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**\*\*\*Good Nietzsche \*\*\***

**1NC \*\*\***

## 1NC 1/6

### God. Is. Dead

**The 1AC is an example of the modern ages attempt to condemn tragedy – this requires the construction of an ideal world in opposition to our world of suffering. In a drive toward resolving disorder, the plan labors to shape the world to fit it's impossible fantasy**

**Saurette 96** (Paul, Prof of political theory/science at John Hopkins University, "I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6, AD: 7/6/09) jl

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.' Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.' However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. 'Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the monstium in animo was a universal danger'. 'No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end—And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation.'

Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, 'Nationality was divined as a saviour—it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....' Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework.

The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World' of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World' of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern' understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition resentment, and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution.

This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic

>SAURETTE CONTINUES<

## 1NC 2/6

### >SAURETTE CONTINUES<

ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the

Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the resentment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote,

**'I suffer: someone must be to blame for it'** thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, **the ascetic priest tells him**: 'Quite so my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,- **you alone are to blame for yourself**—This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of resentment is altered."

Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....' The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdum the Socratic division through the redirection of resentment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action.

This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. **Unable to accept** the Dionysian **suffering** inherent in the Apparent World, **the ascetic resentment** desperately **searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering'.** According to the ascetic model, however, **this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World.** The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. The resentment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, **resentment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an**

**ever-increasing Will to Truth. This** self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests,

[t]he ascetic **ideal has a goal**—this goal is **so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow**; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; **it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.**<sup>4</sup>

**The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures** that theoretical **investigation must be increasingly ordered**, comprehensive, more True, **and closer to the perfection of the ideal.** At the same time, **this** understanding of intellectual theory **ensures** that it **creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World.** With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.



## 1NC 3/6

**The 1ACs attempt to alleviate the suffering of those in poverty is an act of guilt they attempt to mold the world to their fantasy of perfection**

**Arnold 5** (Kathleen, assistant professor of political and feminist theory at the University of Texas, "Asceticism in Contemporary Political Theory: Marx, Weber, Nietzsche and Beyond," Theory & Event, Volume 8, Issue 2, Muse, AD: 7/7/09) j1

In the current political environment, ascetic demands and values are not only preached to the poor but imposed on them in welfare/workfare laws and low wage and deregulation policies. Marx recognized the hypocrisy in these demands that the poor save, for example, or abstain from alcohol or sex, or eat less when the wealthy often do not do any of these things. To apply Nietzsche to Marx, it could be said that the asceticism preached to the poor is not a will to power but characterized by resentment. In Nietzsche's words, those who promote asceticism (policy makers, welfare caseworkers, editorial writers) say "no" to the poor -- what is outside, what is different, not itself, the economic mainstream. That is, in the same way that Nietzsche conceives of the weak in society formulating an ethos that is simply a reaction to the more powerful other, the response to the poor comes paradoxically<sup>124</sup> from a position of weakness or uncertainty. In part, this is because economic power is not always stable; the poor represent a loss in what is conceived of as a zero sum game. A welfare recipient can represent "a purely receptive, expending, and consuming agency, an apparently useless mouth."<sup>125</sup> The resentment of the rich is based on feelings of Schuld, debt and guilt that have been projected back onto the poor. Alternatively, the well-off view not only their work as a sign of grace but also their spending. In contemporary times, stock market speculation, gambling, and investment in various properties can be viewed not as pure excess but a sacrifice, a contribution (and a manifestation of "self-interest properly understood"). George W. Bush confirmed this after the attacks of September 11th, 2001, when he urged all citizens to continue spending money and shopping.

More specifically, ascetic categories are racialized and gendered (but following Agamben, these biologizing categories are effects rather than causes). Hence, the vices of sexual wantonness, poverty, economic dependence and breakup of the nuclear family (among other things) are marked as particularly feminine and racial. The vice of greed, on the other hand, is transformed into economic independence and responsibility and these values are associated with men. Economic independence, notions of responsibility and rationality define these categories and determine the distinction between "vices." The middle classes and rich feel they have earned the right to their excess. In this way, the fetishization of the stock market is interpreted as a logical consequence of work in the new economy while poor working families are criticized for spending beyond their means, not buckling down.<sup>126</sup>

Nevertheless, "we" would only be able to judge "their" actions and endorse moral prescriptions if we felt that we adhered to the norms ourselves. The double standard I have investigated in this article is thus not blatant hypocrisy but still has a double standard at its foundation, which hinges on work. Labor is a key category of modern asceticism and the values associated with it, the "spirit of capitalism" as Weber has shown. The association between the biological (or, the natural) and excess, sin and vice dooms these groups to immorality<sup>127</sup> and consequently, as transgressors of ascetic norms. For this reason, they are seen as not accepting ascetic norms willingly<sup>128</sup> but must be forced to do so for their own good and the good of society. Accordingly, the "protection" of the welfare state and the positive gains for workers through low wage policies are aimed at producing a docile workforce and its mechanisms are coercive, hierarchical and biologized, rather than being therapeutic or humane.

In conclusion, the prescription of asceticism while intended for the entire populace, has been aimed at the working poor and welfare recipients as the exemplar of a group that is simultaneously being molded into good, docile citizens while being punished for "excesses." Despite the gap between rich and poor, employment opportunities for women, sexism, racism and the crisis in affordable housing, these groups are blamed for their poverty. The ascetic values underlying policy and cultural solutions imply that the poor will achieve some sort of self-mastery and thus, fitness for citizenship, if they only buckle down. Nevertheless, this espousal of asceticism is an attempt to master groups falling under the rubric of the biological through eradicating or neutralizing difference and the power relation is one of coercion more than independence or self-will. In this way, the dynamics of power in the liberal capitalist state have allowed for the coexistence of seemingly contradictory power mechanisms, both democratic and non-democratic. However, this seemingly paradoxical coexistence is an integral part of liberal capitalism: "bare life" is crucial to political identity, power and the economy and elucidates the deployment of prerogative power in the domestic arena.

## 1NC 4/6

**Life is a twisted, amoral work of art – Suffering is an unavoidable condition of humanity – the idea we can control the world allows suffering to dominate our lives which destroys all value**

### **Kain 7**

(Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/6/09) jl

We have seen that in Nietzsche's opinion **we cannot bear meaningless suffering and so we give it a meaning. Christianity, for example, explains it as punishment for sin. Eternal recurrence, however, would certainly seem to plunge us back into meaningless suffering (WP 55). It implies that suffering just happens, it repeats eternally, it is fated. There is no plan, no purpose, no reason for it. Eternal recurrence would seem to rub our noses in meaningless suffering. In one sense this is perfectly correct. And Nietzsche does want to accept as much meaninglessness and suffering as he can bear (BGE 39, 225; WP 585a). Nevertheless, we must see that there is meaning here—it is just that it lies precisely in the meaninglessness. Embracing eternal recurrence means imposing suffering on oneself, meaningless suffering, suffering that just happens, suffering for no reason at all. But at the very same time, this creates the innocence of existence.** The meaninglessness of suffering means the innocence of suffering. That is the new meaning that suffering is given. Suffering no longer has its old meaning. Suffering no longer has the meaning Christianity gave to it. **Suffering can no longer be seen as punishment. There is no longer any guilt.** There is no longer any sin. One is no longer accountable (TI "Errors" 8; HH 99). **If suffering just returns eternally, if even the slightest change is impossible, how can one be to blame for it?** How can one be responsible? It can be none of our doing. **We are innocent.** This itself could explain why one would be able to embrace eternal recurrence, love every detail of one's life, not wish to change a single moment of suffering. One would be embracing one's own innocence. One would be loving one's own redemption from guilt. Eternal recurrence brings the Übermensch as close as possible to the truth, meaninglessness, the void, but it does not go all the way or it would crush even the Übermensch. **Eternal recurrence gives the Übermensch meaning. It eliminates emptiness.** It fills the void. With what? It fills it with something totally familiar and completely known; with something that is in no way new, different, or strange; with something that is not at all frightening. **It fills the void with one's own life—repeated eternally. It is true that this life is a life of suffering, but (given the horror of existence) suffering cannot be avoided anyway, and at least suffering has been stripped of any surplus suffering brought about by concepts of sin, punishment, or guilt.** It has been reduced to a life of innocence. Moreover, as Nietzsche has said, it **is only meaningless suffering that is the problem. If given a meaning, even suffering becomes something we can seek (GM III:28). Eternal recurrence, the fatedness of suffering, its meaningless repetition, makes our suffering innocent.** That might well be reason enough to embrace it. Or, although we may not be able to embrace it ourselves, I think we can at least see why Nietzsche might—and even why it might make sense for him to do so. [End Page 59]

Eternal recurrence also gives suffering another meaning. **If one is able to embrace eternal recurrence, if one is able to turn all "it was" into a "thus I willed it," then one not only reduces suffering to physical suffering, breaks its psychological stranglehold, and eliminates surplus suffering related to guilt, but one may even in a sense reduce suffering below the level of physical suffering. One does not do this as the liberal, socialist, or Christian would, by changing the world to reduce suffering. In Nietzsche's opinion that is impossible, and, indeed, eternal recurrence of the same rules it out—at least as any sort of final achievement.**<sup>23</sup> Rather, physical suffering is reduced by treating it as a test, a discipline, a training, which brings one greater power. **One might think of an athlete who engages in more and more strenuous activity, accepts greater and greater pain, handles it better and better, and sees this as a sign of greater strength, as a sign of increased ability. Pain and suffering are turned into empowerment.** Indeed, it is possible to love such suffering as a sign of increased power. One craves pain—"more pain! more pain!" (GM III:20). And the more suffering one can bear, the stronger one becomes. If suffering is self-imposed, if the point is to break the psychological stranglehold it has over us, if the point is to turn suffering into empowerment, use it as a discipline to gain greater strength, then it would be entirely inappropriate for us to feel sorry for the sufferer. **To take pity on the sufferer either would demonstrate an ignorance of the process the sufferer is engaged in, what the sufferer is attempting to accomplish through suffering, or would show a lack of respect for the sufferer's suffering (GS 338; D 135). To pity the sufferer, to wish the sufferer did not have to go through such suffering, would demean the sufferer and the whole process of attempting to gain greater strength through such suffering.** Let us try again to put ourselves in Nietzsche's place. He has suffered for years. He has suffered intensely for years. He has come to realize that he cannot end this suffering. He cannot even reduce it significantly. But he has finally been able to break the psychological stranglehold it has had over him. He is able to accept it. He wills it. He would not change the slightest detail. He is able to love it. And this increases his strength. **How, then, would he respond to our pity?** Very likely, **he would be offended. He would think we were patronizing him. He would not want us around. He would perceive us as trying to rob him of the strength he had achieved, subjugate him again to his suffering, strip him of his dignity. He would be disgusted with our attempt to be do-gooders, our attempt to impose our own meaning on his suffering (treating it as something to pity and to lessen) in opposition to the meaning he has succeeded in imposing on it.**

## 1NC 5/6

**In the face of the horror of existence we ask you vote negative as a willful affirmation of suffering – Only by submitting to it voluntarily are we able to retain our agency and happiness in life.**

### **Kain 7**

(Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/6/09).jl

Try to **imagine yourself with a migraine. Imagine yourself in a feverish state experiencing nausea and vomiting.** Imagine that **this sort of thing has been going on for years** and years and that **you** have been unable to do anything about it. Extreme care with your diet, concern for climate, continuous experimenting with medicines—all **accomplish nothing**. You are unable to cure yourself. You have been unable to even improve your condition significantly.<sup>18</sup> You have no expectation of ever doing so. Suppose **this state has led you to see**, or perhaps merely confirmed your insight into, **the horror** and terror **of existence**. It has led you to suspect that Silenus was right: best never to have been born; second best, die as soon as possible. All you can expect is suffering, suffering for no reason at all, meaningless suffering. You have even thought of suicide (BGE 157).<sup>19</sup> **Now imagine that at your worst moment**, your loneliest loneliness, **a demon appears** to you or you imagine a demon appearing to you. **And** this demon **tells you that you will have to live your life** over again, **innumerable times more**, and that everything, [End Page 55] **every last bit of pain and suffering**, every last migraine, every last bout of nausea and vomiting, **will return, exactly the same, over and over and over again**. What would your reaction be? If your reaction were to be negative, no one would bat an eye. But what if your reaction was, or came to be, positive? **What if you were able to love your life so completely that you would not want to change a single moment—a single moment of suffering?** What if you were to come to crave nothing more fervently than the eternal recurrence of every moment of your life? What if you were to see this as an ultimate confirmation and seal, nothing more divine? How could you do this? Why would you do this? Why wouldn't it be madness? What is going on here? How has this been overlooked by all the commentators? This cries out for explanation. **Eternal recurrence**, I think we can say, **shows us the horror of existence**. **No matter what you say about your life, no matter how happy you claim to have been**, no matter how bright a face you put on it, the threat of **eternal recurrence brings out the basic horror in every life**. Live it over again with nothing new? **It is the "nothing new" that does it**. That is how we make it through our existing life. **We hope for**, we expect, **something new, something different, some improvement, some progress, or at least some distraction, some hope**. **If that is ruled out**, if everything will be exactly the same in our next life, well that is a different story. If you think you are supremely happy with your life, just see what happens if you start to think that you will have to live it again. **Suppose that you can**, as Aristotle suggested, **look back over your life as a whole and feel that it was a good one—a happy one**. **Would** that make **you want to live it again?** Would you at the moment in which you feel that your life was a happy one also crave nothing more fervently than to live it again? **What if your life was a joyous life** or a proud life? It is quite clear that you could have a very positive attitude toward your life and not at all want to live it again. In fact, wouldn't the prospect of eternal repetition, if the idea grew on you and gained possession of you, begin to sap even the best life of its attractiveness? Wouldn't the expectation of eternal repetition make anything less appealing? Wouldn't it empty your life of its significance and meaning? Most commentators seem to assume that the only life we could expect anyone to want to live again would be a good life. That makes no sense to me. On the other hand, most people would assume that a life of intense pain and suffering is not at all the sort of life it makes any sense to want to live again. I think **Nietzsche was able to see that a life of intense pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want to live again**. Let me try to explain. For years **Nietzsche was ill, suffering intense migraines, nausea, and vomiting**. Often he was unable to work and confined to bed. He fought this. **He tried everything**. He sought a better climate. He watched his diet fanatically. He experimented with medicines. Nothing worked. He could not improve his condition. **His suffering was out of his control. It dominated his life and determined his** [End Page 56] **every activity**. He was overpowered by it. There was no freedom or dignity here. He became a slave to his illness. He was subjugated by it. What was he to do? At the beginning of the essay "On the Sublime," Schiller writes: [N]othing is so unworthy of man than to suffer violence. . . . [W]hoever suffers this cravenly throws his humanity away. . . . This is the position in which man finds himself. Surrounded by countless forces, all of which are superior to his own and wield mastery over him. . . . If he is no longer able to oppose physical force by his relatively weaker physical force, then the only thing that remains to him, if he is not to suffer violence, is to eliminate utterly and completely a relationship that is so disadvantageous to him, and to destroy the very concept of a force to which he must in fact succumb. To destroy the very concept of a force means simply to submit to it voluntarily.<sup>20</sup> Although Nietzsche did not go about it in the way Schiller had in mind, nevertheless, this is exactly what Nietzsche did. **What was he to do about his suffering?** What was he to do about the fact that it came to dominate every moment of his life? What was he to do about the fact that it was robbing him of all freedom and dignity? What was he to do about this

**>Kain continues<**

1NC 6/6

## &gt;Kain continues&lt;

subjugation and slavery? **He decided to submit to it voluntarily.** He decided **to accept it fully.** He decided that **he would not change one single detail of his life, not one moment of pain. He decided to love his fate.** At the prospect of living his life over again, over again an infinite number of times, without the slightest change, with every detail of suffering and pain the same, he was ready to say, "Well then! Once more!" (Z IV: "The Drunken Song" 1). **He could not change his life anyway. But this way he broke the psychological stranglehold it had over him. He ended his subjugation. He put himself in charge. He turned all "it was" into a "thus I willed it."** Everything that was going to happen in his life, he accepted, he chose, he willed. **He became sovereign over his life. There was no way to overcome his illness except by embracing it.**

## **\*\*\*Links\*\*\***

## Links – Social Services

**Philanthropy is the desire for collective strength to overcome the suffering inherent in our world – the ideas of the affirmative destroys the ability to affirm life as is**

**Ure 6** (Michael, Prof of history of modern social and political theory and modern German philosophy @ the U of Queensland, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies - Issue 32, Autumn 2006, pp. 68-91, AD: 7/6/09) j1

However, if Nietzsche thus conflates a number of very different discourses, his conceptualization of the social phenomenon he objects to remains much more sharply focused. In theorizing the cult of philanthropy, he accentuates what he sees as the tight connection between the modern form of communal integration and a lamentable process of deindividuation: Today it seems to do everyone good when they hear that society is on the way to adapting the individual to general requirements, and that the happiness and at the same time the sacrifice of the individual lies in feeling himself to be a useful member and instrument of the whole. . . . [T]here is . . . a wonderful and fair-sounding unanimity in the demand that the ego has to deny itself until, in the form of the adaptation to the whole, it again acquires its firmly set circle of rights and duties— until it has become something quite novel and different. What is wanted . . . is nothing less than the fundamental remoulding, indeed weakening and abolition of the individual: one never tires of enumerating and indicting all that is evil and inimical, prodigal, costly, extravagant in the form individual existence has assumed hitherto, one hopes to manage more cheaply, more safely, more equitably, more uniformly if there exists only large bodies and their members. (D 132) Nietzsche's analysis of this post-Enlightenment transformation and valorization of Mitleid is significant for our purposes because it reveals the notion of subjectivity and intersubjectivity that underpins his lament over a communitarianism that, as he sees it, entirely enfolds the individual into the collective.<sup>47</sup> Nietzsche suggests that the concepts of pity, sympathy, and vivre pour autrui have become little more than the ideological stalking horses for the "moral fashion of a commercial society" (D 173, emphasis added)—a moral fashion, that is to say, that transforms individuals into industrious, calculable instruments of social labor. He argues that what unites the modern mantras of "pity," "impersonal action," "self-sacrifice," "adaptation," and the "blessing of work" is the fact that they share one covert idea: the fear of individuality. "In the glorification of 'work,'" as he writes, "I see the same covert idea as in the praise of useful impersonal actions: that of fear of everything individual" (D 173). (The scare quotes around "work" are Nietzsche's; he evidently means to imply that the worship of instrumental, material labor, or "hard industriousness," should not be confused with what he considers the more valuable work, the work on the self [D 173].) In this context, then, his critique of pity highlights his resistance to philosophical and sociological perspectives whose conception of human beings is exhausted by the image of homo faber and homo economicus.<sup>48</sup> Nietzsche challenges the legitimacy of social relations that construct individuals as nothing more than disciplined instruments of labor and uniform members of an integrated collectivity. Such perspectives, he implies, are symptomatic of an anxious desire to cordon ourselves off from the intrapsychic domain. The "blessing of work," he jokes, "is the best policeman. . . . [I]t keeps everyone in bounds and can mightily hinder the development of reason, covetousness, desire for independence" (D 173). Instrumental labor, we might say, is our psychological cordon sanitaire. Of course, Nietzsche concedes, this policing of the self through the discipline of work also has its benefits insofar as the regular satisfaction of small, instrumental problems gives one a sense of "security." However, this is not merely material security but, indeed, a security from the temptations of "reflection, brooding and dreaming," and such security, as Nietzsche puts it, "is now worshipped as the supreme divinity" (D 173). In Daybreak he defines the post-Enlightenment age as one in which the metaphysical and theological dream of salvation has been displaced by the worship of a divinity that protects one from the risks (and possible gains) of confronting and working on one's own psychical reality. According to Nietzsche, the idol of security that modern commercial society worships is a divinity it has erected in order to save us the trouble of working on and cultivating ourselves.

## Links – Socratic Delusion

The 1AC enacts a system of attempting to cure the suffering of our world as is. This view carries with it that the universe is something to be rejected making life something to be hated. Only by affirming the imperfection in our world are we able to retain our value to life

### Kain 7

(Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 6/30/09) j1

At the center of Nietzsche's vision lies his concept of the "terror and horror of existence" (BT 3). As he puts it in The Birth of Tragedy: There is an ancient story that King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus. . . . When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a shrill laugh and broke out into these words: "Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is—to die soon." (BT 3)1 Why is it best never to have been born? Because all we can expect as human beings is to suffer. Yet, still, this is not precisely the problem. As Nietzsche tells us in On the Genealogy of Morals, human beings can live with suffering. What they cannot live with is meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all (GM III:28). In Nietzsche's view we are "surrounded by a fearful void . . ." (GM III: 28; cf. WP 55). We live in an empty, meaningless cosmos. We cannot look into reality without being overcome. Indeed, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche even suggests that "it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would perish . . ." (BGE 39; cf. WP 822). And it was not just intellectual reflection that led Nietzsche to a belief in the horror of existence. He lived it himself.2 In a letter of April 10, 1888, he writes: "Around 1876 my health grew worse. . . . There were extremely painful and obstinate headaches which exhausted all my strength. They increased over long years, to reach a climax at which pain was habitual, so that any given year contained for me two hundred days of pain. . . . My specialty was to endure the extremity of pain . . . with complete lucidity for two or three days in succession, with continuous vomiting of mucus."3 In Nietzsche contra Wagner, he tells us how significant this suffering was for him: I have often asked myself whether I am not much more deeply indebted to the hardest years of my life than to any others. . . . And as to my prolonged illness, [End Page 49] do I not owe much more to it than I owe to my health? To it I owe a higher kind of health, a sort of health which grows stronger under everything that does not actually kill it!—To it, I owe even my philosophy. . . . Only great suffering is the ultimate emancipator of the spirit. . . . Only great suffering; that great suffering, under which we seem to be over a fire of greenwood, the suffering that takes its time—forces us philosophers to descend into our nethermost depths. . . . (NCW "Epilogue") Nietzsche's belief in the horror of existence is largely, if not completely, overlooked by most scholars.4 I hope to show that it had a profound effect on his thought, indeed, that he cannot be adequately understood without seeing the centrality of this concept. To begin to understand its importance, let us consider three different visions of the human condition. The first holds that we live in a benign cosmos. It is as if it were purposively planned for us and we for it. We fit, we belong, we are at home in this cosmos. We are confirmed and reinforced by it. Our natural response is a desire to know it and thus to appreciate our fit into it. Let us call this the designed cosmos. Roughly speaking, this is the traditional view held by most philosophers from Plato and Aristotle through the medievals. And for the most part it has disappeared in the modern world—few really believe in it anymore. The second vision backs off from the assumptions required by the first. This view started with Francis Bacon, if not before, and it is the view of most moderns. Here the cosmos is neither alien nor designed for us. It is neither terrifying nor benign. The cosmos is neutral and, most importantly, malleable. Human beings must come to understand the cosmos through science and control it through technology. We must make it fit us. It does not fit us by design. We must work on it, transform it, and mold it into a place where we can be at home. We must create our own place. For these modern thinkers, we end up with more than the ancients and medievals had. We end up with a fit like they had, but we get the added satisfaction of bringing it about ourselves, accomplishing it through our own endeavor, individuality, and freedom. Let us call this the perfectible cosmos. The third vision takes the cosmos to be alien. It was not designed for human beings at all; nor were they designed for it. We just do not fit. We do not belong. And we never will. The cosmos is horrible, terrifying, and we will never surmount this fact. It is a place where human beings suffer for no reason at all. It is best never to have been born. Let us call this the horrific cosmos. This is Nietzsche's view. Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being.5 For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)—the outlook of liberals, socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will simply weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves. We need more suffering, not less. It has "created all enhancements of man so far . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7).

## Links – Hegemony/Security

**The militarism of the affirmative is rooted our own morality and our neighbors immorality – This predisposition is the root cause of all war – only by embracing fate can we remove ourselves from the cycle**

**Nietzsche 1879** (Friedrich, Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, Human, All Too Human, The Nietzsche Channel, The Wanderer and His Shadow, <http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/was.htm>, AD: 7/6/09) jl

The means to real peace.— **No government admits** any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally **the desire for conquest**. **Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense**, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But **this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality**; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, **the reasons** we give **for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and** who, for his part, **also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight**. Thus **all states** are now ranged against each other: they **presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition**. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. **We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests**. And **perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories** and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, **will** exclaim of its own free will, "We **break the sword**," and will **smash its entire military establishment down** to its lowest foundations. **Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed**, out of a height of feeling—**that is the means to real peace**, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the **so-called armed peace**, as it now exists in all countries, **is the absence of peace of mind**. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.



## Links – Security

**Attempts to secure the state fall prey to the tautology of mastery – this justifies state sanctioned violence in the name of preserving safety of the domestic population**

**Saurette 96** (Paul, Prof of political theory/science at John Hopkins University, “I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory.” Millennium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6, AD: 7/6/09) jl

In both cases, **the domestic order is privileged because 'progress and perfection', or at least the mitigation of the state of nature, is assumed to be possible only through control and rule.** This conception appears coherent **only because non-order, understood as the lack of hierarchical rule,** is a priori defined as a state of nature/conflict. **It is only by a perfectly circular tautology,** then, that realism manages to privilege the state. Once anarchy is defined as dangerous, politics can be conceptualised only as a process of fabrication through which a secure community is forged by rule and control. Moreover, **once security/community is understood in these terms, the logic can only circulate back and reinforce the understanding of political action as mastery and control over human affairs through the authority or violence of rulership.** When considering international relations, then, it is completely consistent for realism to label 'the international' as anarchic and thus dangerous because it is beyond control. Yet, because realism has previously defined non-order as inherently dangerous to survival, **the drive for state security compels the attempt to impose order on the international realm.** In a sense, the international must seem both political (a space in need of hierarchical control) and apolitical (a space beyond hierarchical control). **This dichotomy leads to the double strategy of realism as (1) the attempt to impose order on the international through 'reasoned foreign policy' and power, while (2) retreating into the normative value of the state, and its circular normative justification of domestic order and state survival.** In this light, it is absolutely paradoxical and yet completely consistent for Morgenthau to decry the international as the realm of irrationality and emergency, while nostalgically yearning for objective scientific laws which would allow the statesman to impose theoretical order on international politics, and thus lead to the actual control and mastery of the international realm.' As such, **realism manages to privilege the normative value of the domestic realm while simultaneously idealising the domestication of the international through an extension of control and order.**"

## Links – Security

**The concept of security erects what it tries to defeat – in it's name, wars were waged and WMDs developed all in this search for complete security**

**Der Derian 98** (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html>, AD: 7/7/09) jl

The rapidity of change in the international system, as well as the inability of international theory to make sense of that change, raises this question: Of what value is security? More specifically, just how secure is this preeminent concept of international relations? This evaluation of security invokes interpretive strategies to ask epistemological, ontological, and political questions--questions that all too often are ignored, subordinated, or displaced by the technically biased, narrowly framed question of what it takes to achieve security. The goal, then, of this inquiry is to make philosophically problematic that which has been practically axiomatic in international relations. The first step is to ask whether the paramount value of security lies in its abnegation of the insecurity of all values. No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted.

**Security creates a self fulfilling prophecy in which the rest of the world is an enemy to be destroyed – turns case**

**Der Derian 98** (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html>, AD: 7/7/09) jl

We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." 1 From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference. Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of everything --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." 2 One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict, ranging from latino small-fry to an Identikit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledgehammer returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite. There are also prodromal efforts to shore up the center of the International Relations discipline. In a newly instituted series in the International Studies Quarterly, the state of security studies is surveyed so as to refortify its borders. 3 After acknowledging that "the boundaries of intellectual disciplines are permeable," the author proceeds not only to raise the drawbridge but also to caulk every chink in the moat. 4 Recent attempts to broaden the concept of "security" to include such issues as global environmental dangers, disease, and economic and natural disasters endanger the field by threatening "to destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems." 5 The field is surveyed in the most narrow and parochial way: out of 200-plus works cited, esteemed Third World scholars of strategic studies receive no mention, British and French scholars receive short shrift, and Soviet writers do not make it into the Pantheon at all. The author of the essay, Stephen Walt, has written one of the better books on alliance systems; 6 here he seems intent on constructing a new alliance within the discipline against "foreign" others, with the "postmodernist" as arch-alien. The tactic is familiar: like many of the neoconservatives who have launched the recent attacks on "political correctness," the "liberals" of international relations make it a habit to base their criticisms on secondary accounts of a category of thinking rather than on a primary engagement with the specific (and often differing) views of the thinkers themselves. 7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers 'have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.'" 8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control.

## Links – Security

**The affs constant search for security forces us to live life in a seatbelt – action is discouraged because of fear of the unknown**

**Der Derian 98** (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html>, AD: 7/7/09) jl

**The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life**, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. **The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true**, and everything true, reasonable. In short, **the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it**. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols :

**The causal instinct is thus conditional upon**, and excited by, the **feeling of fear**. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus **one not only searches for some kind of explanation**, to serve as a cause, **but for a particularly selected** and preferred **kind of explanation**--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38

A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, **the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security**. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39

The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": **the feeling of security** such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security **can come from false gods**: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41

## Links – Pity

**The affirmatives actions are not beneign acts of compassion but rather a mask for self gratification – in pity we find envy**

**Ure 6** (Michael, Prof of history of modern social and political theory and modern German philosophy @ the U of Queensland, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies - Issue 32, Autumn 2006, pp. 68-91, AD: 7/6/09) jl

Nietzsche is intent on stripping away pity's golden luster. He builds his case against pitié/Mitleid largely on the basis of his suspicions about the psychological dynamics that, so he claims, we can use to lay bare Schopenhauer's and Rousseau's gilded rationalizations of this pathos. According to Nietzsche, the type of pitié/Mitleid they expound is symptomatic of what we might call, drawing on psychoanalytic terms, the narcissistic malaise.<sup>4</sup> Boldly stated, **he argues that as a psychological transaction Mitleid satisfies the ego's desire to assuage its loss of narcissistic plenitude.** In making this case, Nietzsche dramatically reverses their perspective, arguing that **Mitleid should not be understood as an affective bond with the other, not as a sign of living for others, but, rather, as a veiled means of restoring self-affection at the other's expense.** To show this he analyzes the moral psychology that underpins the precepts of the ethics of pity. If Nietzsche's psychological analysis is correct, then **Mitleid is not antithetical to revenge against others but, in fact, closely linked to** one of its subtle shadings and masks, **which he calls envy. "In the gilded sheath of pity,"** as he puts it with signature pithiness, "there is sometimes stuck the dagger of envy" (AOM 377). Whereas Rousseau and Schopenhauer claim that Mitleid is the only source of ethical concern for others, Nietzsche argues that their psychology of Mitleid uncritically accepts a paranoid-schizoid splitting of the object world, to borrow Melanie Klein's terminology, into the enviable and the pitiable.<sup>5</sup> He claims that because these forms of pity are generated by a paranoid-schizoid psychological constellation, they are better characterized as what we might call "hateship" rather than friendship. In this respect, Nietzsche **sees in the psychology of the pitier an immature or infantile attempt to resolve the narcissistic malaise.** Nietzsche pursues this critique of Rousseau and Schopenhauer as part of a broader concern that informs his middle period: his concern with theorizing a mature transformation of narcissism that does not entail such damaging splitting and projection.

