

# Supporting Document

## Mandatory Technical Document



PP-Module for Wireless Intrusion Detection/Prevention System

Version: 2.0

2022-09-30

**National Information Assurance Partnership**

## Foreword

This is a Supporting Document (SD), intended to complement the Common Criteria version 3 and the associated Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.

SDs may be “Guidance Documents”, that highlight specific approaches and application of the standard to areas where no mutual recognition of its application is required, and as such, are not of normative nature, or “Mandatory Technical Documents”, whose application is mandatory for evaluations whose scope is covered by that of the SD. The usage of the latter class is not only mandatory, but certificates issued as a result of their application are recognized under the CCRA.

### Technical Editor:

National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)

### Document history:

Version	Date	Comment
2.0	2022-09-30	Added 6 GHz spectrum slice
1.0	2020-09-30	Initial Release - PP-Module for NDcPP

### General Purpose:

The purpose of this SD is to define evaluation methods for the functional behavior of Wireless Intrusion Detection/Prevention System products.

### Acknowledgments:

This SD was developed with support from NIAP Wireless Intrusion Detection/Prevention System Technical Community members, with representatives from industry, government agencies, Common Criteria Test Laboratories, and members of academia.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Technology Area and Scope of Supporting Document

The scope of the PP-Module for Wireless Intrusion Detection/Prevention System is to describe the security functionality of Wireless Intrusion Detection/Prevention System products in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for them. The PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PP:

- [Network Device, version 2.2e](#)

This SD is mandatory for evaluations of TOEs that claim conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the PP-Module for :

- Wireless Intrusion Detection/Prevention System, Version 2.0

As such it defines Evaluation Activities for the functionality described in the PP-Module as well as any impacts to the Evaluation Activities to the Base-PP(s) it modifies.

Although Evaluation Activities are defined mainly for the evaluators to follow, in general they also help developers to prepare for evaluation by identifying specific requirements for their TOE. The specific requirements in Evaluation Activities may in some cases clarify the meaning of Security Functional Requirements (SFR), and may identify particular requirements for the content of Security Targets (ST) (especially the TOE Summary Specification), user guidance documentation, and possibly supplementary information (e.g. for entropy analysis or cryptographic key management architecture).

## 1.2 Structure of the Document

Evaluation Activities can be defined for both SFRs and Security Assurance Requirements (SAR), which are themselves defined in separate sections of the SD.

If any Evaluation Activity cannot be successfully completed in an evaluation, then the overall verdict for the evaluation is a 'fail'. In rare cases there may be acceptable reasons why an Evaluation Activity may be modified or deemed not applicable for a particular TOE, but this must be approved by the Certification Body for the evaluation.

In general, if all Evaluation Activities (for both SFRs and SARs) are successfully completed in an evaluation then it would be expected that the overall verdict for the evaluation is a 'pass'. To reach a 'fail' verdict when the Evaluation Activities have been successfully completed would require a specific justification from the evaluator as to why the Evaluation Activities were not sufficient for that TOE.

Similarly, at the more granular level of assurance components, if the Evaluation Activities for an assurance component and all of its related SFR Evaluation Activities are successfully completed in an evaluation then it would be expected that the verdict for the assurance component is a 'pass'. To reach a 'fail' verdict for the assurance component when these Evaluation Activities have been successfully completed would require a specific justification from the evaluator as to why the Evaluation Activities were not sufficient for that TOE.

## 1.3 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

### 1.3.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs <a href="#">[CC]</a> .
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Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)	A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Functional Package (FP)	A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Function (SF)	A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Function Policy (SFP)	The security policy enforced by an SF.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.

### 1.3.2 Technical Terms

Access Point (AP)	A device that provides the network interface that enables 802.11 wireless client hosts to access a wired network.
End User Device (EUD)	An 802.11 enabled device that has the ability to process, transmit, and/or store information.
Service Set Identifier (SSID)	The primary name associated with an 802.11 wireless local area network (WLAN).
Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS)	A security product that provides network security administrators with the ability to monitor, collect, and log real-time to potentially malicious wireless (IEEE 802.11) network traffic.
Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIPS)	A security product that provides network security administrators with the ability to monitor, collect, log, and react in real-time to potentially malicious wireless (IEEE 802.11) network traffic.
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)	An 802.11 wireless computer network that links two or more devices using wireless communication to form a local area network (LAN) within a limited area such as a home, school, computer laboratory, campus, office building etc.

