

Supporting Document

Mandatory Technical Document



PP-Module for SSL/TLS Inspection Proxies

Version: 1.1

2021-09-10

National Information Assurance Partnership

Foreword

This is a Supporting Document (SD), intended to complement the Common Criteria version 3 and the associated Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.

SDs may be “Guidance Documents”, that highlight specific approaches and application of the standard to areas where no mutual recognition of its application is required, and as such, are not of normative nature, or “Mandatory Technical Documents”, whose application is mandatory for evaluations whose scope is covered by that of the SD. The usage of the latter class is not only mandatory, but certificates issued as a result of their application are recognized under the CCRA.

Technical Editor:

National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)

Document history:

Version	Date	Comment
1.1	2021-09-10	Updates to reflect Github conversion, compatibility with NDcPP v2.2E, and Technical Decisions applied to version 1.0
1.0	2019-08-23	Update release

General Purpose:

The purpose of this SD is to define evaluation methods for the functional behavior of SSL/TLS Inspection Proxies products.

Acknowledgements:

This SD was developed with support from NIAP SSL/TLS Inspection Proxies Technical Community members, with representatives from industry, government agencies, Common Criteria Test Laboratories, and members of academia.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Technology Area and Scope of Supporting Document

The scope of the PP-Module for SSL/TLS Inspection Proxies is to describe the security functionality of SSL/TLS Inspection Proxies products in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for them. The PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PP:

- [Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems, Version](#)

This SD is mandatory for evaluations of TOEs that claim conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the PP-Module for :

- SSL/TLS Inspection Proxies, Version 1.1

As such it defines Evaluation Activities for the functionality described in the PP-Module as well as any impacts to the Evaluation Activities to the Base-PP(s) it modifies.

Although Evaluation Activities are defined mainly for the evaluators to follow, in general they also help developers to prepare for evaluation by identifying specific requirements for their TOE. The specific requirements in Evaluation Activities may in some cases clarify the meaning of Security Functional Requirements (SFR), and may identify particular requirements for the content of Security Targets (ST) (especially the TOE Summary Specification), user guidance documentation, and possibly supplementary information (e.g. for entropy analysis or cryptographic key management architecture).

1.2 Structure of the Document

Evaluation Activities can be defined for both SFRs and Security Assurance Requirements (SAR), which are themselves defined in separate sections of the SD.

If any Evaluation Activity cannot be successfully completed in an evaluation, then the overall verdict for the evaluation is a 'fail'. In rare cases there may be acceptable reasons why an Evaluation Activity may be modified or deemed not applicable for a particular TOE, but this must be approved by the Certification Body for the evaluation.

In general, if all Evaluation Activities (for both SFRs and SARs) are successfully completed in an evaluation then it would be expected that the overall verdict for the evaluation is a 'pass'. To reach a 'fail' verdict when the Evaluation Activities have been successfully completed would require a specific justification from the evaluator as to why the Evaluation Activities were not sufficient for that TOE.

Similarly, at the more granular level of assurance components, if the Evaluation Activities for an assurance component and all of its related SFR Evaluation Activities are successfully completed in an evaluation then it would be expected that the verdict for the assurance component is a 'pass'. To reach a 'fail' verdict for the assurance component when these Evaluation Activities have been successfully completed would require a specific justification from the evaluator as to why the Evaluation Activities were not sufficient for that TOE.

1.3 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

1.3.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC] .
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Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility, accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base Protection Profiles.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.

1.3.2 Technical Terms

Attribute	A characterization of an entity (monitored client or the server requested by a monitored client) used in the TLS session establishment policy or the plaintext processing policy implemented by the TOE that describes the entity. Common attributes include IP address, name, and certificates associated to an entity.
Block operation	A high-level operation of the TLS session establishment policy implemented by the TOE that prevents TLS sessions between a monitored client and the server requested by the client.
	A high-level operation of the TLS session establishment policy implemented by the TOE that allows a TLS session between a monitored client and the server requested by the

Bypass operation	client. Alternatively, an operation of the plaintext processing policy implemented by the TOE to bypass certain inspection processing functional components for plaintext data flows established under the SSL/TLS session establishment policy.
Inspect operation	A high-level operation of the TLS session establishment policy implemented by the TOE that establishes a TLS session thread between a monitored client and a server requested by the monitored client in order to provide security services on the underlying plaintext application data.
Inspection processing functional components	A discrete set of security functions implemented within a single logical component, internal or external to the TOE that provides security services based on a plaintext data flow controlled by the TOE intended to protect a monitored client from defined security threats, or to enforce a defined policy regarding the servers allowed to be accessed by monitored clients.
Monitored Client	A TLS client that uses the TOE as an SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy. This device requires a trust anchor to be installed for the internal CA of the TOE, and makes SSL/TLS requests for services external to the enclave. This client makes SSL/TLS requests to a “requested server” through the TOE.
Requested Server	The target of an SSL/TLS request by a monitored client through the TOE. It is typically a service provider for clients using SSL/TLS. If mutual authentication is to be supported, this device requires a trust anchor to be installed for the internal CA of the TOE.
Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS)	A set of security protocols defined by IETF RFCs to establish a secure point-to-point channel between a client and a server. The secure channel provides confidentiality, integrity and proof of origin to plaintext application data transferred between the client and server. SSL refers to early implementations of the SSL/TLS protocols that are deprecated. TLS refers to current versions of the SSL/TLS protocol.
TLS messages	Specific messages defined by TLS protocol standards. The TLS messages addressed in this PP-Module include TLS handshake messages: Client Hello, Server Hello, Server Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Request, Client Certificate, Client Certificate Verify, Server Finished and Client Finished messages.
TLS session parameters	The parameters of a TLS session established by the TOE for protecting thrutraffic, minimally to include: the negotiated version, negotiated cipher suite, the size of any key exchange values sent or received in key exchange messages, the server certificate received, (a reference to) the server certificate sent, the client certificate received, (a reference to) the client certificate sent, and other negotiated values determined by the TLS handshake that are not fixed for all TLS sessions established.
TLS session thread	A connection negotiated by the TOE consisting of a TLS secure point-to-point channel between a monitored client and the TOE, a TLS secure point-to-point channel between the TOE and the requested server, and any traffic flow containing the underlying application plaintext decrypted from one of the SSL/TLS channels, that is transferred within or between inspection processing functional components controlled by the TOE.

