

# PP-Module for Widgets



Version: 1.0  
2020-01-16

**National Information Assurance Partnership**

## Revision History

---

Version	Date	Comment
1.0	2016-10-06	Initial Release

## Contents

---

1	Introduction
1.1	Overview
1.2	Terms
1.2.1	Common Criteria Terms
1.2.2	Technical Terms
1.3	Compliant Targets of Evaluation
1.3.1	TOE Boundary
1.4	Use Cases
2	Conformance Claims
3	Security Problem Description
3.1	Threats
3.2	Assumptions
3.3	Organizational Security Policies
4	Security Objectives
4.1	Security Objectives for the TOE
4.2	Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
4.3	Security Objectives Rationale
5	Security Requirements
5.1	Virtualization PP Security Functional Requirements Direction
5.1.1	Modified SFRs
5.1.2	Additional SFRs
5.2	ND PP Security Functional Requirements Direction
5.2.1	Modified SFRs
5.2.1.1	Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.1.2	Trusted Paths/Channels (FTP)
5.2.2	Additional SFRs
5.3	TOE Security Functional Requirements
5.3.1	Security Audit (FAU)
5.3.2	User Data Protection (FDP)
5.3.3	Security Management (FMT)
5.4	TOE Security Assurance Requirements
6	Consistency Rationale
6.1	Protection Profile for Virtualization Systems
6.1.1	Consistency of TOE Type
6.1.2	Consistency of Security Problem Definition
6.1.3	Consistency of Objectives
6.1.4	Consistency of Requirements
6.2	Protection Profile for Network Devices
6.2.1	Consistency of TOE Type
6.2.2	Consistency of Security Problem Definition
6.2.3	Consistency of Objectives
6.2.4	Consistency of Requirements
Appendix A -	Optional SFRs
A.1	Strictly Optional Requirements
A.1.1	Security Audit (FAU)
A.2	Objective Requirements
A.2.1	Security Audit (FAU)
A.2.2	Protection of the TSF (FPT)
A.3	Implementation-Based Requirements
Appendix B -	Selection-Based Requirements
B.1	Security Audit (FAU)
Appendix C -	Extended Component Definitions
C.1	Extended Components Table
C.2	Extended Component Definitions
C.2.1	FAU_ARP_EXT Security Alarm Filtering
C.2.2	FAU_GEN_EXT Reporting Methods
C.2.3	FAU_IDS_EXT Intrusion Detection Methods
C.2.4	FAU_INV_EXT Environmental Inventory
C.2.5	FAU_INV_EXT Characteristics of Environmental Objects
C.2.6	FAU_INV_EXT Behavior of Environmental Objects
C.2.7	FAU_INV_EXT Location of Environmental Objects
C.2.8	FAU_WID_EXT Malicious Environmental Objects
C.2.9	FAU_WID_EXT Passive Information Flow Monitoring
C.2.10	FAU_WID_EXT Denial of Service
C.2.11	FAU_WID_EXT Unauthorized Authentication Schemes
C.2.12	FAU_WID_EXT Unauthorized Encryption Schemes
C.2.13	FAU_WID_EXT Wireless Spectrum Monitoring
C.2.14	FAU_WID_EXT Wireless Spectrum Monitoring
C.2.15	FAU_ANO_EXT Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection
C.2.16	FAU_SIG_EXT Signature-Based Intrusion Detection
C.2.17	FAU_STG_EXT Protected Audit Event Storage (Packet Captures)
C.2.18	FAU_INV_EXT Detection of Unauthorized Connections

- C.2.19 FAU\_INV\_EXT Signal Library
- C.2.20 FAU\_MAC\_EXT Device Impersonation
- C.2.21 FAU\_WIP\_EXT Wireless Intrusion Prevention
- Appendix D - An Example Appendix
- Appendix E - Acronyms
- Appendix F - Bibliography

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

This Protection Profile Module (PP-Module) describes security requirements for Widgets. This PP-Module is intended to provide a minimal baseline set of requirements that are targeted at mitigating well defined and described threats.

The following content should be included if:

- the TOE implements ""

*This is content that is only applicable to Modules that extend the ND pp.*

This PP-Module contains optional requirements for Widgets, a security product that provides something.

## 1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

### 1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs <a href="#">[CC]</a> .
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility, accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base Protection Profiles.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.
Target of Evaluation	The product under evaluation.

### 1.2.2 Technical Terms

Access Point (AP)	A device that provides the network interface that enables wireless client hosts to access a wired network.
End User Device (EUD)	A device that has the ability to process, transmit, and/or store information.
Service Set Identifier (SSID)	The primary name associated with an 802.11 wireless local area network (WLAN).
Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS)	A security product that provides network security administrators with the ability to monitor, collect, and log real-time to potentially malicious wireless (IEEE 802.11) network traffic.
Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIPS)	A security product that provides network security administrators with the ability to monitor, collect, log, and react in real-time to potentially malicious wireless (IEEE 802.11) network traffic.
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)	A wireless computer network that links two or more devices using wireless communication to form a local area network (LAN) within a limited area such as a home, school, computer laboratory, campus, office building etc.

## 1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

### 1.3.1 TOE Boundary

This PP-Module specifically addresses widgets. Wireless Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (WIDS/WIPS).

The following content should be included if:

- the TOE implements ""

*Text specific to widgets when Newtork Device is the base.*

A conformant WIDS is a product that can monitor, collect, inspect, and analyze real-time network traffic and alert the administrator of policy violations. WIPS functionality is not required to conform to this PP-Module, and it is optional for the TOE to have the additional ability to react in real-time to potentially malicious wireless (IEEE 802.11) network traffic.

A WIDS/WIPS TOE consists of multiple sensors that passively scan the RF environment on the WLAN radio frequency spectrum and a centralized mechanism such as a Server or Controller that processes the data collected by the sensors. Conformant TOEs must use a secure communication path(s) between WIDS/WIPS components.

A WIDS/WIPS can be Integrated (be part of the WLAN infrastructure) or Overlay (independent from WLAN) architecture depending on vendor implementation. The two different architectures are illustrated in the [Figure 1](#) figure below.

A WIDS/WIPS is expected to inspect layers 1 and 2 network traffic, per the OSI network model and monitor wireless frames in the RF spectrum utilized by IEEE 802.11 a, b, g, n, and ac. Monitoring and inspection of other technologies (e.g., cellular) and protocols are optional.

Conformant TOEs will detect potentially malicious network traffic using various approaches. Broadly speaking, the traffic analysis could be based on identification of 'known' threats, or 'unknown' threats. Identification of 'known' threats may be performed through pattern matching, (e.g. by matching strings of characters within a frame with known patterns, or by matching traffic patterns common with reconnaissance or denial of service (DoS) attacks). Identification of 'unknown' threats may be performed through use of various forms of anomaly detection whereby the WIDS/WIPS is provided with (or learns/creates) a definition of expected/typical traffic patterns, such that it's able to detect and react to anomalous (unexpected/atypical) traffic patterns.



Replace this image with a diagram of the Target of Evaluation.

**Figure 1: General TOE**

## 1.4 Use Cases

**[USE CASE 1] Use Case 1**  
A great use case

# 2 Conformance Claims

## Conformance Statement

This PP-Module inherits exact conformance as required from the specified Base-PP and as defined in the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017).

The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module.

- [Protection Profile for Virtualization, version 1.1.1](#)
- [Network Device, version 2.1](#)

## CC Conformance Claims

This is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5.

## PP Claim

This does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

## Package Claim

This does not claim conformance to any packages.

# 3 Security Problem Description

WIDS address a range of security threats related to detection of and reaction to potentially malicious WLAN traffic. The malicious traffic may pose a threat to one or more endpoints on the monitored networks, to the network infrastructure, or to the TOE itself. Attacks against a WLAN could compromise the confidentiality and integrity of WLAN users and system data as well as the availability of the WLAN to legitimate users.

## 3.1 Threats

---

### **T.UNAUTHORIZED\_DISCLOSURE\_OF\_INFORMATION**

Unintended/unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information on a protected WLAN, such as sending unencrypted sensitive data. The WIDS will be capable of collecting and analyzing WLAN data to detect unauthorized disclosure of information.

### **T.UNAUTHORIZED\_ACCESS**

An attacker may attempt to gain unauthorized access to a network, endpoints, or services, by methods such as impersonation of an authorized AP to get an EUD to connect to the unauthorized AP. If malicious external APs or EUDs are able to communicate with APs or EUDs on the protected WLAN, then those devices may be susceptible to the unauthorized disclosure of information.

### **T.DISRUPTION**

Attacks against the WLAN infrastructure might lead to denial of service (DoS) attacks within a protected WLAN. A wireless DoS may occur in two ways: at the physical layer through RF Jamming, or at the data link layer through packet injection.

## 3.2 Assumptions

---

These assumptions are made on the Operational Environment in order to be able to ensure that the security functionality specified in the PP-Module can be provided by the TOE. If the TOE is placed in an Operational Environment that does not meet these assumptions, the TOE may no longer be able to provide all of its security functionality.

### **A.CONNECTIONS**

It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE's security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.

### **A.PROPER\_ADMIN**

The administrator of the WIDS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the WIDS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

## 3.3 Organizational Security Policies

---

An organization deploying the TOE is expected to satisfy the organizational security policy listed below in addition to all organizational security policies defined by the claimed base PP.

### **P.ANALYZE**

Analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about potential intrusions must be applied to WIDS data and appropriate response actions taken.



# 4 Security Objectives

## 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

This document does not define any additional SOs.

## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The Operational Environment of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality (which is defined by the security objectives for the TOE). The security objectives for the Operational Environment consist of a set of statements describing the goals that the Operational Environment should achieve. This section defines the security objectives that are to be addressed by the IT domain or by non-technical or procedural means. The assumptions identified in Section 3 are incorporated as security objectives for the environment. The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality. These track the assumptions about the environment.

### OE.CONNECTIONS

TOE administrators will ensure that the TOE is installed in a manner that will allow the TOE to effectively enforce its policies on the network traffic of monitored networks.

### OE.PROPER\_ADMIN

The administrator of the WIDS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the WIDS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

## 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies map to the security objectives.

Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale

Threat, Assumption, or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DISCLOSURE_OF_INFORMATION	O.SYSTEM_MONITORING	The threat T.Unauthorized Disclosure of Information is countered by O.SYSTEM_MONITORING as this provides for visibility into the network which enables detection of network violations.
	O.WIDS_ANALYZE	The threat T.Unauthorized Disclosure of Information is countered by O.WIDS_ANALYZE as this provides detection of potential violations of approved network usage.
	O.WIPS_REACT	The threat T.Unauthorized Disclosure of Information is countered by O.WIPS_REACT as this provides containment of unauthorized access and EUDs.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS	O.SYSTEM_MONITORING	The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS is countered by O.SYSTEM_MONITORING as this provides for visibility into the network which enables detection of unauthorized APs and EUDs.
	O.WIDS_ANALYZE	The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS is countered by O.WIDS_ANALYZE as this provides detection of potential violations of approved network usage.
	O.WIPS_REACT	The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS is countered by O.WIPS_REACT as this provides containment of unauthorized access and EUDs.
	O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION	The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS is countered by O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION as this ensures proper administration of the TOE.
T.DISRUPTION	O.SYSTEM_MONITORING	The threat T.DISRUPTION is countered by O.SYSTEM_MONITORING as this provides for visibility into the network which enables detection of DoS attacks.
	O.WIDS_ANALYZE	The threat T.DISRUPTION is countered by O.WIDS_ANALYZE as this provides for detection of potential violations of approved network usage.

	O.WIPS_REACT	The threat <a href="#">T.DISRUPTION</a> is countered by O.WIPS_REACT as this provides containment of unauthorized APs and EUDs.
<a href="#">A.CONNECTIONS</a>	<a href="#">OE.CONNECTIONS</a>	The operational environment object <a href="#">OE.CONNECTIONS</a> is realized through <a href="#">A.CONNECTIONS</a> .
<a href="#">A.PROPER_ADMIN</a>	<a href="#">OE.PROPER_ADMIN</a>	The operational environment object <a href="#">OE.PROPER_ADMIN</a> is realized through <a href="#">A.PROPER_ADMIN</a> .
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION (from Network Device)	O.WIDS_ANALYZE	Case I wanted to show an example.
<a href="#">P.ANALYZE</a>	O.WIDS_ANALYZE	The organizational security policy <a href="#">P.ANALYZE</a> is facilitated through O.WIDS_ANALYZE.

# 5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text** or ~~strikethrough text~~): is used to add details to a requirement (including replacing an assignment with a more restrictive selection) or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

## 5.1 Virtualization PP Security Functional Requirements Direction

---

In a PP-Configuration that includes the Virtualization PP, the TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the Virtualization System as a whole and evaluated against the Base-PP. This section describes any modifications that the ST author must make to Base-PP SFRs to satisfy the required VS functionality.

### 5.1.1 Modified SFRs

This PP-Module does not modify any SFRs defined by the Virtualization PP.

### 5.1.2 Additional SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any additional SFRs for any PP-Configuration where the Virtualization PP is claimed as the Base-PP.

## 5.2 ND PP Security Functional Requirements Direction

---

In a PP-Configuration that includes ND PP, the TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the Network Device as a whole and evaluated against the ND PP. The following sections describe any modifications that the ST author must make to the SFRs defined in the ND PP in addition to what is mandated by [Section 5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements](#).

### 5.2.1 Modified SFRs

The SFRs listed in this section are defined in the ND PP and relevant to the secure operation of the TOE.

#### 5.2.1.1 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

##### FPT\_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

FPT\_ITT.1.1

The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure and detect its modification when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE **through the use of [selection: IPsec, SSH, TLS, TLS/HTTPS]**.

**Application Note:** FPT\_ITT.1 is optional in NDcPP, however, since a WIDS/WIPS TOE is distributed, FPT\_ITT.1 shall be included in the ST as modified in this PP-Module and is applicable to the data transmitted between the sensors and controller.

This requirement ensures all communications between components of a distributed TOE is protected through the use of an encrypted communications channel. The data passed in this trusted communication channel are encrypted as defined in the protocol chosen in the selection. The ST author chooses the mechanisms supported by the TOE, and then ensures that the detailed protocol requirements in Appendix B of NDcPP corresponding to their selection are included in the ST, if not already present.

#### 5.2.1.2 Trusted Paths/Channels (FTP)

##### FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

FTP\_ITC.1.1

The TSF shall **be capable of using [selection: IPsec, SSH, TLS, HTTPS]** to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [selection: database server, [assignment: other capabilities], no other capabilities]** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP\_ITC.1.2

The TSF shall permit **the TSF or the authorized IT entities** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: *list of services for which the TSF is able to initiate communications*].

**Application Note:** The intent of the above requirement is to provide a means by which a cryptographic protocol may be used to protect external communications with authorized IT entities that the TOE interacts with to perform its functions. The TOE uses at least one of the listed protocols for communications with the server that collects the audit information.

If the TSF uses a separate database server, the database server selection must be included in the ST.

If other authorized IT entities are protected, the ST author makes the appropriate assignments (for those entities) and selections (for the protocols that are used to protect those connections). The ST author selects the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the TOE, and then ensures that the detailed protocol requirements in Appendix B of NDCPP corresponding to their selection are included in the ST.

### 5.2.2 Additional SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any additional SFRs for any PP-Configuration where the ND PP is claimed as the Base-PP.

## 5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following section describes the SFRs that must be satisfied by any TOE that claims conformance to this PP-Module. These SFRs must be claimed regardless of which PP-Configuration is used to define the TOE.

### 5.3.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### FAU\_ARP.1 Security Alarms

FAU\_ARP.1.1

The TSF shall *display an alert to Authorized Administrator in sufficient detail to include identity of APs and EUDs involved, description of alert and severity level and [selection: capture raw frame traffic that triggered the violation, no other actions]* upon detection of a potential security violation.

**Application Note:** If "capture raw frame traffic that triggers the violation" is selected then [FAU\\_STG\\_EXT.1/PCAP](#) shall be included in the ST.

#### FAU\_ARP\_EXT.2 Security Alarm Filtering

FAU\_ARP\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [assignment: *methods of selection*] to selectively exclude alerts from being generated.

#### FAU\_GEN.1/WIDS Audit Data Generation

FAU\_GEN.1.1/WIDS

The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b. All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit;
- c. *[Auditable events listed in Table 2;*
- d. *Failure of wireless sensor communication].*

**Table 2: Auditable Events**

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
<a href="#">FAU_ANO_EXT.1</a>	None	None
<a href="#">FAU_ARP.1</a>	Actions taken due to potential security violations	None
<a href="#">FAU_ARP_EXT.2</a>	None	None
<a href="#">FAU_GEN.1/WIDS</a>	None	None
<a href="#">FAU_IDS_EXT.1</a>	None	None
<a href="#">FAU_INV_EXT.1</a>	Presence of whitelisted device	Type of device (AP or EUD), MAC Address
<a href="#">FAU_INV_EXT.2</a>	None	None

FAU_INV_EXT.3	None	None
FAU_INV_EXT.4	Location of AP or EUD	MAC Address, device type, classification of device, sensor(s) that detected device, signal strength as received by detecting sensor(s), proximity to detecting sensor(s)
FAU_INV_EXT.5	None	None
FAU_MAC_EXT.1	None	None
FAU_SAA.1	None	None
FAU_SIG_EXT.1	None	None
FAU_STG_EXT.1/PCAP	None	None
FAU_WID_EXT.1	Detection of rogue AP or EUD	None
	Detection of unauthorized SSID	None
FAU_WID_EXT.2	Sensor wireless transmissions capabilities.	Wireless transmission capabilities are turned on.
FAU_WID_EXT.3	None	None
FAU_WID_EXT.4	Use of an unauthorized authentication schemes	MAC Address, device type, classification of the device, authentication method used
FAU_WID_EXT.5	Use of an unauthorized encryption schemes	MAC Address, device type, classification of the device, encryption method used
FAU_WID_EXT.6	Detection of network devices operating in selected RF bands	Frequency band, channel used within frequency band, identification information (MAC address if applicable or other similar unique ID), device technology (i.e., cellular), sensor(s) that detected devices
FAU_WID_EXT.7	None	None
FAU_WID_EXT.8	None	None
FAU_WIP_EXT.1	Isolation of AP or EUD	Description of violation, type of containment used, was containment triggered manually or automatically, sensor performing the containment (if wireless), details about the device (s) being contained (classification, device type, MAC address).
FDP_IFC.1	None	None
FMT_SMF.1/WIDS	None	None
FPT_FLS.1	Information about failure.	Indication that there was a failure, type of failure, device that failed, and time of failure.
FPT_ITT.1	None	None
FTP_ITC.1	None	None

**Application Note:** The auditable events defined in [Table 2](#) are for the SFRs that are explicitly defined in this PP-Module and are intended to extend FAU\_GEN.1 in the Base-PP. The events in the [Table 2](#) should be combined with those of the ND cPP in the context of a conforming Security Target.