## Links – Pity

**The 1AC is not a benevolent act of compassion but rather a psychological tendency where we help out those in poverty because it gives us a feeling of accomplishment – when the objects of our compassion start to lift themselves out of their condition, we psychologically backlash at them to maintain our fantasy of control**

**Ure 6** (Michael, Prof of history of modern social and political theory and modern German philosophy @ the U of Queensland, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies - Issue 32, Autumn 2006, pp. 68-91, AD: 7/6/09) j1

Turning to Klein first, she identifies the paranoid-schizoid position as the incipient ego's primitive response to the anxiety that its rage over the loss of its perfection (or the demise of primary narcissism) might also lead it to destroy the good object on which it depends for its material and psychic survival. Indeed, this rage, or persecutory anxiety as Klein calls it, seems so potent and threatening that the good object must be rendered sublime and perfect in order to protect it from its own rage. In order to crystallize these intrapsychic processes, Klein formulates the concept of the paranoid-schizoid position: the idea that the ego splits its object world into idealized and debased objects (schizoid splitting) and projects them into the other (paranoia). According to Klein, the presence of envy is symptomatic of an abnormally strong paranoid-schizoid tendency. Envy arises, she asserts, because we harbor a fantasy of a condition of inexhaustible plenitude or self-sufficiency. This fantasy is disturbed by the painful discovery of our dependence on others and the limits this places on our narcissistic dream of perfection and omnipotence. Following Freud's lead, she holds that we attempt to maintain and nurture this fantasy and that the ego, at least in part, is constituted and develops as a mechanism for warding off the anxiety generated by this loss and restoring the fantasy of plenitude.<sup>34</sup> In this context, Klein conceives idealization as a projective mechanism that protects this divine image of the self by putting it into the other. She believes that the paranoid-schizoid position serves the ego as a necessary initial stage in fending off and dispersing anxiety. However, individuals who remain fixed in this position, she asserts, establish all the intrapsychic conditions for badly damaged object relations characterized by, among other things, envious spoiling and the consequent inability to accept the other as a separate and independent agent. Although her account of pathological object relations is too elaborate to unpack in detail here, it is possible to discern in Klein's analysis the following account of the relationship among narcissism, idealization, and envy. In order to protect the fantasy of our ideal condition, she argues, we project into our objects the plenitude or omnipotence that we desire for ourselves. In other words, through the mechanism of idealization the object is endowed with all the qualities of self-sufficiency or plenitude that the ego wants for itself but cannot attain. This idealization, however, can only be a transitional solution to the demise of our primary narcissism. For the discovery of the idealized object's independence engenders in the primitive ego the fear of being abandoned by it and shame over its own needy dependence. According to Klein, this early emotional matrix generates either a compulsive attempt to control the object or, when it can no longer be controlled, to spoil and destroy it. However, if in its narcissistic rage over the independence of the other and shame over its dependence on it, the ego enviously spoils and destroys the other, it also thereby prevents itself from assimilating or reintroducing the good that it has put into the other. This is precisely the psychological constellation Nietzsche illuminates in Rousseau's and Schopenhauer's accounts of the moral subject. Both Rousseau's and Schopenhauer's moral psychology remains fixed in the paranoid-schizoid position and its damaging object relations. That is to say, their psychology uncritically accepts the primitive mechanism of assuaging narcissistic loss through enviously destroying or spoiling the joy of others, on the one side, and taking pleasure in their suffering, on the other.<sup>35</sup> Unlike Nietzsche, then, neither Rousseau nor Schopenhauer attempts to theorize the psychological transformations and modulations of narcissism. Nietzsche argues that rather than seeking to overcome envy, Rousseau and Schopenhauer's ethics of pity constructs social relations oriented around the need to assuage the feeling of self-lack. He claims that the envious subject soothes itself through Schadenfreude. It follows, therefore, that if pity also assuages envy, then it must be closely related to Schadenfreude. According to Nietzsche, Schadenfreude results from the projection of an envy-fuelled wish for the other's downfall beyond the social realm into the realm of chance: Schadenfreude originates in the fact that in certain respects of which he is well aware, everyone feels unwell, is oppressed by care or envy or sorrow: the harm that befalls another makes him our equal, it appeases our envy. . . . The disposition bent on equality thus extends its demands to the domain of happiness and chance as well: Schadenfreude is the commonest expression of the victory and restoration of equality within the higher world order too. (WS27, emphasis added) Nietzsche comically draws the links between pitying others and taking delight in their sorrow in the following aphorism: "What is 'elevating' in our neighbour's misfortune.—He has experienced a misfortune, and now the 'compassionate' [Mitleidigen] come along and depict his misfortune for him in detail—at length they go away content and elevated: they have gloated over the unfortunate man's distress and over their own and passed a pleasant afternoon" (D 224). Nietzsche here comically deflates one of the human, all-too-human vices he discovers writ large in Schopenhauer and Rousseau's ethics: the thrilling pleasures of the pitier's voyeurism, which Rousseau unwittingly discloses in his obsessive emphasis on the visual aspects of suffering; for Rousseau, human suffering is an "object," "sight," "scene," impression," "picture," or "spectacle" that leaves us feeling pleasantly satisfied.<sup>3</sup>

## Links – Pity

**Pitying is a violent act – we maintain those in poverty because it psychologically gives us a feeling of being better than the objects of our social services**

**Ure 6** (Michael, Prof of history of modern social and political theory and modern German philosophy @ the U of Queensland, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies - Issue 32, Autumn 2006, pp. 68-91, AD: 7/6/09) j1

Of course, the corollary of Schopenhauer's position is that although the visible signs of envy may disappear with the misfortune of others, the paranoid-schizoid position that fuels envy remains even more firmly entrenched. For rather than curing envy, this kind of pity merely serves to satisfy the envious need for others to be diminished so that one can feel whole and complete. Though by this means pitiers pleasurably assuage their narcissistic wound, it is, as Nietzsche underscores, a damaging and enervating means of doing so because it creates an addiction to finding pleasure in themselves through enviously spoiling the other. According to Nietzsche, the tonic effect of envy is outweighed by its harmful effects on not only the envied but the envier. The psychological consequence of this addiction to envy is melancholia: that is to say, not only do we attack and spoil the other's joy, but inevitably this spoiling constructs a world in which we feel that our own joy may similarly become the object of attack 38 If Schopenhauer's analysis of the moral psychology of pity is correct, then the others' return to joy must make them strangers to our hearts and excite our envy, and with this envy must also come the return of the menace of Schadenfreude. Nietzsche makes just this point regarding the disjointed rejoicing of pity: "The compassionate Christian.—The reverse side of Christian compassion for the suffering of one's neighbour is a profound suspicion of all the joy of one's neighbour, of his joy in all that he wants to do and can" (D 80). In other words, within the framework of Schopenhauer's ethics of pity we can regard others as of equal worth only so long as they suffer equally. Suffering thus bridges the gulf among egos—but not, as we have seen, because as pitiers we mysteriously enter into or participate in the condition of others but, rather, because their demise brings them down to our level and thus appeases the envy we feel at the sight of their self-sufficient happiness (see D 138). The sight of others' suffering, in short, makes their independence more palatable to us because in this debased state they no longer arouse in us painful feelings of deprivation or the anxiety that we may be abandoned. To recall Rousseau on this latter point, the suffering of others is a pledge of their affection for us. As Schopenhauer's analysis implies, taking pleasure in the other's suffering is a tonic for restoring damaged narcissistic self-affection. It is for this reason, Nietzsche believes, that when persistent feelings of envy threaten to attenuate our self-affection we pursue social or intersubjective means for reviving the pleasant feeling of Schadenfreude. In other words, when we enviously spoil others we surreptitiously restore to ourselves our narcissistic self-affection. Our envy does so by enabling us to construct ourselves as those who, by comparison with the spoiled object, are exempt from suffering, need, and loss. Through envy we aim to make the other abject or pitiable so that we no longer feel or experience our own abjection. The damage we inflict through envy reduces the other to the needy, insufficient, pitiable condition that we ourselves experience. It thereby soothes our painful feeling that in the face of a fantasized self-sufficient other we are superfluous or unloved. The imaginative work of envy reaches a successful resolution when it enables us to achieve a reversal of roles and our formerly abject self can feel itself as whole and complete in comparison with the now diminished other: "Sometimes we love the rich man in the midst of misfortunes; but so long as he prospers he has no real friend, except the man who is not deceived by appearances, who pities rather than envies him in spite of his prosperity." 39 In Rousseau's framework, pity is the use to which envy puts the imagination. To clarify, it is the means through which Rousseau believes that wounded narcissists can reverse the positions of lack/plenitude: by pitying others we transform ourselves into those who, like the Epicurean gods, are divinely free of anxiety and exempt from suffering and pain. In this respect the conception of the moral subject that lies at the heart of his ethics of pity exemplifies the paranoid-schizoid defenses of pathological narcissism. It is apparent, to begin with, that Rousseau's moral subjects have not relinquished or tempered their fantasy of narcissistic plenitude insofar as they harbor the regret that they do not occupy the privileged position of the needless Epicurean gods. Indeed, it is partly because they bitterly measure their own loss against this fantasy of divine tranquility that they brim with painful envy at the sight of others' joy. (In accusing the other "of seeking happiness for himself alone" they repeat what Klein describes as the basic complaint of infantile envy: the accusation that its first object "has an unlimited flow of milk" that "it keeps for its own gratification." For Klein this image of a wholly self-gratifying object is the ego's projection of its own most desired state.) 40 Rousseau then begins not with a subject who seeks mutual recognition but with one who suffers deeply from the loss of narcissistic self-sufficiency. The only way he conceives of this subject becoming sociable is to give full rein to its primordial envy to spoil others so that it does not suffer from its own sense of self-lack or narcissistic wound. Envy's conjuring trick is to restore self-affection through diminishing others. This is how Rousseau arrives at the perverse position of affirming a moral psychology in which we experience the other's joy as a source of bitterness and the other's suffering as a source of sweet pleasure. Pity is a disjointed rejoicing. 41 The other's suffering is sweet because it restores to us our narcissistic self-affection: "Pity is sweet, because, when we put ourselves in the place of the one who suffers, we are aware, nevertheless of the pleasure of not suffering like him. Envy is bitter, because the sight of a happy man, far from putting the envious in his place, inspires him with regret that he is not there. The one seems to exempt us from the pain he suffers, the other seems to deprive us of the good things he enjoys." 42

## Links – Ressentiment

**The root cause of the affirmatives violent tendencies is the ressentiment that entrenches their lives. They believe the only way to rid ourselves of guilt is to blame someone else.**

**Deleuze 83** (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 115-116, AD: 7/9/09) jl

Why is ressentiment the spirit of revenge? It might be thought that the man of ressentiment comes into being by accident: having experienced too strong an excitation (a pain), he would have had to abandon the attempt to react, not being strong enough to form a riposte. He would therefore experience a desire for revenge and, by a process of generalisation, would want to take this out on the whole world. Such an interpretation is mistaken; it only takes quantities into account, the quantity of excitation received, "objectively" compared to the quantity of force of a receptive subject. But, for Nietzsche, what counts is not the quantity of force considered abstractly but a determinate relation in the subject itself between the different forces of which it is made up this is what he means by a type. Whatever the force of the excitation which is received, whatever the total force of the subject itself, the man of ressentiment only uses the latter to invest the trace of the former, so that he is incapable of acting and even of reacting to the excitation. There is therefore no need for him to have experienced an excessive excitation. This may happen, but it is not necessary. He does not need to generalise in order to see the whole world as the object of his ressentiment. As a result of his type the man of ressentiment does not "react": his reaction is endless, it is felt instead of being acted. This reaction therefore blames its object, whatever it is, as an object on which revenge must be taken, which must be made to pay for this infinite delay. Excitation can be beautiful and good and the man of ressentiment can experience it as such; it can be less than the force of the man of ressentiment and he can possess an abstract quantity of force as great as that of anyone else. He will none the less feel the corresponding object as a personal offence and affront because he makes the object responsible for his own powerlessness to invest anything but the trace — a qualitative or typical powerlessness. The man of ressentiment experiences every being and object as an offence in exact proportion to its effect on him. Beauty and goodness are, for him, necessarily as outrageous as any pain or misfortune that he experiences. "One cannot get rid of anything, one cannot get over anything, one cannot repel anything — everything hurts. Men and things obtrude too closely; experiences strike one too deeply; memory becomes a festering wound" (EH I 6 p. 320). The man of ressentiment in himself is a being full of pain: the sclerosis or hardening of his consciousness, the rapidity with which every excitation sets and freezes within him, the weight of the traces that invade him are so many cruel sufferings. And, more deeply, the memory of traces is full of hatred in itself and by itself. It is venomous and depreciative because it blames the object in order to compensate for its own inability to escape from the traces of the corresponding excitation. This is why ressentiment's revenge, even when it is realised, remains "spiritual", imaginary and symbolic in principle. This essential link between revenge and memory resembles the Freudian anal-sadistic complex. Nietzsche himself presents memory as an unfinished digestion and the type of ressentiment as an anal type.' This intestinal and venomous memory is what Nietzsche calls the spider, the tarantula, the spirit of revenge . . . We can see what Nietzsche's intention is: to produce a psychology that is really a typology, to put psychology "on the plane of the subject". 8 Even the possibilities of a cure will be subordinated to the transformation of types (reversal and transmutation).

## Links – Ressentiment

**The premise of violence and attacking is rooted in ressentiment. The slave requires assigning evil to everyone outside their moral boundaries so they may call themselves good.**

**Deleuze 83** (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 120-123, AD: 7/9/09) jl

"I am good, therefore you are evil": in the mouths of the masters the word therefore merely introduces a negative conclusion. And this latter is merely advanced as the consequence of a full affirmation: "we the aristocrats, the beautiful, the happy" (GM I 10). In the master everything positive is in the premises. He must have premises of action and affirmation, and the enjoyment of these premises in order to conclude with something negative which is not the main point and has scarcely any importance. It is only an "accessory, a complementary nuance" (GM I 11). **Its only importance is to augment the tenor of the action and the affirmation, to content their alliance and to redouble the corresponding enjoyment: the good "only looks for its antithesis in order to affirm itself with more joy"** (GM I 10). This is the status of aggression: it is the negative, but the negative as the conclusion of positive premises, the negative as the product of activity, the negative as the consequence of the power of affirming. The master acknowledges himself in a syllogism where two positive propositions are necessary to make a negation, the final negation being only a means of reinforcing the premises — "You are evil therefore I am good." Everything has changed: the negative passes into the premises, the positive is conceived as a conclusion, a conclusion from negative premises. The negative contains the essential and the positive only exists through negation. The negative becomes "the original idea, the beginning, the act par excellence" (GM I 11). **The slave must have premises of reaction and negation, of ressentiment and nihilism, in order to obtain an apparently positive conclusion.** Even so, it only appears to be positive. This is why Nietzsche insists on distinguishing ressentiment and aggression: they differ in nature. **The man of ressentiment needs to conceive of a non-ego, then to oppose himself to this non-ego in order finally to posit himself as self. This is the strange syllogism of the slave: he needs two negations in order to produce an appearance of affirmation.** We already sense the form in which the syllogism of the slave has been so successful in philosophy: the dialectic. The dialectic, as the ideology of ressentiment. **"You are evil, therefore I am good."** In this formula it is the slave who speaks. It cannot be denied that values are still being created. But what bizarre values! They begin **by positing the other as evil. He who called himself good is the one who is now called evil. This evil one is the one who acts, who does not hold himself back from acting, who does not therefore consider action from the point of view of the consequences that it will have for third parties.** And the one who is good is now the one who holds himself back from acting: **he is good just because he refers all actions to the standpoint of the one who does not act,** to the standpoint of the one who experiences the consequences, or better still to the more subtle standpoint of a divine third party who scrutinises the intentions of the one who acts. **"And he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God, who keeps himself hidden as we do, who avoids evil and desires little from life, like us, the patient, humble and just"** (GM I 13 p. 46). This is how good and evil are born: ethical determination, that of good and bad, gives way to moral judgment. The good of ethics has become the evil of morality, the bad has become the good of morality. Good and evil are not the good and the bad but, on the contrary, the exchange, the inversion, the reversal of their determination. Nietzsche stresses the following point: **"Beyond good and evil"** does not mean: "Beyond the good and the bad", on the contrary ... (GM I 17). Good and evil are new values, but how strangely these values are created! They **are created by reversing good and bad.** They are not created by acting but by holding back from acting, not by affirming, but by beginning with denial. This is why they are called un-created, divine, transcendent, superior to life. But think of what these values hide, of their mode of creation. They hide an extraordinary hatred, a hatred for life, a hatred for all that is active and affirmative in life. No moral values would survive for a single instant if they were separated from the premises of which they are the conclusion. And, more profoundly, no religious values are separable from this hatred and revenge from which they draw the consequences. The positivity of religion is only apparent: they conclude that the wretched, the poor, the weak, **the slaves, are the good since the strong are "evil" and "damned". They have invented** the good wretch, the good weakling: there is no better revenge against the strong and happy. What would Christian love be without the Judaic power of ressentiment which inspires and directs it? Christian love is not the opposite of Judaic ressentiment but its consequence, its conclusion and its crowning glory (GM I 8). Religion conceals the principles from which it is directly descended to a greater or lesser extent (and often, in periods of crisis, it no longer conceals anything at all); **the weight of negative premises, the spirit of revenge, the power of ressentiment.**





## **\*\*\*Impacts\*\*\***

## Impact – Extinction

**The pity of the affirmative and contempt for life culminates in a condition where extinction is desirable**

**Nietzsche 1886** (Friedrich, Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, Beyond Good and Evil, The Nietzsche Channel, <http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bge.htm>, AD: 7/8/09) jl

Whether it be hedonism or pessimism or utilitarianism or eudaemonism: all these modes of thought which assess the value of things according to pleasure and suffering, that is to say according to attendant and secondary phenomena, are foreground modes of thought and naïvetés which anyone conscious of creative powers and an artist's conscience will look down on with derision, though not without pity. Pity for you! That, to be sure, is not pity for social "distress," for "society" and its sick and unfortunate, for the vicious and broken from the start who lie all around us; even less is it pity for the grumbling, oppressed, rebellious slave classes who aspire after domination—they call it "freedom." Our pity is a more elevated, more farsighted pity—we see how man is diminishing himself, how you are diminishing him!—and there are times when we behold your pity with an indescribable anxiety, when we defend ourselves against this pity—when we find your seriousness more dangerous than any kind of frivolity. You want if possible—and there is no madder "if possible"—to abolish suffering; and we?—it really does seem that we would rather increase it and make it worse than it has ever been! Well-being as you understand it—that is no goal, that seems to us an end! A state which soon renders man ludicrous and contemptible—which makes it desirable that he should perish! The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—do you not know that it is this discipline alone which has created every elevation of mankind hitherto? That tension of the soul in misfortune which cultivates its strength, its terror at the sight of great destruction, its inventiveness and bravery in undergoing, enduring, interpreting, exploiting misfortune, and whatever of depth, mystery, mask, spirit, cunning and greatness has been bestowed upon it—has it not been bestowed through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? In man, creature and creator are united: in man there is matter, fragment, excess, clay, mud, madness, chaos; but in man there is also creator, sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divine spectator and the seventh day—do you understand this antithesis? And that your pity is for the "creature in man," for that which has to be formed, broken, forged, torn, burned, annealed, refined—that which has to suffer and should suffer? And our pity—do you not grasp whom our opposite pity is for when it defends itself against your pity as the worst of all pampering and weakening?—Pity against pity, then!— But, to repeat, there are higher problems than the problems of pleasure and suffering and pity; and every philosophy that treats only of them is a piece of naïveté. —

## Impact – Value to Life

**The Socratic delusion paralyzes action – The aff opens up the horror of existence – destroys value to life.**

### **Kain 7**

(Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 6/30/09) jl

**If we look** deeply into the essence of things, **into the horror of existence**, Nietzsche thinks **we will be** overwhelmed—**paralyzed**. Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things (BT 7). **We must see**, Nietzsche says, that **"a profound illusion . . . first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought . . . can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct. . ."** (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, **we cannot change things**. Instead, with Hamlet **we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint"** (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6).

**Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action—which requires distance and illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do**, Nietzsche thinks, **is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give suffering a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion.** The Greeks constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin (GM II:7; cf. D 78).

## Impacts – Value to Life

**The will to order the affirmative engages in condemns all that is beautiful in life – It becomes valuable only insofar as if we can correct existence**

**White, 90** (Alan, Professor of Philosophy Williams College, "Delusion Frames, From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth," <http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Delusion%20frames.htm>, AD: 7/8/09) jl

What is the secret? Art is generally supposed to be concerned with beauty, science with truth, and morality with goodness, yet Nietzsche suggests, directly, that science may be a defense against truth, an attempt to disguise the truth; he also suggests, indirectly, that morality may be a defense against goodness, an attempt to avoid acknowledging what true goodness would require. The mechanism that allows these defenses to work is a "new and unprecedented treasuring [Hochschätzung] of knowledge and insight." Clear evidence for the novelty of this valuation is provided by Socrates's admission of his own ignorance, and his amazement that others -- great statesmen, orators, poets, and artists -- are governed by instinct rather than by knowledge:

"Only from instinct": with this expression, we touch the heart and midpoint of the Socratic tendency. With it, Socraticism condemns existing art as well as existing ethics: wherever he directs his examining glance, he sees the lack of insight and the power of delusion [Wahn]; from this lack, he concludes that what exists is internally perverse [verkehrt] and reprehensible [verwerflich]. (BT:13)

In condemning all that exists, including current art and ethics, Socrates condemns both what is and what has been; given this rejection of past and present, he can be "detained in life" only by the delusion that he can make the future radically different. He consequently views his own task as one of therapy; he is to "heal the wound of existence" by "correcting existence" (BT:13). This correction or healing is a practical project, but it requires a theoretical foundation: the replacement of custom by morality presupposes a replacement of instinct with knowledge. The result of the two replacements is a transformation of pessimism into optimism:

Socrates is the prototype [Urbild] of the theoretical optimist who, with his already characterized faith in the fathomability [Ergründlichkeit] of the nature of things, ascribes to knowledge and cognition the force of a panacea, and conceives error as evil in itself. To penetrate into every ground [Grund] and to separate true cognition from semblance and from error strikes the Socratic man as the most noble human calling, indeed the only truly human calling. (BT:15)

The Socratic legacy -- hence, the functioning of the Socratic illusion -- is clearest in the paradigm [Typus] of a form of existence unheard of before Socrates: that of the theoretical man, who embraces Socrates's project, "to make existence appear comprehensible and thereby as justified" (BT:16), and thereby also Socrates's "profound delusion [Wahnvorstellung]," the "unshakable faith that thinking, following the guideline of causality, reaches into the deepest abysses of being, and that thinking is in a position not merely to know being, but even to correct it" (BT:15). The "essence of the spirit of science," then, combines "faith in the fathomability [Ergründlichkeit] of nature and in knowledge as panacea [an die Universalheilkraft des Wissens]" (BT:17). Life is worth living, for those possessed of this spirit, only because it is perfectible.

## Impact – Pity

**We backlash at those who become independent of our assistance because of feelings of abandonment – taking violence upon them allows us to retain our sense of accomplishment turning case.**

**Ure 6** (Michael, Prof of history of modern social and political theory and modern German philosophy @ the U of Queensland, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies - Issue 32, Autumn 2006, pp. 68-91, AD: 7/6/09) jl

It is for this reason that Nietzsche claims that **overcoming the feeling of selflack and restoring the vanity of self-affection are the motivating forces of the kind of pity** Rousseau and Schopenhauer identify **as the source of all our moral actions.** Couched in psychoanalytic terms, our feelings of self-lack are a reignition of infantile rage over our asymmetrical dependence on an idealized, self-sufficient other. Pity **serves to soothe this envious rage by overturning the asymmetry that the needy, dependent child fears may lead to its abandonment.** These psychoanalytic insights are implicit in Nietzsche's treatment of Rousseau and Schopenhauer. It is because Nietzsche sees how their notion of **pity is** shaped by this psychological matrix that he argues that it is both **self-serving and damaging to the other.** On the plane of fantasy, he suggests, as pitiers **we imagine the others on whom we depend as self-sufficient and we play the game of pity in order to redress this asymmetry.** We do so **by attempting to make ourselves appear as enviable and self-sufficient individuals on whose beneficence others must depend.** In the psychological transaction of pity, as Nietzsche sees it, **we aim to spoil others by making their suffering the occasion for undermining their independence and asserting our own.** As Nietzsche explains in the following aphorism: If we love, honour, admire someone and then afterwards discover that he is suffering . . . our feeling of love, reverence and admiration changes in an essential respect: it grows tenderer; that is to say, the gulf between us and him seems to be bridged, an approximation to identity seems to occur. Only now do we conceive it possible that we might give back to him, while he previously dwelt in our imagination as being elevated above our gratitude. This capacity to give back produces in us great joy and exaltation. . . . [W]e have the enjoyment of active gratitude—which, in short, is benevolent revenge. **If he wants and takes nothing whatever from us, we go away chilled and saddened, almost offended.** . . . From all of this it follows that, even in the most favorable cases, there is something degrading in suffering and something elevating and productive of superiority in pitying—which separates these two sensations from one another to all eternity. (D 138) As Nietzsche analyzes it here, as pitiers **our giving is motivated by the desire to usurp the position of imagined omnipotence, rather than by the other's desire for our pity.** (It is this insight that informs Zarathustra's caution that pity should always be a conjecture—"May your pity be a conjecture: that you may first know if your friend wants pity" [Z:1 "Of the Friend"].) For Nietzsche the fact that as pitiers we are driven by our desire to restore our self-affection is disclosed by our feeling of offence if the other does not appreciate our "gift" of Mitleid: "Refusing gratitude.—One may well refuse a request, but one may never refuse gratitude (or what comes to the same thing, receive it coldly or conventionally). To do so is very wounding—and why?" (D 235). Through gift giving inspired by such pity, Nietzsche implies, we try to exact from the other the kind of acknowledgment that can aid us in our attempt to restore our fantasy of plenitude. **As a sign of their subordination to us, the gratitude of others can serve to bolster our fragile illusion of omnipotence.** In this context, therefore, if others refuse our gift of pitying concern, they are, as it were, refusing to grant us the right to feel or imagine ourselves as elevated above them. In this regard, the gift of Mitleid is really a gift we attempt to bestow on ourselves at the other's expense.

## Impact/Alternative – Art

**The will to order is the instinct of annihilation – we should laugh in the face of the affirmative and create art in destruction**

**Nietzsche 1886** (Friedrich, Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, Human, All Too Human, The Nietzsche Channel, The Birth of Tragedy, <http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bt2.htm#asc>, AD: 7/7/09) j1

— But, my dear sir, what in the world is romantic if your book isn't? Can deep hatred against "the Now," against "reality" and "modern ideas" be pushed further than you pushed it in your artists' metaphysics? believing sooner in the Nothing, sooner in the devil than in "the Now"? **Is it not a deep bass of wrath and the lust for destruction that we hear humming underneath all of your contrapuntal art and seduction of the ear, a furious resolve against everything that is "now,"** a will that is not too far removed from practical nihilism and seems to say: "sooner let nothing be true than that you should be right, than that your truth should be prove right!" **Listen** yourself, **my dear pessimist** and art-deifier, but with open ears, to a single passage chosen from your book—to the not ineloquent dragon-slayer passage which may have an insidious pied-piper sound for young ears and hearts. How now? Isn't this the typical creed of the romantic of 1830, masked by the pessimism of 1850? Even the usual romantic finale is sounded—break, breakdown, return and collapse before an old faith, before the old God ... How now? Is your pessimists' book not itself a piece of anti-Hellenism and romanticism? **Is it not itself something "equally intoxicating and befogging," in any case a narcotic, even a piece of music,** German music? But listen:

**"Let us imagine a coming generation with such intrepidity of vision,** with such a heroic penchant for the tremendous; let us imagine **the bold stride of these dragon-slayers, the proud audacity with which they turn their back on all the weakling's doctrines of optimism in order to 'live resolutely' in wholeness and fullness:** would it not be necessary for the tragic man of such a culture, in view of his self-education for seriousness and terror, to desire a new art, the art of metaphysical comfort, and to exclaim with Faust:

Should not my longing overleap the distance

And draw the fairest form into existence?"

[Quoted from Section 18]

**"Would it not be necessary?" ... No,** thrice no! you young romantics: it would not be necessary! But it is highly probable that it will end that way—namely, "comforted," as it is written, in spite of all self-education for seriousness and terror, "comforted metaphysically"—in sum, as romantics end, as Christians..... No! You ought to learn the art of this-worldly comfort first—**you ought to learn to laugh, my young friends, if you are hell-bent on remaining pessimists; then perhaps, as laughers, you may some day dispatch all metaphysical comforts to the devil**—metaphysics in front! Or, to say in the language of that Dionysian monster who bears the name of Zarathustra:

**"Raise up your hearts, my brothers, high, higher! And don't forget your legs! Raise up your legs too, good dancers; and still better: stand on your heads!**

**"This crown of the laughter, this rose-wreath crown: I crown myself with this crown; I myself pronounced holy my laughter. I did not find anyone else today strong enough for that.**

"Zarathustra, the dancer; Zarathustra, the light one who beckons with his wings, preparing for a flight, beckoning to all birds, ready and heady, blissfully lightheaded:—

"Zarathustra, the soothsayer; Zarathustra, the sooth-laughter; not impatient; not unconditional; one who loves leaps and side-leaps: I crown myself with this crown.

