely still, of this multitude of productive singularities. The constitution of capitalist temporality (that is, of the power of capital) can no longer be acquired or reconstructed dialectically. The production of merchandise is always followed by the production of subjectivities, which oppose each other as excess. This process takes the form of an apparatus that is virtually antagonistic and can counteract all capitalist synthesis. The Foucauldian distinctions between regimes of power and subjectivity are completely reinvested in this new reality of capitalist organization. They are represented by the scission between capitalist time/value and the singular valorization of the labor force. This is where the Spinozan opposition between power or potestas and potency or potentia (puissance) reemerges with great force.

Let us now return to an essential problem that we previously mentioned in passing: the measure of work and of capitalist time. If we consider that living work is the cause and constitutive motor (indifferently material or immaterial) drall forms of development, that the production of subjectivity is the fundamental key to escaping the dialectic of biopowers and, on the contrary, to constituting a biopolitical fabric, and that this production allows us to pass from a simple disciplinary regime to one that also contains the dimension of control at the same time as it allows the emergence of powerful and common insurgencies, then the question of measure (the quantified rationality of valorization) becomes central. It is paradoxically central, however, since the measures that capital sought to discipline and control are now elusive.

It will, no doubt, prove necessary to open a new field of research in order to determine whether the theme of measure can be proposed anew on the terrain of social production, according to new forms and modalities that will need to be defined. In that case, all analyses must presuppose the ontological break between living labor and constant capital. The fact is that the excess of living labor in relation to constant capital does not appear as an "immeasurable" production, "outside" quantitative measure. This is where the difficulty lies. It is rather a production that goes beyond the very idea of measure, that ceases to be defined as a negative overcoming of measurable limits to become, simply, in an absolutely affirmative and positive way, the potential (puissance) of living labor. And it then becomes legitimate to consider, at least as a tendency, the end of exploitation. And this is no doubt what Foucault and Deleuze refer to when speaking of processes of subjectivation.

NGO Link

___ NGOs Do NOT help women. Instead NGOs are the perfect tool of the Neoliberalism capital priority order. Not only does it re-entrench people further into poverty giving them the forced choice to buy the commodities or die, but the compassion and pity toward the poor that on one hand allows for ethicized subjectivities that create a hyperexploitable workforce and on the other makes them a solidarity and denies them agency in the “other” society.

Briggs, prof of women's studies at Arizona University, in '08

[Laura, , Activisms and Epistemologies: Problems for Transnationalisms, Social Text Vol. 26, No. 4]

In contrast, in “Cultural Talk in the Hot Peace” (1998), Spivak distinguishes between the rhetoric of neoliberal NGOs and other, more productive political movements and consciousnesses that offer a vision of a more ethical world, that situate themselves in opposition to development ideology. The overwhelming impact of NGOs and their view of the world, she argues, is to support development and contribute to the “financialization of the globe”; elsewhere she points to microcredit loans to women as a paradigmatic example. Drawing everyone into global capitalism has several predictable effects. First, some of the people who borrow money will be unable to pay it back, and they will fall into endless cycles of debt. while those who sell commodities to the poor are the primary beneficiaries. Second, she suggests, there is the cultural correlate: the production of compassion and pity toward poor women produces other effects. From the right, delivering ethnicized “women” as a commodity contributes to producing them as a hyperexploitable workforce. On the left, she argues that it produces a national or racial solidarity that denies cleavages within the “other” society (say, India), eviscerating the possibility of talking about sexist exploitation, for example, while opening the way for a hybrid, migratory bourgeoisie to produce the ethnicized, female, poor as the subject of its own (cultural or economic) surplus value — the art show, the film, the fundraiser for poor, victimized women. Finally, she argues, the ways that NGOs open up fragile national economies to the ravages of the global economy is not a good thing for those economies in general, and natural resources in particular.

Organization links

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/thecominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 66-7]

Expect nothing from organizations. Beware of all existing social milieus, and above all, don't become one. It's not uncommon, in the course of a significant breaking of the social bond, to cross paths with organizations – political, labor, humanitarian, community associations, etc. Among their members, one may even find individuals who are sincere – if a little desperate — who are enthusiastic – if a little conniving. Organizations are attractive due to their apparent consistency – they have a history, a head office, a name, resources, a leader, a strategy and a discourse. They are nonetheless empty structures, which, in spite of their grand origins, can never be filled. In all their affairs, at every level, these organizations are concerned above all with their own survival as organizations, and little else. Their repeated betrayals have often alienated the commitment of their own rank and file. And this is why you can, on occasion, run into worthy beings within them. But the promise of the encounter can only be realized outside the organization and, unavoidably, at odds with it. Far more dreadful are social milieus, with their supple texture, their gossip, and their informal hierarchies. Flee all milieus. Each and every milieu is orientated towards the neutralization of some truth. Literary circles exist to smother the clarity of writing. Anarchist milieus to blunt the directness of direct action. Scientific milieus to withhold the implications of their research from the majority of people today. Sport milieus to contain in their gyms the various forms of life they should create. Particularly to be avoided are the cultural and activist circles. They are the old people's homes where all revolutionary desires traditionally go to die. The task of cultural circles is to spot nascent intensities and to explain away the sense of whatever it is you're doing, while the task of activist circles is to sap your energy for doing it. Activist milieus spread their diffuse web throughout the French territory, and are encountered on the path of every revolutionary development. They offer nothing but the story of their many defeats and the bitterness these have produced. Their exhaustion has made them incapable of seizing the possibilities of the present. Besides, to nurture their wretched passivity they talk far too much and this makes them unreliable when it comes to the police. Just as it's useless to expect anything from them, it's stupid to be disappointed by their sclerosis. It's best to just abandon this dead weight. All milieus are counter-revolutionary because they are only concerned with the preservation of their sad comfort.

Pomo/radicalism link

The Invisible Committee in '9

[**The Coming Insurrection**, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/thecominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 60-2]

The West is a civilization that has survived all the prophecies of its collapse with a singular stratagem. Just as the bourgeoisie had to deny itself as a class in order to permit the bourgeoisification of society as a whole, from the worker to the baron; just as capital had to sacrifice itself as a wage relation in order to impose itself as a social relation – becoming cultural capital and health capital in addition to finance capital; just as Christianity had to sacrifice itself as a religion in order to survive as an affective structure – as a vague injunction to humility, compassion, and weakness; so the West has sacrificed itself as a particular civilization in order to impose itself as a universal culture. The operation can be summarized like this: an entity in its death throws sacrifices itself as a content in order to survive as a form. The fragmented individual survives as a form thanks to the “spiritual” technologies of counseling. Patriarchy survives by attributing to women all the worst attributes of men: willfulness, self-control, insensitivity. A disintegrated society survives by propagating an epidemic of sociability and entertainment. So it goes with all the great, outmoded fictions of the West maintaining themselves through artifices that contradict these fictions point by point. There is no “clash of civilizations.” There is a clinically dead civilization kept alive by all sorts of life-support machines that spread a peculiar plague into the planet’s atmosphere. At this point it can no longer believe in a single one of its own “values”, and any affirmation of them is considered an impudent act, a provocation that should and must be taken apart, deconstructed, and returned to a state of doubt. Today Western imperialism is the imperialism of relativism, of the “it all depends on your point of view”; it’s the eye-rolling or the wounded indignation at anyone who’s stupid, primitive, or presumptuous enough to still believe in something, to affirm anything at all. You can see the dogmatism of constant questioning give its complicit wink of the eye everywhere in the universities and among the literary intelligentsias. No critique is too radical among postmodernist thinkers, as long as it maintains this total absence of certitude. A century ago, scandal was identified with any particularly unruly and raucous negation, while today it’s found in any affirmation that fails to tremble. Of course, this imperialism of the relative finds a suitable enemy in every empty dogmatism, in whatever form of Marxist-Leninism, Salifism, or Neo-Nazism: anyone who, like Westerners, mistakes provocation for affirmation. At this juncture, any strictly social contestation that refuses to see that what we’re faced with is not the crisis of a society but the extinction of a civilization becomes an accomplice in its perpetuation. It’s even become a contemporary strategy to critique this society in the vain hope of saving this civilization. So we have a corpse on our backs, but we won’t be able to rid ourselves of it just like that. Nothing is to be expected from the end of civilization, from its clinical death. In and of itself, it can only be of interest to historians. It’s a fact, and it must be translated into a decision. Facts can be conjured away, but decision is political. To decide on the death of civilization, then to work out how it will happen: only decision will rid us of the corpse.

Reform Link

— The affirmative amounts to nothing more than a facelift for global capitalism- the single-issue mode of resistance alienates people from their communities and replicates the top-down management of neoliberal capitalism.

El Kilombo Intergaláctico, actual communist collective based in Durham North Carolina, in ‘7
[“The Fourth, the Sixth, the Other, and US”, <http://inthemiddleofthewhirlwind.wordpress.com/15/>]

Left politics in the United States have been dominated by two primary fields of organization, electoral politics and the NGOification of the grassroots. For those disenchanted with electoral politics — something we can't go into at depth here but speaking of, at minimum, dissatisfaction with the Democratic party or a fraudulent voting system, and, more profoundly, with the party system (nullified by the empire of money) and the crisis of representation in general (which has become a spectacle of simulation) — non-governmental and non-profit organizations have often been the refuge and catch-all for social concerns and activism. As has been written elsewhere [24] and an increasingly common critique, the NGO model has cornered much of left politics into a cycle of fundraising bureaucracy and philanthropic fashion: launching funding searches, funding requests, funding report-backs, organizations have to find money to pay people to find money, to tailor or at least cater political initiatives or campaigns to funding requirements and preferences, and to dedicate endless energy and human resources to donor relationships, agency applications, and creating images attractive to foundations. And while they may be run by nicer people than many of those found in an electoral system of representation, NGOs do not offer a more democratic model. They rarely have or are accountable to a community base or a population, they are not chosen by a base, they are hired by a board, and they tend to, by the nature of their funding structure and salary scale, convert politics into management, much the same way neoliberalism has converted state government into business management. This doesn't mean they are not necessary in particular instances, but it hardly provides a model for alternative social organization. Philanthropic priorities and current trends have determined the focus and movement of these organizations, taking them through environmental justice, anti-nuke organizing, racial justice, gay rights, housing rights, youth development, anti-poverty initiatives, immigrant rights, anti-war movement, union organizing, etc. – all worthy causes in themselves, but also very limited by themselves. **And no matter how long that lists gets, it will likely never arrive at a new system of social relations, of community self-determination, of collective self-government.**

This style of leftist politics not only does not provide us with a “we” adequate for global anticapitalist struggle, but it in fact mirrors the fragmentation imposed by the market itself. What's left? The tired ideologies of sectarianism and vanguardism have shown their utter inadequacy to address current global conditions; or have been so shown by their total rejection by people in struggle. Those discouraged by NGO politics and sectarian or vanguardist practices have in turn often taken refuge in solidarity activism, supporting those movements around the world who have managed to create something else, literally an-other's politics. But the Sixth eliminates this last refuge. Conditions have gone beyond a solidarity structure where the privileged in the north help the poor of the south. The ethical responsibility of the cry “we are all others” lies on our shoulders, to recognize our own conditions, our own struggle, and to construct our own liberation. It is not solidarity groups, single-issue campaigns, and professionalized activist identities that we need, it is our own organized communities—whether those be residential or professional, geographic or virtual—and a project to connect those communities.

The Sixth did not start with the Other Campaign or the highly publicized emergence of the commanders of the Zapatista Army from the Lacandón Jungle. It started years ago when the Zapatista bases began to organize assemblies and implement self-governing structures in their communities, experimenting with rotating juridical duties, a collectively created school curriculum, community-determined conservation and land use laws, and to create a network of autonomous communities with the organizational power to make democratic decisions among hundreds of thousands of people. Their internal organization, with power firmly situated in the assembly, is what created the ability and the collective mechanisms to open themselves to the project of a much bigger network, that which they have determined necessary for combating global capitalism.

Reform Link

REFORM IS USED TO PROP UP FALSE HOPE DESTROYING MOVEMENTS AND MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO.

McCluskey, Professor at State University of New York at Buffalo, in '07

[*Martha, , Buffalo Law Review, 54 Buffalo L. Rev. 1191*]

In explaining why left politics needs hard-hitting critical theory, Brown and Halley are not naive about the left's beleaguered position in contemporary politics. Instead, they direct their argument for the political usefulness of non-instrumental critique to the particular demands of a politically unfriendly context. The problem that grounds their vision is not that law reform advocates make the "wrong" choice but that politics so often consists of bad choices - double binds - that seem to dig advocates into deeper conflicts with left ideals. Having lousy options, of course, is what it means to be on the losing end of a power struggle. A retrospective look back to policy choices made in better times shows that even very promising reforms can turn out to be a powerful tool for those who want to undermine the reformers' goals - because what matters is not law on the books but the messy and uncertain world of law in action: action that is always subject to power. Plausible reform strategies can all too often end up reinforcing rather than subverting the problems with the status quo. In the imperfect real world, steps toward justice almost always come at the cost of complicity with other injustices. In this context, left activists who strive for political virtue are likely to end up divided, exhausted, and immobilized

Security Link

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/thecominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 61]

No social order can securely found itself on the principle that nothing is true. Yet it must be made secure. Applying the concept of “security” to everything these days is the expression of a project to securely fasten onto places, behaviors, and even people themselves, an ideal order to which they are no longer ready to submit. Saying “nothing is true” says nothing about the world but everything about the Western concept of truth. For the West, truth is not an attribute of beings or things, but of their representation. A representation that conforms to experience is held to be true. Science is, in the last analysis, this empire of universal verification. Since all human behavior, from the most ordinary to the most learned, is based on a foundation of unevenly formulated presuppositions, and since all practices start from a point where things and their representations can no longer be distinguished, a dose of truth that the Western concept knows nothing about enters into every life. We talk in the West about “real people,” but only in order to mock these simpletons. This is why Westerners have always been thought of as liars and hypocrites by the people they’ve colonized. This is why they’re envied for what they have, for their technological development, but never for what they are, for which they are rightly held in contempt. Sade, Nietzsche and Artaud wouldn’t be taught in schools if the kind of truth mentioned above was not discredited in advance. Containing all affirmations and deactivating all certainties as they irresistibly come to light—such is the long labor of the Western intellect. The police and philosophy are two convergent, if formally distinct, means to this end.

Unemployment/Workers Rights links

— Fighting against unemployment and giving workers rights is just a way of preventing social unrest. Being against capitalism means being against the alienation of a job and the

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 28-9]

This neurosis is the foundation upon which successive governments could declare war on joblessness, pretending to wage a “battle on unemployment” while ex-managers camped with their cell phones in Red Cross shelters along the banks of the Seine. While the Department of Labor was massively manipulating its statistics in order to bring unemployment numbers below two million. While welfare checks and drug dealing were the only guarantees, as the French state has recognized, against the possibility of social unrest at each and every moment. It's the psychic economy of the French as much as the political stability of the country that is at stake in the maintenance of the workerist fiction. Excuse us if we don't give a fuck. We belong to a generation that lives very well in this fiction. That has never counted on either a pension or the right to work, let alone rights at work. That isn't even “precarious,” as the most advanced factions of the militant left like to theorize, because to be precarious is still to define oneself in relation to the sphere of work, that is, to its decomposition. We accept the necessity of finding money, by whatever means, because it is currently impossible to do without it, but we reject the necessity of working. Besides, we don't work anymore: we do our time. Business is not a place where we exist, it's a place we pass through. We aren't cynical, we are just reluctant to be deceived. All these discourses on motivation, quality and personal investment pass us by, to the great dismay of human resources managers. They say we are disappointed by business, that it failed to honor our parents' loyalty, that it let them go too quickly. They are lying. To be disappointed, one must have hoped for something. And we have never hoped for anything from business: we see it for what it is and for what it has always been, a fool's game of varying degrees of comfort. On behalf of our parents, our only regret is that they fell into the trap, at least the ones who believed.

War on Poverty Link

— The affirmative represents the poor as an enemy that must be eliminated through the reproduction of neo-liberal policies. This criminalizes poor struggles that seek to reclaim the commons.

De Angelis, Reader in economics at the University of East London, in '7

[Massimo, "Enclosures, commons and the 'outside'" in The Accumulation of Capital in Southern Africa, eds. Patrick Bond, Norman Chitonge and Arndt Hopfmann, pg. 64-5]

In the words of the World Bank president, the 'fight' against poverty is a spectacular event, uniting neoliberal supranational institutions and neoliberal national governments marching together with youth wearing sweatshop-produced rubber bands and rock stars with cool sunglasses announcing to the CNN audiences that 'good governance' is indeed the practical solution to such a calamity. As 'poverty' is no longer a concrete condition of life and struggle, it is turned into an abstract enemy, an outside that is supposed to be fought with correspondent abstract policies that is, to recite a recent world bank document assessing South Africa investment climate, 'macroeconomics and regulatory policies:

the security of property rights and the rules of law; and the quality of supporting institutions such as physical and financial infrastructure.' (World Bank 2005: 5)

With the definition of this abstract 'outside', concrete struggles of the poors that turn poverty into conditions of production of community, social cooperation and dignity, can be locally criminalised: after all they threaten macroeconomic stability, they threaten 'property rights and the rule of laws', and they threaten the roles of infrastructures qua vehicle of capital accumulation, demanding instead that they are devoted to the reproduction of needs of communities. With the proclaiming of poverty as an outside to struggle against, Paul Wolfowitz and the discourse promoted by the institution he presides, can declare war to the poors, and kill three birds with a stone: first, continue to promote neoliberal policies that reproduce the poors as poors, through further enclosures and the promotion of disciplinary markets and their homeostatic mechanisms; second, persevering on the creation of a context in which the poors' struggles are criminalised whenever they oppose neoliberal discourse and reclaim commons; and, third, divide the struggling body into goods and bads, the good ones being the 'responsible' movements holding hands with Paul Wolfowitz and the likes, and the others the 'irresponsible' rest of us. The basis of neoliberal governance depends on games and selecting principles like these.

Welfare Can't Solve Cap – Critical Aff Ans

_____ A new New Deal cannot solve the crisis of capitalism. The social has already evaporated and we lack any common language to reconcile the contradictions of empire.

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 15-6]

There will be no social solution to the present situation. First, because the vague aggregate of social milieus, institutions, and individualized bubbles that is called, with a touch of antiphrasis, “society,” has no consistency. Second, because there’s no longer any language for common experience. And we cannot share wealth if we do not share a language. It took half a century of struggle around the Enlightenment to make the French Revolution possible, and a century of struggle around work to give birth to the fearsome “welfare state.” Struggles create the language in which a new order expresses itself. But there is nothing like that today. Europe is now a continent gone broke that shops secretly at discount stores and has to fly budget airlines if it wants to travel at all. No “problems” framed in social terms admit of a solution. The questions of “pensions,” of “job security,” of “young people” and their “violence” can only be held in suspense while the situation these words serve to cover up is continually policed for signs of further unrest. Nothing can make it an attractive prospect to wipe the asses of pensioners for minimum wage. Those who have found less humiliation and more advantage in a life of crime than in sweeping floors will not turn in their weapons, and prison won’t teach them to love society. Cuts to their monthly pensions will undermine the desperate pleasure-seeking of hordes of retirees, making them stew and sputter about the refusal to work among an ever larger section of youth. And finally, no guaranteed income granted the day after a quasi-uprising will be able to lay the foundation of a new New Deal, a new pact, a new peace. The social feeling has already evaporated too much for that.

Welfare Can't Solve Cap – Critical Aff Ans.

Welfare, income guarantees, and attempts to make life equitable are not enough. Only through class mobilization and active insurrection can we overcome capitalism.

Negri, Marxist philosopher, in '9

[Antonio, "Communism: some thoughts on the concept and practice", March 14,

http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm]

3) Being communists means building a new world where the exploitation of capital and subjection to the State are eliminated. Starting from our present circumstances, realistically, from the historical determinations that characterise our current condition, how do we move forward towards the realisation of communism?

First of all, let us say that this determinism can be broken and overcome only by building a force that is superior to that of those in command. But how do we do that? As we said, political rupture seems necessary once indignation, refusal, resistance and struggle have produced a constituent power that wants to realise itself. Only force makes this move forward, this constituent rupture possible. From strikes, industrial sabotage, the breaking and piracy of systems of domination, migrant flight and mobility to riots, insurrections, and the concrete configurations of an alternative power: these are the first recognisable figures of a collective revolutionary will.

This shift is fundamental - communist imagination is exalted in the moment of rupture. Higher wages against labour exploitation, universal income against the financial crisis, a democracy of all against dictatorship: these are the outcomes of a history that produces constituent will. But this is not enough; even if the cause is insufficient it does not make it less necessary, less sine qua non. It is not enough because there is no revolution without organisation, just as the exaltation of the event was not enough, the resorting to myth, or the mystic reference to the barenness of bodies, to a threshold of poverty opposed to the ubiquity of oppression - none of this is enough because there still is no rational design that invests and involves the movements of rupture with the power of organisation.

As Spinoza wrote: "Cupiditas, quae ex ratione oritur, excessum habere nequit" [Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive] (Spinoza, Ethics , Part IV, Proposition LXI, New York: Dover Publications, 1959, p. 229), which thus prohibits any definition of desire that arrests itself [censors itself] with (supposedly objective) limits. What I mean to say is that when we think about and experiment with this framework, no teleology or philosophy of history is at play, only a collective desire that, with force, builds up its organised surplus throughout the entire aleatory process of struggles: the surplus of communism in relation to the dull repetition of the history of exploitation. To this end, communism is closer to us today (which doesn't mean that it's around the corner) because the surplus labour extracted from labour power - as it changes with the cognitive metamorphosis - is only with difficulty translated and turned into that surplus value that the capitalist organises into profit. Cognitive labour is terribly indigestible to capital.

Welfare Links

THE AFFIRMATIVE'S SHARPENING OF THE WELFARE STATE, DESPITE THEIR GOOD INTENTIONS, REINFORCES A MANAGERIAL APPROACH TO LABOR THAT GLOSSES OVER ANTAGONISMS AND MAKES DECENTRALIZED CAPITALISM INEVITABLE.

Negri, former professor of state theory @ University of Purdua, in '8

[Antonio, Trans. Noura Wedell, The Porcelain Workshop. p. 20-3]

If we want to shatter the bourgeois capitalist conception of power, we must go beyond the modern conception of power itself. It is useful, however, to stress that the modern cannot be reduced to merely these political categories. An alternative exists in modern thought (Machiavelli versus theories of "raison d'Etat," Spinoza versus Hobbes) that stands in opposition to what we have just seen, and gives reasons for political association and for the democratic dynamic against transcendental conceptions of power. It affirms the immanence of politics and the constitutive and constituent dimension of democracy. The concepts of multitude and democracy in use in the debate at hand were born of this perspective.

This is what I attempted to show about Spinoza in my book, *The Savage Anomaly*.

We will therefore try to demonstrate that the political situation we are faced with today can only be defined within a paradigm shift in relation to the modern tradition. We intend to show in particular that it is easier to define the contemporary as postmodern than as hypermodern, in spite of the changes the term has undergone particularly in France and in the United States.

Many theoreticians, sociologists and politicians- I am mainly thinking here of certain German intellectuals such as Ulrich Beck- have labeled the contemporary period *hypermodern* all the while paradoxically thinking it in continuous relation to the modern tradition. We will try to prove that only a paradigm shift allow us to interpret the contemporary period, particularly in regards to themes of power, work, and globalization. We insist on this paradigm shift for it affirms a discontinuity that is a starting point, and must be acknowledged. This radical caesura is an essential component of the discussion we wish to engage.

In fact, one cannot address the issue of the caesura without mentioning the crisis of modernity (that is to say, of its political categories), derived from a long series of phenomena.

Let us, for example, ask what it means to "work" today. For a long time, work was reduced to the production of material goods. Today, "work" refers to the entirety of social activity. In order to understand this mutation, we must keep in mind the struggles and transformations of the organization of labor since 1917, an insurrectional challenge on the part of the workers that, for the long term (what some, precisely, have labeled the "short century"), plunged the whole of organized labor into crisis. The first response to the aggression of living work towards the capitalist system took the form of the New Deal, and then developed as the general spread of the welfare state in the central regions of the planet, through the imposition of biopolitical forms of organization and exploitation of both society and the state.

It has since become impossible to define social and productive activity in terms of the modern socialist tradition. Today, we face a tendency towards the hegemony of immaterial work (intellectual, scientific, cognitive, relational, communicative, affective, etc.) increasingly characterizing both the mode of production and processes of valorization. It goes without saying that this form of work is entirely subordinate to new modes of accumulation and exploitation. We can no longer interpret these according to the classic labor theory of value that measures work according to the time employed in production. Cognitive work is not measurable in those terms; it is even characterized by its immensurability, its excess (excedence). A productive relation links cognitive work to the time of life. It is nourished by life as much as it modifies it in return, and its products are those of freedom and imagination. This creativity is precisely the excess that characterizes it. Of course, work still remains at the center of the entire process of production (and this is where we affirm our fidelity to Marxism), but its definition cannot be reduced to a purely material or labor dimension. This constitutes the first element of the caesura between the modern and the postmodern.

A second caesura occurs in regards to the redefinition of the very notion of sovereignty. Under the management of the welfare state, the processes that organize social work have invested society as a whole. Sovereign action has become progressively defined as a growing biopower spreading to cover the entire social field. We have moved from the discipline of the individual

Negri Continues below

Welfare Links

Negri Continues from above

organization of labor to the control of populations. The process of real subsumption of society under capital here expresses itself in all its glory. The distinction between formal subsumption and real subsumption of society under capital goes back to Marx. At the stage of formal subsumption, capital marshals different forms of production under its command: handicraft, peasant, industrial, etc. The capitalist commandment thus presents itself from the outside as the unifying force of all these differences. In real subsumption, however, all forms of production are defined from the outset as homogenous in order to allow for profit. Capital, in this case, is limited to harnessing and accumulating social work. In Foucauldian terms, we have moved from a disciplinarian regime to a regime of control. To clarify this point, please allow me to refer to Marx's pages in the sixth unpublished chapter of Book I of the Capital, and in Grundisse, as well as to Andre Gorz's recent works.

The biopolitical government of society thus consequently tends towards totalitarianism. Biopolitics can even go so far as verging on thanatopolitics: biopolitics and thanatopolitics tend to identify occasionally, as war becomes the essence of politics and thanatopolitics the matrix of biopolitics. What interests us here above all is *the reversal, as paradoxical as it is dramatic, that is playing itself out.* For we rapidly discover that *the global extension of capitalist power over society corresponds to the global spread of insubordination.* How are we justified in affirming this? When the law of value- that commands capitalist development- comes to fail, then the capacity of capital to contain the productive force of labor (immaterial, cognitive, affective, linguistic, etc.) in itself also wears out. Ignorance in regards to the new quality of work and the preoccupation of capitalist command must now face new insubordination and social resistance. The general situation is therefore predisposed to antagonism. This is the second ground on which we can define the radical difference between modernity and the contemporary period. The third series of phenomena concerns the globalization of economic processes and the crisis of the concepts of nation-state, people, sovereignty, etc., following from it. Capitalist development had found its fundamental structure in the nation-state. Today, on the contrary, it is the crisis of the nation-state as induced globalization that the general crisis of the political categories of modernity manifests, opening up thought to the relation between Empire and the multitudes.

We will return to these elements, to the philosophical crisis of the categories of modernity and to the emergence of new concepts, in greater depth. For now, we would like to insist on the fact that the postmodern political horizon appears foremost as the dissolution of the political ontology built around the concept of sovereignty. Not only are the categories of sovereignty affected, reality itself emerges transformed. It is therefore on this point that the political theories of the modern encounter their definitive limit. We discover that sovereignty can no longer be a reduction to the One. Such a reduction being no longer possible, the exercise of sovereignty must affront irreducible differences and submit itself to a ceaselessly growing antagonism. From this line of tension and of explicit antagonism, by recuperating the Machiavellian theory of "tumult," by making ours the Spinozan theory of democratic "multitude" and the Marxist theory of the "class struggle," we can start to define the specific, singular characteristics of our times.

During the course of these lectures, we will also attempt to confront other philosophical theories that have reflected on this mutation of the paradigm of modernity. We have seen how important it is to insist on the depth of the caesura at hand, the rupture induced by the biopolitical order in relation to modern reflections on power. We have just lived through a long crisis warning us against the great narratives of historical development. Those attempting them, beware! It was a difficult condition to overcome. It has become increasingly evident that biopower, between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, developed as the subjugation of all conditions of life, and that life was at the heart of the productive process, representing its absolute condition of possibility. Today, there are many ways to arrive at such knowledge: from the point of view of a day laborer demanding a guaranteed salary or that of an IT engineer needing freeware; from the point of view of a stay at home parent or of a student requiring more time for training and education. In all of these cases, men's and women's lives constitute the base of the valorization process, and inversely, valorization permeates their existence: the objective and the subjective identify completely. Why isn't such an incredible change in the social and productive context recognized? And once it is recognized, why not remunerate life itself, taking stock of the fact that each individual is productive, simply by living in a productive society? As a matter of fact, the demand for indirect salaries and for services that are adequate to the reproduction of society as a whole has become wide- spread. We found it necessary, regarding this issue, to introduce the Marxist concept of real subsumption of society under capital. The reader may recall that the Marxian definition of real subsumption of society under capital not only implies that this society corresponds entirely to merchandise, but also that the contradiction and antagonism determined by the production of merchandise has invested the whole of society. Consequently, general remuneration corresponds to the general dimensions of antagonism in social production.

Welfare Links

Technological change and labor commoditization makes poverty inevitable. Capitalism needs the body of unemployed to regulate and discipline the working class, to lower wages and threaten them with a loss of lively hood. Social welfare policies keep the unemployed from becoming politically important and ready to go back into the labor force.

Harriss-White, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University, in '5

[Barbara, "Working Paper Number 134: Poverty and Capitalism", QEH Working Paper Series, December]

3. Capitalism and unemployment : Capitalism does not only search for cheap and even unwaged labour. Two mechanisms create unemployment. First, technological change: capitalism permeates society through a dynamic process based on the logic of growth and profit in which the productivity of wage labour is continually enhanced by machines.¹³ By itself the elasticity of labour absorption with respect to growth declines – and indeed this is happening in agriculturally advanced regions of India now.¹⁴ The second mechanism concerns the ways in which markets make adjustments to fluctuations. Under capitalism, all markets are related to each other in ways which supply, demand, property rights, prices and contracts are structured in densely instituted and specific ways. One of the elements of such structure is the physical nature and cultural meaning of things transformed as commodities. For one instance, labour is a commodity with consciousness which may reflect on and resist contracts in markets; labour is also not produced for sale. For another, money is not only a commodity but also a stock of wealth. As a result, its value vis a vis other commodities is, and must be, stickier. It will change more slowly than commodity prices do. As Patnaik has recently argued, it then follows that excess demand between money and commodities requires quantity adjustments in commodities and labour. So the dynamic of capitalism requires there to be idle capacity in machinery and plant, cash balances and unemployment regardless of the impact on labour of technological change. The result is the creation of pools of unemployed labour.¹⁵

Some people float in and out of work while others are seasonal migrants and a particularly stagnant pool is filled by those without work for long periods. These reserves of unemployed people are functionally useful to capital since their very existence disciplines and disempowers those in work, discouraging them politically from struggles over the distribution of wages and profits - which might result in their being deprived of livelihoods - and depressing the wages of workers by their mere existence. In the absence of state intervention, they reproduce a system which is self-reinforcing. For political stability as well as welfare reasons, states need to control the rate of labour-displacing growth, but it is a very difficult task. The infrastructural preconditions for capitalism must be guaranteed. To keep capitalism competitive states also need to enforce the weeding-out of unproductive and wasteful forms of investment, to make some provision for the results of risky innovation, to make sure institutions are in place to manage information and technological change and to establish means of challenging the tendency to centralisation, concentration and monopoly.¹⁶ At the same time, as Mushtaq Khan¹⁷ has pointed out, states require resources and authority to maintain political stability and to set economic limits to unavoidable political compromises. Among this armoury of interventions, states may mitigate the poverty of workers by regulating wages, the length of the working day and the minimum rights of labour. They may provide health care and education as public goods in order to help supply the appropriate quality of labour needed by capital at any given stage. By various social security policies the state determines the manner in which unemployed people regulate the political assertiveness of those in work. Social security policies also reduce the vulnerability of those in work to shocks of ill health and enable them to return to work. Social policy may be understood in part as an economic policy for labour. Without such regulation, capitalism seeks to maximise profit and to displace labour. Some have termed this the creation of waste people¹⁸ – but they are not entirely 'waste' for capitalism because, although they constrain demand for commodities, their existence disciplines those in employment. A key question for the state is therefore the extent to which it mitigates the poverty of waste people and reduces their threat to the labour force.

Welfare Links

MYERS, Prof. of Political Science @California State University '02

[Jason, , Historical Materialism, Vol. 10 Iss. 2, 2002]

To this extent, beyond its existence as the object of different ideological tendencies - loved by some: loathed by others - the welfare state was itself an ideological apparatus: it welded together a fractious society, reproduced the legitimacy of capitalism, and made possible the stunning rebound from the inter-war years of catastrophe to the post-war years of seemingly limitless abundance. Seen from this perspective, the welfare state was responsible, in the first instance, for the strategic management of belief. For Habermas and Przeworski, ideology in the welfare state was a political instrument; its effects traceable to the hand of a purposive author. Yet, the way in which life in the market-dominated world might come to appear as 'accidental' suggests the possibility of a somewhat different form of ideology present in and through the welfare state - one having pervasive effects on consciousness, but lacking a clear signature identifying its source. This sort of ideology is much like Marx's later commodity fetishism model in which, as human relations and activities increasingly found expression only as commodities, commodities themselves would appear to possess uniquely human attributes.²⁶ Ideology, in this sense is not a particular interpretation of events offered to us by this politician or that news anchor. It is, instead, the sense of the world generated by the structures through which everyday life is lived. This is not to say, however, that an instrumental model of 'the purchasing of consent' is inaccurate, only that it fails to fully capture the full scope of the ideological dynamics at work in the welfare state. Instrumental and spontaneous models of ideology (as I have argued elsewhere) should not be regarded as mutually exclusive definitions, but as distinct moments in the same process.²⁷ Thus, the law in bourgeois society - in its instrumental instance - creates and defines concrete persons as individuals. As those persons then live out their lives in and through institutions defined by the law, the ideological image of 'the individual' will appear seemingly spontaneously.

What this might mean for ideology in the welfare state is suggested by a piece of poll data recently cited by sociologist William Julius Wilson. In surveys conducted in 1990, a vast majority of Americans held individual factors (lack of effort, thrift, or ability) to be the most significant causes of poverty. An equally large majority of Europeans found structural causes, such as social injustice or technological change, to blame.²⁸ Such findings should come as no surprise to anyone who has spent much time in both the United States and Western Europe. What they reveal, however, is an ideological phenomenon much like Marx's model of commodity fetishism, Lukacs's concept of reification, or their brilliant restatement by Margaret Thatcher: under capitalism, there appears to be no such thing as 'society'. To the extent that the world treats us and forces us to live as individuals, the social relations underpinning everyday life become increasingly difficult to recognise.

Welfare Links

Welfare's sole purpose is to recreate and regulate the production of capital so the system doesn't implode.

Jessop, Professor of Sociology at the University of Lancaster, 2002

[Bob, The Future of the Capitalist State, pg. 18-21]

Together, these contradictions and dilemmas mean that the capital relation cannot be reproduced entirely through market exchange and is therefore prone to what is often expressed ideologically as 'market failure'. This means that the improbable self-valorization of capital cannot be explained in terms of some alleged self-correcting, self expanding logic. This leads us to consider the mechanisms through which, despite capital's contradictions, accumulation may get regularized and reproduced. These extend well beyond the capitalist economy in its narrow sense (profit-oriented production, market-mediated exchange) to include various direct and indirect extra-economic mechanisms. Moreover, insofar as these extra-economic mechanisms also reproduce the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in the economic mechanisms of the capital relation, they further expand the scope for agency, strategies and tactics to shape the course of accumulation and the manner in which

these contradictions and dilemmas are expressed. This in turn requires any analysis of the improbable nature of capital accumulation to take agency seriously. We can best understand what is involved here if we ask why capitalism needs regulating. The answer lies in the indeterminate but antagonistic

nature of the capital relation and its dynamic. This has three key aspects:

- the incompleteness of capital as a purely economic (or market mediated) relation such that its continued reproduction depends, in an unstable and contradictory way, on changing extra-economic conditions;
- the various structural contradictions and strategic dilemmas inherent in the capital relation and their changing structural articulation and forms of appearance in different accumulation regimes, modes of regulation, and conjunctures; ,and conflicts over the regularization and/or governance of these contradictions and dilemmas as they are expressed both in the circuit of capital and the wider social formation.The first aspect refers to the inherent incapacity of capitalism to achieve self-closure in economic terms or, in other words, to its inability to reproduce itself wholly through the value form in a self-expanding logic of commodification. This is linked to the fictitious nature of land, money, knowledge and, above all, labour-power as commodities and to the dependence of accumulation not only on these fictitious commodities but also on various non-commodity forms of social relations.

This incompleteness

is a constitutive, or defining, feature of capitalism and has major implications for its overall dynamic. Even at the most abstract level of analysis, let alone in its actually existing forms, the reproduction

of capitalism depends on its achieving an inherently unstable balance among market-mediated economic supports and other, extra-economic supports whose efficacy depends on their location beyond market mechanisms. This excludes the eventual commodification of everything and, a fortiori, rules out a pure capitalist economy. The resulting instability explains uneven waves of commodification, decommodification and recommodification as the struggle to extend the exchange-value moments of the capital relation encounters real structural limits and/or increasing resistance and, likewise, as new ways to overcome these limits and resistance are sought (Offe 1984). It is also associated with uneven waves of territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization

(Brenner 1999a,b) and the search for-new forms of spatio-temporal fix as prevailing fixes begin to decompose (Jessop 1999a; 2000; 2001b; and section 4 below). Such structural limits and contradictions (and their associated 'market failures') provide chances to shift direction insofar

as capitalism is constantly oriented, under the pressure of competition, to new opportunities for profit. This open-ended dynamic excludes any final destination towards which the logics of capital accumulation and/or class struggle ineluctably draw it (for elaboration, see Postone 1993). In

short, viewed substantively, capitalism has no pre-given trajectory. Second, accumulation within the capitalist economy as a whole depends essentially on profit-oriented, market-mediated exploitation of wage-labour in the labour process. For, while markets mediate the search for added value and modify its distribution within and across classes, they cannot themselves produce it. Moreover, the very process of commodification rooted in the spread of the market mechanism generates structural contradictions that cannot be resolved by that mechanism. Many of these contradictions and their associated strategic

Welfare Links

dilemmas are different expressions of the basic contradiction between exchange- and usevalue in the commodity form (see.table 1.1).

Thus productive capital is both abstract value in motion (notably in the form of realized profits available for reinvestment) and a concrete stock of already invested time- and place-specific assets in the course of being valorized; the worker is both an abstract unit of labour-power substitutable

by other such units (or, indeed, other factors of production) and a concrete individual (or, indeed, a member of a concrete collective workforce) with specific skills, knowledge and creativity;¹¹ the wage is both a cost of production and a source of demand; money functions both as an international currency exchangeable against other currencies (ideally in stateless space) and as national money circulating within national societies¹² and subject to some measure of state control; land functions both as a form of property (based on the private appropriation of nature) deployed in terms of expected revenues in the form of rent and as a natural resource (modified by past actions) that is more or less renewable and recyclable; knowledge is both the basis of intellectual property rights and a collective resource (the intellectual commons). Likewise, the state is not only responsible for securing certain key conditions for the valorization of capital and the reproduction of labour-power as a fictitious commodity but also has overall political responsibility for maintaining social cohesion in a socially divided, pluralistic social formation. In turn, taxation is both an unproductive deduction

from private revenues (profits of enterprise, wages, interest, rents) and a means to finance collective investment and consumption to compensate for 'market failures'. And so forth. These structural contradictions are inherent in the capital relation, and the tensions and dilemmas that they generate provide an important entrypoint into the general analysis of capital accumulation. Nonetheless

it is also important to recognize that they can assume different forms and different weights in different contexts. They can also prove more or less manageable depending on the specific spatio-temporal fixes and institutionalized class compromises with which they are from time to time associated. These differences provide in turn an important entrypoint for analysing different stages and/or varieties of capitalism. It is in this context that I will argue that the KWNS is just one set of mechanisms

among several through which the always problematic delivery of capitalist economic and social reproduction comes to be organized. It coexists with there such mechanisms to produce a specific reproduction regime involved in the overall regulation of capitalism and its embedding into the wider society (see chapters 2 and 4).

Welfare Links

Jessop, Professor of Sociology at the University of Lancaster, **2002** (Bob, The Future of the Capitalist State, pg. 29-30)

The second dimension of economic domination involves the articulation of the economic and extra-economic. Here, it refers to the capacity of capital in general, a given fraction of capital, or particular capitals to steer the evolution of other institutional orders in line with the demands of capital accumulation, either through sheer structural power or through specific strategic capacities. Such domination IS grounded in the nature of capitalism, can express itself in several ways and can, in certain circumstances, become a major element in the more general ecological dominance of capitalism. First, and most crudely, capital can use its 'strike', 'sabotage' and 'flight' powers to secure the compliance of other systems (such as the state) with its specific reproduction requirements. In the long term this capacity is grounded in the tendential ecological dominance of the capitalist economy; in the short term, it depends on specific forms of immaterial interdependence between the economic and non-economic. Second, as capital searches for new sources of valorization, commodity relations can be extended into spheres not currently subject to the logic of accumulation. This process is seen in commodification of political, educational, health, scientific and many other activities, so that they come to be primarily and directly oriented to opportunities for profit. Third, capital can seek to impose an economizing, profit-seeking logic on other systems, even though their activities remain largely non-commercial. This becomes evident when the choice among these non-commercial activities is shaped by calculations about the economic profitability of applying the relevant primary code in any way or another. For example, neoliberal educational, health, scientific and other 'reforms' are intended to induce decision-makers in these systems to become more business-like. They are induced to make judgements on educational medical or scientific matters not only in terms of their respective primary codes, but also in terms of their financial implications. This is reflected in careerism, the influence of market proxies in non-commercial organizations and the subordination of diverse institutions to the (perceived, alleged) imperatives of a strong and healthy (internationally competitive) economy.

WELFARE ADAPTS TO POLITICAL DISSENT TO CONSTRAIN CHANGE AND POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION.