2 Evaluation Activities for SFRs

The EAs presented in this section capture the actions the evaluator performs to address technology specific aspects covering specific SARs (e.g. ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, and ATE_IND.1) – this is in addition to the CEM workunits that are performed in [Section 3 Evaluation Activities for SARs](#).

Regarding design descriptions (designated by the subsections labelled TSS, as well as any required supplementary material that may be treated as proprietary), the evaluator must ensure there is specific information that satisfies the EA. For findings regarding the TSS section, the evaluator’s verdicts will be associated with the CEM workunit ASE_TSS.1-1. Evaluator verdicts associated with the supplementary evidence will also be associated with ASE_TSS.1-1, since the requirement to provide such evidence is specified in ASE in the PP.

For ensuring the guidance documentation provides sufficient information for the administrators/users as it pertains to SFRs, the evaluator’s verdicts will be associated with CEM workunits ADV_FSP.1-7, AGD_OPE.1-4, and AGD_OPE.1-5.

Finally, the subsection labelled Tests is where the authors have determined that testing of the product in the context of the associated SFR is necessary. While the evaluator is expected to develop tests, there may be instances where it is more practical for the developer to construct tests, or where the developer may have existing tests. Therefore, it is acceptable for the evaluator to witness developer-generated tests in lieu of executing the tests. In this case, the evaluator must ensure the developer’s tests are executing both in the manner declared by the developer and as mandated by the EA. The CEM workunits that are associated with the EAs specified in this section are: ATE_IND.1-3, ATE_IND.1-4, ATE_IND.1-5, ATE_IND.1-6, and ATE_IND.1-

2.1 Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems

The EAs defined in this section are only applicable in cases where the TOE claims conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the General Purpose Operating Systems PP.

2.1.1 Modified SFRs

2.1.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)

Other than this SFR becoming mandatory versus optional, there is no modification to this SFR. This PP-Module does not modify this SFR as it is defined in the Base-PP. This SFR is optional in the Base-PP but is mandatory for a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module. There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed.

FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage

FAU_STG.1

There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed.

2.1.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

The ST author is instructed to include security critical parameters and when key destruction is required. The TSF shall destroy all cryptographic keys and critical security parameters, when no longer required in accordance with the specified cryptographic key destruction method For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a Single overwrite consisting of a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF's RBG zeroes ones a new value of the key a static or dynamic value that does not contain any CSP Destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that Logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a singlenumber of passes-pass overwrite consisting of a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF's RBG zeroes ones a new value of the key a static or dynamic value that does not contain any CSP Instructs a part of the TSF to destroy the abstraction that represents the key that meets the following: [no standard]. This SFR is refined from its definition in the Base-PP through the inclusion of security critical parameters and clarifies when destruction is required; a STIP device includes persistent keys, including the embedded CA's signing private key that should not be destroyed until they are no longer needed. Security critical parameters includes security related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys, authentication data such as passwords and PINs) appearing in plaintext or otherwise unprotected form and whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a CA or the security of the information protected by the CA or the security of the information protected by the CA. This SFR is refined in this PP-Module to include requirementsfor destruction of security critical parameters as well as keys. The EA for the Base-PP are extended to include security critical parameters whenever keys are indicated. Other than this SFR becoming mandatory versus selection-based, there is no modification to this SFR. This PP-Module does not modify this SFR as it is defined in the Base-PP. This SFR is selection-based in the Base-PP but is mandatory for a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module because of this PP-Module's modifications to FTP ITC.1. There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed. Other than this SFR becoming mandatory versus selection-based, there is no modification to this SFR. This PP-Module does not modify this SFR as it is defined in the Base-PP. This SFR is selection-based in the Base-PP but is mandatory for a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module because of this PP-Module's modifications to FTP ITC.1. There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed.

FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS_CKM.4

This SFR is refined in this PP-Module to include requirementsfor destruction of security critical parameters as well as keys. The EA for the Base-PP are extended to include security critical parameters whenever keys are indicated.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication

FCS_TLSC_EXT.1

There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed.

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1

There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed.

2.1.1.3 Identification and Authentication

Other than this SFR becoming mandatory versus selection-based, there is no modification to this SFR. This

PP-Module does not modify this SFR as it is defined in the Base-PP. This SFR is selection-based in the Base-PP but is mandatory for a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module because of this PP-Module's modifications to FTP_ITC.1. FIA_X509_EXT.1/STIP defines the TOE's X.509 validation behavior for TLS certificates presented to the TSF as part of TLS proxying. At minimum, FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev is used by the TOE to validate any certificates loaded onto it. If the TOE has other functions that require the use of X.509 certificates (e.g. code signing for integrity testing or software updates, TLS interfaces used for a purpose other than session proxying such as audit server or authentication server connections), FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev applies to those as well. There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed. The PP-Module partially completes selections in this SFR using the available options to specify minimum required functionality for X.509 authentication based on its use in STIP. The PP-Module also refines the authorized management roles that can perform the function defined in FIA_X509_EXT.2.2. The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS, DTLS HTTPS IPsec SSH no other protocols and code signing for system software updates code signing for integrity verification other uses no additional uses . When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the revocation status of a certificate, the TSF shall allow the Security Administrator CA Operations Staff to choose whether to accept the certificate associate the failed connection event per FDP_TEP_EXT.1.5 in these cases accept the certificate not accept the certificate . "TLS" is moved outside the selection in the first element, since the TOE must implement TLS to accomplish the STIP functionality. The application notes for the first element from the Base-PP also apply. It is worth noting that since this SFR applies to all uses of certificates in the TOE, it may be the case that the actions taken in response to a failure to be able to determine revocation status (which is specified in the 2nd element) is handled differently for different connections. If this is the case, the ST author must make it clear which actions are associated with which connections so that the correct evaluation of the functionality can be performed. The second element has three modifications from that in the Base-PP. First, the word "validity" is replaced with "revocation status" for clarity. This is consistent with what is in the application note in the NDcPP, and using "revocation status" more directly indicates what is required. Second, the general notion of "administrator" is replaced with the more refined roles defined in this PP-Module; the ST author should make the appropriate selection. Finally, a selection is added that allows ST author flexibility in addressing the issue of failure to connect to check revocation status in the specific case that the certificates being checked are associated with either a monitored client or a requested server. This selection ("to associate the failed connection event per FDP_TEP_EXT.1.5"), when chosen, indicates that selected administrative role is able to specify a STIP operation (block, bypass, inspect) to be taken in the event that the revocation status can't be checked. The requirement that the TOE be able to perform this operation when such an event occurs is specified in FDP_TEP_EXT.1.5. There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed. There is no change to this SFR. Only its trigger for inclusion is changed because this PP-Module introduces an alternate method of obtaining a certificate for the TOE. In the Base-PP, this SFR is optional but must be claimed in any situation where the TOE presents its own X.509 certificate to an external entity (e.g. any case where the TOE acts as a TLS server or where the TOE acts as a TLS client in an connection that uses mutual authentication). A STIP TOE must present an X.509 certificate to an external entity as part of TLS session proxying. The TOE may obtain this certificate either using PKCS#10 (covered by this SFR) or through Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST), which is covered by the selection-based SFR FIA_ESTC_EXT.1. Therefore, the ST author only claims FIA_X509_EXT.3 if PKCS#10 is selected in FIA_ENR_EXT.1. There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed.

FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev

There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed.

FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FIA_X509_EXT.2

There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed.

FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests

FIA_X509_EXT.3

There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed.

2.1.1.4 Trusted Path/Channels

The PP-Module partially completes selections and assignments in this SFR using the available options to specify external interfaces and trusted channels that all STIP products must support at minimum. The TSF shall be capable of using TLS and IPsec SSH DTLS HTTPS no other protocols to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, TLS session proxying, authentication server other capabilities no other capabilities that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data. The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel. The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for establishment of TLS proxy connections, list of services for which the TSF is able to initiate communications. There is no change to the Base-PP EAs for this SFR when this PP-Module is claimed.

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

2.2 TOE SFR Evaluation Activities

2.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_CKM.1/VPN VPN Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE)

FCS_CKM.1/VPN

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the key generation functionality is invoked.

Guidance

There are no AGD EAs for this requirement.

Tests

If this functionality is implemented by the TSF, refer to the following EAs, depending on the TOE's claimed Base-PP:

- GPOS PP: FCS_CKM.1
- MDF PP: FCS_CKM.1
- App PP: FCS_CKM.1(1)
- MDM PP: FCS_CKM.1

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1

TSS

In addition to the TSS EAs for the individual FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 elements below, the evaluator shall perform the following:

If the TOE boundary includes a general-purpose operating system or mobile device, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes whether the VPN client capability is architecturally integrated with the platform itself or whether it is a separate executable that is bundled with the platform.

Guidance

In addition to the Operational Guidance EAs for the individual FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 elements below, the evaluator shall perform the following:

If the configuration of the IPsec behavior is from an environmental source, most notably a VPN gateway (e.g. through receipt of required connection parameters from a VPN gateway), the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance contains any appropriate information for ensuring that this configuration can be properly applied.

Note in this case that the implementation of the IPsec protocol must be enforced entirely within the TOE boundary; i.e. it is not permissible for a software application TOE to be a graphical front-end for IPsec functionality implemented totally or in part by the underlying OS platform. The behavior referenced here is for the possibility that the configuration of the IPsec connection is initiated from outside the TOE, which is permissible so long as the TSF is solely responsible for enforcing the configured behavior. However, it is allowable for the TSF to rely on low-level platform-provided networking functions to implement the SPD from the client (e.g., enforcement of packet routing decisions).

Tests

As a prerequisite for performing the Test EAs for the individual FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 elements below, the evaluator shall do the following:

The evaluator shall minimally create a test environment equivalent to the test environment illustrated below. It is expected that the traffic generator is used to construct network packets and will provide the evaluator with the ability manipulate fields in the ICMP, IPv4, IPv6, UDP, and TCP packet headers. The evaluator shall provide justification for any differences in the test environment.

Note that the evaluator shall perform all tests using the VPN client and a representative sample of platforms listed in the ST (for TOEs that claim to support multiple platforms).

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and determine that it describes how the IPsec capabilities are implemented.

If the TOE is a standalone software application, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSS asserts that all IPsec functionality is implemented by the TSF. The evaluator shall also ensure that the TSS identifies what platform functionality the TSF relies upon to support its IPsec implementation, if any (e.g. does it invoke cryptographic primitive functions from the platform's cryptographic library, enforcement of packet routing decisions by low-level network drivers).

If the TOE is part of a general-purpose desktop or mobile operating system, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes at a high level the architectural relationship between the VPN client portion of the TOE and the rest of the TOE (e.g. is the VPN client an integrated part of the OS or is it a standalone executable that is bundled into the OS package). If the SPD is implemented by the underlying platform in this case, then the TSS describes how the client interacts with the platform to establish and populate the SPD, including the identification of the platform's interfaces that are used by the client.

In all cases, the evaluator shall also ensure that the TSS describes how the client interacts with the network stack of the platform(s) on which it can run (e.g., does the client insert itself within the stack via kernel mods, does the client simply invoke APIs to gain access to network services).

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the SPD is implemented and the rules for processing both inbound and outbound packets in terms of the IPsec policy. The TSS describes the rules that are available and the resulting actions available after matching a rule. The TSS describes how the available rules and actions form the SPD using terms defined in RFC 4301 such as BYPASS (e.g., no encryption), DISCARD (e.g., drop the packet), and PROTECT (e.g., encrypt the packet) actions defined in RFC 4301. As noted in section 4.4.1 of RFC 4301, the processing of entries in the SPD is non-trivial and the evaluator shall determine that the description in the TSS is sufficient to determine which rules will be applied given the rule structure implemented by the TOE. For example, if the TOE allows specification of ranges, conditional rules, etc., the evaluator shall determine that the description of rule processing (for both inbound and outbound packets) is sufficient to determine the action that will be applied, especially in the case where two different rules may apply. This description shall cover both the initial packets (that is, no SA is established on the interface or for that particular packet) as well as packets that are part of an established SA.

