

# **collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component**



Version: 1.0  
2020-09-10

**National Information Assurance Partnership**

## Revision History

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| Version | Date       | Comment                          |
|---------|------------|----------------------------------|
| 1.0     | 2020-09-10 | First published release version. |
| 1.0x    | 2021-04-06 | Start of first XML version.      |

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## 1 PP introduction

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### 1.1 PP Reference Identification

PP Reference: collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component

PP Version: 1.0

PP Date: September 10, 2020

### 1.2 Overview

The scope of this Protection Profile (PP) is to describe the security functionality of QQQQ products in terms of [\[CC\]](#) and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products.

### 1.3 Terms

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The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

#### 1.3.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance      Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [\[CC\]](#).

Base  
Protection  
Profile (Base-  
PP)      Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.

Common      Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Criteria (CC)                                       | ISO/IEC 15408).  |
| Common Criteria Testing Laboratory                  | Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility, accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations. |
| Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)                 | Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.  |
| Distributed TOE                                     | A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.  |
| Operational Environment (OE)                        | Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.  |
| Protection Profile (PP)                             | An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.   |
| Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration) | A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.  |
| Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)               | An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base Protection Profiles.  |
| Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)                | A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.   |
| Security Functional Requirement (SFR)               | A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.   |
| Security Target (ST)                                | A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.  |
| TOE Security Functionality (TSF)                    | The security functionality of the product under evaluation.  |
| TOE Summary Specification (TSS)                     | A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.  |
| Target of Evaluation (TOE)                          | The product under evaluation.  |


### 1.3.2 Technical Terms

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) | An anti-exploitation feature which loads memory mappings into unpredictable locations. ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to redirect control to code that they have introduced into the address space of a process.   |
| Administrator                             | An administrator is responsible for management activities, including setting policies that are applied by the enterprise on the operating system. This administrator could be acting remotely through a management server, from which the system receives configuration policies. An administrator can enforce settings on the system which cannot be overridden by non-administrator users. |
| Application (app)                         | Software that runs on a platform and performs tasks on behalf of the user or owner of the platform, as well as its supporting documentation.   |
| Application Programming Interface (API)   | A specification of routines, data structures, object classes, and variables that allows an application to make use of services provided by another software component, such as a library. APIs are often provided for a set of libraries included with the platform.   |
| Credential                                | Data that establishes the identity of a user, e.g. a cryptographic key or password.  |
| Critical Security Parameters (CSP)        | Information that is either user or system defined and is used to operate a cryptographic module in processing encryption functions including cryptographic keys and authentication data, such as passwords, the disclosure or modification of which can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module.                        |
| DAR Protection                            | Countermeasures that prevent attackers, even those with physical access, from extracting data from non-volatile storage. Common techniques include data encryption and wiping.   |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Data Execution Prevention (DEP)           | An anti-exploitation feature of modern operating systems executing on modern computer hardware, which enforces a non-execute permission on pages of memory. DEP prevents pages of memory from containing both data and instructions, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to introduce and execute code.  |
| Developer                                 | An entity that writes OS software. For the purposes of this document, vendors and developers are the same.   |
| General Purpose Operating System          | A class of OSes designed to support a wide-variety of workloads consisting of many concurrent applications or services. Typical characteristics for OSes in this class include support for third-party applications, support for multiple users, and security separation between users and their respective resources. General Purpose Operating Systems also lack the real-time constraint that defines Real Time Operating Systems (RTOS). RTOSes typically power routers, switches, and embedded devices. |
| Host-based Firewall                       | A software-based firewall implementation running on the OS for filtering inbound and outbound network traffic to and from processes running on the OS.   |
| Operating System (OS)                     | Software that manages physical and logical resources and provides services for applications. The terms <i>TOE</i> and <i>OS</i> are interchangeable in this document.  |
| Personally Identifiable Information (PII) | Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information which is linked or linkable to an individual. <a href="#">[OMB]</a>      |
| Sensitive Data                            | Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data such as PII, emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must minimally include credentials and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the OS's TSS by the ST author.   |
| User                                      | A user is subject to configuration policies applied to the operating system by administrators. On some systems under certain configurations, a normal user can temporarily elevate privileges to that of an administrator. At that time, such a user should be considered an administrator.  |
| Virtual Machine (VM)                      | Blah Blah Blah   |

## 1.4 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

### 1.4.1 TOE Boundary



Replace this image with a diagram of the Target of Evaluation.

**Figure 1: General TOE**

### 1.4.2 TOE Platform

## 1.5 Use Cases

Requirements in this Protection Profile are designed to address the security problems in at least the following use cases. These use cases are intentionally very broad, as many specific use cases exist for an operating system. These use cases may also overlap with one another. An operating system's functionality may even be effectively extended by privileged applications installed onto it. However, these are out of scope of this PP.

### [USE CASE 1] Elephant-own device

This is everything we need to describe in words about this use case.

For a the list of appropriate selections and acceptable assignment values for this configuration, see [E.1 Elephant-own device](#).

## 2 Conformance Claims

### Conformance Statement

An ST must claim exact conformance to this PP, as defined in the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017).

### CC Conformance Claims

This PP is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5.

### PP Claim

This PP does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

#### **Package Claim**

This PP is **Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 1.1** Conformant and **Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), version 1.0** Conformant .

### **3 Security Problem Description**

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The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the OS is expected to address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational security policies that the OS is expected to enforce.

#### **3.1 Threats**

##### **T.NETWORK\_ATTACK**

An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with applications and services running on or part of the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of altering existing legitimate communications.

##### **T.NETWORK\_EAVESDROP**

An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between applications and services that are running on or part of the OS.

##### **T.LOCAL\_ATTACK**

An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The compromised application may provide maliciously formatted input to the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged system calls and messaging via the file system.

##### **T.LIMITED\_PHYSICAL\_ACCESS**

An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a limited amount of time with the physical device.

#### **3.2 Assumptions**

##### **A.PLATFORM**

The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.

##### **A.PROPER\_USER**

The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy. At the same time, malicious software could act as the user, so requirements which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.

##### **A.PROPER\_ADMIN**

The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

### **4 Security Objectives**

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#### **4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE**

##### **O.ACCOUNTABILITY**

Conformant OSES ensure that information exists that allows administrators to discover unintentional issues with the configuration and operation of the operating system and discover its cause. Gathering event information and immediately transmitting it to another system can also enable incident response in the event of system compromise.

##### **O.INTEGRITY**

Conformant OSES ensure the integrity of their update packages. OSES are seldom if ever shipped without errors, and the ability to deploy patches and updates with integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Conformant OSES provide execution environment-based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of compromising systems.

##### **O.MANAGEMENT**

To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant OSES provide consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes the deployment of applications and application updates through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration and application execution control.

##### **O.PROTECTED\_STORAGE**

To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of credentials in the event of loss of physical control of the storage medium, conformant OSES provide data-at-rest protection for credentials. Conformant OSES also provide access controls which allow users to keep their files private from other users of the same system.

##### **O.PROTECTED\_COMMS**

To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack threats, conformant OSES provide mechanisms to create trusted channels for CSP and sensitive data. Both CSP and sensitive data should not be exposed outside of the platform.

#### **4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment**

The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the OS in correctly providing its security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.

##### **OE.PLATFORM**

The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware.

#### OE.PROPER\_USER

The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of access should have a separate account dedicated for that use.

#### OE.PROPER\_ADMIN

The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

### 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organization security policies map to the security objectives.

Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale

| Threat, Assumption, or OSP | Security Objectives | Rationale  |
|----------------------------|---------------------|--|
| T.NETWORK_ATTACK           | O.PROTECTED_COMMS   | The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for integrity of transmitted data.  |
|                            | O.INTEGRITY         | The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.INTEGRITY as this provides for integrity of software that is installed onto the system from the network.                   |
|                            | O.MANAGEMENT        | The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to defend against network attack.                          |
|                            | O.ACCOUNTABILITY    | The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.ACCOUNTABILITY as this provides a mechanism for the OS to report behavior that may indicate a network attack has occurred. |
| T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP        | O.PROTECTED_COMMS   | The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for confidentiality of transmitted data.   |
|                            | O.MANAGEMENT        | The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to protect the confidentiality of its transmitted data. |
| T.LOCAL_ATTACK             | O.INTEGRITY         | The objective O.INTEGRITY protects against the use of mechanisms that weaken the TOE with regard to attack by other software on the platform.                            |
|                            | O.ACCOUNTABILITY    | The objective O.ACCOUNTABILITY protects against local attacks by providing a mechanism to report behavior that may indicate a local attack is occurring or has occurred. |
| T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS  | O.PROTECTED_STORAGE | The objective O.PROTECTED_STORAGE protects against unauthorized attempts to access physical storage used by the TOE.   |
| A.PLATFORM                 | OE.PLATFORM         | The operational environment objective OE.PLATFORM is realized through A.PLATFORM.  |
| A.PROPER_USER              | OE.PROPER_USER      | The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized through A.PROPER_USER.  |
| A.PROPER_ADMIN             | OE.PROPER_ADMIN     | The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized through A.PROPER_ADMIN.  |

### 5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text** or ~~strikethrough text~~): is used to add details to a requirement (including replacing an assignment with a more restrictive selection) or to remove part of

the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.

- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

## 5.1 Security Functional Requirements

### 5.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

#### FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

FCS\_CKM.1.1

The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys by [parsing in accordance with FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 and FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2, **[selection: asymmetric key generation in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/AK, symmetric key generation in accordance to FCS\_CKM.1/SK, no other methods]** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm **[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]** and specified cryptographic key sizes **[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]** that meet the following: **[assignment: list of standards]**.

**Application Note:** Parsing of keys can refer to both the act of importing keys from outside the TOE boundary and to the act of issuing commands or parameters to the TOE that trigger the TSF to perform a key generation function.

If asymmetric key generation in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/AK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.1/AK must be claimed by the TOE.

If symmetric key generation in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/SK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.1/SK must be claimed by the TOE.

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the TOE obtains a cryptographic key through importation of keys from external sources as specified in FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 and FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2. The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to determine whether it describes any supported asymmetric or symmetric key generation functionality consistent with the claims made in FCS\_CKM.1.1.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key types for all uses identified in the ST. The evaluator shall confirm that the KMD describes:

- The parsing interface and how the TSF imports keys for internal use
- The asymmetric key generation interfaces and how the TSF internally creates asymmetric keys, if claimed
- The symmetric key generation interfaces and how the TSF internally creates symmetric keys, if claimed

If the TOE uses the generated key in a key chain/hierarchy then the KMD shall describe how the key is used as part of the key chain/hierarchy.

#### Tests

Testing for this function is performed in conjunction with FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 and FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2. If asymmetric or symmetric key generation functionality is claimed, testing for this function is also performed in conjunction with FCS\_CKM.1/AK or FCS\_CKM.1/SK.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

**FCS\_CKM.1:**

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the TOE obtains a cryptographic key through importation of keys from external sources as specified in FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 and FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2. The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to determine whether it describes any supported asymmetric or symmetric key generation functionality consistent with the claims made in FCS\_CKM.1.1.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key types for all uses identified in the ST. The evaluator shall confirm that the KMD describes:

- The parsing interface and how the TSF imports keys for internal use
- The asymmetric key generation interfaces and how the TSF internally creates asymmetric keys, if claimed
- The symmetric key generation interfaces and how the TSF internally creates symmetric keys, if claimed

If the TOE uses the generated key in a key chain/hierarchy then the KMD shall describe how the key is used as part of the key chain/hierarchy.

#### Tests

Testing for this function is performed in conjunction with FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 and FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2. If asymmetric or symmetric key generation functionality is claimed, testing for this function is also performed in conjunction with FCS\_CKM.1/AK or FCS\_CKM.1/SK.

#### FCS\_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys)

The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys using the methods defined by the following rows in [Table 2](#): [**selection**: AK1, AK2, AK3, AK4, AK5].

**Table 2: Supported Methods for Asymmetric Key Generation**

| Identifier | Key Type   | Key Sizes   | List of Standards                      |
|------------|------------|---|--|
| AK1        | RSA        | [ <b>selection</b> : 2048 bit, 3072-bit]  | FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.3)           |
| AK2        | ECC-N      | [ <b>selection</b> : 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 521 (P-521)]   | FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.4 & D.1.2)   |
| AK3        | ECC-B      | [ <b>selection</b> : 256 (brainpoolP256r1), 384 (brainpoolP384r1), 512 (brainpoolP512r1)]                               | RFC5639 (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves) |
| AK4        | DSA        | DSA Bit lengths of p and q respectively (L, N) [ <b>selection</b> : (1024, 160), (2048, 224), (2048, 256), (3027, 256)] | FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.1                |
| AK5        | Curve25519 | 256 bits  | RFC 7748                               |

**Application Note:** This requirement is included for the purposes of encryption and decryption operations only. To support ITE protected communications requirement for the transfer of encrypted data, this requirement mandates implementation compliance to FIPS 186-4 only. Implementations according to FIPS 186-2 or FIPS 186-3 will not be accepted.

This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of [FCS\\_CKM.1](#) or [FCS\\_CKM.1/KEK](#) chooses a selection related to generation of asymmetric keys.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#):

#### FCS\_CKM.1/SK Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Encryption Key)

FCS\_CKM.1.1/SK

The TSF shall generate **symmetric** cryptographic keys using the methods defined by the following rows in [Table 3](#): [**selection**: RSK, DSK, PBK].