FAU\_GEN.1.2/WIDS

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a. Date and time of the event, type of event, and subject identity (if applicable);
- b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [*auditable events listed in*

**Application Note:** The subject identity in this case is the whitelisted inventory item.

### FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1 Intrusion Detection System - Reporting Methods

FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide [**selection:**

- Syslog using [**selection:** defined API, Syslog, [**assignment:** other detection method]],
- SNMP trap reporting using [**selection:** defined API, Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), [**assignment:** other detection method]]

].

**Application Note:** Syslog and/or SNMP trap reporting can be used. At least one reporting method must be selected.

FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall provide the ability to import data from the system: [**selection:** custom API, Syslog, common log format, CSV, [**assignment:** vendor detection method (e.g. Splunk)]]

**Application Note:** The system shall provide the ability to interact with an extensible interface to a third party wireless monitoring system for the purposes of importing data from the wireless system.

### FAU\_IDS\_EXT.1 Intrusion Detection System - Intrusion Detection Methods

FAU\_IDS\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide the following methods of intrusion detection [**selection:** anomaly-based, signature-based, behavior-based, [**assignment:** other detection method]].

**Application Note:** At least one detection method must be selected. If multiple detection methods are supported, each method supported shall be selected.

If anomaly-based detection is selected, then FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1 shall be included in the ST. If signature-based detection is selected, then FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1 shall be included in the ST.

### FAU\_INV\_EXT.1 Environmental Inventory

FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall determine if a given AP or EUD is authorized based on MAC addresses.

FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall detect the presence of whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall detect the presence of non-whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

**Application Note:** The inventory of authorized APs and EUDs is defined by FMT\_SMF.1.

This inventory is used as a whitelist to indicate to the WIDS which APs and EUDs are legitimate members of the wireless network. The terminology used to describe an inventoried or whitelisted device may vary by vendor product. This PP-Module utilizes whitelisted to describe APs and EUDs that are part of the inventory and non-whitelisted to describe APs and EUDs that are not part of the inventory.

### FAU\_INV\_EXT.2 Characteristics of Environmental Objects

FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall detect the

- current RF band
- current channel
- MAC Address
- classification of APs and EUDs
- [**selection:** [**assignment:** other details], no other details]

of all APs and EUDs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for APs:

- encryption
- number of connected EUDs.

**Application Note:** For detection of encryption type, the TSF should be able to differentiate between the different WLAN encryption methods and when no encryption is in use.

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for EUDs:

- SSID and BSSID of AP it is connected to.

**FAU\_INV\_EXT.3 Behavior of Environmental Objects**

FAU\_INV\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall detect when inventoried EUDs exhibit the following behavior:

- An EUD establishes a peer-to-peer connection with any other EUD,

[**selection:**

- *An EUD bridges two network interfaces,*
- *An EUD uses internet connection sharing,*
- **[assignment:** *other connection types*],
- *no other connections types*

].

**Application Note:** For this requirement, it is acceptable for the WIDS to use a generic terms for bridges or peer-to-peer connections when generating an alert for the detection of different types of bridges or peer-to-peer connections. The type of connection does not have to be specific.

**FAU\_INV\_EXT.4 Location of Environmental Objects**

FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall detect information on the current physical location of EUDs and APs within range of the TOE’s wireless sensors.

**Application Note:** This SFR only checks for the ability of the WIDS to track the location of APs and EUDs either by placing them on a map or providing the distance of the AP or EUD from the sensor but does not mandate a certain degree of accuracy.

FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.2

The TSF shall detect received signal strength and [**selection:** *RF power levels above a predetermined threshold, no other characteristics*] of hardware operating within range of the TOE’s wireless sensors.

FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.3

The TSF shall detect the physical location of APs and EUDs to within [**assignment:** *value equal or less than 15*] feet of their actual location.

**FAU\_SAA.1 Potential Violation Analysis**

FAU\_SAA.1.1

The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules for monitoring the **wireless traffic** and based upon these rules indicate a potential **malicious action**.

FAU\_SAA.1.2

The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring wireless traffic:

- a. Accumulation or combination of [**assignment:** *subset of defined auditable events*] known to indicate a potential security violation;
- b. *[other potential security violations as defined by Table 3].*

**Potential Security Violation      Additional Information**

Detection of authorized EUD establishing peer-to-peer connection with any other EUD.	Description of behavior detected (i.e., bridge, ICS connection), MAC address of whitelisted device, MAC address of the device that the whitelisted device made a connection with, connection start and end.
Detection of EUD bridging two network interfaces.	Description of behavior detected (i.e., bridge, ICS connection), MAC address of whitelisted device, MAC address of the device that the whitelisted device made a connection with, connection start and end.
Detection of packet flooding/DoS/DDoS.	Description of behavior detected (i.e., bridge, ICS connection), MAC address of whitelisted device, MAC address of the device that the whitelisted device made a connection with, connection start and end.
Detection of ICS connection.	Description of behavior detected (i.e., bridge, ICS connection), MAC address of whitelisted device, MAC address of the device that the whitelisted device made a connection with, connection start and end.
Detection of rogue device.	Description of alert, type of device (AP or EUD), MAC Address, associations made between authorized devices (which APs are EUDs connected to), channel detected on, RF Band detected on, encryption type used by rogue, IEEE 802.11 standard used (a, b, g, n, ac), SSID (if AP).

Detection of mac spoofing.	Description of alert, type of device (AP or EUD), MAC Address, associations made between authorized devices (which APs are EUDs connected to), channel detected on, RF Band detected on, encryption type used by rogue, IEEE 802.11 standard used (a, b, g, n, ac), SSID (if AP), location as labeled by administrator,.
Alert generated by violaton of user defined signature.	Name of alert being triggered (as provided when creating the signature), description of alert (as provided when creating the signature), MAC address of devices involved.
Detection of rogue AP.	Identity information of the devices involved.
Detection of malicious EUD.	Identity information of the devices involved.
Detection of traffic with excessive transmit power level.	Identity information of the devices involved.
Detection of active probing.	Identity information of the devices involved.
Detection of MAC spoofing.	Identity information of the devices involved.
Detection of RF-based denial of service.	MAC Address, device type, classification AP or EUD attacked.
Detection of deauthentication flooding.	MAC Address, device type, and classification AP or EUD attacked.
Detection of disassociation flooding.	MAC Address, device type, and classification AP or EUD attacked.
Detection of request-to-send/clear-to-send abuse.	MAC Address, device type, and classification AP or EUD attacked.
Detection of unauthorized authentication scheme use.	
Detection of unauthorized encryption scheme use.	
Detection of unencrypted traffic.	

Table 3: Potential Security Violations

## FAU\_WID\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects

FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall apply [**selection:** *configurable, automatic*] classification rules to detect rogue APs.

**Application Note:** If "configurable" is selected then, "Define classification rules to detect rogue APs" shall be selected in FMT\_SMF.1

FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall distinguish between benign and malicious APs and EUDs based on automatic detection metrics.

FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall provide the ability to determine if a given SSID is authorized.

**Application Note:** FMT\_SMF.1 defines the subset of authorized SSID(s).

## FAU\_WID\_EXT.2 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring

FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall [**selection:** *simultaneously, nonsimultaneously*] monitor and analyze network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP for all channels in the following RF frequencies:

- 2.4 GHz



- 4.9/5.0 GHz

**[selection:**

- *channels outside regulatory domain,*
- *non-standard channel frequencies,*
- *no other domains*

].

**Application Note:** If "nonsimultaneously" is selected, then "Define the amount of time sensor monitors a specific channel" shall be selected in FMT\_SMF.1.

The "802.11 monitoring SFP" is a security function policy and the SFRs that reference this policy describe what the policy does. The "802.11 monitoring SFP" is established in FDP\_IFC.1> and defined through the FAU\_WID\_EXT SFRs. A vendor does not have to formally define this policy, it only needs to comply with the SFRs.

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide wireless sensors to detect network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP that **[selection:** *can be configured to prevent transmission of data, does not transmit data*].

**Application Note:** If "can be configured to prevent transmission of data" is selected then "Enable/Disable transmission of data by wireless sensor" shall be selected in FMT\_SMF.1.

The intent of this SFR is to employ WIDS sensors that can have all wireless transmission capabilities disabled for instances where a site wishes to implement a no wireless policy.

The "802.11 monitoring SFP" is a security function policy and the SFRs that reference this policy describe what the policy does. The "802.11 monitoring SFP" is established in FDP\_IFC.1> and defined through the FAU\_WID\_EXT SFRs. A vendor does not have to formally define this policy, it only needs to comply with the SFRs.

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall detect the presence of the following unauthorized connections and unauthorized network traffic:

- unauthorized APs broadcasting authorized SSIDs
- APs and EUDs spoofing the MAC address of whitelisted APs and EUDs
- authorized EUDs associating to unauthorized SSIDs
- unauthorized EUDs associating to authorized APs
- unauthorized point to point wireless bridges by whitelisted APs
- active probing
- NULL SSID associations
- **[selection:**
  - *illegal state transitions,*
  - *protocol violations for [selection: 802.11, 802.1X] ,*
  - *no other*

].

