

collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component



Version: 1.0
2020-09-10

National Information Assurance Partnership

Revision History

Version	Date	Comment
1.0	2020-09-10	First published release version.
1.0x	2021-04-06	Start of first XML version.

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1 PP introduction

1.1 PP Reference Identification

PP Reference: collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component

PP Version: 1.0

PP Date: September 10, 2020

1.2 Overview

The scope of this Protection Profile (PP) is to describe the security functionality of QQQQ products in terms of [\[CC\]](#) and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products.

1.3 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

1.3.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC] .
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility, accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base Protection Profiles.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.


1.3.2 Technical Terms

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)	An anti-exploitation feature which loads memory mappings into unpredictable locations. ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to redirect control to code that they have introduced into the address space of a process.
Administrator	An administrator is responsible for management activities, including setting policies that are applied by the enterprise on the operating system. This administrator could be acting remotely through a management server, from which the system receives configuration policies. An administrator can enforce settings on the system which cannot be overridden by non-administrator users.
Application (app)	Software that runs on a platform and performs tasks on behalf of the user or owner of the platform, as well as its supporting documentation.
Application Programming	A specification of routines, data structures, object classes, and variables that allows an application to make use of services provided by another software component, such as a

Interface (API)	library. APIs are often provided for a set of libraries included with the platform.
Credential	Data that establishes the identity of a user, e.g. a cryptographic key or password.
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)	Information that is either user or system defined and is used to operate a cryptographic module in processing encryption functions including cryptographic keys and authentication data, such as passwords, the disclosure or modification of which can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module.
DAR Protection	Countermeasures that prevent attackers, even those with physical access, from extracting data from non-volatile storage. Common techniques include data encryption and wiping.
Data Execution Prevention (DEP)	An anti-exploitation feature of modern operating systems executing on modern computer hardware, which enforces a non-execute permission on pages of memory. DEP prevents pages of memory from containing both data and instructions, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to introduce and execute code.
Developer	An entity that writes OS software. For the purposes of this document, vendors and developers are the same.
General Purpose Operating System	A class of OSES designed to support a wide-variety of workloads consisting of many concurrent applications or services. Typical characteristics for OSES in this class include support for third-party applications, support for multiple users, and security separation between users and their respective resources. General Purpose Operating Systems also lack the real-time constraint that defines Real Time Operating Systems (RTOS). RTOSes typically power routers, switches, and embedded devices.
Host-based Firewall	A software-based firewall implementation running on the OS for filtering inbound and outbound network traffic to and from processes running on the OS.
Operating System (OS)	Software that manages physical and logical resources and provides services for applications. The terms <i>TOE</i> and <i>OS</i> are interchangeable in this document.
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)	Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information which is linked or linkable to an individual. [OMB]
Sensitive Data	Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data such as PII, emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must minimally include credentials and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the OS's TSS by the ST author.
User	A user is subject to configuration policies applied to the operating system by administrators. On some systems under certain configurations, a normal user can temporarily elevate privileges to that of an administrator. At that time, such a user should be considered an administrator.
Virtual Machine (VM)	Blah Blah Blah

1.4 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

1.4.1 TOE Boundary



Replace this image with a diagram of the Target of Evaluation.

Figure 1: General TOE

1.4.2 TOE Platform

1.5 Use Cases

Requirements in this Protection Profile are designed to address the security problems in at least the following use cases. These use cases are intentionally very broad, as many specific use cases exist for an operating system. These use cases may also overlap with one another. An operating system's functionality may even be effectively extended by privileged applications installed onto it. However, these are out of scope of this PP.

[USE CASE 1] Elephant-own device

This is everything we need to describe in words about this use case.

For a the list of appropriate selections and acceptable assignment values for this configuration, see [F.1 Elephant-own device](#).

2 Conformance Claims

Conformance Statement

An ST must claim exact conformance to this , as defined in the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017).

CC Conformance Claims

This is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5.

PP Claim

This does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

Package Claim

This is [Functional Package for Transport Layer Security \(TLS\), version 1.1](#) Conformant and [Functional Package for Secure Shell \(SSH\), version 1.0](#) Conformant .

3 Security Problem Description

The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the OS is expected to address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational security policies that the OS is expected to enforce.

3.1 Threats

T.NETWORK_ATTACK

An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with applications and services running on or part of the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of altering existing legitimate communications.

T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP

An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between applications and services that are running on or part of the OS.

T.LOCAL_ATTACK

An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The compromised application may provide maliciously formatted input to the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged system calls and messaging via the file system.

T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS

An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a limited amount of time with the physical device.

3.2 Assumptions

A.PLATFORM

The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.

A.PROPER_USER

The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy. At the same time, malicious software could act as the user, so requirements which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.

A.PROPER_ADMIN

The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

4 Security Objectives

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

O.ACCOUNTABILITY

Conformant OSES ensure that information exists that allows administrators to discover unintentional issues with the configuration and operation of the operating system and discover its cause. Gathering event information and immediately transmitting it to another system can also enable incident response in the event of system compromise.

O.INTEGRITY

Conformant OSES ensure the integrity of their update packages. OSES are seldom if ever shipped without errors, and the ability to deploy patches and updates with integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Conformant OSES provide execution environment-based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of compromising systems.

O.MANAGEMENT

To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant OSES provide consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes the deployment of applications and application updates through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration and application execution control.

O.PROTECTED_STORAGE

To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of credentials in the event of loss of physical control of the storage medium, conformant OSES provide data-at-rest protection for credentials. Conformant OSES also provide access controls which allow users to keep their files private from other users of the same system.

O.PROTECTED_COMMS

To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack threats,

conformant OSes provide mechanisms to create trusted channels for CSP and sensitive data. Both CSP and sensitive data should not be exposed outside of the platform.

4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the OS in correctly providing its security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.

OE.PLATFORM

The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware.

OE.PROPER_USER

The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of access should have a separate account dedicated for that use.

OE.PROPER_ADMIN

The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organization security policies map to the security objectives.

Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale

Threat, Assumption, or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.NETWORK_ATTACK	O.PROTECTED_COMMS	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for integrity of transmitted data.
	O.INTEGRITY	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.INTEGRITY as this provides for integrity of software that is installed onto the system from the network.
	O.MANAGEMENT	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to defend against network attack.
	O.ACCOUNTABILITY	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.ACCOUNTABILITY as this provides a mechanism for the OS to report behavior that may indicate a network attack has occurred.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP	O.PROTECTED_COMMS	The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for confidentiality of transmitted data.
	O.MANAGEMENT	The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to protect the confidentiality of its transmitted data.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK	O.INTEGRITY	The objective O.INTEGRITY protects against the use of mechanisms that weaken the TOE with regard to attack by other software on the platform.
	O.ACCOUNTABILITY	The objective O.ACCOUNTABILITY protects against local attacks by providing a mechanism to report behavior that may indicate a local attack is occurring or has occurred.
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS	O.PROTECTED_STORAGE	The objective O.PROTECTED_STORAGE protects against unauthorized attempts to access physical storage used by the TOE.
A.PLATFORM	OE.PLATFORM	The operational environment objective OE.PLATFORM is realized through A.PLATFORM.
A.PROPER_USER	OE.PROPER_USER	The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized through A.PROPER_USER.
A.PROPER_ADMIN	OE.PROPER_ADMIN	The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized through A.PROPER_ADMIN.

5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text** or ~~striketrough text~~): is used to add details to a requirement (including replacing an assignment with a more restrictive selection) or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

5.1 Security Functional Requirements

5.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

FCS_CKM.1.1

The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys by [parsing in accordance with FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2, **[selection: asymmetric key generation in accordance with FCS_CKM.1/AK, symmetric key generation in accordance to FCS_CKM.1/SK, no other methods]** ~~in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]~~ and specified cryptographic key sizes ~~[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]~~ that meet the following: ~~[assignment: list of standards]~~.

Application Note: Parsing of keys can refer to both the act of importing keys from outside the TOE boundary and to the act of issuing commands or parameters to the TOE that trigger the TSF to perform a key generation function.

If asymmetric key generation in accordance with FCS_CKM.1/AK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS_CKM.1/AK must be claimed by the TOE.

If symmetric key generation in accordance with FCS_CKM.1/SK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS_CKM.1/SK must be claimed by the TOE.

FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys)

FCS_CKM.1.1/AK

The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys using the methods defined by the following rows in Table 2: **[selection: AK1, AK2, AK3, AK4, AK5]**.

Table 2: Supported Methods for Asymmetric Key Generation

Identifier	Key Type	Key Sizes	List of Standards
AK1	RSA	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072-bit]	FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.3)
AK2	ECC-N	[selection: 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 521 (P-521)]	FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.4 & D.1.2)
AK3	ECC-B	[selection: 256 (brainpoolP256r1), 384 (brainpoolP384r1), 512 (brainpoolP512r1)]	RFC5639 (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves)
AK4	DSA	DSA Bit lengths of p and q respectively (L, N) [selection: (1024, 160), (2048, 224), (2048, 256), (3027, 256)]	FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.1
AK5	Curve25519	256 bits	RFC 7748

Application Note: This requirement is included for the purposes of encryption and decryption operations only. To support ITE protected communications requirement for the transfer of encrypted data, this requirement mandates implementation compliance to FIPS 186-4 only. Implementations according to FIPS 186-2 or FIPS 186-3 will not be accepted.

This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of FCS_CKM.1 or FCS_CKM.1/KEK chooses a selection related to generation of asymmetric keys.

FCS_CKM.1/SK Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Encryption Key)

FCS_CKM.1.1/SK

The TSF shall generate **symmetric** cryptographic keys using the methods defined by the following rows in [Table 3](#): [**selection**: RSK, DSK, PBK].

Table 3: Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Generation

Identifier	Key Type	Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
RSK	[selection : <i>symmetric key, submask, authorization value</i>]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1	[selection : 128, 192, 256, 512] bits	NIST SP 800-133 (Section 7.1) with ISO 18031 as an approved RBG in addition to those in NIST SP 800-133 (Section 5).
DSK [selection : <i>identifier from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions</i>]	[selection : <i>Key Type from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions</i>]	Derived from a Key Derivation Function as specified in FCS_CKM_EXT.5 [selection : <i>Key Derivation Algorithm from Table 16: Key Derivation Function</i>]	[selection : <i>key sizes from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions</i>]	[selection : <i>List of Standards from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions</i>]
PBK	[selection : <i>submask, authentication token, authorization value</i>]	Derived from a Password Based Key Derivation Function as specified in FCS_COP.1/PBKDF	[selection : <i>key sizes as specified in FCS_COP.1/PBKDF</i>]	[selection : <i>standards as specified in FCS_COP.1/PBKDF</i>]

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to ensure that attackers cannot recover SKs with less than a full exhaust of the key space. This requirement explains SK generation regardless of how the DSC uses it or when it generates it. The encryption of user data that is not keying material, authentication tokens, or authorization values is outside the scope of this cPP. This cPP assumes that the DSC lacks the required resources to perform bulk encryption/decryption services at a suitable rate for users. The host may use the SK for encrypting user data outside the boundaries of the DSC. On the other hand, the DSC may use the SK on behalf of the user to perform keyed hashes. In this case, all the requirements for generating, controlling access and use, and destroying the key while under the protection of the DSC apply. The selection of key size 512 bits is for the case of XTS-AES using AES-256. In the case of XTS-AES for both AES-128 and AES-256, the developer is expected to ensure that the full key is generated using direct generation from the RBG as in NIST SP 800-133 section.

The ST author selects at least one algorithm from the RSK row if the ST supports creating keys directly from the output of the RBG without further conditioning, at least one algorithm from the DSK row should be selected if the ST supports key derivation functions which are usually seeded from RBG and then further conditioned to the appropriate key size, and at least one algorithm from the PBK row should be selected if the ST supports keys derived from passwords.

If DSK is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS_CKM_EXT.5](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

If PBK is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS_COP.1/PBKDF](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of [FCS_CKM.1](#) or [FCS_CKM.1/KEK](#) chooses a selection related to generation of symmetric keys.

FCS_CKM.1/KEK Cryptographic Key Generation (Key Encryption Key)

FCS_CKM.1.1/KEK

The TSF shall generate key encryption keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm corresponding to [**selection**:

- *Asymmetric KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS_CKM.1/AK](#) identifier AK1,*
- *Symmetric KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS_CKM.1/SK](#),*
- *Derived KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS_CKM_EXT.5](#)*

] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**assignment**: *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [**assignment**: *list of standards*].