## 2 Evaluation Activities for SFRs

The EAs presented in this section capture the actions the evaluator performs to address technology specific aspects covering specific SARs (e.g. ASE\_TSS.1, ADV\_FSP.1, AGD\_OPE.1, and ATE\_IND.1) - this is in addition to the CEM workunits that are performed in [Section 3 Evaluation Activities for SARs](#).

Regarding design descriptions (designated by the subsections labeled TSS, as well as any required supplementary material that may be treated as proprietary), the evaluator must ensure there is specific information that satisfies the EA. For findings regarding the TSS section, the evaluator's verdicts will be associated with the CEM workunit ASE\_TSS.1-1. Evaluator verdicts associated with the supplementary evidence will also be associated with ASE\_TSS.1-1, since the requirement to provide such evidence is specified in ASE in the PP.

For ensuring the guidance documentation provides sufficient information for the administrators/users as it pertains to SFRs, the evaluator's verdicts will be associated with CEM workunits ADV\_FSP.1-7, AGD\_OPE.1-4, and AGD\_OPE.1-5.

Finally, the subsection labeled Tests is where the authors have determined that testing of the product in the context of the associated SFR is necessary. While the evaluator is expected to develop tests, there may be instances where it is more practical for the developer to construct tests, or where the developer may have existing tests. Therefore, it is acceptable for the evaluator to witness developer-generated tests in lieu of executing the tests. In this case, the evaluator must ensure the developer's tests are executing both in the manner declared by the developer and as mandated by the EA. The CEM workunits that are associated with the EAs specified in this section are: ATE\_IND.1-3, ATE\_IND.1-4, ATE\_IND.1-5, ATE\_IND.1-6, and ATE\_IND.1-7.

### 2.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Device

The EAs defined in this section are only applicable in cases where the TOE claims conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the NDcPP.

#### 2.1.1 Modified SFRs

##### 2.1.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)

###### FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1 Security Audit Data Generation for Distributed TOE Components

###### FAU\_GEN\_EXT.1

There is no change to the EAs specified for this SFR in the NDcPP SD. The PP-Module modifies this SFR to make its inclusion mandatory rather than selection-based, but there is no change to how the SFR must be implemented.

###### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage

###### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1

There is no change to the EAs specified for this SFR in the NDcPP SD. The PP-Module modifies this SFR to remove one of the possible selection items, but there is no change to how the SFR is to be implemented.

### 2.1.1.2 Communications (FCO)

#### FCO\_CPC\_EXT.1 Communication Partner Control

##### FCO\_CPC\_EXT.1

There is no change to the EAs specified for this SFR in the NDcPP SD. The PP-Module modifies this SFR to make its inclusion mandatory rather than optional, but there is no change to how the SFR is to be implemented.

### 2.1.1.3 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### FPT\_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

##### FPT\_ITT.1

There is no change to the EAs specified for this SFR in the NDcPP SD. The PP-Module modifies this SFR to make its inclusion mandatory rather than optional, but there is no change to how the SFR is to be implemented.

### 2.1.1.4 Trusted Paths/Channels (FTP)

#### FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

##### FTP\_ITC.1

There is no change to the EAs specified for this SFR in the NDcPP SD. If 'database server' is selected in FTP\_ITC.1.1, the evaluator shall ensure that the required tests are performed on that external interface in addition to the other claimed interfaces.

The evaluator shall also perform test 4 for this SFR in the NDcPP SD, which is objective in NDcPP.

## 2.2 TOE SFR Evaluation Activities

### 2.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### FAU\_ARP.1 Security Alarms

##### FAU\_ARP.1

###### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes where to find the WIDS alerts on the Administrator console/interface.

###### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall use the operational guidance for instructions on where the alerts generated are displayed within the WIDS interface. If "capture raw frame traffic that triggers the violation is selected", the evaluator shall use the operational guidance to configure the traffic capture capabilities.