Myers '02 [Jason, Prof. of Political Science @ California State University, Historical Materialism, Vol. 10 Iss. 2) 2002]

Various forms of social insurance have much longer histories) but the modern welfare state was a twentieth-century creation. In 1900, only a handful of European states devoted as much as three percent of GNP to social welfare. By the 1950's social spending in most European countries had grown to between ten and twenty percent of GNP. In 1980, even the United States, which had always lagged behind Europe in this respect, saw social expenditures reach some twenty percent of GNP. Just what was responsible for driving history a long this path always remained in dispute. For Harold Wilensky and Kirsten Gronberg the welfare state was the result of a relatively consensual process of evolutionary adaptation.³ For Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward it was born of class struggle. Yet, wherever and through whatever political process welfare-state institutions were built) they were inevitably clothed in the ideology of social provision. This was the case not only for socialist and social-democratic governments, but for their opponents as well. Bismarck's pension plan complemented rather than contradicted his anti-socialist laws, just as elements of Roosevelt's New Deal were meant to undercut popular movements to the left of the Democratic Party. In both cases, though, the creation of state pensions and unemployment compensation was accompanied by public rhetoric speaking to the existence of social rights - desert on the basis of citizenship alone. Certainly, by the middle 1960s, there was a plausibility to T. H. Marshall's claim that the developed countries were gradually making their way through a three-stage accumulation of rights: legal rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth, and social rights in the twentieth.⁵

Welfare Links

_____The welfare state and regulation is what is saving capitalism. It keeps buying power aligned so that the multitude won't form.

Jessop, Professor of Sociology at the University of Lancaster, **2002** (Bob, The Future of the Capitalist State, pg.42-44)

Even a pure capitalist economy, notwithstanding the claims of some classical economists and neoliberal ideologues, would be prone to market failure. Individual capitals compete for profit, act self-interestedly and try to avoid limits on their freedom of action. Competition discourages individual capitals from undertaking activities necessary for economic and social reproduction that are unprofitable from their individual viewpoint and it may also lead them into activities that undermine the general conditions for economic and social reproduction. Regarding economic reproduction, for example, there is no guarantee that the general external conditions for production (such as law, property and money) will be secured through market forces; nor that certain general economic conditions of production ('public goods') will be offered at the right price in the right quantities. This suggests the need for extra-economic institutions to compensate for partial or total market failure in the provision of the important conditions for capital accumulation. These include a formally rational monetary system, a formally rational legal system and the reproduction of labour-power as a fictitious commodity. But, as I have indicated above and will elaborate below, there are many other conditions

too. In this sense, state intervention is not just a secondary activity aimed at modifying the effects of a self-sufficient market but is absolutely essential to capitalist production and market relations. For commodities must be produced before they can be distributed via the market and/or political action. Thus, given the institutional separation between the economic and the political, the state must ensure that capital accumulation occurs before it can begin its redistributive activities (Miiller and Neusiiss 1975: 43-6; Offe 1972). There are many ways in which the state can and does intervene in these respects. In abstract terms, state support for the valorization of capital and social reproduction can be provided through force, law and regulation, money, goods and services, knowledge, or 'moral suasion' and in the form of meta-, macro-, meso- or micropolicies. The relative weight and adequacy of such means of intervention, as we shall see, vary significantly over time and in relation to specific accumulation regimes. Economic and social policies can be oriented in turn to supply-side conditions

and/or the demand for (fictitious) commodities or non-traded goods and services. Metapolicies address the wide variety of extraeconomic factors that affect the systemic competitiveness based on society's overall organizational patterns (Messner: 1998) and their character will change along with notions of competitiveness (see chapter 3).

Macropolicies focus on the general external conditions of production (for example, formally rational legal and monetary systems) and on the provision of general conditions of production (for example, infrastructure and the supply of labour-power) within the spatio-temporal horizons of a discursively and institutionally constituted economy. In the era of imperialism, for example, this was a lirinational economy organized in terms of centre-periphery relations. In the case of Atlantic Fordism, the macrolevel was naturalized as the national economy managed by the Keynesian welfare national state. More recently, European Economic Space is being imagined and instituted as the appropriate macroeconomic framework for European Union (EU) intervention. In all three cases, of course, states also pursued policies concerned to insert the relevant macrolevel economy into wider sets of economic relations up to the world market. Mesopolicies concern specific branches/sectors and/or specific paces/places within this broader economic system. And, finally, micropolicies affect 'individual.' economic units (such as households, individual workers or individual firms). These distinctions are always relative to particular scales of analysis. This can be seen in the partial rescaling of the macrolevel up to Europe for ED member states and in the changing scope of the meta- and mesolevels in the present era of globalization. The distinction between supply- and demand-side policies is likewise relative to specific markets, commodity chains, and so forth. Moreover, as the taken-for-granted meanings of these distinctions began to decompose as a result of the crisis of the postwar national mixed economy, space has opened for debates over what should replace the conventional set of policy goals for the Keynesian welfare national state.

Welfare Links

— **Welfare compromises to keep Capitalist system at equilibrium with further exploitation.**

Jessop, Professor of Sociology at the University of Lancaster, **2002** (Bob, The Future of the Capitalist State, pg.48-49)

Structurally, these fixes emerge when an accumulation regime and its mode of regulation co-evolve to produce a certain structural coherence within a given spatio-temporal framework but not beyond it. This is typically associated with a distinctive hierarchy of structural forms that affects interactions within the institutional architecture as a whole and thereby shapes the overall logic of the spatio-temporal fix. This hierarchy involves giving greater priority to the regularizing of some structural

forms (and giving greater priority, perhaps, to one or other aspect of their associated contradictions and dilemmas) than to other structural forms. These priorities will vary with accumulation regimes, modes of growth and governance capacities (cf Petit 1999). In Atlantic Fordism, for example, the wage and money forms were the principal structural forms at the heart of the mode of regulation; in post-Fordism, other forms have become more important (see chapters 2 and 3). Or, again, while liberal

market economies may give more weight to labour-power as a substitutable factor of production and to the wage as a cost of production, more coordinated capitalist economies may prioritize labour-power in its guise as so-called human capital and the wage as a source of demand. Strategically, because capitalism's contradictions and dilemmas are insoluble in the abstract, they are resolved - partially and provisionally, if at all - through the formulation-realization of specific accumulation

strategies at various economic and political scales in specific spatiotemporal contexts. Once again, then, because of the significance of accumulation strategies (and their associated state projects and, where relevant, hegemonic visions), we observe the importance of agency and discourse in capital accumulation. Such spatio-temporal fixes delimit the main spatial and temporal boundaries within which structural coherence is secured, and externalize certain costs of securing this coherence beyond

these boundaries. Even within these boundaries some classes, class fractions, social categories or other social forces located inside these spatiotemporal boundaries are marginalized, excluded or oppressed. Thus, spatio-temporal fixes also facilitate the institutionalized compromises on which accumulation regimes and modes of regulation depend, and subsequently come to embody them. This can involve super-exploitation of internal or external spaces outside the compromise, super-exploitation of

nature or inherited social resources, deferral of problems into an indefinite future and, of course, the exploitation and/or oppression of specific classes, strata or other social categories. I discuss the spatiotemporalfix of Atlantic Fordism and its breakdown in the next chapter.

Nonetheless, insofar as such compromises marginalize forces that act as bearers of functions or operations essential to long-run accumulation, the growth of significant imbalances, disproportionalities or disunity in the circuit of capital will tend to strengthen the hand of these forces,

enabling them to disrupt the institutionalized compromises involved in a particular accumulation regime, mode of regulation, state form and spatio-temporal fix (cf Clarke 1977). Such crises typically act as a steering mechanism for the always provisional, partial and unstable reequilibration

of capital accumulation insofar as they prompt attempts to guide the forcible reimposition of the unity of the circuit of capital through new accumulation strategies and modes of regulation (cf. Hirsch 1976, 1977; Lindner 1973; Wirth 1977).

Welfare Links

WELFARE MANAGES POLITICAL DISSENT TO PREVENT SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.

Myers '02 [Jason, Prof. of Political Science @ California State University, Historical Materialism, Vol. 10 Iss. 2, 2002]

American liberals are finally coming back into line with the world standard for their ideological valence: delighted by markets and individuals; deeply suspicious of the welfare state. Ideology, in this sense, means something like Weltanschauung: the particular hue of one's political stripe. To think about ideology and the welfare state in this register would be to inquire into ideologies of the welfare state: Spiro Agnew's New Elite of pointy-headed intellectuals leading America down the slippery slope to Stalinism or J.K. Galbraith's senile Malthusian economists hopelessly misconstruing the nature of the New Industrial State. Yet, the classification of different species of political belief is only one possible move within the field of ideology critique. Of at least equal importance is the task of mapping and analysing relationships between the more general categories of 'belief' and 'politics'. Thus, from the 1960s until the early 1980s, an entirely different school of commentary arose around the question of ideology in the welfare state. How, scholars like Herbert Marcuse and Jurgen Habermas asked, might the welfare state play a role in the management of political dissent and the building of ideological hegemony? For intellectuals, on the Left, the question was distinctly Janus-faced. On the one hand, the welfare state was a victory - a concession wrenched from capital by militant trade unions and shrewd social democrats. On the other hand, the welfare state seemed to be the ultimate bourgeois trump card - capitalist reform putting an end forever to any speculation about a socialist revolution. This, of course, was the first (pre-1989) version of an 'End of Ideology' thesis. As Seymour Martin Lipset made the case in 1960: This change in Western political life reflects the fact that the fundamental problems of the industrial revolution have been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship: the conservative have accepted the welfare state.... This very triumph of the democratic social revolution in the West ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political action.

Welfare Links

WELFARE CANNOT OUTCOMPETE THE PENAL SYSTEM. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE IDEOLOGY OF FREE WILL FAVOR THE PRISON.

White'05 [Ahmed, Prof. of Law University of Colorado-Boulder, Arizona State Law Journal, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 759]

According to O'Connor, this intractable problem is exacerbated by several factors: the steady expansion of military expenditures (the "warfare state"); the tendency of demands on the welfare state to expand along with rising standards of living; and most of all, the growth of the welfare state in response to increasing agitation by the lower classes alfd the efforts of capitalists (especially monopoly capitalists) to displace labor costs as well as the costs of maintaining social order onto the state. n234 In addition to these factors, we might add a more uniquely contemporary one: a kind of tax competition that has taken hold both domestically and internationally by which businesses leverage lower tax rates in exchange for investment towards "economic development." n235 For O'Connor, the result of these dynamics is a condition of chronic fiscal crisis, a prediction borne out by the recent history of government finance. n236 This inevitably compromises both the fiscal viability of welfare [*824] programs and the political legitimacy of the social welfare system. Fiscal crisis results directly in the elimination of some social welfare programs and in a reduction in the functionality of remaining programs. n237 By both of these means, fiscal crisis gives apparent credence to ideological critiques of the concept of welfare as unworkable and to tax revolts and other acts of middle and upper class rebellion that underlie the dynamics of fiscal crisis in the first place. n238 Amidst these tendencies, the social welfare system itself inevitably loses legitimacy as a mode of social control. n239 At the same time that the fiscal crisis erodes the legitimacy of the social welfare system I and renders it increasingly untenable, it increases the relative legitimacy of the criminal I justice system. This occurs in several ways. First, as we have already seen, social 'crises' generally generate a bias ill favor of hard forms of social control of the lower classes. This bias proves self-sustaining in the context of fiscal crisis, in that the essential wisdom of hard control seems to be confirmed by the escalating social dysfunction and the growing dysfunctions of welfare state institutions themselves that attend the social welfare system's loss of political favor and functionality. This is not helped by the fact that in recent years fiscal crisis has been exacerbated by changes in tax policy that simultaneously aggravate social inequality. Thus the retrenchment of the social welfare system and its consequences become part of the dynamic over which the criminal justice system is called on to assert its agenda of social control despite its own escalating costs.

Welfare Links

WELFARE IS TAILORED TO MEET THE DIFFERENT DEMANDS OF SOCIAL UNREST AND REVOLUTION. THIS TURNS THE CASE.

White '05 [Ahmed, Prof. of Law University of Colorado-Boulder, Arizona State Law

Journal, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 759]

Among Piven and Cloward's more interesting observations is that these various social control functions respond to different kinds of social dysfunction. The provision of benefits to mute tendencies toward social unrest is more relevant under conditions of labor surplus - for example, mass unemployment in times of recession; while labor discipline by the restriction of eligibility and other devices may be more relevant in times of relative labor shortage and prosperity. For Piven and Cloward this logic has imported to social welfare policy a broadly cyclical character, modulated by the business cycle and its interaction with the dynamics of social protest. n96 In this they see the social welfare system's social control function as truly regulatory in its response to the contradictory nature of the state's role in capitalist society - its need both to mitigate capitalism's dysfunctions and, simultaneously, to preserve the essential integrity of the very institutions that generate these dysfunctions. As this overview demonstrates, the social welfare system is neither fundamentally benign nor devoid of coercive elements. Indeed, within the institutional structures and the history of the social welfare system is an internal spectrum of both soft and hard, both more and less coercive, approaches to the problem of social control of the lower classes. And that problem itself is as rooted in maintaining the stability of the social order and its normative structures as it is in redressing the plight of the lower classes for their own sakes. At the same time, however, the prosecution of social control via the social welfare system is relatively benign in comparison to the criminal justice system. For this liaison, it is also much less problematic in its relationship to the rule of law than this successor means of social control. often complementary fashion. Nevertheless, through much of this period especially from the 1940s through the 1970s - the social welfare system occupied the dominant role in this regard. Consistent with this asymmetrical relationship, through this period the social welfare system expanded fairly steadily in overall size and in the relative comprehensiveness of its protections, while the criminal justice system remained relatively small in scale, and its methods increasingly invested in welfarist tendencies. Beginning in the early 1970s, however, this relationship between the social welfare system and the criminal justice system began to undergo an inversion that would first install the criminal justice system as the dominant, and the social welfare system as the subordinate, system of social control of the lower classes. Second, it would establish a punitive orientation as the dominant motif of social control in virtually all respects purging the criminal justice system of its welfarist tendencies and installing evermore punitive tendencies in what has remained of the social welfare system. This Part describes this change in the dominant form of social control in some detail. It draws on this to explain the deterioration of rule of law norms. And with a focus on the role of fiscal crisis, ideology, and the overall political economy of [*802] contemporary America, it also undertakes to explain why this process has unfolded.

Welfare Links

WELFARE INculcates LABOR DISCIPLINE AND MARKET PARTICIPATION

White '05 [Ahmed, Prof. of Law University of Colorado-Boulder, Arizona State Law Journal, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 759]

Other dimensions of the social welfare system's social control function are both less overt and more coercive. This is evident in its encouragement of labor market participation. Through the modern history of the welfare state, this has been advanced by several, interlocking strategies: by limiting the amount of support offered to eligible recipients to a level below the average prevailing wage, thus preserving an incentive to work; by limiting eligibility for welfare programs based on some combination of substantial need and a demonstrated inability to work; n88 and by actual work requirements as a condition of welfare eligibility (the wages of which are then subsidized by the welfare system). n89 Each of these strategies reflects a different way of advancing the "principle of "less eligibility"" - the concept of maintaining levels of social support that by their designed inadequacy [*784] encourage people to remain in the private labor market. n90 By this logic, the lower classes may be guaranteed some level of insurance against utter destitution, but only if they submit to the labor market and accept levels of support that are no more beneficial than available market wages.

Another dimension of the welfare system's social control function involves its articulation of an ideology of labor discipline and of overall compliance with the norms and structures of capitalist society. This program, which is the adjunct to more direct means of encouraging labor market participation, is accomplished by draconian means including work requirements for receiving public assistance, job search requirements for unemployment, the use of surveillance and interrogation regimes to ensure compliance, and a pervasive tendency to humiliate and dehumanize beneficiaries. These features of the social welfare system advance the idea that labor market participation is normal and is expected by the state, even where such worlds deeply alienating and exploitative, and the added idea that the receipt of state support in lieu of work is not only exceptional and practically difficult to obtain, but also socially deviant. As Piven and Cloward write, "to demean and punish those who do not work is to exalt by contrast even the meanest labor at the meanest wages." n92 The disciplinary effect of these aspects of social welfare is genuinely ideological, they argue, in that extends beyond the recipient herself, who often cannot work anyway, to serve as a lesson to the able bodied as well. Although especially evident in recent welfare reforms, the articulation of this ideological program of labor discipline has always been a feature of the modern social welfare system, functioning alongside the social welfare system's somewhat better recognized program of "moral" training. n94 And [*785] the prosecution of this ideology of labor discipline has not been limited to traditional forms of welfare, like public assistance, food "aid, and unemployment insurance, but also describes more ancillary aspects of the social welfare system, for example child welfare services. n95

Welfare Links

WELFARE REINFORCES CAPITALIST DOMINATION AND MAINTAINS AND EXPANDS SOCIAL CONTROL ON BEHALF OF CLASS INTERESTS

WHITE 05 [Ahmed, Prof. of Law University, of Colorado-Boulder, Arizona State Law Journal, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 759]

The idea of the social welfare state as an institution of social control has perhaps its most important intellectual roots in the work of the economic historian Karl Polanyi, who in the 1930s argued that the stability and legitimacy of the capitalist system depend on an ability to tame self interests and to alleviate the inherent tendencies of its market functions to generate immoral and politically and socially unstable outcomes. n83 To be sure, the modern social welfare system was shaped by a number of actors, including Keynesian economic policy as well as humane and enlightened efforts on the part of political elites to alleviate the suffering of the lower classes. n84 But Polanyi's rather more critical view of its origins is compelling. And more contemporary scholars than he, including Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, have elaborated his thesis to argue that the social welfare system arose to advance an agenda of social control directed at mitigating the social dysfunctions that tend to follow from social marginality, protests, riots, and general criminality, as well as the break down of labor market participation and labor discipline. Articulated politically as palpable threats to social order, dysfunctions of class society are redressed by the social welfare system in several ways: by the direct alleviation of conditions of privation and alienation that engender such disorder; by the mobilization of the lower classes to participate in the capitalist labor market, even under undesirable working conditions; and by the affirmation of an ideology of labor discipline and general compliance with capitalist norms among the lower classes. n85 I [*782] The direct mitigation of unemployment and poverty is the social welfare system's most straightforward (and, on the surface at least, benign) social control function. Since its inception, the social welfare system has offered to the poor and the unemployed a number of benefits in times of structural economic crisis or demonstrated personal need - cash public assistance, food aid, subsidized housing and health insurance, unemployment insurance, and the like. This is partly a humanitarian function, consistent with the role of the lower classes themselves in demanding some protections from the harsh realities of life in capitalist society. And such benefits have been important to raising the standard of living of the lower classes. But in the same fashion, welfare benefits also work to prevent social marginality from generating widespread disorder and noncompliance with social norms, including riots and criminal attacks on institutions of property and authority, or from leading to a normalization of "deviant" modes of life. Welfare benefits serve as both a means of bribing the poor into maintaining their faith in the existing social and political order, and as a way of reducing the level of material deprivation out of which disorder and noncompliance with mainstream social norms grow. Consistent with this view, the expansion of the welfare state corresponds not simply to objective increases in social distress among the lower classes, but instead to episodes of protest, riot, and unrest that often accompany such conditions. n86 [*783] Augmenting this dimension of social control, the provision of welfare benefits also performs what might be called a displacing function: inserting the state and its legal and administrative apparatus as an intermediary in what would otherwise be a direct - and from the standpoint of the legitimacy of capital, a more costly - conflict between the lower classes and the economic elite. To put this another way, the social welfare system refocuses class discontent away from capital and its beneficiaries, to the state. By developing a social welfare system, the state not only socializes, but also politicizes and legalizes structural deficiencies of the capitalist system and the dynamics of class conflict that accompany these deficiencies. n87

Welfare Links

WELFARE STABILIZES CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION AND THE NEOLIBERAL STATE WELFARE IS A FORM OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

White '05 [Ahmed, Prof. of Law University of Colorado-Boulder, Arizona State Law

Journal, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 759]

A major function of the modern, capitalist state n70 is to perform functions that are essential to the maintenance of capitalist production, but which are not within the competency of the economy itself, or "civil society," to provide. Several such tasks are especially significant: the provision of a monetary system and a civil legal system for resolving inter-capitalist disputes, n71 the amelioration of the business cycle, n72 the ideological legitimization of capitalist production, n73 and the commodification of nonnatural commodities (labor foremost among them). n74 Most important to us is a role in mitigating capitalism's many social dysfunctions, including poverty, unemployment, and marginality, and redressing their tendencies to generate social disorder, threats of social disorder, and a repudiation of dominant social norms among the lower classes. n75 The danger that inheres in the state not intervening to manage these tendencies is that they devolve into various kinds of crises: economic, political; and social. The state's ultimate obligation is to prevent social dysfunctions from developing into crises which might then pose generalized threats to economic and social structures or to the state itself. n76 As Claus [*779] Offe describes it, the modern, capitalist state is permanently and fundamentally devoted in this guise to a mission of "crisis management." n77 The performance of crisis management by the state cannot be a neutral or genuinely pluralistic enterprise. Rather, it is an inherently political undertaking steeped in class and other social conflicts. This follows from the fact that the social order that is defended in this process is not itself normatively neutral or pluralistically governed, but instead is premised on an unequal allocation of property; political power, control of the production process, and on systematic exploitation; and it is governed accordingly. n78 Further, the modern state functions within an overarching ideological structure that itself imprisons politics (and jurisprudence) to the hegemony of capitalism and an agenda focused on "different conceptions of how to run the same economic and social system, and not about radically different social systems." n79

The class agenda that inheres in the state's crisis management functions is nowhere more evident than where the state undertakes to mitigate the effects of poverty, unemployment, and other forms of social marginality. Even where the state's actions strike a benign tone, as with social welfare, [*780] they inevitably involve a strong element of repressive

I socialization, or social control.. n80 This is because social marginality and attendant threats to social order and the reign of functional social norms are natural outcomes of the class structure of capitalism. In seeking to mitigate these dysfunctions and their effects, the state essentially supports the dynamics of class exploitation that create them in the first place - and makes clear its expectation that the lower classes resign themselves to this reality. In other words, the order that is secured by social control is an order that supports exploitation, injustice, and inequality.

While the social welfare system and the criminal justice system are not the exclusive modes of social control of the lower classes, they are the most important – especially among those modes that are sponsored by the state - and most directly implicate rule of law concerns about the limits of sovereignty. n81 As this Part reveals, this project of exerting social control over the lower classes can be in varying degrees "hard" or "soft"; It can be more or less repressive, and more or less governed by: rule of law norms. The representative model of soft intervention is the social welfare system, and the representative model of hard intervention is the criminal justice system. As the following' discussion demonstrates, the last several decades have seen a solid shift in American society from the social welfare system to the criminal justice system as the dominant mode of social control of the lower classes. n82 This Part reviews the main features of each of these modes of social control.

Welfare Links

WELFARE REINFORCES THE FEELING OF INEQUALITY AMONG THE POOR. WE MUST REALIZE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE TIED WITH ACCESS TO THE ECONOMY.

Gathil, Professor at Rutgers University, in '99

[James, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, 5 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 107]

Human rights activists also argued that while meeting welfare needs of citizens through beneficial or remedial programs was [*136] important, "policies and programs that were based on a perception of need and powerlessness, reinforced the powerlessness of the recipients who are being given justice rather than as receiving their rights. Recognition of entitlement is itself an act of empowerment," these activists argued. n48

A central feature of international human rights advocacy at the time was therefore aimed at demonstrating that "respect for human rights must be an integral part of the development process and that economic, social and political factors cannot be treated in isolation." n49 In furtherance of this position, it was advanced that these human rights would best be realized if linked to the basic needs development strategy. This involved campaigning for the recognition that the delivery of donor agency and multilateral development bank assistance programs could affect the realization of human rights in developing countries. It also challenged the widely accepted belief that human rights and economic development were two separate or distinct spheres, and that the scope of development was restricted to economic growth. On the contrary, development now had to be recast in order to be accommodated within the prevailing notions of [*137] development which gave priority to potentially contradictory objectives such as increased productivity, growth and profits.

In short, international human rights advocates may be said to have adopted the slogan that human rights must be an integral part of the development process; and they adopted the position that the basic needs development strategy pursued by the World Bank, insofar as it failed to incorporate human rights, was woefully inadequate. In support of their arguments, these activists argued that the incorporation of social and economic rights into the international bill of human rights supported their case for the recognition of social and economic needs as rights. n50

Welfare Links

THE “GOOD GOVERNANCE” THE PROVIDERS OF WELFARE EMBODY TIE THEM DOWN TO THE HARMFUL CAPITALIST SYSTEM. ONLY A POLITICAL STRUGGLE WILL REDESIGN SOCIETY.

Gathil, Professor at Rutgers University, in '99

[James, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law, *Buffalo Human Rights Law Review*, 5 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 107]

[*173] The humanizing project of international human rights advocacy has gained credibility based on its association with the real struggles of those in poverty, economic disadvantage and against political authoritarianism and repressive social convention. The basic needs/rights strategy is closely connected with a commitment to a 'chastened' social democratic vision n132 of meeting basic human needs, such as food, shelter, and housing, which ameliorate misery without fundamentally attacking the basic institutional, social, and political contexts that sustain social dependence and inequality. The good governance strategy on its part places priority, in developing countries, on programs of economic reconstruction "overtly intolerant of governmental activism in the economy and hostile to worker and welfare rights," n133 but also committed to civil and political liberties, especially those of property and freedom to contract. Both of these strategies became popular not just because they have proved to be effective allies of the capitalist, international order within which they operate, but also because they have simultaneously and perhaps paradoxically become associated with humanizing commitments. Undoubtedly, they have given this capitalist international order a moral credibility without posing any fundamental challenge to it.

Consequently, I conclude that both the basic needs/rights strategy and the good governance agenda bear the imprint and support of transnational elites and interests, notwithstanding their commitment to visions of humanizing or ameliorating the problems [*174] of our present institutional contexts. As such, divesting ourselves of the notion that these institutions are indispensable is a useful place to begin. However, nothing short of political struggle will realize the vision of a new set of institutions or a redesign of the present ones. The vested interests of transnational elites will, as always, continue to police and constrain challenges to the status quo by allowing only those forms of dissidence that do not go too far, while at the same time accommodating limited visions of social democracy at the fringes.

Welfare links

WELFARE IS A TRAP, PROVIDING PEOPLE WITH RESOURCES YET TRAPPING THEM WITHIN THE SYSTEM, ALWAYS HAVING TO DEPEND ON THE GOVERNMENT. THIS IS USED AS AN EXERCISE OF CONTROL.

Gathil '99 [James, Professor at Rutgers University, *Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law*, *Buffalo Human Rights Law Review*, 5 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 107]

In the remainder of this section, I will focus on two versions of the basic needs critique: one, weak and the other, strong. In each, the critique argues for a prioritization of the essential needs of the world's poor in development through initiatives such as social insurance against the vagaries of the market through social welfare and publicly funded education, health, and housing. The basic needs approach is also associated with the importance it places on the satisfaction of basic needs such as clothing and nutrition, especially among the poor and economically vulnerable persons within the development process. At the outset, it is significant to point out that the basic needs approach to redistributive justice differs from that embraced within liberal theories of justice. Liberal theories of justice, unlike the basic needs approaches, are mainly concerned with the way in which societal institutions determine the division of benefits and burdens in society. n25 By contrast, basic needs approaches are primarily concerned with the sensitivity of the development policy embraced by a government to the needs of the poor, vulnerable and poverty stricken.

The weak version of the basic needs approach attracted the attention of capitalist oriented countries as well as international [*129] financial institutions for a variety of reasons. n26 First, it represented a means of addressing emerging social movements and unrest in developing countries during the 1950-1960 period, the high point of the 'development as growth' strategy. These movements not only questioned the limits of the 'development as growth' approach, but have been thought of as challenges to "the very concepts of the centralized, impersonal, and bureaucratically organized nation state." n27

Both versions of the basic needs approach cushioned popular challenges both to the capitalist state and also to capitalist development by providing prospects for social amenities that the growth oriented development model overlooked. Secondly, a weak approach to basic needs was consistent with the contradictory nature of capitalist development, which requires the provision of welfare entitlements as a "means of exercising social control over the working class and subsidizing capital's profit making." n28 The contradictory nature of the welfare state is embodied in its simultaneous tendency to provide for basic needs such as housing, food and health through regulation of their provision or through taxation or social security systems, n29 while at the same time [*130] displaying tendencies "to repress and control people, to adopt them to the requirements of the capitalist economy." n30

Welfare Links

THE CURRENT POLICY OF ADMINISTERING WELFARE IS FLAWED IN THE SENSE THAT IT RELIES ON THE CAPITALISTIC MARKET FOR THE PROMISE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

Gathil '99 [James, Professor at Rutgers University, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, 5 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 107]

In this paper I examine the policy implications of the position adopted by the World Bank to the effect that human rights goals cannot be achieved at the cost of its economic and financial mandate under its Articles of Agreement. This view of the Bank on the role of human rights in its work has made it difficult for human rights advocacy to position itself as lending independent critiques of the World Bank's development policies, such as those associated with the New International Economic Order (NIEO), or post second world war efforts to give international law a 'new' social character. Instead, through the good governance agenda, human rights advocacy has, far from adopting an outsider or independent critique to the neo-liberal [*108] economic policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), adopted an approach based on finding complementarity and compatibility between human rights advocacy and the economic and financial policies of the World Bank and the IMF.

This new approach is popularized for desirably abandoning hostile or uncompromising opposition to neo-liberal economic policies in particular, and the ascendancy of capitalist economic policies internationally in general. Neo-liberal economic policies are mainly preoccupied with displacing statist regulatory interventions in the market place while integrating national economies into the international market economy with little or no constraints on the flow of international capital. Neo-liberal economic reform is also characterized as an antidote to previous approaches to development policy that acknowledged the centrality of welfare concerns alongside the imperatives of growth in development policy. In sub-Saharan Africa, neo-liberal economic policy had been experienced under difference labels including structural adjustment. Today, however, good governance is the contemporary label for this expanding agenda.

In this article I argue that good governance serves as the World Bank's short hand for measuring which parts of the human rights agenda are compatible or consistent with its financial and economic mandate. This requirement, I argue, severely constrains the possibilities within the good governance agenda that prior development policies offered human rights advocates and activists. Prior development policies offered those who supported a human rights agenda in development to demand welfare concerns defined in terms of basic needs from the state and institutions of development. The good governance agenda however, has changed this post second world war growth/distribution welfare state compromise through its stigmatization of protective governmental interventions in the economy as necessarily inimical to economic growth and freedom. Good governance policies are thus based in at least three contestable assumptions: first, that reducing governmental interventions in the economy would automatically lead to increases in economic growth and personal freedom; second, that governmental interventions in the economy including those intended to redress social division, hierarchy and inequality in society are inefficient or profit-constraining; [*109] and third, that a redistribution of income in favor of profit or capital by the removal of such profit-constraining regulations including those that support welfare needs or rights is a necessary cost that a society must bear in order to produce a higher rate of investment, productivity, growth and profit

Work Links

Work is no longer about necessity but about producing us as agents of capitalism. Work is a way to suck all the physical and psychic energy from the population draining the resources of the revolution.

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/thecominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 32-3]

The order of work was the order of a world. The evidence of its ruin is paralyzing to those who dread what will come after. Today work is tied less to the economic necessity of producing goods than to the political necessity of producing producers and consumers, and of preserving by any means necessary the order of work. Producing oneself is becoming the dominant occupation of a society where production no longer has an object: like a carpenter who's been evicted from his shop and in desperation sets about hammering and sawing himself. All these young people smiling for their job interviews, who have their teeth whitened to give them an edge, who go to nightclubs to boost the company spirit, who learn English to advance their careers, who get divorced or married to move up the ladder, who take courses in leadership or practice "self-improvement" in order to better "manage conflicts" – the most intimate 'self-improvement'" says one guru, "will lead to increased emotional stability, to smoother and more open relationships, to sharper intellectual focus, and therefore to a better economic performance." This swarming little crowd that waits impatiently to be hired while doing whatever it can to seem natural is the result of an attempt to rescue the order of work through an ethos of mobility. To be mobilized is to relate to work not as an activity but as a possibility. If the unemployed person removes his piercings, goes to the barber and keeps himself busy with "projects," if he really works on his "employability," as they say, it's because this is how he demonstrates his mobility. Mobility is this slight detachment from the self, this minimal disconnection from what constitutes us, this condition of strangeness whereby the self can now be taken up as an object of work, and it now becomes possible to sell oneself rather than one's labor power, to be remunerated not for what one does but for what one is, for our exquisite mastery of social codes, for our relational talents, for our smile and our way of presenting ourselves. This is the new standard of socialization. Mobility brings about a fusion of the two contradictory poles of work: here we participate in our own exploitation, and all participation is exploited. Ideally, you are yourself a little business, your own boss, your own product. Whether one is working or not, it's a question of generating contacts, abilities, networking, in short: "human capital." The planetary injunction to mobilize at the slightest pretext – cancer, "terrorism," an earthquake, the homeless – sums up the reigning powers' determination to maintain the reign of work beyond its physical disappearance. The present production apparatus is therefore, on the one hand, a gigantic machine for psychic and physical mobilization, for sucking the energy of humans that have become superfluous, and, on the other hand, it is a sorting machine that allocates survival to conformed subjectivities and rejects all "problem individuals," all those who embody another use of life and, in this way, resist it. On the one hand, ghosts are brought to life, and on the other, the living are left to die. This is the properly political function of the contemporary production apparatus. To organize beyond and against work, to collectively desert the regime of mobility, to demonstrate the existence of a vitality and a discipline precisely in demobilization, is a crime for which a civilization on its knees is not about to forgive us. In fact, it's the only way to survive it.

Impact Extensions

The assemblage of capital and the state apparatus releases war machines into the world to reterritorialize and colonize whatever they encounter. The process culminates with *rivers of blood* and fires blazing in the streets.

Deleuze and Guattari '87

[*A Thousand Plateaus* p. 230-231]

We cannot say that one of these three lines is bad and another good, by nature and necessarily. The study of the dangers of each line is the object of pragmatics or schizoanalysis, to the extent that it undertakes not to represent, interpret, or symbolize, but only to make maps and draw lines, marking their mixtures as well as their distinctions. According to Nietzsche's Zarathustra and Castaneda's Indian Don Juan, there are three or even four dangers: first, Fear, then Clarity, then Power, and finally the great Disgust, the longing to kill and to die, the Passion for abolition.²⁸ We can guess what fear is. We are always afraid of losing. Our security, the great molar organization that sustains us, the arborescences we cling to, the binary machines that give us a well-defined status, the resonances we enter into, the system of overcoding that dominates us—we desire all that. "The values, morals, fatherlands, religions and private certitudes our vanity and self-complacency generously grant us are so many abodes the world furnishes for those who think on that account that they stand and rest amid stable things; they know nothing of the enormous rout they are heading for . . . in flight from flight."TM We flee from flight, rigidify our segments, give ourselves over to binary logic; the harder they have been to us on one segment, the harder we will be on another; we reterritorialize on anything available: the only segmentarity we know is molar, at the level of the large-scale aggregates we belong to, as well as at the level of the little groups we get into, as well as at the level of what goes on in our most intimate and private recesses. Everything is involved: modes of perception, kinds of actions, ways of moving, life-styles, semiotic regimes. A man comes home and says, "Is the grub ready?", and the wife answers, "What a scowl! Are you in a bad mood?": two rigid segments in confrontation. The more rigid the segmentarity, the more reassuring it is for us. That is what fear is, and how it makes us retreat into the first line. The second danger, Clarity, seems less obvious. Clarity, in effect, concerns the molecular. Once again, everything is involved, even perception, even the semiotic regime, but this time on the second line. Castaneda illustrates, for example, the existence of a molecular perception to which drugs give us access (but so many things can be drugs): we attain a visual and sonorous microperception revealing spaces and voids, like holes in the molar structure. That is precisely what clarity is: the distinctions that appear in what used to seem full, the holes in what used to be compact; and conversely, where just before we saw end points of clear-cut segments, now there are indistinct fringes, encroachments, overlappings, migrations, acts of segmentation that no longer coincide with the rigid segmentarity. Everything now appears supple, with holes in fullness, nebulas in forms, and flutter in lines. Everything has the clarity of the microscope. We think we have understood everything, and draw conclusions. We are the new knights; we even have a mission. A microphysics of the migrant has replaced the macrogeometry of the sedentary. But this suppleness and clarity do not only present dangers, they are themselves a danger. First, supple segmentarity runs the risk of reproducing in miniature the afflictions, the affectations, of the rigid: the family is replaced by a community, conjugality by a regime of exchange and migration; worse, micro-Oedipuses crop up, microfascisms lay down the law, the mother feels obliged to titillate her child, the father becomes a mommy. A dark light that falls from no star and emanates such sadness: this shifting segmentarity derives directly from the most rigid, for which it is indirect compensation. The more molar the aggregates become, the more molecular become their elements and the relations between their elements: molecular man for molar humanity. One deterritorializes, massifies, but only in order to knot and annul the mass movements and movements of deterritorialization, to invent all kinds of marginal reterritorializations even worse than the others. But above all, supple segmentarity brings dangers of its own that do not merely reproduce in small scale the dangers of molar segmentarity, which do not derive from them or compensate for them. As we have seen, microfascisms have a specificity of their own that can crystallize into a macro fascism, but may also float along the supple line on their own account and suffuse every little cell. A multitude of black holes may very well not become centralized, and acts instead as viruses adapting to the most varied situations, sinking voids in molecular perceptions and semiotics. Interactions without resonance. Instead of the great paranoid fear, we are trapped in a thousand little monomanias, self-evident truths, and clarities that gush from every black hole and no longer form a system, but are only rumble and buzz, blinding lights giving any and everybody the mission of self-appointed judge, dispenser of justice, policeman, neighborhood SS man. We have overcome fear, we have sailed from the shores of security, only to enter a system that is no less concentricized, no less organized: the system of petty insecurities that leads everyone to their own black hole in which to turn dangerous, possessing a clarity on their situation, role, and mission even more disturbing than the certitudes of the first line. Power (Pouvoir) is the third danger, because it is on both lines simultaneously. It stretches from the rigid segments with their overcoding and resonance to the fine segmentations with their diffusion and interactions, and back again. Every man of power jumps from one line to the other, alternating between a petty and a lofty style, the rogue's style and the grandiloquent style, drugstore demagoguery and the imperialism of the high-ranking government man. But this whole chain and web of power is immersed in a world of mutant flows that eludes them. It is precisely its impotence that makes power so dangerous. The man of power will always want to stop the lines of flight, and to this end to trap and stabilize the mutation machine in the overcoding machine. But he can do so only by creating a void, in other words, by first stabilizing the overcoding machine itself by containing it within the local assemblage charged with effectuating it, in short, by giving the assemblage the dimensions of the machine. This is what takes place in the artificial conditions of totalitarianism or the "closed vessel." But there is a fourth danger as well, and this is the one that interests us most, because it concerns the lines of flight themselves. We may well have presented these lines as a sort of mutation or creation drawn not only in the imagination but also in the very fabric of social reality; we may well have attributed to them the movement of the arrow and the speed of an absolute—but it would be oversimplifying to believe that the only risk they fear and confront is allowing themselves to be recaptured in the end, letting themselves be sealed in, tied up, reknotted, reterritorialized. They themselves emanate a strange despair, like an odor of death and immolation, a state of war from which one returns broken: they have their own dangers distinct from the ones previously discussed. This is exactly what led Fitzgerald to say: "I had a feeling that I was standing at twilight on a deserted range, with an empty rifle in my hands and the targets down. No problem set—simply a silence with only the sound of my own breathing. . . . My self-immolation was something sodden-dark."³⁰ Why is the line of flight a war one risks coming back from defeated, destroyed, after having destroyed everything one could? This, precisely, is the fourth danger: the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition. Like Kleist's line of flight, and the strange war he wages; like suicide, double suicide, a way out that turns the line of flight into a line of death. We are not

invoking any kind of death drive. There are no internal drives in desire, only assemblages. Desire is always assembled; it is what the assemblage determines it to be. The assemblage that draws lines of flight is on the same level as they are, and is of the war machine type. Mutations spring from this machine, which in no way has war as its object, but rather the emission of quanta of deterritorialization, the passage of mutant flows (in this sense, every creation is brought about by a war machine). There are many reasons to believe that the war machine is of a different origin, is a different assemblage, than the State apparatus. It is of nomadic origin and is directed against the State apparatus. One of the fundamental problems of the State is to appropriate this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a piece in its apparatus, in the form of a stable military institution; and the State has always encountered major difficulties in this. It is precisely when the war machine has reached the point that it has no other object but war, it is when it substitutes destruction for mutation, that it frees the most catastrophic charge. Mutation is in no way a transformation of war; on the contrary, war is like the fall or failure of mutation, the only object left for the war machine after it has lost its power to change. War, it must be said, is only the abominable residue of the war machine, either after it has allowed itself to be appropriated by the State apparatus, or even worse, has constructed itself a State apparatus capable only of destruction. When this happens, the war machine no longer draws mutant lines of flight, but a pure, cold line of abolition. (Later, we will propose a theory of the complex relation between the war machine and war.)³¹ This brings us back to the paradox of fascism, and the way in which fascism differs from totalitarianism. For totalitarianism is a State affair: it essentially concerns the relation between the State as a localized assemblage and the abstract machine of overcoding it effectuates. Even in the case of a military dictatorship, it is a State army, not a war machine, that takes power and elevates the State to the totalitarian stage. Totalitarianism is quintessentially conservative. Fascism, on the other hand, involves a war machine. When fascism builds itself a totalitarian State, it is not in the sense of a State army taking power, but of a war machine taking over the State. A bizarre remark by Virilio puts us on the trail: in fascism, the State is far less totalitarian than it is suicidal. There is in fascism a realized nihilism. Unlike the totalitarian State, which does its utmost to seal all possible lines of flight, fascism is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of pure destruction and abolition. It is curious that from the very beginning the Nazis announced to Germany what they were bringing: at once wedding bells and death, including their own death, and the death of the Germans. They thought they would perish but that their undertaking would be resumed, all across Europe, all over the world, throughout the solar system. And the people cheered, not because they did not understand, but because they wanted that death through the death of others. Like a will to wager everything you have every hand, to stake your own death against the death of others, and measure everything by "deleometers." Klaus Mann's novel, Mephisto, gives samplings of entirely ordinary Nazi speeches and conversations: "Heroism was something that was being ruled out of our lives. . . . In reality, we are not marching forward, we are reeling, staggering. Our beloved Führer is dragging us toward the shades of darkness and everlasting nothingness. How can we poets, we who have a special affinity for darkness and lower depths, not admire him? . . . Fires blazing on the horizon; rivers of blood in all the streets; and the frenzied dancing of the survivors, of those who are still spared, around the bodies of the dead!"³² Suicide is presented not as a punishment but as the crowning glory of the death of others. One can always say that it is just a matter of foggy talk and ideology, nothing but ideology. But that is not true. The insufficiency of economic and political definitions of fascism does not simply imply a need to tack on vague, so-called ideological determinations. We prefer to follow Faye's inquiry into the precise formation of Nazi statements, which are just as much in evidence in politics and economics as in the most absurd of conversations. They always contain the "stupid and repugnant" cry, Long live death!, even at the economic level, where the arms expansion replaces growth in consumption and where investment veers from the means of production toward the means of pure destruction. Paul Virilio's analysis strikes us as entirely correct in defining fascism not by the notion of the totalitarian State but by the notion of the suicidal State: so-called total war seems less a State undertaking than an undertaking of a war machine that appropriates the State and channels into it a flow of absolute war whose only possible outcome is the suicide of the State itself. "The triggering of a hitherto unknown material process, one that is limitless and aimless. . . . Once triggered, its mechanism cannot stop at peace, for the indirect strategy effectively places the dominant powers outside the usual categories of space and time. . . . It was in the horror of daily life and its environment that Hitler finally found his surest means of governing, the legitimization of his policies and military strategy; and it lasted right up to the end, for the ruins and horrors and crimes and chaos of total war, far from discharging the repulsive nature of its power, normally only increase its scope. Telegram 71 is the normal outcome: If the war is lost, may the nation perish. Here, Hitler decides to join forces with his enemies in order to complete the destruction of his own people, by obliterating the last remaining resources of its life-support system, civil reserves of every kind (potable water, fuel, provisions, etc.)."³³ It was this reversion of the line of flight into a line of destruction that already animated the molecular focuses of fascism, and made them interact in a war machine instead of resonating in a State apparatus. A war machine that no longer had anything but war as its object and would rather annihilate its own servants than stop the destruction. All the dangers of the other lines pale by comparison.