Application Note: KEKs protect KEKs and Symmetric Keys (SKs). DSCs should use key strengths commensurate with protecting the chosen symmetric encryption key strengths. If Asymmetric KEKs generated in accordance with

[FCS_CKM.1/AK](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS_CKM.1/AK](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

If Symmetric KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS_CKM.1/SK](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS_CKM.1/SK](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

If Derived KEKs generated in accordance with [FCS_CKM_EXT.5](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS_CKM_EXT.5](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

FCS_CKM.2.1

The TSF shall establish cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: **[selection:**

- *RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography",*
- *RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",*
- *Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following:* **[selection:**
 - *NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography",*
 - *RFC 7748, "Elliptic Curves for Security"*
-],
- *Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography",*
- *Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) that meets the following:* **[selection:**
 - *ANSI X9.63 - Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography,*
 - *IEEE 1363a - Standard Specification for Public-Key Cryptography - Amendment 1: Additional Techniques,*
 - *ISO/IEC 18033-2 - Information Technology - Security Techniques - Encryption Algorithms - Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers,*
 - *SECG SEC1 - Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section 5.1 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme*
-]

~~] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].~~

Application Note: This is a refinement of the SFR [FCS_CKM.2](#) to deal with key establishment rather than key distribution.

The ST author selects all key establishment schemes used for the selected cryptographic protocols.

The RSA-based key establishment schemes are described in Section 8 of NIST SP 800-56B Revision 2 [NIST-RSA]; however, Section 8 relies on implementation of other sections in SP 800-56B Revision 2.

The elliptic curves used for the key establishment scheme correlate with the curves specified in [FCS_CKM.1/AK](#).

The selections in this SFR must be consistent with those for [FCS_COP.1/KAT](#).

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1

The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method

- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a **[selection:**
 - *single overwrite consisting of [selection: a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF's RBG, zeroes, ones, a new value of a key, [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP]],*
 - *removal of power to the memory,*
 - *removal of all references to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection*
-]
- For non-volatile memory **[selection:**
 - *that employs a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:*
 - *single overwrite consisting of [selection: zeroes, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size, [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP]],*
 - *block erase*
 -],
 - *that does not employ a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:*

- **[selection:** *single*, **[assignment:** *ST author-defined multi-pass*]] overwrite consisting of **[selection:** *zeros, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size*, **[assignment:** *some value that does not contain any CSP*]] followed by a read-verify. If the read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated again up to **[assignment:** *number of times to attempt overwrite*] times, whereupon an error is returned.,
- block erase

]

]

that meets the following: *[no standard]*.

Application Note: A DSC must implement mechanisms to destroy cryptographic keys and key material contained in persistent storage when no longer needed. The term “cryptographic keys” in this SFR includes the authorization data that is the entry point to a key chain and all other cryptographic keys and keying material (whether in plaintext or encrypted form). This SFR does not apply to the public component of asymmetric key pairs, or to keys that are permitted to remain stored such as device identification keys.

In the case of volatile memory, the selection “removal of all references to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection” is used in a situation where the TSF cannot address the specific physical memory locations holding the data to be erased and therefore relies on addressing logical addresses (which frees the relevant physical addresses holding the old data) and then requesting the platform to ensure that the data in the physical addresses is no longer available for reading (i.e. the “garbage collection” referred to in the SFR text). Guidance documentation for the TOE requires users not to allow the TOE to leave the user’s control while a session is active (and hence while the DEK is likely to be in plaintext in volatile memory).

The selection for destruction of data in non-volatile memory includes block erase as an option, and this option applies only to flash memory. A block erase does not require a read verify, since collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Components the mappings of logical addresses to the erased memory locations are erased as well as the data itself.

Where different destruction methods are used for different data or different destruction situations then the different methods and the data/situations they apply to (e.g. different points in time, or power-loss situations) are described in the TSS (and the ST may use separate iterations of the SFR to aid clarity). The TSS includes a table describing all relevant keys and keying material (including authorization data) used in the implementation of the SFRs, stating the source of the data, all memory types in which the data is stored (covering storage both during and outside of a session, and both plaintext and non-plaintext forms of the data), and the applicable destruction method and time of destruction in each case.

Some selections allow assignment of “some value that does not contain any CSP.” This means that the TOE uses some specified data not drawn from an RBG meeting FCS_RBG_EXT requirements, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The point of the phrase “does not contain any sensitive data” is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general pool that might contain current or residual data (e.g. SDOs or intermediate key chain values) that itself requires confidentiality protection.

FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction Timing

FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall destroy all keys and keying material when no longer needed.

Application Note: The DSC will have mechanisms to destroy keys, including intermediate keys and key material, by using an approved method, [FCS_CKM.4](#). Examples of keys include intermediate keys, leaf keys, encryption keys, signing keys, verification keys, authentication tokens, and submasks. The DSC will have mechanisms to destroy keys and key material contained in persistent storage when no longer needed. Based on their implementation, vendors will explain when certain keys are no longer needed. An example in which key is no longer necessary includes a wrapped key whose password has changed. However, there are instances when keys are allowed to remain in memory, for example, a device identification key.

FCS_CKM_EXT.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation

FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1

The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys using the Key Derivation Functions defined by the following rows of [Table 4](#): **[selection:** *KeyDrv1, KeyDrv2, KeyDrv3, KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, KeyDrv6, KeyDrv7, KeyDrv8*].

Table 4: Key Derivation Functions

Identifier	Key Type	Input Parameters	Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Stan
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KeyDrv1	[selection: <i>symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</i>]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1	KDF in Counter Mode using [selection: CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, CMAC-AES-256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] as the PRF	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	NIST SP 800-56B (Section 5.1) in Counter Mode [selection: CMAC, NIST CMAC, ISO-CMAC, ISO-HMAC, HMAC, ISO-HMAC, FIPS-SHA]
KeyDrv2	[selection: <i>symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</i>]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1	KDF in Feedback Mode using [selection: CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, CMAC-AES-256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] as the PRF	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	NIST SP 800-56B (Section 5.2) in Feedback Mode [selection: CMAC, NIST CMAC, ISO-CMAC, ISO-HMAC, HMAC, ISO-HMAC, FIPS-SHA]
KeyDrv3	[selection: <i>symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</i>]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1	KDF in Double Pipeline Iteration Mode using [selection: CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, CMAC-AES-256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] as the PRF	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	NIST SP 800-56B (Section 5.3) in n Double Pipeline Iteration Mode) [selection: CMAC, NIST CMAC, ISO-CMAC, ISO-HMAC, HMAC, ISO-HMAC, FIPS-SHA]
KeyDrv4	[selection: <i>symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</i>]	Intermediary keys	[selection: exclusive OR (XOR), SHA256, SHA-512]	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	[selection: HASH, FIPS
KeyDrv5	[selection: <i>symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</i>]	Concatenated keys	KDF in [selection: Counter Mode, Feedback Mode, Double Pipeline Iteration Mode] using [selection: CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, CMAC-AES-256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] as the PRF	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	NIST SP 800-56B (Section 5.1) (KDF in Counter Mode) (Section 5.2) in Feedback Mode); (Section 5.3) in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode) [selection: CMAC, NIST CMAC, ISO-CMAC, ISO-HMAC, HMAC, ISO-HMAC, FIPS-SHA]
KeyDrv6	[selection: <i>symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key</i>]	Two keys	[selection: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM] from FCS_COP.1/SKC Symmetric Key table	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	[selection: of Standards FCS_COP.1 /Symmetric Key table]
KeyDrv7	[selection: <i>symmetric key, secret IV, seed</i>]	Shared secret, salt, output length, fixed information	[selection: hash function from FCS_COP.1/Hash , keyed hash from FCS_COP.1/HMAC]	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	(NIST-KDRV List of Standard in FCS_COP.1 and

					FCS_COP.1/
KeyDrv8	[selection: <i>symmetric key, secret IV, seed</i>]	Shared secret, salt, IV, output length, fixed information	[selection: <i>keyed hash from</i> FCS_COP.1/HMAC]	[selection: <i>128, 192, 256]bits</i>	(NIST-KDRV [selection: <i>List of Stand in</i> FCS_COP.1/ and FCS_COP.1/

Application Note: Note that Camellia algorithms do not support 192-bit key sizes. The interface referenced in the requirement could take different forms, the most likely of which is an application programming interface to an OS kernel. There may be various levels of abstraction. For Authorization Factor Submasks, the key size to be used in the HMAC falls into a range between L1 and L2 defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function (for example for SHA-256 L1 = 512, L2 = 256) where L2 = k = L1.

General note: in order to use a NIST SP 800-108 conformant method of key derivation, the TOE is permitted to implement this with keys as derived as indicated in Key Derivation Functions table above, and with the algorithms as indicated in the same table.

NIST SP 800-131A Rev 1 allows the use of SHA-1 in these use cases.

KeyDrv5, KeyDrv6, and the XOR option in KeyDrv4 will create an “inverted key hierarchy” in which the TSF will combine two or more keys to create a third key. These same KDFs may also use a submask key as input, which could be an authorization factor or derived from a PBKDF. In these cases the ST author must explicitly declare this option and should present a reasonable argument that the entropy of the inputs to the KDFs will result in full entropy of the expected output.

If keys are combined, the ST author shall describe which method of combination is used in order to justify that the effective entropy of each factor is preserved.

The documentation of the product’s encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product’s key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagrams. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS; it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.

SP 800-56C specifies a two-step key derivation procedure that employs an extraction-thenexpansion technique for deriving keying material from a shared secret generated during a key establishment scheme. The Randomness Extraction step as described in Section 5 of SP 800-56C is followed by Key Expansion using the key derivation functions defined in SP 800-108.

This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of [FCS_CKM.1/KEK](#), [FCS_CKM.1/SK](#), or [FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc](#) chooses a selection related to key derivation.

If at least one of KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, or KeyDrv6 is selected AND password-based key derivation is used to create at least one of the inputs, the selection-based SFR [FCS_COP.1/PBKDF](#) must also be claimed.

FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)

FCS_COP.1.1/Hash

The TSF shall perform [*cryptographic hashing*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[selection:** *SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512*] that meets the following: **[selection:** *ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS 180-4*].

Application Note: The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for signature generation. For example, the DSC should choose SHA-256 for 2048-bit RSA or ECC with P-256, SHA-384 for 3072-bit RSA, 4096-bit RSA, or ECC with P-384, and SHA-512 for ECC with P-521. The ST author selects the standard based on the algorithms selected.

SHA-1 may be used for the following applications: generating and verifying hash-based message authentication codes (HMACs), key derivation functions (KDFs), and random bit/number generation (In certain cases, SHA-1 may also be used for verifying old digital signatures and time stamps, provided that this is explicitly allowed by the application domain).

FCS_COP.1/HMAC Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)

FCS_COP.1.1/HMAC

The TSF shall perform [*keyed hash message authentication*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[selection:** *HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, KMAC128, KMAC256*] and cryptographic key sizes **[assignment:** *key size (in bits)*] that meet the following: **[selection:** *ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”, [NIST-KDV] section 4 “KMAC”*].

Application Note: The HMAC key size falls into a range between L1 and L2 defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function (for example for

FCS_COP.1/KAT Cryptographic Operation (Key Agreement/Transport)

FCS_COP.1.1/KAT

The TSF shall perform [cryptographic key agreement/transport] using the supported methods for key agreement/transport defined by the following rows of [Table 5](#): [selection: KAS1, KAS2, KTS-OAEP, RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5, ECDH-NIST, ECDH-BPC, DH, Curve25519, ECIES].

Table 5: Supported Methods for Key Agreement/Transport Operation

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
KAS1	RSA-single party	[selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits	NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 8.2
KAS2	RSA-both party	[selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits	NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 8.3
KTS-OAEP	RSA	[selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits	NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 9
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5	RSA	[selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits	RFC 8017 Section 7.2
ECDH-NIST	ECDH with NIST curves	[selection: 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 512 (P-521)]	NIST SP 800-56Ar3
ECDH-BPC	ECDH with Brainpool curves	[selection: 256 (brainpoolP256r1), 384 (brainpoolP384r1), 512 (brainpoolP512r1)]	RFC 5639 (Section 3)
DH	Diffie-Hellman	[selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits	NIST SP 800-56A rev 3, [selection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RFC 3526 Section [selection: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], • RFC 7919 Appendices [selection: A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5]]
Curve25519	ECDH	256 bits	RFC 7748
ECIES	ECIES	[selection: 256, 384, 512]bits	[selection: ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363a, ISO/IEC 18033-2 Part 2, SECG SEC1 sec 5.1]

Application Note: The selections in this SFR should be consistent with the algorithms selected in [FCS_CKM.2](#).

FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)

FCS_COP.1.1/KeyEnc

The TSF shall perform [key encryption and decryption] using the methods defined in the following rows of [Table 6](#): [selection: SE1, AE1, SE2, XOR]

Table 6: Supported Methods for Key Encryption Operation

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
SE1	Symmetric [selection: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-CTR, AES-KWP, AESKW]	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	See FCS_COP.1/SKC
AE1	Asymmetric KTS-OAEP	[selection: 2048, 3072] bits	See FCS_COP.1/SKC
SE2	Symmetric [selection: CAM-	[selection:	See

	<i>CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM]</i>	128, 256] bits	FCS_COP.1/KAT
XOR	Exclusive OR operation	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	See FCS_CKM_EXT.5

Application Note: A TOE will use this requirement to specify how the Key Encryption Key (KEK) wraps a symmetric encryption key. A TOE will always need this requirement in order to capture the last stage of the key chain in which the Key Encryption Key (KEK) wraps the symmetric encryption key.