**Table 3: Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Generation**

| Identifier | Key Type   | Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm   | Key Sizes   | List of Standards  |
|------------|--|--|---|--|
| RSK        | [ <b>selection</b> : symmetric key, submask, authorization value]        | Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in <a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a>  | [ <b>selection</b> : 128, 192, 256, 512] bits                           | NIST SP 800-133 (Section 7.1) with ISO 18031 as an approved RBG in addition to those in NIST SP 800-133 (Section 5). |
| DSK        | [ <b>selection</b> : Key Type from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions]   | Derived from a Key Derivation Function as specified in <a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.5</a> [ <b>selection</b> : Key Derivation Algorithm from Table 16: Key Derivation Function] | [ <b>selection</b> : key sizes from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions] | [ <b>selection</b> : List of Standards from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions]                                      |
| PBK        | [ <b>selection</b> : submask, authentication token, authorization value] | Derived from a Password Based Key Derivation Function as specified in FCS_COP.1/PBKDF  | [ <b>selection</b> : key sizes as specified in FCS_COP.1/PBKDF]         | [ <b>selection</b> : standards as specified in FCS_COP.1/PBKDF]  |

**Application Note:** The intent of this requirement is to ensure that attackers



cannot recover SKs with less than a full exhaust of the key space. This requirement explains SK generation regardless of how the DSC uses it or when it generates it. The encryption of user data that is not keying material, authentication tokens, or authorization values is outside the scope of this cPP. This cPP assumes that the DSC lacks the required resources to perform bulk encryption/decryption services at a suitable rate for users. The host may use the SK for encrypting user data outside the boundaries of the DSC. On the other hand, the DSC may use the SK on behalf of the user to perform keyed hashes. In this case, all the requirements for generating, controlling access and use, and destroying the key while under the protection of the DSC apply. The selection of key size 512 bits is for the case of XTS-AES using AES-256. In the case of XTS-AES for both AES-128 and AES-256, the developer is expected to ensure that the full key is generated using direct generation from the RBG as in NIST SP 800-133 section.

The ST author selects at least one algorithm from the RSK row if the ST supports creating keys directly from the output of the RBG without further conditioning, at least one algorithm from the DSK row should be selected if the ST supports key derivation functions which are usually seeded from RBG and then further conditioned to the appropriate key size, and at least one algorithm from the PBK row should be selected if the ST supports keys derived from passwords.

If DSK is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

If PBK is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_COP.1/PBKDF](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of [FCS\\_CKM.1](#) or [FCS\\_CKM.1/KEK](#) chooses a selection related to generation of symmetric keys.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#):

### FCS\_CKM.1/KEK Cryptographic Key Generation (Key Encryption Key)

FCS\_CKM.1.1/KEK

The TSF shall generate key encryption keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm corresponding to **[selection:**

- *Asymmetric KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#) identifier AK1,*
- *Symmetric KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#),*
- *Derived KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#)*

**] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].**

**Application Note:** KEKs protect KEKs and Symmetric Keys (SKs). DSCs should use key strengths commensurate with protecting the chosen symmetric encryption key strengths. If Asymmetric KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

If Symmetric KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

If Derived KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_CKM.1/KEK](#):

### TSS

*The evaluator shall examine the key hierarchy section of the TSS to ensure that the formation of all KEKs is described and that the key sizes match that described by the ST author. The evaluator shall examine the key hierarchy section of the TSS to ensure that each KEK encrypts keys of equal or lesser security strength using one of the selected methods.*

*[conditional] If the KEK is generated according to an asymmetric key scheme, the evaluator shall review the TSS to determine that it describes how the functionality described by [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#) is invoked. The evaluator uses the description of the key generation functionality in [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#) or documentation available for the operational environment to determine that the key strength being requested is greater than or equal to 112 bits.*

*[conditional] If the KEK is generated according to a symmetric key scheme, the evaluator shall review the TSS to determine that it describes how the functionality described by [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#) is invoked. The evaluator uses the description of the RBG functionality in [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1](#), or the key derivation functionality in either [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#) or [FCS\\_COP.1/PBKDF](#), depending on the key generation method claimed, to determine that the key size being requested is greater than or equal to the key size and mode to be used for the encryption/decryption of the data.*

*[conditional] If the KEK is formed from derivation, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the method of derivation and that this method is consistent with [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#).*

### Guidance

*There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component. The evaluator shall iterate*

through each of the methods selected by the ST and confirm that the KMD describes the applicable selected methods.

#### **Tests**

The evaluator shall iterate through each of the methods selected by the ST and perform all applicable tests from the selected methods.

## **FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment**

### **FCS\_CKM.2.1**

The TSF shall establish cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: **[selection:**

- RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography",
  - RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
  - Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: **[selection:**
    - NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography",
    - RFC 7748, "Elliptic Curves for Security"
- ],
- Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography",
  - Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) that meets the following: **[selection:**
    - ANSI X9.63 - Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
    - IEEE 1363a - Standard Specification for Public-Key Cryptography - Amendment 1: Additional Techniques,
    - ISO/IEC 18033-2 - Information Technology - Security Techniques - Encryption Algorithms - Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers,
    - SECG SEC1 - Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section 5.1 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme

]

] that meets the following: ~~[assignment: list of standards]~~.

**Application Note:** This is a refinement of the SFR [FCS\\_CKM.2](#) to deal with key establishment rather than key distribution.

The ST author selects all key establishment schemes used for the selected cryptographic protocols.

The RSA-based key establishment schemes are described in Section 8 of NIST SP 800-56B Revision 2 [NIST-RSA]; however, Section 8 relies on implementation of other sections in SP 800-56B Revision 2.

The elliptic curves used for the key establishment scheme correlate with the curves specified in [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#).

The selections in this SFR must be consistent with those for [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#).

## **Evaluation Activities ▼**

### **[FCS\\_CKM.2:](#)**

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that ST supports at least one key establishment scheme. The evaluator also ensures that for each key establishment scheme selected by the ST in [FCS\\_CKM.2.1](#) it also supports one or more corresponding methods selected in [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#). If the ST selects RSA in [FCS\\_CKM.2.1](#), then the TOE must support one or more of "KAS1," or "KAS2," "KTS-OAEP," from [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#). If the ST selects elliptic curve-based, then the TOE must support one or more of "ECDH-NIST" or "ECDH-BPC" from [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#). If the ST selects Diffie-Hellman-based key establishment, then the TOE must support "DH" from [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#).

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key establishment scheme. There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### **Tests**

Testing for this SFR is performed under the corresponding functions in [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#).

## **FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction**

### **FCS\_CKM.4.1**

The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method

- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [**selection:**
    - *single overwrite consisting of [**selection:** a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF's RBG, zeroes, ones, a new value of a key, [**assignment:** some value that does not contain any CSP]],*
    - *removal of power to the memory,*
    - *removal of all references to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection*
  - ]
  - For non-volatile memory [**selection:**
    - *that employs a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a [**selection:**
      - *single overwrite consisting of [**selection:** zeroes, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size, [**assignment:** some value that does not contain any CSP]],*
      - *block erase**
    - ],
    - *that does not employ a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a [**selection:**
      - [**selection:** single, [**assignment:** ST author-defined multi-pass]] overwrite consisting of [**selection:** zeros, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size, [**assignment:** some value that does not contain any CSP]] followed by a read-verify. If the read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated again up to [**assignment:** number of times to attempt overwrite] times, whereupon an error is returned.,*
    - *block erase*
- ]

that meets the following: [no standard].

**Application Note:** A DSC must implement mechanisms to destroy cryptographic keys and key material contained in persistent storage when no longer needed. The term “cryptographic keys” in this SFR includes the authorization data that is the entry point to a key chain and all other cryptographic keys and keying material (whether in plaintext or encrypted form). This SFR does not apply to the public component of asymmetric key pairs, or to keys that are permitted to remain stored such as device identification keys.

In the case of volatile memory, the selection “removal of all references to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection” is used in a situation where the TSF cannot address the specific physical memory locations holding the data to be erased and therefore relies on addressing logical addresses (which frees the relevant physical addresses holding the old data) and then requesting the platform to ensure that the data in the physical addresses is no longer available for reading (i.e. the “garbage collection” referred to in the SFR text). Guidance documentation for the TOE requires users not to allow the TOE to leave the user’s control while a session is active (and hence while the DEK is likely to be in plaintext in volatile memory).

The selection for destruction of data in non-volatile memory includes block erase as an option, and this option applies only to flash memory. A block erase does not require a read verify, since collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Components the mappings of logical addresses to the erased memory locations are erased as well as the data itself.

Where different destruction methods are used for different data or different destruction situations then the different methods and the data/situations they apply to (e.g. different points in time, or power-loss situations) are described in the TSS (and the ST may use separate iterations of the SFR to aid clarity). The TSS includes a table describing all relevant keys and keying material (including authorization data) used in the implementation of the SFRs, stating the source of the data, all memory types in which the data is stored (covering storage both during and outside of a session, and both plaintext and non-plaintext forms of the data), and the applicable destruction method and time of destruction in each case.

Some selections allow assignment of “some value that does not contain any CSP.” This means that the TOE uses some specified data not drawn from an RBG meeting FCS\_RBG\_EXT requirements, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The point of the phrase “does not contain any sensitive data” is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general pool that might contain current or residual data (e.g. SDOs or intermediate key chain values) that itself requires confidentiality protection.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FCS\_CKM.4:

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it lists all relevant keys and keying material (describing the source of the data, all memory types in which the data is stored (covering

storage both during and outside of a session, and both plaintext and non-plaintext forms of the data)), all relevant destruction situations (including the point in time at which the destruction occurs; e.g. factory reset or device wipe function, change of authorization data, change of DEK, completion of use of an intermediate key) and the destruction method used in each case. The evaluator shall confirm that the description of the data and storage locations is consistent with the functions carried out by the TOE (e.g. that all keys in the key chain are accounted for). (Where keys are stored encrypted or wrapped under another key then this may need to be explained in order to allow the evaluator to confirm the consistency of the description of keys with the TOE functions).

The evaluator shall check that the TSS identifies any configurations or circumstances that may not conform to the key destruction requirement (see further discussion in the AGD section below). Note that reference may be made to the AGD for description of the detail of such cases where destruction may be prevented or delayed.

Where the ST specifies the use of “a value that does not contain any sensitive data” to overwrite keys, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how that pattern is obtained and used, and that this justifies the claim that the pattern does not contain any sensitive data.

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation for the TOE requires users to ensure that the TOE remains under the user’s control while a session is active.

A TOE may be subject to situations that could prevent or delay data destruction in some cases. The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation identifies configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement, and that this description is consistent with the relevant parts of the TSS (and KMD). The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation provides guidance on situations where key destruction may be delayed at the physical layer, identifying any additional mitigation actions for the user (e.g. there might be some operation the user can invoke, or the user might be advised to retain control of the device for some particular time to maximise the probability that garbage collection will have occurred).

For example, when the TOE does not have full access to the physical memory, it is possible that the storage may implement wear-levelling and garbage collection. This may result in additional copies of the data that are logically inaccessible but persist physically. Where available, the TOE might then describe use of the TRIM command and garbage collection to destroy these persistent copies upon their deletion (this would be explained in TSS and guidance documentation).

Where TRIM is used then the TSS or guidance documentation is also expected to describe how the keys are stored such that they are not inaccessible to TRIM, (e.g. they would need not to be contained in a file less than 982 bytes which would be completely contained in the master file table).

The evaluator shall examine the KMD to verify that it identifies and describes the interfaces that are used to service commands to read/write memory. The evaluator shall examine the interface description for each different media type to ensure that the interface supports the selections made by the ST author.

45 The evaluator shall examine the KMD to ensure that all keys and keying material identified in the TSS and KMD have been accounted for.

46 Note that where selections include ‘destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection’ (for volatile memory) then the evaluator shall examine the KMD to ensure that it explains the nature of the destruction of the reference, the request for garbage collection, and of the garbage collection process itself.

### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** Applied to each key or keying material held as plaintext in volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE (whether or not the plaintext value is subsequently encrypted for storage in volatile or non-volatile memory).

The evaluator shall:

1. Record the value of the key or keying material.
2. Cause the TOE to dump the SDO/SDE memory of the TOE into a binary file.
3. Search the content of the binary file created in Step #2 to locate all instances of the known key value from Step #1.

Note that the primary purpose of Step #3 is to demonstrate that appropriate search commands are being used for Steps #8 and #9.

4. Cause the TOE to perform normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
5. Cause the TOE to destroy the key.
6. Cause the TOE to stop execution but not exit.
7. Cause the TOE to dump the SDO/SDE memory of the TOE into a binary file.
8. Search the content of the binary file created in Step #7 for instances of the known key value from Step #1.
9. Break the key value from Step #1 into an evaluator-chosen set of fragments and perform a search using each fragment. (Note that the evaluator shall first confirm with the developer how the key is normally stored, in order to choose fragment sizes that are the same or smaller than any fragmentation of the data that may be implemented by the TOE. The endianness or byte-order should also be taken into account in the search.)

Steps #1-8 ensure that the complete key does not exist anywhere in volatile memory. If a

copy is found, then the test fails.

Step #9 ensures that partial key fragments do not remain in memory. If the evaluator finds a 32-or-greater-consecutive-bit fragment, then fail immediately. Otherwise, there is a chance that it is not within the context of a key (e.g., some random bits that happen to match). If this is the case the test should be repeated with a different key in Step #1. If a fragment is also found in this repeated run then the test fails unless the developer provides a reasonable explanation for the collision, then the evaluator may give a pass on this test.

- **Test 2:** Applied to each key and keying material held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE.

1. Record the value of the key or keying material.
2. Cause the TOE to perform normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
3. Search the non-volatile memory the key was stored in for instances of the known key value from Step #1.

*Note that the primary purpose of Step #3 is to demonstrate that appropriate search commands are being used for Steps #5 and #6.*

4. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
5. Search the non-volatile memory in which the key was stored for instances of the known key value from Step #1. If a copy is found, then the test fails.
6. Break the key value from Step #1 into an evaluator-chosen set of fragments and perform a search using each fragment. (Note that the evaluator shall first confirm with the developer how the key is normally stored, in order to choose fragment sizes that are the same or smaller than any fragmentation of the data that may be implemented by the TOE. The endianness or byte-order should also be taken into account in the search).

Step #6 ensures that partial key fragments do not remain in non-volatile memory. If the evaluator finds a 32-or-greater-consecutive-bit fragment, then fail immediately. Otherwise, there is a chance that it is not within the context of a key (e.g., some random bits that happen to match). If this is the case the test should be repeated with a different key in Step #1. If a fragment is also found in this repeated run then the test fails unless the developer provides a reasonable explanation for the collision, then the evaluator may give a pass on this test.

- **Test 3:** Applied to each key and keying material held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE.

1. Record memory of the key or keying material.
2. Cause the TOE to perform normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
3. Cause the TOE to clear the key. Record the value to be used for the overwrite of the key.
4. Examine the memory from Step #1 to ensure the appropriate pattern (recorded in Step #3) is used.