Capitalism = War

Capitalism makes diffused totalitarian control and war inevitable.

Antonio **Negri**, former professor of state theory @ University of Purdua. Trans. Noura Wedell. The Porcelain Workshop. 2008. p. 65-6.

In this situation, war seems the only possible solution. Pax belli: peace is only possible through war. With the disappearance of the internal criteria that allow the self-regulation and the self-valorization of development, it is the violence of the strongest that creates the norm. The idea of the market essentially implies the hypothesis of a society dominated by binding reason. Violence is just its complement: it guarantees the smooth running of society and widens the terms of the market. When the market, when criteria for production and accumulation sweep through the entire social field, when norms of social regulation and measure enter into crisis, when alternative criteria for valorization appear in both central and peripheral fields of capitalism, then the only solution for the systemic forces with the power to dominate capitalism is to recognize irrationality: the universal declaration of a state of emergency. The situation in which we live is characterized by such a “state of emergency.” Contrary to what fascist theories maintain, this state of emergency is not the urgency of power, in fact quite understandable, when faced with disorder. On the contrary, it is the vehement attempt to reintroduce old criteria of measure based neither on the productivity of systems, the participation of subjects nor the articulation of interdependencies, but simply on the maintenance of privileges and the reproduction of established power. A police force exercising on a global scale replaces the normalizing character of productive structures and the functional character of their hierarchy (whether the latter was a mystification is not important: it was, in fact, an efficient one). In this transition towards the postmodern, the bellicose structures of the modern period are transformed into centralized police structures; armies become bands of soldiers and mercenary troops. And since police activities-Polizeiwissenschaft-now occur within a biopolitical fabric-as we have seen-this new war takes the form of a war that creates order. It builds nations, contracts certain charitable organizations or NGOs, and provides itself with generalized instruments of control wherever weaknesses appear in social organization or in economic development. With Michael Hardt, we argued this point at length in *Multitude*, and I will not linger upon it. What I wish to emphasize, however, is that these solutions to problems of development and these dynamics of domination, based on the complete absence of a shared project, operate within precise historical dimensions. I also wish to emphasize that a new order cannot be constructed from these repressive techniques. The latter must therefore continually-and inexorably-sustain expressions of resistance, revolt, as well as civic, and moral refusal.

Capitalism Kills the Planet

CAPITALISM ENSURES OIL COLLAPSE—ITS ECONOMIC SYSTEM IS CENTERED ON FOSSIL FUEL CONSUMPTION—CHINA’S CONSUMPTION DOUBLES IN NINE YEARS, WORLD PRODUCTION OF ALL LIQUIDS PEAKS IN SEVEN MONTHS, AND RENEWABLE ENERGY CAN’T PRODUCE LIQUID FUEL.

U.S. TRANSPORT CONSUMPTION IS IRRELEVANT – THEIR MOUAWAD CARD MISCALCULATES CHINA’S GROWTH RATE, DOESN’T ACCOUNT FOR PEAK OIL, AND IN THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE THE 1AC TEXT SAYS INDIA AND CHINA WILL SURPASS U.S. DEMAND. THEIR “RESOURCE WARS” WAY EVIDENCE CITES MATTHEW SIMMONS—CEO OF AN ENERGY INVESTMENT BANK WITH A VESTED INTEREST IN EXTRACTING PROFIT FROM ALTERNATIVE ENERGY.

Li, Professor of Economics at University of Utah, '08 [Minqi, Monthly Review, April 2008,
<http://www.monthlyreview.org/080401li.php>]

Table 3 shows the growth of China's energy consumption. Since 2000, it has greatly accelerated. It now accounts for 15 percent of the world total and amounts to 70 percent of U.S. energy consumption. At the current growth rate, China's energy consumption will double in seven years and China will soon overtake the United States to become the world's largest energy consumer. China depends on coal for about 70 percent of its total energy consumption and China's coal consumption is also growing at a rate indicating a doubling in seven years. China's oil consumption (already accounting for one-third of the world's incremental demand for oil) is growing at a rate that implies a doubling in nine years. In other words, in about a decade if the current trend holds up, China will consume one and a half times as much energy as the United States consumes today. Will the world energy supply keep pace with China's rapidly growing demand while meeting the demand from the rest of the world? The global capitalist economy depends on fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal) for 80 percent of the world's energy supply. Oil accounts for one-third of the total energy supply and 90 percent of the energy used in the transportation sector. Oil is also an essential input for the production of fertilizers, plastics, modern medicine, and other chemicals. Oil is a nonrenewable resource. In a recent study, the German Energy Watch Group points out that world oil discoveries peaked in the 1960s and world crude oil production has probably already peaked and will start to decline in the coming years. Outside OPEC, oil production in twenty-five major oil producing countries or regions has already peaked, and only nine countries or regions still have growth potential. All the major international oil companies are struggling to prevent their oil production from declining.³ Colin Campbell of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas estimates that the world production of all liquids (including crude oil, tar sands, oil shales, natural gas liquids, gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, and biofuels) is likely to peak around 2010. After the peak, the world oil production will fall by about 25 percent by 2020 and by about two-thirds by 2050. Campbell also estimates that the world natural gas production will peak by 2045. In an earlier study, the German Energy Watch Group expects the world coal production to peak by 2025.⁴ Nuclear energy and many renewable energy sources (such as solar and wind), in addition to their many other limitations, cannot be used to make liquid and gaseous fuels or serve as inputs in chemical industries. Biomass is the only renewable energy source that can be used as a substitute for fossil fuel in the making of liquid or gaseous fuels. But large-scale production of biomass could lead to many serious environmental problems, and the potential of biomass is limited by the available quantity of productive land and fresh water. Ted Trainer, an Australian eco-socialist, estimates that meeting the current U.S. demand for oil and gas would require that the equivalent of nine times all U.S. crop land or eight times all currently forested U.S. land be fully devoted to production of biomass. Trainer concludes that "there is no possibility that more than a quite small fraction of liquid fuel and gas demand could be met by biomass sources."⁵ If world oil production and the production of other fossil fuels reach their peak and start to decline in the coming years, then the global capitalist economy will face an unprecedented crisis that it will find difficult to overcome. The rapid depletion of fossil fuels is only one among many serious environmental problems the world is confronting today. The capitalist economic system is based on production for profit and capital accumulation. In a global capitalist economy, the competition between individual capitalists, corporations, and capitalist states forces each of them constantly to pursue accumulation of capital on increasingly larger scales. Therefore, under capitalism, there is a tendency for material production and consumption to expand incessantly. After centuries of relentless accumulation, the world's nonrenewable resources are being rapidly depleted and the earth's ecological system is now on the verge of collapse. The survival of the human civilization is at stake.⁶

Capitalism Kills the Planet

CAPITALISM GUARANTEES ENVIRONMENTAL EXTINCTION THROUGH A UNIVERSAL WAR ON NATURE – NEW “FREE MARKET” TECHNOLOGY LIKE THE AFF’S ONLY INCREASES THE SCALE OF EXPLOITATION. THIS EVIDENCE CITES EVERY ONE OF WAKE’S INTERNALS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT: DEFORESTATION, BIODIVERSITY, WETLANDS, AND SOIL.

Foster, Professor of Sociology at Oregon, 2007 [John Bellamy, Monthly Review, February,

<http://www.monthlyreview.org/0207JBF.htm>]

In the Oh shit era, the debate, McKibben says, is over. There is no longer any doubt that global warming represents a crisis of earth-shaking proportions. Yet, it is absolutely essential to understand that this is only one part of what we call the environmental crisis. The global ecological threat as a whole is made up of a large number of interrelated crises and problems that are confronting us simultaneously. In my 1994 book, *The Vulnerable Planet*, I started out with a brief litany of some of these, to which others might now be added: Overpopulation, destruction of the ozone layer, global warming, extinction of species, loss of genetic diversity, acid rain, nuclear contamination, tropical deforestation, the elimination of climax forests, wetland destruction, soil erosion, desertification, floods, famine, the despoliation of lakes, streams, and rivers, the drawing down and contamination of ground water, the pollution of coastal waters and estuaries, the destruction of coral reefs, oil spills, overfishing, expanding landfills, toxic wastes, the poisonous effects of insecticides and herbicides, exposure to hazards on the job, urban congestion, and the depletion of nonrenewable resources.¹¹ The point is that not just global warming but many of these other problems as well can each be seen as constituting a global ecological crisis. Today every major ecosystem on the earth is in decline.

Issues of environmental justice are becoming more prominent and pressing everywhere we turn. Underlying this is the fact that the class/imperial war that defines capitalism as a world system, and that governs its system of accumulation, is a juggernaut that knows no limits. In this deadly conflict the natural world is seen as a mere instrument of world social domination. Hence, capital by its very logic imposes what is in effect a scorched earth strategy. The planetary ecological crisis is increasingly all-encompassing, a product of the destructive uncontrollability of a rapidly globalizing capitalist economy, which knows no law other than its own drive to exponential expansion. Transcending Business as Usual Most climate scientists, including Lovelock and Hansen, follow the IPCC in basing their main projections of global warming on a socioeconomic scenario described as “business as usual.”

The dire trends indicated are predicated on our fundamental economic and technological developments and our basic relation to nature remaining the same. The question we need to ask then is what actually is business as usual? What can be changed and how fast? With time running out the implication is that it is necessary to alter business as usual in radical ways in order to stave off or lessen catastrophe. Yet, the dominant solutions—those associated with the dominant ideology, i.e., the ideology of the dominant class—emphasize minimal changes in business as usual that will somehow get us off the hook. After being directed to the growing planetary threats of global warming and species extinction we are told that the answer is better gas mileage and better emissions standards, the introduction of hydrogen-powered cars, the capture and sequestration of carbon dioxide emitted in the atmosphere, improved conservation, and voluntary cutbacks in consumption. Environmental political scientists specialize in the construction of new environmental policy regimes, embodying state and market regulations. Environmental economists talk of tradable pollution permits and the incorporation of all environmental factors into the market to ensure their efficient use. Some environmental sociologists (my own field) speak of ecological modernization: a whole panoply of green taxes, green regulations, and new green technologies, even the greening of capitalism itself.

Futurists describe a new technological world in which the weight of nations on the earth is miraculously lifted as a result of digital “dematerialization” of the economy. In all of these views, however, there is one constant: the fundamental character of business as usual is hardly changed at all. Indeed, what all such analyses intentionally avoid is the fact that business as usual in our society in any fundamental sense means the capitalist economy—an economy run on the logic of profit and accumulation. Moreover, there is little acknowledgement or even appreciation of the fact that the Hobbesian war of all against all that characterizes capitalism requires for its fulfillment a universal war on nature. In this sense new technology cannot solve the problem since it is inevitably used to further the class war and to increase Capitalism Kills the Planet

production dies down or social resistance imposes barriers on the expansion of capital the answer is always to find new ways to exploit/degrade nature more intensively. To quote Pontecorvo's Burn!, "that is the logic of profit....One builds to make money and to go on making it or to make more sometimes it is necessary to destroy." Ironically, this destructive relation of capitalism to the environment was probably understood better in the nineteenth century—at a time when social analysts were acutely aware of the issue of revolutionary changes taking place in the mode of production and how this was transforming the human relation to nature. As a result, environmental sociologists of the more radical stamp in the United States, where the contradiction between economy and ecology nowadays is especially acute, draw heavily on three interrelated ideas derived from Marx and the critique of capitalist political economy dating back to the nineteenth century: (1) the treadmill of production, (2) the second contradiction of capitalism, and (3) the metabolic rift. The first of these, the treadmill of production, describes capitalism as an unstoppable, accelerating treadmill that constantly increases the scale of the throughput of energy and raw materials as part of its quest for profit and accumulation, thereby pressing on the earth's absorptive capacity. "Accumulate, Accumulate!" Marx wrote, "that is Moses and the prophets!" for capital.¹² The second of these notions, the second contradiction of capitalism, is the idea that capitalism, in addition to its primary economic contradiction stemming from class inequalities in production and distribution, also undermines the human and natural conditions (i.e., environmental conditions) of production on which its economic advancement ultimately rests. For example, by systematically removing forests we lay the grounds for increasing scarcities in this area—the more so to the extent that globalization makes this contradiction universal. This heightens the overall cost of economic development and creates an economic crisis for capitalism based on supply-side constraints on production.¹³ The third notion, the metabolic rift, suggests that the logic of capital accumulation inexorably creates a rift in the metabolism between society and nature, severing basic processes of natural reproduction. This raises the issue of the ecological sustainability—not simply in relation to the scale of the economy, but also even more importantly in the form and intensity of the interaction between nature and society under capitalism.¹⁴ I shall concentrate on the third of these notions, the metabolic rift, since this is the most complex of these three socio-ecological concepts, and the one that has been the focus of my own research in this area, particularly in my book Marx's Ecology. Marx was greatly influenced by the work of the leading agricultural chemist of his time, Justus von Liebig. Liebig had developed an analysis of the ecological contradictions of industrialized capitalist agriculture. He argued that such industrialized agriculture, as present in its most developed form in England in the nineteenth century, was a robbery system, depleting the soil. Food and fiber were transported hundreds—even in some cases thousands—of miles from the country to the city. This meant that essential soil nutrients, such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, were transported as well. Rather than being returned to the soil these essential nutrients ended up polluting the cities, for example, in the degradation of the Thames in London. The natural conditions for the reproduction of the soil were thus destroyed. To compensate for the resulting decline in soil fertility the British raided the Napoleonic battlefields and the catacombs of Europe for bones with which to fertilize the soil of the English countryside. They also resorted to the importation of guano on a vast scale from the islands off the coast of Peru, followed by the importation of Chilean nitrates (after the War of the Pacific in which Chile seized parts of Peru and Bolivia rich in guano and nitrates). The United States sent out ships throughout the oceans searching for guano, and ended up seizing ninety-four islands, rocks, and keys between the passage of the 1856 Guano Islands Act and 1903, sixty-six of which were officially recognized as U.S. appurtenances and nine of which remain U.S. possessions today.¹⁵ This reflected a great crisis of capitalist agriculture in the nineteenth century that was only solved in part with the development of synthetic fertilizer nitrogen early in the twentieth century—and which led eventually to the overuse of fertilizer nitrogen, itself a major environmental problem. In reflecting on this crisis of capitalist agriculture, Marx adopted the concept of metabolism, which had been introduced by nineteenth-century biologists and chemists, including Liebig, and applied it to socio-ecological relations. All life is based on metabolic processes between organisms and their environment. Organisms carry out an exchange of energy and matter with their environment, which are integrated with their own internal life processes. It is not a stretch to think of the nest of a bird as part of the bird's metabolic process. Marx explicitly defined the labor process as the "metabolic interaction between man and nature." In terms of the ecological problem he spoke of "an irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social metabolism," whereby the conditions for the necessary reproduction of the soil were continually severed, breaking the metabolic cycle. "Capitalist production," he wrote, "therefore only develops the techniques and the degree of combination of the social process of production by simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the worker." Marx saw this rift not simply in national terms but as related to imperialism as well. "England," he wrote, "has indirectly exported the soil of Ireland," without even allowing its cultivators the means for replacing the constituents of the exhausted soil." This principle of metabolic rift obviously has a very wide application and has in fact been applied by environmental sociologists in recent years to problems such as global warming and the ecological degradation of the world's oceans.¹⁶ What is seldom recognized, however, is that Marx went immediately from a conception of the metabolic rift to the necessity of metabolic restoration, arguing that "by destroying the circumstances surrounding that metabolism, which originated in a merely natural and spontaneous fashion, it [capitalist production] compels its systematic restoration as a regulative law of social reproduction." The reality of the metabolic rift pointed to the necessity of the restoration of nature, through sustainable production. It is this dialectical understanding of the socio-ecological problem that led Marx to what is perhaps the most radical conception of socio-

Capitalism Kills the Planet

ecological sustainability ever developed. Thus he wrote in Capital: From the standpoint of a higher socio-economic formation, the private property of individuals in the earth will appear just as absurd as the private property of one man in other men. Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not owners of the earth. They are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding generations, as boni patres familias [good heads of the household]. For Marx, in other words, the present relation of human beings to the earth under private accumulation could be compared to slavery. Just as “private property of one man in other men” is no longer deemed acceptable, so private ownership of the earth/nature by human beings (even whole countries) must be transcended. The human relation to nature must be regulated so to guarantee its existence “in an improved state to succeeding generations.” His reference to the notion of “good heads of the household” hearkened back to the ancient Greek notion of household or oikos from which we get both “economy” (from oikonomia, or household management) and “ecology” (from oikologia or household study). Marx pointed to the necessity of a more radical, sustainable relation of human beings to production in accord with what we would now view as ecological rather than merely economic notions. “Freedom, in this sphere,” the realm of natural necessity, he insisted, “can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control...accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy.”¹⁷ The destructive uncontrollability of capitalism, emanating from its dual character as a system of class/imperial exploitation and of enslaver/destroyer of the earth itself, was thus well understood by Marx. With regard to the film, Burn!, we saw how the exploitation of human beings was tied to the destruction of the earth. Relations of domination changed but the answer remained the same: to burn the island as a means of winning the class/imperial war. Today a few hundred people taken together own more wealth than the income of billions of the world’s population. To maintain this system of global inequality a global system of repression has been developed and is constantly put in motion. And along with it vast new systems of destructive exploitation of the earth, such as modern agribusiness, have evolved. Social Revolution and Metabolic Restoration Pontecorvo’s film Burn! about revolution in the Caribbean reaches its climax in the year 1848, a revolutionary year in real-world history. In 1848 Marx famously observed in his speech on free trade: “You believe perhaps, gentlemen, that the production of coffee and sugar is the natural destiny of the West Indies. Two centuries ago, nature, which does not trouble herself about commerce, had planted neither sugar cane nor coffee trees there.”¹⁸ Much of what we take as natural is the product of capitalism. Indeed, we are brought up believing that capitalist market relations are more natural, more incontrovertible, than anything within nature. It is this way of thinking that we have to break with if we are to restore our relation to the earth if we are to invert the metabolic rift. The only answer to the ecology of destruction of capitalism is to revolutionize our productive relations in ways that allow for a metabolic restoration. But this will require a break with capitalism’s own system of “socio-metabolic reproduction,” i.e. the logic of profit.¹⁹ What such a revolutionary break with today’s business as usual offers is of course no guarantee but the mere possibility of social and ecological transformation through the creation of a sustainable, egalitarian (and socialist) society. Lovelock’s “revenge of Gaia”—what Frederick Engels, in the nineteenth century called the “revenge” of nature, now writ large on a planetary scale—will not be automatically overcome simply through a rupture with the logic of the existing system.²⁰ Yet, such a rupture remains the necessary first step in any rational attempt to save and advance human civilization. Burn is no longer an island; it stands for the entire world, which is heating up before our eyes. At the end of Pontecorvo’s film José Dolores is killed, but his revolutionary spirit lives on. The strategy of destroying nature to enslave humanity, we are led to believe, will not work forever. Today Latin America is reawakening to the revolutionary spirit of Bolívar and Che—a spirit that has never perished. But we now know—what was seldom understood before—that a revolutionary transformation of society must also be a revolutionary restoration of our metabolic relation to nature: equality and sustainability must coevolve if either is to emerge triumphant. And if we are to survive.

Capitalism Kills the Planet

EXPANSION OF CAPITALISM GUARANTEES EXTINCTION—PROFIT ACCUMULATION HAS PUT THE ENVIRONMENT ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

Li, Professor of Economics at University of Utah, '08 [Minqi, Monthly Review, April 2008,
<http://www.monthlyreview.org/080401li.php>]

Confronted with economic crisis, the Bush administration has simultaneously pursued a further widening of inequality at home and unilateral imperialism abroad. These policies have by now failed decisively. As the United States can no longer finance its economy and imperialist adventure with increasingly larger foreign debt, the U.S. dollar, Wallerstein believes, faces the prospect of a free fall and will cease to be the world's reserve currency. Wallerstein concludes: "The political balance is swinging back....The real question is not whether this phase is over but whether the swing back will be able, as in the past, to restore a state of relative equilibrium in the world-system. Or has too much damage been done? And are we now in for more violent chaos in the world-economy and therefore in the world-system as a whole?"⁹ Following Wallerstein's arguments, in the coming years we are likely to witness a major realignment of global political and economic forces. There will be an upsurge in the global class struggle over the direction of the global social transformation. If we are in one of the normal cycles of the capitalist world-system, then toward the end of the current period of instability and crisis, we probably will observe a return to the dominance of Keynesian or state capitalist policies and institutions throughout the world. However, too much damage has been done. After centuries of global capitalist accumulation, the global environment is on the verge of collapse and there is no more ecological space for another major expansion of global capitalism. The choice is stark—either humanity will permit capitalism to destroy the environment and therefore the material basis of human civilization, or it will destroy capitalism first. The struggle for ecological sustainability must join forces with the struggles of the oppressed and exploited to rebuild the global economy on the basis of production for human needs in accordance with democratic and socialist principles. In this sense, we have entered into a new age of transition. Toward the end of this transition, one way or the other we will be in a fundamentally different world and it is up to us to decide what kind of world it turns out to be.

Capitalism = Genocide/Nuke War

CAPITALISM IS CAUSING AND WILL EXPAND GENOCIDE AND NUCLEAR APOCALYPSE GLOBALLY.

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES '00

[from Internationalist Perspective #36, spring 2000] <http://www.geocities.com/wageslavex/capandgen.html>

Mass death, and genocide, the deliberate and systematic extermination of whole groups of human beings, have become an integral part of the social landscape of capitalism in its phase of decadence. Auschwitz, Kolyma, and Hiroshima are not merely the names of discrete sites where human beings have been subjected to forms of industrialized mass death, but synecdoches for the death-world that is a component of the capitalist mode of production in this epoch. In that sense, I want to argue that the Holocaust, for example, was not a Jewish catastrophe, nor an atavistic reversion to the barbarism of a past epoch, but rather an event produced by the unfolding of the logic of capitalism itself. Moreover, Auschwitz, Kolyma, and Hiroshima are not "past", but rather futural events, objective-real possibilities on the Front of history, to use concepts first articulated by the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch. The ethnic cleansing which has been unleashed in Bosnia and Kosovo, the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda, the mass death to which Chechnya has been subjected, the prospect for a nuclear war on the Indian sub-continent, are so many examples of the future which awaits the human species as the capitalist mode of production enters a new millennium. Indeed, it is just such a death-world that constitutes the meaning of one pole of the historic alternative which Rosa Luxemburg first posed in the midst of the slaughter inflicted on masses of conscripts during World War I: socialism or barbarism!

Yet, confronted by the horror of Auschwitz, Kolyma, and Hiroshima, Marxist theory has been silent or uncomprehending. While I am convinced that there can be no adequate theory of mass death and genocide which does not link these phenomena to the unfolding of the logic of capital, revolutionary Marxists have so far failed to offer one. Worse, the few efforts of revolutionary Marxists to grapple with the Holocaust, for example, as I will briefly explain, have either degenerated into a crude economism, which is one of the hallmarks of so-called orthodox Marxism, or led to a fatal embrace of Holocaust denial; the former being an expression of theoretical bankruptcy, and the latter a quite literal crossing of the class line into the camp of capital itself. Economism, which is based on a crude base-superstructure model (or travesty) of Marxist theory, in which politics, for example, can only be conceived as a direct and immediate reflection of the economic base, in which events can only be conceived as a manifestation of the direct economic needs of a social class, and in the case of the capitalist class, the immediate need to extract a profit, shaped Amadeo Bordiga's attempt to "explain" the Holocaust. Thus, in his "Auschwitz ou le Grand Alibi" Bordiga explained the extermination of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis, as the reaction of one part of the petty bourgeoisie to its historical demise at the hands of capital by "sacrificing" its other -- Jewish -- part so as to save the rest, an undertaking welcomed by big capital, which could thereby liquidate a part of the petty bourgeoisie with the support of the rest of that same class. Quite apart from an economism which simply ignores the dialectic between the economy on the one hand, and the political and ideological on the other (about which more later), such an "explanation" asks us to conceive of genocide not as the complex outcome of the unfolding of the operation of the law of value in the diverse spheres of social life, but as the direct outcome of the utilitarian calculation of segments of the petty bourgeoisie and big capital. Auschwitz, the veritable hallmark of the fundamental irrationality of late capital, is transformed by Bordiga into a rational calculation of its direct profit interests on the part of the capitalists. However,

Capitalism = Genocide/Nuke War

an undertaking which fatally diverted the scarce resources (material and financial) of Nazi Germany from the battlefields of the imperialist world war, simply cannot, in my view, be comprehended on the basis of a purely economic calculus of profit and loss on the part of "big capital."

While Bordiga's reaction to Auschwitz fails to provide even the minimal bases for its adequate theorization, the reaction of the militants of *La Vieille Taupe*, such as Pierre Guillaume, constitutes a political betrayal of the struggle for communist revolution by its incorporation into the politics of Holocaust denial. For Guillaume, Auschwitz can only be a myth, a fabrication of the allies, that is, of one of the imperialist blocs in the inter-imperialist world war, because it so clearly serves their interests in mobilizing the working class to die in the service of democracy; on the alter of anti-fascism. Hence, *La Vieille Taupe*'s "fervor to contest the evidence of its [the Holocaust's] reality by every means possible, including the most fraudulent. For the evidence of genocide is just so many deceptions, so many traps laid for anticapitalist radicality, designed to force it into dishonest compromise and eventual loss of resolve." It is quite true that capital has utilized antifascism to assure its ideological hegemony over the working class, and that the Holocaust has been routinely wielded for more than a generation by the organs of mass manipulation in the service of the myth of "democracy" in the West (and by the state of Israel on behalf of its own imperialist aims in the Middle-East). And just as surely the ideology of antifascism and its functionality for capital must be exposed by revolutionaries. Nonetheless, this does not justify the claims of Holocaust denial, which not only cannot be dissociated from anti-Semitism, but which constitutes a denial of the most lethal tendencies inherent in the capitalist mode of production, of the very barbarism of capitalism, and thereby serves as a screen behind which the death-world wrought by capital can be safely hidden from its potential victims. This latter, in its own small way, is the despicable contribution of *La Vieille Taupe*, and the basis for my conviction that it must be politically located in the camp of capital.

Marxism is in need of a theory of mass death and genocide as immanent tendencies of capital, a way of comprehending the link (still obscure) between the death-world symbolized by the smokestacks of Auschwitz or the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima and the unfolding of the logic of a mode of production based on the capitalist law of value. I want to argue that we can best grasp the link between capitalism and genocide by focusing on two dialectically inter-related strands in the social fabric of late capitalism: first, are a series of phenomena linked to the actual unfolding of the law of value, and more specifically to the completion of the transition from the formal to the real domination of capital; second, are a series of phenomena linked to the political and ideological (this latter understood in a non-reductionist sense, as having a material existence) moments of the rule of capital, specifically to the forms of capitalist hegemony. It is through an analysis of the coalescence of vital elements of these two strands in the development of capital, that I hope to expose the bases for the death-world and genocide as integral features of capitalism in the present epoch.

The real domination of capital is characterized by the penetration of the law of value into every segment of social existence. As Georg Lukács put it in his *History and Class Consciousness*, this means that the commodity ceases to be "one form among many regulating the metabolism of human society," to become its "universal structuring principle." From its original locus at the point of production, in the capitalist factory, which is the hallmark of the formal domination of capital, the law of value has systematically spread its tentacles to incorporate not just the production of commodities, but their circulation and consumption. Moreover, the law of value also penetrates and then comes to preside over the spheres of the political and ideological, including science and technology themselves. This latter occurs not just through the transformation of the fruits of technology and science into

Capitalism = Genocide/Nuke War

commodities, not just through the transformation of technological and scientific research itself (and the institutions in which it takes place) into commodities, but also, and especially, through what Lukács designates as the infiltration of thought itself by the purely technical, the very quantification of rationality, the instrumentalization of reason; and, I would argue, the reduction of all beings (including human beings) to mere objects of manipulation and control. As Lukács could clearly see even in the age of Taylorism, "this rational mechanisation extends right into the worker's 'soul'." In short, it affects not only his outward behavior, but her very internal, psychological, makeup.

The phenomenon of reification, inherent in the commodity-form, and its tendential penetration into the whole of social existence, which Lukács was one of the first to analyze, is a hallmark of the real domination of capital: "Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity', an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people." Reification, the seeming transformation of social relations into relations between things, has as one of its outcomes what the German-Jewish thinker H.G. Adler designated as "the administered man" [Der verwaltete Mensch]. For Adler, when human beings are administered, they are treated as things, thereby clearing the way for their removal or elimination by genocide. The outcome of such a process can be seen in the bureaucratic administration of the Final Solution, in which the organization of genocide was the responsibility of desk killers like Adolf Eichmann who could zealously administer a system of mass murder while displaying no particular hatred for his victims, no great ideological passion for his project, and no sense that those who went to the gas chambers were human beings and not things. The features of the desk killer, in the person of Eichmann, have been clearly delineated by Hannah Arendt. He is the high-level functionary in a vast bureaucratic organization who does his killing from behind a desk, from which he rationally plans and organizes mass murder; treating it as simply a technical task, no different than the problem of transporting scrap metal. The desk killer is the quintessential bureaucrat functioning according to the imperatives of the death-world. As a human type, the desk killer, that embodiment of the triumph of instrumental reason, has become a vital part of the state apparatus of late capitalism.

Here, the Lukácsian concept of reification, the Adlerian concept of the administered man, and the Arendtian portrait of the desk killer, can be joined to Martin Heidegger's concept of das Gestell, enframing, in which everything real, all beings, including humans, are treated as so much Bestand, standing-reserve or raw material, to be manipulated at will. This reduction of humans to a raw material is the antechamber to a world in which they can become so many waste products to be discarded or turned into ashes in the gas chambers of Auschwitz or at ground zero at Hiroshima.

While the reification which attains its culminating point in the real domination of capital may contain within itself the possibility of mass murder and its death-world, it does not in and of itself explain the actual unleashing of the genocidal potential which, because of it, is now firmly ensconced within the interstices of the capitalist mode of production. To confront that issue, I want to elucidate two concepts which, while not directly linked by their authors to the unfolding of the capitalist law of value, can be refunctioned to forge such a link, and have already been effectively wielded in the effort to explain genocide: the concept of the obsolescence of man [Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen],

Capitalism = Genocide/Nuke War

articulated by the German-Jewish philosopher Günther Anders, and the concept of bio-politics, articulated by Michel Foucault.

For Anders, the first industrial revolution introduced the machine with its own source of power as a means of production, while the second industrial revolution saw the extension of commodity production to the whole of society, and the subordination of man to the machine. According to Anders, the third industrial revolution, in the epoch of which humanity now lives, has made humans obsolete, preparing the way for their replacement by machines, and the end of history (Endzeit). For Anders, the Holocaust marked the first attempt at the systematic extermination of a whole group of people by industrial means, opening the way for the extension of the process of extermination to virtually the whole of the human species; a stage which he designates as "post-civilized cannibalism" [postzivilisatorischen Kannibalismus], in which the world is "overmanned", and in which Hiroshima marks the point at which "humanity as a whole is eliminatable" [tötbar]. Anders's philosophy of technology is unabashedly pessimistic, leaving virtually no room for Marxist hope (communist revolution). Nonetheless, his vision of a totally reified world, and technology as the subject of history, culminating in an Endzeit, corresponds to one side of the dialectic of socialism or barbarism which presides over the present epoch. Moreover, Anders's concept of an overmanned world can be fruitfully linked to the immanent tendency of the law of value to generate an ever higher organic composition of capital, culminating in the present stage of automation, robotics, computers, and information technology, on the bases of which ever larger masses of living labor are ejected from the process of production, and, indeed, from the cycle of accumulation as a whole, ceasing to be -- even potentially -- a productive force, a source of exchange-value, in order to become an insuperable burden for capital, a dead weight, which, so long as it lives and breathes, threatens its profitability. This "obsolescence of man" can at the level of total capital thereby create the necessity for mass murder; inserting the industrial extermination of whole groups of people into the very logic of capital: genocide as the apotheosis of instrumental reason! Reason transmogrified into the nihilistic engine of destruction which shapes the late capitalist world.

Michel Foucault's concept of bio-power can also be refunctioned to explicitly link it to the basic tendencies of the development of capitalism, in which case it provides a point of intersection between the triumph of the real domination of capital economically, and the political and ideological transformation of capitalist rule, while at the same time making it possible to grasp those features of capital which propel it in the direction of genocide. The extension of the law of value into every sphere of human existence, the culminating point of the real domination of capital, is marked by the subordination of the biological realm itself to the logic of capital. This stage corresponds to what Foucault designates as bio-politics, which encapsulates both the "statification of the biological", and the "birth of state racism". Bio-politics entails the positive power to administer, manage, and regulate the intimate details of the life -- and death -- of whole populations in the form of technologies of domination: "In concrete terms ... this power over life evolved in two basic forms ... they constituted ... two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these poles ... centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the human body. The second ... focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes:

Capitalism = Genocide/Nuke War

propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population." Such a bio-politics represents the subjugation of biological life in its diverse human forms to the imperatives of the law of value. It allows capital to mobilize all the human resources of the nation in the service of its expansion and aggrandizement, economic and military.

The other side of bio-politics, of this power over life, for Foucault, is what he terms "thanatopolitics," entailing an awesome power to inflict mass death, both on the population of one's enemy, and on one's own population: "the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers ... it is because power is situated at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." Nuclear, chemical, and biological, weapons make it possible to wield this power to condemn whole populations to death. Bio-politics, for Foucault, also necessarily entails racism, by which he means making a cut in the biological continuum of human life, designating the very existence of a determinate group as a danger to the population, to its health and well-being, and even to its very life. Such a group, I would argue, then, becomes a biological (in the case of Nazism) or class enemy (in the case of Stalinism, though the latter also claimed that biological and hereditary characteristics were linked to one's class origins). And the danger represented by such an enemy race can necessitate its elimination through physical removal (ethnic cleansing) or extermination (genocide).

The Foucauldian concept of bio-politics allows us to see how, on the basis of technologies of domination, it is possible to subject biological life itself to a formidable degree of control, and to be able to inflict mass death on populations or races designated as a biological threat. Moreover, by linking this concept to the real domination of capital, we are able to see how the value-form invades even the biological realm in the phase of the real domination of capital. However, while bio-power entails the horrific possibility of genocide, it is Foucault's ruminations on the binary division of a population into a "pure community" and its Other, which allows us to better grasp its necessity. Such a perspective, however, intersects with the transformations at the level of the political and ideological moment of capital, and it is to these, and what I see as vital contributions to their theorization by Antonio Gramsci and Ernst Bloch, that I now want to turn in an effort to better elucidate the factors that propel capital in the direction of mass death and genocide.

What is at issue here is not Gramsci's politics, his political practice, his interventions in the debates on strategy and tactics within the Italian Communist Party, where he followed the counter-revolutionary line of the Stalinist Comintern, but rather his theorization of the political and ideological moment of capital, and in particular his concept of the "integral state", his understanding of the state as incorporating both political and civil society, his concept of hegemony, and his understanding of ideology as inscribed in practices and materialized in institutions, which exploded the crude base-superstructure model of orthodox Marxism and its vision of ideology as simply false consciousness, all of which have enriched Marxist theory, and which revolutionaries ignore at their peril.

Capitalism = Genocide/Nuke War

In contrast to orthodox Marxism which has equated the state with coercion, Gramsci's insistence that the state incorporates both political and civil society, and that class rule is instantiated both by domination (coercion) and hegemony (leadership) allows us to better grasp the complex and crisscrossing strands that coalesce in capitalist class rule, especially in the phase of the real domination of capital and the epoch of state capitalism. For Gramsci, hegemony is the way in which a dominant class installs its rule over society through the intermediary of ideology, establishing its intellectual and cultural leadership over other classes, and thereby reducing its dependence on coercion. Ideology, for Gramsci, is not mere false consciousness, but rather is the form in which humans acquire consciousness, become subjects and act, constituting what he terms a "collective will". Moreover, for him, ideology is no mere superstructure, but has a material existence, is materialized in praxis. The state which rests on a combination of coercion and hegemony is what Gramsci designates as an integral state. It seems to me, that one major weakness of the Gramscian concept of hegemony is that he does not seem to apply it to the control exercised over an antagonistic class. Thus, Gramsci asserts that one dominates, coerces, antagonistic classes, but leads only allied classes. Gramsci's seeming exclusion of antagonistic classes from the ideological hegemony of the dominant class seems to me to be misplaced, especially in the epoch of state capitalism, when the capitalist class, the functionaries of capital, acquire hegemony, cultural and intellectual leadership and control, not just of allied classes and strata (e.g. the middle classes, petty bourgeoisie, etc.), but also over broad strata of the antagonistic class, the working class itself. Indeed, such hegemony, though never total, and always subject to reversal (revolution), is the veritable key to capitalist class rule in this epoch.

One way in which this ideological hegemony of capital is established over broad strata of the population, including sectors of the working class, is by channeling the dissatisfaction and discontent of the mass of the population with the monstrous impact of capitalism upon their lives (subjection to the machine, reduction to the status of a "thing", at the point of production, insecurity and poverty as features of daily life, the overall social process of atomization and massification, etc.), away from any struggle to establish a human *Gemeinwesen*, communism. Capitalist hegemony entails the ability to divert that very dissatisfaction into the quest for a "pure community", based on hatred and rage directed not at capital, but at the Other, at alterity itself, at those marginal social groups which are designated a danger to the life of the nation, and its population.

One of the most dramatic effects of the inexorable penetration of the law of value into every pore of social life, and geographically across the face of the whole planet, has been the destruction of all primitive, organic, and pre-capitalist communities. Capitalism, as Marx and Engels pointed out in the Communist Manifesto, shatters the bonds of immemorial custom and tradition, replacing them with its exchange mechanism and contract. While Marx and Engels stressed the positive features of this development in the Manifesto, we cannot ignore its negative side, particularly in light of the fact that the path to a human *Gemeinwesen* has so far been successfully blocked by capital, with disastrous consequences for the human species. The negative side of that development includes the relentless process of atomization, leaving in its wake an ever growing mass of rootless individuals, for whom the only human contact is by way of the cash nexus. Those who have been uprooted geographically, economically, politically, and culturally, are frequently left with a powerful longing for their lost communities (even where those communities were hierarchically organized and based on inequality), for the certainties and "truths" of the past, which are idealized the more frustrating, unsatisfying, and

Capitalism = Genocide/Nuke War

insecure, the world of capital becomes. Such longings are most powerfully felt within what Ernst Bloch has termed non-synchronous strata and classes. These are strata and classes whose material or mental conditions of life are linked to a past mode of production, who exist economically or culturally in the past, even as they chronologically dwell in the present. In contrast to the two historic classes in the capitalist mode of production, the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which are synchronous, the products of the capitalist present, these non-synchronous strata include the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and -- by virtue of their mental or cultural state -- youth and white-collar workers. In my view, Bloch's understanding of non-synchronicity needs to be extended to segments of the working class, in particular those strata of the blue-collar proletariat which are no longer materially synchronous with the high-tech production process upon which late capitalism rests, and the mass of workers ejected from the production process by the rising organic composition of capital and its concomitant downsizing. In addition, the even greater mass of peasants streaming into the shanty towns around the great commercial and industrial metropolitan centers of the world, are also characterized by their non-synchronicity, their inability to be incorporated into the hyper-modern cycle of capital accumulation. Moreover, all of these strata too are subject to a growing nostalgia for the past, a longing for community, including the blue-collar communities and their institutional networks which were one of the features of the social landscape of capitalism earlier in the twentieth century.

However, no matter how powerful this nostalgia for past community becomes, it cannot be satisfied. The organic communities of the past cannot be recreated; their destruction by capital is irreversible. At the same time, the path to a future *Gemeinwesen*, to which the cultural material and longings embodied in the non-synchronous classes and strata can make a signal contribution, according to Bloch, remains obstructed by the power of capital. So long as this is the case, the genuine longing for community of masses of people, and especially the nostalgia for past communities especially felt by the non-synchronous strata and classes, including the newly non-synchronous elements which I have just argued must be added to them, leaves them exposed to the lure of a "pure community" ideologically constructed by capital itself. In place of real organic and communal bonds, in such an ideologically constructed pure community, a racial, ethnic, or religious identification is merely superimposed on the existing condition of atomization in which the mass of the population finds itself. In addition to providing some gratification for the longing for community animating broad strata of the population, such a pure community can also provide an ideological bond which ties the bulk of the population to the capitalist state on the basis of a race, ethnicity, or religion which it shares with the ruling class. This latter is extremely important to capital, because the atomization which it has brought about not only leaves the mass of humanity bereft, but also leaves the ruling class itself vulnerable because it lacks any basis upon which it can mobilize the population, physically or ideologically.

The basis upon which such a pure community is constituted, race, nationality, religion, even a categorization by "class" in the Stalinist world, necessarily means the exclusion of those categories of the population which do not conform to the criteria for inclusion, the embodiments of alterity, even while they inhabit the same geographical space as the members of the pure community. Those excluded, the "races" on the other side of the biological continuum, to use Foucauldian terminology, the Other, become alien elements within an otherwise homogeneous world of the pure community. As a threat to its very existence, the role of this Other is to become the scapegoat for the inability of the pure community to provide authentic communal bonds between people, for its abject failure to

Capitalism = Genocide/Nuke War

overcome the alienation that is a hallmark of a reified world. The Jew in Nazi Germany, the Kulak in Stalinist Russia, the Tutsi in Rwanda, Muslims in Bosnia, blacks in the US, the Albanian or the Serb in Kosovo, the Arab in France, the Turk in contemporary Germany, the Bahai in Iran, for example, become the embodiment of alterity, and the target against which the hatred of the members of the pure community is directed. The more crisis ridden a society becomes, the greater the need to find an appropriate scapegoat; the more urgent the need for mass mobilization behind the integral state, the more imperious the need to focus rage against the Other. In an extreme situation of social crisis and political turmoil, the demonization and victimization of the Other can lead to his (mass) murder. In the absence of a working class conscious of its historic task and possibilities, this hatred of alterity which permits capital to mobilize the population in defense of the pure community, can become its own impetus to genocide.

The immanent tendencies of the capitalist mode of production which propel it towards a catastrophic economic crisis, also drive it towards mass murder and genocide. In that sense, the death-world, and the prospect of an Endzeit cannot be separated from the continued existence of humanity's subordination to the law of value. Reification, the overmanned world, bio-politics, state racism, the constitution of a pure community directed against alterity, each of them features of the economic and ideological topography of the real domination of capital, create the possibility and the need for genocide. We should have no doubt that the survival of capitalism into this new millenium will entail more and more frequent recourse to mass murder.