###### **Tests**

- Test FAU\_ARP.1:1: The evaluator shall perform a series of events or generate traffic that would successfully trigger an alert for each of the rules defined in FAU\_SAA.1. The evaluator should verify and record whether the TOE generated the alert for each rule, and provided sufficient details. The evaluator should also record the events or traffic that was generated as each alert was attempted to be triggered and record the details provided by the TOE in the alert.
- Test FAU\_ARP.1:2: *[conditional]* If capturing of raw frames was selected, verify that the packet capture was triggered and stored as appropriate.

#### FAU\_ARP\_EXT.1 Security Alarm Filtering

##### FAU\_ARP\_EXT.1

###### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to filter WIDS/WIPS alerts.

###### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance includes instructions on enabling and disabling alerts.

###### **Tests**

- Test FAU\_ARP\_EXT.1:1:
  - **Step 1:** The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to enable/disable detection of available detection capabilities through the WIDS administrator interface. The evaluator shall then generate traffic that would successfully trigger the alert. The evaluator should verify that the TOE generated the alert.
  - **Step 2:** The evaluator shall disable the alert. The evaluator shall then generate events as in previous test that should successfully trigger the alert. The evaluator shall verify that the TOE did not generate an alert.

## **FAU\_GEN.1/WIDS Audit Data Generation (WIDS)**

FAU\_GEN.1/WIDS

### **TSS**

There are no TSS evaluation activities for this SFR.

### **Guidance**

There are no operational guidance activities for this SFR.

### **Tests**

The evaluator shall test the TOE's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records in accordance with the evaluation activities associated with the functional requirements in this PP-Module. When verifying the test results, the evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly.

## **FAU\_IDS\_EXT.1 Intrusion Detection System - Intrusion Detection Methods**

FAU\_IDS\_EXT.1

### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes which intrusion detection method(s) the TOE utilizes. If multiple methods are selected, the evaluator shall confirm that the TSS describes how the different methods are incorporated.

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to configure the TOE in order for it to detect such intrusions.

### **Tests**

Depending on the detection technique used by the TOE, the evaluator shall confirm and note the existence of the capability and test for the appropriate selection-based requirements.

## **FAU\_INV\_EXT.1 Environmental Inventory**

FAU\_INV\_EXT.1

### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes how the presence of authorized EUDs and APs is presented by the TOE. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes where in the WIDS interface the list of detected APs and EUDs is displayed.

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to view authorized and unauthorized APs and EUDs that are within range of the TOE sensors.

### **Tests**

- Test FAU\_INV\_EXT.1:1:
  - **Step 1:** Per guidance in FMT\_SMF.1/WIDS, add MAC Addresses or other unique device identifier for an AP and EUD to the allowlist.
  - **Step 2:** Deploy the AP and EUD that were added to allowlist within the range of the TOE's sensors.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the devices are classified as authorized.
  - **Step 4:** Remove the EUD from the allowlist.
  - **Step 5:** Verify that the EUD is classified as unauthorized.
  - **Step 6:** Remove the AP from the allowlist.
  - **Step 7:** Verify that the AP is classified as unauthorized.
- Test FAU\_INV\_EXT.1:2:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP and EUD, and connect the EUD to the AP.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the list of detected APs and EUDs contains the allowlisted AP and EUD that were just deployed.
  - **Step 3:** If the AP and EUD are detected verify that they are classified as allowlisted devices.
- Test FAU\_INV\_EXT.1:3:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy a non-allowlisted AP and EUD and connect the EUD to the AP.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the list of detected APs and EUDs contains the non-allowlisted AP and EUD that were just deployed.
  - **Step 3:** If the AP and EUD are detected verify that they are not classified as allowlisted devices.

## **FAU\_INV\_EXT.2 Characteristics of Environmental Objects**

FAU\_INV\_EXT.2

### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS explains the capability of detecting the information specified in the requirements for all APs and EUDs within the TOE's wireless range.

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance in order to verify that there are instructions that show how to locate the device inventory mentioned above.