The test succeeds if correct pattern is found in the memory location. If the pattern is not found, then the test fails.

## **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction Timing**

### **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall destroy all keys and keying material when no longer needed.

**Application Note:** The DSC will have mechanisms to destroy keys, including intermediate keys and key material, by using an approved method, [FCS\\_CKM.4](#). Examples of keys include intermediate keys, leaf keys, encryption keys, signing keys, verification keys, authentication tokens, and submasks. The DSC will have mechanisms to destroy keys and key material contained in persistent storage when no longer needed. Based on their implementation, vendors will explain when certain keys are no longer needed. An example in which key is no longer necessary includes a wrapped key whose password has changed. However, there are instances when keys are allowed to remain in memory, for example, a device identification key.

## **Evaluation Activities ▼**

### **[FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.4:](#)**

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify the TSS provides a high-level description of what it means for keys and key material to be no longer needed and when this data should be expected to be destroyed.

#### **Guidance**

There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component. The evaluator shall verify that the KMD includes a description of the areas where keys and key material reside and when this data is no longer needed.

The evaluator shall verify that the KMD includes a key lifecycle that includes a description where key materials reside, how the key materials are used, how it is determined that keys and key material are no longer needed, and how the data is destroyed once it is no longer needed. The evaluator shall also verify that all key destruction operations are performed in a manner specified by [FCS\\_CKM.4](#).

#### **Tests**

There are no test evaluation activities for this component

## **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation**



The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys using the Key Derivation Functions defined by the following rows of [Table 4](#): [selection: KeyDrv1, KeyDrv2, KeyDrv3, KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, KeyDrv6, KeyDrv7, KeyDrv8].

**Table 4: Key Derivation Functions**

| Identifier | Key Type   | Input Parameters  | Key Derivation Algorithm  | Key Sizes                      | List of Stan   |
|------------|--|---|---|--------------------------------|--|
| KeyDrv1    | [selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key] | Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in <a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a> | KDF in Counter Mode using [selection: CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, CMAC-AES-256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512]as the PRF   | [selection: 128, 192, 256]bits | NIST SP 800-108 (Section 5.1) in Counter Mode<br><br>[selection: CMAC, NIST SP 800-38B, CMAC, ISO-10326-2, ISO-HMAC, HMAC, ISO-10326-2, FIPS-SHA]  |
| KeyDrv2    | [selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key] | Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in <a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a> | KDF in Feedback Mode using [selection: CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, CMAC-AES-256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512]as the PRF  | [selection: 128, 192, 256]bits | NIST SP 800-108 (Section 5.2) in Feedback Mode<br><br>[selection: CMAC, NIST SP 800-38B, CMAC, ISO-10326-2, ISO-HMAC, HMAC, ISO-10326-2, FIPS-SHA]   |
| KeyDrv3    | [selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key] | Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in <a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a> | KDF in Double Pipeline Iteration Mode using [selection: CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, CMAC-AES-256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512]as the PRF   | [selection: 128, 192, 256]bits | NIST SP 800-108 (Section 5.3) in n Double Pipeline Iteration Mode<br><br>[selection: CMAC, NIST SP 800-38B, CMAC, ISO-10326-2, ISO-HMAC, HMAC, ISO-10326-2, FIPS-SHA]  |
| KeyDrv4    | [selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key] | Intermediary keys   | [selection: exclusive OR (XOR), SHA256, SHA-512]  | [selection: 128, 192, 256]bits | [selection: NIST SP 800-38B, HASH, FIPS-180-2]   |
| KeyDrv5    | [selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key] | Concatenated keys   | KDF in [selection: Counter Mode, Feedback Mode, Double Pipeline Iteration Mode] using [selection: CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, CMAC-AES-256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512]as the PRF | [selection: 128, 192, 256]bits | NIST SP 800-108 [selection: (Section 5.1) (KDF in Counter Mode), (Section 5.2) in Feedback Mode), (Section 5.3) in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode]<br><br>[selection: CMAC, NIST SP 800-38B, CMAC, ISO-10326-2, ISO-HMAC, HMAC, ISO-10326-2, FIPS-SHA] |
| KeyDrv6    | [selection: symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization                            | Two keys  | [selection: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM] from <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/SKC</a>   | [selection: 128, 192, 256]bits | [selection: set of Standards <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/Symmetric Key</a> table]  |

|         |   | value, HMAC key, KMAC key]                                | Symmetric Key table  |  |   |
|---------|---|---|--|--|---|
| KeyDrv7 | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>symmetric key, secret IV, seed</i> ] | Shared secret, salt, output length, fixed information     | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>hash function from <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/Hash</a>, keyed hash from <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/HMAC</a></i> ] | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>128, 192, 256</i> ]bits | (NIST-KDRV [b]selection: : List of Stand in <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/</a> and <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/</a> |
| KeyDrv8 | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>symmetric key, secret IV, seed</i> ] | Shared secret, salt, IV, output length, fixed information | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>keyed hash from <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/HMAC</a></i> ]  | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>128, 192, 256</i> ]bits | (NIST-KDRV [b]selection: : List of Stand in <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/</a> and <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/</a> |

**Application Note:** Note that Camellia algorithms do not support 192-bit key sizes. The interface referenced in the requirement could take different forms, the most likely of which is an application programming interface to an OS kernel. There may be various levels of abstraction. For Authorization Factor Submasks, the key size to be used in the HMAC falls into a range between L1 and L2 defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function (for example for SHA-256 L1 = 512, L2 =256) where L2 = k = L1.

General note: in order to use a NIST SP 800-108 conformant method of key derivation, the TOE is permitted to implement this with keys as derived as indicated in Key Derivation Functions table above, and with the algorithms as indicated in the same table.

NIST SP 800-131A Rev 1 allows the use of SHA-1 in these use cases.

KeyDrv5, KeyDrv6, and the XOR option in KeyDrv4 will create an “inverted key hierarchy” in which the TSF will combine two or more keys to create a third key. These same KDFs may also use a submask key as input, which could be an authorization factor or derived from a PBKDF. In these cases the ST author must explicitly declare this option and should present a reasonable argument that the entropy of the inputs to the KDFs will result in full entropy of the expected output.

If keys are combined, the ST author shall describe which method of combination is used in order to justify that the effective entropy of each factor is preserved.

The documentation of the product’s encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product’s key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagrams. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS; it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.

SP 800-56C specifies a two-step key derivation procedure that employs an extraction-thenexpansion technique for deriving keying material from a shared secret generated during a key establishment scheme. The Randomness Extraction step as described in Section 5 of SP 800-56C is followed by Key Expansion using the key derivation functions defined in SP 800-108.

This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of [FCS\\_CKM.1/KEK](#), [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#), or [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc](#) chooses a selection related to key derivation.

If at least one of KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, or KeyDrv6 is selected AND password-based key derivation is used to create at least one of the inputs, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_COP.1/PBKDF](#) must also be claimed.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5:](#)

## FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)

FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash

The TSF shall perform [*cryptographic hashing*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection:** *SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512*] that meets the following: [**selection:** *ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS 180-4*].

**Application Note:** The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for signature generation. For example, the DSC should choose SHA-256 for 2048-bit RSA or ECC with P-256, SHA-384 for 3072-bit RSA, 4096-bit RSA, or ECC with P-384, and SHA-512 for ECC with P-521. The ST author selects the standard based on the algorithms selected.

SHA-1 may be used for the following applications: generating and verifying hash-

based message authentication codes (HMACs), key derivation functions (KDFs), and random bit/number generation (In certain cases, SHA-1 may also be used for verifying old digital signatures and time stamps, provided that this is explicitly allowed by the application domain).

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash:](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall check that the association of the hash function with other TSF cryptographic functions (for example, the digital signature verification function) is documented in the TSS. The evaluator shall also check that the TSS identifies whether the implementation is bit-oriented or byte-oriented.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator checks the AGD documents to determine that any configuration that is required to configure the required hash sizes is present. The evaluator also checks the AGD documents to confirm that the instructions for establishing the evaluated configuration use only those hash algorithms selected in the ST. There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

#### **SHA-1 and SHA-2 Tests**

The tests below are derived from the “The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS), Updated: May 21, 2014” from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

The TSF hashing functions can be implemented with one of two orientations. The first is a byte-oriented implementation: this hashes messages that are an integral number of bytes in length (i.e., the length (in bits) of the message to be hashed is divisible by 8). The second is a bit-oriented implementation: this hashes messages of arbitrary length. Separate tests for each orientation are given below.

The evaluator shall perform all of the following tests for each hash algorithm and orientation implemented by the TSF and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP. The evaluator shall compare digest values produced by a known-good SHA implementation against those generated by running the same values through the TSF.

#### **Short Messages Test, Bit-oriented Implementation**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $m+1$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm in bits (see SHA Properties Table). The length of the messages ranges sequentially from 0 to  $m$  bits. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Short Messages Test, Byte-oriented Implementation**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $m/8+1$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm in bits (see SHA Properties Table). The length of the messages ranges sequentially from 0 to  $m/8$  bytes, with each message being an integral number of bytes. The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Selected Long Messages Test, Bit-oriented Implementation**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $m$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm in bits (see SHA Properties Table). The length of the  $i$ th message is  $m + 99*i$ , where  $1 \leq i \leq m$ . The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Selected Long Messages Test, Byte-oriented Implementation**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $m/8$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm in bits (see SHA Properties Table). The length of the  $i$ th message is  $m + 8*99*i$ , where  $1 \leq i \leq m/8$ . The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Pseudo-randomly Generated Messages Test**

The evaluators randomly generate a seed that is  $n$  bits long, where  $n$  is the length of the message digest produced by the hash function to be tested. The evaluators then formulate a set of 100 messages and associated digests by following the algorithm provided in Figure 1 of SHAVS, section 6.4. The evaluators then ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **SHA-3 Tests**

The tests below are derived from the The Secure Hash Algorithm-3 Validation System (SHA3VS), Updated: April 7, 2016, from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

For each SHA-3-XXX implementation, XXX represents  $d$ , the digest length in bits. The capacity,  $c$ , is equal to  $2d$  bits. The rate is equal to  $1600-c$  bits.

65 The TSF hashing functions can be implemented with one of two orientations. The first is a bit-oriented mode that hashes messages of arbitrary length. The second is a byte-oriented mode that hashes messages that are an integral number of bytes in length (i.e., the length (in bits) of the message to be hashed is divisible by 8). Separate tests for each orientation are given below.



The evaluator shall perform all of the following tests for each hash algorithm and orientation implemented by the TSF and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP. The evaluator shall compare digest values produced by a known-good SHA-3 implementation against those generated by running the same values through the TSF.

#### **Short Messages Test, Bit-oriented Mode**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $\text{rate}+1$  short messages. The length of the messages ranges sequentially from 0 to  $\text{rate}$  bits. The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF. The message of length 0 is omitted if the TOE does not support zero-length messages.

#### **Short Messages Test, Byte-oriented Mode**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $\text{rate}/8+1$  short messages. The length of the messages ranges sequentially from 0 to  $\text{rate}/8$  bytes, with each message being an integral number of bytes. The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF. The message of length 0 is omitted if the TOE does not support zero-length messages.

#### **Selected Long Messages Test, Bit-oriented Mode**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of 100 long messages ranging in size from  $\text{rate}+(\text{rate}+1)$  to  $\text{rate}+(100*(\text{rate}+1))$ , incrementing by  $\text{rate}+1$ . (For example, SHA-3-256 has a rate of 1088 bits. Therefore, 100 messages will be generated with lengths 2177, 3266, ..., 109988 bits.) The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Selected Long Messages Test, Byte-oriented Mode**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of 100 messages ranging in size from  $(\text{rate}+(\text{rate}+8))$  to  $(\text{rate}+100*(\text{rate}+8))$ , incrementing by  $\text{rate}+8$ . (For example, SHA-3-256 has a rate of 1088 bits. Therefore 100 messages will be generated of lengths 2184, 3280, 4376, ..., 110688 bits.) The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Pseudo-randomly Generated Messages Monte Carlo) Test, Byte-oriented Mode**

The evaluators supply a seed of  $d$  bits (where  $d$  is the length of the message digest produced by the hash function to be tested. This seed is used by a pseudorandom function to generate 100,000 message digests. One hundred of the digests (every 1000th digest) are recorded as checkpoints. The TOE then uses the same procedure to generate the same 100,000 message digests and 100 checkpoint values. The evaluators then compare the results generated ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are generated by the TSF.

### **FCS\_COP.1/HMAC Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)**

#### **FCS\_COP.1.1/HMAC**

The TSF shall perform [keyed hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection:** HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, KMAC128, KMAC256] and cryptographic key sizes [**assignment:** key size (in bits)] that meet the following: [**selection:** ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2", [NIST-KDF] section 4 "KMAC"].

**Application Note:** The HMAC key size falls into a range between L1 and L2 defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function (for example for SHA-256  $L1 = 512$ ,  $L2 = 256$ ) where  $L2 \leq k \leq L1$ .

### **Evaluation Activities ▼**

#### **[FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC:](#)**

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it specifies the following values used by the HMAC and KMAC functions: output MAC length used.

##### **Guidance**

There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component. There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

##### **Tests**

The following test requires the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

This test is derived from The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code Validation System (HMACVS), updated 6 May 2016.

The evaluator shall provide 15 sets of messages and keys for each selected hash algorithm and hash length/key size/MAC size combination. The evaluator shall have the TSF generate HMAC or KMAC tags for these sets of test data. The evaluator shall verify that the resulting HMAC or KMAC tags match the results from submitting the same inputs to a known-good implementation of the HMAC or KMAC function, having the same characteristics.

### **FCS\_COP.1/KAT Cryptographic Operation (Key Agreement/Transport)**

The TSF shall perform [cryptographic key agreement/transport] using the supported methods for key agreement/transport defined by the following rows of [Table 5](#): [**selection**: KAS1, KAS2, KTS-OAEP, RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5, ECDH-NIST, ECDH-BPC, DH, Curve25519, ECIES].