Cap → Poverty

— Poverty is not just a small inconsistency of capital, it is inseparable. Meaning that trying to solve poverty and at the same time push the Neoliberalism agenda is doomed to failure'

Negri, Italian Marxist Scholar, in '02

[Antonio, Florian Schnider, Thomas Atzert October, A Video Conversation with Antonio Negri <http://www.generation-online.org/t/glossary.htm>]

We really need a capacity to mobilise poverty. The real subjectivation of the multitude does not make one think of organisational forms that have more or less democratic centralism, more or less centripetal webs towards organisation. The problem is all in the content not in the form. What we must manage to develop is the feeling that poverty is a subject, a power, a capacity to renew the world. It is only when we manage to put into motion this concept of poverty as power that we can also understand what organisation is. Poverty is indignation against wealth but also the enormous capacity to produce wealth. Poverty is something that is put to the margin of this world of capitalist production but it's also something that runs through it internally and thoroughly. Poverty is not simply the poor miserable populations who are at the bottom of the third world, poverty is something that is at the centre of our metropolis. Poverty is not something that is outside of the working class or of the normal structure of production. It is something that is inside, that has become more internal to it through the precariat, through the exclusion from the productive function. Rather than strike we should use the word exodus. Strike is the moment of rupture, but here (exodus) it is the moment of rupture but it is also that of a social construction of community. This is what is now in present in consciousness at a very advanced level. We have to interpret this because this strike in the common becomes a fact of a different civilisation. Here there is a whole other issue regarding the anthropology of struggles and behaviours today, of seeing how far for instance in relation to the traditional Fordist worker today the mode of feeling and seeing both work and communal activity has changed, and how it is on this new terrain of anthropological modification and transformation that a new mode of struggle must be conceived. It is a great problem that obviously can only be resolved by practice. The privileged places for this practice are fundamentally the metropolises. It is there that we must try to verify, experiment, take the initiative but especially represent and present things, it would be very interesting on this terrain for instance to make documentaries and movies, to create a physical image of the development of these struggles. In a theatre too...

— Capitalism makes poverty inevitable.

Harris-White, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University, in '5

[Barbara, "Working Paper Number 134: Poverty and Capitalism", QEH Working Paper Series, December]

In this paper I examine the idea that the poverty cannot be eradicated: that on the contrary poverty is continually being created and re-created under the institutions of capitalism. Capitalism is a mode of production in which capital – in the form of money and credit, physical machinery, stocks of goods and labour - is privately owned. Production is for sale, labour is for sale, sale is mediated through money. The owner of the means of production, often operating through specialised managerial labour, controls the hiring and firing and working conditions of labour, the choice of technology, the commodities produced and the exchange of the output. This owner has access to credit from specialised financial institutions, even though he may contest its control. An employer's control over capital takes place in the context of competition for market shares. This competition forces the capitalist to adopt new techniques which cut costs and to accumulate in order to invest in new techniques. Labour contests the wage-profit relation, and governments seek to incentivise, regulate and tax capital. 3 States may also seek to mitigate poverty, but in order to do so effectively the processes which create poverty must be openly understood and the – sometimes perverse - consequences of the various mitigating strategies on these poverty-creating processes must be recognised.

Cap → Poverty – Econ Crisis

— Capitalism creates the conditions of constant crisis due to the balancing of global market mechanisms. This result in perpetual poverty for much of the populations.

Harriss-White, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford

University, in '5

[Barbara, "Working Paper Number 134: Poverty and Capitalism", QEH Working Paper Series, December]

Both in theory and in practice capitalism is associated with crises which may pauperise various fractions of society. In theory crises are caused by the clash of the logic of accumulation and profit (leading to over-production), and that of demand for commodities and the distribution of the wages permitting such demand (leading to under-consumption). A further tension exists within profit between its use in consumption (creating demand) and its use for productive investment. These are delicate interdependencies and shocks to them may have far reaching repercussions. The current era is one in which the movement of capital is global, while regulation is done by states. When currencies compete, states must manipulate interest rates so as to attract investment when exchange rates are weak. When risk is factored into the determination of interest rates, they rise. The accumulation of large-scale public debt in the biggest economies also raises interest rates. The current era is thus one in which returns to finance capital exceed returns to real economic growth.²² Meanwhile many countries must export primary commodities to repay debt and pay for imports, commodities whose real prices fall (on coercively liberalised product markets) while the price of fossil energy – the key import - rises. Financial markets are inherently unstable because of the diabolical combination of necessarily incomplete information and herd behaviour.²³ Under conditions of sudden mass exit, currencies collapse, the burden of debt service becomes so ruinous that states have to take it over, and import prices rise, inducing inflation. These conditions require a surge in exports to rectify the financial imbalances, but exports collapse due to both the decline in assets prices and the flight of finance capital.

A new class of poor people is created from among those who saved as well as those made redundant. The global institutions through which finance capital is regulated will bail countries out only on condition they adopt austerity measures which compromise the capacity of the state to help the old or new poor. The result is the proliferation of informalised, subsistence-oriented petty production and trade; threats to the security of property; parallel systems of protection and governance; a reversion to primitive forms of exchange and the development of nonmarket social structures as instruments of economic regulation. The state can protect its population from such crises only by capping interest rates, creating employment and supplying social security. It is unable to do any of this without sovereignty to regulate finance.

Cap → Poverty – Enviro Collapse

Globalization requires fossil fuels for growth which is causing massive waste leading to global warming, killing millions and leaving more in poverty

Harriss-White, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford

University, in '5

[Barbara, "Working Paper Number 134: Poverty and Capitalism", QEH Working Paper Series, December]

7. Environmental destruction and poverty : While in logic it is possible to conceive of capitalism based upon renewable energy, in practice it is path-dependent on fossil energy. The tendency to increase labour productivity requires ever more matter and energy. It produces ever more physical waste and useless forms of energy. Its tendency to concentrate and centralise ownership does not prevent the dispersal of production sites and of waste but development as a process of catch-up is now understood to be a thermodynamic impossibility.²⁴ Indeed the petty commodity forms of capitalism make sense as means by which capital polices its own ecological limits. To see how the general argument pertains to poverty, the analysis of capitalism has to be made concrete and instituted.

There are many ways in which the impact of capitalism on the environment creates poverty. The logic of growth involves the growth of waste. In theory, at the microlevel waste may be made useful, commodified and create employment. There is a literature on waste-pickers and re-cyclers in developing countries which celebrates their social role.²⁵ In practice much waste is uncommodifiable, either by virtue of relative prices or because of its damaging qualities. Such waste will create poverty through its impact on pollution, disease, work and reproductive capacity. It is now beyond doubt that the accumulation of waste gases (admittedly as a part of a global process of industrialisation and of 'heavy agriculture' based on fossil energy - not always under capitalist production relations in the past) is leading to planetary warming and global climate change. Capitalist development in one part of the planet creates disastrous environmental conditions in others far away. Regions producing climate change and regions on the receiving end of its impact may have no material connections through flows of commodities, raw materials, or labour, being connected only by the atmosphere. The trajectory of human beings affected – pauperised – by climate change-related disasters has risen exponentially. These disasters have rapidly become a major cause of forced migration, exceeding the migrations caused by conflict. It is conservatively estimated that one million people were killed outright by drought in part induced by anthropogenic climate change which now takes place under the dynamic of capitalism.

Cap → Poverty – Marginalized Groups

Capitalism seeks to marginalize and eradicate those who are not fit for labor or pose a threat to the system. This systemic process results in widespread poverty.

Harriss-White, Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford

University, in '5

[Barbara, "Working Paper Number 134: Poverty and Capitalism", QEH Working Paper Series, December]

8. Capitalism's deserving and undeserving poor : Capitalism sees the working human being as one which has physical and cognitive capacities compatible with capital's disciplines of production. Those people who are not only unemployed but unemployable by virtue of their culturally defined age (old) dependent status (young, sick, disabled) or reproductive status (pregnant/lactating) are regarded as deserving of dependent status. This dependent status is generally pauperising – and instituted and borne socially in a variety of ways, ranging from state benefits, local alms and social transfers to the unrewarded caring work of female household members. There is no hard division between the capacity to work and to have needs met, as is revealed by the many ways in which disabled people are continually re-classified and work or 'leisure' are incentivised. These do not change according to the demands of labour, they respond to the demand for labour – as Marta Russell and Ravi Malhotra have demonstrated for US conditions. 26 A needs-based response requires a definition of the standard of living for a given definition of the deserving poor, together with fiscal resources to sustain social security and supportive and palliative infrastructure. Such standards may be set for projects of relief by the state at such punitively low levels that 'the poor' self-select, in which case the impact of such relief on labour market prices is minimised. All societies also have a category of person who amounts to a social enemy whom both society and the state endeavour to eliminate, and whom the state often criminalizes and deprives of citizenship. This category of person is context-specific and socially defined. In the UK currently, the asylum-seeker is regarded as unwanted labour and the terrorist is defined as any individual in violent opposition to the state. In India, lepers or survivors of leprosy, people with HIV/AIDS, transgressors of certain social norms, certain kinds of disabled people, certain girl children and those who have forfeited or simply lost their social entitlement to the obligation to support are rendered destitute, left to fend for themselves and/or deliberately eliminated.²⁷ Destitute migrants lack citizenship and are criminalized. They die or exist through predatory exchange (e.g. the sale of the body or its organs). While not all social enemies or homeless people are poor; most are very poor indeed. Their relation to capitalism is not obvious or direct. While in some societies, where the state provides no social security shield, such people act as a discipline on the behaviour of unemployed people, in other circumstances destitution defines the extreme limits of state protection and is used by the state to define and limit the tolerated scope of resistance. It is no good calling for action in the general interest or appealing to the state for a developmental response to destitution, for the general interest consists in eliminating such people.

TERRORISM IMPACTS/A2 HEGEMONY IMPACT TURNS

TERRORISM IS INEVITABLE UNDER CAPITALISM—THE EXPANSION IMPERATIVE MAKES HEGEMONIC FORCE NECESSARY, WHICH CAUSES TERRORIST BACKLASH

Boggs, Professor of Social Science at National University, **2002** [Carl, *Democracy and Nature* 8.2]

The terrorist attacks of **11 September** 2001, destined to strongly influence world politics well into the 21st century, can be understood as part of a larger dialectic linking US militarism and what has become global terrorism. This destructive cycle is likely to deepen as elements of American superpower hegemony—economic, political, cultural and military—become more consolidated, and as the USA continues to pursue its unprecedented and ill-defined war against terrorism. **The goal of US ruling elites is to make the world increasingly accessible to capital investment, free trade and corporate domination while simultaneously closing off viable alternatives to the neoliberal New World Order.** Here **terrorism** in its different manifestations amounts to both a striking back at US empire—what might be seen as an especially virulent form of blowback—and the unintended re legitimization of this empire as it helps to bolster the war economy and security state. **One of the debilitating consequences of the militarism-terrorism cycle is a further closing off of political discourse** in the US in the midst of a resurgent national chauvinism, ideological conformism and militarised culture.

[BOGGS CONTINUES...]

As the war against terrorism continues, therefore, the arrogance of US superpower unilateralism is destined to aggravate the existing Hobbesian global state of nature in which violence, chaos, fear and despair rule as daily features of social life around the world, particularly in the great mega-cities emanating from globalisation. Such a fragile state of nature means that ethical principles no longer apply, that political and legal methods of solving the spread of both militarism and terrorism will be checkmated in an atmosphere of mounting conflict, disorder and mutual blowback. Under these circumstances, '**globalisation**' could readily turn into a nightmarish reality of worldwide civic crisis, social polarisation and local wars where progressive outcomes—assuming lack of a countervailing power to empire—will be more and more difficult to imagine.

THE NEBULOUS THREAT OF TERRORISM IS LESS ABOUT AN ENEMY, AND MORE ABOUT PROVIDING A NEW LOGIC TO MASSIVE U.S. MILITARISM

TERRORISM IMPACTS/A2 HEGEMONY IMPACT TURNS

Dabashi, Professor of Iranian Studies and Comparative Literature at Columbia, 2007 [Hamid, Iran: A People Interrupted, p. 214-217]

There are certain things that power, no matter how super, cannot move. Immobile lighthouses, solid and serene, suggest a modest lesson in humility that commanders of aircraft carriers, and commanders in chief of empires, capable of projecting monumental destructive force, may or may not wish to learn—always at their own peril. This old navy joke resurfaced on the Internet just around December 2005, more than two years into the carnage that the United States had unleashed in Iraq, and its rosy plans to end states, change regimes, promote democracies, and secure lucrative oil deals all went awry. It is said that the United States is the most powerful country on the face of the earth. Despite its power to blow our planet to kingdom come, one must in all modesty question the factual validity of any phrase like that. The entire U.S. military, estimates suggest, comprises only one million people (there are two million prison inmates in the United States, of whom so percent are African Americans, whereas they are only 12.3 percent of the population). Of this force, more than 250,000 soldiers were reportedly deployed in the course of the second Gulf War, which pretty much tied up the entire global capability of the U.S. military. Despite the presence of substantial U.S. forces in South Korea, North Korea flaunted its alleged capability to manufacture (or continue to manufacture) nuclear warheads, and there was little that President Bush could do, since a credible military response would have required disengaging from Iraq and Afghanistan first.

All evidence suggests that this notion of "al Qaeda" that the United States is projecting has scarcely anything to do with the actual organization operative somewhere in a proverbial Afghan cave. In reality, al Qaeda seems to be more like a blueprint of a global guerrilla operation that gives the Pentagon a pretext to reconfigure its military forces to engage in a U.S. version of a "counterterrorist" guerrilla operation. Al Qaeda is presented by the United States as a shadowy organization that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent, one that can strike anywhere, anytime, and with deadly and unpredictable consequences. This also describes how the United States wishes to project its own military power around the globe. The United States may indeed have the military power and political wherewithal to do so, but the world that that deadly power ultimately faces is really a lighthouse that cannot be moved or shoved around at will. Yet the United States persists in believing that it can not only advance its military and political objectives against other nations and their collective will to resist imperial tyranny but also ignore the environmental catastrophe that now threatens the planet. The United States may foolishly refuse to sign the Kyoto agreement, for to do so might derail its plans for global economic domination. But when the ozone thins even more, and the greenhouse effect accelerates, and the polar ice caps begin to melt even faster, there isn't any bunker in Camp David that can hold 265 million Americans and their SUVs. There may be enough room in it to offer safe haven to the entire regiment of neocons, but alas they will have no world left to rule. The Project for the New American Century will be rendered pointless if we come to the real "end of history."

ECOLOGY IMPACTS/A2 LEWIS IMPACT TURNS

THE DESTRUCTIVE CREATIVITY OF CAPITALISM MAKES ECO-COLLAPSE AND EXTINCTION INEVITABLE.

Foster, Professor of Sociology at Oregon, 2007 [John Bellamy, Monthly Review, February, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0207jbf.htm>]

My intention here is not of course to recount Pontecorvo's entire extraordinary film, but to draw out some important principles from this allegory that will help us to understand capitalism's relation to nature. Joseph Schumpeter once famously praised capitalism for its "creative destruction."² But this might be better seen as the system's destructive creativity. Capital's endless pursuit of new outlets for class-based accumulation requires for its continuation the destruction of both pre-existing natural conditions and previous social relations. Class exploitation, imperialism, war, and ecological devastation are not mere unrelated accidents of history but interrelated, intrinsic features of capitalist development. There has always been the danger, moreover, that this destructive creativity would turn into what István Mészáros has called the "destructive uncontrollability" that is capital's ultimate destiny. The destruction built into the logic of profit would then take over and predominate, undermining not only the conditions of production but also those of life itself. Today it is clear that such destructive uncontrollability has come to characterize the entire capitalist world economy, encompassing the planet as a whole.³ The Earth Summits: 1992 and 2002 It is a characteristic of our age that global ecological devastation seems to overwhelm all other problems, threatening the survivability of life on earth as we know it.

How this is related to social causes and what social solutions might be offered in response have thus become the most pressing questions facing humanity. The world has so far convened two major earth summits: in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992 and Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002. These summits took place a mere ten years apart. Yet, they can be seen as lying in the dividing line separating one historical period from another, revealing the contradictions of an entire century—the twenty-first. The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, organized by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, represented the boundless hope that humanity could come together to solve its mounting global ecological problems. The late 1980s and early 1990s were a period in which the global ecological crisis penetrated the public consciousness. Suddenly there were grave concerns about the destruction of the ozone layer, global warming, and the rising rate of species extinctions resulting from planetary destruction of ecosystems. In June 1988 James Hansen, Director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, testified before the U.S. Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, presenting evidence of global warming due to the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. That same year the United Nations set up a new international organization, the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to address global warming. A new ideology of world unity pervaded the Rio summit. The Gulf War of 1991 and the demise of the Soviet Union later in the same year had given rise to the then dominant rhetoric of a "new world order" and of "the end of history." The world, it was said, was now one. The recent passage of the Montreal Protocol, placing restrictions on the production of ozone-depleting chemicals, seemed to confirm that the world's economically dominant countries could act in unison in response to global environmental threats. The site chosen for the Earth Summit, Brazil, home to the Amazon, was meant to symbolize the planetary goal of saving the world's biodiversity. The summit's principal document, known as Agenda 21, was intended to launch a new age of sustainable development for the twenty-first century. The mood of the second earth summit, the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, could not have been more

different than the first. Rio's hope had given way to Johannesburg's dismay. Rather than improving over the decade that had elapsed, the world environment had experienced accelerated decline. The planet was approaching catastrophic conditions, not just with respect to global warming, but in a host of other areas. Sustainable development had turned out to be about sustaining capital accumulation at virtually any ecological cost. All the rhetoric ten years earlier of a "new world order" and the "end of history"—it was now clear to many of the environmentalists attending the Johannesburg summit—had simply disguised the fact that the real nemesis of the global environment was the capitalist world economy. The site of the Johannesburg summit had been chosen partly to symbolize the end of apartheid, and hence the advent of significant world social progress. Yet, critics at the second earth summit raised the issue of global ecological apartheid, emphasizing the destruction wrought on the environment by the rich nations of the North in ways that disproportionately affected the global South. The ecological imperialism of the center of the capitalist world economy was symbolized by Washington's refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on limiting greenhouse gas emissions generating global warming. Significantly, U.S. President George W. Bush declined to attend the earth summit. Instead, at the very moment that debates were taking place in Johannesburg on the future of the world ecology, the Bush administration seized the world's stage by threatening a war on Iraq, ostensibly over weapons of mass destruction—though to the world's environmentalists assembled in Johannesburg it was clear even then that the real issue was oil.⁴ In fact, a new historical period had emerged in the ten years since the Rio summit. Economically, the world had witnessed what Paul

Sweezy in 1994 called "the triumph of financial capitalism" with the transformation of monopoly capital into what might be called global monopoly-finance capital.⁵ By the end of the twentieth century capitalism had evolved into a system that was if anything more geared to rapacious accumulation than ever before, relatively independent from its local and national roots. Global financial expansion was occurring on top of a world economy that was stagnating at the level of production, creating a more unstable and more viciously inequitable order, dominated by neoliberal economics and financial bubbles. Declining U.S. hegemony in the world system, coupled with the demise of the Soviet Union, induced repeated and increasingly naked U.S. attempts to restore its economic and political power by military means. Meanwhile, global warming and other crucial environmental problems had crossed critical thresholds. The question was no longer whether ecological and social catastrophes awaited but how great these would be. For those (including myself) in Johannesburg in 2002, watching the U.S. president prepare for war in the petroleum-rich Persian Gulf while the planet was heating up from the burning of fossil fuels, the whole world seemed on fire. The Destruction of the Planet In the almost five years that have elapsed since the second earth summit it has become increasingly difficult to separate the class and imperial war inherent to capitalism from war on the planet itself. At a time when the United States is battling for imperial control of the richest oil region on earth, the ecology of

ECOLOGY IMPACTS/A2 LEWIS IMPACT TURNS

the planet is experiencing rapid deterioration, marked most dramatically by global warming.
Meanwhile, neoliberal economic restructuring emanating from the new regime of monopoly-finance
capital is not only undermining the economic welfare of much of humanity, but in some regions is
removing such basic ecological conditions of human existence as access to clean air, drinkable water,
and adequate food. Ecologists who once warned of the possibility of future apocalypse now insist that
global disaster is on our doorstep.

A2 CAP KEY TO TECH

Callinicos '04 [Alex, Director of the Centre for European Studies at King's College, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, 2004 pg. 175-176]

Within the framework of capitalist relations of production these changes take an antagonistic form—unemployment for many workers, speed-up for those left on the job, the ‘deskilling’ of craft labour. But they create the potential for a society in which the drudgery of heavy, repetitive manual labour has been abolished, in which people are no longer tied daily to many hours of backbreaking and boring physical work. The resulting reduction of the working week to a fraction of its present length—hotly resisted by capitalists because it would reduce their profits—would free people to develop their intellectual powers and physical skills. In communist society, thanks to the development of the productive forces and their subjection to common social control, many of the Utopian socialists’ dreams would become reality. As Fourier had anticipated, the barrier between ‘work’ and ‘play’ could be broken down—labour for the sake of physical survival and labour for sheer enjoyment’s sake would no longer be separated from, and opposed to each other. Engels argued that the antithesis between town and country would also be abolished, with the establishment of communes like those advocated by Fourier and Robert Owen in which both agriculture and industry would be carried on. The development of new forms of technology in recent years requiring decentralised units of production linked together by advanced communications systems has made such arrangements more feasible. Marx emphasised that all this depended on the development of the productive forces: The realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production... Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true end of freedom, which can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its basic prerequisite (C iii 820). Communism thus both drastically reduces the burden of extracting a living from nature, freeing us for other pursuits, and subjects the labour process, ‘the realm of necessity’, to rational and collective control. In Engels’ words, ‘it is humanity’s leap from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom’ (AD 336).

Alternative – Communist Ethics

Negri, Marxist philosopher, in '9

[Antonio, "Communism: some thoughts on the concept and practice", March 14,
http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm]

4) What is a communist ethics? As we have seen, it is an ethics of struggle against the State because it moves from the indignation towards subjection and the refusal of exploitation. On the node of indignation and refusal lies the second element of the definition of a communist ethics, which is that of militance and the common construction of struggle against exclusion and poverty, alienation and exploitation.

These two elements (struggle and common militance) already open onto a new plane: that of a whole of singularities that, withdrawing from solitude, work to make themselves multitude - a multitude that looks for the common against privacy. Does this mean to achieve a democracy? For almost three centuries we have conceived of democracy as the administration of the public good, the institutionalisation of the state appropriation of the common. If we seek democracy today, we need to radically rethink it as the common management of the common. This management entails a redefinition of (cosmopolitan) space and (constituent) temporality. It is no longer the case of defining the form of a social contract where everything is everyone's and thus belongs to no one: everything, as it is produced by everyone, belongs to all.

This shift will only occur in the name of organisation. The whole history of the communist movements regarded the issue of organisation as fundamental, because organisation is a collective-being-against, a principle of institution, and thus the very essence of making-multiplicity. The facts of the crisis of neoliberalism, the cultures of individualism, the natural refusal of solitude of human beings who are born and grow up in society, the recognition that solitude is death, manifest themselves as an organisation of resistance against the new reduction to solitude that, in individualist morality, capital tries to re-impose upon subjects.

The first three elements of a communist ethics are: revolt against the State, common militance, and production of institutions. Clearly these are traversed by two fundamental passions: the passion that pushes from natural neediness and economic poverty towards a power of labour and science freed from capital's command; and the passion of love that from the refusal of solitude leads to the political constitution of the common (unsurprisingly religion, bourgeois aesthetics and all new age ideologies try to recuperate, mystify and neutralise these passions). By coming together, developing new forms of common coexistence in resistance and organisation the constituent power of communism is invented. This concept of constituent power has nothing to do with the constitutional structures that capital and its State have organised. At this point, the power [potenza] of labour power, the invention of the multitude and the constituent expression of the proletariat on the one hand and capitalist power, the disciplinary arrogance of the bourgeoisie and the repressive vocation of the State on the other are not homologous. Because the constituent ethics of communism runs much deeper and invests the biopolitical dimension of historical reproduction, and as class struggle makes historical being, it is now going to spread inside the determinations of our age onto the whole set of biopolitical dispositifs. Here communist ethics touches upon the great issues of life (and of death) and takes on the character of great dignity when it appears as the generous and creative articulation of the power [potenza] of the poor and the common desire for love, equality and solidarity.

We have now come to the point where the idea of a practice of 'use-value' re-emerges. This use-value is no longer outside but inside the history made by struggles. It is no longer a remembrance of nature or the reflection of a presumed origin, nor an instance in time or an event of perception, but an expression, a language and a practice.

Finally, under no circumstances is it an identity, a reflection on the concrete characters assumed as the point of the insertion in a universal, but a mixture, a communal, multitudinal, hybrid and mongrel construction, the overcoming of everything that was otherwise known as identity in the dark

Alternative – Communist Ethics

centuries that precede us. The man emerging out of this ethics is a multicoloured Orpheus, a poverty that history returns to us as wealth rather than origin, as desire to-come rather than misery. This is the new use-value: the common . Our existence signals a series of common conditions that we keep wanting to emancipate by withdrawing them from capitalist alienation and State command. Use-value is the newly acquired form of the technical composition of labour, as well as the common political dispositif that lies at the foundation of the practices of constitution of the world in history. The new use-value consists in these dispositifs of the common that are opening up new paths for the organisation of struggle and the forces of destruction of capitalist command and exploitation.

THE ALTERNATIVE SOLVES- CAPITALISM IS FAILING TO INDIVIDUATE THE MULTITUDE AND CREATING CRISIS-LEVEL ANTAGONISM.

Antonio **Negri**, former professor of state theory @ University of Purdua. Trans. Noura Wedell. The Porcelain Workshop. 2008. p. 44-5.

We have now arrived before a new definition of capital as crisis. From the point of view of constant capital, such a capitalist relation seems completely parasitical. We have also arrived where antagonisms that involve the production of subjectivity and the expression of living work might be recomposed. In the following sessions, we shall explore how a new theorization of the crisis of capital has become necessary.

We started out by trying to circumscribe the notions of biopower, biopolitics, discipline, and control. We must now address the notion of multitude. In fact, the entire analysis we are developing is meant to constitute the presupposition of that notion. As a provisional point of reference to be further elaborated and modified, let us propose the following definition. The concept of multitude follows from the relation between a constitutive form (of singularity, of invention, of risk, to which the entire transformation of labor and the new measure of temporality lead) and a practice of power (the destructive tendency of labor-value that capital must today enforce). But while capital used to be able to reduce the multiplicity of singularities to something organic and unitary (a class, a people, a mass, a collection), this process no longer functions. The multitude must necessarily be thought of as a nonorganic, differential and powerful (puissante) multiplicity.

The Multitude Alt

— The novelty of Empire is that it creates a radical potential of revolution. The masses of exploited and subjugated created by the system already provide the force that is opposed to Empire We must act as part of the multitude

Hardt and Negri, nsurgents and social theorists, in 2000

[Michael and Antonio, Empire, pg. 411-413]

Imperial power can no longer resolve the conflict of social forces through mediatory schemata that displace the terms of conflict. The social conflicts that constitute the political confront one another directly, without mediations of any sort. This is the essential novelty of the imperial situation. Empire creates a greater potential for revolution than did the modern regimes of power because it presents us, alongside the machine of command, with an alternative: the set of all the exploited and the subjugated, a multitude that is directly opposed to Empire, with no mediation between them. At this point, then, as Augustine says, our task is to discuss, to the best of our powers, “the rise, the development and the destined ends of the two cities . . . which we find . . . interwoven . . . and mingled with one another.”¹ Now that we have dealt extensively with Empire, we should focus directly on the multitude and its potential political power. We need to investigate specifically how the multitude can become a political subject in the context of Empire. We can certainly recognize the existence of the multitude from the standpoint of the constitution of Empire, but from that perspective the multitude might appear to be generated and sustained by imperial command. In the new postmodern Empire there is no Emperor Caracalla who grants citizenship to all his subjects and thereby forms the multitude as a political subject. The formation of the multitude of exploited and subjugated producers can be read more clearly in the history of twentieth-century revolutions. Between the communist revolutions of 1917 and 1949, the great anti-fascist struggles of the 1930s and 1940s, and the numerous liberation struggles of the 1960s up to those of 1989, the conditions of the citizenship of the multitude were born, spread, and consolidated. Far from being defeated, the revolutions of the twentieth century have each pushed forward and transformed the terms of class conflict, posing the conditions of a new political subjectivity, an insurgent multitude against imperial power. The rhythm that the revolutionary movements have established is the beat of a new *aetas*, a new maturity and metamorphosis of the times. The constitution of Empire is not the cause but the consequence of the rise of these new powers. It should be no surprise, then, that Empire, despite its efforts, finds it impossible to construct a system of right adequate to the new reality of the globalization of social and economic relations. This impossibility (which served as the point of departure for our argument in Section 1.1) is not due to the wide extension of the field of regulation; nor is it simply the result of the difficult passage from the old system of international public law to the new imperial system. This impossibility is explained instead by the revolutionary nature of the multitude, whose struggles have produced Empire as an inversion of its own image and who now represents on this new scene an uncontrollable force and an excess of value with respect to every form of right and law. To confirm this hypothesis, it is sufficient to look at the contemporary development of the multitude and dwell on the vitality of its present expressions. When the multitude works, it produces autonomously and reproduces the entire world of life. Producing and reproducing autonomously mean constructing a new ontological reality. In effect, by working, the multitude produces itself as singularity. It is a singularity that establishes a new place in the non-place of Empire, a singularity that is a reality produced by cooperation, represented by the linguistic community, and developed by the movements of hybridization. The multitude affirms its singularity by inverting the ideological illusion that all humans on the global surfaces of the world market are interchangeable. Standing the ideology of the market on its feet, the multitude promotes through its labor the biopolitical singularizations of groups and sets of humanity, across each and every node of global interchange. Class struggles and revolutionary processes of the past undermined the political powers of nations and peoples. The

The Multitude Alt

revolutionary preamble that has been written from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries has prepared the new subjective configuration of labor that comes to be realized today. Cooperation and communication throughout the spheres of biopolitical production define a new productive singularity. The multitude is not formed simply by throwing together and mixing nations and peoples indifferently; it is the singular power of a *new city*. One might object at this point, with good reason, that all this is still not enough to establish the multitude as a properly political subject, nor even less as a subject with the potential to control its own destiny. This objection, however, does not present an insuperable obstacle, because the revolutionary past, and the contemporary cooperative productive capacities through which the anthropological characteristics of the multitude are continually transcribed and reformulated, cannot help revealing a telos, a material affirmation of liberation. In the ancient world Plotinus faced something like this situation: “Let us flee then to the beloved Fatherland”: this is the soundest counsel . . . The Fatherland to us is There whence we have come, and There is the Father. What then is our course, what the manner of our flight? This is not a journey for the feet; the feet bring us only from land to land; nor need you think of a coach or ship to carry you away; all this order of things you must set aside and refuse to see: you must close the eyes and call instead upon another vision which is to be waked within you, a vision, the birth-right of all, which few turn to use.² This is how ancient mysticism expressed the new telos. The multitude today, however, resides on the imperial surfaces where there is no God the Father and no transcendence. Instead there is our immanent labor. The teleology of the multitude is theurgical; it consists in the possibility of directing technologies and production toward its own joy and its own increase of power. The multitude has no reason to look outside its own history and its own present productive power for the means necessary to lead toward its constitution as a political subject. A material mythology of reason thus begins to be formed, and it is constructed in the languages, technologies, and all the means that constitute the world of life. It is a material religion of the senses that separates the multitude from every residue of sovereign power and from every “long arm” of Empire. The mythology of reason is the symbolic and imaginative articulation that allows the ontology of the multitude to express itself as activity and consciousness. The mythology of languages of the multitude interprets the telos of an *earthly city*, torn away by the power of its own destiny from any belonging or subjection to a *city of God*, which has lost all honor and legitimacy. To the metaphysical and transcendent mediations, to the violence and corruption are thus opposed the absolute constitution of labor and cooperation, the earthly city of the multitude.

ALTERNATIVE SOLVENCY

OBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE IS IMPOSSIBLE- REALITY IS DEFINED BY BIOPOLITICAL FASHIONING OF OUR PERCEPTION. YOU MUST TAKE A LEAP OF FAITH AWAY FROM SYSTEMIC OPPRESSION.

Antonio **Negri**, former professor of state theory @ University of Purdua. Trans. Noura Wedell. The Porcelain Workshop. 2008. p. 15-6.

From this point of view, Nietzsche offers an impure and ambiguous reading, that both opens and closes the relation between the reality and ideality of power while always maintaining the latter's transcendence. If Nietzsche's interpretation of the world is pessimistic, if nature must acknowledge the waste of its possibilities and history the destruction of its powers, it is because reality must henceforth- and precisely in a "realistic" manner- bend to the logical necessities of the management and reproduction of power. Inside the Platonic cave, the world appears a relativised shadow that can only be understood by domination. In Weber's liberal and functional perspective on power, the concept of the political is constructed from above, through closure and through necessity: from above because power is transcendent; through closure because power, inasmuch as it is One, by definition excludes all differences; through necessity, for it cannot be otherwise. As we shall show, this perspective anticipates the idea of biopower Foucault starts developing in the 1970s. The three modalities of the construction of political power listed above could very well apply to the political permeation of life by the state, and more generally, to the micropower network crisscrossing the totality of what determines our existence. In both cases, in Weber and in the Foucauldian analysis of biopower, we are confronted with power as a homologized and homologizing figure. But, contrary to Weber, Foucault does not rest there. If we analyze Carl Schmitt, we are faced, paradoxically enough, with a concept quite analogous to Max Weber's. From this point of view, it is very difficult to identify the first as a democratic thinker and the second as a totalitarian one. Both confuse the theoretical definition of power with the subjective dimension that should define it. Schmitt and Weber differ on the terrain of constitutional theory, but are quite close in terms of political theory. Schmitt also conceives of politics as mystical and theological. Without Weber's Kantian transcendental cover, his power is simply a drastic reduction of ethics to politics. He makes no distinction between an ethics of conviction and one of responsibility; rather, there is a totalitarian flow linking one to the other. As many contemporary writers from Foucault to Agamben have demonstrated, biopower (power's pervasion of the totality of life) and totalitarianism (perversion of the totality of life by the state) operate on a shared terrain, at least partially. German law created a monster within the European constitutional theories of what Foucault would much later qualify as biopolitical. Biopower as totalitarianism: the result of nineteenth and twentieth century struggles, the construction of welfare, the social dimension of consensus have all been absorbed by the totality of the state. National Socialism is the dramatic fulfillment of this figure, and politics is, for Carl Schmitt, the space of its reality. For Schmitt, power is in fact a sort of totalitarian panopticon: each citizen lives inside the living God, the panopticon becomes pantheism. Unlike a panoptic system, however, this living God must also define outcasts: these are precisely outcasts from life, those whose life will soon be declared worthless. Aufhebung, the dialectical resolution of this process- leaving behind those whose life is worthless- translates as the expansion of living space and corresponds to what we would call Nation Building today. Once again, an alleged universal construction, in reality subjects its citizens... Such is the good work of the reactionary mole.

ALTERNATIVES

THE ALTERNATIVE IS THE REJECTION OF REFORM AND THE CREATION OF A COLLECTIVE SUBJECT IN OPPOSITION TO GLOBAL CAPITALISM. WE CANNOT WAIT FOR THE REVOLUTION- STATUS QUO TRANSITION TO NONECONOMIC RELATIONS OF SOLIDARITY MUST BE ACCELERATED. REJECT THE AFFIRMATIVE- CAPITALISM CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO FIX ITSELF.

El Kilombo Intergaláctico, actual communist collective based in Durham North Carolina. “The Fourth, the Sixth, the Other, and US” <<http://inthemiddleofthewhirlwind.wordpress.com/15/>>. 2007.

We could also look at this history in terms of its symbolic icons: the fire, the word, the silence, and the “other.” The fire refers to the uprising and the twelve days of fighting in January of 1994, as well as to the subsequent ceasefire called by the Zapatistas in response to the massive public support and plea for an end to the fighting. The word refers to the dialogues, formally referencing the peace talks with the government, but also, and more importantly the Zapatistas have said, to their process of getting to know “civil society” through meetings, communiqués, letters, and the global traffic in and out of the Zapatista communities. The silence refers the years after the government betrayal of the peace accords with a bad faith counter-reform (2001), when the Zapatistas refused further conversation with those “above,” entered a period of public silence, and set about implementing the accords “in practice.” That is, they decided they would no longer ask or wait for their rights to be granted, and would instead continue with the process of constructing autonomy in their everyday lives themselves. They thus set about the creation of a system of autonomous governing councils, autonomous health and education programs, an autonomous judicial system, and what has resulted in a system of new social relations based on collective production, assembly decision-making, and direct democratic self-governance.

Or, in yet another way of looking at this history, we witness the expanding list of peoples and groups with whom the Zapatistas have met and begun to know, adding each time not just to their list of allies but to their network from and for “below”: students, workers, teachers, housewives, gays and lesbians, other indigenous groups, children, the elderly, religious laypeople who work with those below, artists, musicians, intellectuals, political prisoners, migrants, transvestites, transgender people, punks, goths, skateboarders, sexworkers, and so on.

It is out of this context that the Sixth arises: announcing that, having done an analysis of the world, of the national situation, of global capitalism and of their local conditions, and having carried out a referendum throughout all Zapatista territory to come to an agreement on this next step, they had decided that: 1) due to the continuing process of primitive accumulation, total destruction was imminent, not just of the Lacandón Jungle and the Zapatista communities, but of the global environment and human living conditions in general. Capitalism was destroying everything for short-term profit, they declared, and that it would stop nowhere, it would eat its own to continue the process; 2) that what they wanted, they could not obtain alone, nor was what they wanted just for themselves; and 3) that to do what they proposed in the Sixth Declaration was to risk everything they have gained in the past decade of struggle, but to do nothing was to lose for sure. And so they would come out of the jungle, unarmed, out of the clandestinity and protection provided by a guerrilla existence in the mountains, to meet and organize with the rest of civil society, to, in short, peacefully overturn the entire system of government and destroy capitalism, to remake politics and change the world.

On a national level this would take the form of the Other Campaign, a project to create a national anticapitalist program of struggle, nonviolent, non-electoral, from and for below, to create a new “nation” and a new way of doing politics. On the international level it would take the form of the intergalactic—a planetary network of struggle, highly organized but highly autonomous.

The Sixth Declaration gave an account of Zapatista history somewhat like we have done above—a process not only of fighting for their own rights and demands, of battle and dialogue with the

ALTERNATIVES

government, of construction and rebellion in their own communities, but of a process of meeting other sectors of society, of learning to know other struggles, of learning to respect and to demand respect from the “other.” In the Sixth Declaration the Zapatistas announced that as a consequence of this process, “we couldn’t see and hear all that was happening on our planet and remain quiet, as if it we are only here where we’re at.” For Zapatismo this means that today Iraq is in southeast Mexico, Chiapas is on the US-Mexico border, Palestine is everywhere. The project to connect struggles would be not just a strategy of mutual support and solidarity between groups, but a project to create a new “we,” a collective subject from “below” capable of acting in cooperation beyond previously acknowledged borders that today function only to separate “us.” Included in this new subject are all those who are “humble, simple, dignified, and rebellious.”

Methodologically, the Other Campaign would start with the sending out of a Zapatista delegate to visit, traveling by land, each of the 32 states of the Mexican Republic, in addition to three meetings on the US-Mexico border to meet with people from “the other side” – the US. This was the work of Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, and this was the process undertaken throughout 2006. These meetings were not typically big public events in big cities; the Zapatista delegation traveled where people lived and worked: to the most remote corners of the mountains, the desert, the plains, the forests, the coasts, to indigenous communities, squatter’s colonies, anarchist squats, to the red light districts to meet with sex-workers, to rural high schools to meet with students, to jails to meet with prisoners. These meetings were a great exercise in listening, not simply letting people talk, but creating the space for their words to be heard. Two or 200 participants, the Zapatista delegation listened to every single one. There is no shortcut to creating a new “we,” they said repeatedly, other than to listen to each other. After this initial journey, more commanders of the Zapatista army left Chiapas to meet other sectors and other struggles and continue the process of creating a national network of struggle.

There are two important trajectories of this process that we can point to as central to the process of building this new “we” of, from, and for below. One is the process of becoming united without becoming the same. The history of attempts by the left to unite struggles or create national or international level organizations have been characterized, and usually derailed, by structures and ideologies of the necessity of a vanguard to guide the masses, or the need for a united “people” to lend support and legitimacy to a leader, or the inevitable process whereby peasants give way to proletariat or social movements become political party base, in general the necessity to suppress internal differences in the interest of making a common front to face the enemy. If there was one theme that was most repeated throughout the Other Campaign by the Zapatistas it was this: we do not ask you to be like us, we ask you to be with us; we are not looking for followers, we are looking for comrades; the only thing that makes us the same is that we are all different.

The second aspect is to learn to know the “other,” to create a process of talking, and more importantly listening, that turns the category “other” from something marginal into something universal. That is, the “other” becomes each difference, self-valued and autonomous, among us, rather than measures of deviation from a norm. This was perhaps the conceptualization that most resonated across “civil society,” taking on fluctuating and transformative meanings where the “other” of “(An)Other world is possible” and the “Other Campaign” became an impetus for an “other” education, an “other” media, an “other” communication, an “other” sexuality, etc. The “todos somos Marcos” (We are all Marcos!) chanted by the Zapatista communities in 1994 was transformed into the “tod@s somos OTR@S” (We are all Others!) chanted by the transsexual community, adherents of the Sixth Declaration, in Oaxaca City, 2006.

The process of becoming “other” is not something figurative in the Other Campaign, it is a concrete process. There really was no trick for doing this new “othering” than actually sitting and listening, for

ALTERNATIVES

hours and hours, to how the transsexual community identifies neoliberalism in Oaxaca City, and how the landless peasants live neoliberalism on its outskirts. And in this process, it was not just the Zapatistas that listened to each struggle, but each group began to hear the others, and a network of knowledge began to form in which farmers, street vendors, students, and housewives knew each other's problems, persecutions, and perspectives. These are not easy tasks, and it is sometimes only when one is sitting in an assembly of the communist party and the anarchist collectives of Saltillo, Coahuila, or in a meeting of Oaxacan indigenous farmers and Oaxaca City cross-dressers, that you begin to see that when there is no prescription to follow, when, as the Zapatistas have always said, there is no road where we want to go, when one is offered various paths in life and doesn't like any of them, the rebellious do not pick, they start building a new one.

The new path being constructed in the Other Campaign starts here then, with a new "we" composed of all those from "below." But "below" is not a term for victims, nor is it a term for an opposition; it is not the counterpart to, or the consequence of, "above." It is an affirmative organization, a political project, a new way of composing community. The Other Campaign thus was not about drawing masses of people into a centralized organization, but rather building, one encounter at a time, networks of communities that know each other and work together, that would in turn form alternative communication networks, exchange systems, information circuits, routes of knowledge and resources, and eventually, alternative institutions run by the same communities, what amounts to, at bottom, another society. Such a project makes one thing very clear: we cannot wait for this system or this society to fall before we begin to create a new one.