**"This crown of the laughter, this rose-wreath crown: to you, my brothers, I throw this crown. Laughter I have pronounced holy: you higher men, learn—to laugh!"**





## **\*\*\*Alternative Debate\*\*\***

## Alternative – The Dice Throw

**Instead of giving into the temptation of action, we ask for you to step back and refuse the affirmatives moral project – we should abandon our desire for mastery over the world with a throw of the dice.**

**Deleuze 83** (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 25-27, AD: 7/8/09) jl

The game has two moments which are those of a dicethrow — the dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back. Nietzsche presents the dicethrow as taking place on two distinct tables, the earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown and the sky where the dice fall back: "if ever I have played dice with the gods at their table, the earth, so that the earth trembled and broke open and streams of fire snorted forth; for the earth is a table of the gods, and trembling with creative new words and the dice throws of the gods" (Z III "The Seven Seals" 3 p. 245). "O sky above me, you pure and lofty sky! This is now your purity to me, that there is no eternal reason-spider and spider's web in you; that you are to me a dance floor for divine chances, that you are to me a god's table for divine dice and dicers" (Z III "Before Sunrise" p. 186). But these two tables are not two worlds. They are the two hours of a single world, the two moments of a single world, midnight and midday, the hour when the dice are thrown, the hour when the dice fall back. Nietzsche insists on the two tables of life which are also the two moments of the player or the artist; **"We temporarily abandon life, in order to then temporarily fix our gaze upon it." The dicethrow affirms becoming and it affirms the being of becoming. It is not a matter of several dicethrows which, because of their number, finally reproduce the same combination. On the contrary, it is a matter of a single dicethrow which, due to the number of the combination produced, comes to reproduce itself as such.** It is not that a large number of throws produce the repetition of a combination but rather the number of the combination which produces the repetition of the dicethrow. The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of necessity. Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multiplicity. It will be replied, in vain, that thrown to chance, the dice do not necessarily produce the winning combination, the double six which brings back the dicethrow. This is true, but only insofar as the player did not know how to affirm chance from the outset. For, just as unity does not suppress or deny multiplicity, necessity does not suppress or abolish chance. Nietzsche identifies chance with multiplicity, with fragments, with parts, with chaos: the chaos of the dice that are shaken and then thrown. **Nietzsche turns chance into an affirmation.** The sky itself is called "chance-sky", "innocence-sky" (Z III "Before Sunrise"); the reign of Zarathustra is called "great chance" (Z IV "The Honey Offering" and III "Of Old and New Law Tables"; Zarathustra calls himself the "redeemer of chance"). "By chance, he is the world's oldest nobility, which I have given back to all things; I have released them from their servitude under purpose . . . I have found this happy certainty in all things: that they prefer to dance on the feet of chance" (Z III "Before Sunrise" p. 186); "My doctrine is 'Let chance come to me: it is as innocent as a little child!'" (Z III "On the Mount of Olives" p. 194). What Nietzsche calls necessity (destiny) is thus never the abolition but rather the combination of chance itself. Necessity is affirmed of chance in as much as chance itself affirmed. For there is only a single combination of chance as such, a single way of combining all the parts of chance, a way which is like the unity of multiplicity, that is to say number or necessity. There are many numbers with increasing or decreasing probabilities, but only one number of chance as such, one fatal number which reunites all the fragments of chance, like midday gathers together the scattered parts of midnight. **This is why it is sufficient for the player to affirm chance once in order to produce the number which brings back the dicethrow.** 22 **To know how to affirm chance is to know how to play.** But we do not know how to play, "Timid, ashamed, awkward, like a tiger whose leap has failed. But what of that you dicethrowers! You have not learned to play and mock as a man ought to play and mock!" (Z IV "Of the Higher Man" 14 p. 303). **The bad player counts on several throws of the dice, on a great number of throws. In this way he makes use of causality and probability to produce a combination that he sees as desirable.** He posits this combination itself as an end to be obtained, hidden behind causality. This is what Nietzsche means when he speaks of the eternal spider, of the spider's web of reason, "A kind of spider of imperative and finality hidden behind the great web, the great net of causality — we could say, with Charles the Bold when he opposed Louis XI, "I fight the universal spider" (GM III 9). **To abolish chance by holding it in the grip of causality and finality, to count on the repetition of throws rather than affirming chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity — these are all the operations of a bad player.** They have their root in reason, but what is the root of reason? The spirit of revenge, nothing but the spirit of revenge, the spider (Z II "Of the Tarantulas"). Ressentiment in the repetition of throws, bad conscience in the belief in a purpose. But, in this way, all that will ever be obtained are more or less probable relative numbers. That **the universe has no purpose, that it has no end to hope for any more than it has causes to be known — this is the certainty necessary to play well** (VP III 465). **The dicethrow fails because chance has not been affirmed enough in one throw. It has not been affirmed enough in order to produce the fatal number which necessarily reunites all the fragments and brings back the dicethrow.** We must therefore attach the greatest importance to the following conclusion: for the couple causality-finality, probability-finality, for the opposition and the synthesis of these terms, for the web of these terms, Nietzsche substitutes the Dionysian correlation of chance necessity, the Dionysian couple chance-destiny. **Not a probability distributed over several throws but all chance at once; not a final, desired, willed combination, but the fatal combination, fatal and loved, amor fati; not the return of a combination by the number of throws, but the repetition of a dicethrow by the nature of the fatally obtained number.** 23

## Alternative – Amor Fati – Solvency

Embracing fate solves our sorrow – it allows us to embrace and love every moment in our lives.

### **Kain 7**

(Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/5/09) jl

The greatest weight.—**What, if** some day or **night a demon were to steal** after **you** into your loneliest loneliness **and say** to you: "**This life as you** now live it and **have lived it, you will have to live** once more and **innumerable times more**; and **there will be nothing new** in it, but **every pain** and every **joy** and every **thought** and **sigh** and **everything unutterably small or great in your life will** have to **return to you, all in the same succession** and sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. **The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again**, and you with it, speck of dust!"

**Would you** not **throw yourself down** and gnash your teeth **and curse the demon** who spoke thus? **Or** have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you **would have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine."** If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?

(GS 341)6

It is not enough that eternal recurrence simply be believed. **Nietzsche demands** that **it** actually **be loved**. In Ecce Homo, he explains his doctrine of amor fati: "**My formula** for greatness in a human being **is amor fati**: that **one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity**. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it . . . but love it" (EH "Clever" 10; cf. GS 276). In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra says: "To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'—that alone should I call redemption" (Z II: "On Redemption"; cf. Z III: "On Old and New Tablets" 3). To turn all "it was" into a "thus I willed it" is **to accept fate fully**, to love it. One would have it no other way; one wants everything eternally the same: "Was that life? . . . Well then! Once more!" (Z IV: "The Drunken Song" 1).

## Alternative – Security

**Voting negative allows a new concept of security not based upon the construction of enemies – we go beyond looking at the world as a threat**

**Der Derian 98** (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html>, AD: 7/7/09) jl

**What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities.**

The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." 9 Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security:

**I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. 10 The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference.**



## **\*\*\*Framework Debate \*\*\***

## Framework

**Policy debate framework is complicit with the Socratic Will to Truth that we criticize – forcing debate to be about instrumental desirability imposes mastery and violence into the realm of politics. This deplaces debate with absolutism and totalitarianism**

**Saurette 96** (Paul, Prof of political theory/science at John Hopkins University, "I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6, AD: 7/6/09) jl

Arendt contends that this **rule-based conception of political action assumed a hegemonic and 'natural' status only when the philosophical transformation of Western civilisation created an intellectual framework which necessitated interpreting politics as rulership.** From this perspective, the importance of Arendt's thought is that she reveals the way in which the Will to Order/Truth has created the parameters of the modern understanding of politics. According to Arendt, **our modern notion of politics is an inevitable consequence of the Platonic Will to Truth/Order.** After Plato's Republic, **politics could no longer be conceived of as the freedom to act with equals, but could be conceptualised only as the ordering of society according to the world of forms.** With this paradigmatic substitution of making for acting, homo faber becomes the model political actor, and the realm of human affairs can be interpreted only in terms of work. Further, **through this transformation, the concepts of mastery, control, and violence are inextricably imposed onto the realm of politics.** As Arendt notes, 'Mr] the Republic, the philosopher-king applies the ideas as the craftsman applies his rules and standard; he "makes" his City as the sculptor makes a statue; and in the final Platonic work these same ideas have even become laws which need only be executed'.<sup>27</sup> The politician is idealised as the craftsman whose skill lies first in perceiving the ideal form of the product-to-be, and second, in organising the means to execute its production.

This transformation inverts both the practice and the meaning of politics on at least two levels. First, **the 'end' of political action becomes measured in terms of the ability of actors to replicate an ideal form.** As Arendt notes, **this instrumentalised model of politics evaluates action solely on the grounds of a means-ends calculus which risks devolving into an eternal regression of ungroundable utility.** Arendt states that '[t]he trouble with the utility standard inherent in the very activity of fabrication is that the relationship between means and end on which it relies is very much like a chain whose every end can serve again as a means in some other context'.<sup>1</sup> The only possible way to stabilise this chain is to posit an eternal and perfect end, such as justice, order, or God, which acts as an unquestioned goal due to its perfect truthfulness. **The essence of the Platonic, and later Christian and Enlightenment, conceptions of political action, then, is the ability to ground the final end through recourse to an unquestionable 'truth'. By resituating political judgement in the realm of ideals, this model denies that meaning derives from the apparent world of human affairs, and replaces debate, action, and plurality with absolutes and ideals.** The dichotomisation of the ideal and apparent worlds results in a second inversion. The notion of politician as craftsman undermines the possibility of action in the political sphere by attempting to deny the very condition of plurality and natality. **The prerequisite qualities of equality and persuasion are replaced by the precepts of fabrication: mastery and violence. Plural political action is renounced in favour of the unquestioned order of rulership and mastery (which destroys the potential for natality and plurality), or by the coercion of violence (which simply overwhelms any possibility of action through sheer strength). This consequence is then circularly justified by the belief that the end of action can be nothing more than the realisation of the Real World in the Apparent World. The conception of community through equality and difference is inexorably replaced by the understanding of political community constructed through mastery, control, and rule.**

**The dual inversion of politics-as-making explicitly reveals the profound impact of the philosophical foundation of the Will to Order/Truth on the modern conception of politics.** Within this philosophical order, **politics must be understood as a process of fabrication in which the end utopian goal justifies and underpins rulership, controls and domination.** From this perspective, **the development of a variety of Real World ideals (Platonic justice, Christian salvation, or vulgar Marxist utopianism) which guide political action have disguised the entrenched consistency of the understanding of politics-as-making. It is precisely this 'definition' of politics that must be exposed and problematised. For politics-as-making is neither a 'natural' nor 'realistic' conception of politics, but rather a historical consequence of a specific philosophical foundation. As such, it is neither factual nor beyond critique.**

## Framework

Despite the panacea to suffering the affirmative presents, nothing happens when you vote affirmative – instead vote negative as a means of establishing an ethical relationship with suffering. If we win the alternative is good in the abstract, you should vote negative.

### Kain 7

(Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/6/09) jl

To appreciate how committed he is, suppose we are incorrigible do-gooders—liberals, socialists, or Christians. We just cannot bear to see anyone suffer. Suppose we find a researcher who is working on a cure for Nietzsche's disease. This researcher thinks that within a few years a drug can be produced to eliminate the disease. Suppose the researcher is right. And suppose that just as Nietzsche has solidly committed to eternal recurrence, just as he is able to love his fate, just as he has decided he would not change the slightest detail of his life, we tell him about this cure.

How would Nietzsche respond? Would he accept the cure? Would he give up his hard-won attitude of accepting his migraines, nausea, and vomiting, of refusing to desire any change? Would he revert to his old attitude of hoping to reduce his suffering, trying out whatever might accomplish this? Would he give his illness a chance to reassert its psychological stranglehold? We must remember that our supposition is that he would actually be cured in a few years. But he would also forgo the discipline, the strengthening, the empowerment that a commitment to eternal recurrence and amor fati would have made possible. Although his illness would be cured, he would not have developed the wherewithal to deal with any other suffering—in a world characterized by the horror of existence. We cannot know whether Nietzsche would decide to take the cure or not. What we can be sure of is that if he did, he would not be the Nietzsche we know.

Kierkegaard retells the story of Abraham and Isaac. God commands Abraham to take his only son to Mount Moriah and to sacrifice him there as a burnt offering. Faithful Abraham sets off to obey God's will. But just as he arrives, just as he has drawn his knife, just as he is about to offer his son, he is told instead to sacrifice the ram that God has prepared. Kierkegaard suggests that if he had been in Abraham's position, if he had sufficient faith in God and had obeyed him as Abraham did, if he had been able to summon the same courage, then, when he got Isaac back again he would have been embarrassed. Abraham, he thinks, was not embarrassed. He was not embarrassed because he believed all along, by virtue of the absurd, that God would not require Isaac.<sup>24</sup>

What about Nietzsche? Let us assume that Nietzsche has fully committed to eternal recurrence and amor fati, that he has come to love his fate, that he has decided he would not change the slightest detail. Moreover, he has announced this to the world in his writings. Let us assume that over the years this commitment has empowered him, given him greater strength. We do-gooders now inform him that we can cure his disease and eliminate his suffering. Even further, suppose we were able to prove to him that eternal recurrence is impossible. Would Nietzsche be embarrassed?

Maybe. But it is not absolutely clear that he would be. He might respond that believing in eternal recurrence—perhaps even by virtue of the absurd—allowed him to face the horror of existence. He might respond that it does not really matter whether his life will actually return. The only thing that matters is the attitude he [End Page 61] was able to develop toward his present life. He might respond that it does not really matter that it has become possible to cure his particular illness; there is still plenty of other suffering to be faced given the horror of existence. He might respond that what matters is the strength he was able to gain from believing in eternal recurrence and loving his fate, not whether eternal recurrence is actually true.



## Framework

**Questions of political consideration miss the point of the criticism – the ballot is an ethical choice to save ourselves**

**White, 90** (Alan, Professor of Philosophy Williams College, “Delusion Frames, From Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth,” <http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Without%20frames.htm> , AD: 7/9/09) jl

The most provocative teachings I find in Nietzsche are not political, but rather ethical; Nietzsche does not attempt to tell us how to save the world, but rather how to save ourselves -- how to save ourselves from living lives that we will come to view with regret rather than with pride. And he teaches that we can do that without becoming supermen who blithely crush their supposed inferiors beneath their feet.

**The ballot must be used as an ethical action – instead of roleplaying, only transforming our own personal relationship with suffering can solve**

**Newman 0** (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, AD: 7/8/09) jl

Rather than having an external enemy -- like the State -- in opposition to which one's political identity is formed, we must work on ourselves. As political subjects we must overcome resentment by transforming our relationship with power. One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. To affirm eternal return is to acknowledge and indeed positively affirm the continual 'return' of same life with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps in the same way, eternal return refers to power. We must acknowledge and affirm the 'return' of power, the fact that it will always be with us. To overcome resentment we must, in other words, will power. We must affirm a will to power -- in the form of creative, life-affirming values, according to Nietzsche.[56] This is to accept the notion of 'self-overcoming'.[57] To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, would mean an overcoming of the essentialist identities and categories that limit us. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that that dominate us -- this is what he calls subjectification.[58] We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power, and produce through this denial, a Manichean politics of absolute opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose. This we have seen in the case of anarchism. In order to avoid this Manichean logic, anarchism must no longer rely on essentialist identities and concepts, and instead positively affirm the eternal return of power. This is not a grim realization but rather a 'happy positivism'. It is characterized by political strategies aimed at minimizing the possibilities of domination, and increasing the possibilities for freedom.



**\*\*\*Answer To Section \*\*\***

## AT: Perm

**The perm falls into the trap of enslavement – Embracing every instance is key to understand it's inevitability**

### **Kain 7**

(Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/6/09) jl

I think we are now in a position to see that for eternal recurrence to work, for it to have the effect that it must have for Nietzsche, we must accept without qualification, we must love, every single moment of our lives, every single moment of suffering. We cannot allow ourselves to be tempted by what might at first sight seem to be a much more appealing version of eternal recurrence, that is, a recurring life that would include the desirable aspects of our present life while leaving out the undesirable ones. To give in to such temptation would be to risk losing everything that has been gained. To give in to such temptation, I suggest, would allow the suffering in our present life to begin to reassert its psychological stranglehold. We would start to slip back into subjugation. We would again come to be dominated by our suffering. We [End Page 57] would spend our time trying to minimize it, or avoid it, or ameliorate it, or cure it. We would again become slaves to it.

For the same reason, I do not think it will work for us to accept eternal recurrence merely because of one or a few grand moments—for the sake of which we are willing to tolerate the rest of our lives. Magnus holds that all we need desire is the return of one peak experience.<sup>21</sup> This suggests that our attitude toward much of our life, even most of it, could be one of toleration, acceptance, or indifference—it could even be negative. All we need do is love one great moment and, because all moments are interconnected (Z IV: "The Drunken Song" 10; WP 1032), that then will require us to accept all moments. This would be much easier than actually loving all moments of one's life—every single detail. The latter is what is demanded in Ecce Homo, which says that amor fati means that one "wants nothing to be different" and that we "[n]ot merely bear what is necessary . . . but love it" (EH "Clever" 10, emphasis added [except to love]). We want "a Yes-saying without reservation, even to suffering. . . . Nothing in existence may be subtracted, nothing is dispensable . . ." (EH "BT" 2). If we do not love every moment of our present life for its own sake, those moments we do not love, those moments we accept for the sake of one grand moment, I suggest, will begin to wear on us.<sup>22</sup> We will begin to wish we did not have to suffer through so many of them, we will try to develop strategies for coping with them, we will worry about them, they will start to reassert themselves, they will slowly begin to dominate us, and pretty soon we will again be enslaved by them. Our attitude toward any moment cannot be a desire to avoid it, change it, or reduce it—or it will again begin to dominate us. Indeed, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche says that he had to display a "Russian fatalism." He did so by tenaciously clinging for years to all but intolerable situations, places, apartments, and society, merely because they happened to be given by accident: it was better than changing them, than feeling that they could be changed—than rebelling against them.

Any attempt to disturb me in this fatalism, to awaken me by force, used to annoy me mortally—and it actually was mortally dangerous every time.

Accepting oneself as if fated, not wishing oneself "different"—that is in such cases great reason itself. (EH "Wise" 6)

Eternal recurrence is an attempt to deal with meaningless suffering. It is an attempt to do so that completely rejects an approach to suffering that says, Let's improve the world, let's change things, let's work step by step to remove suffering—the view of liberals and socialists whom Nietzsche so often rails against. If it is impossible to significantly reduce suffering in the world, as Nietzsche thinks it is, then to make it your goal to try to do so is to enslave yourself to that suffering. [End Page 58]

## AT: Perm

**The permutation is impossible – The creation of the fantasy world of the 1AC subsumes the real world in which we live in destroying any chance at life affirmation.**

**Turanli 3** (Aydan, Prof of Department of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Istanbul Technical University, "Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein: An Offense to the Quest for Another World," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26 (55-63), Muse, AD: 7/9/09) jl

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. [End Page 61] Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicians who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "My kingdom is not of this world" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI §309).

## AT: Perm

**The “should” question of the affirmative are mutually exclusive with the alt – These policies are another attempt to mold existence to perfection**

**Nietzsche 1889** (Friedrich, Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, Twilight of the Idols, The Nietzsche Channel, AD: 7/9/09) jl

Let us finally consider how naive it is altogether to say: "Man ought to be such and such!" Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the abundance of a lavish play and change of forms -- and some wretched loafer of a moralist comments: "No! Man ought to be different." He even knows what man should be like, this wretched bigot and prig: he paints himself on the wall and comments, "Ecce homo!" ["behold the man" -- traditionally said of Christ] But even when the moralist addresses himself only to the single human being and says to him, "You ought to be such and such!" he does not cease to make himself ridiculous. The single human being is a piece of fatum from the front to back, one law more, one necessity more for all that is yet to come and to be. To say to him, "Change yourself!" is to demand that everything be changed, even retroactively. And indeed there have been consistent moralists who wanted man to be different, that is, virtuous -- they wanted him remade in their own image, as a prig: to that end, they negated the world! No small madness! No modest kind of immodesty! Morality, insofar as it condemns for its own sake, and not out of regard for the concerns, considerations, and contrivances of life, is a specific error with which one ought to have no pity -- an idiosyncrasy of degenerates which has caused immeasurable harm.

**A firm stance is key with these issues – the perm gives into the herd instinct that lacks thoughtfulness and true advocacy**

**Nietzsche 1882** (Friedrich, Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, The Gay Science, The Nietzsche Channel, AD: 7/9/09) jl

A firm reputation.— A firm reputation used to be extremely useful; and wherever society is still dominated by the herd instinct it is still most expedient for every one to pretend that his character and occupation are unchangeable,—even if at bottom they are not. "One can depend on him, he remains the same":—in all extremities of society this is the sort of praise that means the most. Society is pleased to feel that the virtue of this person, the ambition of that one, and the thoughtfulness and passion of the third provide it with a dependable instrument that is always at hand,—it honors this instrumental nature, this way of remaining faithful to oneself, this unchangeability of views, aspirations, and even faults and lavishes its highest honors upon it. Such esteem, which flourishes and has flourished everywhere alongside the morality of mores, breeds "character" and brings all change, all re-learning, all self-transformation into ill repute. However great the advantages of this way of thinking may be elsewhere, for the search after knowledge no general judgment could be more harmful, for precisely the good will of those who seek knowledge to declare themselves at any time dauntlessly against their previous opinions and to mistrust everything that wishes to become firm in us,—is thus condemned and brought into ill repute. Being at odds with "a firm reputation," the attitude of those who seek knowledge is considered dishonorable while the petrification of opinions is accorded a monopoly on honor:—under the spell of such notions we have to live to this day! How hard it is to live when one feels the opposition of many millennia all around! It is probable that the search after knowledge was afflicted for many millennia with a bad conscience, and that the history of the greatest spirits must have contained a good deal of self-contempt and secret misery.

## AT: Alt = Violence

1. Turn – Violence is only a condition that exists because of a perceived imperfection in the world. State sanctioned violence is the product of a will to control the world and eliminate all difference instead of embracing disorder – That's Saurette.
2. Turn – Value to life outweighs – even if the result of the alternative is suffering, the ability to accept that suffering is what's able to release us from the psychological strangle hold that suffering has over us as sorrow – that's Kain.
3. New Link – This proves the inability to accept the suffering in life by depicting our alt as undesirable because of imperfections – Kain says these imperfections are inevitable and that rejecting that tragedy in life put us back at square one
4. Turn - Violence is only a product of slave morality and the attempts to control disorder in the world – the alternative is a rejection of this mindset

**Deleuze 74** (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Desert Islands and Other Texts, p. 119, AD: 7/9/09) jl

This original depth, Zarathoustra's celebrated height-depth, must be named the will to power. Of course, Mr. Birault figured out how we must understand the term "will to power." It's not wanting to live, because how could whatever life is want to live? It's not a desire for domination either, because how could whatever it is that dominates desire to dominate? Zarathoustra says: "The desire to dominate: now who would call that a desire?" The will to power, then, is not a will that wants power or wants to dominate. Such an interpretation would indeed have two disadvantages. If the will to power meant wanting power, it would clearly depend on long established values, such as honor, money, or social influence, since these values determine the attribution and recognition of power as an object of desire and will. And this power which the will desired could be obtained only by throwing itself into the struggle or fight. More to the point, we ask: who wants such power? who wants to dominate? Precisely those whom Nietzsche calls slaves and the weak. Wanting power is the image of the will to power which the impotent invent for themselves. Nietzsche always saw in struggle, in fighting, a means of selection that worked in reverse, turning to the advantage of slaves and herds. This is one of Nietzsche's great observations: "The strong must be defended just like the weak." Certainly, in the desire to dominate, in the image of the will to power which the impotent invent for themselves, we discover a will to power: but at its lowest level. The will to power has its highest level in an intense or intensive form, which is neither coveting nor taking, but giving, creating. Its true name, says Zarathoustra, is the virtue that gives.<sup>4</sup> And the mask is the most beautiful gift, showing the will to power as a plastic force, as the highest power of art. Power is not what the will wants, but that which wants in will, that is to say, Dionysos.

## AT: Alt = Violence

### 5. Turn – resentment authorizes limitless violence as an attempt to correct the imperfections of our existence

**Deleuze 83** (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 118-119, AD: 7/9/09) jl

The imputation of wrongs, the distribution of responsibilities, perpetual accusation. All this replaces aggression. "The aggressive pathos belongs just as necessarily to strength as vengefulness and rancour belong to weakness" (EH I 7 p. 232). Considering gain as a right, considering it a right to profit from actions that he does not perform, the man of resentment breaks out in bitter reproaches as soon as his expectations are disappointed. And how could they not be disappointed, since frustration and revenge are the a prioris of resentment? "It is your fault if no one loves me, it is your fault if I've failed in life and also your fault if you fail in yours, your misfortunes and mine are equally your fault." Here we rediscover the dreadful feminine power of resentment: it is not content to denounce crimes and criminals, it wants sinners, people who are responsible. We can guess what the creature of resentment wants: he wants others to be evil, he needs others to be evil in order to be able to consider himself good. You are evil, therefore I am good; this is the slave's fundamental formula, it expresses the main point of resentment from the typological point of view, it summarises and brings together all the preceding characteristics. This formula must be compared with that of the master: I am good, therefore you are evil. The difference between the two measures the revolt of the slave and his triumph: "This inversion of the valuepositing eye . . . is of the essence of resentment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile world" (GM 1 10 pp. 36-37). The slave needs, to set the other up as evil from the outset.



## AT: Violence

**Turn – Violence is complicit in a negative will to power – the process of security involves purging the world of all difference.**

**Der Derian 98** (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html>, AD: 7/7/09) jl

Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here.

One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34

The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for "... life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35

Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear.

The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37

## AT: You = Holocaust

**Arguments that we cause the holocaust are intellectually dishonest – the holocaust was a result of the slave morality we criticize**

**Gupta 1** (Akaash, holland and knight charitable foundation, "2001 Holocaust Remembrance Project," <http://holocaust.hklaw.com/essays/2001/2001-11.htm>, AD: 7/9/09) j1

As the Nazi regime of Germany followed Nietzsche's favoured "noble morality" or nihilism, it seems as though the German citizens themselves followed the "slave morality" which Nietzsche denounced. Slave morality is based upon values taught to people as they grow up. According to Nietzsche, these values are unfounded and "To admit a belief merely because it is a custom but that means to be dishonest, cowardly, lazy!" The anti-Semitic beliefs that had been rooted in Germany took custom in Germany because of popular opinion. The propaganda of Adolf Hitler captivated the masses and created a population of uniform beliefs where people consented to Nazi actions. The German public became a slave to Hitler's regime as Nazi actions went unquestioned. This slavery was only possible because of the population's belief that they did not own moral responsibility for the actions of Nazi Germany.

**The holocaust was a result of resentment and the Nazi States hatred of a chaotic world beyond control**

**Peachy 3** (Paul, Senior Lecturer U Cardiff U, "POST-SOVIET SOCIETIES:

CHAUVINISM OR CATHARSIS?," March 30, [http://www.crvp.org/book/Series04/IVA-7/chapter\\_ix.htm](http://www.crvp.org/book/Series04/IVA-7/chapter_ix.htm), AD: 7/9/09) j1

Resentments against Marxist-Leninist rule have long smoldered in the Soviet lands. Grievances are complex, profound, and varied and have hastened the breakup of the old Union. To refer to those grievances, I shall use the original, more robust, French term, ressentiment, originally proposed as a technical term in another context by Friedrich Nietzsche, and later refined by Max Scheler. The latter used the term early in the present century to refer to deeply repressed "emotions and affects . . . (of) revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to distract, and spite."<sup>6</sup> Both the concept and the condition to which it refers deserve greater specification than is possible here. In any case, ressentiment consists of deep-seated and persistent rancor and thirst for revenge. The Soviet regime originally seized control of, and extended, the multi-national, czarist empire. The non-Russian peoples in the Union were thus doubly-yoked by both an ideologically alien and an imperial rule. In his paper (chapter I above), Ghia Nodia notes one specific dimension of the resulting trauma, namely the loss incurred in seventy-year interruption in the historical development of peoples of the former Union. But beyond the seventy-year loss, "Communist rule does not provide anything useful to be kept in the period of transition to modernity and leaves after itself a kind of social desert. There is nothing real on which an attempt to build a modern ('democratic,' 'free market,' etc.,) society may be based." This contrasts, in his view, with modernization elsewhere that "occurred on the basis of elements which emerged in traditional societies." Instead, formerly Soviet societies "can only be founded on ideas: recollection of national past and imitating pre-given models" (presumably, other already-modern societies). Questions may be raised regarding so sweeping a verdict, though Nodia presumably refers specifically to the salient features of the communist system, rather than to the whole life of the era. In any case, the democratic energies now exploding in the former Soviet sphere had been growing for decades beneath the Soviet burden. Mikhail Gorbachev did not simply fall unannounced from the sky, a fact that he recognized from the outset. In that sense, modernization in the Soviet sphere, as modernization in the West earlier, "occurred on the basis of elements that emerged" in the existing society. In the end, though acknowledgement of positive achievements during the Soviet era is part of the healing process, unspeakable trauma remains, and in some respects recurs. Nico Chavchavadze, head of the Institute of Philosophy in the Georgian Academy of Sciences, on his first visit to the United States in 1989, stated publicly that a moral renewal must precede any political rebirth in what then was still the Soviet Union. Subsequent Georgian turmoil appears to confirm his assessment. Nor is it merely or primarily a Georgian problem. Reports out of Czechoslovakia, for example, indicate new and persisting forms of distrust, recrimination, and revenge, despite the nobility of spirit articulated by Vaclav Havel, the dissident turned president.<sup>7</sup> CATHARIS OR CHAUVINISM? Can the monstrous wounds of the Soviet era, indeed of this century generally **the wars, the gulags, the genocide, the recriminations, the resentment, be absolved?** In this regard, the Jewish holocaust has often been treated, as it were, prototypically. Elie Wiesel, himself a survivor, has emphasized, that the victims of that obscenity are in some sense doomed to silence. When we speak, Wiesel observes, we describe by means of comparison. An event, hitherto unknown, is explained in terms of another of which we have some knowledge. But the Holocaust is sui generis, beyond anything comparable. Wiesel writes: "By its uniqueness the Holocaust defies literature."<sup>8</sup> If obscenities, such as the Jewish holocaust or the traumas of the Soviet era, defy our communicable grasp, absolution of the resulting resentment may be similarly handicapped. Without presuming to resolve the conceptual problem, I here employ two "shorthand" terms: chauvinism, for the venting of ressentiment in pre-political ethnic nationalism; catharis for absolution and healing.

## AT: You = Holocaust

**Their misinterpretation of Nietzschean thought is what causes atrocities – Our deployment of the alternative results in the ability to question the logic behind the holocaust and other forms of widespread violence**

**Deleuze 74** (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Desert Islands and Other Texts, p. 256-257, AD: 7/9/09) jl

"...They show up like destiny, without cause or reason, without consideration or pretext, there they are with the speed of lightning, too terrible, too sudden, too conquering, too other even to be an object of hatred..." This is Nietzsche's famous text on the founders of States, "those artists with eyes of bronze" (The Genealogy of Morals, II, 17). Or is it Kafka, writing The Great Wall of China?. "It's impossible to understand how they made it all the way to the capital, which is nonetheless quite far from the frontier. But there they are, and every morning seems to increase their number. [...] Impossible to converse with them. They don't know our language. [...] Even their horses are meat-eaters!"<sup>4</sup> Well then, what I am saying is that texts like these are traversed by a movement which comes from the outside, which does not begin in the page of the book, nor in the preceding pages, which does not fit in the frame of the book, and which is totally different from the imaginary movement of representations or the abstract movement of concepts as they are wont to take place through words and in the reader's head. Something leaps from the book, making contact with a pure outside. It is this, I believe, which for Nietzsche's work is the right to misinterpret. An aphorism is a play of forces, a state of forces which are always exterior to one another. **An aphorism doesn't mean anything, it signifies nothing, and no more has a signifier than a signified.** Those would be ways of restoring a text's interiority. An aphorism is a state of forces, the last of which, meaning at once the most recent, the most actual, and the provisional-ultimate, is the most external. Nietzsche posits it quite clearly: if you want to know what I mean, find the force that gives what I say meaning, and a new meaning if need be. Hook the text up to this force. In this way, there are no problems of interpretation for Nietzsche, **there are only problems of machining: to machine Nietzsche's text,** to find out which actual external force will get something through, like a current of energy. **In this respect, we come across the problem raised by** some of Nietzsche's texts which have a **fascist or anti-Semitic resonance...** And since we are discussing Nietzsche today, we must acknowledge that he has inspired and inspires still many a young fascist. There was a time when it was important to show how Nietzsche was used, twisted, and completely distorted by the fascists. This was done in the revue *Acephale*, with Jean Wahl, Bataille, and Klossowski. Today, however, this is perhaps no longer the problem. It is not at the level of the text that we must fight. Not because we are incapable of fighting at that level, but because such a fight is no longer useful. Rather, **we must find, assign, join those external forces which give to any particular Nietzschean phrase its liberating meaning, its sense of exteriority. It is at the level of method that the question of Nietzsche's revolutionary character is raised: it is the Nietzschean method that makes Nietzsche's text not something about which we have to ask: "is this fascist, bourgeois, or revolutionary in itself?"—but a field of exteriority where fascist, bourgeois, and revolutionary forces confront one another.** And if we pose the problem in this way, the answer that necessarily conforms with the method is: find the revolutionary force (who is superman?) always calling on new forces which come from the exterior, and which traverse and intersect with the Nietzschean text in the frame of the aphorism. **There is your legitimate misinterpretation: to treat the aphorism like a phenomenon awaiting new forces that will "subjugate" it or make it work or explode.**

## AT: Nazism

### Six reasons why Nietzsche opposed Nazism

**Yovel 2** (Hans Jonas Professor of Philosophy Yirmiyahu, Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, "Nietzsche contra Wagner on the Jews" ed. by Jacob Golomb, Robert Solomon Wistrich, Google Books, AD: 7/9/09) jl

But even without considering psychology, there are sufficient philosophical grounds for Nietzsche's active adoption of anti-anti-Semitism. The anti-Semitic movement contained and heightened most of the decadent elements in modern culture that **Nietzsche's philosophy set out to combat:**

**1. Anti-Semitism** as a mass movement **was seen by Nietzsche as vulgar, ideological, a new form of "slay morality" representative of the herd.**

**2. Anti-Semitism was a popular neurosis, affecting weak people who lacked existential power and self-confidence.**

**3. Anti-Semitism**, especially in Germany, **served to reinforce** the Second Reich and **the cult of the state**, which Nietzsche, "the last Unpolitical German," had denounced as "a New Idol."