If XOR is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS_CKM_EXT.5](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

FCS_COP.1/PBKDF Cryptographic Operation (Password-Based Key Derivation Functions)

FCS_COP.1.1/PBKDF

The TSF shall perform [*password-based key derivation functions*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*HMAC- [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512]*], with [**assignment:** *integer number greater than or equal to 1000*] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [**selection:** 128, 192, 256]bits that meet the following standard: [*NIST SP 800-132*].

Application Note: The ST must condition a password into a string of bits prior to using it as input to algorithms that form SKs and KEKs. The ST can perform conditioning using one of the identified hash functions or the process described in NIST SP 800-132; the ST author selects the method used. NIST SP 800-132 requires the use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) consisting of HMAC with an approved hash function.

Appendix A of NIST SP 800-132 recommends setting the iteration count in order to increase the computation needed to derive a key from a password and, therefore, increase the workload of performing a dictionary attack.

The TOE must claim this requirement if it claims [FCS_CKM.1/SK](#) and selects an algorithm in the PBK row or claims [FCS_CKM_EXT.5](#) and selects at least one of KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, or KeyDrv6 AND uses password-based key derivation to create at least one of the inputs.

FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation)

FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen

The TSF shall perform [*digital signature generation*] using the supported methods for signature generation defined in the following rows of [Table 7](#) [**selection:** *SigGen1, SigGen2, SigGen3, SigGen4, SigGen5*].

Table 7: Supported Methods for Signature Generation Operation

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
SigGen1	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using [selection: <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i>]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[selection: <i>RFC 8017, PKCS #1 v2.2 (Section 8.2), FIPS186-4, (Section 5.5)]</i> (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5) [selection: <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)]</i> (SHA)
SigGen2	Digital signature scheme 2 using [selection: <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i>]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 9) (Digital signature scheme 2) [selection: <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)]</i> (SHA)
SigGen3	Digital signature scheme 3 using [selection: <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i>]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 10) (Digital signature scheme 3) [selection:

			ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigGen4	RSASSA-PSS using [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[RFC8017, PKCS#1v2.2 (Section 8.1)] (RSASSAPSS) [selection: ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigGen5	ECDSA on [selection: brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, NIST P-256, NIST P-384, NIST P-521] using [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[selection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> [selection: ISO14888-3, FIPS186-4 (Section 6)] (EDCSA), RFC5639 (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves), FIPS186-4 (Appendix D.1.2) (NIST Curves)] [selection: ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)

FCS_COP.1/SigVer Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)

FCS_COP.1.1/SigVer

The TSF shall perform [digital signature verification] using the supported methods for signature verification defined in the following rows of [Table 8](#) [selection: SigVer1, SigVer2, SigVer3, SigVer4, SigVer5].

Table 8: Supported Methods for Signature Verification Operation

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
SigVer1	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[selection: RFC 8017, PKCS #1 v2.2 (Section 8.2), FIPS186-4, (Section 5.5)] (RSASSA- PKCS1-v1_5) [selection: ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigVer2	Digital signature scheme 2 using [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 9) (Digital signature scheme 2) [selection: ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigVer3	Digital signature scheme 3 using	[selection:	ISO9796-2,

	[selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	2048 bit, 3072 bit]	(Clause 10) (Digital signature scheme 3) [selection: ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigVer4	RSASSA-PSS using [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[RFC8017, PKCS#1v2.2 (Section 8.1)] (RSASSAPSS) [selection: ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigVer5	ECDSA on [selection: brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, NIST P-256, NIST P-384, NIST P-521] using [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[selection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [selection: ISO14888-3, FIPS186-4 (Section 6)] (EDCSA), • RFC5639 (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves), • FIPS186-4 (Appendix D.1.2) (NIST Curves)] [selection: ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)

FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Key Cryptography)

FCS_COP.1.1/SKC

The TSF shall perform [*data encryption/decryption*] using the supported symmetric-key cryptography methods defined in the following rows of [Table 9](#) [**selection:** AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-CTR, XTS-AES, AES-KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM, XTS-CAM].

Table 9: Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Cryptography Operation

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
AES-CCM	AES in CCM mode with unpredictable, nonrepeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits	[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) ISO 19772, Clause 8 (CCM) NIST SP800-38C (CCM)
AES-GCM	AES in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs; IV length must be equal to 96 bits; the deterministic IV construction method (SP800-38D, Section 8.2.1) must be used; the MAC length t must be one of the values [selection: 96, 104, 112, 120, 128]	[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) ISO 19772, Clause 11 (GCM) NIST SP800-38D (GCM)
AES-CBC	AES in CBC mode with non-repeating	[selection:	ISO 18033-

	and unpredictable IVs	128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	3 (AES) ISO 10116 (CBC) NIST SP800-38A (CBC)
AES-CTR	AES in counter mode with a non-repeating initial counter and with no repeated use of counter values across multiple messages with the same secret key	[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) ISO 10116 (CTR) NIST SP800-38A (CTR)
XTS-AES	AES in XTS mode with unique [selection: consecutive non-negative integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer, data unit sequence numbers] tweak values	[selection: 256 bits, 512 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) [selection: IEEE 1619, NIST SP800-38E](XTS)
AES-KWP	KWP based on AES	[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) NIST SP 800-38F, sec. 6.3 (KWP)
AES-KW	KW based on AES	[selection: 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) NIST SP 800-38F, sec. 6.2 (KW) ISO/IEC 19772, clause 7 (key wrap)
CAM-CBC	Camellia in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) ISO 10116 (CBC)
CAM-CCM	Camellia in CCM mode with unpredictable, nonrepeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits	[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) ISO 19772, Clause 8 (CCM) NIST SP800-38C (CCM)
CAM-GCM	Camellia in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs; IV length must be equal to 96 bits; the deterministic IV construction method (SP800-38D, Section 8.2.1) must be used; the MAC length t must be one of the values [selection: 96, 104, 112, 120, 128]	[selection: 128 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) ISO 19772, Clause 11 (GCM) NIST SP800-38D (GCM)
XTS-CAM	Camellia in XTS mode with unique [selection: consecutive non-negative integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer, data unit sequence numbers] tweak values	[selection: 256 bits, 512 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) [selection: IEEE 1619, NIST SP800-38E](XTS)

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [**selection:** *Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)*].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source in accordance with NIST SP 800-90B that accumulates entropy from [**selection:** *[assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source, [assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source*] with a minimum of [**selection:** *128, 192, 256*] bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011, of the keys and CSPs that it will generate.

Application Note: ISO/IEC 18031:2011 contains three different methods of generating random numbers. Each of these in turn depends on underlying cryptographic primitives (hash functions/ciphers). This cPP allows SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 for Hash_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG and only AES-based implementations for CTR_DRBG.

FCS_SLT_EXT.1 Cryptographic Salt Generation

FCS_SLT_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use salts and nonces generated by an RBG as specified in [FCS_RBG_EXT.1](#).

FCS_STG_EXT.1 Protected Storage

FCS_STG_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide [**selection:** *mutable hardware-based, immutable hardware-based, software-based*] protected storage for asymmetric private keys and [**selection:** *symmetric keys, persistent secrets, no other keys*].

Application Note: If the protected storage is implemented in software that is protected as required by [FCS_STG_EXT.2](#), the ST author is expected to select "software-based." If "software-based" is selected, the ST author is expected to select all "software-based key storage" in [FCS_STG_EXT.2](#).

Support for protected storage for all symmetric keys and persistent secrets will be required in future revisions.

FCS_STG_EXT.1.2

[FCS_STG_EXT.1.2](#) The TSF shall support the capability of [**selection:** *importing keys/secrets into the TOE, causing the TOE to generate keys/secrets*] upon request of [**selection:** *a client application, an administrator*].

FCS_STG_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys/secrets in the protected storage upon request of [**selection:** *a client application, an administrator*].

FCS_STG_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the user that [**selection:** *imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated*] to use the key/secret. Exceptions may be explicitly authorized only by [**selection:** *the client application, the administrator*].

FCS_STG_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall allow only the user that [**selection:** *imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated*] to request that the key/secret be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [**selection:** *the client application, the administrator*].

Application Note: Not all conformant TOEs will have the ability to import pre-generated keys into the TOE. In these cases, the TOE's ability to receive commands to perform key generation is considered to be its implementation of the Parse service. A subject that caused a key to be generated is considered to be the 'owner' of that key in the same manner as they would be if they had imported it directly.

FCS_STG_EXT.2 Key Storage Encryption

FCS_STG_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall encrypt [*AKs, SKs, KEKs, and [selection: long-term trusted channel key material, all software-based key storage, no other keys]*] using one of the following methods: [**assignment:** *key encryption methods as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc](#)*].

FCS_STG_EXT.3 Key Integrity Protection

FCS_STG_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall protect the integrity of any encrypted [*AKs, SKs, KEKs, and [selection: long-term trusted channel key material, all software-based key storage, no other keys]*] by using [**selection:**

- *Symmetric encryption in [selection: AES_CCM, AES_GCM, AES_KW, AES_KWP, CAM_CCM, CAM_GCM] mode in accordance with [FCS_COP.1/SKC](#),*
- *A hash of the stored key in accordance with [FCS_COP.1/Hash](#),*

- A keyed hash of the stored key in accordance with [FCS COP.1/HMAC](#),
- A digital signature of the stored key in accordance with [FCS COP.1/SigGen](#) using an asymmetric key that is protected in accordance with [FCS STG EXT.2](#),
- An immediate application of the key for decrypting the protected data followed by a successful verification of the decrypted data with previously known information

].

FCS_STG_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the [**selection:** *hash, digital signature, MAC*] of the stored key prior to use of the key.

Application Note: This requirement is not applicable to derived keys that are not stored. It is not expected that a single key will be protected from corruption by multiple of these methods; however, a product may use one integrity-protection method for one type of key and a different method for other types of keys. The documentation of the product's encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product's key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagrams. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS – it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.

5.1.2 User Data Protection

FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control

FDP_ACC.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [*Access Control SFP*] on [

- *Subjects: S.DSC, S.Admin, S.CA, S.EPS*
- *Objects: OB.P_SDO, OB.T_SDO, OB.AuthData, OB.Pstate, OB.FAACntr, OB.AntiReplay, OB.Context*
- *Operations: OP.Import, OP.Create, OP.Use, OP.Modify, OP.Attest, OP.Store, OP.Export, OP.Destroy*

].

Application Note: The set of operations specified in the assignment can be collectively referred to as “access.” Any subsequent use of the term “access” should be interpreted to refer to one or more of these events.

FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control

FDP_ACF.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [*Access Control SFP*] to objects based on the following: [*subjects (defined in [FDP_ACC.1.1](#)) attempt to perform operations (defined in [FDP_ACC.1.1](#)) against objects (defined in [FDP_ACC.1.1](#)). Subject and object attributes may be used to determine whether the desired operations are permitted.*]

The following are the SFP-relevant security attributes that are associated with the subjects and objects defined in [FDP_ACC.1.1](#), as well as any restrictions on the attribute values:

- *S.DSC*
 - *DSC.ID*
- *S.Admin - none*
- *S.CA*
 - *CA.ID*
- *S.EPS*
 - *EPS.ID*
- *OB.P_SDO*
 - *SDO.ID*
 - *SDO.Type*
 - *SDO.AuthData*
 - *SDO.Reauth*
 - *SDO.Conf*
 - *SDO.Export*
 - *SDO.Integrity*
 - *SDO.Bind*
- *OB.T_SDO - same as OB.P_SDO*
- *OB.AuthData - none*
- *OB.Pstate - none*
- *OB.FAACntr - none*
- *OB.AntiReplay - none*
- *OB.Context- none*

].

FDP_ACF.1.2

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [

- *Any subject that has been authorized to perform any operation against any OB.P_SDO or OB.T_SDO object can continue to perform this operation if*

one of the following conditions is true:

- The object's SDO.Reauth attribute has a value of 'none', indicating that reauthorization is not required for subsequent interactions with the SDO
 - The object's SDO.Reauth attribute has a value of 'each use', indicating that reauthorization is required for each interaction with the SDO, and the subject has supplied valid authorization data to the TOE
- [assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that always prohibit certain subject-object-operation actions]
 - [assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that always permit certain subject-object-operation actions]
 - [assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that conditionally permit certain subject-object-operation actions based on subject security attributes, object security attributes, or other conditions]
 - [selection: [assignment: any configurable rules or parameters that can be modified to affect the behavior of the Access Control SFP], no configurable rules]

].

FDP_ACF.1.3

The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects]**.

Application Note: The expectation of this SFR is that the reader is given sufficient information to determine, for each object controlled by the TOE, the operations that can be performed on it based on the subject attempting to perform the operation, and whether this is conditional based on attribute values or any other circumstances.