COMMONS ALT SOLVENCY

Rearticulating the discourse of the commons is necessary to fight the most recent advance of capital into agriculture – what's important is less the achievement of commons themselves and more the workings towards a *discourse of the commons*

Massimo **De Angelis** ‘3 Lecturer, University of East London “Reflections on alternatives, commons and communities”
<http://www.commoner.org.uk/deangelis06.pdf>

This piece proposes an argument for the development of a **new political discourse** based on two main coordinates, **commons and communities**. Commons suggest alternative, noncommodified means to fulfill social needs, e.g. to obtain social wealth and to organise social production. Commons are necessarily created and sustained by communities, i.e. by social networks of mutual aid, solidarity, and practices of human exchange that are not reduced to the market form. The “place” of these networks does not need to be tied to locality, but communities can operate both in local and through trans-local places. Also, as our movements have shown, communities cannot be separated from the learning practices of direct democracy, horizontality, participation and inclusiveness that are the power to decide what are the goals and modalities of social production. It is argued that the **identification of commons** and communities as the main strategic horizon for a new political discourse emerge out of the practices of the current transnational movement for global justice and solidarity taken as a whole. There are two main reasons why it is important to become aware of these practices and turn them into **founding elements** of a new political discourse. First, because this opens up the space to develop strategic perspectives to win commons and strengthen communities, as they apply in whatever concrete situations. Second, because they make it possible to raise debates not only about the aims of the different concrete struggles, but especially how to articulate these aims across different issues and subjects.

A discourse of the commons must be founded on a resistance of enclosures – the struggle must be marked by the ‘space’ of this resistance.

Massimo **De Angelis** ‘4 Lecturer, University of East London, *Historical Materialism*, volume 12:2 (57–87) “Separating the Doing and the Deed”

However, we must be fully aware of the implications of this discourse on commons. As we have seen, since commons emerge out of a relational social field, they are defined in **opposition to enclosures**. In other words, just as capital’s drive for accumulation must identify a common as limit for its expansion and thus outline strategies of new enclosures,⁶⁷ so the building of alternatives to capital must identify a strategic space in which current enclosures are limiting the development of new commons. To be able to identify, so to speak, ‘them’ as the limit of ‘our’ project would be a great strength, a strength that is based on processes of political recomposition and constitution of projects that pose the concrete question of alternatives here and now, and not in a distant future. In other words, life despite capitalism and not life after capitalism. How can we politically invert capital’s strategies and identify enclosures as limits for non-market social interactions and as a strategic space for new commons? This is the true strategic challenge faced by the many articulations of today’s global justice and solidarity movement. As I have argued elsewhere, to be viable and desirable, a process for the definition and constitution of alternatives requires nothing less than participatory, inclusive and democratic forms of organisation that found their political practice on formulating and addressing questions such as ‘What do we want?’, ‘How do we go about getting it?’ and ‘Who is “we”?’. ⁶⁸ Raising and addressing these naïve questions as part of our political practice implies that we participate in the production of a discursive inversion of the ‘ordinary run of things’, and the opening up of the many spaces for alternatives and the problematisation of their articulation.

COMMONS ALT SOLVENCY

The production of commons is a struggle against enclosures – this is struggle is most important in the commodification of land and food.

Massimo **De Angelis** ‘4 Lecturer, University of East London, *Historical Materialism*, volume 12:2 (57–87) “Separating the Doing and the Deed”

In the context of contemporary dynamics, the many types of ‘new enclosures’⁴⁶ are defined through both of these two processes of identification. Enclosures are identified both by processes of commodification and by processes of decommmodification; by strategies that go under the name, for example, of ‘privatisation’; or by class strategies that roll enclosures back through practices that produce commons and reinvent communities. In the first case, they include attacks on conditions of life by a World Bank-funded dam in India threatening hundred of thousands of farming communities; cuts in social spending to pay for servicing international debt in a country of the global South; cuts in social expenditures in the UK threatening hundreds of thousands of families. In the second case, as in St George’s Hill during the English Civil War,⁴⁷ or currently in Brazil in the waves of land occupations,⁴⁸ or in the de facto mass illegal bypassing of intellectual property rights in music and software production and the establishment of ‘creative commons’, it is possible to identify enclosures as an external limit, posed by capital, to the production of commons. It is this barrier that political and social movements need to overcome through the **production of commons**, and often this production is the result of practices of civil disobedience and direct action, rather than of traditional party politics. Also, it is clear that these productions of commons, in the context in which capital aims at pervading the entire social field, are at the same time **struggles against enclosures**. The awareness and de facto identification of enclosures thus arises either because the **production of commons problematises existing established property rights** (as past enclosures), or because the struggles to defend commons established in the past problematise the threat of **new enclosures attempted by states**. In other words, the extent to which we are aware of enclosures is the extent to which we are confronted by them. In all other social interactions still rooted in commons of different types (take, for example, language), in commons that are not immediately threatened by enclosures, we live our lives undisturbed. Here, we are only preoccupied by the question of how we relate to each other within these commons (say, how do we speak to each other), and not whether the ‘what’ that constitutes the material basis of this ‘how’ is a common or not. We take that for granted. As we have seen, there is a vast critical literature on processes of privatisation, marketisation, cuts in entitlements both North and South, effects of structural adjustment policies, biopiracy, intellectual property rights, resource privatisation, and so on. However, not much effort has been devoted to pulling together these and other types of enclosures into a coherent whole, rooted in a critique of capital. The broad picture which I present derives from an understanding of the role of enclosure from a capitalist-systemic point of view, that is from the role which enclosures play in the accumulation of surplus-value by capital (the M-C-M’ process). From this perspective, all these different types of enclosures, and the consequent enclosure strategies, share a common character: the forcible separation of people from whatever access to social wealth they have which is not mediated by competitive markets and money as capital. Where such access exists, it empowers people in that it gives them a degree of autonomy and independence from the corporate sharks of the world economy and from competitive market relations. New enclosures thus are directed towards the fragmentation and destruction of ‘commons’, that is, social spheres of life whose main characteristic is to provide various degrees of protection from the market.

COMMONS ALT SOLVENCY

— The political discourse of the commons solves – articulating the power of individuals to reclaim the commons is all that is necessary. It's not a question of mass revolution or consciousness shifting – the alternative merely points out the ability of any enclosed space to *be a commons*.

Massimo De Angelis '3 Lecturer, University of East London "Reflections on alternatives, commons and communities"
<http://www.commoner.org.uk/deangelis06.pdf>

This movement has posed the question of a plurality of "alternatives" to the social processes and arrangements that produce the horrors of modern global capital. In order to take the many calls for and practices of alternatives seriously, we have to make them relevant to the real people at the fringe or outside the movement. In other words, we want to move from movement to society not so much by persuading people to "join" our movement, but through a language and a political practice that by tracing the connections between diverse practices attempts to dissolve the distinctions between inside and outside the movement, i.e., actually moves 'from movement to society'. To make the possibility of a new world that contains many worlds an actuality, we have to be able to shape our own discourse in such a way as to echo the needs and aspirations coming from below. We have to give coherence to their plurality, without imposing a model or reiterating dead ideologies. We need a discourse that helps to articulate the many alternatives that spring out of the points of crises of neoliberal capital, which seriously threaten to dispossess people of their livelihood and impose on them new or more intensified commodified patterns of life. We need a discourse that builds on the plurality of the many concrete struggles and their methods and help us to articulate a vision – not a plan – of the whole. Then we can better evaluate what are the global implications of our local struggles, as well as the local implications of global struggles for the building of a world that contains many worlds. But most of all, we need a discourse that recognizes the power we have to shape alternatives, at every level in society, that sets out from the simple fact that, contrarily to common belief, alternatives do exist, are everywhere and plural. To clarify, I think that every social node, that is every individual or network of individuals is a bearer of alternatives. This is evident not only when struggles erupt in any of the waged or unwaged local and trans-local nodes of social production. We just need to look around in the relative normality of daily routines to see that every social node "knows" of different ways to do things within its life-world and sphere of action longs for a different space in which things can be done in different ways. Each social node expresses needs and aspirations that are the basis of alternatives. For example: the alternative to working 10 hours a day is working 6; the alternative to poverty is access to the means of existence; the alternative to indignity is dignity; the alternative to building that dam and uprooting communities is not building that dam and leaving communities where they are; the alternative to tomatoes going rotten while transported on the back of an old woman for 20 miles is not GM tomatoes that do not rot, but access to land near home, or a home, or a road and a truck. Since every social node is aware of a spectrum of alternatives, the problem is simply how to make these alternatives actual? What resources are needed? How to coordinate alternatives in such a way that they are not pitted against each other as is the case of the competitive markets' understanding of alternatives? How to solve the many existing problems without relying on the alienating coordinating mechanism of the market and creating instead social relations of mutual enrichment, dignity, and respect? These are I believe the bottom line questions on which a new political discourse must be based. Once we acknowledge the existence of the galaxy of alternatives as they emerge from concrete needs and aspirations, we can ground today's new political discourse in the thinking and practice of the actualization and the coordination of alternatives, so as each social node and each individual within it has the power to decide and take control over their lives. It is this actualization and this coordination that rescues existing alternatives from the cloud of their invisibility, because alternatives, as with any human product, are social products, and they need to be recognized and validated socially. Our political projects must push their way through beyond the existing forms of coordination, beyond the visible fist of the state, beyond the invisible hand of competitive markets, and beyond the hard realities of their interconnections that express themselves in today forms of neoliberal governance, promoting cooperation through competition and community through disempowerment. As I will argue, this new political discourse is based on the project of defending and extending the space of commons, at the same time building and strengthening communities through the social fields.

Alternative Solvency

Our demand can create social movements around issues of immigration and education that can overload the welfare state causing its collapse.

Jessop, Professor of Sociology at the University of Lancaster, **2002** (Bob, The Future of the Capitalist State, pg.89-90)

The KWNS was also undermined by two sets of emerging trends in the lifeworld. The first of these was a continuing tendential 'denationalization' of civil society. This is reflected in the development of cosmopolitanism and 'tribalism' (or the rediscovery or invention of primordial, affectual identities at the expense both of liberal individualism and of civic loyalty to an 'imagined' national community), and an expansion of diverse social movements that now operate across national boundaries. This was (and still is) associated with a crisis in the national state, which takes different forms according to the nature of the imagined national community on which it is based (see chapter 5). Together, these phenomena weakened the sense of national identity¹⁵ that shaped the KWNS in its formative period and thereby weakened the coalition of forces that sustained it. The second set of social trends concern more specific values, social identities and interests associated with the welfare state and the

growth of social movements opposed to one or more aspects of the KWNS. This is reflected in rejection of the social democratic and/or Atlantic Fordist normative commitment to class-based egalitarianism and its accompanying class-based redistributive politics; in a pluralistic identity politics and 'politics of difference' in which there is greater emphasis on mutual respect, authenticity and autonomy; in a shift from national citizenship to 'a more universal model of membership [in a

state], anchored in deterritorialized notions of persons' rights' (Soysal 1994: 3); in increased concern for personal empowerment rather than for the bureaucratic administration of legal rights, monetized entitlements and uniform public services; and in the expansion of the so-called 'third' sector, which supposedly operates flexibly outside of the framework of pure markets and the bureaucratic state (but often in close conjunction with them as a 'shadow market' and 'shadow state'). The interrelated crisis-generating dynamics of accumulation, changes in social relations intelligible in terms of the dynamic of Fordist societies, and the welfare state were reinforced by important exogenous factors.¹⁶ Chief among these is demographic change. This has affected both the scope and the finances of the welfare state. In particular, the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries has changed dramatically in the last 35 years, as the number of those in retirement has increased (especially among the oldest cohorts with their greater need for long-term medical attention) and the number of those who are economically active has fallen (in part because of the resort in the 1980s and 1990s to forced or voluntary early retirement as a means of reducing the active labour force). Immigration as a partial solution to this latter problem has generated its own social and political problems in turn. Costs in the welfare state also tend to rise disproportionately - education lasts longer, medical progress has increased costs, one-parent families require more support and Fordist productivity raising techniques are less applicable to welfare activities (but see chapter 3 on the contingent nature of this differential price and productivity trap and on alternative exits therefrom). This intensified the fiscal squeeze on welfare policies and made the search for solutions more urgent.

Alto Solvo

Intellectual commons work to militate against the use of knowledge as a fictitious commodity of power under capitalism.

Jessop, Professor of Sociology at the University of Lancaster, **2002** (Bob, The Future of the Capitalist State, pg.110-111)

Fifth, in the post-Fordist (or, at least, the post-industrial) accumulation regime, the inherent capitalist contradiction between the socialization of the productive forces and the private appropriation of profit acquires a new expression in the tension between knowledge as intellectual commons and knowledge as intellectual property. This is hardly surprising. For this basic contradiction has distinctive forms in different times and places that generate fundamental problems of collective action as well as more or less acute 'dilemmas for individual economic or political actors. In its most general form, it can be expressed in terms of the conflicting developmental implications of prioritizing the information economy or the information society (cf. Bell 1973 on the conflict between economizing and sociologizing logics in the post-industrial society). The basic form of the contradiction concerns the private appropriation of knowledge in the form of intellectual property rights (IPRs) so that it can become the basis for monopoly rents and national competitiveness (and thereby becomes subject to many of the tendencies towards market failure long recognized in the academic subdiscipline of the economics of information) and the widening of public access to knowledge as a source of personal empowerment and the expansion of the public sphere. But this contradiction is also replicated in the information economy itself in the form of intellectual property right versus access to the intellectual commons; and, from the viewpoint of the information society, in the form of rights to individual privacy and the claims of official secrecy versus the widening and deepening of public knowledge.

These contradictions and dilemmas obviously have a long and contested history. But they have acquired greater material and discursive significance through the development of the new ICTs and the increased importance of knowledge creation as a driving force in economic expansion on both the exchange- and use-value dimensions. Indeed, the importance of economies of agglomeration and economies of networks in knowledge-based economies heightens the contradiction from both sides. Thus, on the side of the productive forces, the increasing socialization of knowledge production in networked economies makes it hard to distinguish legally between the intellectual property of different firms as a basis for allocating the returns to innovation (Kundnani 1998-9: 56).

This is even more obviously the case for the contributions of individual 'knowledge workers' to the overall social system of innovation. This in turn leads to a search for new forms of enterprise that can capture the rents from such network economies without destroying any broader network(s) involved in generating them. 'Virtual' firms, networked firms, and strategic alliances are one form in which this occurs (Catells 1996: 151-200); another form is more territorial, involving innovation milieus, learning regions, etc., where network economies can be captured in the form of club goods (classically, Silicon Valley). It also encourages attempts to protect vulnerable *monopolies in knowledge or information*

by embedding them in technology, market-generated standards, tacit knowledge or legally entrenched intellectual property rights. These solutions serve to intensify the contradictions on the side of the social relations of production, however, unless the resulting networks embrace all those involved in producing the network economies. For, whereas every capital wants free access to information, knowledge and expertise, it also wants to charge for the information, knowledge and expertise that it

itself can supply. This tension generates systematic asymmetries of interest within the information economy depending on actors' differing positions in the production, circulation and consumption of knowledge. The IPR regime is currently of overwhelming benefit, of course, to the US economy.

Poor = Revolutionary class

The poor are the dangerous class today. They are mobile, precarious and have an intellectual surplus.

Negri, Italian Marxist, in '3

[Antonio, "The poor: a threatening and indispensable enemy", <http://www.generation-online.org/t/negripoor.htm>]

The corsi e ricorsi of history are strange. It is renowned that throughout the history of capitalism the definition of 'dangerous classes' has been very flexible. In the era of manufacture the poor were the dangerous: the multitude of penniless and vagabonds agricultural workers and landless peasants forced to move towards cities and factories. In the era of large industry, the workers became the 'dangerous class': assembled en masse in the factory, they exercised a pressure that affected all social relations; the dangerous class had to be pushed on the path of poverty, unemployment, and the industrial reserve army. Today the poor is the enemy once again: in Postfordism, the flexible worker - mobile and precarious, capable of producing cognitive and intellectual surplus - is the enemy, threatened by means of exclusion, as if poverty was not enough. Precarious middle classes, taylorised intellectual labour and an immaterial labour force degraded through industrial instrumentalisation and the alienation of value: this is the fate of the new condition of poverty. However, never has the poor been in the condition of being as productive as he is now. In social production, since labour becomes cooperative, a concrete common realisation - and this common constitutes the core necessary condition for the production of commodities and services - exclusion would seem to be impossible. Despite the myriad of mechanisms of exclusion to which he is subjected, the poor expresses an enormous power of life and production. What is excluded through the legal and economic forms of capital is nevertheless included in the circuits of social and biopolitical production. Thus the poor, the unemployed, the homeless and wage less represent first of all a contradictory situation: they are excluded from a general social condition that conceives of value as built in community. This is the reason for the dangerousness of the poor, the substance of his 'being foe' to the actual form of capitalist command.

In Postfordism the poor comes out of the picture into which he had been forced by large manufacture capitalism and the operaismo of that stage of social composition of labour. In many ways, the more the worker is positively inserted in social productive activity, the poorer he is today. The distinction between directly productive labour and unproductive labour has always been dubious, also in Marxian discourse. However, for Marx the poor were neither productive nor unproductive: they lied outside of production, as the savage lies outside of civilisation. But just as the savage fully resides inside globalisation today, so has the poor entirely re-entered social production. His productive capacity is not virtual - as it used to be when the vagabond was pushed from the countryside to new industrial cities. The labour capacity of the poor is now actual because the entire set of social relations is productive. However, the poor is still the enemy or has become again the enemy par excellence because he is necessary to production, rich in productive capacity and included in social production. All of this, just in the name of the need for inclusion, makes him dangerous and inimical. As it is always the case for the enemy of society, the poor must fight against poverty and thus recognise himself as his own enemy. Such was the case of the worker who, struggling against exploitation, had to conceive his own destruction. The suppression of poverty must then represent itself as the suppression of the poor. But the suppression of poverty is also a struggle against those who organise poverty as the basis of their wealth and of capitalist development.

If it is true that the poor is included in the biopolitical texture of social production, the struggle against poverty will be a constituent one. Poverty reveals the subversive content of the universal participation of the labour force to social production. In the era of large industry the struggles of the poor were always resistance struggles - whatever their outcome. In England, Germany, the United States in the 1920's, and again in Europe during the 1970's, the struggles of the poor were struggles for appropriation. Resistance and appropriation are the struggles of the excluded, but today, with the social inclusion of labour, the struggles of the poor merge and become entangled with those of the workers and they are constituent. They only become effective when they manage to halt the mechanisms of exploitation and hierarchisation of the global labour force. Because of this, citizenship income becomes the constituent political key of the struggles of the poor: it merges the political recognition of inclusion and the project of democratic management of globalisation. Thus the poor becomes the real enemy.

Poor = Revolutionary class

— **Poverty is power against the system. We must translate this surplus labor into revolutionary power.**

Negri, Italian Marxist, in '3

[Antonio, N for Negri: Antonio Negri in Conversation with Carles Guerra, Spring 2003, No. 11, Pages 86-109]

Poverty is the basis on which to construct constituent power. If we are not poor, there is nothing we can do. This is not because poverty in dialectic with wealth constructs love, as Plato says in his Symposium. Poverty is an absolute lack of authority and defines itself as such. Only when you have been in jail and know just how absolute can be the power that is brought to bear on you, do you understand what poverty is. Basically I have always been rich. I come from a working-class, intelligent, very free family that always allowed me to do whatever I wanted. And the fact that I obtained the post of university lecturer when I was very young meant that I came to form part of the Italian intellectual class very early on. Yet this wealth has always disgusted me. For me, it was much more important to be with the workers, whose poverty was by no means due to a lack of money; they were poor precisely because they were strong. Poverty is not destitution; it is power and, what is more, it immediately allies with love. This is truer than ever these days, when the force of work has become the force of intellectual work that involves language and communication, and, therefore, cooperation and common passion. This places us in the surprising situation of having nothing with which to face the provocations, the violence, and the real exploitation of our time of life. Money is the acceleration of the time of life and, consequently, the possibility of doing more things, of being rich in this sense. The time of our lives has been expropriated because poverty means having to spend many hours of the day looking to our survival, and jail is the most direct form of this expropriation. This is why we have to exalt poverty and defend militancy as the capacity to manage this poverty effectively and to translate it into revolution.

Class Consciousness Key

___ Class Consciousness is critical to the formation of the multitude which is necessary for the calculation of insurrection. This cannot happen spontaneously.

Negri, Marxist philosopher, in '9

[Antonio, "Communism: some thoughts on the concept and practice", March 14,

http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm]

But for us determining the liberation of the labour force and being communists demands the re-appropriation of a common reality that is neither original nor democratically desirable, but rather something that stands opposed to us as power after we have reproduced it with effort and blood.

But let us not be discouraged. As Gramsci taught us in his reading of class struggle, historical materialism proposes to grasp the continuous metamorphosis or rather the anthropology of the character of the worker through different experiences of the proletarian use of technologies and capitalist social organisation.

This introduces a new question, because as the worker changes herself in struggle, she imposes a real metamorphosis on capital. If there are epochs or cycles of struggle, their ontological consistency is measured against this anthropological basis. No nature, identity, gender or race can resist this movement of transformation and historical metamorphosis of the relationship between capital and workers. The multitudes are shaped and always re-qualified by this dynamics. This is also valid for the definition of time in class struggle. When class struggle appears as the production and transformation of subjectivity, the revolutionary process assumes a long-term temporality, an ontological accumulation of counter-power, the 'optimism' of the material force of proletarian 'reason', the desire that becomes solidarity, the love that is always rational, and following Spinoza, the related 'pessimism of the will'. 'Caution !', he said, when the passions are mobilised towards the construction of political structures of freedom. Our guide is not the aleatory emergence of rebellions, these divine sparks of hope that can carve paths of light into the night, but the constant and critical effort and work of organisation, the calculated risk of insurrection. Philosophical imagination can give colour to the real but cannot replace the effort of history-making: the event is always a result, never a starting point.

Alt Goes Global

____ Capitalism is dependent on the acquiescence of the periphery- the alternative rips its supports out from under it.

Antonio Negri, former professor of state theory @ University of Purdua. Trans. Noura Wedell. The Porcelain Workshop. 2008. p. 62-3.

Perhaps the polemical spirit in which we consider the analyses labeling the contemporary period hypermodern rather than postmodern will now be better understood. There is, in fact, a model in the idea of hypermodernity-we do not know whether it is Heideggerian, or socialist-that affirms that the technology and form of modern development cannot be overcome. This model, while paradoxically affirming its historical continuity in relation to that against which it defines itself, stands against the possibility of instituting other values and other paradigms. Now the rupture between modernity and what follows is not only temporal but also substantial. It concerns the very contents of development, their value, and more generally the intensity of subjective apparatuses.

Thus "alterity," for example, is not the opposition between development and underdevelopment, but between underdevelopment

and another development. We must again insist on the depth of the historical caesura with which we started these lectures. Indeed, we are reading the succession of two historical and political moments, and their corresponding theorizations, yet alterity is already undeniably present at the heart of modernity: once the permanence and opposition of two lines are identified: the absolutist one, following Hobbes, and the democratic one, espousing Spinoza.

Today, of course, inside the postmodern, this internal alternative does not have the exact signification it did three centuries ago. But we must analyze its power (puissance).

In all of the countries alluded to above, the debate seemed to have crystallized historically around certain important precepts

(mots-d'ordre): no to homogenization, cultural and political subordination, economic underdevelopment; yes, on the other hand, to a path towards freedom and autonomy. The entire first period of anti-colonial revolutions was constructed on such projects. A second

phase followed the victory and hegemony of these projects for independence after the Bandung Conference, with the diminished

importance of colonial processes in the workings of state governments and the rise of movements of national liberation. This second moment was characterized by a kind of peripheral Fordism, and despite often fierce negotiations, by reduced yet still acute dependence: brutally stated, a neocolonial phase. Indeed, viewed from the "center," the situation at the "peripheries" of the colonial empire was relatively clear: anticolonial and antiimperialist struggles had blasted the "central" countries. The latter could only count on reorganizing their power in terms of development. This development in dependence had to articulate market elements with residue of the colonial question. The possibility of integration through development was allowed, yet it had to function within the schemas of constraint and domination established by the "central" countries.

Dependency became hierarchical structuring. Thus, paradoxically, the definitive anticolonial victories coincided with the triumph of peripheral fordism.

This phase, that characterizes the second half of the twentieth century for the most part, can be assessed today as one of reproduced and hierarchically organized "dependency." But through globalization, it also constitutes the condition for a definitive rupture with the presuppositions above. If we look at development in its diachronic (historical) dimension, globalization imposes a passage from dependence to interdependence, and revives instances of autonomy and powers of development in a completely different context. This process is extremely ambiguous and complex, but it always comprises other-definitive?-attacks against the measures and rules of economic dependency.

Alt Spillover

THE NEW GLOBAL PUBLIC SPHERE MEANS OUR LOCAL INSURGENCY CAN GO GLOBAL.

Buck-Morss '01[Susan, Professor of Political Philosophy and Social Theory in the Department of Government @ Cornell, *Radical Philosophy* November 7, 2001]

September 11 has transformed irrevocably the context in which we as intellectuals speak. The acts of terror on that day were no invasion from the outside by a barbaric evil “other” but, rather, produced fully within a coeval and common world. We are witnessing the mutation of a new, global body-politic, and if we intellectuals are to have any potency as part of its thinking organ, it will be in discourses that refuse to separate academic life from political life, and that inform not just national opinion, but a global public debate. To think and write for a global public sphere is not an easy task. I do not have great confidence that these essays will succeed. I have no political choice but to try, nonetheless, as the commitment to a diverse, multi-centered human society is what my work, and what much of critical, theoretical work has been about for the past several decades, in universities that are now becoming decisively, and quite hopefully, global communities of scholars. The global public sphere in a broader sense, however, is not yet a “community,” or even a coherently navigable discursive terrain. To address it is thus a performative act. It aims to bring about that which it presumes. The notion of the “global” itself circulates globally today, describing and generating discourses of social change. Many, including myself, have questioned its newness, pointing to the five hundred years of European expansion that produced a world economy and world political domination. But the global terrain that is emerging out of the ruins of September 11 and its aftermath is, arguably, of a different order. And this *

This essay was presented at the conference of the journal, *Radical Philosophy*, London, November 7, 2001,

and first published in the December issue. It is also due to be published in Verso’s forthcoming titlekThinking Past Terror: Islamism And Critical Theory On The Left.kSituation Analysis October 2002 11kdifference has fundamentally to do with intellectual vision - what we see, and how we see it. Historical rupture is a jagged process. There has not been a clean break with the past, there never is. The end of the Cold War, the restructuring of transnational capital, the electronic media revolution - these transition markers have been with us for decades. We have charted their development with concepts like post-modernism, post-colonialism, postsocialism, post-Marxism. But recent events bring the realization that in using these terms, our academic “global community” has not gone far enough. The hegemonic signifiers of Western capitalism, Enlightenment modernity and national sovereignty were kept in place. Radical criticism attacked their Eurocentricity without denying it. It appears now that events have outrun us, captured in a videotaped image of destructive fury that left us speechless, devastating our imagined political landscape. What disappeared on September 11 was the apparent invulnerability, not only of U.S. territory, but of U.S., and, indeed, Western hegemony. A new, global struggle for hegemony has begun. But let us not be content just to describe this process, as if the only actors who counted were military men, terrorists and counter-terrorist forces. In fact their use of force indicates their lack of hegemony, not its guarantee. It is, ultimately, the global public that will determine hegemonic power - a public newly forming, for whom the old economic and politicalnarratives – even critical ones – are inadequate interpretive tools.kThe staging of violence as a global spectacle separates September 11 from previous acts of terror. The dialectic of power, the fact that power produces its own vulnerability, was itself the message. This distinguishes it decisively from radical social movements that

aim to accomplish specific social and political goals. The Chiapas resistance movement, which was violent but minimally so, used global channels in order to garner wide support from a public inside and outside of Mexico, in order to bring pressure to bear on the Mexican state to change specific policies. It was and continues to be a radical, cosmopolitan articulation that translates indigenous cultural experience into hegemonic discourses of criticism as the precondition for the intelligibility of its demands. The goal is to communicate within the existing codes of oppositional struggle. A poet, Commandante Marcos, speaks in its name in inclusive, human terms against diverse manifestations of oppression; solidarity for this local struggle is imagined in global terms.

ALT SOLVES

OUR ALTERNATIVE CREATES A SPACE THAT ALLOWS FOR A COUNTER GLOBALISATION THAT SPILLS OVER GLOBALLY

NEGRI, 2002 [ANTONIO, FLORIAN SCHNIDER, THOMAS ATZERT OCTOBER, A VIDEO CONVERSATION WITH ANTONIO NEGRIHTTP://WWW.GENERATION-ONLINE.ORG/T/GLOSSARY.HTM]

...To have the ability to understand that you can't make politics without a space, and there is this space that cannot be closed and egoistic but must really be a space where development is determined, which is the space of the common. Today we can no longer imagine production if not in terms of the common, which is neither the private nor the public, but rather these spaces of the external economies. The common is knowledge, it is the capacity for social mobility, for labour, it is the ability of integration and the reabsorption of what is the new energy that this whole mass of immigrants brings to our countries. These are the really important issues, and they can allow not only Europe but also the American multitudes and surely the Chinese ones and the Brazilian ones, to give meaning back to globalisation. Globalisation in itself is a passage that was imposed by struggles but organised by capital: at this point the question is that of giving it a new push that goes beyond the conservatism and the liberalism of Thatcher and Reagan and Bush or even Brasvin that has been put in place.

WE MUST CHALLENGE THE CURRENT DIMENSIONS OF THE SYSTEM OF CAPITAL IN ORDER TO ORGANIZING MOVEMENTS FROM OUR OWN MATERIAL CONDITIONS. THE TIME FOR WAITING AND HOPEING FOR THE REVOLULUTION IS OVER; IT'S TIME TO ACT.

NEGRI, 2002 [ANTONIO, FLORIAN SCHNIDER, THOMAS ATZERT OCTOBER, A VIDEO CONVERSATION WITH ANTONIO NEGRIHTTP://WWW.GENERATION-ONLINE.ORG/T/GLOSSARY.HTM]

The problem is to be able to shake up the dimensions of the general reproduction of the system, it is not sufficient to destabilise them, we need to be able to destructure them and this is a problem of resistance and exodus, of resistance and refusal, of resistance and alternative proposals that must be developed through movements that involve populations, that touch upon and go through the nation states and constitute the practices of the great areas of the metropolis. Naturally, in Lenin's reasoning on civil war and on the transformation of imperialist war into civil war there was also a different and very strong element, which was the moment of the event, of the ability to decide: the moment of the Party; but this is also something that as far as we are concerned is a long way from being actual or from being possible; now it is rather a question of understanding how mobility is capable of proliferating, how networks are capable of getting into motion, how the decisions are capable of communicating through these processes. It is only by starting from these material conditions that organising moments can be invented.

ALT EMPIRICALLY SOLVES

DOMINATION IS NOT INEVITABLE- ANTI-COLONIAL RESISTANCE PROVIDES THE MODEL OF USING SOLIDARITY AND INFERIOR MEANS TO CHALLENGE BIOPOLITICAL CAPITALISM.

Antonio Negri, former professor of state theory @ University of Purdua. Trans. Noura Wedell. The Porcelain Workshop. 2008. p. 50-1.

Let us therefore, from the point of view of globalization, start to enquire about how the political categories of the modern have changed, not according to the effects of the transformation brought on by the workers' struggle in the Western world, but according to other players, more peripheral although no less important. These are the proletarians of what has been called the Third World, individuals subjected to the rules of colonialism and imperialism in the nine- tenth and twentieth centuries. We all have in mind examples from Brazil, South Africa, India, China, or Iran. Although these differ greatly, historically and socially, they do possess an important common element. Indeed, their underdevelopment was constructed according to the imperialist functions defined in classical theories, yet a network of colonial, racial, and religious biopowers was added making the rules of the central power more complex. Mercantile exports and the accumulation of absolute surplus value do not define imperialism as much as the permanence of powers that have become cosubstantial with the very functioning of colonial and imperialist rules. It was on this terrain that the functional rationality of imperialism played its adventure of conquest in a rising fury. But beneath this power, we must also perceive the drive towards "something else": an entire history of resistances, insurrectional movements, experimentations in cooperation and alternative solidarity, attempts at political and cultural autonomy, struggles, and utopian projects of liberation. In colonized countries more than anywhere else, the presence of ramified biopowers to an antagonism just as diffuse and powerful has been impressive. If we choose to consider events through this viewpoint, we will note a strong homogeneity of local situations of resistance and struggle that try to define development in terms of "another" modernity. It is probably for this reason that those populations freed from the yoke of colonialism are outraged by the reactionary attempts to present colonialism under the guise of an alleged "beneficial" benevolence. When we refer to "another" modernity, we are pointing to another way towards certain economic, social, and political levels of welfare and freedom than the one motioned to by the West. More precisely, we wish to emphasize how the forces and dynamics this alterity proposes can be used to create models of autonomous development based on different values. If we do not analyze the phenomenon of underdevelopment in this perspective, we incur the risk of losing the meaning of that great adventure of anticolonial resistance and of the network of illusions and forces that contributed to it. In certain cases such illusions were nefarious; they were also sometimes very powerful, and almost always revolutionary. Even the "socialist revolution" (Russia, China, Cuba) encountered figures and meanings in the Third World that completely transformed the linearity of capitalist modernity. Although it is completely natural that capitalist rationality condemned these attempts, one cannot but recognize the exalting character of this project for an alternative modernity, and the strength with which it tried to impose itself.

Alt Solves Eugenics

THE MULTITUDE IS THE ONLY CAPABLE WAY TO MILITATE AGAINST EUGENICS.

Negri '04 [Antonio, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Paris and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Padua, Negri on Negri, pg.71-72]

No, it is not the Heraclitean polemos. We are seeking to understand the way in which war has been transformed into a device for imposing structure and order. The Heraclitean polemos is the upheaval of all forms; in Empire, by contrast, the capitalist system remains intact. Imperial war is not polemos because what animates it is a principle of order. Heidegger said something of this sort in connection with Heraclitus as well, but we know what inspired that interpretation. Heraclitus is not Parmenides in disguise. He is concerned at bottom with a kind of ontological war, whether it is physical, as with the atomists, or ethical, as with the Epicureans--in any case, it is a kind of struggle. In postmodern Empire, by contrast, war has been added to discipline and control as an instrument of government at the world level. Panic, fear, the feeling of insecurity--various forms of corrupted vitality--are among the elements developed by the bellicose function in Empire. We may also include television and the media in general: in this case, too, it is a question of elements that belong to a discourse that destroys moral consciousness and intellectual attention.

What, then, is the current form of war? It is a system for the production of order that operates through the destruction of society and of life. War is arche: at once the principle of movement and the principle of order--which is to say the contrary of what Heraclitus thought, and the opposite of what anyone caught up in war is apt to imagine. War is an overdetermination that strikes cultures with full force. But war is also a social phenomenon: a negative and destructive device, which leads to cultural and anthropological collapse, is imposed on the world of immaterial labor, on mobility and flexibility/Eugenics triumphs.

If one day polemos is reborn, it will have to pass through this terrible world; it will have to appear as a way of organizing revolt. Against eugenics, then, there is only polemos. But this must not be understood as synonymous with war--to the contrary, it is what constitutes the multitude.

Insurrection/militant alt

Our alternative is to posit ourselves as being militant. The stance of the insurgent expresses the life of and embodies the multitude. Only militancy can create the counterpower that is capable of challenging Empire.

Hardt and Negri,insurgents and social theorists, in '2K

[Michael and Antonio, Empire, pg. 411-413]

In the postmodern era, as the figure of the people dissolves, the militant is the one who best expresses the life of the multitude: the agent of biopolitical production and resistance against Empire. When we speak of the militant, we are not thinking of anything like the sad, ascetic agent of the Third International whose soul was deeply permeated by Soviet state reason, the same way the will of the pope was embedded in the hearts of the knights of the Society of Jesus. We are thinking of nothing like that and of no one who acts on the basis of duty and discipline, who pretends his or her actions are deduced from an ideal plan. We are referring, on the contrary, to something more like the communist and liberatory combatants of the twentieth-century revolutions, the intellectuals who were persecuted and exiled in the course of anti-fascist struggles, the republicans of the Spanish civil war and the European resistance movements, and the freedom fighters of all the anticolonial and anti-imperialist wars. A prototypical example of this revolutionary figure is the militant agitator of the Industrial Workers of the World. The Wobbly constructed associations among working people from below, through continuous agitation, and while organizing them gave rise to utopian thought and revolutionary knowledge. The militant was the fundamental actor of the “long march” of the emancipation of labor from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries, the creative singularity of that gigantic collective movement that was working-class struggle. Across this long period, the activity of the militant consisted, first of all, in practices of resistance in the factory and in society against capitalist exploitation. It consisted also, through and beyond resistance, in the collective construction and exercise of a counterpower capable of deconstructing the power of capitalism and opposing it with an alternative program of government. In opposition to the cynicism of the bourgeoisie, to monetary alienation, to the expropriation of life, to the exploitation of labor, to the colonization of the affects, and so on, the militant organized the struggle. Insurrection was the proud emblem of the militant. This militant was repeatedly martyred in the tragic history of communist struggles. Sometimes, but not of ten, the normal structures of the rights state were sufficient for the repressive tasks required to destroy the counterpower. When they were not sufficient, however, the fascists and the white guards of state terror, or rather the black mafias in the service of “democratic” capitalisms, were invited to lend a hand to reinforce the legal repressive structures. Today, after so many capitalist victories, after socialist hopes have withered in disillusionment, and after capitalist violence against labor has been solidified under the name of ultra-liberalism, why is it that instances of militancy still arise, why have resistances deepened, and why does struggle continually reemerge with new vigor? We should say right away that this new militancy does not simply repeat the organizational formulas of the old revolutionary working class. Today the militant cannot even pretend to be a representative, even of the fundamental human needs of the exploited. Revolutionary political militancy today, on the contrary, must rediscover what has always been its proper form: not representational but constituent activity. Militancy today is a positive, constructive, and innovative activity. This is the form in which we and all those who revolt against the rule of capital recognize ourselves as militants today. Militants resist imperial command in a creative way. In other words, resistance is linked immediately with a constitutive investment in the biopolitical realm and to the formation of cooperative apparatuses of production and community. Here is the strong novelty of militancy today: it repeats the virtues of insurrectional action of two hundred years of subversive experience, but at the same time it is linked to a new world, a world that knows no

Insurrection/militant alt

outside. It knows only an inside, a vital and ineluctable participation in the set of social structures, with Insurrection/militant alt
no possibility of transcending them. This inside is the productive cooperation of mass intellectuality and affective networks, the productivity of postmodern biopolitics. This militancy makes resistance into counterpower and makes rebellion into a project of love. There is an ancient legend that might serve to illuminate the future life of communist militancy: that of Saint Francis of Assisi. Consider his work. To denounce the poverty of the multitude he adopted that common condition and discovered there the ontological power of a new society. The communist militant does the same, identifying in the common condition of the multitude its enormous wealth. Francis in opposition to nascent capitalism refused every instrumental discipline, and in opposition to the mortification of the flesh (in poverty and in the constituted order) he posed a joyous life, including all of being and nature, the animals, sister moon, brother sun, the birds of the field, the poor and exploited humans, together against the will of power and corruption. Once again in postmodernity we find ourselves in Francis's situation, posing against the misery of power the joy of being. **This is a revolution that no power will control—because biopower and communism, cooperation and revolution remain together, in love, simplicity, and also innocence. This is the irrepressible lightness and joy of being communist**

A2 you don't defend a specific alternative system

— The biopolitical nature of global hegemony necessitates an aleatoric revolutionary class that produces resistance from below. Communism is possible because it is the condition for this resistance. Excess labor is a necessary condition for this coalenscence.

Negri, Marxist philosopher, in '9

[Antonio, "Communism: some thoughts on the concept and practice", March 14,
http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm]

From the standpoint of contemporary biopolitical society, the relation between reform and revolution is different from that of industrial societies. The transformation that has intervened is substantial and can easily be verified by an analysis of the generalisation of the methods of governance in the exercise of sovereignty, in the current weakening of the classical forms of government. The flows, pressures and alterations of governance relations in post-industrial societies show a new terrain where the collision between movements and governments unfolds with alternate outcomes. But they always all reveal the multiplication of assets for the struggle and organisation of reform proposals and subversive tensions that give shape to and internally articulate the multitude. Here we start glimpsing the new institutions of the common.

This process is set off from below. It is a movement that is affirmed with force. Rather than dialectics, what describes it is its will to affirmation. It is not teleological, unless we charge the materialist theory and subversive practice of Machiavelli with ethical and historical finalism. Instead, the multitude is immersed in a process of transition that started when 'one divided into two', when, as we said earlier, it is difficult to turn the surplus labour of the cognitive proletariat into profit and the latter reveals itself as revolutionary surplus [excess]. Rather than a transition from one stage or mode of production to another, this is a change that unfolds inside the multitude itself, it exposes and acts on the web that links the anthropological metamorphoses of subjects to the changes of society and politics, and thus to the possibility of communist emancipation. The society we live in has been really and fully subsumed in capital. We call this command capitalist biopower. But if biopower is the product of the activity of capital even when its hegemony is global, this still needs to be based on a relation: the capital relation, always contradictory and possibly antagonistic, placed inside the biopolitical realm where life itself is put to work and all of its aspects are invested by power; but also where resistance is manifest and the proletariat is present in all of the figures where social labour is realised; where cognitive labour power expresses the excess of value and the multitude is formed. This multitude is not disarmed, because all of these processes that traverse it also describe its institutional articulations and accretion of resistance and subjective emergences.

As we said, the multitude is a totality of desires and trajectories of resistance, struggle and constituent power. We also add that it is a whole made of institutions. Communism is possible because it already exists in this transition, not as an end, but as a condition, it is the development of singularities, the experimentation of this construction and - in the constant wave of power relations - it is tension, tendency and metamorphosis.

A2 the multitude is not a revolutionary class

The multitude produces a revolutionary subject through its very existence.

Negri, Marxist philosopher, in '9

[Antonio, "Communism: some thoughts on the concept and practice", March 14,

http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm]

But, as some tell us, there is no evidence to claim that the relation between subjective excess and the communist project is given through the subversive and insurrectional movements of the multitude. This is true. But we would respond that historical materialism and the immanence of the revolutionary project show us a subject that goes against capital and a multitude of singularities that organises into anti-capitalist power [forza], not formally, as a party, a mature and accomplished organisation, but, by virtue of its existence, as a resistance that is stronger and better articulated the more the multitude is a whole of singular institutions in itself. The latter include forms of life, struggle, economic and union organisation, strikes, the rupture of social processes of exploitation, experiences of re-appropriation, and nodes of resistance. At times they win in great clashes on issues that are central to the capitalist organisation of society, at other times they lose, though always keeping levels of antagonism that function as residues in new modes of subjectivation.

