

Requirements from the *Protection Profile for QQQQ*



Version: 1.0

2015-08-14

National Information Assurance Partnership

Revision History

| Version | Date | Comment |
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| 1.0 | 2015-08-14 | Release - first version released |

Introduction

Purpose. This document presents the functional and assurance requirements found in the *Protection Profile for QQQQ*. Common Criteria evaluation, facilitated in the U.S. by the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP), is required for IA and IA-enabled products in National Security Systems according to CNSS Policy #11.

Using this document. This representation of the Protection Profile includes:

- [Security Functional Requirements](#) for use in evaluation. These are featured without the formal Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile, to assist the reader who is interested only in the requirements.

It also includes, in tables shown later, particular types of security functional requirements that are not strictly required in all cases. These are:

- [Selection-based Security Functional Requirements](#) which become required when certain selections are made inside the regular Security Functionality Requirements (as indicated by the **[selection:]** construct).
 - [Objective Security Functional Requirements](#) which are highly desired but not yet widely-available in commercial technology.
 - [Optional Security Functional Requirements](#) which are available for evaluation and which some customers may insist upon.
- [Security Assurance Requirements](#) which relate to developer support for the product under evaluation, development processes, and other non-functionality security relevant requirements.

Security Functional Requirements

Security Assurance Requirements

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| ADV_FSP.1.1D | The developer shall provide a functional specification. |
| ADV_FSP.1.2D | <p>The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.</p> <p>Application Note:As indicated in the introduction to this section, the functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD_OPE and AGD_PRE documentation. The developer may reference a website accessible to application developers and the evaluator. The assurance activities in the functional requirements point to evidence that should exist in the documentation and TSS section; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element ADV_FSP.1.2D is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.</p> |
| ADV_FSP.1.1C | The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI. |
| ADV_FSP.1.2C | The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI. |
| ADV_FSP.1.3C | The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering. |
| ADV_FSP.1.4C | The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification. |
| ADV_FSP.1.1E | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. |
| ADV_FSP.1.2E | The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs. |
| AGD_OPE.1.1D | <p>The developer shall provide operational user guidance.</p> <p>Application Note:The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages. Rather than repeat information here, the developer should review the assurance activities for this component to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.</p> |
| AGD_OPE.1.1C | <p>The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.</p> <p>Application Note:User and administrator are to be considered in the definition of user role.</p> |
| AGD_OPE.1.2C | The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the in a secure manner. |
| AGD_OPE.1.3C | <p>The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.</p> <p>Application Note: This portion of the operational user guidance should be presented in the form of a checklist that can be quickly executed by IT personnel (or end-users, when necessary) and suitable for use in compliance activities. When possible, this guidance is to be expressed in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) to support security automation. Minimally, it should be presented in a structured format which includes a title for each configuration item, instructions for achieving the secure configuration, and any relevant rationale.</p> |
| AGD_OPE.1.4C | The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF. |
| AGD_OPE.1.5C | The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation. |
| AGD_OPE.1.6C | The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST. |
| AGD_OPE.1.7C | The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable. |

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| AGD_OPE.1.1E | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. |
| AGD_PRE.1.1D | The developer shall provide the , including its preparative procedures. Application Note: As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the assurance activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures. |
| AGD_PRE.1.1C | The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures. |
| AGD_PRE.1.2C | The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST. |
| AGD_PRE.1.1E | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. |
| AGD_PRE.1.2E | The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the can be prepared securely for operation. |
| ALC_CMC.1.1D | The developer shall provide the and a reference for the . |
| ALC_CMC.1.1C | The shall be labeled with a unique reference. Application Note: Unique reference information includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OS Name • OS Version • OS Description • Software Identification (SWID) tags, if available |
| ALC_CMC.1.1E | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. |
| ALC_CMS.1.1D | The developer shall provide a configuration list for the . |
| ALC_CMS.1.1C | The configuration list shall include the following: the itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs. |
| ALC_CMS.1.2C | The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items. |
| ALC_CMS.1.1E | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. |
| ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1D | The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the . |
| ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2D | The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product. |
| ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1C | The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the software. |
| ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2C | The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to the . |
| ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1E | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. |
| ATE_IND.1.1D | The developer shall provide the for testing. |
| ATE_IND.1.1C | The shall be suitable for testing. |
| ATE_IND.1.1E | The evaluator <i>shall confirm</i> that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. |
| ATE_IND.1.2E | The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified. Application Note: The evaluator will test the OS on the most current fully patched version of the platform. |
| AVA_VAN.1.1D | The developer shall provide the for testing. |
| AVA_VAN.1.1C | The shall be suitable for testing. |
| AVA_VAN.1.1E | The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence. |
| AVA_VAN.1.2E | The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the . Application Note: Public domain sources include the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures |

(CVE) dictionary for publicly-known vulnerabilities. Public domain sources also include sites which provide free checking of files for viruses.

AVA_VAN.1.3E

The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.

Selection-Based Security Functional Requirements

Objective Security Functional Requirements

Optional Security Functional Requirements