It is expected that many of the subject-object-operation combinations will always be prohibited by the TSF, either because the target object is not externally modifiable or because the subject lacks the ability to perform the operation in question.

The ST author is not expected to create an exhaustive list of subject-object-operation combinations; it is sufficient to list those that are always permitted and those that are conditionally permitted with the expectation that all remaining combinations are prohibited.

[FDP_ACF.1.3](#) and [FDP_ACF.1.4](#) allow the ST author to optionally specify override conditions to resolve otherwise contradictory Access Control SFP rules. For example, the rule "S.Admin may always modify the SDO.Conf attribute of any OB.P_SDO or OB.T_SDO object" may be overridden by a statement in [FDP_ACF.1.4](#) that identifies any particular SDO objects as nonmodifiable regardless of subject authorizations.

The DSC may contain pre-installed SDOs. The DSC will enforce access control for pre-installed SDOs like any other SDO it contains or manages.

FDP_ETC_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs

FDP_ETC_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall propagate only SDO references, wrapped authorization data, and wrapped SDOs such that only **[selection: the TSF, authorized users]** can access them.

Application Note: The "SDO reference" is a pointer to an object that resides in the TOE; this can be thought of as a token to the object. The "only the TSF can unwrap the data" selection refers to data that is stored outside the TOE boundary (i.e., data that has been propagated).

FDP_FRS_EXT.1 Factory Reset

FDP_FRS_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall permit a factory reset of the TOE upon: **[selection: activation by external interface, presentation of [assignment: types of authorization data required and reference to their specification], no actions or conditions]**.

Application Note: If the DSC provides factory reset and requires an authorization to carry out the operation then the ST author selects either [presentation of...](#) and fills in the authorization data accepted (e.g. a PIN or a cryptographic token based on some specification referenced in the assigned value). If the DSC provides factory reset external to the DSC without requiring authorization then the ST author selects [activation by external interface](#). This selection is intended for use when the device containing the DSC takes responsibility for obtaining and checking the authorization for factory reset.

If any selection other than [no actions or conditions](#) is made in [FDP_FRS_EXT.1.1](#), the selectionbased SFR [FDP_FRS_EXT.2](#) must be claimed.

FDP_ITC_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs

FDP_ITC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support importing SDEs using **[selection: physically protected channels as specified in [FTP_ITP_EXT.1](#), encrypted data buffers as specified in [FTP_ITE_EXT.1](#), cryptographically protected data channels as specified in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#)]**.

FDP_ITC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDE using **[selection:**

- *cryptographic hash as specified in [FCS_COP.1/Hash](#),*
- *keyed hash as specified in [FCS_COP.1/HMAC](#),*
- *integrityproviding encryption algorithm as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc](#)*
[selection: SE1, SE2],
- *digital signature as specified in [FCS_COP.1/SigVer](#),*
- *integrity verification supported by [FDP_ITC_EXT.1.1](#)*

].

FDP_ITC_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

FDP_ITC_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall bind SDEs to security attributes using **[assignment:** *list of ways the TSF generates security attributes and binds them to the SDEs*].

Application Note: The way the TSF checks the integrity of the SDE depends on the method of importation. For example, the encrypted data channel may provide data integrity as part of its service.

When a TSF parses an SDE, it should generate security attributes and create an SDO by binding the security attributes to the SDE.

If physically protected channels as specified in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP_ITP_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

If encrypted data buffers as specified in [FTP_ITE_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP_ITE_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

If cryptographically protected data channels as specified in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

FDP_ITC_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs

FDP_ITC_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall support importing SDOs using **[selection:** *physically protected channels as specified in [FTP_ITP_EXT.1](#), encrypted data buffers as specified in [FTP_ITE_EXT.1](#), cryptographically protected data channels as specified in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#)*].

FDP_ITC_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDO using **[selection:**

- *cryptographic hash as specified in [FCS_COP.1/Hash](#),*
- *keyed hash as specified in [FCS_COP.1/HMAC](#),*
- *integrityproviding encryption algorithm as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc](#)*
[selection: SE1, SE2],
- *digital signature as specified in [FCS_COP.1/SigVer](#),*
- *integrity verification supported by [FDP_ITC_EXT.2.1](#)*

].

FDP_ITC_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.

FDP_ITC_EXT.2.4

The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.

FDP_ITC_EXT.2.5

The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.

Application Note: The way the TSF checks the integrity of the SDO depends on the method of importation. For example, the encrypted data channel may provide data integrity as part of its service.

When a TSF parses an SDO, it should already have a set of security attributes. However, the TSF may modify these attributes, if authorized, to comply with security policies on the TOE.

If physically protected channels as specified in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP_ITP_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

If encrypted data buffers as specified in [FTP_ITE_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP_ITE_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

If cryptographically protected data channels as specified in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

FDP_MFW_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware

FDP_MFW_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be maintained as **[selection:** *immutable, mutable*] firmware.

Application Note: The ST author must include [FDP_MFW_EXT.2](#), [FDP_MFW_EXT.3](#), [FPT_FLS.1/FW](#), and [FPT_RPL.1/Rollback](#) if mutable is selected.

FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection

The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [

- SDOs
- SDEs

].

Application Note: When an SDE is a key then it is also subject to the key destruction requirements in [FCS_CKM.4](#), depending on where and how it is stored. This SFR applies to authorization data that are SDEs and security attributes in SDOs.

FDP_SDC_EXT.1 Confidentiality of SDEs

FDP_SDC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use [selection:

- protected storage,
- symmetric encryption using [selection: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM] as specified in [FCS_COP.1/SKC](#),
- key wrapping using [selection: KAS1, KAS2, KTS-OAEP] as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KAT](#)

] to protect the confidentiality of authorization data and [assignment: list of internally and externally stored SDEs identified in the Confidential SDE List attribute of an SDO].

FDP_SDC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall use [FCS_CKM.1/KEK](#) to derive or generate the key to encrypt the SDEs.

Application Note: This SFR applies to confidential SDEs, especially secret and private keys, Allowed Random Number Generators' state data, and vendor verification reference data. This SFR also applies to all authorization data appearing in the attribute list under SDO.AuthData as well as any administrator authorization data which may be stored implicitly.

If the TOE stores these parameters outside of its boundary, it must encrypt them according to the cryptographic requirements for key encryption, as required by [FDP_ETC_EXT.2](#).

Vendor pre-installed SDOs includes both objects installed during manufacturing, and those provisioned by the vendor before final release to customer. The administrator and no one else owns and controls these objects.

The confidential-SDE List attribute of the SDO indicates those SDEs that require confidentiality. If SDEs do not require confidentiality, then its omission from this list indicates that confidentiality is not required.

FDP_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action

FDP_SDI.2.1

The TSF shall monitor SDOs and SDEs controlled by the TSF for [integrity errors] on all objects, based on the following attributes: [selection:

- [assignment: attribute associated with presence in protected storage],
- cryptographic hash,
- digital signature,
- integrity-providing encryption algorithm as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc](#) [selection: SE1, SE2]

].

FDP_SDI.2.2

Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [

- prohibit the use of the altered data
- send notification of the error where applicable

].

Application Note: This SFR deals with the mechanism that protects the integrity of the SDEs and security attributes within an SDO. This provides the binding data that ensures the prevention of unauthorized changes to the SDEs and attributes.

The cryptographic requirements for cryptographic hashes and digital signatures apply here.

No specific requirement is placed here on the nature of the integrity protection data, but the Security Target shall describe this protection measure, and shall identify the iteration of [FCS_COP.1/Hash](#) or [FCS_COP.1/HMAC](#) that covers any cryptographic algorithm used.

The integrity protection data in [FDP_SDI.2.1](#) is included in the list of attributes identified in [FMT_MSA.1](#), and protects the value of the SDEs and of the SDO security attributes.

When an SDO is parsed, its integrity is checked when it is imported into the TOE.

5.1.3 Identification and Authentication

When a platform process requests the ability to create, use, modify, dispose of, etc., an SDE or SDO within the DSC, as a matter of policy, the DSC may expect or request authorization from the platform process, which may include authentication of the requester on whose behalf the platform process is acting. The DSC assumes the requester to be either a person, a process, or a device. The rules on how the requester formats the request will be outside the scope of this cPP. Upon request (or as a matter of an established protocol), the interface (on behalf of the user) presents to the DSC process those authorization values required to authorize execution of the event request. This may include one or more different types of authentication credentials. The DSC validates these items before acting upon the requested event. The validation may simply compare the authorization values to an expected value, or perform a more complex cryptographic protocol to verify the authenticity of the user. After validation, the DSC may then create and subsequently use an authorization value to represent the validation of these authorization values in anticipation of future requests.

Requirements related to the strength, quality, and performance of authorization values supplied to the DSC, such as X.509 certificates and biometric templates, are all outside the scope of the DSC and are expected to be met by the platform, where applicable. The DSC is only expected to enforce quality metrics on any authorization values it generates itself.

FIA_AFL_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling

FIA_AFL_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall maintain [**selection:**

- *a unique counter for [**selection:** each SDO, the following SDOs [**assignment:** list of SDOs]],*
- *one global counter covering [**selection:** all SDOs, the following SDOs [**assignment:** list of SDOs]]*

], called the failed authorization attempt counters, that counts of the number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these **SDOs**.

FIA_AFL_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall maintain a [**selection:** *static, administrator configurable variable*] threshold of the minimal acceptable number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these **SDOs**.

FIA_AFL_EXT.1.3

When the failed authorization attempt counters [**selection:** *meets, surpasses*] the threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, the TSF shall [**selection:**

- *prevent future authorization attempts for a static prescribed amount of time,*
- *prevent future authorization attempts for an administrator configurable amount of time,*
- *collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Components,*
- *prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock), as described by [FIA_AFL_EXT.2](#),*
- *factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by [FDP_FRS_EXT.2](#)*

] for these **SDOs**.

FIA_AFL_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall increment the failed authorization attempt counter before it verifies the authorization.

Application Note: The product validates the authorization factors prior to determining whether user (administrator or client application) access to the SDE/SDO is permitted. In cases where validation of the authorization factors fails, the product will not allow access to SDE/SDO. The product validates the authorization factors in such a way that it does not allow an attacker to circumvent the other requirements to gain knowledge about the SDE/SDO or other keying material that protects them from inadvertent exposure. It is possible for the TOE to have different rules for the treatment of different SDOs or groups of SDOs. For example, some SDOs may trigger a factory reset in the event of excessive authorization failures while others may only temporarily block future authorization attempts. The ST author should iterate this SFR for each distinct response the TSF can make (as defined by the selections in [FIA_AFL_EXT.1.3](#)) and the SDOs whose authorization failures will trigger these responses.

If prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock), as described by [FIA_AFL_EXT.2](#) is selected in [FIA_AFL_EXT.1.3](#), the selection-based SFR [FIA_AFL_EXT.2](#) must be claimed.

If factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by [FDP_FRS_EXT.2](#) is selected in [FIA_AFL_EXT.1.3](#), the selection-based SFR [FDP_FRS_EXT.2](#) must be claimed.

FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of Secrets

FIA_SOS.2.1

The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate authorization data that meet [*the following quality metrics:*

- *For each authentication attempt, the probability shall be less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will be successful*
- *For multiple attempts to authenticate during a one-minute period, the probability shall be less than one in 100,000 that a series of random*

FIA_SOS.2.2

The TSF shall be able to enforce the use of TSF generated authorization data for **[assignment: non-empty list of TSF functions]**.

Application Note: This SFR expects the TSF must generate authorization data from a sufficiently large key space to ensure that users cannot employ random guessing as a statistically plausible method of authorizing actions within the TOE, both for a single event and over a session.

FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action

FIA_UAU.2.1

The TSF shall require each user **and SDO owner** to be successfully authenticated before **authorizing** any ~~other~~ TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user **or SDO owner**.

Application Note: This SFR goes with [FDP_ACF.1](#), which authorizes access to SDOs (i.e. authorizes operations with or on SDOs). The security policies in [FDP_ACF.1](#) may require authentication of the subjects and owners of the SDOs before the TSF authorizes access to them. An authentication token is critical data bound to a user. Such data, when presented to the TOE and successfully verified by it, authenticates the user. The TOE may use the successful authentication of a user as an authorization to execute an action on its behalf, or to perform a requested operation on or with an SDO.

This requirement specifies the TSF exercise an authentication mechanism from [FIA_UAU.5](#) by which the TOE authenticates the identity of the user requesting the operation and the owner of the SDO which is an object in the operation. Such authentication is necessary to authorize it to operate with the SDOs. A user could present a unique authentication token. The TSF may accept authentication tokens with no further conditioning. The TSF validates the authentication token prior to granting the authorization to perform the requested operation with the SDO. The SDO security attribute SDO.Reauth determines whether or not the TOE may authenticate the user and the SDO owner only once or each time each time it operates with the SDO.