The multitude is a group of institutions that takes on different political compositions time after time and in relation to the shades and vicissitudes of power relations. They are more than the elements of technical composition of the proletariat, and more than the aleatory and/or conjunctural organisations of the oppressed: they are actual moments of political recomposition and coagulates of the subversive production of communist subjectivity. Cupiditates ! (TR: Passions, longings, desires, eagerness!) Instances of these are different and diversified relations between the expressions of a desire for emancipation (wage labour, social movements, political expressions) and the demand of political and/or economic reform.

ALT SOLVES SOCIAL ANTAGONISM

THE REVOLUTION SOLVES ALL CONFLICT REDUCING CLASS ANTAGONISM TO DEMOCRATIC AGONISM. THE STATE WITHERS AND IS TAKING OVER BY THE DEMOS IN THE ABSENCE OF WAR AND SOCIAL VIOLENCE.

Callinicos '04 [Alex, Director of the Centre for European Studies at King's College, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, 2004 pg. 174-175]

The replacement of the ‘government of persons’ by the ‘administration of things’, a notion developed originally by Saint-Simon, does not involve the utopian belief that communism would involve no coercion. It suggests, rather, that with the abolition of classes the main source of social conflict would be removed, so there would be no need for a ‘special repressive force’. Obviously, there would be many issues on which the associated producers might disagree—over sources of energy, styles of architecture, methods of child rearing. But without the grinding material pressures produced by class exploitation, these conflicts could be solved democratically, through debate and majority decision. Where individuals rejected the outcome of these procedures, any necessary compulsion would be the action of the associated producers themselves, not that of a special military apparatus. Far from advocating a strengthening of the state, Marx and Engels looked forward to its abolition. The notion, for example, of ‘state socialism’ was for them a contradiction in terms. They consistently combated the belief, influential in the German workers’ movement thanks to Lassalle, that the existing state was a potentially benevolent institution which could be won over to the workers’ interests. To refute this doctrine was the main purpose of Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme, aimed at the shabby and confused compromise produced by the fusion of his own and Lassalle’s followers. The attribution to him of a totalitarian desire to dissolve the individual into the state is a result of liberal misrepresentation, and of Stalin’s terrible corruption of Marxism. Closely connected with the claim that the transition to communism would involve the withering away of the state was Marx’s belief that it would also require the abolition of the distinction between mental and manual labour. From the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 onwards Marx had denounced this division as one of the main ways in which human beings were stunted, distorted, turned into something less than human, under capitalism. People, he believed, could live happy and fulfilled lives only if they used all their capacities, mental and physical alike, rather than being restricted to one narrow type of work. In a famous passage of *The German Ideology*, Marx writes: In communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic (CW v 47). Commentators have often denounced this picture as utopian. One can indeed wonder how literally Marx meant it to be taken, and it is worth noting that all the pursuits he lists are ones to be found in a traditional pre-industrial society. Nevertheless, there is a serious point underlying the passage, which is that the development of the productive forces under communism will be such as to free people from their existing role as cogs of the economic machine. Marx pursues this point in one of the most brilliant passages of the *Grundrisse*. He argues that the tendency under capitalism to increase the productivity of labour, and therefore the organic composition of capital, the share of the means of production in total investment, will lead to the transformation of the labour process into ‘an automatic system of machinery’, which the worker merely ‘supervises...and guards against interruptions’ (G 692). The result is to reduce the role of manual labour in production: To the degree that labour time—the mere quantity of labour—is posited by capital as the sole determinant element, to that degree, does direct labour and its quantity disappear as the determinant principle of production—of the creation of use values—and is reduced both quantitatively, to a smaller proportion, and qualitatively, as an of course indispensable but subordinate moment, compared to general scientific labour, technological application of the natural sciences, on the one side, and to the general productive force arising from social combination on the other side (G 700). This passage is a brilliant anticipation of developments in capitalism this century—the introduction of mass assembly line production during its first half, and the increasing automation of the labour process during its second half.

Alt Solves Welfare

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/theconomicsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 66-7]

We know that individuals are possessed of so little life that they have to earn a living, to sell their time in exchange for a modicum of social existence. Personal time for social existence: such is work, such is the market. From the outset, the time of the commune eludes work, it doesn't function according to that scheme - it prefers others. Groups of Argentine piqueteros collectively extort a sort of local welfare conditioned by a few hours of work; they don't clock their hours, they put their benefits in common and acquire clothing workshops, a bakery, putting in place the gardens that they need. The commune needs money, but not because we need to earn a living. All communes have their black markets. There are plenty of hustles. Aside from welfare, there are various benefits, disability money, accumulated student aid, subsidies drawn off fictitious child births, all kinds of trafficking, and so many other means that arise with every mutation of control. It's not for us to defend them, or to install ourselves in these temporary shelters or to preserve them as a privilege for those in the know. The important thing is to cultivate and spread this necessary disposition towards fraud, and to share its innovations. For communes, the question of work is only posed in relation to other already existing incomes. And we shouldn't forget all the useful knowledge that can be acquired through certain trades, professions and well-positioned jobs.

Alt Solves Sovereignty

_____ Communist struggle is opposed to sovereignty

Negri, Marxist philosopher, in '9

[Antonio, "Communism: some thoughts on the concept and practice", March 14,
http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm]

In traditional State theory, anarchy and dictatorship are the opposite extremes of all possible forms of sovereign command, but when we speak of communist democracy against the State, we do not do so on the grounds of a possible mediation between anarchy and dictatorship, on the contrary. We propose the overcoming of this alternative because revolutionary struggle not only has no outside but the inside that it defines knows a subversive power, that is, a 'below' that is opposed to the 'above' of sovereignty. Communist being is realised from this 'below', from the turning of constituent desires into expressions of power and alternative contents. So there can also be a revolution, as Gramsci taught, 'against Das Kapital'.

Alternative - Sabotage

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/thecominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 73-5]

It's well known that the streets teem with incivilities. Between what they are and what they should be stands the centripetal force of the police, doing their best to restore order to them; and on the other side there's us, the opposite centrifugal movement. We can't help but delight in the fits of anger and disorder wherever they erupt. It's not surprising that these national festivals that aren't really celebrating anything anymore are now systematically going bad. Whether sparkling or dilapidated, the urban fixtures – but where do they begin? where do they end? – embody our common dispossession. Persevering in their nothingness, they ask for nothing more than to return to that state for good. Take a look at what surrounds us: all this will have its final hour. The metropolis suddenly takes on an air of nostalgia, like a field of ruins. All the incivilities of the streets should become methodical and systematic, converging in a diffuse, effective guerrilla war that restores us to our ungovernability, our primordial unruliness. It's disconcerting to some that this same lack of discipline figures so prominently among the recognized military virtues of resistance fighters. In fact though, rage and politics should never have been separated. Without the first, the second is lost in discourse; without the second the first exhausts itself in howls. When words like "enragés" and "exaltés" resurface in politics they're always greeted with warning shots.²⁴ As for methods, let's adopt the following principle from sabotage: a minimum of risk in taking the action, a minimum of time, and maximum damage. As for strategy, we will remember that an obstacle that has been cleared away, leaving a liberated but uninhabited space, is easily replaced by another obstacle, one that offers more resistance and is harder to attack. No need to dwell too long on the three types of workers' sabotage: reducing the speed of work, from "easy does it" pacing to the "work-to-rule" strike; breaking the machines, or hindering their function; and divulging company secrets. Broadened to the dimensions of the whole social factory, the principles of sabotage can be applied to both production and circulation. The technical infrastructure of the metropolis is vulnerable. Its flows amount to more than the transportation of people and commodities. Information and energy circulates via wire networks, fibers and channels, and these can be attacked. Nowadays sabotaging the social machine with any real effect involves reappropriating and reinventing the ways of interrupting its networks. How can a TGV line or an electrical network be rendered useless? How does one find the weak points in computer networks, or scramble radio waves and fill screens with white noise? As for serious obstacles, it's wrong to imagine them invulnerable to all destruction. The promethean element in all of this boils down to a certain use of fire, all blind voluntarism aside. In 356 BC, Erostratus burned down the temple of Artemis, one of the seven wonders of the world. In our time of utter decadence, the only thing imposing about temples is the dismal truth that they are already ruins. Annihilating this nothingness is hardly a sad task. It gives action a fresh demeanor. Everything suddenly coalesces and makes sense – space, time, friendship. We must use all means at our disposal and rethink their uses – we ourselves being means. Perhaps, in the misery of the present, "fucking it all up" will serve – not without reason – as the last collective seduction.

Small group/Sabotage Solvency

___A small group can be powerful – sabotage works

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/thecominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 82-3]

Block the economy, but measure our blocking power by our level of self-organization At the end of June 2006 in the State of Oaxaca, the occupations of city halls multiply, and insurgents occupy public buildings. In certain communes, mayors are kicked out, official vehicles are requisitioned. A month later, access is cut off to certain hotels and tourist compounds. Mexico's Minister of Tourism speaks of a disaster "comparable to hurricane Wilma." A few years earlier, blockades had become the main form of action of the revolt in Argentina, with different local groups helping each other by blocking this or that major road, and continually threatening, through their joint action, to paralyze the entire country if their demands were not met. For years such threats have been a powerful lever for railway workers, truck drivers, and electrical and gas supply workers. The movement against the CPE in France did not hesitate to block train stations, ring roads, factories, highways, supermarkets and even airports. In Rennes, only three hundred people were needed to shut down the main access road to the town for hours and cause a 40-kilometer long traffic jam. Jam everything—this will be the first reflex of all those who rebel against the present order. In a delocalized economy where companies function according to "just-in-time" production, where value derives from connectedness to the network, where the highways are links in the chain of dematerialized production which moves from subcontractor to subcontractor and from there to another factory for assembly, to block circulation is to block production as well. But a blockade is only as effective as the insurgents' capacity to supply themselves and to communicate, as effective as the self-organization of the different communes. How will we feed ourselves once everything is paralyzed? Looting stores, as in Argentina, has its limits; as large as the temples of consumption are, they are not bottomless pantries. Acquiring the skills to provide, over time, for one's own basic subsistence implies appropriating the necessary means of its production. And in this regard, it seems pointless to wait any longer. Letting two percent of the population produce the food of all the others – the situation today – is both a historical and a strategic anomaly.

A2 Schmitt/Rev = Dictatorship

Callinicos '04 [Alex, Director of the Centre for European Studies at King's College, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, 2004 pg. 181-182]

Further support is lent to this point by the emergence of so-called ‘Marxist-Leninist’ regimes in various underdeveloped countries—China, Vietnam, Cuba and so on. Secondly, the subsequent degeneration of the Russian Revolution into Stalin’s bloody despotism supposedly proves that Marx was wrong again: the dictatorship of the proletariat does not lead to an extension of democracy and to the eventual abolition of classes, but to a tyranny even more vile than the one it replaced. The first part of the argument is comparatively easy to deal with. It attributes to Marx a picture of history in which humanity necessarily passes through certain stages, so that modes of production succeed each other according to the iron laws of historical necessity. Such a version of Marxism was indeed accepted by some Russian socialists, such as Georgi Plekhanov and the Mensheviks, who believed that socialism would not be possible in Russia until the development of capitalism had turned her into an industrialised country like Britain or Germany. This was not, however, Marx’s own view. Russia was one of the first countries where his ideas were taken up. He was highly critical of attempts to treat his analysis, in Capital Volume 1 Part Eight, of the evolution of capitalism as applicable to all societies. Marx attacked one Russian writer for having transformed ‘my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds itself’. Such an approach treated Marxism as ‘a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical’ (SC 313). Marx was careful not to rule out the possibility that a social revolution might enable Russia to arrive at socialism without passing through a capitalist phase, provided that ‘the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West’ (SW i 100). We saw in the previous chapter that revolutions take place as a result of a process of ‘uneven and combined development’. They arise, in other words, from the unique class structure and state of economic development of the society in question, which in turn is bound up with its position in the capitalist world system. Precisely this is true of the Russian Revolution. A backward, primarily rural society, Russia experienced a phase of rapid industrialisation at the turn of the 19th century. This was brought about by a government keen to catch up economically with the West for fear it would otherwise become militarily vulnerable, and by foreign capitalists eager to exploit cheap Russian labour. The result was to create a small, highly concentrated industrial working class possessing a social and political weight far greater than its numbers. The contradiction between capital and labour was added to the age-old struggle between lord and peasant. The explosive nature of the combination was first made plain by the revolution of 1905. The Tsarist state survived this upheaval, only to have its back broken by defeat in the First World War. The revolution of February 1917 then swept it aside, giving rise to a situation of ‘dual power’ between the bourgeois Provisional Government and the soviets or workers’ and soldiers’ councils. In October 1917 the soviets seized power, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, a party firmly based in the urban working class, and benefiting from the benevolent neutrality of the peasants, to whom they had promised the estates of the gentry. A much more serious challenge to Marxism than the fact of a revolution in a backward country is what happened in Russia after October 1917, the transformation of a democratic workers’ state into the bureaucratic monstrosity which rules Russia today. The answer is to be found in Marx’s insistence that socialism could succeed only on a world scale. The Bolsheviks, like him, believed that the Soviet regime could survive only if it became ‘the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West’. But despite the revolutionary wave which did shake Europe at the end of the First World War, the new Soviet republic

A2 Schmitt/Rev = Dictatorship

remained isolated. Furthermore, the bloody war unleashed on Russia by the Western powers and by counter-revolutionary forces caused enormous destruction. The industrial economy collapsed, and workers streamed back to the villages that they had only lately left. The end of the civil war in 1921 found the country exhausted, the working class disintegrated, the soviets a shell of workers' power, and the Bolsheviks effectively the dictatorship of a minority suspended above a largely hostile smallholding peasantry. As Marx had predicted, the confinement of the revolution to a single country meant that 'the whole filthy business' of exploitation and class struggle was restored. The low level of development of the productive forces within Russia was not sufficient to provide a basis for moving towards communism. Only the resources existing on a world scale could have done so. The Bolshevik leadership, especially after Lenin's active political life ceased with his first stroke in 1922, increasingly adapted themselves to the situation. They came to see the interests of the Soviet state as more important than those of the world working class. So again and again in the years between 1923 and 1939 revolutionary possibilities—in China, France and Spain—were squandered because they conflicted with the current objectives of Russian foreign policy. The doctrine of 'socialism in one country' was formulated to justify this approach. Critics within the regime, such as Trotsky and the Left Opposition, were excluded, imprisoned, exiled and murdered. The repression inside the party favoured the development of Stalin's personal dictatorship, which crystallised the domination of Russia by a layer of privileged bureaucrats.

A2 REV IS VIOLENT/GENOCIDAL

KILLING IN THE USSR PALES IN COMPARISON TO THE DEATHS CREATED BY PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION.

Callinicos, Director of the Centre for European Studies at King's College, in '04

[Alex, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, 2004 pg. 183-184]

The defeats suffered by the working class abroad increased the isolation of the Russian regime, and the danger of foreign invasion. To counter this threat Russia required the latest weapons, which could only be produced by an advanced industrial economy. But the resources necessary to industrialise the country could come only from the surplus labour of the workers and peasants. In 1928-29 Stalin flung the regime onto a new course of forced industrialisation. The land was 'collectivised'—in other words, it was placed under state control. Millions of peasants perished in the process. This move provided the regime with the grain necessary to feed the towns, and to sell abroad, where it would earn the foreign exchange necessary to buy advanced Western machinery. At the same time, an enormous range of heavy industries was built from scratch. Peasants were driven off the land—and sucked into the new factories on an enormous scale. It was their surplus labour which made industrialisation possible: one Russian economist has calculated that the economic expansion of the 1930s was financed by an enormous rise in the extraction of both relative and absolute surplus value. Marx had written that the 'primitive accumulation' of capital in Western Europe involved the massive use of coercion—to drive the peasants off the land, to force artisans to work longer hours and thus to produce absolute surplus value, to loot the world of its wealth and to keep unemployed 'vagabonds', deprived of their livelihood, from threatening society. 'These methods...all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organised force of society, to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production, and to shorten the transition' (C i 915-916). This bloody work, which took centuries in Western Europe, was packed into a decade in Russia. The effect was the same. The peasants were separated from the means of production, and what was left of the gains made by workers thanks to the 1917 revolution were eliminated. The effect was, as surely as the process of 'primitive accumulation' analysed by Marx, to separate the direct producers from the means of production, and compel them to sell their labour power. It is true that this situation was concealed by what Marx would call the 'metaphysical or juridical illusion' (CW xviii 99) created by the fact that, legally, the state owned the means of production, and the workers controlled the state. The appearance, like the formal equality of capitalists and workers described by Marx, concealed an underlying reality of class exploitation. The workers did not control the state; rather, the party-state bureaucracy headed by Stalin had political power, and through it enjoyed effective possession of the means of production.

A2 USSR Failed

USSR FAILURE BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL MILITARY PRESSURE NOT MARXISM. WE HAVE TO GO GLOBAL TO SOLVE.

Callinicos '04 [Alex, Director of the Centre for European Studies at King's College, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, 2004 pg. 180-181]

We have seen that capitalism involves two separations. The first, that of the direct producers from the means of production, was brought about in Russia by the forced collectivisation and industrialisation of the 1930s. But what of the second separation, the division of the economy into competing capitals? It is natural to believe that such a state of affairs does not exist in the Soviet Union, since within the country the market for goods other than labour power itself has largely been replaced by state planning and control. Here again, however, the reality is different from how it appears. Once we set Russia in its context, that of the capitalist world system, matters change. For it is clear that the Soviet state is subject to the pressures of the world system. This is reflected in the priority within the Russian economy given to military production, which takes an enormous 12-14 percent of the gross national product. The initial decision in the 1920s to collectivise and industrialise was not the result of Stalin's malevolence and power-lust, but of the pressure of objective circumstances—the need to match Western military might. The same pressure continues to bind Russia to the world system today, and to ensure that surplus labour is not used to benefit the associated producers, but instead is ploughed back into further production. The result is a situation in principle identical to that analysed by Marx in Capital. The aim of production under capitalism is not consumption but accumulation, production for production's sake. And this aim is not the result of a voluntary decision on the capitalist's part. Rather he is compelled as a result of competition to reinvest his profits, or be driven out of business by his rivals. 'The influence of individual capitals on one another has the effect precisely that they must conduct themselves as capitals' (G 657). The position is the same when we look at the relationship between Russia and the West, only now we are dealing with state capitals, rather than private firms, and they compete militarily as well as economically. The prevailing relations of production in the Soviet Union are thus not socialist, but rather are those of bureaucratic state capitalism. The working class is exploited collectively by a state bureaucracy which competes with its Western counterparts. The fate of the Russian Revolution therefore does not refute Marx: rather, it can be explained only on the basis of his theory, as the inevitable consequence of the failure of the revolution to spread, and of the pressures of the capitalist world system.

A2 USSR Failed

_____ **The USSR was just one iteration of capitalism. Its demise signaled a weakness in capital not in communism.**

The Invisible Committee in '9

[[The Coming Insurrection](http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf), http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 44-5]

Nobody respects money anymore, neither those who have it nor those who don't. When asked what they want to be some day, twenty percent of young Germans answer "artist." Work is no longer endured as a given of the human condition. The accounting departments of corporations confess that they have no idea where value comes from. The market's bad reputation would have done it in a decade ago if not for the bluster and fury, not to mention the deep pockets, of its apologists. It is common sense now to see progress as synonymous with disaster. In the world of the economic, everything is in flight, just like in the USSR under Andropov.¹⁴ Anyone who has spent a little time analyzing the final years of the USSR knows very well that the pleas for goodwill coming from our rulers, all of their fantasies about some future that has disappeared without a trace, all of their professions of faith in "reforming" this and that, are just the first fissures in the structure of the wall. The collapse of the socialist bloc was in no way victory of capitalism; it was merely the bankrupting of one of the forms capitalism takes. Besides, the demise of the USSR did not come about because a people revolted, but because the nomenclature was undergoing a process of reconversion. When it proclaimed the end of socialism, a small fraction of the ruling class emancipated itself from the anachronistic duties that still bound it to the people. It took private control of what it already controlled in the name of "everyone." In the factories, the joke went: "we pretend to work, they pretend to pay us." The oligarchy replied, "there's no point, let's stop pretending!" They ended up with the raw materials, industrial infrastructures, the military-industrial complex, the banks and the nightclubs. Everyone else got poverty or emigration. Just as no one in Andropov's time believed in the USSR, no one in the meeting halls, workshops and offices believes in France today. "There's no point," respond the bosses and political leaders, who no longer even bother to file the edges off the "iron laws of the economy." They strip factories in the middle of the night and announce the shutdown early next morning. They no longer hesitate to send in antiterrorism units to shut down a strike, like with the ferries and the occupied recycling center in Rennes. The brutal activity of power today consists both in administering this ruin while, at the same time, establishing the framework for a "new economy."

A2: DOMINATION INEVITABLE

The domination of power is not inevitable.

Negri, former professor of state theory @ University of Purdua, in '8
[Antonio Trans. Noura Wedell. The Porcelain Workshop p. 26]

The problem of reclaiming freedom within the very circle of power must be addressed-and this, just as power has become a biopower that nothing seems to be able to stop.

There is no doubt that the world defined by the real subsumption of society under capital coagulates and neutralizes possibilities of relations, but it does not do this to resistance, to freedom as potency (puissance) or to the constitution of new being. In the same way as

factory workers struggled against the direct exploitation of the assembly line, today, in a society put to work as a whole, the multitudes are rising. It is precisely between Foucault and Deleuze that the passage from the margin to the center of the block of biopower occurred, and that resistance became an ontological force. Foucault gives us a definition of biopower, reformulating and historicizing the analyses of the Frankfurt School, along with a definition of an active biopolitics. He also pinpoints the progressive emergence of a process of production of subjectivities capable of transforming subjects both in themselves, and in their relation to power. In Deleuze, the examination and periodization of the different phases of the relation between biopower and biopolitical reality-from discipline to control-reestablishes the ontological determination of resistance within the historical grid of real subsumption. Thus, the postmodern is given not only through the caesura it creates with modernity but also through the new conditions of an antagonistic process. The latter invests the world of real subsumption and presents it as a world where the antagonistic forces of power and resistance, capital and freedom are at play. If we consider resistance and freedom as material bases, they must of course be defined as activities, as living work, as the production of subjectivity-that is to say, as the invention of a new "use value" inside power, and as the objective saturation of exchange value. But we shall return to this soon.

A2 Rev Not Democratic

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/thecominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 81-2]

Sabotage every representative authority. Spread the talk. Abolish general assemblies. The first obstacle every social movement faces, long before the police proper, are the unions and the entire microbureaucracy whose job it is to control the struggle. Communes, collectives and gangs are naturally distrustful of these structures. That's why the parabureaucrats have for the past twenty years been inventing coordination committees and spokes councils that seem more innocent because they lack an established label, but are in fact the ideal terrain for their maneuvers. When a stray collective makes an attempt at autonomy, they won't be satisfied until they've drained the attempt of all content by preventing any real question from being addressed. They get fierce and worked up not out of passion for debate but out of a passion for shutting it down. And when their dogged defense of apathy finally does the collective in, they explain its failure by citing a lack of political consciousness. It must be noted that in France the militant youth are well versed in the art of political manipulation, thanks largely to the frenzied activity of various trotskyist factions. They could not be expected to learn the lesson of the conflagration of November 2005: that coordinations are unnecessary where coordination exists, organizations aren't needed when people organize themselves. Another reflex is to call a general assembly at the slightest sign of movement, and vote. This is a mistake. The business of voting and deciding a winner, is enough to turn the assembly into a nightmare, into a theater where all the various little pretenders to power confront each other. Here we suffer from the bad example of bourgeois parliaments. An assembly is not a place for decisions but for palaver, for free speech exercised without a goal. The need to assemble is as constant among humans as the necessity of making decisions is rare. Assembling corresponds to the joy of feeling a common power. Decisions are vital only in emergency situations, where the exercise of democracy is already compromised. The rest of the time, "the democratic character of decision making" is only a problem for the fanatics of process. It's not a matter of critiquing assemblies or abandoning them, but of liberating the speech, gestures, and interplay of beings that take place within them. We just have to see that each person comes to an assembly not only with a point of view or a motion, but with desires, attachments, capacities, forces, sadnesses and a certain disposition toward others, an openness. If we manage to set aside the fantasy of the General Assembly and replace it with an assembly of presences, if we manage to foil the constantly renewed temptation of hegemony, if we stop making the decision our final aim, then there is a chance for a kind of massification, one of those moments of collective crystallization where a decision suddenly takes hold of beings, completely or only in part. The same goes for deciding on actions. By starting from the principle that "the action in question should govern the assembly's agenda" we make both vigorous debate and effective action impossible. A large assembly made up of people who don't know each other is obliged to call on action specialists, that is, to abandon action for the sake of its control. On the one hand, people with mandates are by definition hindered in their actions, on the other hand, nothing hinders them from deceiving everyone. There's no ideal form of action. What's essential is that action assume a certain form, that it give rise to a form instead of having one imposed on it. This presupposes a shared political and geographical position – like the sections of the Paris Commune during the French Revolution – as well as the circulation of a shared knowledge. As for deciding on actions, the principle could be as follows: each person should do their own reconnaissance, the information would then be put together, and the decision will occur to us rather than being made by us. The circulation of knowledge cancels hierarchy; it equalizes by raising up. Proliferating horizontal communication is also the best form of coordination among different communes, the best way to put an end to hegemony.

A2 Police Crackdown

____ The spontaneous nature of the insurgency will make police crackdown practically impossible. It will be easier to the revolution to organize than for the police.

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 83-4]

"This business shows that we are not dealing with young people making social demands, but with individuals who are declaring war on the Republic," noted a lucid cop about recent clashes. The push to liberate territory from police occupation is already underway, and can count on the endless reserves of resentment that the forces of order have marshaled against it. Even the "social movements" are gradually being seduced by the riots, just like the festive crowds in Rennes who fought the cops every Thursday night in 2005, or those in Barcelona who destroyed a shopping district during a botellion. The movement against the CPE witnessed the recurrent return of the Molotov cocktail. But on this front certain banlieues remain unsurpassed. Specifically, when it comes to the technique they've been perfecting for some time now: the surprise attack. Like the one on October 13, 2006 in Epinay. A private-security team headed out after getting a report of something stolen from a car. When they arrived, one of the security guards "found himself blocked by two vehicles parked diagonally across the street and by more than thirty people carrying metal bars and pistols who threw stones at the vehicle and used tear gas against the police officers." On a smaller scale, think of all the local police stations attacked in the night: broken windows, burnt-out cop cars. One of the results of these recent movements is the understanding that henceforth a real demonstration has to be "wild," not declared in advance to the police. Having the choice of terrain, we can, like the Black Bloc of Genoa in 2001, bypass the red zones and avoid direct confrontation. By choosing our own trajectory, we can lead the cops, including unionist and pacifist ones, rather than being herded by them. In Genoa we saw a thousand determined people push back entire buses full of carabinieri, then set their vehicles on fire. The important thing is not to be better armed but to take the initiative. Courage is nothing, confidence in your own courage is everything. Having the initiative helps. Everything points, nonetheless, toward a conception of direct confrontations as that which pins down opposing forces, buying us time and allowing us to attack elsewhere — even nearby. The fact that we cannot prevent a confrontation from occurring doesn't prevent us from making it into a simple diversion. Even more than to actions, we must commit ourselves to their coordination. Harassing the police means that by forcing them to be everywhere they can no longer be effective anywhere. Every act of harassment revives this truth, spoken in 1842: "The life of the police agent is painful; his position in society is as humiliating and despised as crime itself... Shame and infamy encircle him from all sides, society expels him, isolates him as a pariah, society spits out its disdain for the police agent along with his pay, without remorse, without regrets, without pity... The police badge that he carries in his pocket documents his shame." On November 21, 2006, firemen demonstrating in Paris attacked the riot police with hammers and injured fifteen of them. This by way of a reminder that wanting to "protect and serve" can never be an excuse for joining the police.

A2 Violent State Backlash/Army

____ The state will inevitably respond with the threat of violence, and revolutionaries must be armed. But the success of the revolution will make use of weapons unnecessary.

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/thecominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 84-5]

There is no such thing as a peaceful insurrection. Weapons are necessary: it's a question of doing everything possible to make using them unnecessary. An insurrection is more about taking up arms and maintaining an "armed presence" than it is about armed struggle. We need to distinguish clearly between being armed and the use of arms. Weapons are a constant in revolutionary situations, but their use is infrequent and rarely decisive at key turning points: August 10th 1792, March 18th 1871, October 1917. When power is in the gutter, it's enough to walk over it. Because of the distance that separates us from them, weapons have taken on a kind of double character of fascination and disgust that can be overcome only by handling them. An authentic pacifism cannot mean refusing weapons, but only refusing to use them. Pacifism without being able to fire a shot is nothing but the theoretical formulation of impotence. Such a priori pacifism is a kind of preventive disarmament, a pure police operation. In reality, the question of pacifism is serious only for those who have the ability to open fire. In this case, pacifism becomes a sign of power, since it's only in an extreme position of strength that we are freed from the need to fire. From a strategic point of view, indirect, asymmetrical action seems the most effective kind, the one best suited to our time: you don't attack an occupying army frontally. That said, the prospect of Iraq-style urban guerilla warfare, dragging on with no possibility of taking the offensive, is more to be feared than to be desired. The militarization of civil war is the defeat of insurrection. The Reds had their victory in 1921, but the Russian Revolution was already lost. We must consider two kinds of state reaction. One openly hostile, one more sly and democratic. The first calls for our out and out destruction, the second, a subtle but implacable hostility, seeks only to recruit us. We can be defeated both by dictatorship and by being reduced to opposing only dictatorship. Defeat consists as much in losing the war as in losing the choice of which war to wage. Both are possible, as was proven by Spain in 1936: the revolutionaries there were defeated twice-over, by fascism and by the republic. When things get serious, the army occupies the terrain. Whether or not it engages in combat is less certain. That would require that the state be committed to a bloodbath, which for now is no more than a threat, a bit like the threat of using nuclear weapons for the last fifty years. Though it has been wounded for a long while, the beast of the state is still dangerous. A massive crowd would be needed to challenge the army, invading its ranks and fraternizing with the soldiers. We need a March 18th 1871. When the army is in the street, we have an insurrectionary situation. Once the army engages, the outcome is precipitated. Everyone finds herself forced to take sides, to choose between anarchy and the fear of anarchy. An insurrection triumphs as a political force. It is not impossible to defeat an army politically.

A2 We are Socialism

____ Socialism is just a way to neutralize the resistance and reinforce the power of the ruling elite.

Negri, Marxist philosopher, in '9

[Antonio, "Communism: some thoughts on the concept and practice", March 14,
http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm]

Therefore communism is the enemy of socialism because socialism is the classical form of this second model of alienation of proletarian power [potenza], which also requires a distorted organisation of the production of its subjectivity. The perversions of 'real socialism' have neutralised a century of class struggle and dispelled all the illusions of the philosophy of history. It is interesting to see how 'real socialism', despite initiating massive processes of collectivisation, never questioned the disciplines of command, be they juridical, political or pertaining to the human sciences. The institutional structure of socialism and its political polarities was produced by an ideology that arbitrarily opposed private to public - whilst these, following Rousseau, overlap one another - and sanctified a ruling class whose functions of command reproduced the ones of the capitalist élite whilst they claimed to be self-elected 'vanguards'!

A2 Cap Too Strong

____ The system has produced the means of its own destruction. The task to find the weakest node and interrupt the network of capital. American longshoremen could have crippled the US and Asian economies with a month long strike.

The Invisible Committee in '9

[The Coming Insurrection, http://tarnac9.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/the_cominsur_booklet.pdf, pg. 40-1]

But the metropolis also produces the means of its own destruction. An American security expert explains the defeat in Iraq as a result of the guerrillas' ability to take advantage of new ways of communicating. The US invasion didn't so much import democracy to Iraq as it did cybernetic networks. They brought with them one of the weapons of their own defeat. The proliferation of mobile phones and internet access points gave the guerrillas newfound ways to self-organize, and allowed them to become such elusive targets. Every network has its weak points, the nodes that must be undone in order to interrupt circulation, to unwind the web. The last great European electrical blackout proved it: a single incident with a high-tension wire and a decent part of the continent was plunged into darkness. In order for something to rise up in the midst of the metropolis and open up other possibilities, the first act must be to interrupt its perpetuum mobile. That is what the Thai rebels understood when they knocked out electrical stations. That is what the French anti-CPE13 protestors understood in 2006 when they shut down the universities with a view toward shutting down the entire economy. That is what the American longshoremen understood when they struck in October, 2002 in support of three hundred jobs, blocking the main ports on the West Coast for ten days. The American economy is so dependent on goods coming from Asia that the cost of the blockade was over a billion dollars per day. With ten thousand people, the largest economic power in the world can be brought to its knees. According to certain "experts," if the action had lasted another month, it would have produced "a recession in the United States and an economic nightmare in Southeast Asia."

A2 Cap is Stable/Sustainable

THE FREE MARKET INEVITABLY PRODUCES MONOPOLISTIC MEGA-CORPORATIONS THAT CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT LABOR WHILE DEFYING THE LOGIC OF THE ‘FREE MARKET’.

Callinicos ’04 [Alex, Director of the Centre for European Studies at King’s College, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, 2004 pg. 184-185]

The emergence of monopoly capital, far from contradicting Marx’s analysis in Capital, is central to it. As we have seen, Marx argued that competition between capitals would lead to the growth in size of the units of production. This process takes two connected forms—the concentration of capital through the accumulation of surplus value, and the centralisation of capital, the absorption of smaller and less efficient firms by their larger and more efficient rivals. At the same time as this ‘constant decrease in the number of capitalist magnates’ (C i 929), legal property forms were changing. Marx described the emergence of joint-stock companies as ‘the abolition of capital as private property within the framework of capitalist production itself’, involving the ‘transformation of the actually functioning capitalist into a mere manager of other people’s capital, and of the owner of capital into a mere owner, a mere money capitalist’ (C iii 436-437). The famous ‘separation of ownership and control’ would thus have come as no surprise to Marx. The growth of monopoly capital has continued apace during the 20th century. For example, the 100 largest companies in Britain in 1970 accounted for 46 percent of net manufacturing output. Since the Second World War the big corporations have increasingly operated on an international scale, spreading their operations across the globe. These changes have not made the behaviour of industrialists any less capitalist. Claims to the contrary tend to rely on businessmen’s psychology—on the differences between the Victorian laissez faire capitalist out to grab the most for himself, and the smooth ‘socially aware’ mid-20th century executive, concerned more about the company than about his own personal interests. Even if we ignore the question of how accurate these pictures are, they are irrelevant to the central issue of the nature of contemporary capitalism. For, as we have seen, Marx stressed that the dynamic that leads capitalists to extract and accumulate surplus value has nothing to do with their personal desires, but rather arises from the impersonal pressures of the competitive system of which they are part. And competition between capitals continues as ferociously as ever, even if the struggle is now between multinational firms rather than individual capitalists. In such a competitive environment, profits remain the only adequate measure of success or failure—above all because they are the source of funds for reinvestment. The shift from short term profit to long term growth, even if it has happened, simply reflects a change in the means of maximising profits, not an abandonment of the goal of profitability.

A2 Marx oversimplify history/not class struggle

Arguing that history is not class struggle is a failure to understand capitalism's complete domination of the life world through. Understanding this relationship of power is necessary for the development of communism.

Negri, Marxist philosopher, in '9

[Antonio, "Communism: some thoughts on the concept and practice", March 14,
http://www.generation-online.org/p/fp_negri21.htm]

1) Communists assume that history is always the history of class struggle.

For some this position is untenable because history is determined and now so totally dominated by capital that such an assumption is ineffectual and unverifiable.

But they forget that capital is always a relation of power [force], that whilst it might be able to organise a solid and overbearing hegemony, this hegemony is always the function of a particular command inside a power relation. Neither the concept of capital nor its historical variants would exist in the absence of a proletariat who, whilst being exploited by capital, is always the living labour that produces it. Class struggle is the power relation expressed between the boss and the worker: this relation invests exploitation and capitalist command and is established in the institutions that organise the production and circulation of profit.

Others who claim that history cannot simply be reduced [traced back] to class struggle assume the permanent [persistance/existance] subsistence of a 'use-value'. They qualify this as the value of labour power or as the value of nature and of the environmental surroundings of human labour. This assumption is not only radically inadequate as an explanation of capitalist development, but is also certainly wrong as a description of the current form of capitalism.

Capital has conquered and enveloped the entire life-world, its hegemony is global. There is no room for narodniki! Class struggle develops here, 'from the premises now in existence', not under different circumstances: class relations are founded on these historical determinations (historical determinism) and the new production of subjectivity (of the boss and worker alike).

Firstly, it is of interest to note that there is no longer an 'outside' in this context, and that struggle (not only struggle, but the substance of subjects in struggle) is now totally 'inside': there is no longer any semblance or reflection of 'use-value'. We are completely immersed in the world of 'exchange-value' and its brutal and ferocious reality.

Historical materialism explains how and why exchange value is so central to class struggle: 'In bourgeois society, the worker e.g. stands there purely without objectivity, subjectively; but the thing which stands opposite him has now become the true community [das wahre Gemeinwesen], which the proletariat 'tries to make a meal of, and which makes a meal of him' (Marx, Grundrisse, Notebook V, trans. by M. Nicolaus, London: Pelican, 1973, p.496).

Yes, but in this alternative appropriation – that of the capitalists against that of the workers - capital definitely appears as a relation. Communism begins to take shape when the proletarian takes it as her objective to re-appropriate the Gemeinwesen, the community, to turn it into the order of a new society.

Aff Ans Permutation – Demand Aff

It is necessary to deploy protest politics and calls upon the state in order to make gains against the system. Protesting for welfare does not trade off with wider disruptive politics that seek to change the system.

Schram, teaches social policy and social theory in the Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr College, in '3

[Sanford F., "The Praxis of Poor People's Movements: Strategy and Theory in Dissensus Politics", Symposium Vol. 1/No. 4]

The welfare rights case study was one in which Piven and Cloward had firsthand experience as scholar/activists, and it best represents the way they were producing situated knowledge tied to a specific political struggle. The politics of disruption in this case was energized by Cloward and Piven's paper "A Strategy to End Poverty." This widely circulated paper appeared in 1966 in The Nation and later in various other publications.¹⁰ Thousands of welfare activists were drawn into the strategy. The paper used recent research by Piven and Cloward indicating that about one out of every two families eligible for welfare was not receiving it. Using this issue as the basis of strategy, the authors proposed mobilizing the poor to sign up for welfare so as to overload the system, underscore its inability to meet legitimate need, and thereby force a crisis that would lead to replacing the inadequate welfare system with a guaranteed income. This approach came to be called the "crisis strategy," and it almost worked when the guaranteed income was seriously considered by the Nixon administration and Congress.

The crisis strategy was what its name says it was: strategy—not theory—using a politics of disruption as a critical but contingent tool for creating political change. To highlight the contingent character of such a resource, Piven and Cloward famously wrote at the conclusion of their first book: "A placid poor get nothing, but a turbulent poor sometimes get something."¹¹ Years later, the all-pervasive reality of political contingency became clear. In the face of the 1990s welfare retrenchment, Cloward was asked whether their crisis strategy had backfired, and he responded: "We knew that trouble was coming. Our view is the poor don't win much, and they only win it episodically. You get what you can when you can get it—and then you hold onto your hat."¹² I call this orientation "radical incrementalism," where activism pushes for fundamental changes by forcing concessions from those in power, taking what incremental gains can be had and using them to build a better future.¹³ The crisis strategy did just that, effectively combining a "politics of survival" with a "politics of social change."¹⁴ The strategy of radical incrementalism among activists collided with the theories of social movement scholars that emphasized the importance of building organizations to approach policy change more systematically. Piven and Cloward wrote that social movement theorists often seemed to be saying that social movements were too disruptive and in need of "normalization."¹⁵ While social movement theorists in the resource mobilization (RM) school (led by Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy) did not agree with the collective behavior theorists (such as Neil Smelser), who saw movements as irrational, RM theorists did see social movements as often inchoate.¹⁶ They prided themselves on offering a new strategic realism to social movement theory.¹⁷ Yet their approach to strategy was often overly theoretical, abstract, generic, and disconnected from the exigencies of specific struggles. These scholars were also far too often preoccupied with theorizing the conditions for creating solidarity through organization. RM theorists repeatedly hypothesized about the rational calculus that could build social movements into sustainable mass-membership organizations. They tended to elide the important differences between protest politics and more conventional forms of politics rather than examine the strategic relationship between the two. They often failed to see how protest politics was valuable in creating a distinctive way of exercising political influence. As a result, RM theorists were at risk of "normalizing" protest politics and likely to dismiss the most disruptive forms as inconsistent with the conventional politics they favored.¹⁸ RM theorists often misunderstood Piven and Cloward as diehard proponents of disruption in all cases.¹⁹ Rather, Piven and Cloward saw protest politics in terms of contingencies: sometimes

Schram continues below.