**Table 5: Supported Methods for Key Agreement/Transport Operation**

| Identifier       | Cryptographic Algorithm    | Key Sizes   | List of Standards   |
|------------------|----------------------------|---|---|
| KAS1             | RSA-single party           | [ <b>selection</b> : 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits                                    | NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 8.2   |
| KAS2             | RSA-both party             | [ <b>selection</b> : 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits                                    | NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 8.3   |
| KTS-OAEP         | RSA                        | [ <b>selection</b> : 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits                                    | NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 9   |
| RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 | RSA                        | [ <b>selection</b> : 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits                                    | RFC 8017 Section 7.2  |
| ECDH-NIST        | ECDH with NIST curves      | [ <b>selection</b> : 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 512 (P-521)]                               | NIST SP 800-56Ar3   |
| ECDH-BPC         | ECDH with Brainpool curves | [ <b>selection</b> : 256 (brainpoolP256r1), 384 (brainpoolP384r1), 512 (brainpoolP512r1)] | RFC 5639 (Section 3)  |
| DH               | Diffie-Hellman             | [ <b>selection</b> : 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits                                    | NIST SP 800-56A rev 3, [ <b>selection</b> :<br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RFC 3526 Section [<b>selection</b>: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7],</li> <li>• RFC 7919 Appendices [<b>selection</b>: A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5]</li> </ul> ] |
| Curve25519       | ECDH                       | 256 bits  | RFC 7748  |
| ECIES            | ECIES                      | [ <b>selection</b> : 256, 384, 512]bits   | [ <b>selection</b> : ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363a, ISO/IEC 18033-2 Part 2, SECG SEC1 sec 5.1]   |

**Application Note:** The selections in this SFR should be consistent with the algorithms selected in [FCS\\_CKM.2](#).

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#):

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall ensure that the selected RSA and ECDH key agreement/transport schemes correspond to the key generation schemes selected in [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#), and the key establishment schemes selected in [FCS\\_CKM.2](#). If the ST selects DH, the TSS shall describe how the implementation meets the relevant sections of RFC 3526 (Section 3-7) and RFC 7919 (Appendices A.1-A.5). If the ST selects ECIES, the TSS shall describe the key sizes and algorithms (e.g. elliptic curve point multiplication, ECDH with either NIST or Brainpool curves, AES in a mode permitted by [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#), a SHA-2 hash algorithm permitted by [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#), and a MAC algorithm permitted by [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#)) that are supported for the ECIES implementation.

The evaluator shall ensure that, for each key agreement/transport scheme, the size of the derived keying material is at least the same as the intended strength of the key agreement/transport scheme, and where feasible this should be twice the intended security strength of the key agreement/transport scheme.

Table 2 of NIST SP 800-57 identifies the key strengths for the different algorithms that can be used for the various key agreement/transport schemes.

#### **Guidance**

There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component. There are no KMD evaluation

activities for this component.

### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of the key generation routines of the supported schemes using the following tests:

#### **If ECDH-NIST or ECDH-BPC is claimed:**

##### **SP800-56A Key Agreement Schemes**

The evaluator shall verify a TOE's implementation of SP800-56A key agreement schemes using the following Function and Validity tests. These validation tests for each key agreement scheme verify that a TOE has implemented the components of the key agreement scheme according to the specifications in the Recommendation. These components include the calculation of the DLC primitives (the shared secret value Z) and the calculation of the derived keying material (DKM) via the Key Derivation Function (KDF). If key confirmation is supported, the evaluator shall also verify that the components of key confirmation have been implemented correctly, using the test procedures described below. This includes the parsing of the DKM, the generation of MACdata and the calculation of MACTag.

##### **Function Test**

The Function test verifies the ability of the TOE to implement the key agreement schemes correctly. To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each supported key agreement scheme-key agreement role combination, KDF type, and, if supported, key confirmation role-key confirmation type combination, the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. The data set consists of one set of domain parameter values (FFC) or the NIST approved curve (ECC) per 10 sets of public keys. These keys are static, ephemeral or both depending on the scheme being tested.

The evaluator shall obtain the DKM, the corresponding TOE's public keys (static or ephemeral), the MAC tags, and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the Other Information field OI and TOE id fields.

If the TOE does not use a KDF defined in SP 800-56A, the evaluator shall obtain only the public keys and the hashed value of the shared secret.

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of a given scheme by using a known good implementation to calculate the shared secret value, derive the keying material DKM, and compare hashes or MAC tags generated from these values.

If key confirmation is supported, the TSF shall perform the above for each implemented approved MAC algorithm.

##### **Validity Test**

The Validity test verifies the ability of the TOE to recognize another party's valid and invalid key agreement results with or without key confirmation. To conduct this test, the evaluator shall obtain a list of the supporting cryptographic functions included in the SP800-56A key agreement implementation to determine which errors the TOE should be able to recognize. The evaluator generates a set of 24 (FFC) or 30 (ECC) test vectors consisting of data sets including domain parameter values or NIST approved curves, the evaluator's public keys, the TOE's public/private key pairs, MACTag, and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the other info and TOE id fields.

The evaluator shall inject an error in some of the test vectors to test that the TOE recognizes invalid key agreement results caused by the following fields being incorrect: the shared secret value Z, the DKM, the other information field OI, the data to be MACed, or the generated MACTag. If the TOE contains the full or partial (only ECC) public key validation, The evaluator shall also individually inject errors in both parties' static public keys, both parties' ephemeral public keys and the TOE's static private key to assure the TOE detects errors in the public key validation function or the partial key validation function (in ECC only). At least two of the test vectors shall remain unmodified and therefore should result in valid key agreement results (they should pass).

The TOE shall use these modified test vectors to emulate the key agreement scheme using the corresponding parameters. The evaluator shall compare the TOE's results with the results using a known good implementation verifying that the TOE detects these errors.

#### **If KAS1, KAS2, KTS-OAEP, or RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 is claimed:**

##### **SP800-56B and PKCS#1 Key Establishment Schemes**

If the TOE acts as a sender, the following evaluation activity shall be performed to ensure the proper operation of every TOE supported combination of RSA-based key establishment scheme:

To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each combination of supported key establishment scheme and its options (with or without key confirmation if supported, for each supported key confirmation MAC function if key confirmation is supported, and for each supported mask generation function if KTS-OAEP is supported), the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. Each test vector shall include the RSA public key, the plaintext keying material, any additional input parameters if applicable, the MacKey and MacTag if key confirmation is incorporated, and the outputted ciphertext. For each test vector, the evaluator shall perform a key establishment encryption operation on the TOE with the same inputs (in cases where key confirmation is incorporated, the test shall use the MacKey from the test vector instead of the randomly generated MacKey used in normal operation) and ensure that the outputted ciphertext is equivalent to the ciphertext in the test vector.

If the TOE acts as a receiver, the following evaluation activities shall be performed to ensure the proper operation of every TOE supported combination of RSA-based key establishment scheme:

To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each combination of supported key establishment scheme and its options (with or without key confirmation if supported, for each supported key confirmation MAC function if key confirmation is supported, and for each supported mask generation function if KTSOAEP is supported), the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. Each test vector shall include the RSA private key, the plaintext keying material (KeyData), any additional input parameters if applicable, the MacTag in cases where key confirmation is incorporated, and the outputted ciphertext. For each test vector, the evaluator shall perform the key establishment decryption operation on the TOE and ensure that the outputted plaintext keying material (KeyData) is equivalent to the plain text keying material in the test vector. In cases where key confirmation is incorporated, the evaluator shall perform the key confirmation steps and ensure that the outputted MacTag is equivalent to the MacTag in the test vector.

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the TOE handles decryption errors. In accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-56B, the TOE must not reveal the particular error that occurred, either through the contents of any outputted or logged error message or through timing variations. If KTS-OAEP is supported, the evaluator shall create separate contrived ciphertext values that trigger each of the three decryption error checks described in NIST Special Publication 800-56B section 7.2.2.3, ensure that each decryption attempt results in an error, and ensure that any outputted or logged error message is identical for each.

#### **DH:**

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of each TSF implementation of each supported Diffie-Hellman group by comparison with a known good implementation.

#### **Curve25519:**

The evaluator shall verify a TOE's implementation of the key agreement scheme using the following Function and Validity tests. These validation tests for each key agreement scheme verify that a TOE has implemented the components of the key agreement scheme according to the specification. These components include the calculation of the shared secret K and the hash of K.

#### **Function Test**

The Function test verifies the ability of the TOE to implement the key agreement schemes correctly. To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each supported key agreement role and hash function combination, the tester shall generate 10 sets of public keys. These keys are static, ephemeral or both depending on the scheme being tested.

The evaluator shall obtain the shared secret value K, and the hash of K. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of a given scheme by using a known good implementation to calculate the shared secret value K and compare the hash generated from this value.

#### **Validity Test**

The Validity test verifies the ability of the TOE to recognize another party's valid and invalid key agreement results. To conduct this test, the evaluator generates a set of 30 test vectors consisting of data sets including the evaluator's public keys and the TOE's public/private key pairs.

The evaluator shall inject an error in some of the test vectors to test that the TOE recognizes invalid key agreement results caused by the following fields being incorrect: the shared secret value K or the hash of K. At least two of the test vectors shall remain unmodified and therefore should result in valid key agreement results (they should pass).

The TOE shall use these modified test vectors to emulate the key agreement scheme using the corresponding parameters. The evaluator shall compare the TOE's results with the results using a known good implementation verifying that the TOE detects these errors.

#### **ECIES:**

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of each TSF implementation of each supported use of ECIES by comparison with a known good implementation.

### **FCS\_COP.1/KeyEnc Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)**

FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyEnc

The TSF shall perform [key encryption and decryption] using the methods defined in the following rows of [Table 6](#): [selection: SE1, AE1, SE2, XOR]

**Table 6: Supported Methods for Key Encryption Operation**

| Identifier | Cryptographic Algorithm   | Key Sizes                       | List of Standards                 |
|------------|---|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| SE1        | Symmetric [selection: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-CTR, AES-KWP, AESKW] | [selection: 128, 192, 256] bits | See <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/SKC</a> |
| AE1        | Asymmetric KTS-OAEP   | [selection: 2048, 3072] bits    | See <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/SKC</a> |
| SE2        | Symmetric [selection: CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM]                          | [selection: 128, 256]           | See <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/KAT</a> |

|     |                        |   |
|-----|------------------------|---|
|     |                        | bits                                    |
| XOR | Exclusive OR operation | [ <b>selection:</b> 128, 192, 256] bits |
|     |                        | See <a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.5</a>       |

**Application Note:** A TOE will use this requirement to specify how the Key Encryption Key (KEK) wraps a symmetric encryption key. A TOE will always need this requirement in order to capture the last stage of the key chain in which the Key Encryption Key (KEK) wraps the symmetric encryption key.

If XOR is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc:](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it identifies whether the implementation of this cryptographic operation for key encryption (including key lengths and modes) is an implementation that is tested in [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#).

The evaluator shall check that the TSS includes a description of the key wrap functions and shall check that this uses a key wrap algorithm and key sizes according to the specification selected in the ST out of the table as provided in the cPP table.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator checks the AGD documents to confirm that the instructions for establishing the evaluated configuration use only those key wrap functions selected in the ST. If multiple key access modes are supported, the evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to determine that the method of choosing a specific mode/key size by the end user is described.

The evaluator shall examine the KMD to ensure that it describes when the key wrapping occurs, that the KMD description is consistent with the description in the TSS, and that for all keys that are wrapped the TOE uses a method as described in the cPP table. No uncertainty should be left over which is the wrapping key and the key to be wrapped and where the wrapping key potentially comes from i.e. is derived from.

If “AES-GCM” or “AES-CCM” is used the evaluator shall examine the KMD to ensure that it describes how the IV is generated and that the same IV is never reused to encrypt different plaintext pairs under the same key. Moreover in the case of GCM, he must ensure that, at each invocation of GCM, the length of the plaintext is at most  $(2^{32}-2)$  blocks.

#### **Tests**

Refer to [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#) for the required testing for each symmetric key wrapping method selected from the table and to [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#) for the required testing for each asymmetric key wrapping method selected from the table. Each distinct implementation shall be tested separately.

If the implementation of the key encryption operation is the same implementation tested under [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#) or [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#), and it has been tested with the same key lengths and modes, then no further testing is required. If key encryption uses a different implementation, (where “different implementation” includes the use of different key lengths or modes), then the evaluator shall additionally test the key encryption implementation using the corresponding tests specified for [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#) or [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#).

## **FCS\_COP.1/pbkdf Cryptographic Operation (Password-Based Key Derivation Functions)**

### FCS\_COP.1.1/pbkdf

The TSF shall perform [password-based key derivation functions] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC- [**selection:** SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512]], with [**assignment:** integer number greater than or equal to 1000] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [**selection:** 128, 192, 256]bits that meet the following standard: [NIST SP 800-132].

**Application Note:** The ST must condition a password into a string of bits prior to using it as input to algorithms that form SKs and KEKs. The ST can perform conditioning using one of the identified hash functions or the process described in NIST SP 800-132; the ST author selects the method used. NIST SP 800-132 requires the use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) consisting of HMAC with an approved hash function.

Appendix A of NIST SP 800-132 recommends setting the iteration count in order to increase the computation needed to derive a key from a password and, therefore, increase the workload of performing a dictionary attack.

The TOE must claim this requirement if it claims [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#) and selects an algorithm in the PBK row or claims [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#) and selects at least one of KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, or KeyDrv6 AND uses password-based key derivation to create at least one of the inputs.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_COP.1/pbkdf:](#)



## FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation)

FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen

The TSF shall perform [*digital signature generation*] using the supported methods for signature generation defined in the following rows of [Table 7](#) [**selection:** *SigGen1, SigGen2, SigGen3, SigGen4, SigGen5*].