**Application Note:** "Authorized" EUDs/APs are those that are assigned to the whitelist as defined by FMT\_SMF.1.

The 802.11 standard allows APs to beacon with the SSID field set to null. This is referred to as a hidden or cloaked SSID. The client seeking to associate with an AP using a hidden SSID must first send out a Probe Request that contains the SSID of that network, then the AP will return with a Probe Request of its own. The TSF needs to be able to detect if an AP is allowing clients to associate without providing the valid SSID of the AP.

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.4

The TSF shall perform stateful frame inspection and log attacks spanning multiple frames.

**Application Note:** Attackers possess the capability to distribute an attack across multiple frames in an attempt to avoid traditional detection measures that solely focus on packet headers. Stateful frame inspection will allow for the identification of obfuscation techniques centered around spreading an attack across multiple frames.

### FAU\_WID\_EXT.3 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall detect RF-based denial of service, deauthentication flooding, disassociation flooding, request-to-send/clear-to-send abuse, and **[selection:** *[assignment: other DoS methods], no other DoS methods*].

### FAU\_WID\_EXT.4 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN authentication schemes that are not authorized.

**Application Note:** Whitelisted APs and EUDs are defined in FMT\_SMF.1.

## FAU\_WID\_EXT.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes

### FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.1

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN encryption schemes that are not authorized.

**Application Note:** Whitelisted APs and EUDs are defined in FMT\_SMF.1.

### FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.2

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs send or receive unencrypted data.

**Application Note:** Whitelisted APs and EUDs are defined in FMT\_SMF.1. When referring to unencrypted data being received by a whitelisted AP or EUD it refers to unencrypted data being sent to a whitelisted AP or EUD from either a non-whitelisted or whitelisted AP or EUD.

## 5.3.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

### FDP\_IFC.1 Information Flow Control Policy

#### FDP\_IFC.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the *[802.11 monitoring SFP]* on *[all IEEE 802.11 a, b, g, n, ac frame types and subtypes between:*

- *authorized APs and authorized EUDs*
- *authorized APs and unauthorized EUDs*
- *unauthorized APs and authorized EUDs].*

**Application Note:** "Authorized" EUDs/APs are those that are assigned to the whitelist as defined by FMT\_SMF.1.

The "802.11 monitoring SFP" is a security function policy and the SFRs that reference this policy describe what the policy does. The "802.11 monitoring SFP" is established in [FDP\\_IFC.1](#) and defined through the FAU\_WID\_EXT SFRs. A vendor does not have to formally define this policy, it only needs to comply with the SFRs.

## 5.3.3 Security Management (FMT)

### FMT\_SMF.1/WIDS Specification of Management Functions (WIDS)

#### FMT\_SMF.1.1/WIDS

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions for WIDS functionality:

- Define an inventory of authorized APs based on MAC addresses,
- Define an inventory of authorized EUDs based on MAC addresses,
- Define rules for monitoring and alerting on the wireless traffic,
- Define authorized SSID(s),
- Define authorized WLAN authentication schemes,
- Define authorized WLAN encryption schemes,
- **[selection:**
  - *Specification of periods of network activity that constitute baseline of expected behavior,*
  - *Definition of anomaly activity,*
  - *Define classification rules to detect rogue APs,*
  - **[selection:** *Enable, Disable]* *transmission of data by wireless sensor,*
  - *Define attack signatures,*
  - *Define rules for overwriting previous packet captures,*
  - *Define the amount of time sensor monitors a specific [selection: frequency, channel],*
  - *no other capabilities*

].

**Application Note:** Define authorized WLAN authentication and encryption schemes does not enforce, but rather establishes a baseline to determine if an unauthorized scheme is used.

If [FAU\\_ANO\\_EXT.1](#) is included in the ST, "Specification of periods of network activity that constitute baseline of expected behavior" shall be selected. If [FAU\\_ANO\\_EXT.1](#) is included in the ST and "manual configuration by administrators" is selected in [FAU\\_ANO\\_EXT.1](#), then "Definition of anomaly activity" shall be selected.

If "can be configured to prevent transmission of data" is selected in [FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.2](#) then "Enable/Disable transmission of data by wireless sensor" shall be selected.

It is expected that an Authorized Administrator will be responsible for configuring the AP to operate on a specific frequency pursuant to the 802.11 standard. The TSF will have the ability to adjust the amount of time it passively monitors and captures WLAN traffic on a given frequency and channel.

## 5.4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

---

This PP-Module does not define any SARs beyond those defined within the Base-PPs to which it can claim conformance. It is important to note that a TOE that is evaluated against this PP-Module is inherently evaluated against the Virtualization PP, and ND PP as well. These PPs include a number of EAs associated with both Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and SARs. Additionally, this PP-Module includes a number of SFR-based EAs that similarly refine the SARs of the Base-PPs. The evaluation laboratory will evaluate the TOE against the chosen Base-PP and supplement that evaluation with the necessary SFRs that are taken from this PP-Module.

# 6 Consistency Rationale

## 6.1 Protection Profile for Virtualization Systems

### 6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

When this PP-Module is used to extend the Virtualization PP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a Virtualization System. The TOE boundary does not change.

### 6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSP	Consistency Rationale
<a href="#">T.UNAUTHORIZED_DISCLOSURE_OF_INFORMATION</a>	This threat is consistent with
<a href="#">T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS</a>	This threat is consistent with
<a href="#">T.DISRUPTION</a>	This threat is consistent with
<a href="#">A.CONNECTIONS</a>	This assumption is consistent with
<a href="#">A.PROPER_ADMIN</a>	This assumption is consistent with
<a href="#">P.ANALYZE</a>	Just because

### 6.1.3 Consistency of Objectives

The objectives for the TOE's Operational Environment are consistent with the Virtualization PP based on the following rationale:

PP-Module Operational Environment Objective	Consistency Rationale
<a href="#">OE.CONNECTIONS</a>	Just because
<a href="#">OE.PROPER_ADMIN</a>	Just because

### 6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SFRs from the Virtualization PP that are needed to support Widgets functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the Virtualization PP is being used for its intended purpose. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the Virtualization PP are as follows:

PP-Module Requirement	Consistency Rationale
<b>Modified SFRs</b>	
This PP-Module does not modify any requirements when the Virtualization PP is the base.	
<b>Additional SFRs</b>	
This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the Virtualization PP is the base.	
<b>Mandatory SFRs</b>	
<a href="#">FAU_ARP.1</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_ARP_EXT.2</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_GEN.1/WIDS</a>	Wids module rationale/
<a href="#">FAU_GEN_EXT.1</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_IDS_EXT.1</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_INV_EXT.1</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_INV_EXT.2</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_INV_EXT.3</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_INV_EXT.4</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_SAA.1</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_WID_EXT.1</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_WID_EXT.2</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_WID_EXT.3</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_WID_EXT.4</a>	
<a href="#">FAU_WID_EXT.5</a>	

FDP_IFC.1
FMT_SMF.1/WIDS
<b>Optional SFRs</b>
FAU_WID_EXT.6
FAU_WID_EXT.7
<b>Selection-based SFRs</b>
FAU_ANO_EXT.1
FAU_SIG_EXT.1
FAU_STG_EXT.1/PCAP
<b>Objective SFRs</b>
FAU_INV_EXT.5
FAU_INV_EXT.6
FAU_MAC_EXT.1
FAU_WIP_EXT.1
FPT_FLS.1
<b>Implementation-Dependent SFRs</b>
This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-Dependent requirements.

6.2 Protection Profile for Network Devices

6.2.1 Consistency of TOE Type

When this PP-Module extends the Network Device cPP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still WIDS/WIPS products.

6.2.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSP	Consistency Rationale
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DISCLOSURE_OF_INFORMATION	This threat is consistent with
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS	HHHHHHHHYYY.
T.DISRUPTION	This threat is consistent with
A.CONNECTIONS	This assumption is consistent with
A.PROPER_ADMIN	This assumption is consistent with
P.ANALYZE	Just because

6.2.3 Consistency of Objectives

The objectives for the TOE's Operational Environment are consistent with the ND PP based on the following rationale:

PP-Module Operational Environment Objective	Consistency Rationale
OE.CONNECTIONS	Just because
OE.PROPER_ADMIN	Just because

6.2.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SFRs from the ND PP that are needed to support Widgets functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the ND PP is being used for its intended purpose. The PP-Module also identifies a number of modified SFRs from the ND PP that are used entirely to provide functionality for Widgets. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the ND PP are as follows:

PP-Module Requirement	Consistency Rationale
Modified SFRs	
FPT_ITT.1	Some really good reasons
FTP_ITC.1	
Additional SFRs	

This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the ND PP is the base.

#### **Mandatory SFRs**

FAU\_ARP.1

FAU\_ARP\_EXT.2

FAU\_GEN.1/WIDS

Wids module rationale/

FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1

FAU\_IDS\_EXT.1

FAU\_INV\_EXT.1

FAU\_INV\_EXT.2

FAU\_INV\_EXT.3

FAU\_INV\_EXT.4

FAU\_SAA.1

FAU\_WID\_EXT.1

FAU\_WID\_EXT.2

FAU\_WID\_EXT.3

FAU\_WID\_EXT.4

FAU\_WID\_EXT.5

FDP\_IFC.1

FMT\_SMF.1/WIDS

#### **Optional SFRs**

FAU\_WID\_EXT.6

FAU\_WID\_EXT.7

#### **Selection-based SFRs**

FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1

FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1

FAU\_STG\_EXT.1/PCAP

#### **Objective SFRs**

FAU\_INV\_EXT.5

FAU\_INV\_EXT.6

FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1

FAU\_WIP\_EXT.1

FPT\_FLS.1

#### **Implementation-Dependent SFRs**

This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-Dependent requirements.