Aff Ans Permutation – Demand Aff

Schram continued from above.

there was no other viable course. As early as 1963, Piven—in support of rent strikes in New York City—wrote that poor people are “without regular resources for influencing public policy,” so “disruptive and irregular tactics are the only resource, short of violence, available to low-income groups seeking to influence public policy.”²⁰ For the poor, mobilizing for protest politics was often strategically smarter than organizing to build massmembership organizations. In PPM, Piven and Cloward noted that a strategy for poor people’s political action that emphasized building mass-membership organizations was flawed for one major reason: “[I]t is not possible to compel concessions from elites that can be used as resources to sustain oppositional organizations over time” (xxi). Reflecting the RM tendency to prize solidarity, organization, and conventional politics over discontent, disruption, and protest politics, Sidney Tarrow (in this symposium) is also wrong to characterize Piven and Cloward as “radical Durkheimians” content to assume that the poor would always be alienated and could not be organized. Tarrow notes the strategic realism offered by PPM; however, he fails to appreciate that this strategic realism was contextually based. PPM suggested that the issue was not whether the poor should organize, but what forms of organization would be most appropriate for poor people, whose main political resource was their ability to be disruptive.²¹ In short, the book was about leveraging power in particular instances, for particular movements. It is also a mistake to suggest that Piven and Cloward rejected conventional politics generally. (This is yet another way that critics have missed PPM’s nuanced grasp of the contingent relationship between protest politics and conventional politics, electoral politics in particular.)²² PPM reiterated the theme of a 1968 article by Piven and Cloward: while protest politics and electoral politics were different—one emphasized conflict, the other consensus and coalitions—they were also interdependent.²³

The strategy of PPM was not to pursue protest politics independent of electoral politics, but to play them off each other. Electoral politics often created unsatisfactory results that over time could lead to the development of protest politics, and protest politics could help marginalized groups gain a greater voice in the electoral process. The politically strategic character of Piven and Cloward’s scholarship is made clear by how its critics could turn 180 degrees when the context changed—and Piven and Cloward’s strategizing adjusted accordingly. PPM predicted that the time would come when protest politics would not be the strategic option to emphasize. For the welfare rights movement, that time came in the 1980s. In 1983, Piven and Cloward worked with others to form the Human Service Employees Registration and Voter Education Fund (Human SERVE), which eventually became instrumental in winning passage of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (the Motor Voter Law). This law required motor vehicle, welfare, and other state government offices to help register citizens to vote. Critics from the left began to suggest that Piven and Cloward had forsaken the radical politics of protest for the conservative politics of the ballot box.²⁴ Yet Piven and Cloward did not forsake one form of politics for another; they simply emphasized one over another as context and contingency suggested. The strategic uses of protests and elections were both part of what Piven and Cloward would later emphasize as the “power repertoires” associated with movement politics.²⁵

Aff Perm

**It is necessary to work both within the state and outside of it to challenge the totality of capitalism.
Also your framework arguments fetishize the idea of being a legislator and “in power”**

Jessop, Professor of Sociology at the University of Lancaster, **2002** (Bob, The Future of the Capitalist State, pg.40-41)

The general form-analytic, strategic-relational approach adopted below treats the state as a social relation (Poulantzas 1978). This implies that the exercise of state power (or, better, state powers in the plural) involves a form-determined condensation of the changing balance of forces. In other words, state power reflects the prevailing balance of forces as this is institutionally mediated through the state apparatus with its structurally inscribed strategic selectivity. Adopting this approach, the state can be defined as a relatively unified ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularized, and strategically selective institutions, organizations, social forces and activities organized around (or at least involved in) making collectively binding decisions for an imagined political community. By strategic electivity, I understand the ways in which the state considered as a social ensemble has a specific, differential impact on the ability of various political forces to pursue particular interests and strategies in specific spatio-temporal contexts through their access to and/or control over given state capacities - capacities that always depend for their effectiveness on links to forces and powers that exist and operate beyond the state's formal boundaries.¹⁹ It follows that to talk of state managers, let alone of the state itself, exercising power is at best to perpetrate a convenient fiction that masks a far more complex set of social relations that extend far beyond the state apparatus and its distinctive capacities. Interestingly, this is reflected in the practices and discourses of state managers themselves. For, whilst they sometimes proudly claim the credit for having initiated and carried through a general strategic line or a specific policy, at other times they happily seek to offload responsibility for state actions and/or outcomes to other social forces (or to *force majeure*) at one or more points elsewhere in the ongoing struggle over power. While the constitutionalization and centralization of state power enable responsibility to be formally attributed to named officials and bodies, this should not lead us

to fetishize the fixing of formal political responsibility at specific points and/or in specific personages. We should always seek to trace the circulation of power through wider and more complex sets of social relations both within and beyond the state. This is especially important where the growing complexity and mass mediatization of the exercise of state power lead to a search for charismatic figures who can simplify political realities and promise to resolve them.

For, as Grande (2000) shows, charisma actually serves to hide complex, if not chaotic, behind-the-scenes practices which would be hard to explain or defend in public. This approach is inconsistent with any attempt to treat the state as a simple instrument or functional mechanism for reproducing capitalist relations of production. Indeed, it suggests that the typical form of the capitalist state actually problematizes its overall functionality for capital accumulation and political class domination. For the institutional separation

of the state from the market economy, a separation which is a necessary and defining feature of capitalist societies, results in the dominance of different (and potentially contradictory) institutional logics and modes of calculation in the state and the economy (for example, Hirsch 1976; Offe 1984; Poulantzas 1978; Reuten and Williams 1989; Wood 1981). Thus there is no guarantee that political outcomes will serve the needs of capital - even assuming that these could be objectively identified in

advance in sufficient detail to provide the basis for a capitalistically rational plan of state action and inaction. The operational autonomy of the state is a further massive complicating factor in this regard. Indeed, to the extent that it enables the state to pursue the interests of capital in general at the expense of particular capitals, it also enables it to damage the interests of capital in general. Accordingly, one must pay careful attention to the structurally inscribed strategic selectivity of the specific state forms and political regimes; and move away from abstract, often essentialist theorization towards more detailed accounts of the complex interplay of social struggles and institutions. A key element in such investigations is a concern with the changing state and/or hegemonic projects that define the nature and purposes of state actions (and inaction) in particular periods, stages and phases of social development and/or in different varieties of capitalism with their distinctive institutional configurations. It also requires attention to statecraft (the art of government) as a repertoire of skilled, discursive practices that reflexively monitor events and activities beyond as well as within the state and thereby inform state projects and attempts to exercise state power.

Aff Ans – Demand Solves

Globalization has created the perfect conditions for the protest politics of the affirmative. We can use the power of the multitude to create global social change through our demand. The specifics of the demand will prevent it from becoming a legitimating of corporate and state power, rather it will become a beacon for anti-capitalist protest world-wide.

Schram, teaches social policy and social theory in the Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr College, in '3

[Sanford F., "The Praxis of Poor People's Movements: Strategy and Theory in Dissensus Politics", Symposium Vol. 1/No. 4]

This line of inquiry, however, can be too bleak.³⁵ PPM teaches us that even today, in the shadow of the surveillance state, mass mobilizing beyond everyday acts of resistance is still possible and as relevant as ever. We need look no further than the rising tide of activism against globalization in various forms. Additionally, welfare rights activism has not withered under welfare reform; it has been mobilized by the cruelties of the new regime. Mass protest geared toward a politics of disruption often remains the best political resource that the otherwise politically powerless have.

The politics of disruption championed by PPM returns now to take on heightened strategic significance in an age of globalization. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who invoke Piven and Cloward in a laudable attempt to articulate a contemporary movement politics for the oppressed, advocate "a politics of subversion" situated between everyday acts of sabotage and the more organized forms of mass politics. Hardt and Negri show that globalization creates new venues for public activism even as it closes down the older ones.³⁶ Global social movements against sweatshops, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses spring up and even coalesce with increasing frequency, first against the World Trade Organization and then against unilateral war by the Bush administration. "Smart mobs" arise via the Internet.³⁷ Public activism does not die with globalization; it is transformed.

Hardt and Negri make the point that compared to the national economies that preceded it, the emerging global empire—with its postindustrial economy—is ever more dependent on the cooperative participation of the what they call the "multitude" (i.e., the diverse groups of people around the world who are needed to participate in the emerging global system of production).³⁸ More docile bodies and more malleable minds are needed in a transcultural, global system of exchange. And so "reproduction," in the broad sense of reproducing the type of private family, community, and social life needed for participation in the global public spheres of exchange, becomes as critical as the production that goes on in those spheres. The emerging global empire is more dependent upon the cooperative efforts of the multitude for the success of economic, political, social, and cultural relations. A politics of resistance at the level of creating compliant subjects therefore generates the political potential to threaten power's consolidation.

The new world order is in this sense arguably more vulnerable than the old to attacks from below. In the end, Hardt and Negri demonstrate that a politics of protest can be grounded in a positive program of social change.³⁹ A radicalized multiculturalism tied to resisting the consolidation of political and economic power informs this positive program, motivated by cultural and economic justice. This multiculturalism would not rationalize global capitalism by making diversity a source for corporate legitimacy with clients and customers in foreign countries. Instead, it would allow diverse people around the world to unite in their need to resist global capitalism's appropriation of their cultures and subordination of their communities. Like Piven and Cloward in PPM, Hardt and Negri in Empire thoughtfully resist the temptation to lay down blueprints and foundational theories for justice, preferring instead to emphasize the contingent character of social justice struggles.

Aff Answers

NOT ONLY ARE ANTI-CAPITALISTS UNABLE TO RECOGNIZE THE IMMENSITY OF CAPITALISM, THEY ARE ALL FLAWED BECAUSE THEY DON'T UNDERSTAND THE CAPITALISM IS THE REVOLUTION.

Bernstein (PHD in philosophy state university of NY) 2005 (Andrew "The Capitalist Manifesto" page 159-160)

The fundamental error of virtually all of capitalism's critics, and too many of its supporters, is their failure to understand this absolutely essential point: Capitalism is the revolution, the liberation of creative human mind power from centuries of feudalism and other forms of statism, the subsequent socialist onslaught against capitalism constitutes a statis counterrevolution against the mind, led fittingly by Marx and his heirs philosophical materialists who deny the mind's value (even its existence) and exalt manual labor –the functions of the body – as the source of economic production. It is because of its unleashed brain power that capitalism raised, and continues to raise, workers' real wages and living standards. IT is also the reason the capitalism eradicated child labor, the capitalist revolution performed, and continues to perform, a miracle in the life of the common man while its critics putter about on its fringes debating whether its results have been good or bad. Because they are witless regarding capitalism's fundamental nature and cause, they are intellectually unequipped to recognize the immensity of its effects.

(he continues)

The conclusion of part one must be: capitalism in the brief span of two centuries, has brought greater improvements in the material conditions of men's lives than have the statist regimes of all preceding centuries combined.

The disturbing specter of the Great Disconnect is then perceived with greater clarity. Capitalism is condemned solely because it counters mankind's prevailing moral code. But if the facts of capitalism's life-giving benevolence oppose men's dominant moral code, then it is time to challenge that code.

Aff Answers

SOLIDARITY WITH THE OPPRESSED IS INSUFFICIENT TO CREATE CHANGE. WE NEED SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO CHALLENGE THE CAUSES OF POVERTY.

Branwen Gruffydd **Jones**, International Relations at University of Aberdeen, **2005**

[*Third World Quarterly* 26.6]

The poor know that they are poor, and can describe their daily suffering, but they will not necessarily be able to provide a fully adequate account of the causes of their poverty. This is especially so in the era of global capitalism, when conditions of local poverty in Africa and elsewhere are rooted in and reproduced by social relations which are globally extended. It is the intransitivity of social relations which makes objectivity and social scientific inquiry necessary, and normative commitments insufficient in the production of critical social inquiry. In the context of unequal power relations and oppressive social orders, the best way to be critical in terms of intellectual inquiry and scholarship (which is necessarily conducted from a site of relative privilege), is to try to identify, theorise and explain the causes or production of specific social conditions and processes such as poverty, with a view to the possibility of progressive, ultimately transformative social change. Conclusion: towards a global political economy of poverty in Africa The institutionalised division of labour which structured the emergence of academic disciplines in the 20th century led to an absence of poverty from the concerns of International Relations, and an absence of theorising the international from the discipline of Development Studies. This, together with the tacit commitment to empiricism underlying the mainstream of both disciplines, reproduces in academic knowledge the ‘internalism’ underlying popular and institutional portrayals of global poverty. As a result neither International Relations nor Development Studies has adequately emphasised or theorised the global production and reproduction of local poverty in Africa. There is some hope that these flaws will be remedied, given the increasing attention to studying international relations and globalisation ‘from below’ in recent critical scholarship. However, methodologically, current critical approaches in IR and Development Studies are disabled by their abandonment of objectivity and a commitment to explanation. The incomplete critique of positivism which prevails in critical IR has emphasised the social nature of knowledge, in relation to power, at the expense of the content of knowledge and of ontology. Solidarity with the oppressed is important, and it is necessary to reject the false confidence and certainties of unreflexive positivism and to acknowledge the global relations of unequal power which affect the production of knowledge as well as the production of poverty. But if critical scholarship can do nothing more than listen to the voices of the poor and celebrate their agency, it has little to offer.⁴⁴ Rather than lingering in moral anxiety and discomfort,⁴⁵ which forever delays taking the (bolder?) step of actually trying to explain the world in order to change it, we need to develop a causal explanation of the global political economy of poverty and oppression.

Aff Answers

DEMANDS FOR JUSTICE CAN RADICALIZE THE GLOBE AND TRANSFORM THE SYSTEM

Buck-Morss '02 [Susan, Prof. of Political Science @ Cornell, *Situation Analysis*, Iss. 1, Oct. 2002 pg. 1478-2022]

September 11 has transformed irrevocably the context in which we as intellectuals speak. The acts of terror on that day were no invasion from the outside by a barbaric evil “other” but, rather, produced fully within a coeval and common world. We are witnessing the mutation of a new, global body-politic, and if we intellectuals are to have any potency as part of its thinking organ, it will be in discourses that refuse to separate academic life from political life, and that inform not just national opinion, but a global public debate. To think and write for a global public sphere is not an easy task. I do not have great confidence that these essays will succeed. I have no political choice but to try, nonetheless, as the commitment to a diverse, multi-centered human society is what my work, and what much of critical, theoretical work has been about for the past several decades, in universities that are now becoming decisively, and quite hopefully, global communities of scholars. The global public sphere in a broader sense, however, is not yet a “community,” or even a coherently navigable discursive terrain. To address it is thus a performative act. It aims to bring about that which it presumes. The notion of the “global” itself circulates globally today, describing and generating discourses of social change. Many, including myself, have questioned its newness, pointing to the five hundred years of European expansion that produced a world economy and world political domination. But the global terrain that is emerging out of the ruins of September 11 and its aftermath is, arguably, of a different order. And this difference has fundamentally to do with intellectual vision - what we see, and how we see it.

Historical rupture is a jagged process. There has not been a clean break with the past, there never is. The end of the Cold War, the restructuring of transnational capital, the electronic media revolution - these transition markers have been with us for decades. We have charted their development with concepts like post-modernism, post-colonialism, postsocialism, post-Marxism. But recent events bring the realization that in using these terms, our academic “global community” has not gone far enough. The hegemonic signifiers of Western capitalism, Enlightenment modernity and national sovereignty were kept in place. Radical criticism attacked their Eurocentricity without denying it. It appears now that events have outrun us, captured in a videotaped image of destructive fury that left us speechless, devastating our imagined political landscape. What disappeared on September 11 was the apparent invulnerability, not only of U.S. territory, but of U.S., and, indeed, Western hegemony. A new, global struggle for hegemony has begun. But let us not be content just to describe this process, as if the only actors who counted were military men, terrorists and counter-terrorist forces. In fact their use of force indicates their lack of hegemony, not its guarantee. It is, ultimately, the global public that will determine hegemonic power - a public newly forming, for whom the old economic and political narratives – even critical ones – are inadequate interpretive tools. The staging of violence as a global spectacle separates September 11 from previous acts of terror. The dialectic of power, the fact that power produces its own vulnerability, was itself the message. This distinguishes it decisively from radical social movements that aim to accomplish specific social and political goals. The Chiapas resistance movement, which was violent but minimally so, used global channels in order to garner wide support from a public inside and outside of Mexico, in order to bring pressure to bear on the Mexican state to change specific policies. It was and continues to be a radical, cosmopolitan articulation that translates indigenous cultural experience into hegemonic discourses of criticism as the precondition for the intelligibility of its demands. The goal is to communicate within the existing codes of oppositional struggle. A poet, Commandante Marcos, speaks in its name in inclusive, human terms against diverse manifestations of oppression; solidarity for this local struggle is imagined in global terms. In contrast, the destruction of September 11 was a mute act. The attackers perished without making demands. They left no note behind, only the moving, deadly image, which the cameras of those who were attacked themselves supplied, as they did the fuel-loaded, civilian planes that mutated suddenly into self-annihilating weapons. A mute act, played and replayed before a global audience - a message, sent by satellite to the multitude - a diversity of peoples who, witnessing the same cinematic time-image, the same movementimage, exploded into enemy camps. Or did they? Is the adequate word for the global reception, rather, “implosion,” as a global terrain means by definition that there is no outside, at the same time that there is, tragically, no cohesion among the multitude who inhabit it. All the forces of global society, however radically incompatible, are immanent within this overdetermined, indivisible terrain¹. Communicative acts demand a code, we are told. But only one? The force of these images was that they entered simultaneously multiple fields of communication within the global public sphere, with highly varied meanings, from terror to triumph. It was not only, even primarily to Americans that the act was addressed. Indeed, to Americans the aim was less to communicate than to explode understanding, a weapon of sabotage with devastating effects because, like an email virus, to receive the communication had the consequence of destroying the code. For us as Americans, to open ourselves to this message as meaningful necessitated conscious acceptance of realities - 5% of the Iraqi population destroyed by U.S. attacks and the ongoing embargo, persistent U.S. opportunism in its Middle-East foreign policy, double standards of political, economic and human rights, support for Israel despite its colonialist oppression of Palestine - realities that have been in front of our eyes and ears for decades, but that

Aff Answers

the code of American selfunderstanding with its master signifier of innocence had effectively blocked out as meaningless. The repeated question after September 11, “Why do they hate us?” did not want an answer. More than a rhetorical question, it was a ritual act: to insist on its unanswerability was a magical attempt to ward off this lethal attack against an American “innocence” that never did exist. September 11 ripped a hole in the American psyche. But it was possible, even in the desolation, to see an opening to a different collective sense of self, the hope of leaving the counterfeit innocence of America behind. New York City is on American soil, but it belongs to the world, not just as a node in a network of global cities, but as a place to work and live. An extreme diversity of national, ethnic, and religious communities calls it home. Imperfect, conflicted, a place of struggle, New York is a really existing, global public sphere in the most concrete and, currently, most optimistic sense. And when the rescue effort immediately began, these urban dwellers acted first together without thinking separate agendas, performing heroically in the name of the diverse multitude of New Yorkers. They give me courage to write. On September 11 the stabilizing structures of the global society that for better or worse keep the global order going, proved themselves vulnerable in the highest degree. The attack exposed the fact that global capitalism is inadequately imagined as deterritorialized. Just as “the state” would reveal itself during the Anthrax incident to consist of postal workers walking their delivery routes, so “capital” showed itself after September 11 as working people facing job lay-offs without a union for support. The World Trade Center towers were a symbol; but they were also a human and material reality, and the photographically mediated experience of the attack was of both the symbol and the real, antagonistically superimposed. “Photography is a theological technology,” Peter Osborne tells us, because it is indexical, a trace marking the intelligibility of the material world². This trace is the surplus that escapes even multiple meanings of the intentional message, in this case, sent by the terrorists. It is “theological” precisely not in the fundamentalist sense. The latter appeals to the text, whether Bible or Qur'an, to interpret the world as fateful intention. To do so is to exclude photography's material trace, the meaning of which surpasses the predetermination of the word. The traumatic intensity of the images of destruction existed precisely here: As cinematic as they appeared, they were unintentionally actual, irrefutably material and real. And the reality muddied the symbolic message. If we are to read the act symbolically as an attack on global capital, then how do we square this with the fact that it was the secretaries, janitors, food servers, clerical workers, security guards, and firemen who were killed? If it was an attack on “America,” then why were there so many other citizen nationals and so many different ethnic names among the victims? If this was the hub of the global economy, then why was it small business people and laid-off workers who suffered? If New York was symbolic of Western cultural decadence and sexual libertinism, then why were so many ordinary friends, families and children left behind? To see a photograph as purely symbolic, rather than as a trace of the real, is a reductive visual practice - shall we call it visual fundamentalism? Of course, this practice precisely describes the American reception of photographs of the Gulf War a decade ago: “smart” bombs that exploded human vehicles, houses and bridges like computer-game targets; retreating Iraqi troops massacred as they fled; Iraqi women sobbing in grief for family members lost in the brutal U.S. bomb-raid on Amiriya bunker in Baghdad. On September 11, these images surged back into memory, and with them a ghost-like presence, the home-grown, mid-Western terrorist, the Gulf War veteran, the “perfect soldier” who, with reference to the U.S.-caused death of Iraqi children, spoke with bitter irony of the Oklahoma City children he killed as “collateral damage,” and who when interrogated by police answered according to U.S. military instructions for captured prisoners of war³. No one in the U.S. quite dared to mention this ghost, Timothy McVeigh, executed less than a year before. But surely the nihilism of his act parallels that of September 11, as does its unpardonable violence. To relate them is to acknowledge global accountability for political acts as opposed to national difference. At that moment, this blurring of boundaries was too threatening to be allowed. When hegemony is under siege, when the imagined political landscape is under attack, there is little tolerance for complexity of meaning. But complexity is just what the diverse multitude in a global public sphere demands. Striking is the speed with which every image taken of the New York City disaster was reduced within a week to one image, the American flag, and under it one caption, “the nation under attack.” With brutal simplification, President George W. Bush declared: “you are with us or against us.” Hundreds of thousands demonstrating for peace around the globe were simply ignored. Millions of critics of U.S. foreign policy at home and abroad were placed under suspicion. George W. Bush, well advised after his alarming, initial slip of calling for a “crusade” against “cowards,” spoke eloquently of the need to make a clear distinction between two Islams: one, a great and honorable religion that has been a humanizing force over the centuries and is practiced in multiple ways by more than a billion people; the other, a subterfuge for criminal acts of terror. Bush has said it: a small group of men (and the actors on both sides in this disaster have been overwhelmingly men) must not be allowed to “hijack” the multitude. And who are we, if not this multitude, forced by both sides to acquiesce to the killing of innocent civilians? But to express a cosmopolitan consciousness at that moment was seen as a threat to exclusionary loyalties. We were made to feel afraid. Terror produces terror, as observers have long noted. Bin Laden and his supporters indeed pose a threat, but that threat doubles when it is countered in kind. A “fundamental paradox” of the paranoid style in American politics, wrote Richard Hofstadter in 1952, the era of the Cold War, “is the imitation of the enemy.”⁴ Now, as on that occasion, the acts of enemies reflect each other. The engagements of war cannot exist without this mirroring, that ensures an overlapping of the military terrain. In this terrain, we, the hijacked multitude, the vast majority, have been subjected to the common paranoid vision of violence and counter-violence, and prohibited from engaging each

Aff Answers

other in a common public sphere. The “we” who are Americans, under attack by the terrorists, have been given an ultimatum by our protectors to mute our dissent, rely unquestioningly on our alltoo-human leaders, and trust their secretly arrived at determination of our interest. To other nations the United States gives leeway according to the pragmatics of diplomatic policy, but one mandate for all seems non-negotiable: to be against terrorism means to accept the legitimacy of the U.S. to deploy its military power globally to fight terrorists as it alone, secretly defines them. For Muslims, it is not their right to practice their religion that is at stake. Rather, it is their right to challenge collectively, in Islam’s name, the terrorist actions of states: Israeli state terror against the Palestinians or U.S. state terror against Iraqi civilians. But even secular criticism now appears contentious. Samuel Huntington, no radical, has observed that in the Islamic world “images of the West as arrogant, materialistic, repressive, brutal, and decadent are held not only by fundamentalist imams but also by those whom many in the West would consider their natural allies and supporters.”⁵ It now becomes dangerous for them to say so. Can I continue to use the term United States here? U.S. policy? U.S. violence? Since September 11, now more than ever, we must maintain a double vision if we are to see clearly. There are two United States of America, and any political analysis - whether from the left or the right -- that aims at accuracy rather than myth-making must make that distinction. The one United States, of which I am a voting citizen, is institutionally a democratic republic. It is committed by its constitution to a balance of powers -- between local and federal elected officials on the one hand, and among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches on the other. (This balance has been in jeopardy from the moment of George W. Bush’s election.) It is a nation founded on principles of freedom - not the shallow freedoms of mass culture mediocrity and consumer choice - but the deeply human, I will say it, universal political freedoms of belief, speech, assembly, due process, and equality before the law - equality that has evolved over two hundred years of citizen struggle to mean blindness to sexual and class difference, sexual preference, racial heritage, and ethnic origin, with the goal of affirming and protecting difference in all the individual and collective human senses. I am fiercely loyal to the United States of American that espouses these ideals - ideals in no way the exclusive product of our history, but struggled for widely within the global public sphere. I will give my life to defend both them and the multiplicity and diverse human beings that as fellow citizens and honored guests inhabit my beautiful land - and I will defend them particularly against attempts to drape the persecution of difference with the American flag. But there is another United States over which I have no control, because it is by definition not a democracy, not a republic. I am referring to the national security state that is called into existence with the sovereign pronouncement of a “state of emergency” and that generates a wild zone of power, barbaric and violent, operating without democratic oversight, in order to combat an “enemy” that threatens the existence not merely and not mainly of its citizens, but of its sovereignty. The paradox is that this undemocratic state claims absolute power over the citizens of a free and democratic nation. My own coming to age politically was the consequence of another September 11 in 1973, when the U.S. government committed criminal acts, including murder, in support of the military coup in Chile of General Pinochet that caused the violent overthrow of Salvador Allende, the legally elected, Marxist President of Chile. (To think these two September 11 events simultaneously – to think Kissinger and Pinochet together as *Situation Analysis October 2002* 15 criminals against humanity, to think the U.S. School of the Americas together with the Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan as terrorist training grounds – is precisely what a global public must capable of doing.) Under the logic of the national security state that has existed formally in the United States since at least 1947, the “national interest” was conflated with that of the “free world”; freedom-loving regimes were by definition pro-American; freedom-fighters were any indigenous groups, no matter how antidemocratic, who with U.S. backing attempted to destroy leftist social movements throughout the world. A strong, secular left existed in every Middle-Eastern nation in the 1970s. It supported the Palestinian struggle, in Edward Said’s words, as “a liberation ideal, not a provincial movement for municipal self-rule under foreign tutelage. We saw it as an integral unit within the liberation movements of the Third World - secular, democratic, revolutionary.”⁶ This secular Arab left pressed for social and economic justice in terms antithetical to U.S. military and economic interests, and it was in this atmosphere that the U.S. national security state nurtured figures like Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein (who in 1988 with the knowledge of the Western powers, killed 5,000 people in a poison gas attack on Halabja),⁷ and the leaders of the Taliban, all of whom would learn well the lessons of the wild zone of power. The U.S. national security state is a war machine positioned within a geopolitical landscape. It must have a localizable enemy for its powers to appear legitimate; its biggest threat is that the enemy disappears.⁸ But given a war, even a Cold War, and now given an ill-defined yet total “war on terrorism,” the declared “state of emergency” is justification for suspending the rights and freedoms of citizens. It justifies arresting and holding individuals without due process. It justifies killing and bombing without oversight or accountability. It justifies secrecy, censorship, and a monopoly over the accumulation and dissemination of information. All of these state practices are totalitarian, of course. In 1927, Stalin in his struggle for power took advantage of an almost hysterical fear in the Soviet Union that the Western powers would invade, declaring: “We have internal enemies. We have external enemies. This, comrades, must not be forgotten for a single moment.”⁹ The perception of a total threat legitimated the implementation of total, extralegal power both domestically and abroad. The word “terror” is used to describe the execution or imprisonment in the USSR of thousands of purged party members in the 1930s, and we are accustomed to equating this terror with Stalin’s name, as if one evil individual were responsible, rather than the logic intrinsic to the whole idea of “terror.” But Stalin justified his actions because the *citizenry*

Aff Answers

felt threatened, a state of mind that is fertile ground for abuses of power. According to one participant: "In the thirties we felt we were at war, at war with the entire world, and we believed that in war you should act like there is a war on."¹⁰ The consequence was that popular support existed for Stalin's regime, precisely because he was not squeamish about rooting out the evil source. The language, the thinking, has begun to sound unpleasantly familiar. I have argued elsewhere that the unlimited, unmonitored wild zone of power is a potential of every state that claims sovereign power, and with it, a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence¹¹. Two consequences follow. The first is that no matter how democratic the constitution of a state regime, as a sovereign state it is always more than a democracy, and consequently a good deal less. The second is that human rights, human freedom, and human justice cannot be exclusive possessions of one nation or one civilization. They must be global rights, or they will not be rights at all. The problem is not that the West imposes its democratic values on the rest of the world, but that it does so selectively. It is intolerable that rights be applied with a double standard; it is inexcusable to justify this flagrant opportunism of U.S. or any state policy in terms of respect for cultural diversity. Huntington describes U.S. duplicity: "Democracy is promoted but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalists to power; nonproliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq but not for Israel; free trade is the elixir of economic growth but not for agriculture [or steel, it now appears]; human rights are an issue with China but not with Saudi Arabia; aggression against oil-owning Kuwaitis is massively repulsed but not against non-oil-owning Bosnians."¹² We can add to this list: the killing of innocent civilians in New York City is a terrorist act, but Afghani innocents killed and starving are merely unfortunate; the Taliban's violation of women's rights makes them deserving of destruction, while the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan are not even being mentioned as a necessary component of an anti-Taliban regime. As participants in a global public, we cannot allow ourselves, cynically, to accept such double standards. Humanity is the subject of the global public sphere, not the United States. No individual nation, no partial alliance, can wage war in humanity's name. We, the diverse multitude of humanity, must insist on this as non-negotiable: on this point, "you are with us or against us." The United States was left dangling as the sole super-power after the fall of the Soviet Union, an absurdity, arguably, once the enemy was gone, but - it is what having hegemony means - that did not end its superpower status. If indeed the Emperor had no clothes, no one in the Empire was letting on. The United States still had smart bombs and nuclear stockpiles, Wall Street and Hollywood, and that seemed, for all intents and purposes, to matter. Until now, the U.S. has been able, openly, to shift from the moral high ground to raw self-interest and still prevail. Until now. We in the vestige democracy that still calls itself proudly the United States of America, have the opportunity, now, to free ourselves from decades of being held hostage by the U.S. national security state that has sullied our reputation and stolen our name. We must ask ourselves: How will we citizens, both civilians and soldiers, benefit from this "unlimited" war on terror, when its continuation is precisely what places our lives and our futures in danger? If the American way of life is going to have to change, let it be for the better. Let us not die for a system that exploits the globe's resources disproportionately and disproportionately reaps its wealth; that treats others with superpower arrogance and uses economic bribes to cripple the potency of the newly emerging, global body politic. If the war is brought to the homeland, let us be the ones who wage it - not with terrorist violence whereby the ends justifies the means, but with divine violence as Walter Benjamin, a Jew and a Marxist, conceived it: collective political action that is lethal not to human beings, but to the mythic powers that reign over them. George W. Bush insists: This is not the Cold War but a new war; the goal is not to defend the free world but, rather, freedom itself ("enduring freedom," as vaguely defined as the war). Yet the military action that George W. Bush calls the "First War of the Twenty-first Century" looks remarkably similar to U.S. military actions in the past. World Wars, the particular insanity of the twentieth century, were struggles for territory. Sovereignty was a geopolitical concept. The enemy was situated within a spatial terrain. In this context, "defending the free world" meant, physically, pushing the enemy out, setting up lines of defense, deportation of sympathizers, pursuits into enemy territory, geographic embargoes - in short, spatial attack and isolation. The overthrow - "destabilization" - of nation-state regimes from within was a clandestine action, best done by indigenous forces, so as not to challenge the terms of legitimization of the sovereign-state system in which wars took place. In global war, conflict cannot be discretely spatialized, a fact that has enormous implications in terms of the imaginary landscape. Because the "enemy" does not inhabit a clear territorial space, there is nothing geopolitical to attack. The fact that the United States has now nonetheless attacked the geopolitical territory of Afghanistan is indicative of its self-contradictory situation. Its superpower strength is still envisioned in traditional military terms. But the new global immanence means that there is no outside, a fact that the terrorists operating on September 11 exploited with brilliant brutality. In contrast, the United States is manifesting distinctly dinosaur-like symptoms by compulsively repeating its old tactics of massive military response. Global immanence has changed the role of the media most especially. In world wars, the news was directed to distinct audiences. Radio and movie newsreels reported the war unapologetically as "propaganda," editing and interpreting events to rally the home front and demoralize the enemy. But when a global audience makes it impossible to separate home and enemy populations, when the vast majority of human beings who are tuned in can be defined as neither "us" nor "them"; when audiences do not sit in spatially isolated bleachers, there is no way of controlling the propaganda effect. The media, rather than reporting the war, is inextricably entangled within it. It is a deterritorialized weapon among diverse populations, which it can both harm and protect. Again, symptomatic of the vulnerability of the United States in these changed conditions is that when global media cannot help but expose as false

Aff Answers

he stark opposition of good and evil that the government proclaims, its first response is to muzzle the media. Its second is to package and “sell” the U.S. government’s version of world events. Under conditions of global immanence, these policies backfire. The U.S. must operate within a global media market that it does not monopolize. There are competing brands. Truth in advertising becomes an issue. When Al Jazeera reaches 35 million viewers, including a growing American domestic audience, the good/evil narrative is challenged and complicated. The dilemma, of course, is that an open media is just what legitimates U.S. violence in the global defense of freedom, so that policy rationale is continuously in danger of undermining itself. Are we witnessing a U.S. national security state bid to transform itself from an obsolete superpower into a global sovereign power? Such sovereignty would challenge the nation-state system by claiming the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, launching “police actions” against “criminals” throughout the globe.¹³ What, crucially, would be its relation to global capital? In the twentieth century, given the traditional American formula of economic presence and political absence (as opposed to the European formula of direct political imperialism), the Cold War was vital for the legitimacy of U.S. foreign interventions that protected transnational business under the hegemonic banner of protecting the “free world” from communism, capitalism’s binary other. In the new situation of global immanence, this strategy no longer makes sense. As political actor, Osama Bin Laden is as imbricated in global capitalism as is Bush. And he is as imbricated in global media. Again, his strategy has been to use the most current technology against U.S. hegemonic power. Within the terms of this struggle, the hope that a felicitously reconstituted, “post-modern” sovereignty will come about as a new paradigm of power, as suggested by Hardt and Negri in their recent book Empire, now seems clearly overly optimistic.¹⁴ Would a U.S.-based global sovereignty be capable of becoming the violent arm of global capital? Surely, in the present “state of emergency,” the fledgling protest movements against global capital are already feeling the heavy hand of the new security and surveillance. But there is a contradiction that may hinder a U.S. bid for global power, at least in the short run. Global capital cannot exist without the freedom of movement that a global war against terrorism necessarily circumscribes. What does seem likely, and not undesirable, is that global capital will begin to separate itself from the protective shield that American dominance has provided. Not undesirable, because the equation of global capital with Americanization has obfuscated the political situation. Global capitalism needs to be analyzed with the same double vision (if for different reasons) that we have applied to the U.S. state regime. On the one hand, it is the very foundation of the whole possibility of a global public sphere. On the other, because it thrives on uneven development and the lack of universal rights within that sphere, it continues to be an indefensible system of brutal exploitation of human labor and nature’s labor.¹⁵ The true nightmare is that, under the terror produced by a total and unlimited war on terror, a U.S.-led alliance of powers (rather than a potentially more democratic and egalitarian United Nations) will develop in a way that protects the global mobility of capital and its interests, but not that of the multitude and the interests of its public sphere. Global sovereignty that would attempt to monopolize violence in global capital’s defense is a case of reactionary cosmopolitanism, because it lacks a radical sense of social justice. Al Qaeda and the exclusivity of its fundamentalist struggle is a case of reactionary radicalism, because it lacks a cosmopolitan sense of the public sphere. But when radicalism and cosmopolitanism converge in a global public sphere, when the multitude ceases to be hijacked by either side, when Western hegemony is provincialized within a larger humanity, then terror and counter-terror will have lost its hold. Whether that happens will depend on us.

Aff Answers

STATISM ESSENTIALIZE THE STATE IGNORING THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER VIOLENT ORGANIZATIONS OF POWER. WE CHALLENGE THE PENAL STATE IN SOCIALIZING AND THEREFORE DEMOCRATIZING WEALTH.

Wacquant '09 [Loic, Prof. of Sociology at U.C. Berkeley and Centre de sociologie européenne, Paris, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity, 2009]

In his lecture course on socialism, Émile Durkheim contends that the state is "not an enormous coercive power, but a vast and conscious organization" capable "of an action at once unified and varied, supple and extensive."^{*} Historical experience shows that these two aspects are by no means incompatible, and that a state apparatus can very well be both at the same time. Such is the case at the dawn of the twenty-first century with the United States, where, notwithstanding the virulently statist ambient discourse, public force understood *in the strict sense* plays an increasingly decisive role in the patterning and conduct of national life.

AZ
to
statism

Over the past three decades, that is, since the race riots that shook the ghettos of its big cities and marked the closing of the Civil Rights revolution, America has launched into a social and political experiment without precedent or equivalent in the societies of the postwar West: the gradual replacement of a (semi-) welfare state by a police and penal state for which the criminalization of marginality and the punitive containment of dispossessed categories serve as social policy at the lower end of the class and ethnic order. To be sure, this welfare state was, as we shall note shortly, notably underdeveloped compared to its European counterparts. For a number of well-known historical reasons, the sphere of citizenship is particularly constricted in the United States, and the ability of subordinate categories to make themselves heard, severely circumscribed.^{**} Rather than of a welfare state, one should

42 CHAPTER TWO

speak here of a *charitable state* inasmuch as the programs aimed at vulnerable populations have at all times been limited, fragmentary, and isolated from other state activities, informed as they are by a moralistic and moralizing conception of poverty as a product of the individual failings of the poor.¹ The guiding principle of public action in this domain is not solidarity but *compassion*; its goal is not to reinforce social bonds, and still less to reduce inequalities, but at best to relieve the most glaring destitution and to demonstrate society's moral sympathy for its deprived yet deserving members.

Aff Answers

Moreover, the hypertrophied penal state that is bit by bit replacing the rump social-welfare state at the bottom of the class structure—or supplementing it according to a gendered division of labor—is itself incomplete, incoherent, and often incompetent, so that it can fulfill neither the unrealistic expectations that have given birth to it nor the social functions that it has as its mission to shore up. And it is hard to see how its development could go unchecked indefinitely, since in the medium run it threatens to bankrupt the large states that lead the pack in the frantic race to hyperincarceration, such as California, New York, Texas, and Florida.² Lastly, notwithstanding the thundering proclamations of politicians from all sides about the necessity to “end the era of Big government”—the cheery chorus of Clinton’s State of the Union address in 1996—the US government continues to provide many kinds of guarantees and support to corporations as well as to the middle and upper classes, starting, for example, with home-ownership assistance: almost half of the \$64 billion in fiscal deductions for mortgage interest payments and real estate taxes granted in 1994 by Washington (amounting to nearly three times the budget for public housing) went to the 5 percent of American households earning more than \$100,000 that year; and 16 percent of that sum went to the top 1 percent of taxpayers with incomes exceeding \$200,000. Over seven in ten families in the top 1 percent received mortgage subsidies (averaging \$8,457) as against fewer than 3 percent of the families below the \$30,000 mark (for a paltry \$486 each).³ This fiscal subsidy of \$64 billion to wealthy home owners dwarfed the national outlay for welfare (\$17 billion), food stamps (\$25 million), and child nutrition assistance (\$7.5 billion).

It is the thesis of this book that the United States is groping its way

Aff Answers

toward a new kind of hybrid state, neither a "protector" state, in the Old World sense of the term, nor a "minimalist" and noninterventionist state conforming to the ideological tale spun by zealots of the market. Its social side and the benefits it dispenses are increasingly secured by the privileged, especially through the "fiscalization" of public support (for education, health insurance, and housing),^{*} while its disciplinary vocation is upheld mainly in its relation to the lower class and subordinate ethnic categories. This *centaur state*, guided by a liberal head mounted upon an authoritarian body, applies the doctrine of "*laissez-faire et laissez passer*" upstream, when it comes to social inequalities and the mechanisms that generate them (the free play of capital, deregulation of labor law and deregulation of employment, retraction or removal of collective protections), but it turns out to be brutally paternalistic and punitive downstream, when it comes to coping with their consequences on a daily level.

This chapter provides a preliminary sketch of the twofold shift that has tipped the balance of the US bureaucratic field from its protective to its punitive pole when it comes to managing poor populations and territories.⁴ It argues that the downsizing of the social-welfare sector of the state and the concurrent upsizing of its penal arm are functionally linked, forming, as it were, the two sides of the same coin of state restructuring in the nether regions of social and urban space in the age of ascending neoliberalism. The gradual rolling back of the social safety net commenced in the early 1970s as part of the backlash against the progressive movements of the previous decade and culminated in 1996 with the conversion of the right to "welfare" into the obligation of "workfare," designed to dramatize and enforce the work ethic at the bottom of employment ladder. We shall show in the next chapter that the new punitive organization of welfare programs operates in the manner of a labor parole program designed to push its "beneficiaries" into the subpoverty jobs that have proliferated after the discarding of the Fordist-Keynesian compromise. The diffusing social insecurity and escalating life disorders caused by the desocialization of wage labor and the correlative curtailment of social protection, in turn, were curbed by the stupendous expansion of the penal apparatus that has propelled the United States to the rank of world leader in incarceration. This abrupt rolling out of the penal state will be mapped out in detail in the second part of the book. >

Aff Answers

REJECTING THE STATE IS INSUFFICIENT. WE HAVE TO UNDE DIVISIONS AND EXPLOITATION IS MANIPULATE FOR STATE I CHALLENGE IT.

Wacquant '09 [Loic, Prof. of Sociology at U.C. Berkeley and Centre de socie europeenne, Paris, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social In 2009] 284-0.

In *The Weight of the World* and related essays, Pierre Bourdieu has proposed that we construe the state, not as a monolithic and coordinated ensemble, but as a splintered space of forces vying over the definition and distribution of public goods, which he calls the "bureaucratic field."¹ The constitution of this space is the end-result of a long-term process of concentration of the various species of capital operative in a given social formation, and especially of "juridical capital as the objectified and codified form of symbolic capital" which enables the state to monopolize the official definition of identities and the administration of justice.² In the contemporary period, the bureaucratic field is traversed by two internecine struggles. The first pits the "higher state nobility" of policy-makers intent on promoting market-oriented reforms and the "lower state nobility" of executants attached to the traditional missions of government. The second opposes what Bourdieu calls the "Left hand" and the "Righthand" of the state. The Left hand, the feminine side of Leviathan, is materialized by the "spendthrift" ministries in charge of "social functions"—public education, health, housing, welfare, and labor law—which offer protection and succor to the social categories shorn of economic and cultural capital. The Right hand, the masculine side, is charged with enforcing the new economic discipline via budget cuts, fiscal incentives, and economic deregulation.

By inviting us to grasp in a single conceptual framework the various sectors of the state that administer the life conditions and chances of the lower class, and to view these sectors as enmeshed in relations of antagonistic cooperation as they vie for preeminence inside the bureaucratic field, this conception has helped us map the ongoing shift from the social to the penal treatment of urban marginality.³ The present investigation fills in a gap in Bourdieu's model by inserting the police, the courts, and *the prison as core constituents of the "Right hand"* of the state, alongside the ministries of the economy and the budget. It suggests that we need to bring penal policies from the periphery to the center of our analysis of the redesign and deployment of government programs aimed at coping with the entrenched poverty and deepening disparities spawned in the polarizing city by the discarding of the Fordist-Keynesian social compact. The new government of social insecurity put in place in the United States and offered as model to other advanced countries entails both a shift from the social to the penal wing of the state (detectable in the reallocation of public budgets, personnel, and discursive precedence) and the colonization of the welfare sector by the panoptic and punitive logic characteristic of the postreha-

Aff Answers

bilitation penal bureaucracy (examined in chapters 2 and 3). The slanting of state activity from the social to the penal arm and the incipient penalization of welfare, in turn, partake of the *remasculinization of the state*, in reaction to the wide-ranging changes provoked in the political field by the women's movement and by the institutionalization of social rights antinomtic to commodification. The new priority given to duties of citizenship," and the martial reaffirmation of the capacity of the state to lock the troublemaking poor (welfare recipients and criminals) "in a subordinate relation of dependence and obedience" toward state managers portrayed as virile protectors of the society against its wayward members.* all these policy planks pronounce and promote the transition from the kindly "nanny state" of the Fordist-Keynesian era to the strict "daddy state" of neoliberalism.