Guidance

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify it describes how the SPD is created and configured. If there is an administrative interface to the client, then the guidance describes how the administrator specifies rules for processing a packet. The description includes all three cases - a rule that ensures packets are encrypted/decrypted, dropped, and allowing a packet to flow in plaintext. The evaluator shall determine that the description in the operational guidance is consistent with the description in the TSS, and that the level of detail in the operational guidance is sufficient to allow the administrator to set up the SPD in an unambiguous fashion. This includes a discussion of how ordering of rules impacts the processing of an IP packet.

If the client is configured by an external application, such as the VPN gateway, then the operational guidance should indicate this and provide a description of how the client is configured by the external application. The description should contain information as to how the SPD is established and set up in an unambiguous fashion. The description should also include what is configurable via the external application, how ordering of entries may be expressed, as well as the impacts that ordering of entries may have on the packet processing.

In either case, the evaluator ensures the description provided in the TSS is consistent with the capabilities and description provided in the operational guidance.

Tests

Depending on the implementation, the evaluator may be required to use a VPN gateway or some form of application to configure the client. For Test 2, the evaluator is required to choose an application that allows for the configuration of the full set of capabilities of the VPN client (in conjunction with the platform). For example, if the client provides a robust interface that allows for specification of wildcards, subnets, etc., it is unacceptable for the evaluator to choose a VPN Gateway that only allows for specifying a single fully qualified IP addresses in the rule.

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** : The evaluator shall configure an SPD on the client that is capable of the following: dropping a packet, encrypting a packet, and allowing a packet to flow in plaintext. The selectors used in the construction of the rule shall be different such that the evaluator can generate a packet and send packets to the client with the appropriate fields (fields that are used by the rule - e.g., the IP addresses, TCP/UDP ports) in the packet header. The evaluator performs both positive and negative test cases for each type of rule. The evaluator observes via the audit trail, and packet captures that the TOE exhibited the expected behavior: appropriate packets were dropped, allowed through without modification, was encrypted by the IPsec implementation.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall devise several tests that cover a variety of scenarios for packet processing. These scenarios must exercise the range of possibilities for SPD entries and processing modes as outlined in the TSS and operational guidance. Potential areas to cover include rules with overlapping ranges and conflicting entries, inbound and outbound packets, and packets that establish SAs as well as packets that belong to established SAs. The evaluator shall verify, via the audit trail and packet captures, for each scenario that the expected behavior is exhibited, and is consistent with both the TSS and the operational guidance.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2

TSS

The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure it states that the VPN can be established to operate in tunnel mode and/or transport mode (as selected).

Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions on how to configure the connection in each mode selected.

If both transport mode and tunnel mode are implemented, the evaluator shall review the operational guidance to determine how the use of a given mode is specified.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following test(s) based on the selections chosen:

- **Test 1:** [conditional]: If tunnel mode is selected, the evaluator uses the operational guidance to configure the TOE to operate in tunnel mode and also configures a VPN gateway to operate in tunnel mode. The evaluator configures the TOE and the VPN gateway to use any of the allowable cryptographic algorithms, authentication methods, etc. to ensure an allowable SA can be negotiated. The evaluator shall then initiate a connection from the client to connect to the VPN GW peer. The evaluator observes (for example, in the audit trail and the captured packets) that a successful connection was established using the tunnel mode.
- **Test 2:** [conditional]: If transport mode is selected, the evaluator uses the operational guidance to configure the TOE to operate in transport mode and also configures an IPsec peer to accept IPsec connections using transport mode. The evaluator configures the TOE and the endpoint device to use any of the allowed cryptographic algorithms, authentication methods, etc. to ensure an allowable SA can be negotiated. The evaluator then initiates a connection from the TOE to connect to the remote endpoint. The evaluator observes (for example, in the audit trail and the captured packets) that a successful connection was established using the transport mode.
- **Test 3:** [conditional]: If both tunnel mode and transport mode are selected, the evaluator shall perform both Test 1 and Test 2 above, demonstrating that the TOE can be configured to support both modes.
- **Test 4:** [conditional]: If both tunnel mode and transport mode are selected, the evaluator shall modify the testing for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 to include the supported mode for SPD PROTECT entries to show that they only apply to traffic that is transmitted or received using the indicated mode.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that the TSS provides a description of how a packet is processed against the SPD and that if no “rules” are found to match, that a final rule exists, either implicitly or explicitly, that causes the network packet to be discarded.

Guidance

The evaluator shall check that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to construct or acquire the SPD and uses the guidance to configure the TOE for the following test.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following test:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall configure the SPD such that it has entries that contain operations that DISCARD, PROTECT, and (if applicable) BYPASS network packets. The evaluator may use the SPD that was created for verification of FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1. The evaluator shall construct a network packet that matches a BYPASS entry and send that packet. The evaluator should observe that the network packet is passed to the proper destination interface with no modification. The evaluator shall then modify a field in the packet header; such that it no longer matches the evaluator-created entries (there may be a “TOE-created” final entry that discards packets that do not match any previous entries). The evaluator sends the packet, and observes that the packet was not permitted to flow to any of the TOE’s interfaces.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that the algorithms AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256 are implemented. If the ST author has selected either AES-CBC-128 or AES-CBC-256 in the requirement, then the evaluator verifies the TSS describes these as well. In addition, the evaluator ensures that the SHA- based HMAC algorithm conforms to the algorithms specified in the relevant iteration of FCS_COP.1 from the Base-PP that applies to keyed-hash message authentication.

Guidance

The evaluator checks the operational guidance to ensure it provides instructions on how the TOE is configured to use the algorithms selected in this component and whether this is performed through direct configuration, defined during initial installation, or defined by acquiring configuration settings from an environmental component.