The means of validation may vary based on the type of authentication token.

FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms

FIA_UAU.5.1

The TSF shall provide **[selection: none, authentication token mechanism, cryptographic signature mechanism, [assignment: list of authentication mechanisms]]** to support user authentication.

FIA_UAU.5.2

The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the **[selection: all subject users and SDO owners shall successfully authenticate themselves using one of the mechanisms listed in [FIA_UAU.5.1](#), the Prove service shall not accept "none" as an authentication method, [assignment: rules describing how each authentication mechanism provides authentication]]**

Application Note: This SFR describes the authentication mechanisms required for any user of any service as a precondition for providing authorization to execute the service. This includes the authentication of the owner of the SDOs of the service.

FIA-UAU.6 Re-Authenticating

FIA-UAU.6.1

The TSF shall re-authenticate the user **for access to an SDO** under the conditions:
[

1. Re-authentication and re-authorization by further successful completion of the authentication and authorization methods in [FIA_UAU.2](#), in accordance with the value of the SDO.Reauth attribute of the SDO as follows:
 - a. If SDO.Reauth has the value 'each access';
 - b. if SDO.Reauth has the value 'policy' and the TSF determines that the TOE satisfies the policy for re-authentication and reauthorization

]

Application Note: The allowed values for the SDO.Reauth attribute of an SDO are defined in [FMT_MSA.3](#) and the SDO Attributes Initialization Table. The rules in [FDP_ACF.1.2](#) and also ensure that the need for re-authorization has been checked before access to an SDO.

An SDO.Reauth value of 'none' indicates that no authentication of the subject user nor of the SDO owners is necessary. It also indicates that no reauthorization for operations using the SDO is necessary.

An SDO.Reauth value of policy indicates that there may be a more complicated set of circumstances that trigger a re-auth (re-authentication of the users and

owners as well as reauthorization of the operation). This could be a policy of a time limit for which a user can use an SDO before re-authentication (e.g. 10 minutes or 24 hours). The ST should indicate the policies allowed, and how the TOE evaluates the policies. The ST should also indicate the location of those policies, and how the TOE protects the integrity of those policies.

When the TSF binds a user to access an SDO, this means that the TSF has authenticated the user and that the TSF authorized the user to have the right to exercise one or more of the following actions: generate the SDO, modify the SDO, including its security attributes, use the SDO in a TOE operation, propagate or duplicate the SDO for use by a device external to the DSC, or destroy the SDO. The user may not have exclusive rights to exercise the operations listed.

Policy as represented by the attributes in the SDO dictates whether or not a user must authenticate itself in order to authorize access to the SDO.

It is possible that the attributes of some SDOs should remain unchanged, and that the attributes of other SDOs may be changed by authorized users. If this is the case, then the ST author should iterate this SFR and indicate in the TSS which SDOs apply to each iteration.

5.1.4 Security Management (FMT)

FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior

FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in [FMT_SMF.1](#) to authenticated administrators.

FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes

FMT_MSA.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [**assignment:** *list of security attributes, to include attributes as specified in the Supported Methods for SDO Attributes table*] to [the authorized identified roles as specified in the Supported Methods for SDO Attributes table]. **Table 10: Supported Methods for SDO Attributes**

SDO Attribute	Modification Constraints
SDO.ID	Cannot be modified
SDO.Type	Cannot be modified
SDO.AuthData	[assignment: <i>list of roles that are authorized to modify SDO reference authorization data</i>]
SDO.Reauth	[assignment: <i>list of roles that are authorized to ` modify re-authorization conditions</i>]
SDO.Conf	[assignment: <i>assignment: list of roles that are authorized to modify confidential SDElist</i>]
SDO.Export	[assignment: <i>list of roles that are authorized to modify export flag</i>]
SDO.Integrity	Cannot be modified by users (maintained automatically by TSF)
SDO.Bind	Cannot be modified by users (maintained automatically by TSF)

Application Note: The SDO Attributes Modification Table defines the required constraints on security attribute modification. The Security Target completes the other parts not specified here (along with any other information for other security attributes relevant to a particular TOE).

The assignments of authorized subjects in the SDO Attributes Modification Table may be defined by the ST author in terms of roles or in terms of an action such as presentation of a valid authentication token of a particular type (in this case the ST author identifies in an Application Note the other SFRs that govern the action).

The TSF vendor may pre-install SDOs with default attributes. The Security Target should make clear which attributes the administrators may change or are prohibited from changing. It should also make clear between authorization values required to use pre-installed SDOs and authorization values required to change the attributes of pre-installed SDOs.

The SDO Attributes Modification Table lists SDO ID as “cannot be modified”. In some cases, a change in the attributes may cause a change in the SDO ID. In these cases, a change in the SDO ID causes the creation of a new SDO and possibly the loss of the old SDO.

Only authorized subjects can change the attributes of an SDO, and only as permitted in the SDO Attributes Modification Table.

FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization

This SFR deals with the initialization of the attributes of an SDO when it is created by parsing or provisioning. The generation process includes SDOs created by the TSF (provisioned) and those imported via [FDP_ITC_EXT.2](#) (parsed).

The TSF is expected to give an SDO a set of security attributes at the time of its creation. This set is

expected to include at least the following attributes:

- SDO identifier
- SDO type
- SDO reference authorization data (i.e. the data that is used when determining whether to grant access to an SDO, for each relevant mode of access, on the basis of an authorization token presented to the DSC)
- Re-authorization conditions (i.e. event after which re-authorization is required)
- Confidential-SDE list (each SDE in this list is held encrypted when the SDO is stored)
- Export Flag (indicating whether the SDO is allowed to be propagated)
- Integrity protection data
- Binding Data (created by the TOE to strongly link or associate the SDO with other entities such as the TOE itself or with other SDOs in a hierarchy such as a child to a parent).

The TSF provides the capability to protect the contents of an SDO (i.e. the set of its SDEs together with the SDO attributes) from unauthorized modification. The DSC shall check for such modifications before using the SDO or any of its SDEs.

FMT_MSA.3.1

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to provide [**selection:** *restrictive, permissive*, [**assignment:** *other property*]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT_MSA.3.2

The TSF shall allow the [*authorized identified roles, according to the Supported Methods for SDO Attributes Initialization table*] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

Table 11: Supported Methods for SDO Attributes Initialization

SDO Attribute	Property	Authorized Override Role	Initialization Method	Allowed Values
SDO.ID	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[assignment: <i>range of allowed values</i>]
SDO.Type	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[assignment: <i>list of allowed types</i>]
SDO.AuthData	Permissive	[selection: <i>admin, client application</i>]	Import process	[selection: <i>none</i> , [assignment: <i>list of types of authentication tokens allowed</i>], [assignment: <i>range of authorization values allowed</i>]]
	Restrictive	None	Generation process	
SDO.Reauth	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[selection: <i>none, each access, policy</i>]
SDO.Conf	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[assignment: <i>list of SDEs of which the TOE must provide a confidentiality service</i>]
SDO.Export	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[selection: <i>exportable, non-exportable</i>]
SDO.Integrity	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[assignment: <i>range of allowed values</i>]
SDO.Bind	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[assignment: <i>range of allowed values</i>]

Application Note: Both admin and client application roles can initiate the import process. The imported object contains the default values for each attribute, where allowed. The TSF can override default values for the following attributes of imported objects: SDO.ID, SDO.Type, SDO.Reauth, SDO.Export, and SDO.Integrity. The TSF may override default values in these cases to force the objects to comport to established structures within the TOE, or to comply with TOE-wide security policies. In these cases, the defined roles (i.e. admin and client application) cannot override the default values. For SDO.AuthData, the TSF shall allow user roles (i.e. admin and client applications) to override authorization data that may arrive with the object. For SDO.Conf the TSF accepts the imported value for this attribute. SDO.Bind is explained below.

Unless otherwise noted, both admin and client application roles can initiate the generation process. The admin and client application will provide the default values for the attributes. This SFR assumes the TSF checks SDO.Type, SDO.AuthData, SDO.Reauth, SDO.Conf, and SDO.Export for compliance with established security policies and refuses to create objects which do not comply and thus will not override the value of any of these attributes. In the cases of the SDO.ID and SDO.Integrity, the TSF generates these values and therefore there is no need to override.

In the case of SDO.Bind for both import and generation processes, the TSF may override values that denote a binding to the TOE, but it should not override values that denote a binding to other keys. In the case of the import process, the

defined roles cannot override the default values for any binding.

The SDO Attributes Initialization Table is referenced from [FMT_MSA.3](#) and matches the attributes covered by [FMT_MSA.1](#) (which defines controls on the modification of the attributes). The initialization of these security attributes occurs when an SDO is either parsed by the TOE or generated on the TOE. The required constraints on security attribute initialization specified in this PP are shown in Table 11; the Security Target completes the selection and assignments in the SFR and adds to the table any other information for other security attributes relevant to a particular TOE.

The SDO.AuthData attribute is data that is required in order to validate authorization of a subject to access the SDO (in each of the modes relevant to that SDO). The nature of this data will depend on the authorization mechanism used in the TOE, as described in [FIA_UAU.2](#).

The SDO.Reauth attribute for an individual SDO takes one of the values defined in the selection in the Allowed Values column of Table 11. Examples of TOE-specified events might be explicit revocation of authorization by a user, expiry of a time interval, or completion of a fixed number of uses since the last authorization. The re-authorization conditions are used in [FIA_UAU.6](#) and [FDP_ACF.1](#). These determine whether a single authorization by the SDO owner will allow any number of uses of the SDO until the end of the user's session (value 'none'), or whether each use of the SDO must be individually authorized (value 'each access'), or whether re-authorization must happen each time one of the TOE-specified events occurs.

The SDO.Conf attribute indicates which SDEs, if any, the TOE should encrypt when not in operational use. The TOE should use the methods in [FCS_COP.1/SKC](#), [FCS_STG_EXT.1](#), or [FCS_STG_EXT.2](#) to protect the SDEs in this list.

The SDO.Export attribute takes one of the values 'exportable' or 'non-exportable'.

The SDO.Integrity attribute includes evidence that the TSF can use to protect and verify the integrity of the SDO.

Attributes assigned by the TOE to any parsed SDOs must be described in the Security Target and in operational user guidance.

The TOE uses the Binding Data for an SDO to strongly link the SDO to the TOE, a parent SDO in a hierarchy, or to nothing at all. SDOs bound to nothing may freely travel from one TOE to another without restrictions. If bound to another SDO as a child to a parent in a hierarchy, it may travel only where the parent SDO travels. If bound to the TOE, it may travel to any other TOE for any reason, even if the TOE moves its parent to another TOE. Note that vendors will initialize attributes of pre-installed SDOs with default values. However, authorization values to change the attributes of pre-installed SDOs may differ from the authorization value required to use the pre-installed SDO.

The vendor should document the implicit attributes for pre-installed SDOs and SDOs stored in special locations.

In cases in which the SDO ID is a cryptographic hash of the attributes and SDEs, that value represents both the ID and projects the integrity of the SDO, including the SDEs. As the TOE unwraps an incoming SDO, it may automatically check the integrity. For pre-installed SDOs in protected storage, the hardware plus the TSF projects the integrity of them.

When a remote peer sends an SDO to the TOE, it properly indicates through the SDEconfidentiality list of any authorization values and authentication tokens present in the SDO, whether they are present in the SDE or as attributes, which control access to the SDE.

When a TOE generates an SDO internally for the first time, it properly indicates through the SDEconfidentiality list any SDEs that are authorization values or authentication tokens. Similarly, if any of the attributes are authorization values or authentication tokens, the TOE will properly indicate through the SDEconfidentiality list that it will encrypt them prior to storing them.

The TOE may contain pre-installed SDOs or SDOs either provisioned the first time the user turns on the TOE or provisioned as the result of a "factory reset" event. TSFs may refer to such persistent SDOs as root keys or trusted anchors. Pre-installed SDOs may reside in immutable hardware and persist across factory resets. Other persistent SDOs may persist until a user issues a "factory reset" which either cryptographically erases the SDOs or overwrites them by provisioning new ones. These SDOs may not contain a confidential SDE list since either these persistent values serve as a root encryption key for a hierarchy of SDOs, or they serve as a KDF seed for generating root encryption keys for a hierarchy of SDOs.

It is possible that the default attributes of some SDOs should be restrictive, and that the default attributes of other SDOs may be permissive. If this is the case, then the ST author should iterate this SFR and indicate in the TSS what the default attribute properties are for each SDO.

FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- Set authorization failure parameters for [FIA_AFL_EXT.1](#)

- *Reset TOE to factory state for [FDP_FRS_EXT.1](#)*
- *Configure authorization policies for TOE resources [**selection:***
 - *update TOE firmware and pre-installed SDOs,*
 - *unlock access to SDO following excessive failed authorization attempts,*
 - *no other functions*

]

Application Note: If [FDP_MFW_EXT.1](#) selects mutable firmware, then [FMT_SMF.1](#) must select Update TOE firmware and pre-installed SDOs.