**Table 7: Supported Methods for Signature Generation Operation**

| Identifier | Cryptographic Algorithm  | Key Sizes                                       | List of Standards   |
|------------|--|---|---|
| SigGen1    | RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using [ <b>selection:</b> <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i> ]   | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>2048 bit, 3072 bit</i> ] | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>RFC 8017, PKCS #1 v2.2 (Section 8.2), FIPS186-4, (Section 5.5)] (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)</i><br><br>[ <b>selection:</b> <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)</i>   |
| SigGen2    | Digital signature scheme 2 using [ <b>selection:</b> <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i> ]  | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>2048 bit, 3072 bit</i> ] | ISO9796-2, (Clause 9)<br>(Digital signature scheme 2)<br><br>[ <b>selection:</b> <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)</i>  |
| SigGen3    | Digital signature scheme 3 using [ <b>selection:</b> <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i> ]  | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>2048 bit, 3072 bit</i> ] | ISO9796-2, (Clause 10)<br>(Digital signature scheme 3)<br><br>[ <b>selection:</b> <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)</i>   |
| SigGen4    | RSASSA-PSS using [ <b>selection:</b> <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i> ]  | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>2048 bit, 3072 bit</i> ] | [RFC8017, PKCS#1v2.2 (Section 8.1)] (RSASSAPSS)<br><br>[ <b>selection:</b> <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)</i>  |
| SigGen5    | ECDSA on [ <b>selection:</b> <i>brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, NIST P-256, NIST P-384, NIST P-521</i> ] using [ <b>selection:</b> <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i> ] | [ <b>selection:</b> <i>2048 bit, 3072 bit</i> ] | [ <b>selection:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>[<b>selection:</b> <i>ISO14888-3, FIPS186-4 (Section 6)] (EDCSA),</i></li><li><i>RFC5639 (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves),</i></li><li><i>FIPS186-4 (Appendix D.1.2) (NIST Curves)</i></li></ul> ]<br><br>[ <b>selection:</b> <i>ISO10118-3</i> |

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_COP.1/SigGen:](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that all signature generation functions use the approved algorithms and key sizes.

#### **Guidance**

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component. There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

Each section below contains tests the evaluators must perform for each selected digital signature scheme. Based on the assignments and selections in the requirement, the evaluators choose the specific activities that correspond to those selections.

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are not found on the TOE in its evaluated configuration.

#### **If SigGen1: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 or SigGen4: RSASSA-PSS is claimed:**

The below test is derived from The 186-4 RSA Validation System (RSA2VS). Updated 8 July 2014, Section 6.3, from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

To test the implementation of RSA signature generation the evaluator uses the system under test to generate signatures for 10 messages for each combination of modulus size and SHA algorithm. The evaluator then uses a known-good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.

#### **If SigGen2: Digital Signature Scheme 2 (DSS2) or SigGen3: Digital Signature Scheme 3 (DSS3):**

To test the implementation of DSS2/3 signature generation the evaluator uses the system under test to generate signatures for 10 messages for each combination of SHA algorithm, hash size and key size. The evaluator then uses a known-good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.

#### **If SigGen5: ECDSA is claimed:**

The below test is derived from The FIPS 186-4 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm Validation System (ECDSA2VS). Updated 18 March 2014, Section 6.4, from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

To test the implementation of ECDSA signature generation the evaluator uses the system under test to generate signatures for 10 messages for each combination of curve, SHA algorithm, hash size, and key size. The evaluator then uses a known-good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.

## **FCS\_COP.1/SigVer Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)**

FCS\_COP.1.1/SigVer

The TSF shall perform [digital signature verification] using the supported methods for signature verification defined in the following rows of [Table 8](#) [selection: SigVer1, SigVer2, SigVer3, SigVer4, SigVer5].

**Table 8: Supported Methods for Signature Verification Operation**

| Identifier | Cryptographic Algorithm  | Key Sizes                       | List of Standards   |
|------------|--|---------------------------------|---|
| SigVer1    | RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using<br>[selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]          | [selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit] | [selection: RFC 8017, PKCS #1 v2.2 (Section 8.2), FIPS186-4, (Section 5.5)] (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)<br><br>[selection: ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA) |
| SigVer2    | Digital signature scheme 2 using<br>[selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512] | [selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit] | ISO9796-2, (Clause 9) (Digital signature scheme 2)  |

|         |   |  |   |
|---------|---|--|---|
|         |   |  | <b>[selection:</b><br>ISO10118-3<br>(Clause 10, 11),<br>FIPS180-4<br>(Section 6)]<br>(SHA)  |
| SigVer3 | Digital signature scheme 3 using<br><b>[selection:</b> SHA-256, SHA-384,<br>SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,<br>SHA3-512]   | <b>[selection:</b><br>2048 bit,<br>3072 bit] | ISO9796-2,<br>(Clause 10)<br>(Digital<br>signature<br>scheme 3)<br><br><b>[selection:</b><br>ISO10118-3<br>(Clause 10, 11),<br>FIPS180-4<br>(Section 6)]<br>(SHA)   |
| SigVer4 | RSASSA-PSS using <b>[selection:</b><br>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512,<br>SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]  | <b>[selection:</b><br>2048 bit,<br>3072 bit] | [RFC8017,<br>PKCS#1v2.2<br>(Section 8.1)]<br>(RSASSAPSS)<br><br><b>[selection:</b><br>ISO10118-3<br>(Clause 10, 11),<br>FIPS180-4<br>(Section 6)]<br>(SHA)  |
| SigVer5 | ECDSA on <b>[selection:</b><br>brainpoolP256r1,<br>brainpoolP384r1,<br>brainpoolP512r1, NIST P-256,<br>NIST P-384, NIST P-521] using<br><b>[selection:</b> SHA-256, SHA-384,<br>SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,<br>SHA3-512] | <b>[selection:</b><br>2048 bit,<br>3072 bit] | <b>[selection:</b><br><ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>[selection:</b><br/>ISO14888-3,<br/>FIPS186-4<br/>(Section 6)]<br/>(EDCSA),</li> <li>RFC5639<br/>(Section 3)<br/>(Brainpool<br/>Curves),</li> <li>FIPS186-4<br/>(Appendix<br/>D.1.2)<br/>(NIST<br/>Curves)</li> </ul> ]<br><b>[selection:</b><br>ISO10118-3<br>(Clause 10, 11),<br>FIPS180-4<br>(Section 6)]<br>(SHA) |

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_COP.1/SigVer:](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it describes the overall flow of the signature verification. This should at least include identification of the format and general location (e.g., "firmware on the hard drive device" rather than "memory location 0x00007A4B") of the data to be used in verifying the digital signature; how the data received from the operational environment are brought onto the device; and any processing that is performed that is not part of the digital signature algorithm (for instance, checking of certificate revocation lists).

#### **Guidance**

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component. There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

Each section below contains tests the evaluators must perform for each selected digital signature scheme. Based on the assignments and selections in the requirement, the evaluators choose the specific activities that correspond to those selections.

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are not found on the TOE in its evaluated configuration.

#### **SigVer1: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 and SigVer4: RSASSA-PSS**

These tests are derived from The 186-4 RSA Validation System (RSA2VS), updated 8 Jul 2014, Section 6.4.



The FIPS 186-4 RSA Signature Verification Test tests the ability of the TSF to recognize valid and invalid signatures. The evaluator shall provide a modulus and three associated key pairs (d, e) for each combination of selected SHA algorithm, modulus size and hash size. Each private key d is used to sign six pseudorandom messages each of 1024 bits. For five of the six messages, the public key (e), message, IR format, padding, or signature is altered so that signature verification should fail. The test passes only if all the signatures made using unaltered parameters result in successful signature verification, and all the signatures made using altered parameters result in unsuccessful signature verification.

#### **SigVer5: ECDSA on NIST and Brainpool Curves**

These tests are derived from The FIPS 186-4 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm Validation System (ECDSA2VS), updated 18 Mar 2014, Section 6.5.

The FIPS 186-4 ECC Signature Verification Test tests the ability of the TSF to recognize valid and invalid signatures. The evaluator shall provide a modulus and associated key pair (x, y) for each combination of selected curve, SHA algorithm, modulus size, and hash size. Each private key (x) is used to sign 15 pseudorandom messages of 1024 bits. For eight of the fifteen messages, the message, IR format, padding, or signature is altered so that signature verification should fail. The test passes only if all the signatures made using unaltered parameters result in successful signature verification, and all the signatures made using altered parameters result in unsuccessful signature verification.

#### **SigVer2: Digital Signature Scheme 2**

The following or equivalent steps shall be taken to test the TSF.

For each supported modulus size, underlying hash algorithm, and length of the trailer field (1- or 2-byte), the evaluator shall generate  $N_T$  sets of recoverable message (M1), non-recoverable message (M2), salt, public key and signature (#03A3;).

1.  $N_T$  shall be greater than or equal to 20.
2. The length of salts shall be selected from its supported length range of salt. The typical length of salt is equal to the output block length of underlying hash algorithm (see 9.2.2 of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010).
3. The length of recoverable messages should be selected by considering modulus size, output block length of underlying hash algorithm, and length of salt ( $L_S$ ). As described in Annex D of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010, it is desirable to maximise the length of recoverable message. The following table shows the maximum bit-length of recoverable message that is divisible by 512, for some combinations of modulus size, underlying hash algorithm, and length of salt. None that 2-byte trailer field is assumed in calculating the maximum length of recoverable message

| Maximum length of recoverable message divisible by 512 (bits) | Modulus size (bits) | Underlying hash algorithm (bits) | Length of salt $L_S$ (bits) |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1536  | 2048                | SHA-256                          | 128                         |
| 1024  |                     |                                  | 256                         |
| 1024  |                     | SHA-512                          | 128                         |
| 1024  |                     |                                  | 256                         |
| 512   |                     |                                  | 512                         |
| 2560  | 3072                | SHA-256                          | 128                         |
| 2048  |                     |                                  | 256                         |
| 2048  |                     | SHA-512                          | 128                         |
| 2048  |                     |                                  | 256                         |
| 1536  |                     |                                  | 512                         |

4. The length of non-recoverable messages should be selected by considering the underlying hash algorithm and usages. If the TSF is used for verifying the authenticity of software/firmware updates, the length of non-recoverable messages should be selected greater than or equal to 2048-bit. With this length range, it means that the underlying hash algorithm is also tested for two or more input blocks.
5. The evaluator shall select approximately one half of  $N_T$  sets and shall alter one of the values (non-recoverable message, public key exponent or signature) in the sets. In altering public key exponent, the evaluator shall alter the public key exponent while keeping the exponent odd. In altering signatures, the following ways should be considered:
  - a. Altering a signature just by replacing a bit in the bit-string representation of the signature
  - b. Altering a signature so that the trailer in the message representative cannot be interpreted. This can be achieved by following ways:
    - Setting the rightmost four bits of the message representative to the values other than '1100'.
    - In the case when 1-byte trailer is used, setting the rightmost byte of the message representative to the values other than '0xbc', while keeping the rightmost four bits to '1100'.
    - In the case when 2-byte trailer is used, setting the rightmost byte of the message representative to the values other than '0xcc', while keeping the rightmost four bits to '1100'.

- c. In the case when 2-byte trailer is used, altering a signature so that the hash algorithm identifier in the trailer (i.e. the left most byte of the trailer) does not correspond to hash algorithms identified in the SFR. The hash algorithm identifiers are 0x34 for SHA-256 (see Clause 10 of ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018), and 0x35 for SHA-512 (see Clause 11 of ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018).
- d. Let  $L_S$  be the length of salt, altering a signature so that the intermediate bit string  $D$  in the message representative is set to all zeroes except for the rightmost  $L_S$  bits of  $D$ .
- e. (non-conformant signature length) Altering a signature so that the length of signature #03A3; is changed to modulus size and the most significant bit of signature #03A3; is set equal to '1'.
- f. (non-conformant signature) Altering a signature so that the integer converted from signature #03A3; is greater than modulus  $n$ .

The evaluator shall supply the NT sets to the TSF and obtain in response a set of NT Verification-Success or Verification-Fail values. When the VerificationSuccess is obtained, the evaluator shall also obtain recovered message ( $M_1^*$ ).

The evaluator shall verify that Verification-Success results correspond to the unaltered sets and Verification-Fail results correspond to the altered sets.

For each recovered message, the evaluator shall compare the recovered message ( $M_1^*$ ) with the corresponding recoverable message ( $M_1$ ) in the unaltered sets.

The test passes only if all the signatures made using unaltered sets result in Verification-Success, each recovered message ( $M_1^*$ ) is equal to corresponding  $M_1$  in the unaltered sets, and all the signatures made using altered sets result in Verification-Fail.

### SigVer3: Digital Signature Scheme 3

The evaluator shall perform the test described in SigVer2: Digital Signature Scheme 2 while using a fixed salt for NT sets.

## FCS\_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Key Cryptography)

FCS\_COP.1.1/SKC

The TSF shall perform [data encryption/decryption] using the supported symmetric-key cryptography methods defined in the following rows of [Table 9](#) [**selection:** AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-CTR, XTS-AES, AES-KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM, XTS-CAM].