## **Tests**

- Test FAU\_INV\_EXT.2:1:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP, non-allowlisted AP and two allowlisted EUDs.
  - **Step 2:** Connect one allowlisted EUD to the allowlisted AP and one to the non-allowlisted AP.
  - **Step 3:** Check the WIDS user interface for a list of detected APs and EUDs.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that current RF band, current channel, MAC Address, received signal strength, device detection timestamps, classification of device, are part of the information presented on the WIDS user interface for all the APs and EUDs detected. For APs verify that encryption, number of connected EUDs, SSID (if not hidden), received frames/packets and beacon rate are presented. For EUDs verify that the SSID and BSSID of AP it is connected and DHCP configuration is presented.

## **FAU\_INV\_EXT.3 Location of Environmental Objects**

FAU\_INV\_EXT.3

### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes information on location tracking, optimal number of sensors and sensor placement to meet the required level of accuracy.

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS contains information regarding the TSF's ability to record signal strength of hardware operating within range of its sensors.

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance for instructions on how to configure location tracking, how to load a location map (if applicable), and where in the TSF administrator interface the location of APs and EUDs can be viewed.

If the option for detection of RF power levels above a predetermined threshold is selected, the evaluator shall use the operational guidance to set or check what the threshold is in a given test. The evaluator should also verify that the operational guidance provides instruction on how to configure the TOE to generate an alert when the threshold is exceeded.

## **Tests**

- Test FAU\_INV\_EXT.3:1:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an AP within range of the sensors.
  - **Step 2:** Verify the TSF provides location tracking information about the AP.
  - **Step 3:** Verify the AP location presented is within 25 feet actual location.
- Test FAU\_INV\_EXT.3:2:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an AP within range of the sensors.
  - **Step 2:** Check the WIDS user interface for a list of detected APs and EUDs.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the current received signal strength is part of the information presented on the WIDS user interface about the APs and EUDs.

## **FAU\_RPT\_EXT.1 Intrusion Detection System - Reporting Methods**

FAU\_RPT\_EXT.1

### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes which method the TOE utilizes.

### **Guidance**

There are no operational guidance activities for this SFR.

### **Tests**

Depending on the detection technique used by the TOE, the evaluator shall confirm and note the existence of the capability.

- Test FAU\_RPT\_EXT.1:1:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP and connect it to the protected wired infrastructure via wire.
  - **Step 2:** Confirm that the TSF can observe and capture traffic and events generated by the AP.
  - **Step 3:** Confirm that the TSF can use the reporting mechanisms specified in the TSS.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that the TSF can import and export observable event data in each of the formats specified in the TSS.

## **FAU\_SAA.1 Potential Violation Analysis**

FAU\_SAA.1

### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to detect the network behavior described by the SFR. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the methods that the TOE uses to detect the presence of unauthorized connections and unauthorized network traffic. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes the denial of service attacks that can be detected by the TOE. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to detect when unauthorized WLAN authentication schemes and encryption schemes are used. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes

the ability of the TOE to detect when unauthorized APs and EUDs send or receive unencrypted data.

### **Guidance**

If the ability of the TSF to detect the different potential security violations is configurable, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to configure the TOE.

### **Tests**

- Test FAU\_SAA.1:1: **Detection of non-allowlisted AP:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy a non-allowlisted AP.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the AP is detected as a non-allowlisted AP.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:2: **Detection of non-allowlisted EUD:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy a non-allowlisted EUD.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the EUD is detected as an non-allowlisted EUD.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:3: **Detection of authorized EUD establishing peer-to-peer connection with any other EUD:**
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:3.1: Create the following connections between two allowlisted EUDs.
    - Windows ad hoc
    - Mac OS ad hoc
    - Linux ad hoc
    - Wi-Fi Direct
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:3.2: Create the following connections between one allowlisted EUD and a non-allowlisted EUD
    - Windows ad hoc
    - Mac OS ad hoc
    - Linux ad hoc
    - Wi-Fi Direct

Verify that alerts were generated by each of the connections in each test.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:4: **Detection of EUD bridging two network interfaces:**

Bridge two network interfaces on an allowlisted EUD (one must be the wireless card listed as allowlisted).