Recall that resetting a TOE to factory state also wipes all user data, but may not wipe out preinstalled SDOs. Configuring authorization policies includes setting policies for allowed access to SDOs.

Protections for pre-installed SDEs/SDOs come through the firmware, and by extension, through firmware updates. In the same vein, the authorized updates may also affect the SDEs as well, if the vendor so chooses. One could say that the authorized update binds the attributes present in the functionality of the firmware to the pre-installed SDEs.

FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles

FMT_SMR.2.1

The TSF shall maintain the roles: [*administrator, client application*].

FMT_SMR.2.2

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_SMR.2.3

The TSF shall ensure that the conditions [

- Only client applications can access their own encrypted data,
- Only administrators can perform privileged functions

]

are satisfied.

Application Note: This cPP uses the term “user” throughout to reference both the administrator and client application roles simultaneously.

5.1.5 Protection of the TSF

FPT_FLS.1/FI Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Fault Injection)

FPT_FLS.1.1/FI

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [*fault injections*].

Application Note: Note that a secure state does not imply the uninterrupted enforcement of all claimed security functionality it is appropriate for the TSF to “fail closed” and block the execution of securityrelevant behavior if a fault injection attempt or other significant glitch occurs.

FPT_MOD_EXT.1 Debug Modes

FPT_MOD_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide no access to debug modes.

Application Note: ‘Debug modes’ may include, but are not limited to, any alternate mode of operation, such as developer mode, test mode, manufacturer mode, or altered boot mode.

FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack

FPT_PHP.3.1

The TSF shall resist [*data extraction via fault injection, extreme temperatures, abnormal voltage*] to the [*TSF storage elements that contain [**selection:** SDEs, SDOs, firmware]*] by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

Application Note: Physical protection mechanisms as envisioned by this requirement are mechanisms that protect communications to the extent that encryption or other logical protections are not required to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and assured identification of endpoints. Such mechanisms may include, for example, physically isolated traces, or mechanisms that take advantage of physical properties of signals to ensure that communications are receivable only by the intended endpoint. Any physical external casing or potting material of the TOE is considered an ‘external interface’, not just those interfaces over which data is transmitted. This ensures that the TSF will respond appropriately if, for example, an attacker penetrates the physical surface of the DSC in an attempt to access its stored data.

The TOE’s protection against abnormal temperature and voltage can be considered equivalent to what is required by assertion AS07.77 of [ISO-TR].

FPT_PRO_EXT.1 Root of Trust

FPT_PRO_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall contain an SDO that contains the identity of the Root of Trust.

Application Note: Every DSC is expected to have a single RoT that comprises the DSC hardware and pre-installed SDOs, from which services (e.g. Storage, Authorization, etc.) can be offered. Depending on the use case and the way status registers are used, unique identity keys may be bound to the TOE, the TOE platform, or both.

The sole presence of unique identity keys linking to the RoT does not prove authenticity without the use of digital signatures.

FPT_PRO_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall maintain Root of Trust data as [**selection:** *immutable, mutable if and only if its mutability is controlled by a unique identifiable owner*].

Application Note: One expects that only authorized sources can modify the single RoT, such as through a secure update. A pre-installed SDO may contain the identity of the manufacturer of the RoT. The process of authenticating the source of a secure update may involve querying the identity of the manufacturer, contained on a pre-installed SDO. If this identity is in the form of an X.509 certificate containing a signature verification key signed by the manufacturer, then the authentication process is sufficient.

A unique identifiable owner is assumed to be one with an administrative role; however, there may be circumstances where the owner does not take on an administrative role, which should be documented.

FPT_ROT_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services

FPT_ROT_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide a Root of Trust for Storage, a Root of Trust for Authorization, and [**selection:** *Root of Trust for Measurement, Root of Trust for Reporting, no others*].

Application Note: This document uses the [GP_ROT] definitions for RoT for Storage (denoted as the combination of RoT for Confidentiality and RoT for Integrity), Authorization, Measurement, and Reporting. DSCs use Roots of Trust for Storage to protect SDOs. Section 6.5 has a number of requirements for ensuring the TSF has functionality to authorize a user in order to access an SDO, including FIA_UAU.6.

If both Root of Trust for Measurement and Root of Trust for Reporting are selected in [FPT_ROT_EXT.1.1](#), the selection-based SFR FDP_DAU.1/Prove must also be claimed.

FPT_ROT_EXT.2 Root of Trust for Storage

FPT_ROT_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall prevent unauthorized access to SDOs associated with the Root of Trust for Storage.

Application Note: TOEs may use shielded locations or cryptographic protections to prevent unauthorized access to SDOs. Use [FDP_SDI.2](#) to protect the integrity of SDOs stored in the RoT for Storage.

FPT_RPL_EXT.1 Replay Prevention

FPT_RPL_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall have a mechanism for preventing replay of user authorization of operations on SDOs using the following methods [**selection:** *monotonic counters, random nonces, [assignment: other methods as specified]*].

FPT_RPL_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall detect replay for the following actions: [*authorization of operations on SDOs*].

FPT_RPL_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall deny the requested operation on the SDO when it detects a replay.

Application Note: The TSF receives authorization from an external source to the DSC to perform an operation on an SDO. If the operation on the SDO is restricted to authorized users, then anyone observing the communication to the DSC can copy the authorization and replay it. Random nonces and monotonic counters are but two mechanisms the TSF can use to mitigate replay. In this requirement, operations on SDOs include generating, using, modifying, propagating, and destroying. Besides monotonic counters and random nonces, the TSF could employ other methods to prevent replay of user authorizations, which the Security Target should describe.

This requirement does not specify how TSF detects replays.

FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps

FPT_STM.1.1

The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

Application Note: It is acceptable for the TSF to provide timestamp data either through an internal clock or a counter. It is also permissible for the TSF to obtain time data from a clock contained within the same physical enclosure as

the TOE.

FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing

FPT_TST.1.1

The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during power-on start-up, [**selection:** *periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at no other condition, at the conditions* [**assignment:** *conditions under which self test should occur*]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [the TSF].

FPT_TST.1.2

The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of [TSF data].

FPT_TST.1.3

The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of the [TSF].

Application Note: This requirement intends to cover integrity of the TSF functionality (i.e. runtime checks).

TSF integrity testing provides the ability to test the TSF's correct operation. These tests are expected to be performed automatically and autonomously at start-up but may also be performed periodically during operation, at the request of the authorized user, or when other conditions are met. It also provides the ability to verify the integrity of TSF data and executable code.

All cryptographic functions come with known answer tests (KATs). In addition to verifying the integrity of the firmware executing the TSF, the DSC should also verify the integrity of any data associated with the TSF (such as constants for cryptographic algorithms) as well as performing the KATs.

5.1.6 Resource Utilization (FRU)

FRU_FLT.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance

FRU_FLT.1.1

The TSF shall ensure the operation of [protection of TSF data] when the following failures occur: [*fault injection*].

Application Note: TSF data may be protected in response to a fault injection either by providing a method to ensure that the data remains protected or by logically destroying the data or any part of a key change that encrypts it. This behavior may differ based on the type of fault.

5.1.7 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:

Table 12: SFR Rationale

OBJECTIVE	ADDRESSED BY	RATIONALE
O.ACCOUNTABILITY	FAU_GEN.1	'cause FAU_GEN.1 is awesome
	FTP_ITC_EXT.1	Cause FTP reasons
O.INTEGRITY	FPT_SBOP_EXT.1	For reasons
	FPT_ASLR_EXT.1	ASLR For reasons
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1	For reasons
	FPT_TUD_EXT.2	For reasons
	FCS_COP.1/HASH	For reasons
	FCS_COP.1/SIGN	For reasons
	FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC	For reasons
	FPT_ACF_EXT.1	For reasons
	FPT_SRP_EXT.1	For reasons
	FIA_X509_EXT.1	For reasons
	FPT_TST_EXT.1	For reasons
	FTP_ITC_EXT.1	For reasons
	FPT_W^X_EXT.1	For reasons
	FIA_AFL.1	For reasons
	FIA_UAU.5	For reasons

O.MANAGEMENT	FMT_MOF_EXT.1	For reasons
	FMT_SMF_EXT.1	For reasons
	FTA_TAB.1	For reasons
	FTP_TRP.1	For reasons
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE	FCS_STO_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT, FDP_ACF_EXT.1	Rationale for a big chunk
O.PROTECTED_COMMS	FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.4, FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT, FCS_COP.1/HASH, FCS_COP.1/SIGN, FCS_COP.1/HMAC, FDP_IFC_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FTP_ITC_EXT.1	Rationale for a big chunk

5.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The Security Objectives in [Section 4 Security Objectives](#) were constructed to address threats identified in [Section 3.1 Threats](#). The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) are a formal instantiation of the Security Objectives. The PP identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs independent testing.

This section lists the set of SARs from CC part 3 that are required in evaluations against this PP. Individual Assurance Activities to be performed are specified both in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) as well as in this section.

The general model for evaluation of OSs against STs written to conform to this PP is as follows:

After the ST has been approved for evaluation, the TSEF will obtain the OS, supporting environmental IT, and the administrative/user guides for the OS. The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC SARs. The ITSEF also performs the Assurance Activities contained within [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#), which are intended to be an interpretation of the other CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the OS. The Assurance Activities that are captured in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) also provide clarification as to what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the OS is compliant with the PP.

5.2.1 Class ASE: Security Target

As per ASE activities defined in [\[CEM\]](#).

5.2.2 Class ADV: Development

The information about the OS is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the TSS portion of the ST. The OS developer must concur with the description of the product that is contained in the TSS as it relates to the functional requirements. The Assurance Activities contained in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) should provide the ST authors with sufficient information to determine the appropriate content for the TSS section.

ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)

The functional specification describes the TSFIs. It is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. Additionally, because OSs conforming to this PP will necessarily have interfaces to the Operational Environment that are not directly invocable by OS users, there is little point specifying that such interfaces be described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be possible. For this PP, the activities for this family should focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation. No additional “functional specification” documentation is necessary to satisfy the assurance activities specified. The interfaces that need to be evaluated are characterized through the information needed to perform the assurance activities listed, rather than as an independent, abstract list.

Developer action elements:

ADV_FSP.1.1D

The developer shall provide a functional specification.

Content and presentation elements:

ADV_FSP.1.2C

The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.

Application Note: As indicated in the introduction to this section, the functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD_OPE and AGD_PRE documentation. The developer may reference a website accessible to application developers and the evaluator. The assurance activities in the functional requirements point to evidence that should exist in the documentation and TSS section; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element [ADV_FSP.1.2D](#) is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.

ADV_FSP.1.3C

The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV_FSP.1.4C

The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each

SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.

ADV_FSP.1.5C

The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.

ADV_FSP.1.6C

The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

Evaluator action elements:

ADV_FSP.1.7E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ADV_FSP.1.8E

The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

Evaluation Activities ▼

ADV_FSP.1:

There are no specific assurance activities associated with these SARs, except ensuring the information is provided. The functional specification documentation is provided to support the evaluation activities described in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#), and other activities described for AGD, ATE, and AVA SARs. The requirements on the content of the functional specification information is implicitly assessed by virtue of the other assurance activities being performed; if the evaluator is unable to perform an activity because there is insufficient interface information, then an adequate functional specification has not been provided.

5.2.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation

The guidance documents will be provided with the ST. Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the IT personnel. Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and Instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment. Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality is also provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in the assurance activities specified with each requirement.

AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)

Developer action elements:

AGD_OPE.1.1D

The developer shall provide operational user guidance.

Application Note: The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages. Rather than repeat information here, the developer should review the assurance activities for this component to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.

Content and presentation elements:

AGD_OPE.1.2C

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.

Application Note: User and administrator are to be considered in the definition of user role.

AGD_OPE.1.3C

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the OS in a secure manner.

AGD_OPE.1.4C

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.

Application Note: This portion of the operational user guidance should be presented in the form of a checklist that can be quickly executed by IT personnel (or end-users, when necessary) and suitable for use in compliance activities. When possible, this guidance is to be expressed in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) to support security automation. Minimally, it should be presented in a structured format which includes a title for each configuration item, instructions for achieving the secure configuration, and any relevant rationale.

AGD_OPE.1.5C

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

AGD_OPE.1.6C

The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the OS (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.

AGD_OPE.1.7C

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

AGD_OPE.1.8C

The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

Evaluator action elements:

AGD_OPE.1.9E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

Evaluation Activities ▼

[AGD_OPE.1:](#)

Some of the contents of the operational guidance are verified by the assurance activities in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) and evaluation of the OS according to the [\[CEM\]](#). The following additional information is also required. If cryptographic functions are provided by the OS, the operational guidance shall contain instructions for configuring the cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the OS. It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the OS. The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the OS by verifying a digital signature – this may be done by the OS or the underlying platform. The evaluator will verify that this process includes the following steps: Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to the OS (e.g., placement in a specific directory). Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or unsuccessful. This includes generation of the hash/digital signature. The OS will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this PP. The operational guidance shall make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the evaluation activities.

AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)

Developer action elements:

AGD_PRE.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS, including its preparative procedures.

Application Note: As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the assurance activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.

Content and presentation elements:

AGD_PRE.1.2C

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered OS in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.

AGD_PRE.1.3C

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the OS and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

Evaluator action elements:

AGD_PRE.1.4E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AGD_PRE.1.5E

The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the OS can be prepared securely for operation.

Evaluation Activities ▼

[AGD_PRE.1:](#)

As indicated in the introduction above, there are significant expectations with respect to the documentation—especially when configuring the operational environment to support OS functional requirements. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the guidance provided for the

5.2.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support

At the assurance level provided for OSs conformant to this PP, life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the OS vendor's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it is a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.

ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)

This component is targeted at identifying the OS such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user.

Developer action elements:

ALC_CMC.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS and a reference for the OS.

Content and presentation elements:

ALC_CMC.1.2C

The OS shall be labeled with a unique reference.

Application Note: Unique reference information includes:

- OS Name
- OS Version
- OS Description
- Software Identification (SWID) tags, if available

Evaluator action elements:

ALC_CMC.1.3E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

Evaluation Activities ▼

[ALC_CMC.1:](#)

The evaluator will check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the ST. Further, the evaluator will check the AGD guidance and OS samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor maintains a web site advertising the OS, the evaluator will examine the information on the web site to ensure that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.

ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)

Given the scope of the OS and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's assurance activities are covered by the assurance activities listed for [ALC_CMC.1](#).

Developer action elements:

ALC_CMS.1.1D

The developer shall provide a configuration list for the OS.

Content and presentation elements:

ALC_CMS.1.2C

The configuration list shall include the following: the OS itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.

ALC_CMS.1.3C

The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

Evaluator action elements:

ALC_CMS.1.4E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

Evaluation Activities ▼

[ALC_CMS.1:](#)

The "evaluation evidence required by the SARs" in this PP is limited to the information in the ST coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that the OS is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the ST and in the AGD guidance (as done in the assurance activity for [ALC_CMC.1](#)), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this component. Life-cycle support is targeted aspects of the developer's life-cycle and instructions to providers of applications for the developer's devices, rather than an in-depth examination of the TSF manufacturer's

development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation. The evaluator will ensure that the developer has identified (in guidance documentation for application developers concerning the targeted platform) one or more development environments appropriate for use in developing applications for the developer's platform. For each of these development environments, the developer shall provide information on how to configure the environment to ensure that buffer overflow protection mechanisms in the environment(s) are invoked (e.g., compiler and linker flags). The evaluator will ensure that this documentation also includes an indication of whether such protections are on by default, or have to be specifically enabled. The evaluator will ensure that the TSF is uniquely identified (with respect to other products from the TSF vendor), and that documentation provided by the developer in association with the requirements in the ST is associated with the TSF using this unique identification.

ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates

This component requires the OS developer, in conjunction with any other necessary parties, to provide information as to how the end-user devices are updated to address security issues in a timely manner. The documentation describes the process of providing updates to the public from the time a security flaw is reported/discovered, to the time an update is released. This description includes the parties involved (e.g., the developer, carriers(s)) and the steps that are performed (e.g., developer testing, carrier testing), including worst case time periods, before an update is made available to the public.

Developer action elements:

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1D

The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the OS.

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2D

The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product.

Content and presentation elements:

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.3C

The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the OS software.

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.4C

The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to the OS.

Note: The reporting mechanism could include web sites, email addresses, as well as a means to protect the sensitive nature of the report (e.g., public keys that could be used to encrypt the details of a proof-of-concept exploit).

Evaluator action elements:

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.5E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

Evaluation Activities ▼

ALC_TSU_EXT.1:

The evaluator will verify that the TSS contains a description of the timely security update process used by the developer to create and deploy security updates. The evaluator will verify that this description addresses the entire application. The evaluator will also verify that, in addition to the OS developer's process, any third-party processes are also addressed in the description. The evaluator will also verify that each mechanism for deployment of security updates is described.

The evaluator will verify that, for each deployment mechanism described for the update process, the TSS lists a time between public disclosure of a vulnerability and public availability of the security update to the OS patching this vulnerability, to include any third-party or carrier delays in deployment. The evaluator will verify that this time is expressed in a number or range of days. The evaluator will verify that this description includes the publicly available mechanisms (including either an email address or website) for reporting security issues related to the OS. The evaluator shall verify that the description of this mechanism includes a method for protecting the report either using a public key for encrypting email or a trusted channel for a website.

5.2.5 Class ATE: Tests

Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA_VAN family. At the assurance level specified in this PP, testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirements.

ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)

Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the administrative (including configuration and operational) documentation provided. The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) being met, although some additional testing is specified for SARs in [Section 5.2 Security Assurance Requirements](#). The Assurance Activities identify the additional testing activities associated with these components. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/OS combinations that are claiming conformance to this PP. Given the scope of the OS and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's assurance activities are covered by the assurance activities listed for [ALC_CMC.1](#).

Developer action elements:

ATE_IND.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS for testing.

Content and presentation elements:

ATE_IND.1.2C

The OS shall be suitable for testing.

Evaluator action elements:

ATE_IND.1.3E

The evaluator *shall confirm* that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ATE_IND.1.4E

The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.

Application Note: The evaluator will test the OS on the most current fully patched version of the platform.

Evaluation Activities ▼

ATE_IND.1:

The evaluator will prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system, including any application crashes during testing. The evaluator shall determine the root cause of any application crashes and include that information in the report. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the [\[CEM\]](#) and the body of this PP's Assurance Activities.

While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an Assurance Activity, the evaluator must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST is covered. The test plan identifies the platforms to be tested, and for those platforms not included in the test plan but included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing the platforms. This justification must address the differences between the tested platforms and the untested platforms, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no affect; rationale must be provided. If all platforms claimed in the ST are tested, then no rationale is necessary. The test plan describes the composition of each platform to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the evaluator is expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each platform either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) should be provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the OS and its platform. This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The cryptographic algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by this PP and used by the cryptographic protocols being evaluated (IPsec, TLS). The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those objectives. These procedures include expected results.

The test report (which could just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a "fail" and "pass" result (and the supporting details), and not just the "pass" result.

5.2.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment

For the first generation of this protection profile, the evaluation lab is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. Until penetration tools are created and uniformly distributed to the evaluation labs, the evaluator will not be expected to test for these vulnerabilities in the OS. The labs will be expected to comment on the likelihood of these vulnerabilities given the documentation provided by the vendor. This information will be used in the development of penetration testing tools and for the development of future protection profiles.

AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)

Developer action elements:

AVA_VAN.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS for testing.

Content and presentation elements:

AVA_VAN.1.2C

The OS shall be suitable for testing.

Evaluator action elements:

AVA_VAN.1.3E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AVA_VAN.1.4E

The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the OS.

Application Note: Public domain sources include the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) dictionary for publicly-known vulnerabilities. Public domain sources also include sites which provide free checking of files for viruses.

AVA_VAN.1.5E

The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the OS is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.

Evaluation Activities ▼

[AVA_VAN.1:](#)

The evaluator will generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to find vulnerabilities that have been found in similar applications with a particular focus on network protocols the application uses and document formats it parses. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report.

For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.

Appendix A - Optional Requirements

As indicated in the introduction to this , the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE) are contained in the body of this . This appendix contains three other types of optional requirements that may be included in the ST, but are not required in order to conform to this . However, applied modules, packages and/or use cases may refine specific requirements as mandatory.

The first type ([A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements](#)) are strictly optional requirements that are independent of the TOE implementing any function. If the TOE fulfills any of these requirements or supports a certain functionality, the vendor is encouraged to include the SFRs in the ST, but are not required in order to conform to this .

The second type ([A.2 Objective Requirements](#)) are objective requirements that describe security functionality not yet widely available in commercial technology. The requirements are not currently mandated in the body of this , but will be included in the baseline requirements in future versions of this . Adoption by vendors is encouraged and expected as soon as possible.

The third type ([A.3 Implementation-based Requirements](#)) are dependent on the TOE implementing a particular function. If the TOE fulfills any of these requirements, the vendor must either add the related SFR or disable the functionality for the evaluated configuration.

A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

A.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_ENT_EXT.1 Entropy for External IT Entities

FCS_ENT_EXT.1.1

[FCS_ENT_EXT.1.1](#) The TSF shall provide an interface to make entropy that meets [FCS_RBG_EXT.1](#) available to external IT entities.

FCS_RBG_EXT.2 External Seeding for Random Bit Generation

FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall provide an interface to allow external seeding of the DRBG with a bit-string of at least the minimum number of bits selected in [FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2](#) before the DRBG produces any output.

A.1.2 Protection of the TSF

FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

FPT_ITT.1.1

The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure] and [**selection:** *modification, no other actions*] when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

FPT_PRO_EXT.2 Data Integrity Measurements

FPT_PRO_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall be able to quantify the integrity of the data protected by the TOE by generating integrity measurements and assertions making them available to authorized entities.

Application Note: The generation of these integrity measurements and assertions is the creation of OB.Pstate. Data protected by the TOE includes DSC firmware, DSC configuration data, and user data. DSC configuration data may include persistent SDEs or SDOs such as immutable or mutable root keys, authorization values, and authentication tokens (i.e. DSC.ID, OB.P_SDO, OB.FAACntr, OB.AntiReplay, and OB.Context). User data may include transient SDEs and SDOs as well as authorization values and authentication tokens bound to these SDEs and SDOs (i.e. OB.T_SDO). Integrity reporting is the process of attesting to integrity measurements (including those recorded in status registers in a DSC).

FPT_PRO_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall accumulate platform characteristics using a consistent [**assignment:** *description of process for accumulating platform characteristics*] process in which verified quantifiable measurements are accumulated to prove the integrity of its SDOs.

Application Note: Although a platform may enter any state possible—including undesirable or insecure states—it can use platform characteristics, including integrity measurements and assertions, along with logging and reporting to accurately report the state derived from data attributing to those states. In this context, platform characteristics can include, but is not limited to, cryptographic hashes of binary data, security-critical configurations, register values (including status registers) and milestones, such as verification of firmware, or transitioning from a boot phase to an operational phase. A platform characteristic may also represent the state of some entity outside the DSC. A process independent from the DSC or the host containing the DSC may evaluate the platform characteristics and determine an appropriate action.

FPT_ROT_EXT.3 Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms

The TSF shall be able to attest to a state as represented by platform characteristics with a Root of Trust for Reporting mechanism that uses for its identity [**selection:** *a cryptographically verifiable identity in [FPT_PRO_EXT.1](#), an alias key bound to the cryptographically verifiable identity in [FPT_PRO_EXT.1](#)*] and using a signature algorithm as specified in [FCS_COP.1/SigGen](#).

Application Note: While it is possible for a group of components to share a single unique group identifier, it is important to ensure that individual components have their own unique identifiers relative to each other. Resident keys or aliases are designed such that they are never visible outside the subset of DSC scope containing the RoT services and are only to be used for encryption. Therefore, possession of such aliases or keys can only be proved indirectly by using it to decrypt a value that has been encrypted with a corresponding public key. In this way, these resident keys or aliases can provide for authentication based on decryption operations instead of producing a digital signature.

If non-specialized cryptographic keys used for algorithms in FCS_COP is selected, it is expected that when used in the context of the RoT for Reporting, these keys are not visible to full DSC scope as described above. While it is possible for a group of components to share a single unique group identifier, it is important to ensure that individual components have their own unique identifiers relative to each other.

The DSC will not expose the private portions of resident keys or aliases outside the subset of DSC scope containing the RoT services. Therefore, possession of such aliases or keys can only be proved indirectly by using it to decrypt a value that has been encrypted with a corresponding public key. In this way, these resident keys or aliases can provide for authentication based on decryption operations instead of producing a digital signature.

The DSC responds to requests from an external entity to attest to the provenance and integrity of platform characteristics contained within the DSC.

Integrity reporting is the process of attesting to platform characteristics (including those recorded in status registers in a DSC). The philosophy behind integrity measurement, logging, and reporting is that a platform may enter any state possible—including undesirable or insecure states—but can still accurately report measurements derived from data attributing to those states. In this context, data can include, but is not limited to, code, security-critical configurations, values of registers, including status registers. An independent process may evaluate the integrity states and determine an appropriate response.

A.2 Objective Requirements

This does not define any Objective requirements.

A.3 Implementation-based Requirements

This does not define any Implementation-based requirements.

Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements

As indicated in the introduction to this , the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE or its underlying platform) are contained in the body of this . There are additional requirements based on selections in the body of the : if certain selections are made, then additional requirements below must be included.