**Table 9: Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Cryptography Operation**

| Identifier | Cryptographic Algorithm  | Key Sizes   | List of Standards   |
|------------|--|---|---|
| AES-CCM    | AES in CCM mode with unpredictable, nonrepeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits  | [ <b>selection:</b> 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] | ISO 18033-3 (AES)<br>ISO 19772, Clause 8 (CCM)<br>NIST SP800-38C (CCM)  |
| AES-GCM    | AES in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs; IV length must be equal to 96 bits; the deterministic IV construction method (SP800-38D, Section 8.2.1) must be used; the MAC length $t$ must be one of the values [ <b>selection:</b> 96, 104, 112, 120, 128] | [ <b>selection:</b> 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] | ISO 18033-3 (AES)<br>ISO 19772, Clause 11 (GCM)<br>NIST SP800-38D (GCM) |
| AES-CBC    | AES in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs   | [ <b>selection:</b> 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] | ISO 18033-3 (AES)<br>ISO 10116 (CBC)<br>NIST SP800-38A (CBC)            |
| AES-CTR    | AES in counter mode with a non-repeating initial counter and with no repeated use of counter values across multiple messages with the same secret key  | [ <b>selection:</b> 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] | ISO 18033-3 (AES)<br>ISO 10116 (CTR)<br>NIST SP800-38A (CTR)            |
| XTS-AES    | AES in XTS mode with unique [ <b>selection:</b> consecutive non-negative   | [ <b>selection:</b> 256 bits,                     | ISO 18033-3 (AES)   |

|         |  |  |   |
|---------|--|--|---|
|         | <i>integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer, data unit sequence numbers]</i> tweak values  | 512 bits]  | <b>[selection:</b> IEEE 1619, NIST SP800-38E](XTS)  |
| AES-KWP | KWP based on AES   | <b>[selection:</b> 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] | ISO 18033-3 (AES)<br>NIST SP 800-38F, sec. 6.3 (KWP)                                      |
| AES-KW  | KW based on AES  | <b>[selection:</b> 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] | ISO 18033-3 (AES)<br>NIST SP 800-38F, sec. 6.2 (KW)<br>ISO/IEC 19772, clause 7 (key wrap) |
| CAM-CBC | Camellia in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs  | <b>[selection:</b> 128 bits, 256 bits]           | ISO 18033-3 (Camellia)<br>ISO 10116 (CBC)   |
| CAM-CCM | Camellia in CCM mode with unpredictable, nonrepeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits   | <b>[selection:</b> 128 bits, 256 bits]           | ISO 18033-3 (Camellia)<br>ISO 19772, Clause 8 (CCM)<br>NIST SP800-38C (CCM)               |
| CAM-GCM | Camellia in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs; IV length must be equal to 96 bits; the deterministic IV construction method (SP800-38D, Section 8.2.1) must be used; the MAC length t must be one of the values <b>[selection:</b> 96, 104, 112, 120, 128] | <b>[selection:</b> 128 bits, 256 bits]           | ISO 18033-3 (Camellia)<br>ISO 19772, Clause 11 (GCM)<br>NIST SP800-38D (GCM)              |
| XTS-CAM | Camellia in XTS mode with unique <b>[selection:</b> consecutive non-negative integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer, data unit sequence numbers]   | <b>[selection:</b> 256 bits, 512 bits]           | ISO 18033-3 (Camellia)<br><b>[selection:</b> IEEE 1619, NIST SP800-38E](XTS)              |

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_COP.1/SKC:](#)

### FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using **[selection:** Hash\_DRBG (any), HMAC\_DRBG (any), CTR\_DRBG (AES)].

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source in accordance with NIST SP 800-90B that accumulates entropy from **[selection:** **[assignment:** number of software-based sources] software-based noise source, **[assignment:** number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source] with a minimum of **[selection:** 128, 192, 256] bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011, of the keys and CSPs that it will generate.

**Application Note:** ISO/IEC 18031:2011 contains three different methods of generating random numbers. Each of these in turn depends on underlying cryptographic primitives (hash functions/ciphers). This cPP allows SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 for Hash\_DRBG or HMAC\_DRBG and only AES-based implementations for CTR\_DRBG.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1:](#)

### FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Salt Generation

FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use salts and nonces generated by an RBG as specified in [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1](#).

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_SLT\\_EXT.1:](#)

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Storage

FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide [**selection:** *mutable hardware-based, immutable hardware-based, software-based*] protected storage for asymmetric private keys and [**selection:** *symmetric keys, persistent secrets, no other keys*].

**Application Note:** If the protected storage is implemented in software that is protected as required by [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2](#), the ST author is expected to select "software-based." If "software-based" is selected, the ST author is expected to select all "software-based key storage" in [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2](#).

Support for protected storage for all symmetric keys and persistent secrets will be required in future revisions.

FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.2

[FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.1.2](#) The TSF shall support the capability of [**selection:** *importing keys/secrets into the TOE, causing the TOE to generate keys/secrets*] upon request of [**selection:** *a client application, an administrator*].

FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys/secrets in the protected storage upon request of [**selection:** *a client application, an administrator*].

FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the user that [**selection:** *imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated*] to use the key/secret. Exceptions may be explicitly authorized only by [**selection:** *the client application, the administrator*].

FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall allow only the user that [**selection:** *imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated*] to request that the key/secret be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [**selection:** *the client application, the administrator*].

**Application Note:** Not all conformant TOEs will have the ability to import pre-generated keys into the TOE. In these cases, the TOE's ability to receive commands to perform key generation is considered to be its implementation of the Parse service. A subject that caused a key to be generated is considered to be the 'owner' of that key in the same manner as they would be if they had imported it directly.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.1:](#)

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.2 Key Storage Encryption

FCS\_STG\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall encrypt [AKs, SKs, KEKs, and [**selection:** *long-term trusted channel key material, all software-based key storage, no other keys*]] using one of the following methods: [**assignment:** *key encryption methods as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc](#)*].

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2:](#)

## FCS\_STG\_EXT.3 Key Integrity Protection

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall protect the integrity of any encrypted [AKs, SKs, KEKs, and **[selection: long-term trusted channel key material, all software-based key storage, no other keys]**] by using **[selection:**

- Symmetric encryption in **[selection: AES\_CCM, AES\_GCM, AES\_KW, AES\_KWP, CAM\_CCM, CAM\_GCM]** mode in accordance with [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#),
- A hash of the stored key in accordance with [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#),
- A keyed hash of the stored key in accordance with [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#),
- A digital signature of the stored key in accordance with [FCS\\_COP.1/SigGen](#) using an asymmetric key that is protected in accordance with [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2](#),
- An immediate application of the key for decrypting the protected data followed by a successful verification of the decrypted data with previously known information

].

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the **[selection: hash, digital signature, MAC]** of the stored key prior to use of the key.

**Application Note:** This requirement is not applicable to derived keys that are not stored. It is not expected that a single key will be protected from corruption by multiple of these methods; however, a product may use one integrity-protection method for one type of key and a different method for other types of keys. The documentation of the product's encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product's key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagrams. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS – it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.3:](#)

## 5.1.2 User Data Protection

### FDP\_ACC.1 Subset Access Control

#### FDP\_ACC.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] on [

- *Subjects:* S.DSC, S.Admin, S.CA, S.EPS
- *Objects:* OB.P\_SDO, OB.T\_SDO, OB.AuthData, OB.Pstate, OB.FAACntr, OB.AntiReplay, OB.Context
- *Operations:* OP.Import, OP.Create, OP.Use, OP.Modify, OP.Attest, OP.Store, OP.Export, OP.Destroy

].

**Application Note:** The set of operations specified in the assignment can be collectively referred to as “access.” Any subsequent use of the term “access” should be interpreted to refer to one or more of these events.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FDP\\_ACC.1:](#)

### FDP\_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control

#### FDP\_ACF.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following: [subjects (defined in [FDP\\_ACC.1.1](#)) attempt to perform operations (defined in [FDP\\_ACC.1.1](#)) against objects (defined in [FDP\\_ACC.1.1](#)). Subject and object attributes may be used to determine whether the desired operations are permitted.

The following are the SFP-relevant security attributes that are associated with the subjects and objects defined in [FDP\\_ACC.1.1](#), as well as any restrictions on the attribute values:

- S.DSC
  - DSC.ID
- S.Admin – none
- S.CA
  - CA.ID
- S.EPS
  - EPS.ID
- OB.P\_SDO

- *SDO.ID*
- *SDO.Type*
- *SDO.AuthData*
- *SDO.Reauth*
- *SDO.Conf*
- *SDO.Export*
- *SDO.Integrity*
- *SDO.Bind*
- *OB.T\_SDO* - same as *OB.P\_SDO*
- *OB.AuthData* - none
- *OB.Pstate* - none
- *OB.FAACntr* - none
- *OB.AntiReplay* - none
- *OB.Context* - none

].

#### FDP\_ACF.1.2

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [

- *Any subject that has been authorized to perform any operation against any OB.P\_SDO or OB.T\_SDO object can continue to perform this operation if one of the following conditions is true:*
  - *The object's SDO.Reauth attribute has a value of 'none', indicating that reauthorization is not required for subsequent interactions with the SDO*
  - *The object's SDO.Reauth attribute has a value of 'each use', indicating that reauthorization is required for each interaction with the SDO, and the subject has supplied valid authorization data to the TOE*
- *[assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that always prohibit certain subjectobject-operation actions]*
- *[assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that always permit certain subjectobject-operation actions]*
- *[assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that conditionally permit certain subject-object-operation actions based on subject security attributes, object security attributes, or other conditions]*
- *[selection: [assignment: any configurable rules or parameters that can be modified to affect the behavior of the Access Control SFP], no configurable rules]*

].

#### FDP\_ACF.1.3

The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [**assignment:** *rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects*].

**Application Note:** The expectation of this SFR is that the reader is given sufficient information to determine, for each object controlled by the TOE, the operations that can be performed on it based on the subject attempting to perform the operation, and whether this is conditional based on attribute values or any other circumstances.

It is expected that many of the subject-object-operation combinations will always be prohibited by the TSF, either because the target object is not externally modifiable or because the subject lacks the ability to perform the operation in question.

The ST author is not expected to create an exhaustive list of subject-object-operation combinations; it is sufficient to list those that are always permitted and those that are conditionally permitted with the expectation that all remaining combinations are prohibited.

[FDP\\_ACF.1.3](#) and [FDP\\_ACF.1.4](#) allow the ST author to optionally specify override conditions to resolve otherwise contradictory Access Control SFP rules. For example, the rule "S.Admin may always modify the SDO.Conf attribute of any OB.P\_SDO or OB.T\_SDO object" may be overridden by a statement in [FDP\\_ACF.1.4](#) that identifies any particular SDO objects as nonmodifiable regardless of subject authorizations.

The DSC may contain pre-installed SDOs. The DSC will enforce access control for pre-installed SDOs like any other SDO it contains or manages.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

[FDP\\_ACF.1:](#)

### FCS\_ETC\_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs

#### FCS\_ETC\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall propagate only SDO references, wrapped authorization data, and wrapped SDOs such that only [**selection:** *the TSF, authorized users*] can access them.

**Application Note:** The "SDO reference" is a pointer to an object that resides in

the TOE; this can be thought of as a token to the object. The “only the TSF can unwrap the data” selection refers to data that is stored outside the TOE boundary (i.e., data that has been propagated).

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FCS\\_ETC\\_EXT.2:](#)

### FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset

FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall permit a factory reset of the TOE upon: [**selection:** *activation by external interface, presentation of* [**assignment:** *types of authorization data required and reference to their specification*], *no actions or conditions*].

**Application Note:** If the DSC provides factory reset and requires an authorization to carry out the operation then the ST author selects either presentation of... and fills in the authorization data accepted (e.g. a PIN or a cryptographic token based on some specification referenced in the assigned value). If the DSC provides factory reset external to the DSC without requiring authorization then the ST author selects activation by external interface. This selection is intended for use when the device containing the DSC takes responsibility for obtaining and checking the authorization for factory reset.

If any selection other than no actions or conditions is made in [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.1.1](#), the selection-based SFR FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 must be claimed.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.1:](#)

### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support importing SDEs using [**selection:** *physically protected channels as specified in FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1, encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1, cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1*].

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDE using [**selection:**

- *cryptographic hash as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#),*
- *keyed hash as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#),*
- *integrityproviding encryption algorithm as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc](#) [**selection:** *SE1, SE2*],*
- *digital signature as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/SigVer](#),*
- *integrity verification supported by [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1.1](#)*

].

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall bind SDEs to security attributes using [**assignment:** *list of ways the TSF generates security attributes and binds them to the SDEs*].

**Application Note:** The way the TSF checks the integrity of the SDE depends on the method of importation. For example, the encrypted data channel may provide data integrity as part of its service.

When a TSF parses an SDE, it should generate security attributes and create an SDO by binding the security attributes to the SDE.

If physically protected channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 must be claimed.

If encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 must be claimed.

If cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 must be claimed.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1:](#)

### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall support importing SDOs using [**selection:** *physically protected channels as specified in FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1, encrypted data buffers as specified in*



*FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1, cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1].*

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDO using [**selection:**

- *cryptographic hash as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#),*
- *keyed hash as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#),*
- *integrity providing encryption algorithm as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc](#) [**selection:** SE1, SE2],*
- *digital signature as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/SigVer](#),*
- *integrity verification supported by [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2.1](#)*

].

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.4

The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.5

The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.

**Application Note:** The way the TSF checks the integrity of the SDO depends on the method of importation. For example, the encrypted data channel may provide data integrity as part of its service.

When a TSF parses an SDO, it should already have a set of security attributes. However, the TSF may modify these attributes, if authorized, to comply with security policies on the TOE.

If physically protected channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

If encrypted data buffers as specified in [FTP\\_ITE\\_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITE\\_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

If cryptographically protected data channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2:](#)

## FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware

FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be maintained as [**selection:** *immutable, mutable*] firmware.

**Application Note:** The ST author must include FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2, FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3, FPT\_FLS.1/FW, and FPT\_RPL.1/Rollback if mutable is selected.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FDP\\_MFW\\_EXT.1:](#)

## FDP\_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection

FDP\_RIP.1.1

The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [*deallocation of the resource from*] the following objects: [

- *SDOs*
- *SDEs*

].

**Application Note:** When an SDE is a key then it is also subject to the key destruction requirements in [FCS\\_CKM.4](#), depending on where and how it is stored. This SFR applies to authorization data that are SDEs and security attributes in SDOs.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FDP\\_RIP.1:](#)

## FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1 Confidentiality of SDEs

FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use [**selection:**



- *protected storage,*
- *symmetric encryption using [selection: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM] as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#),*
- *key wrapping using [selection: KAS1, KAS2, KTS-OAEP] as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#)*

] to protect the confidentiality of authorization data and [assignment: *list of internally and externally stored SDEs identified in the Confidential SDE List attribute of an SDO*].

FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall use [FCS\\_CKM.1/KEK](#) to derive or generate the key to encrypt the SDEs.

**Application Note:** This SFR applies to confidential SDEs, especially secret and private keys, Allowed Random Number Generators' state data, and vendor verification reference data. This SFR also applies to all authorization data appearing in the attribute list under SDO.AuthData as well as any administrator authorization data which may be stored implicitly.

If the TOE stores these parameters outside of its boundary, it must encrypt them according to the cryptographic requirements for key encryption, as required by FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2.

Vendor pre-installed SDOs includes both objects installed during manufacturing, and those provisioned by the vendor before final release to customer. The administrator and no one else owns and controls these objects.