**4. Anti-Semitism was also a lubricant of German nationalism, which** the mature **Nietzsche opposed** most insistently (though he did so "from the right").

**5. Anti-Semitism** also **depended on racism, which Nietzsche's philosophy rejected as a value distinction among groups**, though he did use race as a descriptive category. **Nietzsche favored the mixing of races** within the new Europe he envisaged.

**6. At the root of anti-Semitism lay a common genealogical structure of fear, insecurity, existential weakness, and, above all, resentment** malignant rancor against the mentally powerful and self-affirming, **as well as the hatred toward the other as a precondition for self-esteem**. The ardor of the anti-Semite conceals his or her deep insecurity: he does not start with the celebratory affirmation of his own being, but with the negation of the other by which alone the anti-Semite proves able to reaffirm his own self—which he does in an overblown, empty, and arrogant manner.

**Nietzsche's four negations**—those of nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, and the cult of the state—also **explain why he was bound to have opposed fascism and Nazism**, although these ideologies successfully manipulated his philosophy for their devious purposes.

### Nietzsche despised anti-Semitism – it showed the resentment and herd mentality in Europe

**Deleuze 83** (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 25-27, AD: 7/8/09) jl

We will have to return to those famous passages where Nietzsche considers the Judaism of the Jewish priest. They have often produced the most dubious interpretations. **We know that the Nazis had ambiguous relations with Nietzsche's work:** ambiguous because **they liked to appeal to it but could not do so without mutilating quotations, falsifying editions and banning important texts**. On the other hand, **Nietzsche** himself did not have ambiguous relations with the Bismarckian regime, still less with Pan-Germanism and anti-Semitism. He **despised** and hated **them**: **"Do not associate with anyone who is implicated in this shameless racial hoax."** 17 And the cry de coeur, "But, finally, what do you think I feel when the name of Zarathustra comes from the mouths of anti-Semites!" In order to understand the sense of Nietzschean reflections on Judaism it must be recalled that the "Jewish question" had become, in the Hegelian school, a dialectical theme par excellence. Nietzsche takes up the question once again but according to his own method. He asks: how is the priest constituted in the history of the Jewish people? Under what conditions is he constituted — conditions which will prove decisive for the whole of European history? **Nothing is more striking than Nietzsche's admiration for the Kings of Israel and the Old Testament.** 9 The Jewish problem is the same as the problem of the constitution of the priest in this world of Israel: this is the true typological problem. This is why Nietzsche is so insistent on the following point: I am the inventor of the psychology of the priest (EH III GM). It is true that there are racial considerations in Nietzsche. But race only ever intervenes as an element in a crossbreeding, as a factor in a complex which is physiological but also psychological, political, historical and social. Such a complex is exactly what Nietzsche calls a type. The type of the priest — there is no other problem for Nietzsche. And this same Jewish people which, at one moment in its history found its conditions of existence in the priest, is today the people to save Europe, to protect it from itself by inventing new conditions." **What Nietzsche wrote about Judaism cannot be read without recalling what he wrote to Fritsch, an antisemitic and racist writer: "I beg you to stop sending me your publications if you please: I fear for my patience."**

## **AT: Eternal Recurrence doesn't Exist**

**AT: ER does not exist – it doesn't matter if it exists or not, it's the concept of embracing something if it did exist.**

### **Kain 7**

(Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/5/09) jl

At any rate, Nietzsche claims that **just thinking about the possibility of eternal recurrence can shatter and transform us**.<sup>13</sup> In published works, eternal recurrence is presented as the teaching of a sage, as the revelation of a demon, or as a thought that gains possession of one. In The Gay Science 341, we must notice, **eternal recurrence is not presented as a truth**. Many commentators argue that **it simply does not matter whether or not it is true; its importance lies in the effect it has on those who believe it**.<sup>14</sup>

## AT: We can make the World Better

Questions about “decreasing” suffering miss the point of the criticism – steps toward a perfectible cosmos are bad because we cannot eliminate suffering, only mask it. It’s better to embrace that suffering rather than run away from it.

### Kain 7

(Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/2/09) jl

One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern science and technology have done so? Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred?

Well, perhaps not. Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology may have caused as many problems as it has solved. The advocate of the perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if technology does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubt—not at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things. The widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibiotics give rise to even more powerful bacteria that are immune to those [End Page 51] antibiotics. We have largely eliminated diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease. We can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS.

Even if we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it.

But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (TL 1, 79).

Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence.

The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, even if we can change this or that, even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed.

Nietzsche does not reject all forms of change. What he rejects is the sort of change necessary for a perfectible cosmos. He rejects the notion that science and technology can transform the essence of things—he rejects the notion that human effort can significantly reduce physical suffering. Instead, he only thinks it possible to build up the power necessary to construct meaning in a meaningless world and thus to conceal the horror of existence, which cannot be eliminated.

We cannot prove the opposite view, and I do not think we can dismiss Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to the assumptions of [End Page 52] Christianity, science, liberalism, socialism, and so forth. And we certainly cannot dismiss this view if we hope to understand Nietzsche. At any rate, for Nietzsche, we cannot eliminate suffering; we can only seek to mask it.

## AT: Human Nature

### Claims of human nature are backward – it's theory that creates reality

**Saurette 96** (Paul, Prof of political theory/science at John Hopkins University, "I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6, AD: 7/6/09) jl

What is startling about this strategy is not so much its circular logic, nor even its contradictory tendencies, but rather what they suggest about the direction, origin, and function of realist assumptions. **It has always been understood that the theories of Hobbes and Rousseau, and thus Morgenthau and Waltz, flow logically from their a priori assumptions about human nature.** But **what if the relationship is backwards** in this understanding? **What if their assumptions of human nature flow logically from their theories of political action?** The importance of Hobbes might not be that he theorised the emergence of a new mode of political action after the demise of Christianity, but rather that he preserved the traditional understanding of politics-as-making by endowing it with a new absolute: **human nature**. From this perspective, Hobbes **conserves the traditional interpretation of political action by simply substituting the Truth of eternal human nature for the declining ideal of God.** In other words, Hobbes' **thought takes as natural the instrumental nature of politics and merely creates a new anchor for the means-end calculation.** Thus, while Hobbes can be viewed as innovative and indicative of the emergence of a modern resolution of spatial politics,' I would suggest that the continuity manifested in his understanding of politics-as-making is perhaps the more remarkable of the two tendencies. In this sense, the normative foundation and limitations of realism lie not merely in the Hobbesian assumption of human nature, but rather in the tradition of politics-as-making which remains intact despite Hobbes' 'revolutionary' strategy.

## AT: You're Mean

**The alternative does not advocate a break away from interaction but rather rejecting interactions that allow escape from self growth and reflection – the alternative allows us to be enlightened by struggle**

**Ure 6** (Michael, Prof of history of modern social and political theory and modern German philosophy @ the U of Queensland, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies - Issue 32, Autumn 2006, pp. 68-91, AD: 7/6/09) jl

Nietzsche maintains that by seeking to secure ourselves from the travails of self-cultivation we also create for ourselves strict limits on how we can engage with others. In this regard, his critique of modern communitarianism and its "fear of everything individual" is not a rejection of engaging with others but, rather, of the kind of turning to others and the treatment of their suffering that is integral to a culture in which individuals flee from the intrapsychic realm of "reflections, brooding and dreaming." Because this culture treats our personal engagement with ourselves as a troublesome obstacle that should be overcome, or so he claims, "helping" others can only take the form of ensuring that they too learn to police themselves with instrumental labor and find their happiness in the blessings of self-oblivion. In this context, helping others, to use Nietzsche's metaphors, must mean helping them transform themselves into "small, soft, round, unending" granules of "sand" or, translating these metaphors, into interchangeable, undifferentiated atoms that can be smoothly adapted to meet the imperatives of a commercially driven collectivity. Nietzsche argues that in a commercial culture that defies security, the practices of "pity," "help," or "sympathy" can only ever be either "superficial" or "tyrannical" (D 174). These practices must become superficial to the extent that commercial culture compels individuals to flee from the "labyrinth" of the soul and "tyrannical" to the extent that its market imperatives ultimately exclude nonutilitarian self-cultivation and unprofitable, unassimilable forms of alterity (D 174, 169). Nietzsche claims, then, that it is a flight from the labyrinth of a complex, differentiated self that underpins modern commercial culture and its transformation of the relations between self and other. In opposition to the desert of undifferentiated atoms this culture creates, Nietzsche conjures up the image of an oasis. It is not, however, an image depicting either the lost glories of Homeric agonism or the splendid isolation of the great individual.<sup>49</sup> Rather, in a passage largely overlooked in the Nietzsche literature, he depicts the self's engagement with others through an overdetermined allusion to the complex thread of Old Testament, classical, Christian, and medieval-romance images of the "paradise garden": The question itself remains unanswered whether one is of more use to another by immediately leaping to his side and helping him—which can only be superficial where it does not become a tyrannical seizing and transforming—or by creating something out of oneself that the other can behold with pleasure: a beautiful, restful, self-enclosed garden perhaps, with high walls against the storms and the dust of the roadway but also a hospitable gate. (D 174)<sup>50</sup> Nietzsche's image of the "self-enclosed garden" is one that draws on the long history of Western iconography and ideas of paradise as a topos rather than "an abstract state imagined in terms of . . . metaphysical ecstasy."<sup>51</sup> Etymologically, the notion of paradise originally derives from the Persian word *paradeiza* for "walled garden" or a circular walled enclosure that came to be applied to royal parks. As a recurrent dream in Western literature and iconography, this figure of the enclosed paradise garden has become, as Robert Hughes observes, "saturated in nostalgia: this is the innocence our ancestors lost for us, at the close of a period over whose vanishing we had no control."<sup>52</sup> From the accent he places on its beauty and restfulness, Nietzsche seems especially drawn to the classical conception of the paradise garden as an "epigram of order," albeit, as the abode of Venus, an orderly topos of pleasure.<sup>53</sup> Nietzsche's taste for the classical idea of paradise also becomes apparent in his subtle inversion of Christianity's allegorical interpretation of the garden, which added to the image of the *hortus conclusus* the *porta clausa*, or locked gate. In his metaphor of the self as a garden of paradise Nietzsche replaces this locked gate with the hospitable gate. Nietzsche's alternative to the desert of pity is thus the cultivation of oneself as a paradise garden that is open to the other. To cultivate oneself, as he understands it, is to create oneself as a paradise garden for the other. By contrast, Nietzsche implies, by exercising the kind of pity that precludes us from taking pleasure in the other's joy and which "helps" by transforming the other into an undifferentiated nonentity, we create a porta clausa. Ironically, then, it is through the exercise of pity that we lock ourselves and others out of paradise.



## AT: Nihilism

**Turn – The will to desire a better world free of suffering is nihilism – it rejects the ability to create value**

**White, 90** (Alan, Professor of Philosophy Williams College, "Delusion Frames, From Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth," <http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Delusion%20frames.htm>, AD: 7/7/09) jl

I take as my starting point Nietzsche's assertion that the emergence of nihilism as a "psychological state" is bound up with the failure of the attempt to endow the world with value by attributing to it an ultimate "purpose," "unity," or "truth" (N:11[99] / WP:12). This failure leads to nihilism as "the radical rejection of value, meaning, and desirability" (N:2[127] / WP:1). These descriptions suggest that nihilism has its origin in a negation, i.e., in the failure of an attempt, or in the rejection of a purported value. Yet neither of these negations can be the first step towards nihilism, because neither is a first step at all. The failure of an attempt presupposes that it has been made, and any rejection presupposes either prior acceptance or, at least, prior awareness of a question.

I therefore suggest that the first step towards nihilism -- a step that, in Nietzsche's view, leads historically to the second -- is the step taken with the judgment that the existence of our world of becoming would be justified only through a purpose that guides it, through an "infinitely valuable" unity that underlies it, or through another world, a "true world" or "world of being" that is accessible through it (N:11[99] / WP:12). This step, like the step to rejection, is a negation in that it contains, at least implicitly, the judgment that our "world of becoming" as it presents itself, in isolation from such purpose, unity, or truth, "ought not to exist" (N:9[60] / WP:585); the step presupposes the judgment that without some such source of worth, which cannot be contained within the flux of a "world of becoming," that world -- our world -- would be worthless. Is the person who has taken this first step -- who has judged that the world requires justification -- a nihilist? Certainly not an avowed one: this person will use the appellation "nihilist," if at all, only for others. Nevertheless, this person is "nihilistic" in a way that one who simply accepts the world of becoming is not. From the Nietzschean perspective, those who posit the extraneous source of value are nihilists in that (1) they judge of our world that it ought not to be (on its own), and (2) they believe in a world that is, despite their beliefs to the contrary, "fabricated solely from psychological needs," a world to which we have "absolutely no right" (N:11[99] / WP:12). To be sure, they are not aware that the world of their belief is a mere fabrication; that is why they will deny being nihilists. For this reason, if it is appropriate to term them "nihilists" at all, an essential qualification must be added: their nihilism is unconscious. Or, to adopt a more Nietzschean term, they are religious nihilists: their affirmation of another world or source of value is a consequence of their denial of our world as bearer of its own value.

Nihilism becomes conscious -- avowed or, in a Nietzschean term, "radical" -- with a second step, the step taken with the judgment that the sources of value are absent, that the three categories of value remain uninstantiated. "Radical nihilism," in Nietzsche's explicit definition, is the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence when it is a matter of the highest values that one recognizes; plus the insight that we have not the slightest right to posit a being or an in-itself of things that would be 'divine' or incarnate morality. (N:10[192] / WP:3)

## AT: Realism

**Realism creates a self-fulfilling prophecy where we must eliminate the other in the name of our own security, in turn producing insecurity among everyone**

**Der Derian 98** (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html>, AD: 7/7/09) jl

In traditional **realist representations of world politics** as the struggle for power among states, the will to security **is born out of a primal fear**, a natural estrangement and a condition of anarchy which diplomacy, international law and the balance of power seek, **yet ultimately fail**, to mediate. 11 By considering some historical meanings of security that exceed this prevailing view, I wish to suggest "new" possibilities and intelligibilities for security. Admittedly, this brief genealogy is thin on analysis and thick on description. But **my intention is to provoke discussion, and to suggest that there is more than a speculative basis for the acceptance of a concept of security that is less coherent and dogmatic, and more open to the historical complexity and contingent nature of international relations.**

## AT: Value to Life = Inevitable

**Value to life is only able to be retained through the eternal recurrence – life isn't intrinsically valuable it's value comes through living life through affirmation**

**Hicks and Rosenberg 3** (Steven V, Department of Philosophy @ Queens College, Alan, Associate Professor of Philosophy @ Queens College, "Nietzsche and Untimeliness: The "Philosopher of the Future" as the Figure of Disruptive Wisdom," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 25 1-34, Muse, AD: 7/9/09) jl

Here, Nietzsche employs a disruptive figure, the demon, to articulate an "untimely" nonascetic myth, the myth of the recurrence cosmology, in order to facilitate the eventual acceptance of an alternative practical nonascetic doctrine for life. His disruptive figures help him to postulate a possible alternative nonascetic ideal for those future postmortal humans (who can perhaps dispense with the myth) in order to help them become the kind of people who would consider the demon's message "divine." The untimely myth of the recurrence cosmology provides a disruptive strategy of sorts for finding intrinsic value in life itself, that is, for valuing the process of living as an end in itself and not merely as a means to an end beyond the process. 55 It provides a way to formulate a figurative test of one's underlying attitude toward life. The demon asks us to take the willingness to relive one's (figurative) recurring life as a measure of the affirmation of one's actual nonrecurring life. The transformative effect of accepting the demon's "crushing" message is that those people who possess the "courage of conscience" to "joyfully react to it" will not be tempted to disesteem life by contrasting it with something eternal, unalterable, suprahistorical, or intrinsically good, i.e., some "true world" [End Page 20] or "afterworldly" view. Likewise, by having the myth of eternal recurrence promoted by a disruptive, self-consuming figure, Nietzsche can commend a possible nonascetic competitor ideal to universal attention in a way that is nondogmatic and open-ended. Both the presentation as well as the content of the commended alternative ideal would accord with Zarathustra's transvaluative question, "This is my way; but where is yours?" (Z III, 11). The figure of the demon challenges us to "learn the meaning of [our] own individual lives" from the general "picture of life" presented by the recurrence myth (cf. UM III, § 3). He invites each of us to consider what would be the transformative effects in our own lives of accepting the ideal of affirming eternal recurrence. What would this require of us? What kind of life would it entail? The demon cannot tell us; we must discover it ourselves. We must become, in Zarathustra's words, "our own judge and law-giver" (Z I, 17). The ideal of recurrence does not tell us beforehand what our alternative values should be, only that whatever they are, they should always be rooted in gratitude and service to life rather than resentment against it. To be a possible alternative to the ascetic ideal, it would admittedly have to supply some general content, namely, do whatever is necessary to affirm eternal recurrence; for example, overcome the oppression of your present situation if it prevents you from getting a sufficient sense of power and effectiveness in relation to life except by devaluing life. 56 But the implementation of the ideal would always be particularistic, contextual, nondogmatic, and open-ended.

## AT: Misogyny

### **Despite prejudices, Nietzsche's alternative is key to breaking down patriarchy**

**Helm 4** (Barbara Prof @ Institute for Philosophy, University of Tübingen, and Max-Planck Research Centre for Ornithology, Andechs, Germany, "Combating Misogyny? Responses to Nietzsche by Turn-of-the-Century German Feminists," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 27 (64-84), Muse, AD: 7/9/09) j1

In 1896, Simmel called Nietzsche's "deed" of centering ethics in the self "the Copernican revolution of moral philosophy," an allusion to Kant. 97 Nietzsche's worldly approach to politics and ethics traced truth and morality to the interests of those in power and yielded analytical tools for social change. What was formerly considered "truth" was now discussed as social construction and subject to change. 98

Contemporary feminists were quick to realize that his contextual and perspectival approach could help them identify and combat power structures that served women's oppression. Nietzsche's approach made room for new concepts of ethics and gender relations, implying great promises for future improvements of society, 99 and was thus explosively liberating to Wilhelmine women who had been expected to perpetuate—even improve—the moral basis of society. Some of the most radical feminists adumbrated new ethical and religious programs. 100 Clearly Nietzsche's ethics appealed to progressive women while appalling the more conservative.

In accordance with his perspectivism, Nietzsche repeatedly encouraged others to find approaches of their own in order to move "beyond" contemporary standards. His emphasis on "self-creation," "higher development," and individualism was a great source of inspiration, attractive to feminists of all backgrounds. Conservatives emphasized "aristocracy of the spirit" and "self-transcendence" as goals for female character development. Unorthodox socialists regarded "self-overcoming" as "revolutionary practice" in anticipation of a new society. 101 Bourgeois conservatives and unorthodox socialists tried to temper "Nietzschean" individualism by humanist values that they either claimed to find in Nietzsche's own writing or brought, a "female addition," to bear on his male approach.

### **Correct use of Nietzsche is able to solve the problem of misogyny**

**Helm 4** (Barbara Prof @ Institute for Philosophy, University of Tübingen, and Max-Planck Research Centre for Ornithology, Andechs, Germany, "Combating Misogyny? Responses to Nietzsche by Turn-of-the-Century German Feminists," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 27 (64-84), Muse, AD: 7/9/09) j1

I conclude that, overall, women effectively analyzed and challenged misogynous and antifeminist remarks in Nietzsche's writing. After coming to terms with these aspects of his philosophy, they were able to make use of it in ways that benefited the development of feminist theory. It is interesting to note that various topoi of today's Nietzsche appropriation, although phrased differently, often resemble those of the turn of the century.

It is harder to weigh the pros and cons of the feminist embrace of Nietzschean biological views. His affirmation of worldly, bodily subjects and his overtly gendered writing helped bring up in a theoretical context feminist issues that were concealed in reason-centered traditional thought. However, such gendered structures were risking essentialist associations of a feminine nature and made feminist discourse vulnerable to biological instrumentalization. 104 It is in this context that misogynous elements of his thought have come to bear on contemporary feminist theory.

## AT: Inaction Bad

**Action is illusory – Waiting for change to come as an “event” is passive nihilism – it gives us the feeling of activism while keeping everything the same**

**Zupancic 3** (Alenka, Prof of Philosophy at the U of Ljubljana, *The Shortest Shadow*, p 70, AD: 7/8/09) jl

I should point out, however, that the true value of Nietzsche's thought does not lie simply in prophecies and diagnostics like these. And his philosophy should not be understood—as it is by Heidegger— as an attempt at, or a project of, overcoming nihilism. As Alain Badiou correctly points out, for Nietzsche, “the act is not an overcoming. The act is an event. And this event is an absolute break, the proper name of which is Nietzsche.”<sup>37</sup> Or, to put it in a slightly different manner, Nietzsche is not simply a severe analyst of contemporary “discontent in civilization,” of its forms and causes, endowed with the additional gift of prophecy concerning the eventual overcoming of this condition. He is already a break; he is already something different. Various forms of what he defines as nihilism may still persist for centuries to come. And yet, with Nietzsche, something else—a different configuration of thought—has already taken place. That is to say, complaining about (or criticizing) the (post)modern condition, while waiting for or aspiring to an event that will finally change this condition, is in itself as “nihilistic” as the world this attitude denounces as nihilistic. In other words, the possible stepping out of the nihilist either/or is not an act that has to refer to some future point (when the world and its ways will change), but an act that can refer only to past and present points where this stepping out already has its real territory. The true importance of Nietzsche's thought is situated here: not in the fact that it can help us to perceive and criticize the “nihilist condition,” but, rather, in the fact that it already carries within itself the Real of a different configuration

## AT: Progress Good

**Faith in the value of progress creates the notion we must always search for universal truth without attaching any value or meaning to existence – we become animals without value on a constant search to find truth in the world**

**Saurette 96** (Paul, Prof of political theory/science at John Hopkins University, "I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6, AD: 7/6/09) jl

**Science, however, is not an overcoming of the Will to Truth, but merely the most complete, empty, and nihilistic ascetic ideal.** It refutes 'faith' but retains an unquestioned belief in itself. **Although science claims to follow no authority, its 'unconditional will to truth is faith in the ascetic ideal itself, even if as an unconscious imperative... it is the faith in a metaphysical value, the absolute value of truth' .58 The scientific Will to Truth is both the most advanced and the most dangerous manifestation of the Will to Order/Truth, because in spite of its disavowal of the Christian dichotomised world, it retains a belief in Truth without attaching any value or meaning to existence.**<sup>59</sup> With the rise of science, then, the sole virtue of the Christian Will to Truth/Order, the 'faith in the dignity and uniqueness of man, in his irreplaceability in the great chain of being, [becomes] a thing of the past. **Man has become an animal, literally and without reservation or qualification'.** **The radical scepticism of science is the 'suicidal nihilism' of the late-modern age, 'affirming as little as it denies'.** It is the process by which all such 'transcendent' grounds are dissolved in a corrosive scepticism: the true world becomes a fable. The central value of our culture—truth—drives us towards ceaseless unmasking....The irony, as Tracy Strong observes, is that **this discovery does not liberate us from the sense that we must have truth in order to have meaning, that meaning is somehow inextricably tied to truth or the universal. We continue to search for what we know does not exist, confirming our growing sense of meaninglessness; worse, we come to be at home in this exhaustion of meaning.**"

Ironically, then, Nietzsche suggests that it is precisely the nihilism of scientific faith which pushes man 'onto an inclined plane—now he is slipping faster and faster away from the centre into—what? into nothingness? into a penetrating sense of nothingness',"

The danger of the late-modern nihilistic Will to Truth is that this reactive 'will to negation', while yearning for a truthful foundation, can only destroy and negate. Even anthropocentric recreations of authoritative Truth, such as faith in progress, utilitarian happiness-for-everyone, socialist utopias, or Kant's secularised teleologies, cannot survive the scrutiny of this nihilistic Will to Truth. As Michael Haar notes, [a]fter having killed God—i.e. after having recognized the nothingness of the 'true world'—and after having placed himself where God once was, Man continues to be haunted by his iconoclastic act: he cannot venerate himself, and soon ends up by turning his impiety against himself and smashing this new idol."

The radical and untempered scepticism of scientific Will to Truth undermines the foundational meanings of the modern world and thus threatens modern life with the prospect of unconditional nihilism.

The Will to Truth must become 'conscious of itself as a problem' if it is to avoid this fate.<sup>60</sup> And with the historical stage of late modernity, we are able to explore the possibilities of this self-overcoming of the Will to Truth. As Nietzsche states, '[w]e finally come to a complete stop before a still more basic question. We ask about the value of this will. **Suppose we want Truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?**'"

## **AT: Elitism/Nietzsche Doesn't Know What Suffering Is**

**It's a personal choice whether or not to embrace suffering – those who cannot accept this should be left behind**

**Von Tevenar 5** (Gurdren, Prof of Philosophy @ Birkbeck, "NIETZSCHE'S OBJECTIONS TO PITY AND COMPASSION," [www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/.../GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05](http://www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/.../GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05), AD: 7/8/09) jl

With the above in mind, let us now turn to the second of our two questions and Nussbaum's claim [see bibliography] that Nietzsche lacked 'inner understanding' of the misery and contingency of suffering.

**Nussbaum** accuses Nietzsche of insensitivity for the way suffering can be erosive of human well-being. She **argues that Nietzsche had no grasp of the simple truth that one functions badly when one is hungry and that stoic self-command is just not possible when suffering** from what she terms 'basic vulnerability'.

Nussbaum contrasts 'basic vulnerability', which comprises deprivations of resources utterly central to human mental, physical, and intellectual functioning, from 'bourgeois vulnerability' with its relatively comfortable pains of loneliness, ill health, bad reputation, and so on. These latter pains, Nussbaum argues, are indeed painful enough but not such as to impair human functioning altogether. She insists that Nietzsche simply ignored 'basic vulnerability' since he apparently believed that even a beggar could be a stoic hero so long as socialism and Mitleid did not keep him weak. Thus Nussbaum concludes that despite all his famous unhappiness Nietzsche was without 'inner understanding of the ways contingency matters for virtue'.

These are powerful and thought provoking objections. However, I suggest that they **somewhat miss their point because Nietzsche was not interested in virtue**, did not address himself to the multitude, and did not, therefore, envisage the possibility of members of the herd growing into stoic heroes. Moreover, **there is ample evidence throughout his writings as well as in his letters that he was not insensitive to the fact that deprivation – mental and physical – stunts growth and that severe pain and misery not only hurts but also harms people**. Yet Nietzsche nonetheless, and here lies the highly controversial nature of his thought, refused to grant suffering, even severe suffering, the kind of significance assigned to it through the influence of Christianity and Schopenhauer, which leads, almost inevitably, to Mitleid and hence, **Nietzsche feared, to erosion of the will to power of those precious, privileged few by undermining their confidence in themselves and in their lives. The truly objectionable feature of suffering**. Nietzsche holds, **is** not the well-acknowledged fact that it hurts and harms people, but the **non-acknowledged and deeply deplorable fact that so many sufferers simply fail to respond appropriately to their suffering and** thus allow themselves to become feeble, impaired, wretched – in other words, they **allow themselves to 'suffer' hurt and harm**. We can conclude, then, that **Nietzsche was not insensitive to the misery and contingency of suffering but simply refused to accept its alleged wider significance.**





**\*\*\*Evil Nietzsche\*\*\***

## **\*\*\*Links\*\*\***

## Links - Poverty

**Poverty is a condition which is completely constructed by humans – living in poverty allows greater appreciation of suffering**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 93-94, AD: 7/7/09) jl

Persuaded that poverty is the human lot, **I can no longer believe in** any doctrine of **reform**. All such doctrines are equally stupid and futile. **There is no poverty among animals, because they live on their own, ignorant of hierarchy and exploitation**. This phenomenon is exclusively human, **for man alone made his equals his slaves. Man alone is capable of so much self-contempt. All the charitable endeavors in this world only manage to bring poverty into greater relief; they show it to be more terrible and unintelligible than utter dereliction**. Poverty, like ruins, hurts by an absence of humanity and makes one regret that men are unwilling to change that which is well within their power to change. **Knowing full well that men could abolish poverty, you are nevertheless aware of its eternity and you feel a bitter anxiety in which man appears in all his petty inconsequence**. Poverty in social life is only a pale reflection of man's infinite inner poverty. Whenever I think of poverty, I lose my desire to live. I should throw away my pen and move into the slums, where I could relieve poverty better and more efficiently than with a poisonous book. Whenever I think of man's abject poverty, his rot, his spreading gangrene, I am gripped by mortal despair. Instead of constructing theories and ideologies to deal with poverty, man, this rational animal, should simply give the coat off his back in a gesture of fraternal understanding. Poverty in the world compromises man more than anything else and will no doubt bring about the downfall of such a megalomaniac animal. In front of poverty, I'm even ashamed of music. The essence of social life is injustice. How, then, should one support any social or political doctrine?

## Links – Helping People

**Attempts to hold back the temptation for cruelty and atrocities are attempts to hold back the foundations of life – we can create beauty in that cruelty**

**Miller 90** (James, Professor of Political Science and Chair, Department of Liberal Studies @ Fullerton, “Carnivals of Atrocity: Foucault, Nietzsche, Cruelty,” Political Theory 18: 3, Aug, 470-491, Jstor, AD: 7/8/09) jl

Suing for peace, the human being, in time, comes to swear allegiance to a kind of psychological "oligarchy," with "regulation, foresight, and pre-meditation" keeping at bay "our underworld of utility organs working with and against one another. "With the" aid of the morality of mores and the social straitjacket," as

Nietzsche puts it, the organism's oligarchy is kept in power; man learns "to be ashamed of all his instincts." Stifling his cruel and murderous impulses, he becomes "calculable, regular, necessary" - a subject of civilized reason and morality.<sup>9</sup> But the organism's cruel impulses do not disappear altogether.