Aff Answers

**VOTE AFF TO CHALLENGE THE NEOLIBERAL STATE. IF LEFT TO ITS OWN DEVICES,
WILL SPREAD INSECURITY AND VIOLENCE.**

Wacquant '09 [Loic, Prof. of Sociology at U.C. Berkeley and Centre de sociologie europeenne, Paris, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity, 2009] 287.

Three analytic breaks have proven necessary to elaborate the diagnosis of the invention of a new government of social insecurity wedging restrictive "welfare" and expansive "prisonfare" presented in this book, and to account for the punitive policy turn taken by the United States and other advanced societies following its lead onto the path of economic deregulation and welfare retrenchment in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

The first consists in *breaking out of the crime-and-punishment poke*, which continues to straightjacket scholarly and policy debates on incarceration, even as the divorce of this familiar couple grows ever more barefaced. The runaway growth and fervent glorification of the penal apparatus in America after the mid-1970s—and its milder expansion and startling political rehabilitation in Western Europe with a two-decade lag—are inexplicable so long as one insists on deriving them from the incidence and composition of offenses. For the rolling out of the penal state after the peaking of the Civil Rights movement responds, not to rising *criminal insecurity*, but to the wave of *social insecurity* that has flooded the lower tier of the class structure owing to the fragmentation of wage labor and the destabilization of ethnoracial or ethnonational hierarchies (provoked by the implosion of the dark ghetto on the United States side and by the settlement of postcolonial migrants on the European side). Indeed, the obsessive focus on crime, backed by ordinary and scholarly common sense, has served well to hide from view the new politics and policy of poverty that is a core component in the forging of the neoliberal state.*

must
Racist
I.e.
do Aff
to Choke
red-b
state


Aff Answers

The State provides support for localized movements

Frank Munger (Professor of Law, New York Law School), Winter, 2004, EDWARD V. SPARER PUBLIC INTEREST LAW PROGRAM SYMPOSIUM: THE NEW ECONOMY AND THE UNRAVELING SOCIAL SAFETY NET: HOW CAN WE SAVE THE SAFETY NET? *:
Afterword

Grassroots organizing for economic development has often had a political component. n126 In truth, few gains could be maintained without the support of government, at the very least through tax breaks or other benefits afforded not-for-profits, but often also through special benefits or laws intended to lock in opportunistic political gains.ⁿ¹²⁷ Simon argues that the political focus of low-income communities can often be extremely narrow and self-interested, displaying little of the public-regarding rhetoric associated with broader public interest movements. Their narrow, self-interested political focus, he argues, offsets their economic disadvantages as low-income people.ⁿ¹²⁸

The model of deepening democracy envisions a broader, mutually cooperative coalition of traditional opponents within a semi-autonomous institutional setting - a sector of the economy, a local government, or a school system - a movement defined by similarity of demography and interest. The rationale is to include enough traditionally competing actors so that when agreement is reached, the agreement itself is an effective instrument of governance that reorganizes relationships among the participants to achieve gains in efficiency, productivity, and communal support - in other words, welfare. As such, each successful coalition replaces existing competitive relations with [*_576] more mutually beneficial cooperative relations, thereby becoming a component of a reorganized welfare state.ⁿ¹²⁹

Bernhardtⁿ¹³⁰ provides an example of a business sector coalition, the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP), that restructured the employment relationship for many low-wage and welfare-to-work employees by creating mutually cooperative arrangements among business competitors who benefited from a reliable supply of skilled workers at a cost born equally among competitors for their services. Professors Archon Fung and Erik O. Wright discuss other local democracy experiments that have achieved at least partial success in a wide range of community settings and policy areas: decentralization in the Chicago school system, participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, village governance in India, and production of Habitat Conservation Plans under the Endangered Species Act.ⁿ¹³¹ Each experiment successfully created a more inclusive democratic base for political, economic, or administrative decision making that included some previously excluded, relatively powerless members of the community who benefited from a redistribution of public or private welfare. Redistributed benefits included better jobs and fringe benefits, responsive municipal government, environmental amenities, or better education for their children.

The present ideological climate favors the experiments advocated by these scholars. A key structural characteristic of the sector, local government, institution, or other setting in which the experiment can succeed is devolution; together the actors must be able to exercise real power. At the same time, Fung and Wright note that an agreement among the parties will be effective and constitutive of their future relations only if backed by a higher authority, in most cases the state, a condition they term "coordinated decentralization." The higher central authority must agree to respect and enforce the decision reached through deliberation among local actors. It [*_577] follows that the agreements are not voluntary, but binding and enforceable in some way by governmental authority.

Fung and Wright's careful assessment of the experiments identifies important preconditions, in particular the deliberative style of decision making undertaken by each group. A deliberative style of decision making is non-adversarial, relies on reasoned argument, and yields compromise as well as commitment to decisions. Of all the preconditions for success, they acknowledge, deliberative decision making and commitment will be the most problematic. Further, power imbalances will be nearly unavoidable among participants in such attempts to reorganize social relations and the local welfare state. Unless an imbalance of power can be checked by opportunistic alliances, conditional rewards for deliberation by a higher level of authority, or threats by such low-wage worker or consumer-friendly groups as unions or local advocacy organizations, truly deliberative decision making may not develop.ⁿ¹³² While these examples show that the local welfare state may be reformed to achieve progressive welfare state goals, these experiments will not be easy to replicate. Their reliance on unique circumstances, exceptional political coalitions, or high levels of social capital suggests that broader transformation will be difficult to achieve.

Finally, the factors that limit replication of the WRTP or successful Habitat Conservation Plan negotiations by members of the middle and working class are even more problematic for the working poor and dependent poor who seek better safety net provisions. Handler's evaluation of welfare reforms acknowledges the differences in results achieved through widely varying state approaches to public assistance following the devolution of responsibility under TANF.ⁿ¹³³ Sharp divergence between the benign outcomes for recipients who benefit from public assistance in Utah's program offering intensive support for the hard-to-assist and those who are left destitute and homeless under Florida's rigorous "work first" [*_578] program illustrates the range of possibilities. But central to this evaluation is the principle that far higher costs are associated with successful programs. As the national economy has weakened, Utah has cut back its intensive support programs. Without additional federal financial support and federal benchmark standards that reflect what has been learned from successful programs, costly but effective programs will be severely limited. Moreover, a politically weak minority such as the poor, who often have overlapping political disadvantages associated with poverty, gender, and race (and, for a large proportion, disability or health problems), are unlikely to achieve changes in policies at the state or local level on their own. The problems of "street-level" bureaucracy will only be exacerbated by devolution of responsibility for policies to the local level together with "government by objective delegation" of new responsibilities to frontline workers to help recipients with work and time limits.ⁿ¹³⁴

Because of the acknowledged barriers to political mobilization for mutually beneficial redistribution of benefits and opportunities, the state remains the ultimate provider of entitlements and oversight, especially for those who are unable to meet the demands of the unregulated labor market.

Aff Answers

HARVEY AND PURELY MATERIALIST ACCOUNT OF NEOLIBERALISM IGNORE ROLE OF THE PRISONS IN CONTROLLING DISSENT AND CHANGE. THE PRISON BOTH A SYMBOLIC AND MATERIAL ROLE IN THE DISCIPLINING OF SUBORDINATE POPULATIONS.

Wacquant '09 [Loic, Prof. of Sociology at U.C. Berkeley and Centre de sociologie européenne, Paris, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity 2009] p. 309-0

A similar oversight of the centrality of the penal institution to the new government of social insecurity is found in the works of eminent critics of neoliberalism. David Harvey's extended characterization of "the neoliberal state" in his *Brief History of Neoliberalism* is a case in point, which appropriately spotlights the obdurate limitations of the traditional political economy of punishment which the present book has sought to overcome. For Harvey, neoliberalism aims at maximizing the reach of market transactions via "deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision." As in previous eras of capitalism, the task of Leviathan is "to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign capital," but now this translates into penal expansion:

The neoliberal state will resort to coercive legislation and policing tactics (anti-picketing rules, for instance) to disperse or repress collective forms of opposition to corporate power. Forms of surveillance and policing multiply: in the US, incarceration became a key state strategy to deal with problems arising among the discarded workers and marginalized populations. *The coercive arm of the state is augmented to protect corporate interests* and, if necessary, to *repress dissent*. None of this seems consistent with neoliberal theory.³¹

With barely a few passing mentions of the prison and not a line on workfare, Harvey's account of the rise of neoliberalism is woefully incomplete. His conception of the neoliberal state turns out to be surprisingly restricted, first, because he remains wedded to the repressive conception of power, instead of construing the manifold missions of penality through the expansive category of production. Subsuming penal institutions under the rubric of coercion leads him to ignore the expressive function and ramifying material effects of the law and its enforcement, which are to generate controlling images and public categories, to stoke collective emotions and accentuate salient social boundaries, as well as to activate state bureaucracies so as to mold social ties and strategies. Next, Harvey portrays this repression as aimed at political opponents to corporate rule and dissident movements that

challenge the hegemony of private property and profit, whereas this book shows that the primary targets of penalization in the post-Fordist era have been the precarious fractions of the proletariat concentrated in the tainted districts of dereliction of the dualizing metropolis who, being squeezed by the urgent press of day-to-day subsistence, have little capacity or care to contest corporate rule.*

Aff Answers

MARXISM MISUNDERSTANDS THE ROLE OF THE STATE, PARTICULARLY THE PENAL STATE, IN SPREADING AND ENFORCING THE FREE MARKET. THE STATE HAS NOT WITHDRAWN IT HAS JUST DISCOVERED BETTER CAMOUFLAGE.

Wacquant '09 [Loic, Prof. of Sociology at U.C. Berkeley and Centre de sociologie européenne, Paris, *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*, 2009] p. 310

Az
Harvey

Third, for the author of *Social Justice and the City* the state "intervenes" through coercion only when the neoliberal order breaks down to repair economic transactions, ward off challenges to capital, and resolve social crises. By contrast, *Punishing the Poor* argues that the present penal activism of the state—translating into carceral bulimia in the United States and policing frenzy throughout Western Europe—is an ongoing, routine feature of neoliberalism. Indeed, it is not economic failure but economic success that requires the aggressive deployment of the police, court, and prison in the nether sectors of social and physical space. And the rapid turnings of the law-and-order merry-go-round are an index of the reassertion of state sovereignty, not a sign of its weakness. Harvey does note that the retrenchment of the welfare state "leaves larger and larger segments of the population exposed to impoverishment" and that "the social safety net is reduced to a bare minimum in favor of a system that emphasizes individual responsibility and the victim is all too often blamed."³² But he does not recognize that it is precisely these normal disorders, inflicted by economic deregulation and welfare retrenchment, that are managed by the enlarged penal apparatus in conjunction with supervisory welfare. Instead, Harvey invokes the bogeyman of the "prison-industrial complex," suggesting that incarceration is a major plank of capitalist profit-seeking and accumulation when it is a disciplinary device entailing a gross drain on the public coffers and a tremendous drag on the economy.³³

Aff Answers

MARXIST ARE WRONG ABOUT THE INSTABILITY OF THE NEOLIBERAL ORDER. VIOLENCE OF STATE AND PENALIZATION STABILIZE THE ORDER AND MUST BE TAKEN ON DIRECTLY TO ALTER THE CONDITIONS OF THE ECONOMY.

Wacquant '09 [Loic, Prof. of Sociology at U.C. Berkeley and Centre de sociologie européenne, Paris, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity, 2009] p. 111

Fourth and last, Harvey views the neoconservative stress on coercion and order restoration as a temporary fix for the chronic instability and functional failings of neoliberalism, whereas I construe authoritarian moralism as an *integral constituent of the neoliberal state* when it turns its sights on the lower rungs of the polarizing class structure. Like Garland, Harvey must artificially dichotomize "neoliberalism" and "neoconservatism" to account for the reassertion of the supervisory authority of the state over the poor because his narrow economicistic definition of neoliberalism replicates its ideology and truncates its sociology.* To elucidate the paternalist transformation of penalty at century's turn, then, we must imperatively escape the "crime-and-punishment" box, but also exorcise once and for all the ghost of Louis Althusser, whose instrumentalist conception of Leviathan and crude duality of ideological and repressive apparatuses gravely hamstring the historical anthropology of the state in the neoliberal age. Following Bourdieu, we must fully attend to the internal complexity and dynamic recomposition of the bureaucratic field, as well as to the constitutive power of the symbolic structures of penalty to trace the intricate meshing of market and moral discipline across the economic, welfare, and criminal justice realms.³³

*Az
Harvey*

Aff Answers

Elevating class to the preeminent identity blinds us to how power inscribes sexist and racist domination: the alternative will reproduce racism and patriarchy.

Vivyan C. Adair. Prof of Women's Studies @ Hamilton College. Branded with Infamy: Inscriptions of Poverty and Class in America. Signs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Winter, 2002), pp 451-471.

Traditionally, Marxist and Weberian perspectives have been employed as lenses through which to examine and understand the material and bodily "injuries of class." Yet feminists have clearly critiqued these theories for their failure to address the processes through which class is produced on the gendered and raced bodies of its subjects in ways that assure for the perpetuation of systems of stratification and domination.² Over the past decade or so, a host of inspired feminist welfare scholars and activists has addressed and examined the relationship between state power and the lives of poor women and children.³ As important and insightful as these exposes are, with few exceptions, they do not get at the closed circuit that fuses together systems of power, the material conditions of poverty, and the bodily experiences that allow for the perpetuation--and indeed for the justification--of these systems. They fail to consider what the speaker of my opening passage recognized so astutely: that systems of power produce and patrol poverty through the reproduction of both social and bodily markers.

What is inadequate, then, even in many feminist theories of class production, is an analysis of this nexus of the textual and the corporeal. Here Michel Foucault's ([1977] 1984a) argument about the inscriptions of bodies is a powerful mechanism for understanding the material and physical conditions and bodily costs of poverty across racial difference and for interrogating the connection between power's expression as text, as body, and as site of resistance.⁴

Aff Answers

PLAN ISN'T JUST RESIGNIFICATION, IT IS A PROCESS OF BUILDING A NEW SOCIAL ORDER – WE ARE A PREREQUISITE TO THE ALT.

DEAN, TEACHES POLITICAL THEORY @ HOBART AND WILLIAM SMITH COLLEGES, 2007 [JODI, "RESISTANCE IS SURRENDER", I CITE, Nov. 8, [HTTP://JDEANICITE.TYPEPAD.COM/I_CITE/2007/11/RESISTANCE-IS-S.HTML](http://JDEANICITE.TYPEPAD.COM/I_CITE/2007/11/RESISTANCE-IS-S.HTML)]

But this might be too fast--why not recognize how defenses of the welfare state plus some good old liberal rights (fair trial, privacy, not to be tortured) are not acquiescences to neoliberalism at all but fronts in a struggle against capitalism? And why not recognize the practices of building something new underneath it all as a kind of enacting of a new order? Trying to hold on to and even extend social welfare and basic rights is not the making of hysterical demands meant to be rejected--far from it. It involves envisioning and seeking to bring about a better order. It seems to me that the Frankfurt inflection, the negative inflection of reason, is the correct one--resignification today is the tactic of torturers and the deniers of climate change. But the negative inflection need not be coupled with resignation, resistance or reform. It can be a moment toward something else.

MINOR DEMANDS FROM THE GOVERNMENT THAT FOCUS ON PARTICULAR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE CAN CREATE MAJOR SHIFTS IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE SYSTEM.

ZIZEK 2007 (SLAVOJ, A PROFESSOR AT THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIOLOGY, LJUBLJANA AND AT THE EUROPEAN GRADUATE SCHOOL EGS, "BADIOU: NOTES FROM AN ONGOING DEBATE")

< There are situations in which a minimal measure of social reform can have much stronger large-scale consequences than self-professed "radical" changes, and this "inherent incalculability to the factors involved in setting the pace of the cadence of socio-political change" points towards as the dimension of what Badiou tried to capture under the title of the "materialist notion of grace."² So when Johnston raises the question of

"what if the pre-eventual actors "don't really know exactly what they're doing or quite where they're going? What if, under the influence of statist ideology, they anticipate that a particular gesture will effectuate a system-preserving modification only to find out, after-the-fact of this gesture, that their intervention unexpectedly hastened (rather than delayed) the demise of this very system?" is not the first association that comes to mind here that of Mikhail Gorbachov's perestroika which, while aiming at minor improvements that would make the system more efficient triggered the process of its total disintegration? These, then, are the two extremes between which political interventions has to find their way: the Scylla of "minor" reforms which eventually lead to total collapse (recall also the – justified, we can say today – Mao Ze Dong's fear that even a minimal compromise with market economy will open up the path that ends in total surrender to capitalism), and the Karybda of the "radical" changes which in the long run merely fortify the system (Roosevelt's New Deal, etc.). Among other things, this also opens up the question of how "radical" different forms of resistance are: what may appear as "radical critical stance" or as subversive activity can effectively function as the system's "inherent transgression," so that, often, a minor legal reform which merely aims at bringing the system in accordance with its professed ideological goals can be more subversive than the open questioning of the system's basic presuppositions.

Aff Answers

AN ACT OF POLITICAL RESISTANCE IS ONLY POSSIBLE WHEN WE PROMOTE THE IDEA OF CONTINUM RATHER THAN CREATING A WORLD OF ALL GOOD AND ALL BAD

STAVRAKAKIS, LACANIAN PHILOSOPHER AND WRITER, 2007 (YANNIS, "THE LACANIAN LEFT PSYCHOANALYSIS THEORY POLITICS" 110)

<In trying to illuminate Z'iz'ek's 'revolutionary' desire and to evaluate its consequences for the Lacanian Left, I will be discussing as thoroughly as possible his recent work on the act. Although I will also be commenting on the overall development of Z'iz'ek's argumentation over the years, this chapter will not provide a comprehensive introduction or analysis of all aspects of Z'iz'ek's prolific and multidimensional work, a task which, if at all possible, would require a separate monograph. First, I will try to substantiate my claim that Z'iz'ek is guilty of a disavowal of the constitutive dialectics between negative and positive. I will argue that, contrary to his claims, this theoretico-political orientation is inconsistent with Lacan's understanding of the act. Furthermore, it does not take into account the dimension of temporality beyond the moment of this miraculous occurrence, it neglects the dialectics between time and space, and, as a result, it disregards the problem of the form institutional arrangements can and should take following the act, including the possibility of experimenting with new post-fantasmatic types of ordering. What the Lacanian Left needs is to move in the direction of articulating an alternative conception of the act, one which may link Lacan's insights (operating at both the real and symbolic levels) with a radical democratic project, able to promote the idea of a continuous re-enacting of the act as well as to imagine and construct a (conceptual, affective and material) space where such re-enacting becomes possible. >

NOTHING IS MORE VIOLENT THAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR.

SCHMITT, 1962

(CARL SCHMITT. "THE THEORY OF PARTISAN, A COMMENTARY/REMARK ON THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL", LECTURER AND LEGAL THEORIST AT UNIVERSITY OF GREIFSWALD, WHERE HE WAS A PROFESSOR)

A further touchstone that imposes itself on us in present times is the intense political commitment which sets the partisan apart from other fighters. The intensely political character of the partisan is crucial since he has to be distinguished from the common thief and criminal, whose motives aim at private enrichment. This conceptual criterion of his *political* character possesses—in its exact inversion—the very same structure as the case of pirates in maritime law, whose concept is based on the *unpolitical* character of his bad deed which aim at private theft and profit. The pirate is possessed of what jurisprudence knows as *animus furandi* [felonious intent]. The partisan, by contrast, fights on a political front, and it is precisely the political character of his action that brings to the fore again the original sense of the word *partisan*. The word is derived from *Partei*[party] and refers to the relation to some kind of fighting, warring, or politically active party or group. Such connections to a party are particularly strong in revolutionary times. In revolutionary war, adherence to a revolutionary party implies nothing less than total integration [*Erfassung*]. Other groups and associations, and in particular the state in its current form, are no longer able to integrate their members and adherents so totally as a revolutionary party does its active fighters. In the wide-ranging discussions about the so-called total state, it has not been noticed yet that it is not the *state* as such today, but the revolutionary *party* as such that represents [22] the proper and ultimately only totalitarian organization.⁹ Purely organizationally, in terms of the strict function of command and obedience, it must even be said that in this regard many revolutionary organizations must be considered superior to many regular troops, and that a certain confusion in international martial law has to arise when organization as such becomes the criterion of regularity as happened in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (v. *infra* p. 31).

Aff Answers

THE REVOLUTION WOULD FAIL AND LEAD TO MASSIVE VIOLENCE. REVOLUTIONS THRIVE ON THE DEHUMANIZATION AND TOTALIZATION OF THE ENEMY LEAVING NO SPACE FOR PEACE OR NEGOTIATION.

SCHMITT, 1962

(CARL SCHMITT. "THE THEORY OF PARTISAN, A COMMENTARY/REMARK ON THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL", LECTURER AND LEGAL THEORIST AT UNIVERSITY OF GREIFSWALD, WHERE HE WAS A PROFESSOR)

Hans Schomerus, already cited as an authority on partisanship earlier on, gives as the heading of one of the sections of his elaborations (which were made available to me in manuscript form) [53]: From Empecinado to Budjonnny. It means: from the partisan of the Spanish Guerrilla War against Napoleon to the organizer of the Soviet Cavalry, the mounted officer [Reiterführer] of the Bolshevik war of 1920. Such a heading illuminates an interesting military-scientific line of development. But for us, aiming at the Carl Schmitt • 33 theory of the partisan, it draws attention too strongly to military-technical questions of the tactics and strategy of mobile warfare. We need to keep an eye on the development of the concept of the political, which undergoes in exactly this moment a striking turn. The classical concept of the political as fixed in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century was founded on the state of European international law. This concept understood the war of classical international law as a pure state-war contained by international law. Since the twentieth century, however, this mode of state-war with its containments was set aside and replaced by the revolutionary partisan-war [Parteien-Krieg]. This is why we assigned to the following elaborations the heading From Clausewitz to Lenin. In doing so we might run the risk of losing our way in the opposite danger, namely in the derivations and genealogical tracings of the history of philosophy, instead of the restriction to pure military science. In this context the partisan is a safe guide since he protects us from such commonplace historical-philosophical genealogies, leading us back into the reality of revolutionary development. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had long since recognized that the revolutionary war of today is not the barricade war [Barrikadenkrieg] of the older sort. Engels, who had written many military-scientific treatments, lay particular stress on this. But he considered it possible that bourgeois democracy with the assistance of universal suffrage might confer a majority on the proletariat in the parliament, and so transform bourgeois social order into a classless society in a legal manner. Consequently, even a wholly un-partisan revisionism might appeal to the authority of Marx and Engels. In contrast to this, it was Lenin who recognized the inevitability of violence and of bloody revolutionary civil war as well as state war, [54] and so affirmed partisan war too as a necessary ingredient of the revolutionary process. Lenin was the first who consciously conceived of the partisan as an important figure of national and international civil war, and tried to make him into an effective instrument of central communist-party leadership. As far as I can see, it turns up first in an essay called Der Partisanenkampf that appeared on 30 September 1906 in the Russian journal Der Proletarier.³² It represents a clear continuation of the recognition of enemy and enmity.³⁴ • The Theory of the Partisan that begins in particular with the turn against the objectivism of Struve in his essay "What to Do" in 1902. "The professional revolutionary followed logically" from it.³³ Lenin's essay about the partisan concerns the tactics of the socialist civil war and takes aim at the attitude, widespread among social democrats of the period, that the proletarian revolution would be achieved as a mass movement in parliamentary countries, so that methods of direct use of violence would then be obsolete. For Lenin, the partisan war belongs to the realm of the methods of civil war and is concerned, like all others, with a purely tactical or strategic question relating to the concrete situation. Partisan war is, as Lenin says, "an unavoidable form of combat," one to be employed without dogmatism or preconceived principles just like other means and methods—legal or illegal, peaceful or violent, regular or irregular—depending on the particular situation. The purpose is the communist revolution in all countries of the world; whatever serves this purpose [55] is good and just. Thus, the partisan problem too can be very easily solved pursuant to this line. Partisans directed by the central communist authority become freedom fighters and venerable heroes. Partisans whose

activity deviates from this authority become lumpen rabble and enemies of mankind. Lenin was a great expert and admirer of Clausewitz. He studied the book Vom Kriege intensively in 1915 during World War I, and he entered extracts from it in German, marginal notes in Russian with underlinings and exclamation marks, into the Tetrada, his notebooks. In this way he produced one of the greatest documents in world history and the history of ideas. From a rigorous study of these extracts, marginalia, underlinings, and exclamation marks the new theory of absolute war and absolute enmity can be developed, one that would be determinant for the age of revolutionary war and the methods of the modern cold war.³⁴ What Lenin learned from Clausewitz, and he learned it well, was not just the famous formula of war as the continuation of politics. It involved the larger recognition that in the age of revolution the distinction between friend and enemy is the [56] primary distinction, decisive for war as for politics. Only revolutionary war is true war for Lenin, because it derives from absolute enmity. Everything else is a conventional game.

Aff Answers

THE REVOLUTIONARY ACT OF THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD ONLY PRODUCE ABSOLUTE ENMITY AGAINST THE REST OF THE WORLD TO BE DISPOSED OF TO USHER IN THE NEW UNIVERSAL OF MARXISM.

SCHMITT, 1962 (CARL SCHMITT, "THE THEORY OF PARTISAN, A COMMENTARY/REMARK ON THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL", LECTURER AND LEGAL THEORIST AT UNIVERSITY OF GREIFSWALD, WHERE HE WAS A PROFESSOR)

The war of absolute enmity knows no containment. The consistent realization of absolute enmity provides its meaning and its justice. The only question therefore is this: is there an absolute enemy and who is it in concreto? For Lenin the answer was unequivocal, and his superiority among all other socialists and Marxists consisted in his seriousness about absolute enmity. His concrete absolute enemy was the class enemy, the bourgeois, the western capitalist and his social order in every country in which they ruled. The knowledge [Kenntnis] of the enemy was the secret of Lenin's enormous strike power. His comprehension of the partisan rested on the fact that the modern partisan had become the irregular proper and, [57] in his vocation as the executor proper of enmity, thus, the most powerful negation of the existing capitalist order. The partisan's irregularity refers today not only to a military "line" or formation, as it did in the eighteenth century, when the partisan was just a "lightly armed troop," nor to the proud uniform of the regular troop. The irregularity of class struggle calls not just the military line but the whole edifice of political and social order into question. In the Russian professional revolutionary, Lenin, this new reality was raised to philosophical consciousness. The alliances of philosophy with the partisan, established by Lenin, unleashed unexpected new, explosive forces. It produced nothing.³⁶ • The Theory of the Partisan less than the demolition of the whole Eurocentric world, which Napoleon had tried to save and the Congress of Vienna had hoped to restore. The containment of the interstate regular war and the taming of the intrastate civil war had become so commonplace to the European eighteenth century that even intelligent parties of the Ancien Régime could not imagine the destruction of this kind of regularity, not even after the events of the French revolution of 1789 and 1793. They could only express it in a language of general and insufficient childish analogies. A great courageous thinker of the Ancien Régime, Joseph de Maistre, was clairvoyant in anticipating what it was all about. In a letter of summer 1811³⁶ he declared Russia ripe for a revolution, but hoped that it would be a natural revolution, as he calls it, and not an enlightenment-European one like the French revolution. What he feared most was an academic Pugatschow. He expressed himself in this way in order to illustrate what he correctly [58] recognized as the real danger, namely an association of philosophy with the elemental forces of insurrection. Who was Pugatschow? The leader of a peasant and Cossack uprising against Tsarina Catherine II, executed in 1775 in Moscow, who had passed himself off as the Tsarina's deceased husband. An academic, Pugatschow would be a Russian who "started a revolution in the European way." That would unleash a hideous spate of wars, and if it came to that, "words would fail me to tell what we would have to fear from it."

occupying the devastated area. A new sort of partisan could then add a new chapter to world history with a new form of space-appropriation.

Aff Answers

THE INDIVIDUAL OF REVOLUTION BECOMES SIMPLY A UNIT OF MANIPULATION FOR A LARGER CAUSE, THIS NEGATIVE ORIENTATION TOWARDS LIFE GIVES THE REVOLUTIONARY VALUE TO LIFE ONLY IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE FIGHTING CAPITALISM.

SCHMITT, 1962 (CARL SCHMITT, "THE THEORY OF PARTISAN, A COMMENTARY/REMARK ON THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL", LECTURER AND LEGAL THEORIST AT UNIVERSITY OF GREIFSWALD, WHERE HE WAS A PROFESSOR)

The third aspect, the interconnectedness with world-political fronts and contexts, has likewise long since been brought to bear on our common awareness. The autochthonous defenders of the home soil, who died pro aris et focis [for our altars and our hearths], the national and patriotic heroes who went into the woods, all elemental, telluric force in reaction to foreign invasion; it has all come under an international and transnational central control that provides assistance and support, but only in the interest of its own quite distinct world-aggressive purposes and that, depending on how things stand, either protects or abandons. At this point the partisan ceases to be essentially defensive. He becomes a manipulated cog in the wheel of world-revolutionary aggression. He is simply sent to slaughter, and betrayed of everything he was fighting for, everything the telluric character, the source of his legitimacy as an irregular partisan, was rooted in.

BINARY POLITICS FAIL – AN ABSOLUTE VISION OF BEING FOR OR AGAINST SOMETHING ENFORCES A FALSE CHOICE BETWEEN TWO FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG CONCEPTS, WE MUST RATHER FIGHT FOR THE THIRD.

ZIZEK 2007 (SLAVOJ, A PROFESSOR AT THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIOLOGY, LJUBLJANA AND AT THE EUROPEAN GRADUATE SCHOOL EGS, "BADIOU: NOTES FROM AN ONGOING DEBATE")

<This allows us also to approach in a new way Badiou's concept of "point" as the point of decision, as the moment at which the complexity of a situation is "filtered" through a binary disposition and thus reduced to a simple choice: all things considered, are we AGAINST or FOR (should we attack or retreat? support that proclamation or oppose it? etc. etc.). With regard to the Third moment as the subtraction from the Two of the hegemonic politics, one should always bar in mind that one of the basic operations of the hegemonic ideology is to enforce a false point, to impose on us a false choice – like, in today's "war on terror," when anyone who draws attention to the complexity and ambiguity of the situation, is sooner or later interrupted by a brutal voice telling him: "OK, enough of this muddle – we are in the middle of a difficult struggle in which the fate of our free world is at stake, so please, make it clear, where do you really stand: do you support freedom and democracy or not?" (One can also imagine a humanitarian version of such a pseudo-ethical blackmail: "OK, enough of this muddle about the neocolonialism, the responsibility of the West, and so on – do you want to do something to really help the millions suffering in Africa, or do you just want to use them to score points in your ideologico-political struggle?") The obverse of this imposition of a false choice is, of course, the blurring of the true line of division – here, Nazism is still unsurpassed with his designation of the Jewish enemy as the agent of the "plutocratic- bolshevik plot." In this designation, the mechanism is almost laid bare: the true opposition ("plutocrats" versus "Bolsheviks," i.e., capitalists versus proletariat) is literally obliterated, blurred into One, and therein resides the function of the name "Jew" – to serve as the operator of this obliteration. The first task of the emancipatory politics is therefore to distinguish between "false" and "true" points, "false" and "true" choices, i.e., to bring back the third element whose obliteration sustains the false choice – like, today, the false choice "liberal democracy or Islamofascism" is sustained by the obliteration of the radical secular emancipatory politics. So one should be clear here in rejecting the dangerous motto "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," which leads us to discover "progressive" anti-imperialist potential in fundamentalist Islamist movements: the ideological universe of movements like Hezbollah is based on the blurring of distinctions between capitalist neo-imperialism and secular progressive emancipation: within the Hezbollah ideological space, women's emancipation, gay rights, etc., are NOTHING BUT the "decadent" moral aspect of Western imperialism... > 2-3

Aff Answers

REVOLUTION CAN NO LONGER ASSUME THE HISTORICAL AGENT OF THE MATERIALIST DIALECTIC. ECOLOGICAL CRISIS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND BIOGENETIC INTERVENTION RESTORE INDIVIDUALS TO DRIVERS SEAT OF HISTORY. PRAGMATIC COURSES OF ACTION ARE NECESSARY TO PREVENT EXTINCTION.

ŽIŽEK, SENIOR RESEARCHER AT THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA, 2007. [SLAVOJ, CENSORSHIP TODAY: VIOLENCE, OR ECOLOGY AS A NEW OPIUM FOR THE MASSES (PART 1), [HTTP://WWW.LACAN.COM/ZIZECOLOGY1.HTM](http://WWW.LACAN.COM/ZIZECOLOGY1.HTM)]

1. Ecology:

In spite of the infinite adaptability of capitalism which, in the case of an acute ecological catastrophe or crisis, can easily turn ecology into a new field of capitalist investment and competition, the very nature of the risk involved fundamentally precludes a market solution - why? Capitalism only works in precise social conditions: it implies the trust into the objectivized/reified mechanism of the market's "invisible hand" which, as a kind of Cunning of Reason, guarantees that the competition of individual egotisms works for the common good. However, we are in the midst of a radical change. Till now, historical Substance played its role as the medium and foundation of all subjective interventions: whatever social and political subjects did, it was mediated and ultimately dominated, overdetermined by the historical Substance. What looms on the horizon today is the unheard-of possibility that a subjective intervention will intervene directly into the historical Substance, catastrophically disturbing its run by way of triggering an ecological catastrophe, a fateful biogenetic mutation, a nuclear or similar military-social catastrophe, etc. No longer can we rely on the safeguarding role of the limited scope of our acts: it no longer holds that, whatever we do, history will go on. For the first time in human history, the act of a single socio-political agent effectively can alter and even interrupt the global historical process, so that, ironically, it is only today that we can say that the historical process should effectively be conceived "not only as Substance, but also as Subject." This is why, when confronted with singular catastrophic prospects (say, a political group which intends to attack its enemy with nuclear or biological weapons), we no longer can rely on the standard logic of the "Cunning of Reason" which, precisely, presupposes the primacy of the historical Substance over acting subjects: we no longer can adopt the stance of "let the enemy who threatens us deploy its potentials and thereby self-destruct himself" - the price for letting the historical Reason do its work is too high since, in the meantime, we may all perish together with the enemy. Recall a frightening detail from the Cuban missile crisis: only later did we learn how close to nuclear war we were during a naval skirmish between an American destroyer and a Soviet B-59 submarine off Cuba on October 27 1962. The destroyer dropped depth charges near the submarine to try to force it to surface, not knowing it had a nuclear-tipped torpedo. Vadim Orlov, a member of the submarine crew, told the conference in Havana that the submarine was authorized to fire it if three officers agreed. The officers began a fierce, shouting debate over whether to sink the ship. Two of them said yes and the other said no. "A guy named Arkhipov saved the world," was a bitter comment of a historian on this accident.

Aff Answers

REVOLUTION LEADS TO UNCONDITIONAL VIOLENCE AS THE ENEMY BECOMES THE TOTALITY, THE WAR BECOMES AGAINST ALL, THIS LOGIC LEGITIMATES A REVOLUTION FILLED WITH BLOOD AND RESISTANCE, IN WHICH THERE WILL BE NO VICTOR ONLY A DESOLATE WASTE LAND.

SCHMITT, 1962

(CARL SCHMITT. "THE THEORY OF PARTISAN, A COMMENTARY/REMARK ON THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL", LECTURER AND LEGAL THEORIST AT UNIVERSITY OF GREIFSWALD, WHERE HE WAS A PROFESSOR)

Every citizen, so it says in the Prussian royal edict of April 1813, is obliged to resist the intruding enemy with weapons of whatever kind. Axes, pitchforks, scythes, and shotguns are explicitly recommended (§43). Every Prussian is charged to obey no order from the enemy, but to harm him with whatever means are at hand. Even if the enemy is trying to re-establish public order, one mustn't obey, because obedience facilitates his military operations. It is explicitly stated that the "excesses of the unbridled rabble" are less damaging than that state of affairs in which the enemy can dispose freely of all his troops. Reprisals and terror in defense of the partisan are [48] assured, and the enemy threatened with them. This document represents, in short, a sort of Magna Carta of partisanship. In three places—the introduction and paragraphs 8 and 52—explicit reference to Spain and its Carl Schmitt • 29 Guerrilla War as "prototype and example" is made. Combat is justified as a battle of self-defense that "sanctifies every means" (§7), even the unleashing of total disorder. As I have said, a German partisan war against Napoleon did not come about. The Landsturm Edict itself was already changed three months later, on 17 July 1813, and purged of every partisan danger, of every achronic dynamic. What followed was played out purely in battles conducted by regular armies, even if the troops were inspired by the dynamic of the nationalist impulse, Napoleon could pride himself on the fact that in the many years of French occupation, not one German civilian had taken a shot at a French uniform. Thus, in what does the special significance of that short-lived Prussian ordinance of 1813 consist? In the fact that it is the official document that legitimates the partisan in the name of national defense. It is a special legitimization, namely, one that proceeds from a spirit and a philosophy that were current in the Prussian capital of Berlin at that time. The Spanish Guerrilla War against Napoleon, the Tyrolean uprising of 1809, and the Russian Partisan War of 1812 were elemental, autochthonic movements of a pious, catholic, or orthodox people whose religious tradition was untouched by the philosophical spirit of revolutionary France; they were underdeveloped in this sense. In an angry letter of 2 December 1811 to his Hamburg General Governor Davout, Napoleon called the Spaniards in particular a treacherous, superstitious people misled by 300,000 monks, who could hardly be compared with the diligent, hard-working, and reasonable Germans. By contrast, the Berlin of 1808–1813 was characterized by an intellectual atmosphere, which was on intimate terms with the French Enlightenment: so intimate as to be equal if not superior to it. [49] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a great philosopher; highly educated and genial military men like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Clausewitz; a writer like Heinrich von Kleist, deceased in November 1811, indicate the enormous spiritual potential of the ready-to-act/enthusiastic Prussian intelligentsia in that critical moment. The nationalism of this milieu of the Berlin intelligentsia was a matter of the intellectuals, not that of a simple or even illiterate people. In such an atmosphere in which an aroused national 30 • The Theory of the Partisan feeling united itself with philosophical education, the partisan was discovered philosophically, and the theory of the partisan became historically possible. That a doctrine of war pertains to this alliance, too, is shown in the letter which Clausewitz wrote as an anonymous military man (Königsberg, 1809) to Fichte as "the author of an essay on Machiavelli." In it, the Prussian officer instructs the famous philosopher respectfully that Machiavelli's doctrine of war is too dependent on antiquity, and that today "infinitely more is gained by the vitality of individual forces than by artful form." The new weapons and masses. Clausewitz opines in this letter, do fully correspond to this principle, and in the end it is the courage of the individual in close combat that is decisive, especially in the most beautiful of all wars, conducted by a people in its own fields [Fluren] on behalf of their freedom and independence. The young Clausewitz knew the partisan from Prussian insurrection plans in 1808/13. In 1810 and 1811 he presented lectures at the general military academy in Berlin on low-intensity war; he was not only one of the most important military experts on such war in its technical sense of the employment of lightly armed mobile troops. The guerrilla war was for him, as for the other reformers in his circle, preeminently a political matter in the highest sense of the word, of an almost revolutionary character. The declaration of arming the people, insurrection, revolutionary war, resistance and uprising against the established order, even when it is embodied by a foreign occupation regime—this is something really new for Prussia, something dangerous which—so to speak—falls outside the sphere of the judicial [50] state. These words by Werner Hahlweg capture the essence of it for us. But he quickly adds: "The revolutionary war against Napoleon, as imagined by the Prussian reformers, certainly did not take place." A "semiinsurrectional war," in the words of Friedrich Engels, was all that it came to. Still, the famous memorandum of February 1812 remains important for grasping the "innermost incentives" (Rothfels) of the reformers; Clausewitz authored it with the help of Gneisenau and Boyen, before he went over to the Russians. It is a "document of sober political and general staff-worthy analysis"; it refers to the experiences of the Spanish people's war and cool-headed lets it come "to countering cruelty with cruelty, acts Carl Schmitt • 31 of violence with acts of violence." The Prussian Landsturm Edict of April 1813 is already clearly recognizable here.²⁸ Clausewitz must have been sorely disappointed that everything he had expected from the insurrection "fell through."²⁹ The people's war and partisans—Parteigänger, as Clausewitz calls them—had been recognized by him as an essential part of "the forces exploding in war," and he worked them into the system of his doctrine of war. Especially in Book 6 of his doctrine of war (Precis of Defensive Means), and in the famous Chapter 6B of Book 8 (War is an Instrument of Politics), he recognizes openly

[HE CONTINUES]

Aff Answers

the new “potential” that it represents. In addition, one finds astonishingly telling remarks in his work, like the one about the civil war in the Vendée: that sometimes a few isolated partisans might even be able “to lay claim to the title of [51] army.”³⁰ But he remains on the whole the reform-minded regular officer of a regular army of his age, unable to germinate the seed which becomes visible here or to develop it to its full potential. As we will see, that would happen only much later, and it involved an active professional revolutionary. Clausewitz himself still thought all too much in classical categories when in the “wondrous triplexity of war” he attributes to the people only the “blind natural impulse” of hate and enmity; to the commander and his army “courage and talent” as a free activity of the soul; and to the government the purely rational management of war as an instrument of politics. Within this short-lived *Landsturm* Edict of April 1813 is concentrated the moment in which the partisan turns up for the first time in a new, decisive role, as a novel and hitherto unacknowledged figure of the world-spirit [*Figur des Weltgeistes*]. It was not the will to resistance of a brave, belligerent people but education and intelligence that opened this door for the partisan, bestowing on him legitimacy from a philosophical basis. It was here that he was, if I may put it so, philosophically accredited and that he became presentable [*hoffähig*]. Before this, he was no such thing. In the seventeenth century he had sunk to the level of a figure in a picaresque novel; in the eighteenth century, the age of Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great, he was Pandarus and Husar. But now, in the Berlin of 1808–13, he was discovered not only in his military-technical capacity but also philosophically,³² • The Theory of the Partisan and valued accordingly. For one moment at least he attained to historical stature and spiritual vocation. This was a process he would never forget. For our theme this is decisive. We speak of the theory of the partisan. Now, a political theory of the partisan exceeding merely military classifications [52] had become possible in fact only through this accreditation in Berlin. The spark that in 1808 flew north from Spain found in Berlin a theoretical form that made it possible to preserve its flame and pass it on to other hands. At first, however, even in Berlin the traditional piety of the people was as little threatened as the political unity of the monarch and his people. It seemed fortified rather than endangered by the conjuration and glorification of the partisan. The Acheron that had been released receded immediately into the channels of state order. Following the wars of freedom, the philosophy of Hegel was dominant in Prussia. It attempted a systematic mediation of revolution and tradition.³¹ It could be considered conservative, and it was. But it also conserved the revolutionary sparks, and provided, via its philosophy of history, a dangerous ideological weapon for the forward driving revolution, more dangerous than Rousseau’s philosophy in the hands of the Jacobins. This historical-philosophical weapon fell into the hands of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. But the two German revolutionaries were thinkers more than activists of the revolutionary war. It was only through a professional Russian revolutionary, Lenin, that Marxism became the doctrine of world-historical power that it now appears to be.