The confidential-SDE List attribute of the SDO indicates those SDEs that require confidentiality. If SDEs do not require confidentiality, then its omission from this list indicates that confidentiality is not required.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FDP\\_SDC\\_EXT.1:](#)

## FDP\_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action

FDP\_SDI.2.1

The TSF shall monitor SDOs and SDEs controlled by the TSF for [*integrity errors*] on all objects, based on the following attributes: [selection:

- [assignment: *attribute associated with presence in protected storage*],
- *cryptographic hash,*
- *digital signature,*
- *integrity-providing encryption algorithm as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc](#) [selection: SE1, SE2]*

].

FDP\_SDI.2.2

Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [

- *prohibit the use of the altered data*
- *send notification of the error where applicable*

].

**Application Note:** This SFR deals with the mechanism that protects the integrity of the SDEs and security attributes within an SDO. This provides the binding data that ensures the prevention of unauthorized changes to the SDEs and attributes.

The cryptographic requirements for cryptographic hashes and digital signatures apply here.

No specific requirement is placed here on the nature of the integrity protection data, but the Security Target shall describe this protection measure, and shall identify the iteration of [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#) or [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#) that covers any cryptographic algorithm used.

The integrity protection data in [FDP\\_SDI.2.1](#) is included in the list of attributes identified in FMT\_MSA.1, and protects the value of the SDEs and of the SDO security attributes.

When an SDO is parsed, its integrity is checked when it is imported into the TOE.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FDP\\_SDI.2:](#)

### 5.1.3 Identification and Authentication

When a platform process requests the ability to create, use, modify, dispose of, etc., an SDE or SDO within the DSC, as a matter of policy, the DSC may expect or request authorization from the platform process, which may include authentication of the requester on whose behalf the platform process is acting. The DSC assumes the requester to be either a person, a process, or a device. The rules on how the requester formats the

request will be outside the scope of this cPP. Upon request (or as a matter of an established protocol), the interface (on behalf of the user) presents to the DSC process those authorization values required to authorize execution of the event request. This may include one or more different types of authentication credentials. The DSC validates these items before acting upon the requested event. The validation may simply compare the authorization values to an expected value, or perform a more complex cryptographic protocol to verify the authenticity of the user. After validation, the DSC may then create and subsequently use an authorization value to represent the validation of these authorization values in anticipation of future requests.

Requirements related to the strength, quality, and performance of authorization values supplied to the DSC, such as X.509 certificates and biometric templates, are all outside the scope of the DSC and are expected to be met by the platform, where applicable. The DSC is only expected to enforce quality metrics on any authorization values it generates itself.

## FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling

FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall maintain [**selection:**

- *a unique counter for [**selection:** each SDO, the following SDOs [**assignment:** list of SDOs]],*
- *one global counter covering [**selection:** all SDOs, the following SDOs [**assignment:** list of SDOs]]*

], called the failed authorization attempt counters, that counts of the number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these **SDOs**.

FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall maintain a [**selection:** *static, administrator configurable variable*] threshold of the minimal acceptable number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these **SDOs**.

FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3

When the failed authorization attempt counters [**selection:** *meets, surpasses*] the threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, the TSF shall [**selection:**

- *prevent future authorization attempts for a static prescribed amount of time,*
- *prevent future authorization attempts for an administrator configurable amount of time,*
- *collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Components,*
- *prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock), as described by FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2,*
- *factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2*

] for these **SDOs**.

FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall increment the failed authorization attempt counter before it verifies the authorization.

**Application Note:** The product validates the authorization factors prior to determining whether user (administrator or client application) access to the SDE/SDO is permitted. In cases where validation of the authorization factors fails, the product will not allow access to SDE/SDO. The product validates the authorization factors in such a way that it does not allow an attacker to circumvent the other requirements to gain knowledge about the SDE/SDO or other keying material that protects them from inadvertent exposure. It is possible for the TOE to have different rules for the treatment of different SDOs or groups of SDOs. For example, some SDOs may trigger a factory reset in the event of excessive authorization failures while others may only temporarily block future authorization attempts. The ST author should iterate this SFR for each distinct response the TSF can make (as defined by the selections in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#)) and the SDOs whose authorization failures will trigger these responses.

If prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock), as described by FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 is selected in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#), the selection-based SFR [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.2](#) must be claimed.

If factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 is selected in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#), the selection-based SFR [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.2](#) must be claimed.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1:](#)

## FIA\_SOS.2 TSF Generation of Secrets

FIA\_SOS.2.1

The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate authorization data that meet [the following quality metrics:

- *For each authentication attempt, the probability shall be less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will be successful*
- *For multiple attempts to authenticate during a one-minute period, the probability shall be less than one in 100,000 that a series of random*

#### FIA\_SOS.2.2

The TSF shall be able to enforce the use of TSF generated authorization data for **[assignment: non-empty list of TSF functions]**.

**Application Note:** This SFR expects the TSF must generate authorization data from a sufficiently large key space to ensure that users cannot employ random guessing as a statistically plausible method of authorizing actions within the TOE, both for a single event and over a session.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

[FIA\\_SOS.2:](#)

#### FIA\_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action

##### FIA\_UAU.2.1

The TSF shall require each user **and SDO owner** to be successfully authenticated before **authorizing** any ~~other~~ TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user **or SDO owner**.

**Application Note:** This SFR goes with [FDP\\_ACF.1](#), which authorizes access to SDOs (i.e. authorizes operations with or on SDOs). The security policies in [FDP\\_ACF.1](#) may require authentication of the subjects and owners of the SDOs before the TSF authorizes access to them. An authentication token is critical data bound to a user. Such data, when presented to the TOE and successfully verified by it, authenticates the user. The TOE may use the successful authentication of a user as an authorization to execute an action on its behalf, or to perform a requested operation on or with an SDO.

This requirement specifies the TSF exercise an authentication mechanism from [FIA\\_UAU.5](#) by which the TOE authenticates the identity of the user requesting the operation and the owner of the SDO which is an object in the operation. Such authentication is necessary to authorize it to operate with the SDOs. A user could present a unique authentication token. The TSF may accept authentication tokens with no further conditioning. The TSF validates the authentication token prior to granting the authorization to perform the requested operation with the SDO. The SDO security attribute SDO.Reauth determines whether or not the TOE may authenticate the user and the SDO owner only once or each time each time it operates with the SDO.

The means of validation may vary based on the type of authentication token.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

[FIA\\_UAU.2:](#)

#### FIA\_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms

##### FIA\_UAU.5.1

The TSF shall provide **[selection: none, authentication token mechanism, cryptographic signature mechanism, [assignment: list of authentication mechanisms]]** to support user authentication.

##### FIA\_UAU.5.2

The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the **[selection: all subject users and SDO owners shall successfully authenticate themselves using one of the mechanisms listed in [FIA\\_UAU.5.1](#), the Prove service shall not accept "none" as an authentication method, [assignment: rules describing how each authentication mechanism provides authentication]]**

**Application Note:** This SFR describes the authentication mechanisms required for any user of any service as a precondition for providing authorization to execute the service. This includes the authentication of the owner of the SDOs of the service.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

[FIA\\_UAU.5:](#)

#### FIA-UAU.6 Re-Authenticating

##### FIA-UAU.6.1

The TSF shall re-authenticate the user **for access to an SDO** under the conditions:  
[

1. Re-authentication and re-authorization by further successful completion of

the authentication and authorization methods in [FIA\\_UAU.2](#), in accordance with the value of the SDO.Reauth attribute of the SDO as follows:

- a. If SDO.Reauth has the value 'each access';
- b. if SDO.Reauth has the value 'policy' and the TSF determines that the TOE satisfies the policy for re-authentication and reauthorization

]

**Application Note:** The allowed values for the SDO.Reauth attribute of an SDO are defined in FMT\_MSA.3 and the SDO Attributes Initialization Table. The rules in [FDP\\_ACF.1.2](#) and also ensure that the need for re-authorization has been checked before access to an SDO.

An SDO.Reauth value of 'none' indicates that no authentication of the subject user nor of the SDO owners is necessary. It also indicates that no reauthorization for operations using the SDO is necessary.

An SDO.Reauth value of policy indicates that there may be a more complicated set of circumstances that trigger a re-auth (re-authentication of the users and owners as well as reauthorization of the operation). This could be a policy of a time limit for which a user can use an SDO before re-authentication (e.g. 10 minutes or 24 hours). The ST should indicate the policies allowed, and how the TOE evaluates the policies. The ST should also indicate the location of those policies, and how the TOE protects the integrity of those policies.

When the TSF binds a user to access an SDO, this means that the TSF has authenticated the user and that the TSF authorized the user to have the right to exercise one or more of the following actions: generate the SDO, modify the SDO, including its security attributes, use the SDO in a TOE operation, propagate or duplicate the SDO for use by a device external to the DSC, or destroy the SDO. The user may not have exclusive rights to exercise the operations listed.

Policy as represented by the attributes in the SDO dictates whether or not a user must authenticate itself in order to authorize access to the SDO.

It is possible that the attributes of some SDOs should remain unchanged, and that the attributes of other SDOs may be changed by authorized users. If this is the case, then the ST author should iterate this SFR and indicate in the TSS which SDOs apply to each iteration.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

[FIA-UAU.6:](#)

### 5.1.4 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:

**Table 10: SFR Rationale**

| OBJECTIVE                        | ADDRESSED BY      | RATIONALE                   |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| <a href="#">O.ACCOUNTABILITY</a> | FAU_GEN.1         | 'cause FAU_GEN.1 is awesome |
|                                  | FTP_ITC_EXT.1     | Cause FTP reasons           |
| <a href="#">O.INTEGRITY</a>      | FPT_SBOP_EXT.1    | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FPT_ASLR_EXT.1    | ASLR For reasons            |
|                                  | FPT_TUD_EXT.1     | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FPT_TUD_EXT.2     | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FCS_COP.1/HASH    | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FCS_COP.1/SIGN    | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FPT_ACF_EXT.1     | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FPT_SRP_EXT.1     | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FIA_X509_EXT.1    | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FPT_TST_EXT.1     | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FTP_ITC_EXT.1     | For reasons                 |
|                                  | FPT_W^X_EXT.1     | For reasons                 |

|                     |   |                           |
|---------------------|---|---------------------------|
|                     | FIA_AFL.1   | For reasons               |
|                     | FIA_UAU.5   | For reasons               |
| O.MANAGEMENT        | FMT_MOF_EXT.1   | For reasons               |
|                     | FMT_SMF_EXT.1   | For reasons               |
|                     | FTA_TAB.1   | For reasons               |
|                     | FTP_TRP.1   | For reasons               |
| O.PROTECTED_STORAGE | FCS_STO_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT, FDP_ACF_EXT.1  | Rationale for a big chunk |
| O.PROTECTED_COMMS   | FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.4, FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT, FCS_COP.1/HASH, FCS_COP.1/SIGN, FCS_COP.1/HMAC, FDP_IFC_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FTP_ITC_EXT.1 | Rationale for a big chunk |

## 5.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The Security Objectives in [Section 4 Security Objectives](#) were constructed to address threats identified in [Section 3.1 Threats](#). The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) are a formal instantiation of the Security Objectives. The PP identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs independent testing.

This section lists the set of SARs from CC part 3 that are required in evaluations against this PP. Individual Assurance Activities to be performed are specified both in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) as well as in this section.

The general model for evaluation of OSs against STs written to conform to this PP is as follows:

After the ST has been approved for evaluation, the TSEF will obtain the OS, supporting environmental IT, and the administrative/user guides for the OS. The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC SARs. The ITSEF also performs the Assurance Activities contained within [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#), which are intended to be an interpretation of the other CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the OS. The Assurance Activities that are captured in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) also provide clarification as to what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the OS is compliant with the PP.

### 5.2.1 Class ASE: Security Target

As per ASE activities defined in [\[CEM\]](#).

### 5.2.2 Class ADV: Development

The information about the OS is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the TSS portion of the ST. The OS developer must concur with the description of the product that is contained in the TSS as it relates to the functional requirements. The Assurance Activities contained in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) should provide the ST authors with sufficient information to determine the appropriate content for the TSS section.

#### ADV\_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV\_FSP.1)

The functional specification describes the TSFIs. It is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. Additionally, because OSs conforming to this PP will necessarily have interfaces to the Operational Environment that are not directly invocable by OS users, there is little point specifying that such interfaces be described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be possible. For this PP, the activities for this family should focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation. No additional “functional specification” documentation is necessary to satisfy the assurance activities specified. The interfaces that need to be evaluated are characterized through the information needed to perform the assurance activities listed, rather than as an independent, abstract list.

#### Developer action elements:

ADV\_FSP.1.1D

The developer shall provide a functional specification.

#### Content and presentation elements:

ADV\_FSP.1.2C

The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.

**Application Note:** As indicated in the introduction to this section, the functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD\_OPE and AGD\_PRE documentation. The developer may reference a website accessible to application developers and the evaluator. The assurance activities in the functional requirements point to evidence that should exist in the documentation and TSS section; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element [ADV\\_FSP.1.2D](#) is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.

ADV\_FSP.1.3C

The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV\_FSP.1.4C

The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV\_FSP.1.5C

The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.

ADV\_FSP.1.6C

The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

#### Evaluator action elements:

ADV\_FSP.1.7E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ADV\_FSP.1.8E

The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

##### *ADV\_FSP.1:*

*There are no specific assurance activities associated with these SARs, except ensuring the information is provided. The functional specification documentation is provided to support the evaluation activities described in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#), and other activities described for AGD, ATE, and AVA SARs. The requirements on the content of the functional specification information is implicitly assessed by virtue of the other assurance activities being performed; if the evaluator is unable to perform an activity because there is insufficient interface information, then an adequate functional specification has not been provided.*

### 5.2.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation

The guidance documents will be provided with the ST. Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the IT personnel. Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and Instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment. Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality is also provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in the assurance activities specified with each requirement.

#### AGD\_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD\_OPE.1)

##### Developer action elements:

AGD\_OPE.1.1D

The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

**Application Note:** The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages. Rather than repeat information here, the developer should review the assurance activities for this component to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.

##### Content and presentation elements:

AGD\_OPE.1.2C

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.

**Application Note:** User and administrator are to be considered in the definition of user role.

AGD\_OPE.1.3C

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the OS in a secure manner.

AGD\_OPE.1.4C

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.