  - **Step 1:** Create a Windows Hosted Network with an allowlisted EUD.
  - **Step 2:** Connect a different allowlisted EUD to the network.

Verify that alerts were generated by each of the connections in each test.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:5: **Detection of unauthorized point to point wireless bridges by allowlisted APs:**
  - **Step 1:** Setup a point-to-point wireless bridge using allowlisted APs in the range of the wireless sensors.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the TSF detects the bridge.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:6: **Alert generated by violation of user defined signature:**
  - **Step 1:** Setup a user defined detection signature.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the TSF generates an alert once the rules of signature have been violated.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:7: **Detection of ICS connection:**
  - **Step 1:** Setup an Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) connection.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the TSF detects the establishment of the ICS connection.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:8: **Detection of MAC spoofing:**
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:8.1:
    - **Step 1:** Spoof mac address of an allowlisted EUD connected to an allowlisted AP on a second EUD.
    - **Step 2:** Connect EUD with spoofed MAC address to another allowlisted AP while the valid EUD it is spoofing is connected to the first AP.
    - **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF detected the MAC spoofing.
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:8.2:
    - **Step 1:** Spoof mac address of an allowlisted AP on a second AP.
    - **Step 2:** Verify that the TSF detected the MAC spoofing.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:9: **Detection of unauthorized AP broadcasting authorized SSIDs:**
  - **Step 1:** Configure a non-allowlisted AP to operate on a set channel on the 2.4 GHz band broadcasting an authorized SSID.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the TSF detects the non-allowlisted AP broadcasting an authorized SSID.
  - **Step 3:** Repeat the test utilizing the 5 GHz band.
  - **Step 4:** Repeat the test utilizing the 6 GHz band.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:10: **Detection of authorized AP broadcasting an unauthorized SSID:**
  - **Step 1:** Configure an allowlisted AP to operate on a set channel on the 2.4 GHz band broadcasting an unauthorized SSID.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the TSF detects the non-allowlisted AP broadcasting an authorized SSID.
  - **Step 3:** Repeat the test utilizing the 5 GHz band.
  - **Step 4:** Repeat the test utilizing the 6 GHz band.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:11: **Detection of allowlisted EUD connected to unauthorized SSID:**



- **Step 1:** Configure an allowlisted AP to operate on a set channel on the 2.4 GHz band with an unauthorized SSID.
- **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to the AP.
- **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF detects the allowlisted EUD associated to the allowlisted AP broadcasting an unauthorized SSID.
- **Step 4:** Repeat the test utilizing the 5 GHz band.
- **Step 5:** Repeat the test utilizing the 6 GHz band.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:12: **Detection of NULL SSID associations:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy allowlisted AP.
  - **Step 2:** Configure the AP to have null SSID.
  - **Step 3:** Attempt to connect an allowlisted EUD to the AP without supplying the correct AP SSID.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that the AP does not permit the EUD to complete an association by returning a Probe Request.
  - **Step 5:** If an association does occur, confirm that an alert is triggered due to a violation of policy.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:13: **Detection of active probing:**
  - **Step 1:** Perform an active scan on the subnet of the WLAN.
  - **Step 2:** Record tools used and type of scan performed.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF detects the active probing.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:14: **Detection of packet flooding/DoS/DDoS:**
  - **Step 1:** Generate a large amount of TCP and UDP traffic from a single EUD.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the TSF detects the network-based DoS.
  - **Step 3:** Generate a large amount of TCP and UDP traffic from multiple EUDs.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that the TSF detects the network-based DDoS.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:15: **Detection of RF-based denial of service:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP and configure to stay in a particular channel.
  - **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to the AP.
  - **Step 3:** Use an RF Jammer or signal generator on the same frequency as the AP and EUD to create a RF-based DoS.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that the TOE detects the RF-based DoS.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:16: **Detection of deauthentication flooding:**
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:16.1:
    - **Step 1:** Deploy allowlisted AP and configure to a set channel.
    - **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to the AP.
    - **Step 3:** Send an flood of deauthentication frames to the EUD using the MAC address of allowlisted AP it is connected to.
    - **Step 4:** Verify that the TSF detects the deauthentication flood.
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:16.2:
    - **Step 1:** Deploy allowlisted AP and configure to a set channel.
    - **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to the AP.
    - **Step 3:** Send an flood of deauthentication frames with the MAC address of allowlisted AP as the source and destination as a broadcast.
    - **Step 4:** Verify that the TSF detects the deauthentication flood.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:17: **Detection of disassociation flooding:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP and connect authorized EUDs.
  - **Step 2:** Generate disassociation frames from an unauthorized EUD.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF detected the disassociation flooding.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:18: **Detection of request-to-send/clear-to-send abuse:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy allowlisted AP and configure to a set channel.
  - **Step 2:** Connect two allowlisted EUDs to the AP.
  - **Step 3:** Send an flood of CTS frames to reserve RF medium.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that the TSF detects the CTS abuse.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:19: **Detection of unauthorized authentication scheme use:**