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall configure the TOE as indicated in the operational guidance configuring the TOE to using each of the AES-GCM-128, and AES-GCM-256 algorithms, and attempt to establish a connection using ESP. If the ST Author has selected either AES-CBC-128 or AES-CBC-256, the TOE is configured to use those algorithms and the evaluator attempts to establish a connection using ESP for those algorithms selected.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 are implemented. If IKEv1 is implemented, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS indicates whether or not XAUTH is supported, and that aggressive mode is not used for IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges (i.e. only main mode is used). It may be that these are configurable options.

Guidance

The evaluator shall check the operational guidance to ensure it instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 (as selected), and uses the guidance to configure the TOE to perform NAT traversal for the test below. If XAUTH is implemented, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how it is enabled or disabled.

If the TOE supports IKEv1, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance either asserts that only main mode is used for Phase 1 exchanges, or provides instructions for disabling aggressive mode.

Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall configure the TOE so that it will perform NAT traversal processing as described in the TSS and RFC 7296, section 2.23. The evaluator shall initiate an IPsec connection and determine that the NAT is successfully traversed. If the TOE supports IKEv1 with or without XAUTH, the evaluator shall verify that this test can be successfully repeated with XAUTH enabled and disabled in the manner specified by the operational guidance. If the TOE only supports IKEv1 with XAUTH, the evaluator shall verify that connections not using XAUTH are unsuccessful. If the TOE only supports IKEv1 without XAUTH, the evaluator shall verify that connections using XAUTH are unsuccessful.
- **Test 2:** [conditional]: If the TOE supports IKEv1, the evaluator shall perform any applicable operational guidance steps to disable the use of aggressive mode and then attempt to establish a connection using an IKEv1 Phase 1 connection in aggressive mode. This attempt should fail. The evaluator shall show that the TOE will reject a VPN gateway from initiating an IKEv1 Phase 1 connection in aggressive mode. The evaluator should then show that main mode exchanges are supported.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6

TSS

The evaluator shall ensure the TSS identifies the algorithms used for encrypting the IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 payload, and that the algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 are specified, and if others are chosen in the selection of the requirement, those are included in the TSS discussion.

Guidance

The evaluator checks the operational guidance to ensure it provides instructions on how the TOE is configured to use the algorithms selected in this component and whether this is performed through direct configuration, defined during initial installation, or defined by acquiring configuration settings from an environmental component.

Tests

The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to configure the TOE (or to configure the Operational Environment to have the TOE receive configuration) to perform the following test for each ciphersuite selected:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall configure the TOE to use the ciphersuite under test to encrypt the IKEv1 and/or IKEv2 payload and establish a connection with a peer device, which is configured to only accept the payload encrypted using the indicated ciphersuite. The evaluator will confirm the algorithm was that used in the negotiation. The evaluator will confirm that the connection is successful by confirming that data can be passed through the connection once it is established. For example, the evaluator may connect to a webpage on the remote network and verify that it can be reached.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7

TSS

There are no TSS EAs for this requirement.

Guidance

The evaluator shall check the operational guidance to ensure it provides instructions on how the TOE configures the values for SA lifetimes. In addition, the evaluator shall check that the guidance has the option

for either the Administrator or VPN Gateway to configure Phase 1 SAs if time-based limits are supported. Currently there are no values mandated for the number of packets or number of bytes, the evaluator shall simply check the operational guidance to ensure that this can be configured if selected in the requirement.

Tests

When testing this functionality, the evaluator needs to ensure that both sides are configured appropriately. From the RFC "A difference between IKEv1 and IKEv2 is that in IKEv1 SA lifetimes were negotiated. In IKEv2, each end of the SA is responsible for enforcing its own lifetime policy on the SA and rekeying the SA when necessary. If the two ends have different lifetime policies, the end with the shorter lifetime will end up always being the one to request the rekeying. If the two ends have the same lifetime policies, it is possible that both will initiate a rekeying at the same time (which will result in redundant SAs). To reduce the probability of this happening, the timing of rekeying requests SHOULD be jittered."

Each of the following tests shall be performed for each version of IKE selected in the FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 protocol selection:

Each of the following tests shall be performed for each version of IKE selected in the FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 protocol selection:

- **Test 1:** [conditional]: The evaluator shall configure a maximum lifetime in terms of the # of packets (or bytes) allowed following the operational guidance. The evaluator shall establish an SA and determine that once the allowed # of packets (or bytes) through this SA is exceeded, the connection is closed.
- **Test 2:** [conditional]: The evaluator shall construct a test where a Phase 1 SA is established and attempted to be maintained for more than 24 hours before it is renegotiated. The evaluator shall observe that this SA is closed or renegotiated in 24 hours or less. If such an action requires that the TOE be configured in a specific way, the evaluator shall implement tests demonstrating that the configuration capability of the TOE works as documented in the operational guidance.
- **Test 3:** [conditional]: The evaluator shall perform a test similar to Test 2 for Phase 2 SAs, except that the lifetime will be 8 hours or less instead of 24 hours or less.
- **Test 4:** [conditional]: If a fixed limit for IKEv1 SAs is supported, the evaluator shall establish an SA and observe that the connection is closed after the fixed traffic and/or time value is reached.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8

TSS

The evaluator shall check to ensure that the DH groups specified in the requirement are listed as being supported in the TSS. If there is more than one DH group supported, the evaluator checks to ensure the TSS describes how a particular DH group is specified/negotiated with a peer.

Guidance

There are no AGD EAs for this requirement.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following test:

- **Test 1:** For each supported DH group, the evaluator shall test to ensure that all supported IKE protocols can be successfully completed using that particular DH group.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9

TSS

The evaluator shall check to ensure that, for each DH group supported, the TSS describes the process for generating "x" (as defined in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9) and each nonce. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS indicates that the random number generated that meets the requirements in this EP is used, and that the length of "x" and the nonces meet the stipulations in the requirement.

Guidance

There are no AGD EAs for this requirement.

Tests

There are no test EAs for this requirement.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10

EAs for this element are tested through EAs for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11

TSS

The evaluator ensures that the TSS identifies RSA and/or ECDSA as being used to perform peer authentication.

If pre-shared keys are chosen in the selection, the evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS describes how pre-shared keys are established and used in authentication of IPsec connections. The description in the TSS shall also indicate how pre-shared key establishment is accomplished depending on whether the TSF can

generate a pre-shared key, accept a pre-shared key, or both.