What otherwise might be inexplicable-namely, the pleasure many men have clearly learned to feel in taking pains to rule themselves - Nietzsche explains through the survival of internalized cruelty and the paradoxical convergence of pleasure and pain that characterizes it. The idea of "self-chosen torture"- prima facie, a monstrous oxymoron- becomes the key in the Genealogy of Morals to interpreting a host of intertwined phenomena: guilt; the bad conscience; and, above all, the triumph of asceticism in Christianity.

20 The internalization of cruel impulses represented by the triumph of asceticism ramifies in unpredictable ways. Guilt hobbles man's animal energies; shared taboos make exercising the will difficult and sometimes unpleasant. Yet in some rare souls, the masochistic pleasures of self-rule paradoxically strengthen the will to power in all of its cruel splendor; the old animal impulses, cultivated with foresight and transmogrified through the use of memory, imagination, and reason erupt in new forms of mastery. "This secret self-ravishment, this artist's cruelty, this delight in imposing a form upon oneself as a hard, recalcitrant, suffering material and in burning a will, a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a No into it, this uncanny, dreadfully joyous labor of a soul voluntarily at odds with itself that makes itself suffer out of joy in making suffer-eventually this entire active bad conscience-you will have guessed it- as the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena, also brought to life an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty itself."

## Links – Helping People

The ability for humans to exercise cruelty on others is the only potential for greatness – the plans attempts to create less cruelty aim are perfecting power to the point it becomes useless.

**Miller 90** (James, Professor of Political Science and Chair, Department of Liberal Studies @ Fullerton, “Carnivals of Atrocity: Foucault, Nietzsche, Cruelty,” Political Theory 18: 3, Aug, 470-491, Jstor, AD: 7/8/09) jl

By contrast, contemporary societies, which seek to institute" less cruelty, less suffering, more gentleness, more respect, more 'humanity,' " aim at a "perfection of power" that would "render its actual exercise useless." With the abolition of death by torture, "the people was robbed of its old pride in its crimes." No longer was traversing the law permitted to be a source of shared pleasure. The criminal was no longer cast as an outlaw, a hero, a fitting adversary of sovereign power, but rather as a "deviant," an anomaly, an aberration from the norms of a universal humanity, and therefore a "case," to be analyzed, rehabilitated, and, if possible, cured. Deprived of a shared public forum for savoring displays of cruel omnipotence, subject to disciplinary regimens that painlessly "dissociate power from the body," dissipating savage impulses by acting in depth "on the heart, the thought, the will, inclinations," mankind finds its potential for greatness - its ability to exercise its "super-power"-s quandered. The eagle - Nietzsche's proud symbol of sovereign power - becomes useless, as does the "dancing star" born of chaos: "Incipit tragoedia."32

## Links – Goo

**Exploitation is an inevitable condition of earth – a desire for a world free of domination is a desire for a world that isn't ours – this is the foundation for the decay of life**

**Nietzsche 1886** (Friedrich, Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, *Beyond Good and Evil*, The Nietzsche Channel, <http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bge.htm>, AD: 7/6/09) jl

Refraining mutually from injury, violence, and exploitation and placing one's will on a par with that of someone else—this may become, in a certain rough sense, good manners among individuals if the appropriate conditions are present (namely, if these men are actually similar in strength and value standards and belong together in one body). But as soon as this principle is extended, and possibly even accepted as the fundamental principle of society, it immediately proves to be what it really is—a will to the denial of life, a principle of disintegration and decay. Here we must beware of superficiality and get to the bottom of the matter, resisting all sentimental weakness: life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation—but why should one always use those words in which a slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages? Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals, as suggested before—and this happens in every healthy aristocracy—if it is a living and not a dying body, has to do to other bodies what the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant—not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will to power. But there is no point on which the ordinary consciousness of Europeans resists instruction as on this: everywhere people are now raving, even under scientific disguises, about coming conditions of society in which “the exploitative aspect” will be removed—which sounds to me as if they promised to invent a way of life that would dispense with all organic functions. “Exploitation” does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will of life.— If this should be an innovation as a theory—as a reality it is the original fact of all history: people ought to be honest with themselves at least that far. —

## Links – Morality

**Life is inherently immoral – The morality the affirmative outlines confines life to certain boundaries that makes extinction desirable.**

**Nietzsche 1886** (Friedrich, Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, The Birth Of Tragedy, The Nietzsche Channel, <http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bt2.htm#asc>, AD: 7/6/09) jl

Already in the preface addressed to Richard Wagner, art, and not morality, is presented as the truly metaphysical activity of man. In the book itself the suggestive sentence is repeated several times, that **the existence of the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon**. Indeed, the whole book knows only an artistic meaning and crypto-meaning behind all events—a "**god**," if you please, but certainly only an **entirely reckless and amoral artist-god who wants to experience, whether he is building or destroying, in the good and in the bad, his own joy and glory**—one who, creating worlds, frees himself from the distress of fullness and overfullness and from the affliction of the contradictions compressed in his soul. The world—at every moment the attained salvation of God, as the eternally changing, eternally new vision of the most deeply afflicted, discordant, and contradictory being who can find salvation only in appearance: you can call this whole artists' metaphysics arbitrary, idle, fantastic; what matters is that it betrays a spirit who will one day fight at any risk whatever the moral interpretation and significance of existence. Here, perhaps for the first time, a pessimism "beyond good and evil" is suggested. Here that "perversity of mind" gains speech and formulation against which Schopenhauer never wearied of hurling in advance his most irate curses and thunderbolts [Parerga and Paralipomena (1851), II.5, 69]: a philosophy that dares to move, to demote, morality into the realm of appearance—and not merely among "appearances" or phenomena (in the sense of the idealistic terminus technicus [technical term]), but among "deceptions," as semblance, delusion, error, interpretation, contrivance, art. Perhaps the depth of this antimoral propensity is best inferred from the careful and hostile silence with which Christianity is treated throughout the whole book—Christianity as the most prodigal elaboration of the moral theme to which humanity has ever been subjected. **In truth, nothing could be more opposed to the purely aesthetic interpretation and justification of the world which are taught in this book than the Christian teaching, which** is, and wants to be, only moral and which **relegates art, every art, to the realm of lies; with its absolute standards, beginning with the truthfulness of God, it negates, judges, and damns art**. Behind this mode of thought and valuation, which must be hostile to art if it is at all genuine, I never failed to sense a hostility to life—a furious, vengeful antipathy to life itself: for all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view [Optik], and the necessity of perspectives and error. Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life's nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed up as, faith in "another: or "better" life. Hatred of "the world," condemnations of the passions [Affekte], fear of beauty and sensuality, a beyond invented the better to slander this life, at bottom a craving for the nothing, for the end, for respite, for "the sabbath of sabbaths"—all this always struck me, no less than the unconditional will of Christianity to recognize only moral values, as the most dangerous and uncanny form of all possible forms of a "will to decline"—at the very least a sign of abysmal sickness, weariness, discouragement, exhaustion, and the impoverishment of life. **For**, confronted with **morality** (especially Christian, or unconditional, morality), **life must continually and inevitably be in the wrong, because life is something essentially amoral—and eventually, crushed by the weight of contempt and the eternal** No, life must then be felt to be unworthy of desire and altogether worthless. **Morality** itself—how now? **might** not morality **be "a will to negate life," a secret instinct of annihilation, a principle of decay, diminution, and slander—the beginning of the end? Hence, the danger of dangers?** ... It was against morality that my instinct turned with this questionable book, long ago; it was an instinct that aligned itself with life and that discovered for itself a fundamentally opposite doctrine and valuation of life—purely artistic and anti-Christian. What to call it? **As a philologist and man of words I baptized it, not without taking some liberty—for who could claim to know the rightful name of the Antichrist?—in the name of a Greek god: I called it Dionysian.** —

## Links – Morality

**Morality is arbitrary – confining life to certain moral boundaries makes life a missed opportunity instead of one of emotional ecstasy**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 62-63, AD: 7/7/09) jl

Even today nobody can tell what is right or what is wrong. It will be the same in the future. The relativity of such expressions means little; not to be able to dispense with their use is more significant. I don't know what is right and what is wrong, and yet I divide actions into good and bad. If anyone asked me why I do so, I couldn't give an answer. I use moral criteria instinctively; later, when I reconsider, I do not find any justifications for having done so. Morality has become so complex and contradictory because its values no longer constitute themselves in the order of life but have crystallized in a transcendental region only feebly connected to life's vital and irrational forces. How does one go about founding a morality? I'm so sick of the word "good"; it is so stale and vapid! Morality tells you to work for the triumph of goodness! And how? Through the fulfillment of one's duties, respect, sacrifice. These are just empty words: in front of naked reality, moral principles are void, so much so that one wonders whether life without them would not be preferable. I would love a world free of forms and principles, a world of absolute indeterminacy. I like to imagine a world of fantasy and dream, where talk of right and wrong would no longer make sense. Since reality is essentially irrational, why set rules, why distinguish the right from the wrong? Morality cannot be saved; it's a mistake to believe otherwise. Yet there are those who maintain that in this world pleasure and sin are minor satisfactions which enjoy only a brief triumph and that only good deeds partake of eternity. They pretend that at the end of this world's misery, goodness and virtue will win but they have failed to see that, if eternity obliterates superficial pleasures, it does the same with virtue, good deeds, and moral actions. Eternity does not lead to the triumph of either good or evil; it ravages all. It is silly to condemn the epicureans in the name of eternity. How is suffering rather than pleasure going to make me immortal? From a purely objective point of view, is there any significant difference between one man's agony and another's pleasure? Whether you suffer or not, nothingness will swallow you forever. There is no objective road to eternity, only a subjective feeling experienced at irregular moments in time. Nothing created by man will endure. Why this intoxication with moral illusions when there are other illusions even more beautiful? Those who speak of moral salvation in the face of eternity refer to the moral action's indefinite echo in time, its unlimited resonance. Nothing could be less true, since so-called virtuous men are actually cowards who will disappear from the world's consciousness faster than those who have wallowed in pleasure. And even so, supposing the opposite were true, would a dozen or more years really count? Any unsatisfied pleasure is a loss of life. I shall not be the one to preach against pleasure, orgy, and excess in the name of suffering. Let the mediocre speak of the consequences of pleasure: are not those of suffering even greater? Only the mediocre want to die of old age. Suffer, then, drink pleasure to its last dregs, cry or laugh, scream in despair or with joy, sing about death or love, for nothing will endure! Morality can only make life a long series of missed opportunities!



## Links – Suffering

**Our mortality is inevitable – only by experiencing intense suffering can we grasp our value to life**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 27, AD: 7/7/09) jl

The feeling for the irreversible and the irrevocable, which always accompanies the awareness of agony, can achieve a painful acceptance mixed with fear, but there is no such thing as love or sympathy for death. The art of dying cannot be learned, because there is no technique, there are no rules. The irrevocability of **agony is experienced by each individual alone, through infinite and intense suffering.** Most people are unaware of the slow agony within themselves. For them **there is only one kind of agony, the one immediately preceding the fall into absolute nothingness. Only such moments of agony bring about important existential revelations in consciousness.** That is why they expect everything from the end instead of trying to grasp the meaning of a slow revelatory agony. **The end will reveal too little, and they will die as ignorant as they have lived.** Since agony unfolds in time, **temporality is a condition not only for creativity but also for death,** for the dramatic phenomenon of dying. The demonic character of time, in which life and death, creation and destruction, evolve without convergence toward a transcendental plane, is thus made manifest. The feeling of the irrevocable, which appears as an ineluctable necessity going against the grain of our innermost tendencies, is conceivable only because of time's demonism. The conviction that **you cannot escape an implacable fate and that time will do nothing but unfold the dramatic process of destruction is an expression of irrevocable agony. Isn't nothingness, then, salvation? But how can there be salvation in nothingness? If salvation is nearly impossible through existence, how can it be possible through the complete absence of existence?** Since there is no salvation either in existence or in nothingness, let this world with its eternal laws be smashed to pieces!

## Links – Suffering

**The spectacle of torture proves the irrepressibility of human nature – Our fascination with torture cannot be overcome**

**Miller 90** (James, Professor of Political Science and Chair, Department of Liberal Studies @ Fullerton, "Carnivals of Atrocity: Foucault, Nietzsche, Cruelty," Political Theory 18: 3, Aug, 470-491, Jstor, AD: 7/8/09) jl

Let us start by looking more closely at the discussion of suppliance death by torture in this book's second chapter, entitled "L'eclat des supplices." The word eclat evokes a paradox underlined through out the text:

Torture, far from being a disgusting act of blind savagery, was, as Foucault describes it, a carefully regulated practice with its own splendors and glory. An art of "maintaining life in pain," a "theatre of hell," "the poetry of Dante put into laws," suppliance was, emphatically, a festive pleasure: Crowds avidly flocked to the scene of torture: "If the crowd gathered round the scaffold, it was not simply to witness the sufferings of a condemned man or to excite the anger of the executioner: it was also to hear someone who had nothing left to lose curse the judges, laws, power, religion. Death-by-torture allowed the condemned man this momentary saturnalia, where nothing was prohibited or punishable."

Climaxing in the ceremony of dismemberment, suppliance also, adds Foucault, allowed the "the crime to explode [eclater] into its truth."<sup>27</sup> But In what does this "truth" consist? That crime has "beauty and greatness," Foucault insists: "The most intense point of lives, that which concentrates their energy, is precisely where they collide with power, struggle with it, attempt to use its forces or escape its traps." Through "sacrificial and glorious murders," the criminal becomes a "lightning-existence," harshly illuminating the "ambiguity of the justifiable and the outlawed"; his fate, as it is recorded in popular memory, reveals "the relation between power and the people, stripped down to essentials: the order to kill, the prohibition against killing; to make oneself kill, to be executed; voluntary sacrifice, ordained punishment; memory, oblivion. "Crime looms as a "privilege" - the "exclusive privilege of those who are really great." Far from being a symptom of pathology, murder In Foucault's eyes evinces an admirable sort of power: "At bottom, the existence of crime happily manifests 'an irrepressibility of human nature;' it is necessary to see In it, not a weakness or a disease, but rather an energy that is straightening itself out, a 'striking protestation of human individuality, 'which no doubt gives it, in the eyes of all, its strange power of fascination."

## Links – Suffering

**Pain isn't a reason to reject life – it's a reason to embrace it – it gives meaning to life**

**Deleuze 83** (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 128-130, AD: 7/8/09) jl

Such, at least, is the definition of the first aspect of bad conscience, of the topological aspect, its raw or material state. Interiority is a complex notion. What is interiorised is primarily active force; but interiorised force becomes manufacturer of pain; and as pain is produced more abundantly, interiority gains "in depth, width and height", an ever more voracious abyss. This means, secondly, that pain in its turn is interiorised, sensualised, spiritualised. What do these expressions mean? A new sense is invented for pain, an internal sense, an inward sense: pain is made the consequence of a sin, a fault. You have produced your pain because you have sinned, you will save yourself by manufacturing your pain. Pain conceived as the consequence of an inward fault and the interior mechanism of salvation, pain being interiorised as fast as it is produced, "pain transformed into feelings of guilt, fear and punishment": (GM III 20) this is the second aspect of bad conscience, its typological moment, bad conscience as feeling of guilt. In order to understand the nature of this invention we must assess the importance of a more general problem: what is the meaning of pain? **The meaning of existence is completely dependent on it: existence is meaningful only to the extent that the pain of existence has a meaning** (UM III, 5). Now, **pain is a reaction. Thus it appears that its only meaning consists in the possibility of acting this reaction or at least of localising it, isolating its trace, in order to avoid all propagation until one can re-act once more. The active meaning of pain therefore appears as an external meaning.** In order for pain to be judged from an active point of view it must be kept in the element of its exteriority. There is a whole art in this, an art which is that of the masters. The masters have a secret. They know that pain has only one meaning: giving pleasure to someone, giving pleasure to someone who inflicts or contemplates pain. If the active man is able not to take his own pain seriously it is because he always imagines someone to whom it gives pleasure. It is not for nothing that such an imagination is found in the belief in the active gods which peopled the Greek world: "Every evil the sight of which edifies a god is justified" ... what was at bottom the ultimate meaning of Trojan Wars and other such tragic terrors? There can be no doubt whatever: they were intended as festival plays for the gods" (GM II 7 p. 69). There is a tendency to invoke pain as an argument against existence; this way of arguing testifies to a way of thinking which is dear to us, a reactive way. We not only put ourselves in the position of the one who suffers, but in the position of the man of resentment who no longer acts his reactions. It must be understood that the active meaning of pain appears in other perspectives: **pain is** not an argument against life, but, on the contrary, a stimulant to life, "**a bait for life**", an argument in its favour. **Seeing or even inflicting suffering is a structure of life as active life, an active manifestation of life. Pain has an immediate meaning in favour of life: its external meaning.** "Our delicacy and even more our tartuffery . . . resist a really vivid comprehension of the degree to which cruelty constituted the great festival pleasure of more primitive men and was indeed an ingredient of almost every one of their pleasures . . . **Without cruelty there is no festival: thus the longest and most ancient part of human history teaches — and in punishment there is so much that is festive!**" (GM II 6 p. 66 and p. 67\*). This is Nietzsche's contribution to a peculiarly spiritual problem: what is the meaning of pain and suffering? We must admire the astonishing invention of the bad conscience all the more: a new meaning for suffering, an internal meaning. It is no longer a question of acting one's pain, nor of judging it from an active standpoint. On the contrary, one is numbed against pain by passion. "The passion of the most savage": pain is made the consequence of a fault and the means of a salvation; pain is healed by manufacturing yet more pain, by internalising it still further; one tries to forget, that is to say, one cures oneself of pain by infecting the wound (GM III 15). Nietzsche had already pointed out an essential thesis in the Birth of Tragedy: **tragedy dies at the same time as drama becomes an inward conflict and suffering is internalised.** But who invents and wills the internal meaning of pain?

## Links – Suffering

**Tragedy is a beautiful condition of life – we can see joy and multiplicity in even the deepest of suffering**

**Deleuze 83** (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 128-130, AD: 7/8/09) jl

Dionysus affirms all that appears, "**even the most bitter suffering**", and appears in all that is affirmed. Multiple and pluralist affirmation— **this is the essence of the tragic**. This will become clearer if we consider the difficulties of making everything an object of affirmation. Here the effort and the genius of pluralism are necessary, the power of transformations, Dionysian laceration. **When anguish and disgust appear in Nietzsche it is always at this point: can everything become an object of affirmation, that is to say of joy? We must find, for each thing in turn, the special means by which it is affirmed, by which it ceases to be negative.** The tragic is not to be found in this anguish or disgust, nor in a nostalgia for lost unity. The tragic is only to be found in multiplicity, in the diversity of affirmation as such. **What defines the tragic is the joy of multiplicity, plural joy.** This joy is not the result of a sublimation, a purging, a compensation, a resignation or a reconciliation. **Nietzsche can attack all theories of the tragic for failing to recognize tragedy as an aesthetic phenomenon. The tragic is the aesthetic form of joy, not a medical phrase or a moral solution to pain, fear or pity."** It is joy that is tragic. But this means that **tragedy is immediately joyful, that it only calls forth the fear and pity of the obtuse spectator**, the pathological and moralising listener who counts on it to ensure the proper functioning of his moral sublimations and medical purgings. "Thus the artistic listener is also reborn with the rebirth of tragedy. In his place in the theatre a curious quid pro quo used to sit with half moral, half scholarly pretensions — the 'critic' " (BT 22 p. 133). And indeed, **a true renaissance is needed in order to liberate the tragic from all the fear or pity of the bad listeners who gave it a mediocre sense born of bad conscience.** The anti-dialectical and anti-religious dream which runs through the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy is a logic of multiple affirmation and therefore a logic of pure affirmation and a corresponding ethic of joy. **The tragic is not founded on a relation of life and the negative but on the essential relation of joy and multiplicity**, of the positivity and multiplicity, of affirmation and multiplicity. "The hero is joyful, this is what has, up to now, escaped the authors of tragedies" (VP IV 50). Tragedy — frank, dynamic, gaiety.

## Links – Extinction

**Celebration in the face of extinction provides a moment of triumph in our lives of agony**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 52-53, AD: 7/7/09) jl

How I would love one day to see all people, young and old, sad or happy, men and women, married or not, serious or superficial leave their homes and their work places, relinquish their duties and responsibilities, gather in the streets and refuse to do anything anymore. at that moment, let slaves to senseless work, who have been toiling for future generations under the dire delusion that they contribute to the good of humanity, avenge themselves on the mediocrity of a sterile and insignificant life, on the tremendous waste that never permitted spiritual transfiguration. At that moment, when all faith and resignation are lost, let the trappings of ordinary life burst once and for all. Let those who suffer silently, not even uttering a sigh of complaint, yell with all their might, making a strange, menacing, dissonant clamor that would shake the earth. Let the waters flow faster and the mountains sway threateningly, the trees show their roots like an eternal and hideous reproach, the birds croak like ravens, and the animals scatter in fright and fall from exhaustion. Let ideals be declared void; beliefs, trifles; art, a lie; and philosophy, a joke. Let everything be climax and anticlimax. Let lumps of earth leap into the air and crumble in the wind; let plants make strange arabesques, frightful and distorted shapes, in the sky. Let wildfires spread rapidly and a terrifying noise drown out everything so that even the smallest animal would know that the end is near. Let all form become formless, and chaos swallow the structure of the world in a gigantic maelstrom. Let there be tremendous commotion and noise, terror, and explosion, and then let there be eternal silence and total forgetfulness. And in those final moments, let all that humanity has felt until now, hope, regret, love, despair, and hatred, explode with such force that nothing is left behind. Would not such moments be the triumph of nothingness and the final apotheosis of nonbeing?

## Links – Pity

**Pity and compassion are insulting actions – it's better to focus on overcoming personal suffering**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 61, AD: 7/7/09) j1

How can one still have ideals when there are so many blind, deaf, and mad people in the world? How can I remorselessly enjoy the light another cannot see or the sound another cannot hear? I feel like a thief of light. Have we not stolen light from the blind and sound from the deaf? Isn't our very lucidity responsible for the madman's darkness? When I think about such things, I lose all courage and will, thoughts seem useless, and compassion, vain. For I do not feel mediocre enough to feel compassion for anyone. Compassion is a sign of superficiality: broken destinies and unrelenting misery either makes you scream or turn you to stone. Pity is not only inefficient; it is also insulting. And besides, how can you pity another when you yourself suffer ignominiously? Compassion is as common as it is because it does not bind you to anything! Nobody in this world has yet died from another's suffering. And the one who said that he died for us did not die; he was killed.

## Links – Irony Affs

**Irony is a betrayal of emotional attachment – it shows an inability to live innocently and naivety**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 91, AD: 7/7/09) j1

Once you've negated everything and done away completely with all forms of existence, once nothing can survive in the path of your negativity, who can you turn to, laughing or crying, if not your own self? Once you have witnessed the fall of the entire world, there is nothing left but for you to fall too. **The infinite character of irony cancels all of life's contents.** I'm not speaking here of elegant, refined irony, born of a sense of superficial pride and superiority - **the irony some use to show off their detachment from the world - but of the tragic, bitter irony of despair.** **Genuine irony replaces tears, convulsions, or even a grotesque and criminal grin. There is a great difference between the irony of sufferers and that of lazy, superficial people.** That of **the former is** the sign of a **chronic inability to live innocently, connected with a sense of the loss of vital forces,** whereas that of the latter knows nothing of this irrevocable loss and does not reflect it in consciousness. **Irony betrays an inner convulsion, a deepening of wrinkles, the absence of spontaneous love, of human communion and understanding. It is a veiled contempt, despising naive, spontaneous gestures, because it is beyond the irrational and the naive.** Nonetheless, this irony is envious of naive people. Enormously proud and therefore unable to show openly his admiration for simplicity, the ironic man, envious and poisonous, shrinks with spite. This bitter, tragic irony seems to me more genuine than lighthearted, skeptical irony. The fact that self irony is always tragic and agonic is quite revealing. Self-irony is made up of sighs, not of smiles, even though its sighs are stifled. **Self-irony is an expression of despair. You've lost the world; you've lost yourself.** Henceforth a sinister, poisonous burst of laughter haunts your actions at every step, and above the ruins of smiling innocence raises the hideous ghost of an agonic grin, more contorted than those of primitive masks and more rigid than those on Egyptian statues.

## Links – Democracy

**The democratic values the affirmative attempts to impose has it's roots in slave morality lowering life to it's lowest common denominator**

**Newman 0** (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, "Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment," Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, AD: 7/8/09) jl

Ressentiment is diagnosed by Nietzsche as our modern condition. In order to understand ressentiment, however, it is necessary to understand the relationship between master morality and slave morality in which ressentiment is generated. Nietzsche's work *On the Genealogy of Morality* is a study of the origins of morality. For Nietzsche, the way we interpret and impose values on the world has a history -- its origins are often brutal and far removed from the values they produce. The value of 'good', for instance, was invented by the noble and high-placed to apply to themselves, in contrast to common, low-placed and plebeian.[3] It was the value of the master -- 'good' -- as opposed to that of the slave -- 'bad'. Thus, according to Nietzsche, it was in this pathos of distance, between the high-born and the low-born, this absolute sense of superiority, that values were created.[4]

However, this equation of good and aristocratic began to be undermined by a slave revolt in values. This slave revolt, according to Nietzsche, began with the Jews who instigated a revaluation of values:

It was the Jews who, rejecting the aristocratic value equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = blessed) ventured with awe-inspiring consistency, to bring about a reversal and held it in the teeth of their unfathomable hatred (the hatred of the powerless), saying, 'Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are good; the suffering, the deprived, the sick, the ugly, are the only pious people, the only ones, salvation is for them alone, whereas you rich, the noble, the powerful, you are eternally wicked, cruel, lustful, insatiate, godless, you will also be eternally wretched, cursed and damned!'....[5]

In this way the slave revolt in morality inverted the noble system of values and began to equate good with the lowly, the powerless -- the slave. This inversion introduced the pernicious spirit of revenge and hatred into the creation of values. Therefore morality, as we understand it, had its roots in this vengeful will to power of the powerless over the powerful -- the revolt of the slave against the master. It was from this imperceptible, subterranean hatred that grew the values subsequently associated with the good -- pity, altruism, meekness, etc.

**Political values** also **grew from this** poisonous root. For Nietzsche, values of **equality and democracy**, which form the cornerstone of radical political theory, **arose out of the slave revolt in morality. They are generated by the same spirit of revenge and hatred of the powerful. Nietzsche** therefore **condemns political movements like liberal democracy, socialism, and** indeed **anarchism. He sees the democratic movement as an expression of the herd-animal morality derived from the Judeo-Christian revaluation of values.**[6] **Anarchism** is for Nietzsche the most extreme heir to democratic values -- the most rabid expression of the herd instinct. It **seeks to level the differences between individuals, to abolish class distinctions, to raze hierarchies to the ground, and to equalize the powerful and the powerless, the rich and the poor, the master and the slave.** To Nietzsche **this is bringing everything down to level of the lowest common denominator -- to erase the pathos of distance between the master and slave, the sense of difference and superiority through which great values are created.** Nietzsche sees this as the worst excess of European nihilism -- the death of values and creativity.