**Application Note:** This portion of the operational user guidance should be presented in the form of a checklist that can be quickly executed by IT personnel (or end-users, when necessary) and suitable for use in compliance activities. When possible, this guidance is to be expressed in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) to support security automation. Minimally, it should be presented in a structured format which includes a title for each configuration item, instructions for achieving the secure configuration,



and any relevant rationale.

AGD\_OPE.1.5C

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

AGD\_OPE.1.6C

The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the OS (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.

AGD\_OPE.1.7C

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD\_OPE.1.8C

The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

#### Evaluator action elements:

AGD\_OPE.1.9E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

##### *AGD\_OPE.1:*

*Some of the contents of the operational guidance are verified by the assurance activities in Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements and evaluation of the OS according to the [CEM]. The following additional information is also required. If cryptographic functions are provided by the OS, the operational guidance shall contain instructions for configuring the cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the OS. It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the OS. The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the OS by verifying a digital signature – this may be done by the OS or the underlying platform. The evaluator will verify that this process includes the following steps: Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to the OS (e.g., placement in a specific directory). Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or unsuccessful. This includes generation of the hash/digital signature. The OS will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this PP. The operational guidance shall make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the evaluation activities.*

#### AGD\_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures (AGD\_PRE.1)

##### Developer action elements:

AGD\_PRE.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS, including its preparative procedures.

**Application Note:** As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the assurance activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.

##### Content and presentation elements:

AGD\_PRE.1.2C

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered OS in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.

AGD\_PRE.1.3C

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the OS and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

##### Evaluator action elements:

AGD\_PRE.1.4E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AGD\_PRE.1.5E

The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the OS can be prepared securely for operation.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

##### *AGD\_PRE.1:*

*As indicated in the introduction above, there are significant expectations with respect to the*

documentation—especially when configuring the operational environment to support OS functional requirements. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the guidance provided for the OS adequately addresses all platforms claimed for the OS in the ST.

#### 5.2.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support

At the assurance level provided for OSs conformant to this PP, life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the OS vendor's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it is a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.

##### ALC\_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE (ALC\_CMC.1)

This component is targeted at identifying the OS such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user.

##### Developer action elements:

ALC\_CMC.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS and a reference for the OS.

##### Content and presentation elements:

ALC\_CMC.1.2C

The OS shall be labeled with a unique reference.

**Application Note:** Unique reference information includes:

- OS Name
- OS Version
- OS Description
- Software Identification (SWID) tags, if available

##### Evaluator action elements:

ALC\_CMC.1.3E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

##### [ALC\\_CMC.1:](#)

*The evaluator will check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the ST. Further, the evaluator will check the AGD guidance and OS samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor maintains a web site advertising the OS, the evaluator will examine the information on the web site to ensure that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.*

##### ALC\_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage (ALC\_CMS.1)

Given the scope of the OS and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's assurance activities are covered by the assurance activities listed for [ALC\\_CMC.1](#).

##### Developer action elements:

ALC\_CMS.1.1D

The developer shall provide a configuration list for the OS.

##### Content and presentation elements:

ALC\_CMS.1.2C

The configuration list shall include the following: the OS itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.

ALC\_CMS.1.3C

The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

##### Evaluator action elements:

ALC\_CMS.1.4E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

##### [ALC\\_CMS.1:](#)

*The "evaluation evidence required by the SARs" in this PP is limited to the information in the ST coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that the OS is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the ST and in the AGD guidance (as done in the assurance activity for [ALC\\_CMC.1](#)), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this component. Life-cycle support is targeted*



aspects of the developer's life-cycle and instructions to providers of applications for the developer's devices, rather than an in-depth examination of the TSF manufacturer's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation. The evaluator will ensure that the developer has identified (in guidance documentation for application developers concerning the targeted platform) one or more development environments appropriate for use in developing applications for the developer's platform. For each of these development environments, the developer shall provide information on how to configure the environment to ensure that buffer overflow protection mechanisms in the environment(s) are invoked (e.g., compiler and linker flags). The evaluator will ensure that this documentation also includes an indication of whether such protections are on by default, or have to be specifically enabled. The evaluator will ensure that the TSF is uniquely identified (with respect to other products from the TSF vendor), and that documentation provided by the developer in association with the requirements in the ST is associated with the TSF using this unique identification.

### ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates

This component requires the OS developer, in conjunction with any other necessary parties, to provide information as to how the end-user devices are updated to address security issues in a timely manner. The documentation describes the process of providing updates to the public from the time a security flaw is reported/discovered, to the time an update is released. This description includes the parties involved (e.g., the developer, carriers(s)) and the steps that are performed (e.g., developer testing, carrier testing), including worst case time periods, before an update is made available to the public.

#### Developer action elements:

ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.1D

The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the OS.

ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.2D

The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product.

#### Content and presentation elements:

ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.3C

The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the OS software.

ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.4C

The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to the OS.

**Note:** The reporting mechanism could include web sites, email addresses, as well as a means to protect the sensitive nature of the report (e.g., public keys that could be used to encrypt the details of a proof-of-concept exploit).

#### Evaluator action elements:

ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.5E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1:

The evaluator will verify that the TSS contains a description of the timely security update process used by the developer to create and deploy security updates. The evaluator will verify that this description addresses the entire application. The evaluator will also verify that, in addition to the OS developer's process, any third-party processes are also addressed in the description. The evaluator will also verify that each mechanism for deployment of security updates is described.

The evaluator will verify that, for each deployment mechanism described for the update process, the TSS lists a time between public disclosure of a vulnerability and public availability of the security update to the OS patching this vulnerability, to include any third-party or carrier delays in deployment. The evaluator will verify that this time is expressed in a number or range of days. The evaluator will verify that this description includes the publicly available mechanisms (including either an email address or website) for reporting security issues related to the OS. The evaluator shall verify that the description of this mechanism includes a method for protecting the report either using a public key for encrypting email or a trusted channel for a website.

### 5.2.5 Class ATE: Tests

Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE\_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA\_VAN family. At the assurance level specified in this PP, testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirements.

## ATE\_IND.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE\_IND.1)

Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the administrative (including configuration and operational) documentation provided. The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) being met, although some additional testing is specified for SARs in [Section 5.2 Security Assurance Requirements](#). The Assurance Activities identify the additional testing activities associated with these components. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/OS combinations that are claiming conformance to this PP. Given the scope of the OS and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's assurance activities are covered by the assurance activities listed for [ALC\\_CMC.1](#).

### Developer action elements:

ATE\_IND.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS for testing.

### Content and presentation elements:

ATE\_IND.1.2C

The OS shall be suitable for testing.

### Evaluator action elements:

ATE\_IND.1.3E

The evaluator *shall confirm* that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ATE\_IND.1.4E

The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.

**Application Note:** The evaluator will test the OS on the most current fully patched version of the platform.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [ATE\\_IND.1:](#)

*The evaluator will prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system, including any application crashes during testing. The evaluator shall determine the root cause of any application crashes and include that information in the report. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the [\[CEM\]](#) and the body of this PP's Assurance Activities.*

*While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an Assurance Activity, the evaluator must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST is covered. The test plan identifies the platforms to be tested, and for those platforms not included in the test plan but included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing the platforms. This justification must address the differences between the tested platforms and the untested platforms, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no affect; rationale must be provided. If all platforms claimed in the ST are tested, then no rationale is necessary. The test plan describes the composition of each platform to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the evaluator is expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each platform either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) should be provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the OS and its platform. This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The cryptographic algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by this PP and used by the cryptographic protocols being evaluated (IPsec, TLS). The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those objectives. These procedures include expected results.*

*The test report (which could just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a "fail" and "pass" result (and the supporting details), and not just the "pass" result.*

## 5.2.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment

For the first generation of this protection profile, the evaluation lab is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. Until penetration tools are created and uniformly distributed to the evaluation labs, the evaluator will not be expected to test for these vulnerabilities in the OS. The labs will be expected to comment on the likelihood of these vulnerabilities given the documentation provided by the vendor. This information will be used in the development of penetration testing tools and for the development of future protection profiles.

## AVA\_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA\_VAN.1)

### Developer action elements:

AVA\_VAN.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS for testing.

### Content and presentation elements:

AVA\_VAN.1.2C

The OS shall be suitable for testing.

#### Evaluator action elements:

AVA\_VAN.1.3E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AVA\_VAN.1.4E

The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the OS.

**Application Note:** Public domain sources include the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) dictionary for publicly-known vulnerabilities. Public domain sources also include sites which provide free checking of files for viruses.

AVA\_VAN.1.5E

The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the OS is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

##### [AVA\\_VAN.1:](#)

*The evaluator will generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE\_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to find vulnerabilities that have been found in similar applications with a particular focus on network protocols the application uses and document formats it parses. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report.*

*For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE\_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.*

# Appendix A - Implementation-Dependent Requirements

Implementation-Dependent Requirements are dependent on the TOE implementing a particular function. If the TOE fulfills any of these requirements, the vendor must either add the related SFR or disable the functionality for the evaluated configuration.

## A.1 Widget Thing

This is a super description of this certain feature.

If this is implemented by the TOE, the following requirements must be included in the ST:

# Appendix B - Inherently Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this Protection Profile. However, these requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [\[CC\]](#) Part 1, **8.2 Dependencies between components**.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the Protection Profile provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.

| Requirement                               | Rationale for Satisfaction   |
|---|--|
| FIA_UAU.1 - Timing of authentication      | FIA_AFL.1 implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been authenticated, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test. |
| FIA_UID.1 - Timing of identification      | FIA_AFL.1 implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been identified, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test.    |
| FMT_SMR.1 - Security roles                | FMT_MOF_EXT.1 specifies role-based management functions that implicitly defines user and privileged accounts; therefore, it is duplicative to include separate role requirements.  |
| FPT_STM.1 - Reliable time stamps          | FAU_GEN.1.2 explicitly requires that the OS associate timestamps with audit records; therefore it is duplicative to include a separate timestamp requirement.  |
| FTA_SSL.1 - TSF-initiated session locking | FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines requirements for managing session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement.   |
| FTA_SSL.2 - User-initiated locking        | FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines requirements for user-initiated session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement.   |
| FAU_STG.1 - Protected audit trail storage | FPT_ACF_EXT.1 defines a requirement to protect audit logs; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate protection of audit trail requirements.  |
| FAU_GEN.2 - User identity association     | FAU_GEN.1.2 explicitly requires that the OS record any user account associated with each event; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to associate a user account with each event.  |
| FAU_SAR.1 - Audit review                  | FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2 requires that audit logs (and other objects) are protected from reading by unprivileged users; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to protect only the audit information.   |

**Appendix C - Acronyms**



# Appendix D - Selection Rules

This rules in this appendix define which combinations of selections are considered valid. An ST is considered conforming only if it satisfies all rules.

# Appendix E - Use Case Templates

## E.1 Elephant-own device

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# Appendix F - Acronyms

| Acronym | Meaning   |
|---------|---|
| AES     | Advanced Encryption Standard                        |
| API     | Application Programming Interface                   |
| API     | Application Programming Interface                   |
| ASLR    | Address Space Layout Randomization                  |
| Base-PP | Base Protection Profile                             |
| CC      | Common Criteria                                     |
| CEM     | Common Evaluation Methodology                       |
| CESG    | Communications-Electronics Security Group           |
| CMC     | Certificate Management over CMS                     |
| CMS     | Cryptographic Message Syntax                        |
| CN      | Common Names  |
| CRL     | Certificate Revocation List                         |
| CSA     | Computer Security Act                               |
| CSP     | Critical Security Parameters                        |
| DAR     | Data At Rest  |
| DEP     | Data Execution Prevention                           |
| DES     | Data Encryption Standard                            |
| DHE     | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral                            |
| DNS     | Domain Name System                                  |
| DRBG    | Deterministic Random Bit Generator                  |
| DSS     | Digital Signature Standard                          |
| DSS     | Digital Signature Standard                          |
| DT      | Date/Time Vector                                    |
| DTLS    | Datagram Transport Layer Security                   |
| EAP     | Extensible Authentication Protocol                  |
| ECDHE   | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral             |
| ECDSA   | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm          |
| EST     | Enrollment over Secure Transport                    |
| FIPS    | Federal Information Processing Standards            |
| HMAC    | Hash-based Message Authentication Code              |
| HTTP    | Hypertext Transfer Protocol                         |
| HTTPS   | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure                  |
| IETF    | Internet Engineering Task Force                     |
| IP      | Internet Protocol                                   |
| ISO     | International Organization for Standardization      |
| IT      | Information Technology                              |
| ITSEF   | Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility |
| NIAP    | National Information Assurance Partnership          |
| NIST    | National Institute of Standards and Technology      |
| OCSP    | Online Certificate Status Protocol                  |
| OE      | Operational Environment                             |
| OID     | Object Identifier                                   |
| OMB     | Office of Management and Budget                     |

|                  |   |
|------------------|---|
| OS               | Operating System                                      |
| PII              | Personally Identifiable Information                   |
| PKI              | Public Key Infrastructure                             |
| PP               | Protection Profile                                    |
| PP               | Protection Profile                                    |
| PP-Configuration | Protection Profile Configuration                      |
| PP-Module        | Protection Profile Module                             |
| RBG              | Random Bit Generator                                  |
| RFC              | Request for Comment                                   |
| RNG              | Random Number Generator                               |
| RNGVS            | Random Number Generator Validation System             |
| S/MIME           | Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions         |
| SAN              | Subject Alternative Name                              |
| SAR              | Security Assurance Requirement                        |
| SFR              | Security Functional Requirement                       |
| SHA              | Secure Hash Algorithm                                 |
| SIP              | Session Initiation Protocol                           |
| ST               | Security Target                                       |
| SWID             | Software Identification                               |
| TLS              | Transport Layer Security                              |
| TOE              | Target of Evaluation                                  |
| TSF              | TOE Security Functionality                            |
| TSFI             | TSF Interface   |
| TSS              | TOE Summary Specification                             |
| URI              | Uniform Resource Identifier                           |
| URL              | Uniform Resource Locator                              |
| USB              | Universal Serial Bus                                  |
| VM               | Virtual Machine                                       |
| XCCDF            | eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format |
| XOR              | Exclusive Or  |
| app              | Application   |

# Appendix G - Bibliography

| Identifier | Title   |
|------------|---|
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