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the TOE compares the peer's presented identifier to the reference identifier. This description shall include whether the certificate presented identifier is compared to the ID payload presented identifier, which field(s) of the certificate are used as the presented identifier (DN, Common Name, or SAN) and, if multiple fields are supported, the logical order comparison. If the ST author assigned an additional identifier type, the TSS description shall also include a description of that type and the method by which that type is compared to the peer's presented certificate.

Guidance

The evaluator shall check that the operational guidance describes how pre-shared keys are to be generated and established.

The evaluator ensures the operational guidance describes how to set up the TOE to use the cryptographic algorithms RSA and/or ECDSA.

In order to construct the environment and configure the TOE for the following tests, the evaluator will ensure that the operational guidance also describes how to configure the TOE to connect to a trusted CA, and ensure a valid certificate for that CA is loaded into the TOE as a trusted CA.

The evaluator shall also ensure that the operational guidance includes the configuration of the reference identifier(s) for the peer.

Tests

For efficiency's sake, the testing that is performed here has been combined with the testing for **FIA_X509_EXT.2** and **FIA_X509_EXT.3** (for IPsec connections and depending on the Base-PP), **FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12**, and **FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13**. The following tests shall be repeated for each peer authentication protocol selected in the **FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11** selection above:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall have the TOE generate a public-private key pair, and submit a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a CA (trusted by both the TOE and the peer VPN used to establish a connection) for its signature. The values for the DN (Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, and Country) will also be passed in the request. Alternatively, the evaluator may import to the TOE a previously generated private key and corresponding certificate.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall configure the TOE to use a private key and associated certificate signed by a trusted CA and shall establish an IPsec connection with the peer.
- **Test 3:** : The evaluator shall test that the TOE can properly handle revoked certificates – conditional on whether CRL or OCSP is selected; if both are selected, and then a test is performed for each method. For this current version of the PP-Module, the evaluator has to only test one up in the trust chain (future drafts may require to ensure the validation is done up the entire chain). The evaluator shall ensure that a valid certificate is used, and that the SA is established. The evaluator then attempts the test with a certificate that will be revoked (for each method chosen in the selection) to ensure when the certificate is no longer valid that the TOE will not establish an SA
- **Test 4:** [conditional]: The evaluator shall generate a pre-shared key and use it, as indicated in the operational guidance, to establish an IPsec connection with the VPN GW peer. If the generation of the pre-shared key is supported, the evaluator shall ensure that establishment of the key is carried out for an instance of the TOE generating the key as well as an instance of the TOE merely taking in and using the key.

For each supported identifier type (excluding DNs), the evaluator shall repeat the following tests:

- **Test 5:** For each field of the certificate supported for comparison, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the field in the peer's presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication succeeds.
- **Test 6:** For each field of the certificate support for comparison, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to not match the field in the peer's presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication fails.

The following tests are conditional:

- **Test 7:** [conditional]: If, according to the TSS, the TOE supports both Common Name and SAN certificate fields and uses the preferred logic outlined in the Application Note, the tests above with the Common Name field shall be performed using peer certificates with no SAN extension. Additionally, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE to not match the SAN in the peer's presented certificate but to match the Common Name in the peer's presented certificate, and verify that the IKE authentication fails.
- **Test 8:** [conditional]: If the TOE supports DN identifier types, the evaluator shall configure the peer's reference identifier on the TOE (per the administrative guidance) to match the subject DN in the peer's presented certificate and shall verify that the IKE authentication succeeds. To demonstrate a bit-wise comparison of the DN, the evaluator shall change a single bit in the DN (preferably, in an Object Identifier (OID) in the DN) and verify that the IKE authentication fails. **To demonstrate a comparison of DN values, the evaluator shall change any one of the four DN values and verify that the IKE authentication fails.**
- **Test 9:** [conditional]: If the TOE supports both IPv4 and IPv6 and supports IP address identifier types, the evaluator must repeat test 1 and 2 with both IPv4 address identifiers and IPv6 identifiers. Additionally, the evaluator shall verify that the TOE verifies that the IP header matches the identifiers by setting the presented identifiers and the reference identifier with the same IP address that differs from

the actual IP address of the peer in the IP headers and verifying that the IKE authentication fails.

- **Test 10:** [conditional]: If, according to the TSS, the TOE performs comparisons between the peer's ID payload and the peer's certificate, the evaluator shall repeat the following test for each combination of supported identifier types and supported certificate fields (as above). The evaluator shall configure the peer to present a different ID payload than the field in the peer's presented certificate and verify that the TOE fails to authenticate the IKE peer.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12

EAs for this element are tested through EAs for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13

EAs for this element are tested through EAs for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14

TSS

The evaluator shall check that the TSS describes the potential strengths (in terms of the number of bits in the symmetric key) of the algorithms that are allowed for the IKE and ESP exchanges. The TSS shall also describe the checks that are done when negotiating IKEv1 Phase 2 and/or IKEv2 CHILD_SA suites to ensure that the strength (in terms of the number of bits of key in the symmetric algorithm) of the negotiated algorithm is less than or equal to that of the IKE SA this is protecting the negotiation.

Guidance

There are no AGD EAs for this requirement.

Tests

The evaluator follows the guidance to configure the TOE to perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall successfully negotiate an IPsec connection using each of the supported algorithms and hash functions identified in the requirements.
- **Test 2:** [conditional]: This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall attempt to establish an SA for ESP that selects an encryption algorithm with more strength than that being used for the IKE SA (i.e., symmetric algorithm with a key size larger than that being used for the IKE SA). Such attempts should fail.
- **Test 3:** This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall attempt to establish an IKE SA using an algorithm that is not one of the supported algorithms and hash functions identified in the requirements. Such an attempt should fail.
- **Test 4:** This test shall be performed for each version of IKE supported. The evaluator shall attempt to establish an SA for ESP (assumes the proper parameters were used to establish the IKE SA) that selects an encryption algorithm that is not identified in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4. Such an attempt should fail.

2.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection

FDP_RIP.2

TSS

Requirement met by the platform

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) the extent to which the client processes network packets and addresses the FDP_RIP.2 requirement.