## Links – Democracy

**Withstanding cruelty makes one stronger – Democracy deprives us of our innate desire for destruction**

**Miller 90** (James, Professor of Political Science and Chair, Department of Liberal Studies @ Fullerton, "Carnivals of Atrocity: Foucault, Nietzsche, Cruelty," Political Theory 18: 3, Aug, 470-491, Jstor, AD: 7/8/09) jl

In trying to imagine what kind of institutions might, in the future, reinforce rather than weaken the will to power, it is useful to recall that different historical cultures have differed widely in the degree of internalization that they have required and also in the externalized displays of power that they have permitted. For long centuries, as we have seen, the state, according to Nietzsche, employed the most "fearful means" for molding its human material. "Consider the old German punishments: for example, stoning, breaking on the wheel, piercing with stakes, tearing apart or trampling by horses, boiling of the criminal in oil or wine, the popular flaying alive, cutting flesh from the chest, and also the practice of smearing the wrongdoer with honey and leaving him in the blazing sun for the flies." Nietzsche remarks that the popular belief that punishment awakens con-science is quite mistaken: "One reason," he speculates, that "belief in punishment" is "tottering" among nineteenth-century Europeans. "Generally speaking," he observes, "punishment makes men hard and cold; it concentrates; it sharpens the feeling of alienation; it strengthens the power of resistance." Harsh penal practices paradoxically honor and preserve man's murderous impulses: for the criminal and spectators sense that "the type" of the criminal's actions "as such" cannot be reprehensible since one sees "exactly the same kind of actions practiced in the service of justice and approved of and practiced with a good conscience: violence, defamation, imprisonment, torture, murder, practiced as a matter of principle and without even emotion to excuse them."<sup>23</sup> The modern state, by contrast, tends, as a matter of humanitarian and egalitarian principle, to outlaw harsh forms of punishment and cruel practices generally, abolishing slavery, for example, eliminating titles and status symbols, softening hierarchical distinctions. In the wake of the French Revolution, there had appeared a new kind of "legal order, thought of as sovereign and universal." "The democratic state is organized "not as a means in the struggle between power-complexes, but as a means of preventing all struggle in general." Heralded both by Kant's philosophy and by the liberal and socialist movements of the nineteenth century, this legal order Nietzsche despised; it introduced "a principle hostile to life, an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt to assassinate the future of man." Mankind was becoming enmeshed in a "tremendous clockwork, composed of ever smaller, ever more subtly 'adapted' gears," in which there is "an ever-growing superfluity of all dominating and commanding elements," "in which Individuals represent" minimal forces, minimal values." Such individuals, deprived of the spectacle of punishment and tired of the war within, crave peace, tranquility, an end to suffering. With "nothing any more to be afraid of," man is "no longer able to despise himself," no longer able even to enjoy the pleasure of inflicting pain on himself. At the end of this path lies the "last man" - docile denizen of a world that, to return to our starting point In Foucault's text, has rendered useless "both the eagle and the sun."<sup>24</sup>

## **\*\*\*Impact Debate\*\*\***

## Impacts – Value to Life

**The ability to inflict pain, cruelty and suffering on others is the highest gratification of the feeling of power – any attempt to hold this back is a will to negate life.**

**Miller 90** (James, Professor of Political Science and Chair, Department of Liberal Studies @ Fullerton, "Carnivals of Atrocity: Foucault, Nietzsche, Cruelty," Political Theory 18: 3, Aug, 470-491, Jstor, AD: 7/8/09) j1

Now, Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals expresses the same disquieting transvaluation that I have already noted in Surveiller et punir Nietzsche, too, **expresses skepticism about the value of eliminating pain; he also expresses an unwonted, disturbing sympathy for institutions that promote public displays of cruelty.** Nietzsche, furthermore, **explicitly places the phenomenon of cruelty at the heart of his genealogy.** By cruelty, I mean (to modify slightly the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary) "a disposition to inflict suffering"; Indifference to or delight in pain or misery; mercilessness, hard-heartedness, especially as exhibited in action. "Man is the cruellest animal," writes Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: "Whatever is most evil is his best power and the hardest stone for the highest creator." This conviction takes shape gradually in Nietzsche's work. It grows, on one hand, from his observation that the purity and beauty of ancient Greek culture emerged only after a "long comfortless period" of "dark crudity and cruelty"-an observation that leads Nietzsche to comment that "one can speak of spring as long as one has a winter to precede it."<sup>13</sup> More fateful, because more fundamental, though, is Nietzsche's proposition - at first advanced hesitantly - that the infliction of pain, to the extent it excites pleasure, ought not to be regarded as evil. When suffering is "accompanied by pleasure (feeling of one's own power, of one's own strong excitation)," writes Nietzsche in Human, All Too Human, "it occurs for the wellbeing of the individual. Without pleasure no life; the struggle for pleasure is the struggle for life. Whether an Individual pursues this struggle in such a way that people call him good, or in such a way that they call him evil, is determined by the degree and quality of his intellect."<sup>14</sup> This formulation, which yokes pleasure and pain together in a kind of Dionysian folie a deux, grows increasingly central to Nietzsche's thought. To exercise actively the will to power, he regards as the essence of life. To exercise this power with abandon is not only to court being cruel but, when cruelty occurs, to enjoy the pain, the suffering, the agony that cruelty causes. "To practice cruelty is to enjoy the highest" - note the adjective: the highest - "gratification of the feeling of power." To enjoy the exercise of power is, in effect, to be cruel: This is Nietzsche's hard teaching.<sup>15</sup>

**Cruelty will always happen – it's just a question of whether or not we expel it outward in a good way or declare war on ourselves**

**Miller 90** (James, Professor of Political Science and Chair, Department of Liberal Studies @ Fullerton, "Carnivals of Atrocity: Foucault, Nietzsche, Cruelty," Political Theory 18: 3, Aug, 470-491, Jstor, AD: 7/8/09) j1

At first, contends Nietzsche, such pleasure was public. Cruelty is "one of the oldest festive joys of mankind." "It is not long since princely weddings and public festivals of the more magnificent kind were unthinkable without executions, torturing, or perhaps an auto-da-fe, and no noble household was without creatures upon whom one could heedlessly vent one's malice and cruel jokes." For thousands of years, societies have been organized hierarchically, enabling the man with prestige to enjoy the cruel pleasure of exciting envy and permitting the man of power "the pleasure of being allowed to vent his power freely upon one who is powerless, the voluptuous pleasure 'defaire le mal pour le plaisir de le faire,' the enjoyment of violation."<sup>6</sup> It was by public displays of cruelty, Nietzsche speculates, that memory and, with it, the spheres of legal obligation and morality were first brought into existence. "Blood, torture and sacrifices" were the way in which man created "a memory for himself" - "only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory." Joining a group, a man pledged himself to obey shared rules - on pain of cruel punishment if he did not. Such punishment produces "an increase of fear, a heightening of prudence, mastery of the desires: thus punishment tames men, but it does not make them 'better.'"<sup>17</sup> Taming, for Nietzsche, entails what he calls "internalization" - an idea that, in our own post-Freudian age, seems deceptively self-evident. "All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward," writes Nietzsche: "[T]hus it was that man first developed what was later called his 'soul' "The invention of the soul divides the human animal. "Its instinct for freedom pushed back and repressed incarcerated within, and finally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself," the organism declares war on itself."<sup>8</sup>

## Impacts – Value to Life

**The ability to overcome suffering can give us brutal satisfaction – alternative action results in a distrust and hate of life.**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 6-7, AD: 7/7/09) jl

Among the many forms of the grotesque, I find the one whose roots are steeped in despair more unusual and complex. The other forms have less intensity. It is important to note that the grotesque is inconceivable without intensity of feeling. And what intensity is deeper and more organic than despair? The grotesque appears only in very negative states, when great anxiety arises from a lack of life; the grotesque is exaltation in negativity. there is a mad launch toward negativity in that bestial, agonizing grimace when the shape and lines of the face are contorted into strangely expressive forms, when the look in one's eyes changes with distant light and shadow, and one's thoughts follow the curve of similar distortions. Truly intense and irrevocable despair cannot be objectified except in grotesque expressions, because the grotesque is the absolute negation of serenity, that state of purity, transparency, and lucidity so different from the chaos and nothingness of despair. Have you ever had the brutal and amazing satisfaction of looking at yourself in the mirror after countless sleepless nights? Have you suffered the torment of insomnia, when you count the minutes for nights on end, when you feel alone in this world, when your drama seems to be the most important in history and history ceases to have meaning, ceases to exist? When the most terrifying flames grow in you and your existence appears unique and isolated in a world made only for the consummation of your agony? You must have felt those moments, as countless and infinite as suffering, in order to have a clear picture of the grotesque when you look at yourself in the mirror. It is a picture of total strain, a tense grimace to which is added the demonically seductive pallor of a man who has struggled along horrible, dark precipices. Isn't this grotesque expression of despair similar to a precipice? It has something of the abysmal maelstrom of great depths, the seduction of the all-encompassing infinite to which we bow as we bow to fatality. How good it would be if one could die by throwing oneself into an infinite void! The complexity of the grotesque born out of despair resides in its capacity to indicate an inner infinity and to produce a paroxysm of the highest tension. How could this intense agony manifest itself in pleasant linear curves and formal purity? The grotesque essentially negates the classic, as well as any idea of style, harmony, and perfection. It is evident to anyone who understands the multiple forms of inner drama that the grotesque hides secret tragedies, indirectly expressed. Whoever has seen his face grotesquely disfigured can never forget it, because he will always be afraid of himself. Despair is followed by painful anxiety. What else does the grotesque do if it does not actualize fear and anxiety?

## Impacts – Turns Case

**The morality of the affirmative depends on an external enemy to call itself good in opposition to itself – this means the affirmatives harms will always exist as they require them for their moral project turning the case**

**Newman 0** (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, “Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment,” Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse, AD: 7/8/09) jl

**Slave morality is characterized by the attitude of resentment** -- the resentment and hatred of the powerless for the powerful. Nietzsche sees resentment as an entirely negative sentiment -- **the attitude of denying what is life-affirming, saying 'no' to what is different, what is 'outside' or 'other'**. Ressentiment is characterized by an orientation to the outside, rather than the focus of noble morality, which is on the self. [7] While **the master says 'I am good' and adds** as an afterthought, **'therefore he is bad'**; **the slave says** the opposite -- **'He (the master) is bad, therefore I am good'**. Thus the **invention of values comes from a comparison** or opposition **to that which is outside**, other, different. Nietzsche says: "... in order to come about, slave **morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act all, -- its action is basically a reaction.**"[8] **This** reactive stance, this **inability to define anything except in opposition to something else, is the attitude of resentment**. It is the reactive stance of the weak who define themselves in opposition to the strong. **The weak need the existence of this external enemy to identify themselves as 'good'. Thus the slave takes 'imaginary revenge' upon the master**, as he cannot act without the existence of the master to oppose. The man of resentment hates the noble with an intense spite, a deep-seated, seething hatred and jealousy. It is **this** resentment, according to Nietzsche, that **has poisoned the modern consciousness**, and finds its expression in ideas of equality and democracy, and in radical political philosophies, like anarchism, that advocate it.

## **\*\*\*Alternative Debate\*\*\***

## Alternatives – Pessimism

**The tragedy of suffering is our greatest value in life – Embracing the sweet suffering in human experience both defines who we are individually as well as the relationships that connect us.**

**Dienstag 4** (Joshua Foa, Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, "Tragedy, Pessimism, Nietzsche," New Literary History 34:1 Project Muse, AD: 7/9/09) jl

So, while the pessimistic conception of tragedy may remain hostile to works of easy redemption, there is no barrier to tragedy's appearing in our time or outside of the theater. Indeed, a pessimist must insist on the universal availability of tragic themes, if not on their perennial appearance.<sup>30</sup> Not only did Nietzsche believe his own philosophy was one such manifestation, but he also found writing like Dostoyevsky's to reflect, not nihilism, but precisely a pessimistic ethic. Nor should Nietzsche's labeling of Dostoyevsky (and himself) as "liberating" surprise us. Pessimism is as much an ethic of radical possibility as it is of radical insecurity; indeed, the former is grounded in the latter. It is the lack of any natural boundaries to human character that permits, simultaneously, our capacity for novelty and distinctiveness as well as our capacity for enormous [End Page 95] cruelty; we cannot have one without the other. Dostoyevsky's characters sometimes react to this lack of boundaries with actions that are hideous, but this is due to a lack of imagination that does not, on Nietzsche's account, afflict Dostoyevsky himself. Raskolnikov does not define the pessimistic condition; rather, he is its worst possible consequence. But the effect of the book is still liberating, because, like tragedy, it alerts us to, even as it warns us about, the double-edged freedom that is our lot.

Or, perhaps, instead of speaking of freedom as double-edged, we should refer to pessimistic tragedy as teaching the universal, simultaneous presence of freedom and terror in our lives. To political theorists such as Hannah Arendt, the idea that we tread the political arena "without a banister" announces both the danger of totalitarianism and the condition of possibility for true individuality. Modern fascism had demonstrated that there are no innate limits to human cruelty, but our acknowledgement of that fact could, curiously, allow us to reach the equally true conclusion that "with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world" from which "the unexpected can be expected."<sup>31</sup> Steiner argued that Greek drama demonstrated the capricious cruelty of the world, as well as revealing the independence and humanity of those who are the victims of it. But even a social drama as microscopic and modern (and bourgeois) as Edith Wharton's *The House of Mirth* (or, I think, the recent film *Amores Perros*) has the requisite dual sense of freedom and terror. In both of these, the shape of individuals is most vividly revealed as the social structures that support them collapse—precisely as in *Antigone* or *Ajax*.<sup>32</sup>

This is not the idea that we see the "true" individual in a time of adversity. Rather, it is the view that the sources of individuality and of that which destroys individuality are the same. From this perspective, it makes no sense to ask whether the tragic personage is one who willfully separates themselves from their society or whether they are pushed out by malice or circumstance (neither for *Antigone* nor for Lily Bart is there a good answer to this question). To a pessimist, all of these situations arise equally from the fundamental instability of human beings and human institutions, anchorless in time. We are all equally subject to the freedom and terror of the tragic situation. And if some stories are "more tragic" than others, this is due merely to (a) the circumstance that some situations exemplify a fundamental condition better than others, and (b) our limited, but real enough, capacity to insulate ourselves from this circumstance by burying ourselves in a life of conformity. It is one of the special marks of tragedy, I think, that it often causes us to question the pursuit of a safe and painless life, even as it promises us that in abandoning this pursuit we will come to a bad end. In [End Page 96] enlarging the envelope of possible human experience, we will necessarily mark out a unique path of suffering. Perhaps, instead of "sweet violence," we should speak of a terror that liberates.

## Alternatives – Pessimism

**Life never gets better and we are doomed to a world of misery. By surrendering our lives to pessimism we can affirm our world of tragedy and create an authentic relationship with ourselves**

**Dienstag 4** (Joshua Foa, Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, "Tragedy, Pessimism, Nietzsche," New Literary History 34:1 Project Muse, AD: 7/9/09) jl

From the beginning, too, this view is associated with the Dionysian, "the mother of the mysteries, tragedy, pessimism" (KGW 3.3.309). The Athenian public theatrical festivals were known as the Dionysia, and Nietzsche goes so far as to claim the existence of a tradition "that **Greek tragedy in its earliest form had for its sole theme the sufferings of Dionysus**" (BT 73).<sup>16</sup> In Nietzsche's account, Dionysus suffers the prototypical agonies of existence inflicted by time. He is severed from the eternal flux and individuated, then torn to pieces and reunited with the whole: "This view of things already provides us with all the elements of a profound and pessimistic view of the world, together with the mystery doctrine of tragedy: the fundamental knowledge of the oneness of everything existent, the conception of individuation as the primal cause of evil, and of art as the joyous hope that the spell of individuation may be broken in augury of a restored oneness" (BT 10).

Dionysian suffering is essentially human suffering. In tragedy, this is indicated by a connection between the various elements involved in the public performance of the drama. The tragic hero, to Nietzsche, simply personifies the "Dionysian state" of the chorus as a whole (BT 73). The chorus is likewise "the mirror-image in which the Dionysian man contemplates himself" and also "a vision of the Dionysian mass of spectators" (BT 63). Thus, actor, chorus, and public are all connected in tragedy through their Dionysian character (PT 165). Each is a fragment torn from the whole. Nietzsche is here critiquing, but also reconstituting, the traditional philological stance that the chorus represents the Greek public itself. Although he sharply attacks the original proponents of this view, he, in fact, proposes not to reject it but to modify it. He will accept the connection of citizens and chorus only on the condition that the Greek public is understood as a unique phenomenon, a "Dionysian throng," that is, as a public already infected with the pessimistic wisdom of the pre-Socratics.<sup>17</sup>

Nietzsche's conception is, then, just the opposite of the elitism it is often associated with. Tragic knowledge is not something to which only a privileged few have access. Instead, the tragic theater can function, on his account, only when the ethos of pessimism is shared throughout the demos. When Nietzsche rails against the "democratization" of taste in post-Socratic Athens, he does not mean the larger population has a natural distaste for tragedy; his complaint is only that the lower classes are particularly susceptible to Socrates' optimism. Appealing to their suffering, it has the effect of stoking their resentments against the rich. (If people were naturally optimistic, Socrates' role would be unimportant. If anything is "natural," it is pessimism, though Nietzsche, who eschews such terms, will only speak of it as "older and more original.") So, he writes, in a lecture on Sophocles, "Tragedy has always contained [End Page 88] a pure democratic character, as it springs from the people" (KGW 2.3.17).<sup>18</sup>

Against this account of pessimism and tragedy as a kind of Dionysian wisdom, Nietzsche counterposes the new Socratic philosophy, whose characteristic feature now appears to be its optimism.<sup>19</sup> Even while proclaiming its ignorance, Socratic inquiry rejects the pessimistic idea that inquiry, like every human activity, is ultimately doomed: "For who could mistake the optimistic element in the nature of dialectic, which celebrates a triumph with every conclusion . . . the optimistic element which, having once penetrated tragedy must gradually overgrow its Dionysian regions and impel it necessarily to self-destruction" (BT 91). Socrates does not promise eternal happiness, but he does affirm both that virtue results in happiness and that virtue can be taught—thus happiness theoretically is within the grasp of all.<sup>20</sup> He denies that there is anything ultimately mysterious about life or inevitable about suffering: "By contrast with this practical pessimism, Socrates is the prototype of the theoretical optimist who, with his faith that the nature of things can be fathomed, ascribes to knowledge and insight the power of a panacea" (BT 97). Notwithstanding Socrates' fate at the hands of his fellow citizens, Nietzsche has no doubt that this approach, developed by Plato, was ultimately victorious in its struggle with tragedy: "Optimistic dialectic drives music out of tragedy with the scourge of its syllogisms" (BT 92). Just as the pessimism of an older generation of Greeks explains the origin of tragedy, so the Socratic turn in Greek philosophy explains its demise. When the population adopted the optimistic perspective, the cultural context for tragedy evaporated (PT 161). From Nietzsche's viewpoint, this was anything but a theoretical advance. Greek pessimism had a fundamental honesty that Socratic-Platonic philosophy lacks. This point, in particular, he reemphasized in the 1886 introduction to *The Birth of Tragedy*. While pessimism today, as it was in Nietzsche's time, is commonly associated with ideas of cultural decay, he takes the Greek experience to indicate precisely the opposite: "Is pessimism necessarily a sign of decline . . . as it once was in India and now is, to all appearances, among us, 'modern' men and Europeans? Is there a pessimism of strength? . . . And again: that of which tragedy died, the Socratism of morality, the dialectics, frugality, and cheerfulness of the theoretical man—how now? Might not this very Socratism be a sign of decline . . . Is the resolve to be so scientific about everything perhaps a kind of fear of, an escape from, pessimism? A subtle last resort against—truth?" (BT 17-18).

The Greeks of Socrates' generation could no longer bear to live with the brutal truths of the human condition and sought refuge in an optimistic philosophy. To Nietzsche this was "morally speaking, a sort of [End Page 89] cowardice . . . amorally speaking, a ruse" (BT 18). Either way, it was an active self-deception that made life more tolerable but less genuine. It was a retreat from a real look at time—

>DIENSTAG CONTINUES<





## Alternatives – Pessimism

### >DIENSTAG CONTINUES<

bound existence to a pleasing fantasy of progress and happiness. Thus, Nietzsche concludes, it is the optimists who are the true harbingers of cultural decline. What else can we call their weakening of resolve in comparison with the stance of the earlier Greeks? Nietzsche's attack on Socrates and Plato is often taken to be a defense of irrationalism, but from his perspective it is they who have retreated from an honest assessment of the world. The pessimistic vision of the world as fundamentally disordered, untamable, unfair, and destructive is the "truth" against which they close their eyes and withdraw to a cave.<sup>21</sup>

## Alternative – Bathe in Fire

**The willful affirmation of our complete annihilation is a state of complete purity – we become nothing but a dancing flame**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 45, AD: 7/7/09) jl

There are so many ways to achieve the sensation of immateriality that it would be difficult, if not futile, to make a classification. Nevertheless, I think that the bath of fire is one of the best. The bath of fire: you're being ablaze, all flashes and sparks, consumed by flames as in hell. The bath of fire purifies so radically that it does away with existence. Its heat waves and scorching flames burn the kernel of life, smothering its vital elan, turning its aggressiveness into aspiration. To live in a bath of fire, transfigured by its rich glow - such is the state of immaterial purity where one is nothing but a dancing flame. Freed from the laws of gravity, life becomes illusion or dream. But this is not all: at the end, a most curious and paradoxical sensation occurs; the feeling of dreamy unreality gives way to the sensation of becoming ash. The bath of fire invariable ends thus: when the inner conflagration has scorched the ground of your being, when all is ashes, what else is there left to experience? There is both mad delight and infinite irony in the thought of my ashes scattered to the four winds, sown frenetically in space, an eternal reproach to the world.

## Alternatives – Solvency

**We should laugh at our inevitable deaths and view it in a limited life, we can escape the fear hovering over our lives**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 33-34, AD: 7/7/09) jl

How important can it be that I suffer and think? My presence in this world will disturb a few tranquil lives and will unsettle the unconscious and pleasant naiveté of others. Although **I feel that my tragedy is the greatest in history - greater than the fall of empires - I am nevertheless aware of my total insignificance.** I am absolutely persuaded that I am nothing in this universe; yet I feel that mine is the only real existence. If I had to choose between the world and me, I would reject the world, its lights and laws, unafraid to glide alone in absolute nothingness. Although life for me is torture, I cannot renounce it, because I do not believe in the absolute values in whose name I would sacrifice myself. If I were to be totally sincere, I would say that I do not know why I live and why I do not stop living. The answer probably lies in the irrational character of life which maintains itself without reason. What if there were only absurd motives for living? Could they still be called motives? **This world is not worth a sacrifice in the name of an idea or a belief. How much happier are we today because others have died for our well-being and our enlightenment? Well-being? enlightenment? If anybody had died so that I could be happy, then I would be even more unhappy, because I do not want to build my life on a graveyard.** There are moments when I feel responsible for all the suffering in history, since I cannot understand why some have shed blood for us. It would be a great irony if we could determine that they were happier than we are. **Let history crumble into dust!** Why should I bother? **Let death appear in a ridiculous light; suffering, limited and unrevealing; enthusiasm, impure; life, rational; life's dialectics, logical rather than demonic; despair, minor and partial; eternity, just a word; the experience of nothingness, an illusion; fatality, a joke!** I seriously ask myself, what is the meaning of all this? Why raise questions, throw lights, or see shadows? Wouldn't it be better if I buried my tears in the sand on seashore in utter solitude? But I never cried, because my tears have always turned into thoughts. And my thoughts are as bitter as tears.

## Alternatives – Solvency

**Despair is a permanent condition of what it means to be human – consuming ourselves by inner fires feeds the embracement of our agony**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 37-38, AD: 7/7/09) jl

**Is there anything on earth which cannot be doubted except death,** the only certainty in this world? To doubt and yet to live - this is a paradox, though not a tragic one, since doubt is less intense, less consuming, than despair. Abstract doubt, in which one participates only partially, is more frequent, whereas in despair one participates totally and organically. Not even the most organic and serious forms of doubt ever reach the intensity of despair. In comparison with despair, skepticism is characterized by a certain amount of dilettantism and superficiality. I can doubt everything, I may very well smile contemptuously at the world, but this will not prevent me from eating, from sleeping peacefully, and from marrying. In despair, whose depth one can fathom only by experiencing it, such actions are possible only with great effort. On the heights of despair, nobody has the right to sleep. Thus **a genuinely desperate man cannot forget his own tragedy: his consciousness preserves the painful actuality of his subjective torment.** Doubt is anxiety about problems and things, and has its origins in the unsolvable nature of all big questions. If such questions could be solved, the skeptic would revert to more normal states. The condition of the desperate man in this respect is utterly different: if all problems were solved, he would not be any less anxious, since his anxiety arises out of his own subjective existence. **Despair is the state in which anxiety and restlessness are immanent to existence.** Nobody in despair suffers from problems, but from his own inner torment and fire. It's a pity that **nothing can be solved in this world.** Yet there never was and here never will be anyone who would commit suicide for this reason. So much for the power that intellectual anxiety has over the total anxiety of our being! **That is why I prefer the dramatic life, consumed by inner fires and tortured by destiny, to the intellectual, caught up in abstractions which do not engage the essence of our subjectivity. I despise the absence of risks, madness and passion in abstract thinking.** How fertile live, passionate thinking is! Lyricism feeds it like blood pumped into the heart! It is interesting to observe the dramatic process by which men, originally preoccupied with abstract and impersonal problems, so objective as to forget them, come to reflect upon their own subjectivity and upon existential questions once they experience sickness and suffering. Active and objective men do not have enough inner resources to make an interesting problem of their own destiny. One must descend all the circles of an inner hell to turn one's destiny into a subjective yet universal problem. If you are not burned to ashes, you will then be able to philosophize lyrically. **Only when you do not deign even to despise this world of unsolvable problems will you finally come to achieve a superior form of personal existence. And this will be so not because you have any special value or excellence, but because nothing interests you beyond your own personal agony.**

## Alternatives – Extinction

Facing extinction allows us to get over the anxiety of complete destruction – it becomes a willful affirmation

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 90, AD: 7/7/09) j1

Let us return to original chaos! Let us imagine the primordial din, the original vortex! Let us throw ourselves into the whirlwind which has preceded the creation of form. Let our being tremble with effort and madness in the fiery abyss! Let everything be wiped out so that, surrounded by confusion and disequilibrium, we participate fully in the general delirium, retracing our way back from cosmos to chaos, from form to swirling gyres. The disintegration of the world is creation in reverse: an apocalypse upside down but sprung from similar impulses. Nobody desires to return to chaos without having first experienced an apocalyptic vertigo. How great my terror and my joy at the thought of being dragged into the vortex of initial chaos, that pandemonium of paradoxical symmetry - the unique geometry of chaos, devoid of sense or form! In every whirlwind hides a potential for form, just as in chaos there is a potential cosmos. Let me possess an infinite number of unrealized, potential forms! Let everything vibrate in me with the universal anxiety of the beginning, just awakening from nothingness! I can only live at the beginning or the end of this world.

## **\*\*\*Answers To Section \*\*\***

## AT: Perm

### **The permutation fails – The combination of pessimism and the elements of the affirmative result in an inability to affirm the entirety of tragedy**

**Dienstag 4** (Joshua Foa, Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, "Tragedy, Pessimism, Nietzsche," New Literary History 34:1 Project Muse, AD: 7/9/09) jl

The task that *The Birth of Tragedy* set itself was to explain not only the appearance of Greek tragedy, but also its decline in Greek society after Euripides. As is well known, Nietzsche hypothesizes that Socrates' introduction (and Plato's furtherance) of a rationalistic philosophy destroyed the preexisting cultural grounds for Greek tragedy (BT 81ff.). But what exactly did Socrates destroy, and how was this possible? Why, in any case, should a philosopher have had the power to affect the theater? The answer lies in the pessimism that Nietzsche associates with the pre-Socratic philosophers and his belief that their ideas reflected the original character of early Greek culture. "**Tragedy**," as he put it in a note from this period, "**is the outlet of mystic-pessimistic knowledge**."12 Pessimism was the philosophical basis for the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles. **This was the wisdom that the pre-Socratics possessed and that later generations first denied** and then forgot. Socrates is the agent of this change because his philosophy is essentially optimistic (BT 91ff.).13 Nietzsche did not think of optimism and pessimism as two equal, if opposite, ways of looking at the world, as we might today; rather "pessimism . . . is older and more original than optimism" (KGW 4.1.208). Pessimism is the domain of the Ionian philosophers who preceded Socrates and whose teachings we possess only in fragments. Instead of trying to construct a systematic, ordering philosophy, as Socrates and Plato were to do, the pre-Socratics grasped the chaotic and disordered nature of the world and only attempted to cope with it, insofar as that was possible: "**Pessimism is the consequence of knowledge of the absolute illogic of the world-order**" (KGW 3.3.74). [End Page 86]

In other notes from this period, Nietzsche first attributes to Democritus the doctrine that "the world [is] without moral and aesthetic meaning" and calls this idea "the pessimism of accidents" (KGW 3.4.151). In *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (written at about the same time as *The Birth* but published only posthumously), he likens Anaximander to Schopenhauer and calls him "the first philosophical author of the ancients." He goes on to describe Anaximander as a "true pessimist" and quotes his only extant fragment to justify the label: "Where the source of things is, to that place they must also pass away, according to necessity, for they must pay penance and be judged for their injustices, in accordance with the ordinance of Time."14

In other words, the pre-Socratics, as Nietzsche interpreted them, grasped the animating principle of **pessimism**: that time **is an unshakable burden for human beings because it leads to the ultimate destruction of all things—and that this fate belies any principle of order that may, on the surface, appear to guide the course of events**. Of course, whether any of the pre-Socratics would have put things this way is debatable (although Heraclitus, in particular, is certainly often understood in this fashion). What is important here is that Nietzsche understood them to be doing so, that he understood the root of pessimism to be, as he later wrote, "time-sickness [Zeit-Krankheit]" (KGW 7.2.51). The epigraph from Weil captures the thought exactly: it is the destructive power of time that stands behind any particular cause of suffering in the world.

**Nietzsche considered tragic theater to be an outgrowth of this view of the universe as something constantly in flux, constantly in the process of becoming and, thus, constantly in the process of destroying**. The ravages of time could not be cured or compensated for through tragedy, only understood: "Tragedy . . . is in its essence pessimistic. Existence is in itself something very terrible, man something very foolish" (KGW 3.2.38). Nietzsche rejects the conclusion, popular since Aristotle, that **tragedy offers some kind of purification of the emotions generated by the terrible truths of the human condition**.15 He also **rejects the idea that tragedies contain some sort of moral lesson meant to instruct us in ethical behavior**. Instead, he argues, **tragedy simply serves to lay bare for us the horrible situation of human existence that the pre-Socratic philosophers describe, a situation from which our minds would otherwise flee: "The hero of tragedy does not prove himself . . . in a struggle against fate, just as little does he suffer what he deserves. Rather, blind and with covered head, he falls to his ruin: and his desolate but noble burden with which he remains standing in the presence of this well-known world of terrors presses itself like a thorn in our soul"** (KGW 3.2.38). **The tragic outlook is thus generated from a base of pessimistic knowledge. It recommends no cure for the pains of existence, only a public recognition of their depth and power.** [End Page 87]



## AT: We Solve Oppression

### History proves exploitation and hierarchies are an inevitable part of human society

**Nietzsche 1886** (Friedrich, Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, Beyond Good and Evil, The Nietzsche Channel, <http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bge.htm>, AD: 7/8/09) jl

257. Every elevation of the type “man,” has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society—and so it will always be—a society believing in a long scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth among human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or other. Without the pathos of distance, such as grows out of the incarnated difference of classes, out of the constant out-looking and down-looking of the ruling caste on subordinates and instruments, and out of their equally constant practice of obeying and commanding, of keeping down and keeping at a distance—that other more mysterious pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an ever new widening of distance within the soul itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer, further, more extended, more comprehensive states, in short, just the elevation of the type “man,” the continued “self-surmounting of man,” to use a moral formula in a supermoral sense. To be sure, one must not resign oneself to any humanitarian illusions about the history of the origin of an aristocratic society (that is to say, of the preliminary condition for the elevation of the type “man”): the truth is hard. Let us acknowledge unprejudicedly how every higher civilization hitherto has originated! Men with a still natural nature, barbarians in every terrible sense of the word, men of prey, still in possession of unbroken strength of will and desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more moral, more peaceful races (perhaps trading or cattle-rearing communities), or upon old mellow civilizations in which the final vital force was flickering out in brilliant fireworks of wit and depravity. At the commencement, the noble caste was always the barbarian caste: their superiority did not consist first of all in their physical, but in their psychical power—they were more complete men (which at every point also implies the same as “more complete beasts”).

### The will to power of society ensures domination will happen

**Nietzsche 1886** (Friedrich, Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel, Beyond Good and Evil, The Nietzsche Channel, <http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bge.htm>, AD: 7/8/09) jl

258. Corruption—as the indication that anarchy threatens to break out among the instincts and that the foundation of the emotions (i.e., “life”) is convulsed—differs radically according to the organization in which it manifests itself. When, for instance, an aristocracy like that of France at the beginning of the Revolution, flung away its privileges with sublime disgust and sacrificed itself to an excess of its moral sentiments, it was corruption—it was really only the closing act of the corruption that had existed for centuries, by virtue of which that aristocracy had abdicated step by step its lordly prerogatives and lowered itself to a function of royalty (in the end even to its decoration and parade-dress). The essential thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard itself as a function either of the monarchy or the commonwealth, but as the significance and highest justification thereof—that it should then accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, for its sake, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is not allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher existence: like those sun-seeking climbing plants in Java—they are called Sipo matador—which encircle an oak so long and so often with their arms, until at last, high above it, but supported by it, they can unfold their tops in the open light, and exhibit their happiness.

## AT: Levinas

**Connecting with the Other through understanding is not only impossible but if it were, would collapse society into an eruption of blood**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 6-7, AD: 7/7/09) jl

There are people who are destined to taste only the poison in things, for whom any surprise is a painful surprise and any experience a new occasion for torture. If someone were to say to me that such suffering has subjective reasons, related to the individual's particular makeup, I would then ask; is there an objective criterion for evaluating suffering? Who can say with precision that my neighbor suffers more than I do or that Jesus suffered more than all of us? There is no objective standard because suffering cannot be measured according to the external stimulation or local irritation of the organism, but only as it is felt and reflected in consciousness. Alas, from this point of view, any hierarchy is out of the question. Each person remains with his own suffering, which he believes absolute and unlimited, how much would we diminish our own personal suffering if we were to compare it to all the world's sufferings until now, to the most horrifying agonies and the most complicated tortures, the most cruel deaths and the most painful betrayals, all the lepers, all those burned alive or starved to death? Nobody is comforted in his sufferings by the thought that we are not all mortals, nor does anybody who suffers really find comfort in the past or present suffering of others. Because in this organically insufficient and fragmentary world, the individual is set to live fully, wishing to make of his own existence an absolute. Each subjective existence is absolute to itself. For this reason each man lives as if he were the center of the universe or the center of history. Then how could his suffering fail to be absolute? I cannot understand another's suffering in order to diminish my own. Comparisons in such cases are irrelevant, because suffering is an interior state, in which nothing external can help. But there is a great advantage in the loneliness of suffering. What would happen if a man's face could adequately express his suffering, if his entire inner agony were objectified in his facial expression? Could we still communicate? Wouldn't we then cover our faces with our hands while talking? Life would really be impossible if the infinitude of feelings we harbor within ourselves were fully expressed in the lines of our faces. Nobody would dare look at himself in the mirror, because a grotesque, tragic image would mix in the contours of his face with stains and traces of blood, wounds which cannot be healed, and unstoppable streams of tears. I would experience a kind of voluptuous awe if I could see a volcano of blood, eruptions as red as fire and as burning as despair, burst into the midst of the comfortable and superficial harmony of everyday life, or if I could see all our hidden wounds open, making of us a bloody eruption forever. Only then would we truly understand and appreciate the advantage of loneliness, which silences our suffering and makes it inaccessible. The venom drawn out from suffering would be enough to poison the whole world in a bloody eruption, bursting out of the volcano of our being. There is so much venom, so much poison, in suffering!