# Appendix A - Optional SFRs

## A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

---

### A.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.6 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring

FAU\_WID\_EXT.6.1

The TSF shall detect the presence of network devices that operate in the following RF bands: **[selection: 3.6 GHz, 60 GHz, sub-GHz (0-900 MHz), all cellular bands]**.

**Application Note:** This SFR refers to Non-Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11 a, b, g, n, and ac) network devices that operate in the specified frequencies. If the ST author selects detection of devices in the cellular bands, [FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.4](#) must be included in the ST.

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.7 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis

FAU\_WID\_EXT.7.1

The TSF shall provide a dedicated sensor for wireless spectrum analysis.

## A.2 Objective Requirements

---

### A.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### FAU\_INV\_EXT.5 Detection of Unauthorized Connections

FAU\_INV\_EXT.5.1

The TSF shall detect when non-whitelisted APs have a wired connection to the internal corporate network.

#### FAU\_INV\_EXT.6 Signal Library

FAU\_INV\_EXT.6.1

The TSF shall include a signal library.

**Application Note:** The TSF will need to have the ability to import, export, or update the existing signal library.

#### FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1 Device Impersonation

FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall detect when two sensors in non-overlapping locations receive traffic from the same MAC address simultaneously.

**Application Note:** The intent of this SFR is to detect MAC spoofing where an attacker is able to cause the whitelisted EUD to disconnect and promptly connects a non-whitelisted device using the MAC address of the whitelisted EUD.

FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall detect when two sensors in non-overlapping locations receive traffic from the MAC addresses of non-whitelisted EUDs within an Authorized administrator-configurable timeframe based on distance between sensors.

**Application Note:** The intent of this SFR is to allow the administrator to determine the time that should be allowed between a whitelisted EUD connecting in two distant locations.

#### FAU\_WIP\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Prevention

FAU\_WIP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall allow an Authorized Administrator to isolate a wireless AP or EUD from the network monitored by the TSF using the following methods: **[selection: wireless containment, wire-side containment of an unauthorized AP connected to the internal corporate wired network.]**

**Application Note:** It is expected that an Authorized Administrator will be responsible for confirming the AP or EUD as a rogue AP or EUD to initiate wireless containment.

In this SFR the containment of an unauthorized AP connected to the internal corporate wired network refers to an unauthorized AP that is physically connected (via wire) to the protected internal wired infrastructure.

### A.2.2 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### FPT\_FLS.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

FPT\_FLS.1.1

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: *[sensor functionality failure, potential compromise of the TSF]*.

**Application Note:** At minimum, the preservation of a secure state requires the generation of audit records when the defined failure conditions occur.

### **A.3 Implementation-Based Requirements**

---

This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-Based SFRs.



# Appendix B - Selection-Based Requirements

## B.1 Security Audit (FAU)

### FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1 Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection

*The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FAU\\_IDS\\_EXT.1.1](#).*

#### FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support the definition of [**selection:** *baselines* ('expected and approved'), *anomaly* ('unexpected') *traffic patterns*] including the specification of [**selection:**

- *throughput* (data elements (e.g. bytes, packets, etc.) per time period (e.g. minutes, hours, days)),
- *time of day*,
- *frequency*,
- *thresholds*,
- [**assignment:** *other methods*]

] and the following network protocol fields:

- all management and control frame header elements.

#### FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support the definition of anomaly activity through [**selection:** *manual configuration by administrators*, *automated configuration*].

**Application Note:** The "baseline" and "anomaly" can be something manually defined/configured by a TOE administrator (or importing definitions), or something that the TOE is able to automatically define/create by inspecting network traffic over a period of time (a.k.a. "profiling").

### FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1 Signature-Based Intrusion Detection

*The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FAU\\_IDS\\_EXT.1.1](#).*

#### FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support user-defined and customizable attack signatures.

### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1/PCAP Protected Audit Event Storage (Packet Captures)

*The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FAU\\_ARP.1.1](#).*

#### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.1/PCAP

The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated packet captures to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to [FTP\\_ITC.1](#).

**Application Note:** Per FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 in the Base-PP, the TOE must support transfer of the audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel per [FTP\\_ITC.1](#). Note that this PP-Module modifies [FTP\\_ITC.1](#) from the Base-PP. If "capture raw frame traffic that triggers the violation" is selected in [FAU\\_ARP.1](#), then this SFR shall be included in the ST, and this iteration is for the PCAPs generated as a selectable action completed upon detection of a potential security violation in [FAU\\_ARP.1](#).

#### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.2/PCAP

The TSF shall be able to store generated packet captures on the TOE itself.

#### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.3/PCAP

The TSF shall [**selection:** *drop new packet capture data*, *overwrite previous packet captures according to the following rule:* [**assignment:** *rule for overwriting previous packet captures*] , [**assignment:** *other action*] ] when the local storage space for packet capture data is full.

# Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP-Module.

## C.1 Extended Components Table

---

All extended components specified in the PP-Module are listed in this table:

**Table 4: Extended Component Definitions**

Functional Class	Functional Components
Security Audit (FAU)	FAU_ANO_EXT Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection FAU_ARP_EXT Security Alarm Filtering FAU_GEN_EXT Reporting Methods FAU_IDS_EXT Intrusion Detection Methods FAU_INV_EXT Environmental Inventory FAU_INV_EXT Characteristics of Environmental Objects FAU_INV_EXT Behavior of Environmental Objects FAU_INV_EXT Location of Environmental Objects FAU_INV_EXT Detection of Unauthorized Connections FAU_INV_EXT Signal Library FAU_MAC_EXT Device Impersonation FAU_SIG_EXT Signature-Based Intrusion Detection FAU_STG_EXT Protected Audit Event Storage (Packet Captures) FAU_WID_EXT Malicious Environmental Objects FAU_WID_EXT Passive Information Flow Monitoring FAU_WID_EXT Denial of Service FAU_WID_EXT Unauthorized Authentication Schemes FAU_WID_EXT Unauthorized Encryption Schemes FAU_WID_EXT Wireless Spectrum Monitoring FAU_WID_EXT Wireless Spectrum Monitoring FAU_WIP_EXT Wireless Intrusion Prevention

## C.2 Extended Component Definitions

---

### C.2.1 FAU\_ARP\_EXT Security Alarm Filtering

[FAU\\_ARP\\_EXT.2](#), Security Alarm Filtering,

**Management:** FAU\_ARP\_EXT.2

**Audit:** FAU\_ARP\_EXT.2

#### FAU\_ARP\_EXT.2 Security Alarm Filtering

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### FAU\_ARP\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [**assignment:** *methods of selection*] to selectively exclude alerts from being generated.

### C.2.2 FAU\_GEN\_EXT Reporting Methods

[FAU\\_GEN\\_EXT.1](#), Intrusion Detection System - Reporting Methods,

**Management:** FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1

**Audit:** FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1

#### FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1 Intrusion Detection System - Reporting Methods

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide [**selection:**

- Syslog using [**selection:** *defined API*, Syslog, [**assignment:** *other detection method*]],
- SNMP trap reporting using [**selection:** *defined API*, Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), [**assignment:** *other detection method*]]

].


##### FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall provide the ability to import data from the system: [**selection:** *custom API*, Syslog, *common log format*, CSV, [**assignment:** *vendor detection method (e.g. Splunk)*]]

## C.2.3 FAU\_IDS\_EXT Intrusion Detection Methods

### Family Behavior

### Component Leveling



[FAU\\_IDS\\_EXT.1](#), Intrusion Detection System - Intrusion Detection Methods,

**Management:** FAU\_IDS\_EXT.1

**Audit:** FAU\_IDS\_EXT.1

### FAU\_IDS\_EXT.1 Intrusion Detection System - Intrusion Detection Methods

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### FAU\_IDS\_EXT.1.1


The TSF shall provide the following methods of intrusion detection [**assignment:** *detection methods*].

## C.2.4 FAU\_INV\_EXT Environmental Inventory

### Family Behavior

Description of family behavior

### Component Leveling



[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.1](#), Environmental Inventory, Textt for Component Levling

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.2](#), Characteristics of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.3](#), Behavior of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.4](#), Location of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.5](#), Detection of Unauthorized Connections,

**Management:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.1

**Audit:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.1

### FAU\_INV\_EXT.1 Environmental Inventory

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall determine if a given AP or EUD is authorized based on MAC addresses.

#### FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall detect the presence of whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

#### FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall detect the presence of non-whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

**Management:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.2

**Audit:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.2

### FAU\_INV\_EXT.2 Characteristics of Environmental Objects

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall detect the

- current RF band
- current channel
- MAC Address
- classification of APs and EUDs
- [**selection:** [**assignment:** *other details*], no other details]

of all APs and EUDs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for APs:

- encryption
- number of connected EUDs.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for EUDs:

- SSID and BSSID of AP it is connected to.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3 Behavior of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect when inventoried EUDs exhibit the following behavior:

- An EUD establishes a peer-to-peer connection with any other EUD,

[**selection:**

- *An EUD bridges two network interfaces,*
- *An EUD uses internet connection sharing,*
- [**assignment:** *other connection types*],
- *no other connections types*

].

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4**

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4 Location of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect information on the current physical location of EUDs and APs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.2**

The TSF shall detect received signal strength and [**selection:** *RF power levels above a predetermined threshold, no other characteristics*] of hardware operating within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.3**

The TSF shall detect the physical location of APs and EUDs to within [**assignment:** *value equal or less than 15*] feet of their actual location.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.5**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.5**

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5 Detection of Unauthorized Connections**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when non-whitelisted APs have a wired connection to the internal corporate network.