Requirement met by the TOE

"Resources" in the context of this requirement are network packets being sent through (as opposed to "to", as is the case when a security administrator connects to the TOE) the TOE. The concern is that once a network packet is sent, the buffer or memory area used by the packet still contains data from that packet, and that if that buffer is re-used, those data might remain and make their way into a new packet. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS describes packet processing to the extent that they can determine that no data will be reused when processing network packets. The evaluator shall ensure that this description at a minimum describes how the previous data are zeroized/overwritten, and at what point in the buffer processing this occurs.

Guidance

There are no AGD EAs for this requirement.

Tests

There are no test EAs for this requirement.

2.2.3 Security Management (FMT)

FMT_SMF.1/VPN Specification of Management Functions (VPN)

TSS

The evaluator shall check to ensure the TSS describes the client credentials and how they are used by the TOE.

Guidance

The evaluator shall check to make sure that every management function mandated in the ST for this requirement is described in the operational guidance and that the description contains the information required to perform the management duties associated with each management function.

Tests

The evaluator shall test the TOE's ability to provide the management functions by configuring the TOE according to the operational guidance and testing each management activity listed in the ST.

The evaluator shall ensure that all management functions claimed in the ST can be performed by completing activities described in the AGD. Note that this may be performed in the course of completing other testing.

2.2.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN TSF Self-Test

FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN

Except for where it is explicitly noted, the evaluator is expected to check the following information regardless of whether the functionality is implemented by the TOE or by the TOE platform.

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details the self-tests that are run by the TSF on startup; this description should include an outline of what the tests are actually doing (e.g., rather than saying "memory is tested", a description similar to "memory is tested by writing a value to each memory location and reading it back to ensure it is identical to what was written" shall be used). The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF is operating correctly. If some of the tests are performed by the TOE platform, the evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that those tests are identified, and that the ST for each platform contains a description of those tests. Note that the tests that are required by this component are those that support security functionality in the VPN Client PP-Module, which may not correspond to the set of all self-tests contained in the platform STs.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how the integrity of stored TSF executable code is cryptographically verified when it is loaded for execution. The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the integrity of stored TSF executable code has not been compromised. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the cryptographic requirements listed are consistent with the description of the integrity verification process.

The evaluator also ensures that the TSS (or the operational guidance) describes the actions that take place for successful (e.g. hash verified) and unsuccessful (e.g., hash not verified) cases. For checks implemented entirely by the platform, the evaluator ensures that the operational guidance for the TOE references or includes the platform-specific guidance for each platform listed in the ST.

Guidance

If not present in the TSS, the evaluator ensures that the operational guidance describes the actions that take place for successful (e.g. hash verified) and unsuccessful (e.g., hash not verified) cases. For checks implemented entirely by the platform, the evaluator ensures that the operational guidance for the TOE references or includes the platform-specific guidance for each platform listed in the ST.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator performs the integrity check on a known good TSF executable and verifies that the check is successful.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator modifies the TSF executable, performs the integrity check on the modified TSF executable and verifies that the check fails.

2.3 Evaluation Activities for Optional SFRs

The PP-Module does not define any optional requirements.

2.4 Evaluation Activities for Selection-Based SFRs

2.4.1 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_PSK_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition

FIA_PSK_EXT.1

TSS

The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to ensure it describes the process by which the bit-based preshared keys are generated (if the TOE supports this functionality), and confirm that this process uses the RBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it states that text-based pre-shared keys of 22 characters are supported. The evaluator shall also confirm that the TSS states the conditioning that takes place to transform the text-based pre-shared key from the key sequence entered by the user (e.g., ASCII representation) to the bit string used by IPsec, and that this conditioning is consistent with the FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3.

Guidance

If the TOE supports bit-based pre-shared keys, the evaluator shall confirm the operational guidance contains instructions for either entering bit-based pre-shared keys for each protocol identified in the requirement, or generating a bit-based pre-shared key (or both). The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to ensure it describes the process by which the bit-based pre-shared keys are generated (if the TOE supports this functionality), and confirm that this process uses the RBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.

The evaluator shall check that any management functions related to pre-shared keys that are performed by the TOE are specified in the operational guidance.

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to determine that it provides guidance on the composition of strong text-based pre-shared keys, and (if the selection indicates keys of various lengths can be entered) that it provides information on the merits of shorter or longer pre-shared keys. The guidance must specify the allowable characters for pre-shared keys, and that list must include, at minimum, the same items contained in FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall compose a pre-shared key of 22 characters that contains a combination of the allowed characters in accordance with the operational guidance, and demonstrates that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.
- **Test 2:** [conditional]: If the TOE supports pre-shared keys of multiple lengths, the evaluator shall repeat Test 1 using the minimum length; the maximum length; and invalid lengths that are below the minimum length, above the maximum length, null length, empty length, or zero length. The minimum and maximum length tests should be successful, and the invalid lengths must be rejected by the TOE.
- **Test 3:** [conditional]: If the TOE supports but does not generate bit-based pre-shared keys, the evaluator shall obtain a bit-based pre-shared key of the appropriate length and enter it per the instructions in the operational guidance. The evaluator shall then demonstrate that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.
- **Test 4:** [conditional]: If the TOE does generate bit-based pre-shared keys, the evaluator shall generate a bit-based pre-shared key of the appropriate length and use it according to the instructions in the operational guidance. The evaluator shall then demonstrate that a successful protocol negotiation can be performed with the key.

2.5 Evaluation Activities for Objective SFRs

2.5.1 Security Audit (FAU)

FAU_GEN.1/VPN Audit Data Generation

FAU_GEN.1/VPN

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the auditable events and the component that is responsible for each type of auditable event.

Guidance

The evaluator shall check the operational guidance and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events and provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type mandated by the VPN Client PP-Module is described and that the description of the fields contains the information required in FAU_GEN.1.2/VPN, and the additional information specified in the Auditable Events table of the VPN Client PP-PP-Module.