## AT: Levinas

**In the innermost solitude we are freed from our suffering – we crave a life with spontaneity.**

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 6-7, AD: 7/7/09) jl

True solitude is the feeling of being absolutely isolated between the earth and the sky. **Nothing should detract attention from these phenomena of absolute isolation**: a fearfully lucid intuition will reveal the entire drama of man's finite nature facing the infinite nothingness of the world. Solitary walks - extremely fertile and dangerous at the same time, for the inner life - must take place in such a way that nothing will obscure the solitary's meditation on man's isolation in the world. Solitary walks are propitious to an intense process of exteriorization especially in the evening, when none of the usual seductions can steal one's interest. Then revelations about the world spring from the deepest corner of the spirit, from the place where it has detached itself from life, from the wound of life. **To achieve spirituality, one must be very lonely**. So much death-in-life and so many inner conflagrations! Loneliness negates so much of life that the spirit's blooming in vital dislocations becomes almost insufferable. **Isn't it significant that those who have too much spirit, who know the deep wound inflicted on life at the birth of the spirit, are the ones who rise against it?** Healthy, fat people, without the least intuition of what spirit is, who have never suffered the tortures of life and the painful antinomies at the base of existence, are the ones who rise up in defense of the spirit. Those who truly know it either tolerate it with pride or regard it as a calamity. Nobody can really be pleased at the bottom of his heart with spirit, an acquisition so damaging to life. **How can one be pleased with life without its charm, naiveté, and spontaneity? The presence of the spirit indicates a want of life, great loneliness, and long suffering**. Who dares talk of salvation through the spirit? It is by no means true that life on the immanent plane creates an anxiety from which man escapes through the spirit. On the contrary, it is much truer that through spirit man achieves disequilibrium, anxiety as well as grandeur. **What do you expect those who don't know the dangers of life to know of the dangers of the spirit? To argue the case for spirit is a sign of great ignorance, just as to make a case for life is a sign of great disequilibrium**. For the normal man, life is an undisputed reality; only the sick man is delighted by life and praises it so that he won't collapse. And what about the man who cannot praise either life or the spirit?

## **AT: We should stop suffering**

The direct result of suffering is greatness – only by embracing our suffering and learning to use it to make us better can we become truly heroic for what does not kill us, makes us stronger

**Cioran 34** (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 6-7, AD: 7/7/09) jl

I am: therefore the world is meaningless. **What meaning is there in the tragic suffering of a man for whom everything is ultimately nothing and whose only law in this world is agony?** If the world tolerates somebody like me, this can only mean that the blots on me the so-called sun of life are so large that in time they will obscure its light. Life's beastliness trampled me under foot and oppressed me, clipped my wings in full flight and stole all my rightful joys. I the enthusiastic zeal and mad passion I put into becoming a brilliant individual, the demonic charm I adopted to gain an aura in the future, and the energy I spent on an organic, glamorous, inner rebirth, all proved weaker than the beastly brutality and irrationality of this world, which poured into me all its reserves of negativity and poison. **Life is impossible at high temperatures. That's why I have reached the conclusion that anguished people, whose inner dynamism is so intense that it reaches paroxysm, and who cannot accept normal temperatures, are doomed to fall.** The destruction of those who live unusual lives is an aspect of life's demonism, but it is also an aspect of its insufficiency, which explains why life is the privilege of mediocre people. **Only mediocrities live at life's normal temperature; the others are consumed at temperatures at which life cannot endure, at which they can barely breathe,** already one foot beyond life. I cannot contribute anything to this world because I only have one method: agony. **You complain that people are mean, vengeful, ungrateful, and hypocritical? I propose the agony method to rid you of all these imperfections.** Apply it to every generation and its effects will soon be evident. Maybe in this way I too could become useful to mankind! **Bring every man to the agony of life's last moments by whip, fire, or injections, and through terrible torture he will undergo the great purification afforded by a vision of death. Then free him and let him run in a fright until he falls exhausted. I warrant you that the effect is incomparably greater than any obtained through normal means.** If I could, I would drive the entire world to agony to achieve a radical purification of life; **I would set a fire burning insidiously at the roots of life, not to destroy them but to give them a new and different sap, a new heat. The fire I would set to the world would not bring ruin but cosmic transfiguration.** In this way **life would adjust to higher temperatures and would cease to be an environment propitious to mediocrity.** And maybe in this dream, death too would cease to be immanent in life.



**\*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\***

## Perm – Solvency

**Liberal institutions are absolutely necessary to crafting the new values of the higher types – democracy allows for the highest types to take power and their political influence can only be negative (positive?).**

**Egyed 8** (Béla, Professor of Philosophy at Carleton University, Ottawa. Eruo-Zine, "Nietzsche's anti-democratic liberalism" April 8 2008. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-04-08-egyed-en.html> AD 7/7/09) JM

Nietzsche's problem is that **by rejecting traditional morality he has "wiped away" those horizons that have hitherto served to stabilize and give meaning to social existence. Since absolute and permanent values are no longer available to him, he needs to give an account of how valuation – something he deems to be essential for human existence – is still possible.** It is at this point that Nietzsche's doctrine of Will to Power, his ontology of agency, becomes significant. **According to him human subject** are not absolutely stable unities. They **are more or less stable organizations of heterogeneous multiplicities: structures of dominance.** These fragile unities are complexes of competing drives (passions, emotions, affects). Under the regency of one of these drives: **We gain the correct idea of the nature of subject-unity,** namely as regents at the head of a community (not as "souls" or "life forces"), also **of the dependence of these regents upon the ruled and of an order of rank and division of labour as the conditions that make possible the whole and its parts.** In the same way, how living unities continually arise and die and how the "subject" is not eternal; in the same way, that the struggle expresses itself in obeying and commanding, and that the fluctuating assessments of the limits of power is part of life. (WP 492) On the basis this conception of subjectivity, Nietzsche envisions three different human types: first, those in whom the struggle among the drives is so intense that even a fragile unity cannot result from them; second, those whose dominant drive is so strong that they remain in a constant defensive struggle against a hostile Other in order to preserve it; finally, those who are capable of organizing the greatest number of different drives under the greatest possible unity. **"The highest man, Nietzsche says, would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured"** (WP 966). Or again: **"I believe that it is precisely through the presence of opposites and feelings they occasion that the great man, the bow with the greatest tension, develops"** (WP 967). **It is worth repeating: Nietzsche is an elitist.** He holds, in my opinion, the following paradoxical complex of views: Liberal democratic institutions are here to stay. The great danger is that the democratization of Europe leads to the debasing of the human spirit. The material survival of humanity requires some measure of stability that can only be provided by a permanent working force. **For its spiritual survival, humanity needs values: spiritual horizons. Since God is dead, there are no absolute values, therefore, new spiritual horizons, new creators, are needed, and these will be legislators/diagnosticians of human drives.** These higher types need to understand, but keep their distance from, the herd and its values. **Societies, in spite of their democratic structure, will always require, and will always have, extra-political aristocratic features. The higher types will lead by example only; their political role can only be negative.** Their task will be to subvert outworn human values, propose new ones, all along insisting that human existence is essentially tragic. By so doing, they will also, indirectly, enhance the power of all individuals to overcome themselves. I feel fairly confident about all but the last sentence of the previous paragraph, and I am also fairly confident that Detwiler too would agree with most of it. But what evidence is there that Nietzsche would have accepted both my non-interventionist account of his politics, as well as my suggestion that in spite of their pathos of distance higher types could still be educators of the "herd"? The picture that one can easily get from his "The Greek State" and, indeed, some of his later statements, is that he was only interested in educating higher types – cultivating genius. At times he does suggest that, "a good and healthy aristocracy ... [should accept] with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings who for its sake, must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments" (BGE 258, p.202) (also WP 954). Comments like these are disturbing, and they definitely go against any attempt to construe Nietzsche as "moderate aristocrat" and a liberal. One has only a few options here. One could dismiss comments like this as the ranting of a desperate, hardly sane, person. Or, one could try, as Kaufmann does, to take the sting out of such passages by reading them strictly metaphorically. More to the point, however, one could ask: how can comments like these be reconciled with Nietzsche's view that "the destiny of humanity depends upon the attainment of its highest type" (WP 987)? Surely, **if the higher types are to have any relevance for the destiny of humanity they cannot be completely irrelevant to it. Even if we admit that they need to keep their distance, and admit, also, that they cannot enter into communication with the herd on its terms; if the herd learns nothing from them, even indirectly, what is their social use? What is art, what is culture, worth, if it does not contribute to the perfection of human nature?** To deny them that role would go against even what Nietzsche says in BT.

## Perm – Solvency

**Political action isn't nihilism – their link arguments are contrived and don't assume a creative path of politics**

**Bourke 8** (James, Graduate Student Department of Political Science Duke University, "Nietzsche\Connolly: Problems of a Nietzschean Democracy," [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/2/6/5/7/7/pages265777/p265777-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/5/7/7/pages265777/p265777-1.php), AD: 7/8/09) jl

There are at least two ways of going about a critique of Connolly's appropriation of Nietzsche. One would be largely hermeneutic, and might involve an attempt to show that Nietzsche's politics are aristocratic and inegalitarian in such a way that expropriating whatever we might like from this picture destroys the coherence of calling it a "Nietzschean" view in the first place. To do this successfully one would not merely have to point out some of the many places where Nietzsche either attacks democracy or supports a radical aristocratic political vision. <sup>3</sup> One would have to go further by showing the ways in which Nietzsche's political views "hang together" in an overall coherent picture, extraction from which for non-Nietzschean purposes makes a mess of the whole. One might add to this the claim that Nietzsche's politics are embedded in an overall metaphysic (though we might want to qualify the term "metaphysic" with a view to Nietzsche's perspectivism and epistemological skepticism) of hierarchy and power. I will not attempt such a project here. First, even if, as I think is correct, Nietzsche presents a more or less coherent, though certainly not systematic, view by the time of his late works, it is not clear to me that one could successfully explain away all of the ambiguities and resistances that such a rich and protean thinker as Nietzsche consistently offers up. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it is not clear what would be gained from such an effort by way of critical leverage over Connolly. Though this interpretation might advance the aim of getting Nietzsche "right," if such a thing is possible, it is not clear that Connolly's project is thereby undermined. For couldn't Connolly insist that his ideas make sense on their own apart from the accuracy of his interpretations? As Connolly has said in response to this kind of critic, these are questions for the "academic police" <sup>4</sup> to resolve, while those using Nietzsche creatively and in ways relevant to the present can consider their enterprise separate from the work of scholarly precision and accuracy. Getting Nietzsche right is less important to Connolly than is uncovering ways in which Nietzsche and others disclose political and ethical potentialities that can support the vibrancy of democracy.



## Link Turn – Liberal Institutions

**Liberal institutions allow the higher type to establish a base of authority among the lower type.**

**Egyed 8** (Béla, Professor of Philosophy at Carleton University, Ottawa. Eruo-Zine, "Nietzsche's anti-democratic liberalism" April 8 2008. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-04-08-egyed-en.html> AD 7/7/09) JM

By way of an answer, I offer the following hypothesis: While Nietzsche has no doubt that there will always be a significant distinction between higher and lower types – between those who create new visions of existence freely, and those who produce the requirements of material existence under some forms of moral and material constraints, given his ontology of agency, the distinction must remain relatively open. **Individualism is a virtue of those who exist under some form of constraint; their will to power** – reminding us of the lion's in Zarathustra's "Prologue" – **is sufficient only to get free from an overpowering domination by society. Their struggle is not that of the higher types, although the living examples and the visions created by the higher types might serve them in their struggle.** And, individuals struggling for their liberation might, at the end of those struggles, with themselves, as well as with their external "constraints", become persons. "Persons", as I understand them, will not be only higher types. Nevertheless, they will be like the third type I described earlier. They will be open to experimentation with ways of being, tolerating diversity, and imposing on the tensions within themselves, and those surrounding them, the maximum order compatible with that diversity. The question is: If what I say represents Nietzsche's position, why did he not make it more explicit? Part of the answer, surely, must be Nietzsche's extreme suspicion of the masses as carriers of the pathogen of Christian morality. In any commerce with them, the higher types would be in danger of infection. For that reason they must keep their distance. They could not, as Connolly proposes, be engaged in "democratic politics". Democratic politics might indeed be liberating for individuals, or groups of individuals, negotiating about divergent "hegemonic" interests, but such negotiations are fraught with great danger for the higher types. For that reason they must avoid them. Still, if my analysis here is correct, **it does not follow from it that the higher types are politically irrelevant. They could, as I will show in a moment, help individuals in their becoming-persons – in achieving, as Connolly would say, "contingent identities". Also, they could help in the drawing and re-drawing of socio-political horizons providing a limited, fragile place within which a true political militancy could evolve.** Still, someone who takes Detwiler's position might object to this particular line of argument. They might say that most of the evidence I have marshalled in support of my claim that Nietzsche's elitism is not essentialist, comes from the middle period and, therefore, it does not have much weight. My reply to that possible objection would be that the onus is on those who deny the relevance of the middle period wrings in assessing Nietzsche's political views, to explain how it is that there is such a remarkable congruence between passages coming from it and from the late period. But, as I said earlier the onus is also on me to offer an explanation for those passages that have nourished the opinion that Nietzsche advocates the political oppression and exploitation of the "masses", by the higher types. Perhaps the most embarrassing passages for my interpretation are the following: Put in the crudest form: how could one sacrifice the development of mankind to help a higher species than man to come into existence? (WP 859) A declaration of war on the masses by higher men is needed! (WP 861) **The dwarfing of man must for a long time count as the only goal; because a broad foundation has first to be created so that a stronger species of man can stand upon it.** (WP 890) These passages, however, **need to be read in the context of others where Nietzsche speaks of: a) the higher type's need for a "base" upon which it can perform its task** (WP 901); **and b) where he speaks of the need to protect the strong against the weak** (WP 684-5, 863-4). These passages imply that for Nietzsche the "lower types" will be essential not only in the production/reproduction of the means of material survival, but are also essential as the bearers of a relatively stable moral base serving as a context in which the creation of new visions of human existence will become possible. Nietzsche's call for the pathos of distance has a very specific purpose. It is to prevent that: "The values of the weak prevail because the strong have taken them over as devices of leadership" (WP 863). The danger for the higher types is that they may be seduced by herd morality. But that does not mean that they can ignore it. In fact, their main role is, having recognized its practical necessity, to prevent it from becoming ossified, and to revitalize it. So, I would maintain that, in spite of some of the troubling statements he makes, **it would be rash to exclude the possibility that Nietzsche allowed for the open ended-ness of, not only of higher type subjectivity, but also of a lower type one. And, indeed this is as it should be. Otherwise he would be guilty of precisely that type of essentialism that he wishes to avoid.**

## Link Turn – Liberal Institutions

**Liberal institutions, once attained, immediately give up their liberalism when aristocracy takes charge.**

**Egyed 8** (Béla, Professor of Philosophy at Carleton University, Ottawa. Eruo-Zine, “Nietzsche's anti-democratic liberalism” April 8 2008. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-04-08-egyed-en.html> AD 7/7/09) JM

Lest I be accused of being too abstract, I offer the following clarification of my last point: Nietzsche's doctrine of Will to Power has the most immediate application on the personal or the micro-political level. It is there that encounters involve the clash, or convergence, of feeling passions, and where drives are alternately dominating or dominated. It has broader political implication in cases of specific struggles against intolerable conditions, or in cases where specific passions or drives are mobilized to achieve some desired goal. It invites suspicion about totalizing party politics, and it is positively hostile to forms of identity politics that confine persons within narrow limits. A Nietzsche inspired politics would focus on local, punctual, issues. It would encourage not so much a critique of the most obvious and loudest political events or issues, but a diagnosis of the imperceptible forces and tendencies driving them. It might, in this way, prepare the conditions for a truly radical militancy, and it might unleash a truly effective subversion of entrenched values, be they that of "the people" or, indeed, that of the "higher types" themselves. This would, in my view, capture the true spirit of liberalism, one that advocates a true autonomy, one that welcomes contest, and one that is more interested in the process of liberation than in its achievements. Let me give the last word to Nietzsche: Liberal institutions immediately cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: subsequently there is nothing more harmful to freedom than liberal institutions [...] As long as they are still being fought for, these same institutions produce quite different effects; they then in fact promote freedom mightily. (Twilight of the Idols 38, p.92)

## Impact Turn – Genocide

The alternative empirically leads to genocide – when you place the privileged above everyone else and the rules you end up in a big game of King of the Hill where the poor and disadvantaged are exterminated.

**Simpson 95** (Chris, scholar in Human Rights and the merits of Democracy. Common Courage Press, "The Splendid Blond Beast" 1995. <http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Genocide/SplendidBlondeBeast.html> AD 7/8/09) JM

**Friedrich Nietzsche called the aristocratic predators who write society's laws "the splendid blond beast" precisely because they so often behave as though they are beyond the reach of elementary morality.** As he saw things, these elites have cut a path toward a certain sort of excellence consisting mainly of the exercise of power at the expense of others. When dealing with ordinary people, he said, they "revert to the innocence of wild animals.... We can imagine them returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape and torture, jubilant and at peace with themselves as though they had committed a fraternity prank-convicted, moreover, that the poets for a long time to come will have something to sing about and to praise." **Their brutality was true courage, Nietzsche thought, and the foundation of social order. Today genocide-the deliberate destruction of a racial, cultural, or political group-is the paramount example of the institutionalized and sanctioned violence of which Nietzsche spoke.** Genocide has been a basic mechanism of empire and the national state since their inception and remains widely practiced in "advanced" and "civilized" areas. **Most genocides in this century have been perpetrated by nation-states upon ethnic minorities living within the state's own borders; most of the victims have been children.** The people responsible for mass murder have by and large gotten away with what they have done. Most have succeeded in keeping wealth that they looted from their victims; **most have never faced trial. Genocide is still difficult to eradicate because it is usually tolerated, at least by those who benefit from it.** The Splendid Blond Beast examines how the social mechanisms of genocide often encourage tacit international cooperation in the escape from justice of those who perpetrated the crime... According to psychologist Ervin Staub, who has studied dozens of mass crimes, genocidal societies usually go through an evolution during which the different strata of society literally learn how to carry out group murder. In his book *The Roots of Evil*, Staub contends that genocidal atrocities most often take place in countries under great political, economic, and often military stress. They are usually led by authoritarian parties that wield great power yet are insecure in their rule, such as the Nazis in Germany or the Ittihad (Committee of Union and Progress) in Turkey. The ideologies of such parties can vary in important respects, but they are nonetheless often similar in that they create unity among "in-group" members through dehumanization of outsiders. Genocidal societies also show a marked tendency toward what psychologists call "justworld" thinking: Victims are believed to have brought their suffering upon themselves and, thus, to deserve what they get. But the ideology of these authoritarian parties and even their seizure of state power are not necessarily enough to trigger a genocide. **The leading perpetrators need mass mobilizations to actually implement their agenda.** For example, the real spearheads of genocide in Germany-the Nazi party, SS, and similar groups- by themselves lacked the resources to disenfranchise and eventually murder millions of Jews. They succeeded in unleashing the Holocaust, however, by harnessing many of the otherwise ordinary elements of German life-of commerce, the courts, university scholarship, religious observance, routine government administration, and so on-to the specialized tasks necessary for mass murder. Not surprisingly, **many of the leaders of these "ordinary" institutions were the existing notables in German society. The Nazi genocide probably would not have been possible without the active or tacit cooperation of many collaborators who did not consider themselves Nazis** and, in some cases, even opposed aspects of Hitler's policies, yet nonetheless cooperated in mass murder. **Put bluntly, the Nazis succeeded in genocide in part through offering bystanders money, property, status, and other rewards for their active or tacit complicity in the crime.**

## Impact Turn – Genocide

**Nietzsche's philosophy glorifies racism and queer bashing – the neg says that genocide is freakin awesome.**

**Ross 8** (Kelly L., PhD, Department of Philosophy, Los Angeles Valley College. Friesian.com, "Friedrich Nietzsche", last updated in 2008. <http://www.friesian.com/NIETZSCH.HTM> AD 7/9/09) JM

First of all, **Nietzsche's racism is unmistakable.** The best way to approach this is to let Nietzsche speak for himself. In the quotes that follow, I will simply offer examples from The Genealogy of Morals alone, as translated by Francis Golffing (in the footnotes I have been adding some passages from Beyond Good and Evil for comparison). The Latin malus ["bad"] (beside which I place melas [Greek for "black"]) might designate the common man as dark, especially black-haired ("hic niger est"), as the pre-Aryan settler of the Italian soil, notably distinguished from the new blond conqueror race by his color. At any rate, the Gaelic presented me with an exactly analogous case: fin, as in the name Fingal, the characteristic term for nobility, eventually the good, noble, pure, originally the fair-haired as opposed to the dark, black-haired native population. The Celts, by the way, were definitely a fair-haired race; and it is a mistake to try to relate the area of dark-haired people found on ethnographic maps of Germany to Celtic bloodlines, as Virchow does. These are the last vestiges of the pre-Aryan population of Germany. (The subject races are seen to prevail once more, throughout almost all of Europe; in color, shortness of skull, perhaps also in intellectual and social instincts. Who knows whether modern democracy, the even more fashionable anarchism, and especially that preference for the commune, the most primitive of all social forms, which is now shared by all European socialists -- whether all these do not represent a throwback, and whether, even physiologically, the Aryan [master] race of conquerors is not doomed?) [The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956, p.164, boldface added; note the term "master" deleted in the Golffing translation; note] Here we have an unmistakable racism: **the good, noble, and blond Aryans, contrasted with the dark and primitive indigenes of Europe. While Nietzsche's thought is often defended as unrelated to the racism of the Nazis, there does not seem to be much difference from the evidence of this passage.** One difference might be Nietzsche's characterization of the "commune" as "the most primitive of all social forms." Nazi ideology was totalitarian and "social," denigrating individualism. Nietzsche would not have gone for this -- and the small, dark Hitler is certainly no Aryan -- but then many defenders of Nietzsche these days also tend to prefer a communitarian democracy, which means they might have more in common with the Nazis, despite their usual anti-racism, than Nietzsche himself. This is characteristic of the confusion of contemporary politics, let alone Nietzsche apologetics. The passage above, at least, provides as much aid and comfort for the Nazis as for any other interpretation or appropriation of Nietzsche. **Nietzsche's racism might be excused as typical of its age, and criticism of it anachronistic. However, the racism of Thomas Jefferson, a century earlier, involved an explicit denial that physical or intellectual differences between the races (about which Jefferson expressed no certainty) compromised the rights of the inferior races. To Nietzsche, however, the "subject races" have no "rights"; and domination, not to mention all the forms of "oppression" exorciated by the trendy Left, are positive and desirable goods. This anxiety or distemper may be due to a variety of causes. It may result from a crossing of races too dissimilar (or of classes too dissimilar. Class distinctions are always indicative of genetic and racial differences: the European Weltschmerz and the pessimism of the nineteenth century were both essentially the results of an abrupt and senseless mixing of classes)... [p.267, boldface added, note] In the litany of political sins identified by the Left, "racism, classism, and homophobia" are the holy trinity -- with "classism," of course, as a codeword for the hated capitalism. Here we see that for Nietzsche racism and "classism" are identical: the "subject races" form the subject classes. This is good and noble.** We also get another aspect of the matter, the "mixing" of races and classes is "senseless" and productive of the pessimism and social problems of modern society. In these terms, Nietzsche can only have approved of the Nazis laws against marriage or even sex between Aryans and Untermenschen. The lack of rights for the dark underclasses brings us to the principal theme of The Genealogy of Morals: **The morality of "good and evil" has been invented out of hatred and resentment by the defeated and subjugated races, especially the Jews. People who love Nietzsche for his celebration of creativity and his dismissal of the moralism of traditional religion, mainly meaning Christianity, usually seem to think of going "beyond good and evil" as merely legitimizing homosexuality, drugs, abortion, prostitution, pornography, and the other desiderata of progressive thinking. They don't seem to understand that Nietzsche wasn't particularly interested in things like that, but, more to the point, legitimizing rape, murder, torture, pillage, domination, and political oppression by the strong. The only honest Nietzschean graduate student I ever met frankly stated, "To be creative, you must be evil."** We get something similar in the recent Sandra Bullock movie, Murder by Numbers [2002], where the young Nietzschean student simply says, "Freedom is crime." The story of the movie is more or less that of Leopold and Loeb, the **Chicago teenagers who in 1924 murdered a young boy (Bobby Franks) to prove that they were "beyond good and evil."** Leopold and Loeb understood their Nietzsche far better than most of his academic apologists.

## Impact Turn – Violence

**Pushing for a politics that allows political stability, avoids agonism and policy making can avoid the political instability and violence that is inherent within a Nietzschean alternative**

**Bourke 8** (James, Graduate Student Department of Political Science Duke University, "Nietzsche\Connolly: Problems of a Nietzschean Democracy," [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/2/6/5/7/7/pages265777/p265777-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/5/7/7/pages265777/p265777-1.php), AD: 7/8/09) jl

A second way of critiquing Connolly's Nietzschean project does not simply frame the problem as a set of hermeneutic abuses, but rather targets Connolly's borrowings from Nietzsche as the sources of unresolved tensions and practical obstacles. Of course, Connolly might retort that he likes unresolved tensions, and that he sees them as generative of the political possibilities of democratic life. However, I am not focusing on the torsional relationships between being and becoming and other dualities that Connolly endorses. My claim is instead that Connolly's use of Nietzsche introduces threats not only to the practicability of his ethico-political program but to the stability of liberal democracy itself. To make this claim, I must answer the question "what problems is Nietzsche brought in to solve, and what are the contours of these solutions?" As we will see, Connolly's debts to Nietzsche are layered. At the first layer lies what I will characterize as the fundamental political problem for Connolly: the problem of identity\difference and the otherizations and marginalizations that accompany it. At this first and fundamental level, Nietzsche is one of Connolly's many sources for understanding the dynamics of identity\difference. A second layer consists in Connolly's solution, or rather his strategy of mitigation, to the problem of identity\difference, a politics of democratic agonism. This strategy is inspired by Nietzsche and closely resembles his valorization of struggle. However, the solution of agonism poses a problem of violence and instability that Connolly needs to contain if his politics can be pursued without endangering liberal democracy, which it presupposes as a background condition. So Connolly's agonistic strategy for mitigating the pressures of identity\difference introduces a second problem, one of violence, that needs to be addressed. Connolly attempts to address this problem with another Nietzschean borrowing, and it is at this third level that Connolly's debts to Nietzsche are perhaps at their deepest. Here Connolly has a threefold strategy of dampening tendencies to violence and instability inherent in a politics of contestation. First, he directs Nietzschean themes such as an ethics of adversarial respect towards what he calls "agonistic respect." Second, he develops a Nietzschean nontheistic reverence or gratitude for the abundance of being which is meant to bolster ethical relationships to others. Finally, and most recently, he reinvents the Nietzschean ideal of nobility into an ethic of cultivation such that we develop more generous dispositions toward others.

I will argue below that these various Nietzschean moves put Connolly in something of a bind. I take issue primarily with his last, and deepest, Nietzschean debt, his attempts to resolve the problem of agonistic instability through Nietzschean ethical attitudes. These attitudes, it seems to me, are inadequate to the task of securing a stable liberal democratic polity. I do not oppose to them a "teleotranscendental" ethics, some source of respect that goes deeper than what Connolly admits is a thoroughly contestable doctrine. I am not arguing that the insufficiencies of Connolly's Nietzschean ethics throw us back upon a necessary, universal, and/or transcendent ground for political morality. Indeed, I am sympathetic to parts of Connolly's critiques of such perspectives. However, I think that his reliance on Nietzsche does not serve as a convincing solution to the problems his Nietzschean agonism introduces. It seems to me there are two ways out for someone committed to broadening the scope and deepening the contours of democracy. Either one can abandon the Nietzschean ethical solutions while keeping the agonism and look for other, more robust ways around the problems of violence and instability this agonism threatens. Or one can dampen the emphasis on agonism itself as a political strategy, pushing instead for a politics that, while not devoid of struggle and contestation, does not valorize it in a Nietzschean manner but views it instead as a feature of politics that can lead to good outcomes only when first constrained within the limits of a viable public morality. The two solutions can be woven together, and in conclusion I will briefly suggest a combination of them as a more viable vision for liberal democracy.

## Impact Turn – Rape

**The alternative makes rape not only OK but also desirable**

**Ross 8** (Kelly L., PhD, Department of Philosophy, Los Angeles Valley College. Friesian.com, “Friedrich Nietzsche”, last updated in 2008. <http://www.friesian.com/NIETZSCH.HTM> AD 7/9/09) JM

But, one might think, **violence and oppression are unjust!** How could any progressive person not see that exploitation and abuse are wrong! We have **Nietzsche's answer:** **No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is intrinsically "unjust," since life itself is violent,** rapacious, exploitative, and destructive and cannot be conceived otherwise. Even more disturbingly, we have to admit that from the biological [i.e. Darwinian] point of view legal conditions are necessarily exceptional conditions, since they limit the radical life-will bent on power and must finally subserve, as means, life's collective purpose, which is to create greater power constellations. To accept any legal system as sovereign and universal -- to accept it, not merely as an instrument in the struggle of power complexes, but as a weapon against struggle (in the sense of Dühring's communist cliché that every will must regard every other will as its equal) -- is an anti-vital principle which can only bring about man's utter demoralization and, indirectly, a reign of nothingness. [p.208, boldface added] **Nietzsche is certainly life affirming, but then violence, rape, exploitation, and destruction are intrinsic to his view of life.** Attempts to protect the weak, see that justice is done, and mitigate suffering are "anti-vital" projects that, being adverse to life itself, actually tend towards "a reign of nothingness." Thus, **if we actually care about others and are not just interested in asserting power over them and using them for our own pleasure, then we can look forward to extinction.** The delicacy -- even more, the tartufferie -- of domestic animals like ourselves shrinks from imagining clearly to what extent cruelty constituted the collective delight of older mankind, how much it was an ingredient of all their joys, or how naïvely they manifested their cruelty, how they considered disinterested malevolence (Spinoza's sympathia malevolens) a normal trait, something to which one's conscience could assent heartily.... To behold suffering gives pleasure, but to cause another to suffer affords an even greater pleasure. [pp.197-198, boldface added] **A great part of the pleasure that we get, according to Nietzsche, from injustice to others is simply the pleasure of inflicting suffering. In this it is worth recollecting the feminist shibboleth that rape is not about sex, it is about power.** Nietzsche would heartily concur. So much the better! And what is more, **the value of rape is not just power, it is the chance to cruelly inflict suffering. The rapist who beats and mutilates, perhaps even kills, his victim, has done no evil, he is instead one of the heroes of true historic nobility.** And people think that the droit de seigneur represents some "abuse" of power! No! **It is the truly noble man as heroic rapist!** Nietzsche would turn around Susan Brownmiller, who said that all men are rapists. No, it is just the problem that they are not. **Nietzsche would regard most men as virtual castrati (domestic oxen, geldings) for not being rapists.**

## Alternative – No Solvency

Nietzsche implicitly says that even the most superior are still weak and true autonomy can't exist – the alternative can't ever be fully realized.