### **C.2.5 FAU\_INV\_EXT Characteristics of Environmental Objects**

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.1](#), Environmental Inventory, Textt for Component Levling

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.2](#), Characteristics of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.3](#), Behavior of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.4](#), Location of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.5](#), Detection of Unauthorized Connections,

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.1**

## **Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.1**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1 Environmental Inventory**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall determine if a given AP or EUD is authorized based on MAC addresses.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall detect the presence of whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall detect the presence of non-whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

## **Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.2**

### **Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.2**

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2 Characteristics of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall detect the

- current RF band
- current channel
- MAC Address
- classification of APs and EUDs
- **[selection: [assignment: other details], no other details]**

of all APs and EUDs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for APs:

- encryption
- number of connected EUDs.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for EUDs:

- SSID and BSSID of AP it is connected to.

## **Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

### **Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3 Behavior of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect when inventoried EUDs exhibit the following behavior:

- An EUD establishes a peer-to-peer connection with any other EUD,

**[selection:**

- *An EUD bridges two network interfaces,*
- *An EUD uses internet connection sharing,*
- **[assignment: other connection types],**
- *no other connections types*

**].**

## **Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4**

### **Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4**

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4 Location of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect information on the current physical location of EUDs and APs within range of the

TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.2**

The TSF shall detect received signal strength and [**selection:** *RF power levels above a predetermined threshold, no other characteristics*] of hardware operating within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.3**

The TSF shall detect the physical location of APs and EUDs to within [**assignment:** *value equal or less than 15*] feet of their actual location.

**Management:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.5

**Audit:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.5

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5 Detection of Unauthorized Connections**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when non-whitelisted APs have a wired connection to the internal corporate network.

### **C.2.6 FAU\_INV\_EXT Behavior of Environmental Objects**

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.1](#), Environmental Inventory, Textt for Component Levling

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.2](#), Characteristics of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.3](#), Behavior of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.4](#), Location of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.5](#), Detection of Unauthorized Connections,

**Management:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.1

**Audit:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.1

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1 Environmental Inventory**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall determine if a given AP or EUD is authorized based on MAC addresses.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall detect the presence of whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall detect the presence of non-whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

**Management:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.2

**Audit:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.2

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2 Characteristics of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall detect the

- current RF band
- current channel
- MAC Address
- classification of APs and EUDs
- [**selection:** *[assignment: other details], no other details*]

of all APs and EUDs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for APs:

- encryption
- number of connected EUDs.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for EUDs:

- SSID and BSSID of AP it is connected to.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3 Behavior of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect when inventoried EUDs exhibit the following behavior:

- An EUD establishes a peer-to-peer connection with any other EUD,

[**selection:**

- *An EUD bridges two network interfaces,*
- *An EUD uses internet connection sharing,*
- [**assignment:** *other connection types*],
- *no other connections types*

].

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4 Location of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect information on the current physical location of EUDs and APs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.2**

The TSF shall detect received signal strength and [**selection:** *RF power levels above a predetermined threshold, no other characteristics*] of hardware operating within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.3**

The TSF shall detect the physical location of APs and EUDs to within [**assignment:** *value equal or less than 15*] feet of their actual location.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.5**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.5**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5 Detection of Unauthorized Connections**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when non-whitelisted APs have a wired connection to the internal corporate network.

## **C.2.7 FAU\_INV\_EXT Location of Environmental Objects**

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.1](#), Environmental Inventory, Textt for Component Levling

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.2](#), Characteristics of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.3](#), Behavior of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.4](#), Location of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.5](#), Detection of Unauthorized Connections,

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.1**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.1**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1 Environmental Inventory**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall determine if a given AP or EUD is authorized based on MAC addresses.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall detect the presence of whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall detect the presence of non-whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.2**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.2**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2 Characteristics of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall detect the

- current RF band
- current channel
- MAC Address
- classification of APs and EUDs
- **[selection: [assignment: other details], no other details]**

of all APs and EUDs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for APs:

- encryption
- number of connected EUDs.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for EUDs:

- SSID and BSSID of AP it is connected to.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3 Behavior of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect when inventoried EUDs exhibit the following behavior:

- An EUD establishes a peer-to-peer connection with any other EUD,

**[selection:**

- *An EUD bridges two network interfaces,*
- *An EUD uses internet connection sharing,*
- **[assignment: other connection types],**
- *no other connections types*

**].**

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4 Location of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect information on the current physical location of EUDs and APs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.2**

The TSF shall detect received signal strength and **[selection: RF power levels above a predetermined threshold, no other characteristics]** of hardware operating within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.3**

The TSF shall detect the physical location of APs and EUDs to within **[assignment: value equal or less**



than 15] feet of their actual location.

**Management:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.5

**Audit:** FAU\_INV\_EXT.5

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5 Detection of Unauthorized Connections**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when non-whitelisted APs have a wired connection to the internal corporate network.

### **C.2.8 FAU\_WID\_EXT Malicious Environmental Objects**

#### **Family Behavior**

#### **Component Leveling**



[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.1](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Malicious Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.2](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Passive Information Flow Monitoring,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.3](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Denial of Service,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.4](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Unauthorized Authentication Schemes,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.5](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Unauthorized Encryption Schemes,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.6](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.7](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Wireless Spectrum Analysis,

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.1

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.1

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Detection – Malicious Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall apply [**selection:** *configurable, automatic*] classification rules to detect rogue APs.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall distinguish between benign and malicious APs and EUDs based on automatic detection metrics.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall provide the ability to determine if a given SSID is authorized.

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.2

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.2

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2 Wireless Intrusion Detection – Passive Information Flow Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall [**selection:** *simultaneously, nonsimultaneously*] monitor and analyze network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP for all channels in the following RF frequencies:

- 2.4 GHz
- 4.9/5.0 GHz

[**selection:**

- *channels outside regulatory domain,*
- *non-standard channel frequencies,*
- *no other domains*

].

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall provide wireless sensors to detect network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP that [**selection:** *can be configured to prevent transmission of data, does not transmit data*].

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the presence of the following unauthorized connections and unauthorized network traffic:

- unauthorized APs broadcasting authorized SSIDs
- APs and EUDs spoofing the MAC address of whitelisted APs and EUDs
- authorized EUDs associating to unauthorized SSIDs
- unauthorized EUDs associating to authorized APs
- unauthorized point to point wireless bridges by whitelisted APs
- active probing
- NULL SSID associations
- [**selection:**
  - *illegal state transitions,*
  - *protocol violations for [**selection:** 802.11, 802.1X] ,*
  - *no other*

].

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.4**

The TSF shall perform stateful frame inspection and log attacks spanning multiple frames.

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect RF-based denial of service, deauthentication flooding, disassociation flooding, request-to-send/clear-to-send abuse, and [**selection:** [**assignment:** *other DoS methods*], *no other DoS methods*].

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN authentication schemes that are not authorized.

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.5**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.5**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN encryption schemes that are not authorized.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.2**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs send or receive unencrypted data.

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.6**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.6**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6.1**

The TSF shall detect the presence of network devices that operate in the following RF bands:  
[**assignment:** *some bands*].

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.7

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.7

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7.1**

The TSF shall provide a dedicated sensor for wireless spectrum analysis.

### **C.2.9 FAU\_WID\_EXT Passive Information Flow Monitoring**

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.1](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.2](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.3](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.4](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.5](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.6](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.7](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis,

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.1

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.1

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall apply [**selection:** *configurable, automatic*] classification rules to detect rogue APs.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall distinguish between benign and malicious APs and EUDs based on automatic detection metrics.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall provide the ability to determine if a given SSID is authorized.

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.2

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.2

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall [**selection:** *simultaneously, nonsimultaneously*] monitor and analyze network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP for all channels in the following RF frequencies:

- 2.4 GHz
- 4.9/5.0 GHz

[**selection:**

- *channels outside regulatory domain,*
- *non-standard channel frequencies,*
- *no other domains*

].

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall provide wireless sensors to detect network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP that [**selection:** *can be configured to prevent transmission of data, does not transmit data*].

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the presence of the following unauthorized connections and unauthorized network traffic:

- unauthorized APs broadcasting authorized SSIDs
- APs and EUDs spoofing the MAC address of whitelisted APs and EUDs
- authorized EUDs associating to unauthorized SSIDs
- unauthorized EUDs associating to authorized APs
- unauthorized point to point wireless bridges by whitelisted APs
- active probing
- NULL SSID associations
- **[selection:**
  - *illegal state transitions,*
  - *protocol violations for [selection: 802.11, 802.1X] ,*
  - *no other*

].

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.4**

The TSF shall perform stateful frame inspection and log attacks spanning multiple frames.

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect RF-based denial of service, deauthentication flooding, disassociation flooding, request-to-send/clear-to-send abuse, and **[selection: [assignment: other DoS methods], no other DoS methods]**.

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN authentication schemes that are not authorized.

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.5**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.5**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN encryption schemes that are not authorized.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.2**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs send or receive unencrypted data.

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.6**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.6**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6.1**

The TSF shall detect the presence of network devices that operate in the following RF bands: **[assignment: some bands]**.

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.7**

## **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.7**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7.1**

The TSF shall provide a dedicated sensor for wireless spectrum analysis.

