

Tabular Presentation of the *Protection Profile for QQQQ*



Version: 1.0

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National Information Assurance Partnership

Revision History

Version	Date	Comment
1.0	2015-08-14	Release - first version released

Introduction

This document presents the Security Functional Requirements and Security Assurance Requirements from the *Protection Profile for QQQQ*. This tabular representation is provided for those audiences whose interest primarily lies in those portions of that document. The Protection Profile itself remains the only complete and authoritative representation, and includes discussion of assumptions, threats, and objectives.

Security Functional Requirements

ID	Requirement	Assurance Activity
QQQ_QQQ.1.1		
Application Note:		

Security Assurance Requirements

ID	Requirement	Assurance Activity
ADV_FSP.1.1D	The developer shall provide a functional specification.	
ADV_FSP.1.2D	The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs. Application Note: As indicated in the introduction to this section, the functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD_OPE and AGD_PRE documentation. The developer may reference a website accessible to application developers and the evaluator. The assurance activities in the functional requirements point to	

	evidence that should exist in the documentation and TSS section; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element ADV_FSP.1.2D is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.	
ADV_FSP.1.1C	The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.	
ADV_FSP.1.2C	The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.	
ADV_FSP.1.3C	The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.	
ADV_FSP.1.4C	The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.	
ADV_FSP.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	
ADV_FSP.1.2E	The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.	There are no specific assurance activities associated with these SARs, except ensuring the information is provided. The functional specification documentation is provided to support the evaluation activities described in , and other activities described for AGD, ATE, and AVA SARs. The requirements on the content of the functional specification information is implicitly assessed by virtue of the other assurance activities being performed; if the evaluator is unable to perform an activity because there is insufficient interface information, then an adequate functional specification has not been provided.
AGD_OPE.1.1D	The developer shall provide operational user guidance. Application Note: The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages. Rather than repeat information here, the developer should review the assurance activities for this component to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.	
AGD_OPE.1.1C	The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings. Application Note: User and administrator are to be considered in the definition of user role.	
AGD_OPE.1.2C	The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the in a secure manner.	
AGD_OPE.1.3C	The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate. Application Note: This portion of the operational user guidance should be presented in the form of a checklist that can be quickly executed by IT personnel (or end-users, when necessary) and suitable for use in compliance activities. When possible, this guidance is to be expressed in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) to support security automation. Minimally, it should be presented in a structured format which includes a title for each configuration item, instructions for achieving the secure configuration, and any relevant rationale.	
AGD_OPE.1.4C	The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.	

AGD_OPE.1.5C	The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.	
AGD_OPE.1.6C	The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.	
AGD_OPE.1.7C	The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.	
AGD_OPE.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	Some of the contents of the operational guidance are verified by the assurance activities in and evaluation of the according to the . The following additional information is also required. If cryptographic functions are provided by the , the operational guidance shall contain instructions for configuring the cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the . It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the . The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the by verifying a digital signature – this may be done by the or the underlying platform. The evaluator will verify that this process includes the following steps: Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to the (e.g., placement in a specific directory). Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or unsuccessful. This includes generation of the hash/digital signature. The will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this PP. The operational guidance shall make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the evaluation activities.
AGD_PRE.1.1D	The developer shall provide the , including its preparative procedures. Application Note: As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the assurance activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.	
AGD_PRE.1.1C	The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.	
AGD_PRE.1.2C	The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.	
AGD_PRE.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	
AGD_PRE.1.2E	The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the can be prepared securely for operation.	As indicated in the introduction above, there are significant expectations with respect to the documentation—especially when configuring the operational environment to support functional requirements. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the guidance provided for the adequately addresses all platforms claimed for the in the ST.
ALC_CMC.1.1D	The developer shall provide the and a reference for the .	
ALC_CMC.1.1C	The shall be labeled with a unique reference. Application Note: Unique reference information includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OS Name • OS Version • OS Description • Software Identification (SWID) tags, if available 	
ALC_CMC.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	The evaluator will check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the ST. Further, the evaluator will check the AGD guidance and samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor maintains a web site advertising the , the evaluator will examine the information on the web site to ensure that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.
ALC_CMS.1.1D	The developer shall provide a configuration list for the .	
ALC_CMS.1.1C	The configuration list shall include the following: the itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.	
ALC_CMS.1.2C	The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.	
ALC_CMS.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	The "evaluation evidence required by the SARs" in this PP is limited to the information in the ST coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that the is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the ST and in the AGD guidance (as done in the assurance activity for ALC_CMC.1), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this component. Life-cycle support is targeted aspects of the developer's life-cycle and instructions to providers of applications for the developer's devices, rather than an in-depth examination of the TSF manufacturer's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the

overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation.