In particular, the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance is clear in relation to the contents for failed cryptographic events. In the Auditable Events table of the VPN Client PP-Module, information detailing the cryptographic mode of operation and a name or identifier for the object being encrypted is required. The evaluator shall ensure that name or identifier is sufficient to allow an administrator reviewing the audit log to determine the context of the cryptographic operation (for example, performed during a key negotiation exchange, performed when encrypting data for transit) as well as the non-TOE endpoint of the connection for cryptographic failures relating to communications with other IT systems.

The evaluator shall also make a determination of the administrative actions that are relevant in the context of the VPN Client PP-Module. The TOE may contain functionality that is not evaluated in the context of the VPN

Client PP-Module because the functionality is not specified in an SFR. This functionality may have administrative aspects that are described in the operational guidance. Since such administrative actions will not be performed in an evaluated configuration of the TOE, the evaluator shall examine the operational guidance and make a determination of which administrative commands, including subcommands, scripts, and configuration files, are related to the configuration (including enabling or disabling) of the mechanisms implemented in the TOE that are necessary to enforce the requirements specified in the VPN Client PP-Module, which thus form the set of “all administrative actions”. The evaluator may perform this activity as part of the activities associated with ensuring the AGD_OPE guidance satisfies the requirements.

For each required auditable event, the evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to determine that it is clear to the reader where each event is generated (e.g. the TSF may generate its own audit logs in one location while the platform-provided auditable events are generated elsewhere).

Tests

The evaluator shall test the TOE’s ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records in accordance with the EAs associated with the functional requirements in the VPN Client PP-Module. Additionally, the evaluator shall test that each administrative action applicable in the context of the VPN Client PP-Module is auditable. When verifying the test results, the evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly. For example, testing performed to ensure that the administrative guidance provided is correct verifies that AGD_OPE.1 is satisfied and should address the invocation of the administrative actions that are needed to verify the audit records are generated as expected.

FAU_SEL.1/VPN Selective Audit

FAU_SEL.1/VPN

TSS

There are no TSS EAs for this SFR.

Guidance

The evaluator shall review the administrative guidance to ensure that the guidance itemizes all event types, as well as describes all attributes that are to be selectable in accordance with the requirement, to include those attributes listed in the assignment. The administrative guidance shall also contain instructions on how to set the pre-selection, or how the VPN gateway will configure the client, as well as explain the syntax (if present) for multi-value pre-selection. The administrative guidance shall also identify those audit records that are always recorded, regardless of the selection criteria currently being enforced.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** For each attribute listed in the requirement, the evaluator shall devise a test to show that selecting the attribute causes only audit events with that attribute (or those that are always recorded, as identified in the administrative guidance) to be recorded.
- **Test 2:** [conditional] If the TSF supports specification of more complex audit pre-selection criteria (e.g., multiple attributes, logical expressions using attributes) then the evaluator shall devise tests showing that this capability is correctly implemented. The evaluator shall also, in the test plan, provide a short narrative justifying the set of tests as representative and sufficient to exercise the capability.

2.5.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

FDP_IFC_EXT.1/VPN Subset Information Flow Control

FDP_IFC_EXT.1/VPN

TSS

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS section of the ST describes the routing of IP traffic through processes on the TSF when a VPN client is enabled. The evaluator shall ensure that the description indicates which traffic does not go through the VPN and which traffic does and that a configuration exists for each baseband protocol in which only the traffic identified by the ST author is necessary for establishing the VPN connection (IKE traffic and perhaps HTTPS or DNS traffic) is not encapsulated by the VPN protocol (IPsec). The ST author shall also identify in the TSS section any differences in the routing of IP traffic when using any supported baseband protocols (e.g. WiFi or, LTE).

Guidance

The evaluator shall verify that the following is addressed by the documentation:

- The description above indicates that if a VPN client is enabled, all configurations route all IP traffic (other than IP traffic required to establish the VPN connection) through the VPN client.
- The AGD guidance describes how the user and/or administrator can configure the TSF to meet this requirement.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following test:

Step 1 - The evaluator shall use the platform to enable a network connection without using IPsec. The evaluator shall use a packet sniffing tool between the platform and an Internet-connected network. The evaluator shall turn on the sniffing tool and perform actions with the device such as navigating to websites, using provided applications, accessing other Internet resources (Use Case 1), accessing another VPN client (Use Case 2), or accessing an IPsec-capable network device (Use Case 3). The evaluator shall verify that the sniffing tool captures the traffic generated by these actions, turn off the sniffing tool, and save the session data.

Step 2 - The evaluator shall configure an IPsec VPN client that supports the routing specified in this requirement, and if necessary, configure the device to perform the routing specified as described in the AGD guidance. The evaluator shall turn on the sniffing tool, establish the VPN connection, and perform the same actions with the device as performed in the first step. The evaluator shall verify that the sniffing tool captures traffic generated by these actions, turn off the sniffing tool, and save the session data.

Step 3 - The evaluator shall examine the traffic from both step one and step two to verify that all IP traffic, aside from and after traffic necessary for establishing the VPN (such as IKE, DNS, and possibly HTTPS), is encapsulated by IPsec.

Step 4 - The evaluator shall attempt to send packets to the TOE outside the VPN connection and shall verify that the TOE discards them.

3 Evaluation Activities for SARs

The PP-Module does not define any SARs beyond those defined within the base General Purpose Operating Systems PP to which it must claim conformance. It is important to note that a TOE that is evaluated against the PP-Module is inherently evaluated against this Base-PP as well. The General Purpose Operating Systems PP includes a number of Evaluation Activities associated with both SFRs and SARs. Additionally, the PP-Module includes a number of SFR-based Evaluation Activities that similarly refine the SARs of the Base-PPs. The evaluation laboratory will evaluate the TOE against the Base-PP and supplement that evaluation with the necessary SFRs that are taken from the PP-Module.

4 Required Supplementary Information

This Supporting Document has no required supplementary information beyond the ST, operational guidance, and testing.

Appendix A - References

Identifier	Title
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.• Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.• Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
	[OS PP] Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems , Version 4.2.1, April 2019
	[MD PP] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals , Version 3.1, June 2017
	[MDM PP] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management (This needs to be updated) , Version 3.1, June 2017
[App PP]	Protection Profile for Application Software , Version 1.3, March 2019
[SD]	Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document, PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, Version 2.1, November 2019