## **C.2.10 FAU\_WID\_EXT Denial of Service**

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.1](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.2](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.3](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.4](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.5](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.6](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.7](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis,

### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.1**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.1**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall apply [**selection:** *configurable, automatic*] classification rules to detect rogue APs.

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall distinguish between benign and malicious APs and EUDs based on automatic detection metrics.

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall provide the ability to determine if a given SSID is authorized.

### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.2**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.2**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall [**selection:** *simultaneously, nonsimultaneously*] monitor and analyze network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP for all channels in the following RF frequencies:

- 2.4 GHz
- 4.9/5.0 GHz

[**selection:**

- *channels outside regulatory domain,*
- *non-standard channel frequencies,*
- *no other domains*

].

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall provide wireless sensors to detect network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP that [**selection:** *can be configured to prevent transmission of data, does not transmit data*].

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the presence of the following unauthorized connections and unauthorized network traffic:

- unauthorized APs broadcasting authorized SSIDs
- APs and EUDs spoofing the MAC address of whitelisted APs and EUDs
- authorized EUDs associating to unauthorized SSIDs
- unauthorized EUDs associating to authorized APs
- unauthorized point to point wireless bridges by whitelisted APs
- active probing
- NULL SSID associations

- **[selection:**
  - *illegal state transitions,*
  - *protocol violations for [selection: 802.11, 802.1X] ,*
  - *no other*

].

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.4**

The TSF shall perform stateful frame inspection and log attacks spanning multiple frames.

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect RF-based denial of service, deauthentication flooding, disassociation flooding, request-to-send/clear-to-send abuse, and **[selection: [assignment: other DoS methods], no other DoS methods]**.

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN authentication schemes that are not authorized.

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.5**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.5**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN encryption schemes that are not authorized.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.2**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs send or receive unencrypted data.

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.6**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.6**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6.1**

The TSF shall detect the presence of network devices that operate in the following RF bands: **[assignment: some bands]**.

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.7**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.7**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7.1**

The TSF shall provide a dedicated sensor for wireless spectrum analysis.

### C.2.11 FAU\_WID\_EXT Unauthorized Authentication Schemes

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.1](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Malicious Environmental Objects,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.2](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Passive Information Flow Monitoring,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.3](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Denial of Service,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.4](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Unauthorized Authentication Schemes,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.5](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Unauthorized Encryption Schemes,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.6](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring,  
[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.7](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Wireless Spectrum Analysis,

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.1

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.1

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Detection – Malicious Environmental Objects

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall apply [**selection:** *configurable, automatic*] classification rules to detect rogue APs.

##### FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall distinguish between benign and malicious APs and EUDs based on automatic detection metrics.

##### FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall provide the ability to determine if a given SSID is authorized.

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.2

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.2

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2 Wireless Intrusion Detection – Passive Information Flow Monitoring

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall [**selection:** *simultaneously, nonsimultaneously*] monitor and analyze network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP for all channels in the following RF frequencies:

- 2.4 GHz
- 4.9/5.0 GHz

[**selection:**

- *channels outside regulatory domain,*
- *non-standard channel frequencies,*
- *no other domains*

].

##### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide wireless sensors to detect network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP that [**selection:** *can be configured to prevent transmission of data, does not transmit data*].

##### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall detect the presence of the following unauthorized connections and unauthorized network traffic:

- unauthorized APs broadcasting authorized SSIDs
- APs and EUDs spoofing the MAC address of whitelisted APs and EUDs
- authorized EUDs associating to unauthorized SSIDs
- unauthorized EUDs associating to authorized APs
- unauthorized point to point wireless bridges by whitelisted APs
- active probing
- NULL SSID associations
- [**selection:**
  - *illegal state transitions,*
  - *protocol violations for [**selection:** 802.11, 802.1X] ,*
  - *no other*

].

##### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.4

The TSF shall perform stateful frame inspection and log attacks spanning multiple frames.

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect RF-based denial of service, deauthentication flooding, disassociation flooding, request-to-send/clear-to-send abuse, and [selection: *[assignment: other DoS methods]*, no other DoS methods].

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN authentication schemes that are not authorized.

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.5**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.5**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN encryption schemes that are not authorized.

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.2**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs send or receive unencrypted data.

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.6**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.6**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6.1**

The TSF shall detect the presence of network devices that operate in the following RF bands: [assignment: *some bands*].

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.7**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.7**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7.1**

The TSF shall provide a dedicated sensor for wireless spectrum analysis.

## **C.2.12 FAU\_WID\_EXT Unauthorized Encryption Schemes**

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.1](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.2](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.3](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.4](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.5](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes,



[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.6](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.7](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection – Wireless Spectrum Analysis,

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.1**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.1**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Detection – Malicious Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall apply [**selection:** *configurable, automatic*] classification rules to detect rogue APs.

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall distinguish between benign and malicious APs and EUDs based on automatic detection metrics.

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall provide the ability to determine if a given SSID is authorized.

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.2**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.2**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2 Wireless Intrusion Detection – Passive Information Flow Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall [**selection:** *simultaneously, nonsimultaneously*] monitor and analyze network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP for all channels in the following RF frequencies:

- 2.4 GHz
- 4.9/5.0 GHz

[**selection:**

- *channels outside regulatory domain,*
- *non-standard channel frequencies,*
- *no other domains*

].

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall provide wireless sensors to detect network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP that [**selection:** *can be configured to prevent transmission of data, does not transmit data*].

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the presence of the following unauthorized connections and unauthorized network traffic:

- unauthorized APs broadcasting authorized SSIDs
- APs and EUDs spoofing the MAC address of whitelisted APs and EUDs
- authorized EUDs associating to unauthorized SSIDs
- unauthorized EUDs associating to authorized APs
- unauthorized point to point wireless bridges by whitelisted APs
- active probing
- NULL SSID associations
- [**selection:**
  - *illegal state transitions,*
  - *protocol violations for [**selection:** 802.11, 802.1X] ,*
  - *no other*

].

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.4**

The TSF shall perform stateful frame inspection and log attacks spanning multiple frames.

#### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3 Wireless Intrusion Detection – Denial of Service**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect RF-based denial of service, deauthentication flooding, disassociation flooding, request-to-send/clear-to-send abuse, and [**selection:** *[assignment: other DoS methods]*, no other DoS methods].

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.4

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.4

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN authentication schemes that are not authorized.

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.5

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.5

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN encryption schemes that are not authorized.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.2**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs send or receive unencrypted data.

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.6

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.6

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6.1**

The TSF shall detect the presence of network devices that operate in the following RF bands: [**assignment:** *some bands*].

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.7

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.7

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7.1**

The TSF shall provide a dedicated sensor for wireless spectrum analysis.

### **C.2.13 FAU\_WID\_EXT Wireless Spectrum Monitoring**

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.1](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.2](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.3](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.4](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.5](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.6](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.7](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis,

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.1

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.1

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall apply [**selection:** *configurable, automatic*] classification rules to detect rogue APs.

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall distinguish between benign and malicious APs and EUDs based on automatic detection metrics.

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall provide the ability to determine if a given SSID is authorized.

### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.2**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.2**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall [**selection:** *simultaneously, nonsimultaneously*] monitor and analyze network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP for all channels in the following RF frequencies:

- 2.4 GHz
- 4.9/5.0 GHz

[**selection:**

- *channels outside regulatory domain,*
- *non-standard channel frequencies,*
- *no other domains*

].

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall provide wireless sensors to detect network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP that [**selection:** *can be configured to prevent transmission of data, does not transmit data*].

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the presence of the following unauthorized connections and unauthorized network traffic:

- unauthorized APs broadcasting authorized SSIDs
- APs and EUDs spoofing the MAC address of whitelisted APs and EUDs
- authorized EUDs associating to unauthorized SSIDs
- unauthorized EUDs associating to authorized APs
- unauthorized point to point wireless bridges by whitelisted APs
- active probing
- NULL SSID associations
- [**selection:**
  - *illegal state transitions,*
  - *protocol violations for [**selection:** 802.11, 802.1X] ,*
  - *no other*

].

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.4**

The TSF shall perform stateful frame inspection and log attacks spanning multiple frames.

### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect RF-based denial of service, deauthentication flooding, disassociation flooding, request-to-send/clear-to-send abuse, and [**selection:** [**assignment:** *other DoS methods*], *no other DoS methods*].

### **Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4**

#### **Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN authentication schemes that are not authorized.

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.5**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.5**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN encryption schemes that are not authorized.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.2**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs send or receive unencrypted data.

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.6**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.6**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6.1**

The TSF shall detect the presence of network devices that operate in the following RF bands: [assignment: *some bands*].

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.7**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.7**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7.1**

The TSF shall provide a dedicated sensor for wireless spectrum analysis.

### **C.2.14 FAU\_WID\_EXT Wireless Spectrum Monitoring**

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.1](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.2](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.3](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.4](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.5](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.6](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring,

[FAU\\_WID\\_EXT.7](#), Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis,

**Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.1**

**Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.1**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall apply [selection: *configurable, automatic*] classification rules to detect rogue APs.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall distinguish between benign and malicious APs and EUDs based on automatic detection

metrics.

### FAU\_WID\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall provide the ability to determine if a given SSID is authorized.

## Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.2

## Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.2

### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall [**selection:** *simultaneously, nonsimultaneously*] monitor and analyze network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP for all channels in the following RF frequencies:

- 2.4 GHz
- 4.9/5.0 GHz

[**selection:**

- *channels outside regulatory domain,*
- *non-standard channel frequencies,*
- *no other domains*

].