The evaluator will ensure that the developer has identified (in guidance documentation for application developers concerning the targeted platform) one or more development environments appropriate for use in developing applications for the developer's platform. For each of these development environments, the developer shall provide information on how to configure the environment to ensure that buffer overflow protection mechanisms in the environment(s) are invoked (e.g., compiler and linker flags). The evaluator will ensure that this documentation also includes an indication of whether such protections are on by default, or have to be specifically enabled. The evaluator will ensure that the TSF is uniquely identified (with respect to other products from the TSF vendor), and that documentation provided by the developer in association with the requirements in the ST is associated with the TSF using this unique identification.

ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1D	The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the .	
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2D	The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product.	
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1C	The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the software.	
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2C	The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to the .	
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	<p>The evaluator will verify that the TSS contains a description of the timely security update process used by the developer to create and deploy security updates. The evaluator will verify that this description addresses the entire application. The evaluator will also verify that, in addition to the OS developer's process, any third-party processes are also addressed in the description. The evaluator will also verify that each mechanism for deployment of security updates is described.</p> <p>The evaluator will verify that, for each deployment mechanism described for the update process, the TSS lists a time between public disclosure of a vulnerability and public availability of the security update to the OS patching this vulnerability, to include any third-party or carrier delays in deployment. The evaluator will verify that this time is expressed in a number or range of days.</p> <p>The evaluator will verify that this description includes the publicly available mechanisms (including either an email address or website) for reporting security issues related to the OS. The evaluator shall verify that the description of this mechanism includes a method for protecting the report either using a public key for encrypting email or a trusted channel for a website.</p>
ATE_IND.1.1D	The developer shall provide the for testing.	
ATE_IND.1.1C	The shall be suitable for testing.	
ATE_IND.1.1E	The evaluator <i>shall confirm</i> that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	
ATE_IND.1.2E	<p>The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.</p> <p>Application Note: The evaluator will test the OS on the most current fully patched version of the platform.</p>	<p>The evaluator will prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system, including any application crashes during testing. The evaluator shall determine the root cause of any application crashes and include that information in the report. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the and the body of this PP's Assurance Activities.</p> <p>While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an Assurance Activity, the evaluator must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST is covered. The test plan identifies the platforms to be tested, and for those platforms not included in the test plan but included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing the platforms. This justification must address the differences between the tested platforms and the untested platforms, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no affect; rationale must be provided. If all platforms claimed in the ST are tested, then no rationale is necessary. The test plan describes the composition of each platform to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the evaluator is expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each platform either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) should be provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the and its platform.</p> <p>This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The cryptographic algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by this PP and used by the cryptographic protocols being evaluated (IPsec, TLS). The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those objectives. These procedures include expected results.</p> <p>The test report (which could just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a "fail" and "pass" result (and the supporting details), and not just the "pass" result.</p>
AVA_VAN.1.1D	The developer shall provide the for testing.	
AVA_VAN.1.1C	The shall be suitable for testing.	
AVA_VAN.1.1E	The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.	
AVA_VAN.1.2E	<p>The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the .</p> <p>Application Note: Public domain sources include the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)</p>	

	dictionary for publicly-known vulnerabilities. Public domain sources also include sites which provide free checking of files for viruses.	
AVA_VAN.1.3E	The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.	The evaluator will generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to find vulnerabilities that have been found in similar applications with a particular focus on network protocols the application uses and document formats it parses. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report. For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.

Glossary

Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation. In this case, the SDN Controller and its supporting documentation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in a ST.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
SOMETHING ()	