**Golomb 6** (Jacob, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 32, "Can One Really Become a "Free Spirit Par Excellence" or an Übermensch?" 2006. Project Muse, AD 7/8/09) JM

In HAH Nietzsche suggests that the highly developed spiritual and intellectual component of power may weaken even the most superior personality. Because they are genuinely free and independent, they are unlikely to adhere to any rigid and inflexible set of norms: the values they possess are open to examination and susceptible to being "overcome." They will, then, be more vulnerable to the surreptitious indoctrination and devious manipulations that the weak use against them. Their freedom from any given tradition induces a kind of vulnerability, though it allows them to oscillate perpetually among whatever possibilities they may encounter. Hence, in historical praxis, this dynamic may produce an impressionable personality, susceptible to manipulation and exploitation: "Compared with him who has tradition on his side and requires no reasons for his actions, the free spirit is always weak, especially in actions; for he is aware of too many motives and points of view and therefore possesses an uncertain and unpracticed hand. What means are there of nonetheless rendering him relatively strong? How does the strong spirit come into being?" (HAH I:230). [End Page 24] The problem may be recast as that of turning purely spiritual power into a concrete historical force: Is it possible to preserve the spirit of Hamlet in the body of Faust? Nietzsche's solution focuses on the social fabric woven with religious and moral dogmas that produces a psychological pattern of guilt, vengeance, and bad conscience. These are the weakest threads of culture, responsible for the corruption of spiritual power and cultural achievements. In emphasizing these elements, Nietzsche implicitly admits that there can be no absolute autonomy; even the most powerful are not impervious to the influence of the environment with which they interact. The revaluation of prevalent cultural norms is essential to the evolution of the psychology of the Übermensch, because even the arena of the "authentic legislator" is penetrated by environmental values and forces. Hence it becomes clear that the Übermensch type is essentially different from the free spirit par excellence. The latter, namely, the absolutely autonomous will to power, is, therefore, no more than a regulative idea—one that provides the model for approximation but which can in principle never be fully realized.

## Alternative – No Solvency

The Alt is paradoxical – once the individual reaches the ubermensch there is no where to go. You are either re-integrated into society or you fade.

**Golomb 6** (Jacob, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 32, "Can One Really Become a "Free Spirit Par Excellence" or an Übermensch?" 2006. Project Muse, AD 7/8/09) JM

According to Nietzsche, the cry for personal authenticity appeared at the "twilight of the idols" and is an explicit expression of revolt against the spirit of objectivity. Thus it is inconceivable to have a fully authentic individual living in society, which by nature is founded on a set of objective norms and common ethos. To clarify this point I will draw an analogy from the domain of psychoanalysis. If neurosis is, as Freud claims, a natural outcome of the repressive society, which is founded on such repression, can we imagine a society where there are no neurotic people? This question remains valid even for a society in which all neurotic individuals have successfully undergone psychoanalytic treatment. But once they try to live in that society under, more or less, the same conditions that caused their neuroses in the first place, won't they to some degree regress? The same consideration is relevant to the individual whose quest for authenticity or for optimal positive power, that is, in the form of the Übermensch, is supposedly finally fulfilled. Because such a person continues to be a member of society, the processes of social conditioning and the assault from within on one's "pure power" will continue to exert their antiauthenticating and weakening effects. Moreover, imagine a society where authenticity became a general norm: such a society either would be destroyed or would destroy that authenticity, which would be manifested precisely in those individuals who attempt to overcome its ethic and exhibit the spirit of revolt. Hence the struggles to attain personal authenticity and Übermensch status face what seems to be a paradoxical situation: these lofty ideals cannot be materialized without society, but neither can they be lived within its framework. Nietzsche's genealogy cannot provide us with the sought-after empirical evidence that authenticity or, invariably, the Übermensch were common among human beings in any given society. Hence he was well aware of the difficulty of trying to allow for the "ought" of the übermenschlich authenticity within the social "is." The fact is that he leaves this issue intentionally vague in the closing sentence of his book, where Zarathustra, who personifies the ideal of personal authenticity, leaves his "cave" in order to do—what? To return to society? It is far from being completely clear: "[T]hus spoke Zarathustra, and he left his cave, glowing and strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark mountains" [End Page 37] (Z 439). The metaphor of a "sun" implies that Zarathustra, not able to become part of the human social nexus, is like the sun, which, not being part of the earth, only warms it from above. Zarathustra can only inspire us to try and become authentic, to be freer than we are, to be mentally and intellectually more powerful than at the present. All those Nietzschean lofty ideals are solely regulative ideals rather than manifestly viable norms. As a consoling afterthought one may perhaps state that though the Übermensch is not viable in a human community, striving to approximate this ideal will help us in overcoming the mentality of the "herd," or the "slaves," but, of course, will not liberate us from society as such.



## Alternative – No Solvency

**Schotten 5** (C Heike, Assistant Prof of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, "Between Past and Future: The Politics of Nietzschean Affirmation," [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/0/8/5/6/9/pages85696/p85696-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/5/6/9/pages85696/p85696-1.php). AD: 7/8/09) jl

Nietzsche's texts, like his life, are of an inherently dual nature. He emphasizes this in *Ecce Homo*, acknowledging his "dual descent" as "at the same time a decadent and a beginning," 1 both a decadent and "the opposite of a decadent," 2 with access to a "dual series of experiences," positioned with "one foot beyond life." 3 As **even Nietzsche recognized**, then, **his being both a member of modernity and yet able to see beyond it**, positioned with one foot in this world and another foot beyond it, **renders him able to experience decadence and yet unable to recover from it**. This is the case in his own dual description of himself: his health—his "one foot beyond" life—is also his sickness, for the "beyond," as Nietzsche so often reminds us, is synonymous with death. Nietzsche's health (his untimeliness, his "beyond" modernity) is thus co-implicated with sickness, and his sickness—his living membership in modernity—is simultaneously his health. In this paper, I focus in particular on the unhealthy or decadent aspect of Nietzsche's dual philosophy, arguing that **because Nietzsche found modern decadence too horrifying to own and affirm, he was unable to be healthy himself. He could not value or affirm the very age which gave him life—he could not**, as I will later term it, **delight in decay**. In particular, I will show that **Nietzsche's inability to delight in decay renders him incapable of coping with modernity except through an illegitimate longing for redemption, which he himself argues against**. 4 Finally, I will argue that Nietzsche's infrequent recommendations of laughter and love offer a more productive avenue for achieving the kind of reconciliation with modernity and (self-)affirmation Nietzsche valorizes, albeit not via the means he seems explicitly to endorse.

## Alternative – No Solvency

**The will to power inevitably runs back into slave morality - both are attempts to make up for a lack in the self, the only truly ethical action is to view oneself as distinct from the world and view the self as interconnected to all other beings**

**Loy 96** (David, professor of Philosophy. Asian Philosophy, Vol 6, No 1, "Beyond good and evil? A Buddhist critique of Nietzsche" March 1996. <http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ADM/loy.htm> AD 7/8/09) JM

**All power is in essence power to deny mortality. Either that or it is not real power at all**, not ultimate power, not the power that mankind is really obsessed with. **Power means power to increase oneself, to change one's natural situation from one of smallness, helplessness, finitude, to one of bigness, control, durability, importance.** (Becker) [15] We feel we are masters over life and death when we hold the fate of others in our hands, adds Becker; and we feel we are real when the reality of others is in our hands, adds Buddhism. From that perspective, however, **desire for power is little different from the slave morality** Nietzsche criticises. **Both become symptoms of our lack, equally frustrating inasmuch as we are motivated by something that cannot be satisfied in the way we try to satisfy it.** No wonder Nietzsche's will-to-power can never rest, that it needs to expand its horizons, and that for most of us morality has been a matter of collecting religious brownie points. In both cases we think that we have found the way to get a grip on our eligibility for immortality -- or being. The whole basis of the urge to goodness is to be something that has value, that endures... **Man uses morality to try to get a place of special belongingness and perpetuation in the universe**... Do we wonder why one of man's chief characteristics is his tortured dissatisfaction with himself, his constant self-criticism? It is the only way he has to overcome the sense of hopeless limitation inherent in his real situation. (Becker) [16] **When I realise that I am not going to attain clouture on that diabolical part of myself, it is time to project it.** "The Devil is the one who prevents the heroic victory of immortality in each culture -- even the atheistic, scientific ones." [17] As long as lack keeps gnawing, we need to keep struggling with the Devil, and as we all know the best devil is one outside our own group. **Evil is whatever we decide is keeping us from becoming real, and since no victory over any external devil can yield the sense of being we seek, we have become trapped in a paradox of our own making: evil is created by our urge to eliminate evil.** Stalin's collectivisation programme was an attempt to build a more perfect socialist society. The Final Solution of the Nazis was an attempt to purify the Earth of its vermin. The Buddhist critique of such resentment includes understanding the self-deception involved in such dualistic thinking, when I identify with one pole and vainly try to eliminate its interdependent other. [18] Buddhism gets beyond good and evil not by rebaptising our evil qualities as our best, but with an entirely different perspective. As long as we experience ourselves as alienated from the world, and society as a set of separate selves, the world is devalued into a field-of-play wherein we compete to fulfill ourselves. That is the origin of the ethical problem we struggle with today: **without some transcendental ground such as God, what will bind our atomised selves together? When my sense-of-self lets-go and disappears, however, I realise my interdependence with all other phenomena.** It is more than being dependent on them: when I discover that I am you, the trace of your traces, the ethical problem of how to relate to you is transformed. [19] Of course, **this provides no simple yardstick to resolve knotty ethical dilemmas. Yet more important, I think, is that this absolves the sense of separation between us which usually makes those dilemmas so difficult to resolve, including the conceit that I am the one who has privileged access to transcendental principles, or who embodies more fully the will-to-power.** Loss of self-preoccupation entails the ability to respond to others without an ulterior motive which needs to gain something from that encounter. Buddhist ethical principles approximate the way of relating to others that nondual experience reveals. As in Christianity, I should love my neighbour as myself -- in this case because my neighbour is myself. In contrast to the "Thou shalt not -- or else!" implied in Mosaic law, the Buddhist precepts are vows one makes not to some other being but to one's-to-be-realised-as-empty self: "I vow to undertake the course of training to perfect myself in non-killing," and so forth. **If we have not developed to the degree that we spontaneously experience ourselves as one with others, by following the precepts we endeavour to act as if we did feel that way. Yet even these precepts are eventually realised not to rest on any transcendental, objectively-binding moral principle. There are, finally, no moral limitations on our freedom -- except the dualistic delusions which incline us to abuse that freedom in the first place.**

## Alternative – No Solvency – ER

**Embracing eternal recurrence is inherently cyclical – the alternative can only result in re-territorialization and fail at producing change.**

**Conway 98** (Daniel W., Professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University. He is author of “Nietzsche and the Political” and “Nietzsche's Dangerous Game”. Symploke 6.1, “Tumbling Dice”, 1998. Project Muse AD 7/8/09)  
JM

In his familiar deterritorializing aspect, **Nietzsche is an astute physician of culture, an experimenter who exposes and de-mystifies the constraints required, and imposed, by civilization.** As a "master of suspicion," he potentially liberates desire from the self-prescribed repression called for by advanced industrial capitalism in late modernity. This is the Nietzsche whom Deleuze originally fetishized, the rhizomaniacal inventor of the "Heraclitean fire machine." In his less familiar reterritorializing aspect, however, **Nietzsche is a resentful, lying priest, who contributes to the besetting schizophrenia of late modernity.** He presents the decadence of late modernity as a novel field of agency, albeit one which he himself has already delimited and policed. Aspiring disciples of Dionysus complete their rites of initiation under Nietzsche's conduct, only to find themselves enmeshed in the familiar "mysteries" of yet another Oedipal cult. Having whetted his readers' desire with the deterritorializing promise of unrepressed cathexis upon its natural and proper object, the priestly **Nietzsche decrees decadence to be an originary lack or loss, for which desiring machines can never fully compensate. His children are "free" to explore the undiscovered country of decadence, but their desire can express itself only in Oedipal operations of self-repression and self-denial.** They may gain an epiphanic insight into the shipwreck of their age, but this cognitive triumph does not translate into the volitional recuperation he originally promised. He thus permits his children to preview the end of history, but this end promises only further repression and, finally, auto-destruction. While it is perhaps true that humankind would sooner desire nothingness than not desire, Nietzsche **provides no hope that anything other than self-annihilation is available as an object of desire.** [End Page 14] While it may be true that Nietzsche's nomadic adventures confounded all despotic attempts to codify the law, **it is simply not the case that he, or anyone else, could sustain indefinitely the rhizomatic activities for which he is celebrated.** While his "nomadic war machine" succeeded in deterritorializing the despotic codifications of philosophy, thereby creating the conditions for the possibility of investigating difference, it also contributed eventually to the inevitable reterritorialization of philosophy, through the despotic codification of new oppositional categories. **Nietzsche's labyrinth, so inviting initially as an extra-dialectical retreat from the orthodoxy of binary opposition, eventually reveals itself as a gilded cage, wherein self-styled nomads satisfy their twisted desire to wave the despot's scepter. In order to put Nietzsche to work, one must not only embrace his familiar deterritorializing movement** which corresponds to the affirmation of chance; **one must also embrace his inevitable reterritorialization, which corresponds to the affirmation of necessity.**<sup>1</sup> For all of his rhizomatic calisthenics, his dice too must return to earth, and the fatal combination they eventually deliver will necessarily betray the promise of his nomadic war machine. **In order to affirm Nietzsche, one must forcibly inscribe his practice of critique into the context of his critique of modernity, thereby divesting him of any** extra-machinic (either romantically human or fatuously divine) **privilege. He must be reduced—as he reduces all others—to a collection of signs, which may be decoded unsentimentally and incorporated within the framework of one's own evolving difference engine.**

## Alternative – No Solvency – ER

**Nietzsche's eternal recurrence strategy fails – his nomadic war machine fails to engage the production of difference.**

**Conway 98** (Daniel W., Professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University. He is author of "Nietzsche and the Political" and "Nietzsche's Dangerous Game". Symploke 6.1, "Tumbling Dice", 1998. Project Muse AD 7/8/09)  
JM

How is it possible, however, that Nietzsche's celebrated nomadism might be or become productive? Why is the nomad not merely an aimless outsider, wandering and wasteful? How could the mobilization of nomadic forces possibly contribute to the production of difference? Notwithstanding Deleuze's enthusiasm, Nietzsche's nomadic war machine does not deliver him to victory over the dialectic. On the contrary, Nietzsche's nomadism ultimately betrays its original promise, culminating in a colonization and settlement of its own unique design. His "Heraclitean fire machine" is ultimately productive not of difference, but of yet another iteration of binary opposition. The problem here is that Nietzsche's faux nomads continue to roam Nature, as wandering heroes tragically displaced from their ownmost homes. Indeed, his nomadic war machine is haunted by the ghost of romanticism: these nomads may revel in their rhizomatic distribution across a particular region, but their ultimate aim is to return home, to the originary womb of Nature. Owing to this residual naturalism, Nietzsche fails to mount a differential critique of the dialectic, one that might foster revolution or change; he aspires only to a nomadism in thought (or perhaps in script), but not in deed. Nietzsche's experiments with nomadism are compromised in the end by his (involuntary) foundational commitment to negativity—lack, loss, sin or deficiency—as the originary metaphysical condition of human experience. Although Nietzsche understands this preoccupation with negativity as a prejudice fundamental to the crisis of European nihilism, shrewdly exposing it in its various neo-Hegelian incarnations, his experiments with originary sufficiency all eventually founder. In promulgating his dubious teaching of the Übermensch, for example, he cannot help but present this figure of originary sufficiency within the irrefrangible frame of negativity, as a "cure" his readers both lack and need in order to become whole (Nietzsche 1982, 124-137). Even Dionysus [End Page 12] himself, the enduring symbol for the unquenchable sufficiency of Life, the diceplayer par excellence, eventually becomes conscripted as an agent of negativity. Nietzsche's failure to escape the snares of originary deficiency is illuminated most clearly in his repeated miscarriage of the teaching of eternal recurrence. Although Deleuze recommends eternal recurrence as a promising engine of repetition, Nietzsche's best renditions of this teaching clearly fail to engage the production of difference. As Heidegger has argued in his own parlance, Nietzsche remains mired in the metaphysical tradition, attempting with his teaching of eternal recurrence to "eternalize the moment" within a single, heroic act of will. Heidegger thus detects in Nietzsche's teaching of eternal recurrence a residual subjectivism, which tinctures his subsequent experiments with difference and repetition (Heidegger 1977, 95-105). Despite his efforts to illuminate the difference that metaphysical thinking necessarily occludes, he ultimately conflates the eternal recurrence of the same with the eternal recurrence of identity. While his teaching of eternal recurrence does in fact clear a conceptual space for the investigation of difference, he promptly fills this space with identity, confounding the traditional codes of philosophy only to replace them with binary oppositions of his own design.

## Alternative – Turn – Otherness

### **Turn – The Ks reliance on identity creation creates a moral framework founded on otherness that makes resentment of the other inevitable**

**Bourke 8** (James, Graduate Student Department of Political Science Duke University, "Nietzsche\Connolly: Problems of a Nietzschean Democracy," [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/2/6/5/7/7/pages265777/p265777-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/5/7/7/pages265777/p265777-1.php), AD: 7/8/09) jl

Before examining the strategies of democratic agonism that Connolly recommends in order to mitigate and dampen the cruelties of identity, we should consider what Nietzschean elements come into the basic problem of identity\difference. Part of the Nietzschean debt here concerns Nietzsche's insights into the logic of resentment. In the first essay of the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche describes the ways in which master and slave morality are both constituted with respect to an other or opposite. The master affirms himself and in order to do so identifies in those opposite qualities of the slave an other labeled "bad." But, and more importantly for Connolly's reading of identity, the slave goes a step further. Here, the identification is first a demonization of the other, the conversion of that which the master calls "good" into the category of "evil." Resentment of the other here makes the first move in forming the identity of the self, which only after pinpointing the qualities of evil goes on to affirm their opposites. Though Connolly would probably insist that this slave-like logic is more the rule than the exception, his debt to Nietzsche on this matter is clear. Another use of Nietzsche appears in Connolly's generalization of the dynamics of resentment to the very conditions that promote identity\difference dynamics in the first place. Here it is not a question of how identity and otherness are played out, but rather a question of why we seek refuge in identity formations in the first place. To answer this question, Connolly introduces the theme of "existential resentment," a Nietzschean idea that tracks more closely the development of the idea of revenge and resentment in Thus Spoke Zarathustra as opposed to the Genealogy. Connolly borrows here from Nietzsche's diagnosis of the deepest sources of resentment in the desire for revenge against the dead hand of the past and its "it was." What Nietzsche sees as a general resentment at our inability to turn back the wheel of time, Connolly expands into the idea that every resistance of the world to our attempts to master it generates resentment. Connolly locates existential resentment primarily in the drive to find some locus of responsibility for the sufferings we endure. Existential resentment is resentment toward the recalcitrance of the world to our attempts to explain and master it. As Connolly elaborates, People tend to demand ... a world in which suffering is ultimately grounded in proportional responsibility. We resent a world in which it appears that this is not so. But resentment must locate an appropriate object if it is to be discharged as resentment. It thereby seeks a responsible agent that it can convince itself is otherwise worthy of receiving the load of incipient resentment it carries. ... So, part of the drive to insistent attributions of responsibility flows from existential resentment. 6 As one might imagine, the drive to pin responsibility on an agent is itself a part of the logic of identity\difference. But more fundamentally, existential resentment illustrates the features of the human condition that give rise to identity formations in the first place. For the resistance of the world to our attempts to master it is part of Connolly's Nietzschean understanding of action and will to power. According to Connolly's Nietzsche, "to do is to forgo," and the will to power is fundamentally "the will to give form to something." 7 In combination, these two ideas suggest a weak ontology in which giving form and actualizing possibilities always leaves a remainder that resists the original effort. In such a world, identity formation suggests itself as a potential way to discharge the resentment that such recalcitrance engenders.

## Alternative – Turn – Democracy

**Policy making can be utilized with the alternative – It's key to generating confrontation and struggle**

**Bourke 8** (James, Graduate Student Department of Political Science Duke University, "Nietzsche\Connolly: Problems of a Nietzschean Democracy," [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/2/6/5/7/7/pages265777/p265777-1.php](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/5/7/7/pages265777/p265777-1.php), AD: 7/8/09) jl

We have seen the ways in which the logic of identity\difference stands at the core of Connolly's thought as well as the ways in which Connolly defines this logic using Nietzsche's ideas. The second layer of Nietzschean indebtedness I identified above concerns Connolly's preferred strategy for mitigating the pressures of identity that lead to the cruelties labeled as the second problem of evil. **This strategy is one of agonistic contestation among identity groups.** Connolly clearly defines agonism as a strategy of mitigating the second problem of evil. **"Is there, then, a practice of democracy ... that responds to the problematic relationship between identity and difference? I suspect there is ...** Let me call this political imaginary **'agonistic democracy,' a practice that affirms the indispensability of identity to life, disturbs the dogmatization of identity, and folds care for the protean diversity of human life into the strife of identity\difference.**" 8 **Agonism consists in the active struggle between identity groups over the conditions of identity\difference.** The terms of agonistic confrontation are set by the claims identity groups make to otherize the groups against which they struggle and the counterarguments deployed in the effort to resist these moves. Connolly focuses his theoretical energy on the kinds of arguments and contestations likely to upset or disturb the hegemonic positions of dominant identity groups. Agonism is primarily developed in his thought as a strategy for the marginalized to be used in defusing the power of already entrenched groups. Several Nietzschean debts and strategies are evident in Connolly's privileging of agonistic contests. On the most basic level, **democratic agonism reflects Nietzsche's valorization of struggle as the means to achieving greatness. Without accepting a crude, brutalist interpretation of will to power, we can identify in Nietzsche a strong theme of the celebration of confrontation, struggle, and war.** There are several dimensions to this theme. First of all, **Nietzsche sees in struggle a fundamental drive of life itself. Life is will to power for Nietzsche, and though this power may be spiritual and non-violent, it must be admitted that domination and hierarchy form a part of the Nietzschean thematic here.** Connolly does not accept an interpretation of Nietzsche as the philosopher of world mastery, as he makes clear in the following passage: Let me say something, though, about ... **the reading of Nietzsche as the consummate philosopher of world mastery.** While **such a reading** is possible, it is **not the single or necessary reading to be drawn from a thinker as protean as Nietzsche.** It tends to be given by those who endorse strong transcendental or teleological perspectives. They presume that any ethic of care and self-limitation must flow from a teleotranscendental perspective, and that since Nietzsche noisily repudiates such a perspective, the coiner of the phrase "will to power" must endorse a ruthless philosophy in which a few exercise mastery over other humans and nature. 9 However, Connolly smuggles in certain Nietzschean attitudes toward the value of struggle. This is evident in his selection of a passage from "Homer's Contest" for the epigraph of Identity\Difference. "And not only Aristotle but the whole of Greek antiquity thinks differently from us about hatred and envy, and judges with Hesiod; who in one place calls one discord evil—namely the one that leads men into hostile fights of annihilation against one another—while praising another discord as good—the one that, as jealousy, hatred and envy, spurs men to activity; not to the activity of fights of annihilation but to the activity of fights which are contests." 10 **Confrontation and struggle are not merely, for Connolly, features of life and politics; rather, they are generative sources of potentiality.**

## Alternative – Extinction Outweighs

Nietzsche admits that society is necessary for the ubermensch to appear – preventing our impacts is a precursor to the alternative's solvency.

**Golomb 6** (Jacob, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 32, "Can One Really Become a "Free Spirit Par Excellence" or an Übermensch?" 2006. Project Muse, AD 7/8/09) JM

**Nietzsche's affirmation of society as the necessary condition for the materialization of positive power attenuates the radical stance of his extreme individualism.** And because Nietzsche affirms "a community" (e.g., GM II:9) and does not seek to destroy it, he had to explain how the übermenschlich patterns of behavior or the morality of positive power are possible within the social context. He analyzes the nature of the interaction among members of society and maintains that genuine justice is possible only within a social fabric composed of equally powerful members: "Justice . . . is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, to reach an 'understanding' by means of a settlement—and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves" (GM II:8). **Nietzsche argues that the powerful individual is characterized by egoism.** Avoidance of any altruistic activity and ideology would seemingly contradict any possible moral system. **This emphasis on the egoism of genuine power, however, does not prevent Nietzsche from continuing to describe the moral and social network of powerful individuals who would willingly and freely enter the restrictive social fabric:** The noble soul accepts this fact of its egoism without any question mark. . . . [U]nder certain circumstances there are some who have rights equal to its own. . . . [I]t moves among these equals with their equal privileges, showing the same sureness of modesty and delicate reverence that characterize its relation with itself. . . . [E]very star is such an egoist. . . . [I]t honors itself in them and in the rights it cedes to them; it does not doubt that **the exchange of honors and rights is of the nature of all social relations and thus also belongs to the natural condition of things.** (BGE 265) Nietzsche declares here that recognition of the value and freedom of others originates in egoism. Only an individual possessing an abundance of positive [End Page 27]power and a firm selfhood is able to grant similar rights and freedoms to all those who are recognized as equals. This individual is not afraid that this might diminish or destroy her or his own power. It is a self-affirmation and a confidence in one's power and virtues that enable the affirmation of "others" and their uniqueness. For Nietzsche, human egoism and the emphasis on selfhood do not contradict the social and moral order; they actually create the ideal conditions for its proper functioning. Yet Nietzsche is not occupied solely with characterizing the ideal features of the übermenschlich society. He also seeks to show that **the morality of positive power has already existed in one form or another in history**, so that it is empirically feasible and does not stand in any a priori contradiction to society. Thus he speaks about "the essential characteristic of a good and healthy aristocracy," urging us to "look for once at an aristocratic commonwealth . . . an ancient Greek polis, or Venice," which in his view are typical social and political examples "of the morality of the powerful" (BGE 258, 262, 260). In this context he also refers several times to the historical patterns of Rome and the Renaissance. At this point a question arises: **Why do the powerful need a society at all?** Isn't it the case that the need of others indicates feebleness and insufficiency? In answer, one may point out that **the powerful person is not identical with an omnipotent and absolutely perfect God, capable of functioning fully and freely apart from his creation.** There is no upper limit to power, and there is no optimum for absolute autarchy and self-sufficiency. Moreover, **cultural enterprises require the association and collaboration of various creative powers, each contributing its distinct capacities to the common enterprise. The close cooperation and interaction of the different distinct powers are required.** To make the social manifestation of power possible, any creation, even the most individual, needs the social fabric and the mutual exchange of ideas and concepts. There is no power without creation and giving form, and **there is no creation without society. Hence there is no power without society, and its essential manifestations are impossible if there is a complete severance from the social context.** Furthermore, because absolute power never actually "exists," and because there is no creation ex nihilo, persons possessing positive powers, namely, "we free spirits" (and this includes, by extrapolation, the Übermenschen), need each other and need society and culture as the vital working framework within which they create. **Society itself obviously also requires moral patterns that organize and consolidate it. Nietzsche, then, is not a negating "nihilist" who wishes to overthrow society and go beyond its limits.** The "Antichrist" within him does not turn him into an anarchist; nor does it make him immoral—quite the reverse. This is especially related to his anthropological concept of Macht.

## Alternative – Extinction Outweighs

**Success of the alternative can only happen in a world where we're still alive – extinction claims precede the alternative.**

**Connolly 91** (William E., professor and chair of the Department of political science at The Johns Hopkins University. "Identity/Difference" 1991. [http://books.google.com/books?id=1F2j604\\_ByEC&pg=PA186&lpg=PA186&dq=%22The+idea+is+to+stop+worrying+about+the+preservation+of+man,+to+strive+to+create+a+few+overmen.+%22&source=bl&ots=27Nmce-2zO&sig=chlgEPm4P\\_xS0LeyROp4wq5p3qw&hl=en&ei=0lhWSoXzOJ7cswOHm8HBBg&sa=X&oi=book\\_result&ct=result&resnum=1](http://books.google.com/books?id=1F2j604_ByEC&pg=PA186&lpg=PA186&dq=%22The+idea+is+to+stop+worrying+about+the+preservation+of+man,+to+strive+to+create+a+few+overmen.+%22&source=bl&ots=27Nmce-2zO&sig=chlgEPm4P_xS0LeyROp4wq5p3qw&hl=en&ei=0lhWSoXzOJ7cswOHm8HBBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1) AD 7/9/09) JM

Zarathustra says: "The most concerned ask today, 'How is man to be preserved?' But Zarathustra is the first and only one to ask: 'How is man to be overcome?'"<sup>16</sup> **The idea is to stop worrying about the preservation of man, to strive to create a few overmen. Leave to their own devices those who insist upon being consumed by resentment, so that a few can cultivate another type of humanity.** The new type to be cultivated consists of a few free spirits who fend off the resentment against the human condition that wells up in everyone, a few who rise above the insistence that there be symmetry between evil and responsibility, who live above the demand that some guilty agent worthy of punishment be located every time they themselves suffer, who recognize that existential suffering is a precondition of wisdom. But this typological differentiation between man and overman no longer makes much sense, if it ever did. For the overman—constituted as an independent, detached type—refers simultaneously to a spiritual disposition and to the residence of free spirits in a social space relatively insulated from reactive politics. **The problem is that the disappearance of the relevant social preconditions confounds any division of humanity into two spiritual types. If there is anything in the type to be admired, the ideal must be dismantled as a distinct caste of solitary individuals and folded into the political fabric of late-modern society.** The "overman" now falls apart as a set of distinctive dispositions concentrated in a particular caste or type, and its spiritual qualities migrate to a set of dispositions that may compete for presence in any self. The type now becomes (as it already was to a significant degree) a voice in the self contending with other voices, including those of resentment. This model is implicitly suggested by Foucault when he eschews the term "overman" (as well as "will to power") and shifts the center of gravity of Nietzschean discourse from heroes and classical tragic figures to everyday misfits such as AlexiAlexina and Pierre Riviere. These textual moves are, I think, part of a strategy to fold Nietzschean agonism into the fabric of ordinary life by attending to the extraordinary character of the latter. I seek to pursue this same trail. **The Nietzschean conception of a few who overcome resentment above politics while the rest remain stuck in the muck of resentment in politics is not today viable on its own terms. Today circumstances require that many give the sign of the overman a presence in themselves and in the ethicopolitical orientations they project onto the life of the whole.** But this break with the spirit of Nietzsche requires further elucidation. **The shift results partly from the late-modern possibility of self-extinction.** In this new world the failure to "preserve man" could also extinguish the human basis for the struggle Nietzsche named "overman." **Preservation and overcoming are now drawn closer together so that each becomes a term in the other:** the latter cannot succeed unless it touches the former. But the entanglement of each with the other in sociopolitical relations means, when the logic of this entanglement is worked out, that the "overman" as a type cannot eliminate from its life some of the modalities definitive of the "human." If the overman was ever projected as a distinct type—and this is not certain—it now becomes refigured into a struggle within the self between the inclination to existential resentment and an affirmation of life that rises above this tendency.