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide wireless sensors to detect network traffic matching the 802.11 monitoring SFP that [**selection:** *can be configured to prevent transmission of data, does not transmit data*].

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall detect the presence of the following unauthorized connections and unauthorized network traffic:

- unauthorized APs broadcasting authorized SSIDs
- APs and EUDs spoofing the MAC address of whitelisted APs and EUDs
- authorized EUDs associating to unauthorized SSIDs
- unauthorized EUDs associating to authorized APs
- unauthorized point to point wireless bridges by whitelisted APs
- active probing
- NULL SSID associations
- [**selection:**
  - *illegal state transitions,*
  - *protocol violations for [**selection:** 802.11, 802.1X] ,*
  - *no other*

].

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.4

The TSF shall perform stateful frame inspection and log attacks spanning multiple frames.

## Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3

## Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.3

### FAU\_WID\_EXT.3 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Denial of Service

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall detect RF-based denial of service, deauthentication flooding, disassociation flooding, request-to-send/clear-to-send abuse, and [**selection:** [**assignment:** *other DoS methods*], *no other DoS methods*].

## Management: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4

## Audit: FAU\_WID\_EXT.4

### FAU\_WID\_EXT.4 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Authentication Schemes

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### FAU\_WID\_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN authentication schemes that are not authorized.

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.5

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.5

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Unauthorized Encryption Schemes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs attempt to use WLAN encryption schemes that are not authorized.

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5.2**

The TSF shall detect when whitelisted APs and EUDs send or receive unencrypted data.

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.6

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.6

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.6.1**

The TSF shall detect the presence of network devices that operate in the following RF bands:  
[assignment: *some bands*].

**Management:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.7

**Audit:** FAU\_WID\_EXT.7

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:


##### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.7.1**

The TSF shall provide a dedicated sensor for wireless spectrum analysis.

### **C.2.15 FAU\_ANO\_EXT Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection**

#### **Family Behavior**

#### **Component Leveling**



[FAU\\_ANO\\_EXT.1](#), Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection,

**Management:** FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1

**Audit:** FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1

#### **FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1 Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall support the definition of [selection: *baselines* ('expected and approved'), *anomaly* ('unexpected') *traffic patterns*] including the specification of [selection:

- *throughput* (data elements (e.g. bytes, packets, etc.) per time period (e.g. minutes, hours, days)),
- *time of day*,
- *frequency*,
- *thresholds*,
- [assignment: *other methods*]

] and the following network protocol fields:

- all management and control frame header elements.

##### **FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall support the definition of anomaly activity through [selection: *manual configuration by administrators*, *automated configuration*].

### **C.2.16 FAU\_SIG\_EXT Signature-Based Intrusion Detection**

## Family Behavior

### Component Leveling



[FAU\\_SIG\\_EXT.1](#), Signature-Based Intrusion Detection,

**Management: FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1**

**Audit: FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1**

#### FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1 Signature-Based Intrusion Detection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support user-defined and customizable attack signatures.

### C.2.17 FAU\_STG\_EXT Protected Audit Event Storage (Packet Captures)

## Family Behavior

### Component Leveling



[FAU\\_STG\\_EXT.1/PCAP](#), Protected Audit Event Storage (Packet Captures),

**Management: FAU\_STG\_EXT.1/PCAP**

**Audit: FAU\_STG\_EXT.1/PCAP**

#### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1/PCAP Protected Audit Event Storage (Packet Captures)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.1/PCAP

The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated packet captures to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to [FTP\\_ITC.1](#).

##### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.2/PCAP

The TSF shall be able to store generated packet captures on the TOE itself.

##### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.3/PCAP

The TSF shall [**selection:** *drop new packet capture data, overwrite previous packet captures according to the following rule:* [**assignment:** *rule for overwriting previous packet captures*] , [**assignment:** *other action*] ] when the local storage space for packet capture data is full.

### C.2.18 FAU\_INV\_EXT Detection of Unauthorized Connections

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.1](#), Environmental Inventory, Textt for Component Levling

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.2](#), Characteristics of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.3](#), Behavior of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.4](#), Location of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.5](#), Detection of Unauthorized Connections,

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.1**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.1**

#### FAU\_INV\_EXT.1 Environmental Inventory

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall determine if a given AP or EUD is authorized based on MAC addresses.

##### FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall detect the presence of whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

##### FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall detect the presence of non-whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.2**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.2**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2 Characteristics of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall detect the

- current RF band
- current channel
- MAC Address
- classification of APs and EUDs
- **[selection: *[assignment: other details]*, no other details]**

of all APs and EUDs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for APs:

- encryption
- number of connected EUDs.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for EUDs:

- SSID and BSSID of AP it is connected to.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3 Behavior of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect when inventoried EUDs exhibit the following behavior:

- An EUD establishes a peer-to-peer connection with any other EUD,

**[selection:**

- *An EUD bridges two network interfaces,*
- *An EUD uses internet connection sharing,*
- **[assignment: other connection types],**
- *no other connections types*

**].**

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4 Location of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall detect information on the current physical location of EUDs and APs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.2**

The TSF shall detect received signal strength and **[selection: *RF power levels above a predetermined threshold, no other characteristics*]** of hardware operating within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.3**

The TSF shall detect the physical location of APs and EUDs to within **[assignment: *value equal or less than 15*]** feet of their actual location.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.5**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.5**

### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5 Detection of Unauthorized Connections**

Hierarchical to: No other components.



Dependencies to:

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5.1**

The TSF shall detect when non-whitelisted APs have a wired connection to the internal corporate network.

### **C.2.19 FAU\_INV\_EXT Signal Library**

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.1](#), Environmental Inventory, Textt for Component Levling

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.2](#), Characteristics of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.3](#), Behavior of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.4](#), Location of Environmental Objects,

[FAU\\_INV\\_EXT.5](#), Detection of Unauthorized Connections,

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.1**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.1**

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1 Environmental Inventory**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall determine if a given AP or EUD is authorized based on MAC addresses.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall detect the presence of whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall detect the presence of non-whitelisted EUDs and APs in the Operational Environment.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.2**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.2**

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2 Characteristics of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall detect the

- current RF band
- current channel
- MAC Address
- classification of APs and EUDs
- **[selection: *[assignment: other details]*, no other details]**

of all APs and EUDs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for APs:

- encryption
- number of connected EUDs.

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall detect the follow additional details for EUDs:

- SSID and BSSID of AP it is connected to.

**Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

**Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.3**

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3 Behavior of Environmental Objects**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall detect when inventoried EUDs exhibit the following behavior:

- An EUD establishes a peer-to-peer connection with any other EUD,

**[selection:**

- *An EUD bridges two network interfaces,*

- An EUD uses internet connection sharing,
- [assignment: other connection types],
- no other connections types

].

#### Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4

#### Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.4

#### FAU\_INV\_EXT.4 Location of Environmental Objects

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall detect information on the current physical location of EUDs and APs within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

##### FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.2

The TSF shall detect received signal strength and [selection: RF power levels above a predetermined threshold, no other characteristics] of hardware operating within range of the TOE's wireless sensors.

##### FAU\_INV\_EXT.4.3

The TSF shall detect the physical location of APs and EUDs to within [assignment: value equal or less than 15] feet of their actual location.

#### Management: FAU\_INV\_EXT.5

#### Audit: FAU\_INV\_EXT.5

#### FAU\_INV\_EXT.5 Detection of Unauthorized Connections

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### FAU\_INV\_EXT.5.1

The TSF shall detect when non-whitelisted APs have a wired connection to the internal corporate network.

### C.2.20 FAU\_MAC\_EXT Device Impersonation

#### Family Behavior

#### Component Leveling



[FAU\\_MAC\\_EXT.1](#), Device Impersonation,

#### Management: FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1

#### Audit: FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1

#### FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1 Device Impersonation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

##### FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall detect when two sensors in non-overlapping locations receive traffic from the same MAC address simultaneously.

##### FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall detect when two sensors in non-overlapping locations receive traffic from the MAC addresses of non-whitelisted EUDs within an Authorized administrator-configurable timeframe based on distance between sensors.

### C.2.21 FAU\_WIP\_EXT Wireless Intrusion Prevention

#### Family Behavior

#### Component Leveling



[FAU\\_WIP\\_EXT.1](#), Wireless Intrusion Prevention,

**Management: FAU\_WIP\_EXT.1**

**Audit: FAU\_WIP\_EXT.1**

**FAU\_WIP\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Prevention**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to:

**FAU\_WIP\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall allow an Authorized Administrator to isolate a wireless AP or EUD from the network monitored by the TSF using the following methods: [**selection:** *wireless containment, wire-side containment of an unauthorized AP connected to the internal corporate wired network.*]

# Appendix D - An Example Appendix

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

# Appendix E - Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AP	Access Point
BSSID	Basic Service Set Identifier
Base-PP	Base Protection Profile
CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
DoS	Denial of Service
EUD	End User Device
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
MAC	Media Access Control
OE	Operational Environment
PP	Protection Profile
PP-Configuration	Protection Profile Configuration
PP-Module	Protection Profile Module
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SSH	Secure Shell
SSID	Service Set Identifier
ST	Security Target
TKIP	Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSFI	TSF Interface
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
WEP	Wired Equivalent Protocol
WIDS	Wireless Intrusion Detection System
WIPS	Wireless Intrusion Prevention System
WLAN	Wireless Local Area Network
WPA	Wi-Fi Protected Access

# Appendix F - Bibliography

Identifier	Title
[CC]	<div>Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li><li>Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li><li>Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li></ul></div>