B.1 User Data Protection

FDP_DAU.1/prove Basic Data Authentication (for Use with The Prove Service)

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FDP_DAU.1.1/prove

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of [**selection:** [**assignment:** *list of objects or information types*] declared valid by the TSF, [**assignment:** *list of objects or information types*] declared valid by an authenticated user].

FDP_DAU.1.2/prove

The TSF shall provide [**assignment:** *list of subjects*] with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information.

Application Note: This SFR describes the output of the Prove service provided by the DSC. The evidence of validity or authenticity, or other evidence derived, is expected to be processed by the RoT for Measurement. Additionally, the use of a RoT for Reporting presupposes a logging capability or other means of generating state information that could be conveyed to external entities. Therefore, FDP_DAU.1.1/Prove must be selected if-and-only-if the RoT for Measurement and the RoT for Reporting are both selected in [FPT_ROT_EXT.1.1](#). An ‘authenticated user’ in the sense of the selection in FDP_DAU.1.1/Prove means a user who has been authenticated by the DSC according to the mechanisms of [FIA_UAU.5](#).

In FDP_DAU.1.1/Prove, the DSC will issue a validity-stamped or authenticity-stamped piece of data. In this case, validity-stamped means that the form of the issued data enables an external entity to verify that the data has been issued via the DSC’s Prove service. The implementation might be via a DSC cryptographic signature, or a MAC using a symmetric key shared with the receiver, for example. Authenticity-stamped means that the receiver of the data can verify that the user providing this data is authentic.

Data that would need to be validity-stamped includes data over which the DSC is the authority, such as the state of its own firmware. Data that would need to be authenticity-stamped includes data about which the DSC knows nothing, but where it will issue the data with a statement that the DSC has authenticated the source of this data.

For data that is validity-stamped, the DSC does nothing but respond to a request to issue the data; thus, authentication of the user issuing the data is not needed and is covered by FDP_DAU.1/Prove. Otherwise, in the case the DSC has no understanding of this data, a step is needed via [FIA_UAU.5](#) by which the DSC authenticates the user for this service, and that the DSC or Prove service will therefore vouch for the user, not the validity of the data itself.

FDP_FRS_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FDP_FRS_EXT.2.1

Upon initiation of a factory reset, the TSF shall destroy [*all non-persistent SDOs*] and restore the following pre-installed SDOs to their factory settings: [**assignment:** *preinstalled SDOs to be restored during a factory reset*].

Application Note: Not all DSCs permit a factory reset of the TOE, or perform a factory reset in response to excessive failed authentication or authorization attempts. Those that do are expected to perform a factory reset in a manner that prevents any inadvertent disclosure of security-relevant data that was present on the DSC prior to the factory reset. For DSCs that permit factory reset functionality (as indicated by selection of factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by [FDP_FRS_EXT.2](#) in [FIA_AFL_EXT.1.3](#), or by no actions or conditions NOT being selected in [FDP_FRS_EXT.1.1](#)), this SFR must be included in the TOE boundary.

FDP_MFW_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FDP_MFW_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall have the ability to verify the integrity of the firmware.

FDP_MFW_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the integrity of the firmware.

Application Note: Data and firmware integrity is not a required component of this cPP in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in [FDP_MFW_EXT.1.1](#).

The TOE guarantees the integrity of the firmware by verifying its integrity.

Verifying the integrity of the firmware could be accomplished by guaranteeing the validity of firmware within the TOE prior to execution.

This requirement covers the case of ensuring the firmware is trustworthy in immutable form or mutable through any firmware updates, since the integrity and authenticity are checked prior to execution.

[FCS_COP.1/SigVer](#) applies if the TOE provides the capability to update the TOE firmware and uses digital signatures and MAC verification for update verification. The ST Author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures. For the algorithms chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.

FDP_MFW_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FDP_MFW_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall have the ability to verify the authenticity of the firmware.

FDP_MFW_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the authenticity of the firmware.

Application Note: Firmware authentication is not a required component of this cPP in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in [FDP_MFW_EXT.1.1](#).

The TOE guarantees the authenticity of the firmware by verifying its signature.

Verifying the authenticity of the firmware could be accomplished by guaranteeing the validity of firmware within the TOE prior to execution.

This requirement covers the case of ensuring the firmware is trustworthy in immutable form or mutable through any firmware updates, since the integrity and authenticity are checked prior to execution.

[FCS_COP.1/SigVer](#) applies if the TOE provides the capability to update the TOE firmware and uses digital signatures and MAC verification for update verification. The ST Author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures. For the algorithms chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.

B.2 Identification and Authentication

FIA_AFL_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FIA_AFL_EXT.2.1

When the TSF locks an **SDO** (i.e. prevents authorization attempts for an SDO) due to a user exceeding the allowed threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, then only an administrator may unlock access to the **SDO** and reset the corresponding failed authorization attempt counter.

Application Note: This SFR is applicable only when the TSF's response to excessive authorization failures selects prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock) as specified by [FIA_AFL_EXT.1.3](#).

B.3 Protection of the TSF

FPT_FLS.1/FW Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Firmware)

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FPT_FLS.1.1/FW

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of firmware failures occur: [*authenticity violation, integrity violation, rollback violation*].

Application Note: A DSC's ability to handle failures related to authenticity, integrity, and invalid versions of firmware is not applicable in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in [FDP_MFW_EXT.1.1](#).

The phrase “secure state” refers to a state in which the TOE has consistent TSF data and a TSF that can correctly enforce the policy. The TOE must ensure that no further processing of TSF or user data takes place while in an insecure state. This state may be the initial “boot” of a clean system, or it might be some check-pointed state. It is expected that in most cases, the TOE will halt and require a reset or re-initialization to return to a known secure state.

FPT_RPL.1/Rollback Replay Detection (Rollback)

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FPT_RPL.1.1/Rollback

The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [*previous firmware builds*].

FPT_RPL.1.2/Rollback

The TSF shall prevent the execution of the loaded firmware and perform [**selection:** [**assignment:** *other actions*], *no other actions*] when replay is detected.

Application Note: A DSC’s ability to detect an attempted rollback (software/firmware downgrade) is not applicable in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware that cannot be modified in any way. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in [FDP_MFW_EXT.1.1](#).

The TSF data is used as a guarantee of the ordinal identifier of the firmware instance. When a firmware load is requested, the TSF ensures the authenticated firmware ordinal identifier is greater than or equal to the previously authenticated firmware identifier. For example, this could be accomplished by ensuring the validated instance of the firmware to be loaded is greater than or equal to the instance previously validated and loaded into the TOE. By loading a previous instance of firmware, it potentially opens up the device to known vulnerabilities.

B.4 Trusted Paths/Channels

FPT_CCMP_EXT.1 CCM Protocol

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FPT_CCMP_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement CCMP using [**selection:** *AES, Camellia*] in CCM mode and key size [**selection:** *128-bits, 256-bits*] as defined in [**selection:** *IEEE 802.11i, IEEE 802.11ac*].

FPT_CCMP_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

FPT_CCMP_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

Application Note: This SFR must be claimed if CCMP is selected in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#).

Inclusion of this SFR requires inclusion of AES-CCM or CAM-CCM in [FCS_COP.1/SKC](#).

CCMP is defined in IEEE 802.11i. CCMP-256 is defined in IEEE 802.11ac.

FPT_GCMP_EXT.1 GCM Protocol

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FPT_GCMP_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement GCMP using [**selection:** *AES, Camellia*] in GCM mode and key size [**selection:** *128-bits, 256-bits*] as defined in [*IEEE 802.11ad*].

FPT_GCMP_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

FPT_GCMP_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

Application Note: This SFR must be claimed if GCMP is selected in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#).

Inclusion of this SFR requires inclusion of AES-GCM or CAM-GCM in [FCS_COP.1/SKC](#).

FPT_ITC_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FPT_ITC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use [**selection**: *CCMP, GCMP*] protocol to provide a communication channel between itself and [**assignment**: *list of entities external to the TOE*] that protects channel data from disclosure and ensures the integrity of channel data.

Application Note: This SFR must be claimed if cryptographically protected data channels as specified in [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#) is selected in either [FDP_ITC_EXT.1](#) or [FDP_ITC_EXT.2](#).

Entities external to the TOE include applications that communicate with the TOE such as authentication capabilities (e.g. biometrics reader), external storage, and interfaces with an external DSC.

If [CCMP](#) is selected, the ST author must include [FTP_CCMP_EXT.1](#). If [GCMP](#) is selected, the ST author must include [FTP_GCMP_EXT.1](#).

FTP_ITE_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FTP_ITE_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall encrypt data for transfer between the TOE and [**assignment**: *list of entities external to the TOE*] using a cryptographic algorithm and key size as specified in [FCS_COP.1/SKC](#), and using [**selection**:

- *Pre-shared keys,*
- *Keys established according to [FCS_CKM.2](#),*
- *Keys exchanged using a physically protected communication mechanism conformant with [FTP_ITP_EXT.1](#)*

].

Application Note: This SFR must be claimed if encrypted data buffers as specified in [FTP_ITE_EXT.1](#) is selected in either [FDP_ITC_EXT.1](#) or [FDP_ITC_EXT.2](#).

This requirement applies to encrypted data communications between the TOE and external entities that do not use a physically protected mechanism conforming to [FTP_ITP_EXT.1](#), or a cryptographically protected data channel as conforming to [FTP_ITC_EXT.1](#). For example, if data is transferred through encrypted buffers (or blobs) then this requirement applies. If data is transferred through a physically protected channel, then [FTP_ITP_EXT.1](#) applies. This requirement would apply, for example, for communications implemented through a shared data buffer.

FTP_ITP_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon a selection in .

FTP_ITP_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide a physically protected communication channel between itself and [**assignment**: *list of other IT entities within the same platform*].

Application Note: This SFR must be claimed if physically protected channels as specified in [FTP_ITP_EXT.1](#) is selected in either [FDP_ITC_EXT.1](#) or [FDP_ITC_EXT.2](#).

Appendix C - Inherently Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this Protection Profile. However, these requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [\[CC\]](#) Part 1, **8.2 Dependencies between components**.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the Protection Profile provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.

Requirement	Rationale for Satisfaction
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FIA_UAU.1 - Timing of authentication	FIA_AFL.1 implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been authenticated, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test.
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FIA_UID.1 - Timing of identification	FIA_AFL.1 implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been identified, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test.
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FMT_SMR.1 - Security roles	FMT_MOF_EXT.1 specifies role-based management functions that implicitly defines user and privileged accounts; therefore, it is duplicative to include separate role requirements.
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FPT_STM.1 - Reliable time stamps	FAU_GEN.1.2 explicitly requires that the OS associate timestamps with audit records; therefore it is duplicative to include a separate timestamp requirement.
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FTA_SSL.1 - TSF-initiated session locking	FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines requirements for managing session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement.
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FTA_SSL.2 - User-initiated locking	FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines requirements for user-initiated session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement.
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FAU_STG.1 - Protected audit trail storage	FPT_ACF_EXT.1 defines a requirement to protect audit logs; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate protection of audit trail requirements.
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FAU_GEN.2 - User identity association	FAU_GEN.1.2 explicitly requires that the OS record any user account associated with each event; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to associate a user account with each event.
---------------------------------------	---

FAU_SAR.1 - Audit review	FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2 requires that audit logs (and other objects) are protected from reading by unprivileged users; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to protect only the audit information.
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Appendix D - Acronyms

Appendix E - Selection Rules

This rules in this appendix define which combinations of selections are considered valid. An ST is considered conforming only if it satisfies all rules.

Appendix F - Use Case Templates

F.1 Elephant-own device

Appendix G - Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Programming Interface
API	Application Programming Interface
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization
Base-PP	Base Protection Profile
CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
CESG	Communications-Electronics Security Group
CMC	Certificate Management over CMS
CMS	Cryptographic Message Syntax
CN	Common Names
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSA	Computer Security Act
CSP	Critical Security Parameters
DAR	Data At Rest
DEP	Data Execution Prevention
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DHE	Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
DNS	Domain Name System
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DT	Date/Time Vector
DTLS	Datagram Transport Layer Security
EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
ECDHE	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EST	Enrollment over Secure Transport
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
HMAC	Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IP	Internet Protocol
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSF	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OE	Operational Environment
OID	Object Identifier
OMB	Office of Management and Budget

OS	Operating System
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
PP	Protection Profile
PP-Configuration	Protection Profile Configuration
PP-Module	Protection Profile Module
RBG	Random Bit Generator
RFC	Request for Comment
RNG	Random Number Generator
RNGVS	Random Number Generator Validation System
S/MIME	Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
SAN	Subject Alternative Name
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SIP	Session Initiation Protocol
ST	Security Target
SWID	Software Identification
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSFI	TSF Interface
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
USB	Universal Serial Bus
VM	Virtual Machine
XCCDF	eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format
XOR	Exclusive Or
app	Application

Appendix H - Bibliography

Identifier	Title
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.• Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.• Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM]	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security - Evaluation Methodology , CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[CESG]	CESG - End User Devices Security and Configuration Guidance
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