The evaluator shall configure the TOE, per FMT\_SMF.1/WIDS, with 802.1x authentication as the only mode of authorized WLAN authentication scheme.

  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:19.1:
    - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP with open authentication.
    - **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to AP.
    - **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF detects the AP and the EUD using unauthorized authentication schemes.
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:19.2:
    - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP that uses pre-shared key authentication.
    - **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to AP.
    - **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF detects the AP and the EUD using unauthorized authentication schemes.

- Test FAU\_SAA.1:20: **Detection of unauthorized encryption scheme use:**
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:20.1:
    - **Step 1:** Configure the TOE with 128 bit AES encryption type as the only allowed encryption scheme.
    - **Step 2:** Deploy an allowlisted AP with no encryption.
    - **Step 3:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to AP.
    - **Step 4:** Verify that the TOE detects the AP and the EUD using unauthorized encryption schemes.
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:20.2:
    - **Step 1:** Configure the TOE with 128 bit AES encryption type as the only allowed encryption scheme.
    - **Step 2:** Deploy an allowlisted AP that uses TKIP encryption only.
    - **Step 3:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to AP.
    - **Step 4:** Verify that the TSF detects the AP and the EUD using unauthorized encryption schemes.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:21: **Detection of unencrypted traffic:**
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:21.1:
    - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP with no encryption.
    - **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to AP and generate traffic.
    - **Step 3:** Verify that the TOE detects unencrypted data frames being sent between the allowlisted AP and EUD.
    - **Step 4:** Connect a non-allowlisted EUD to AP and generate traffic.
    - **Step 5:** Verify that the TSF detects unencrypted data frames being sent between the allowlisted AP and non-allowlisted EUD.
  - Test FAU\_SAA.1:21.2:
    - **Step 1:** Deploy a non-allowlisted AP with no encryption.
    - **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to AP and generate traffic.
    - **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF detects unencrypted data frames being between the non-allowlisted AP and allowlisted EUD.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:22: **Detection of allowlisted EUD or AP that is using weak/outdated WLAN protocols and protocol implementations:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP that utilizes the 802.11g or older WLAN protocol.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the TSF detects the weak/outdated WLAN protocol and generates an alert.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:23: **Detection of extremely high numbers of client devices using a particular allowlisted AP:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP.
  - **Step 2:** Configure a threshold amount of client devices that can use a particular AP.
  - **Step 3:** Connect enough client devices to the AP to purposely exceed the defined threshold.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that the TSF detects when the client usage exceeds the threshold.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:24: **Detection of a high number of failed attempts to join the WLAN in a short period of time:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP.
  - **Step 2:** Configure a threshold amount of connection attempts that can occur in a particular timeframe.
  - **Step 3:** Attempt to authenticate to the AP with enough client devices to purposely exceed the defined threshold.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that the TSF detects when the connection attempts within the specific timeframe exceeds the threshold.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:25: **Detection of the use of active WLAN scanners (e.g. wardriving tools) to generate WLAN traffic:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the TSF detects when WLAN scanners are the source of WLAN traffic.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:26: **Detection of the physical location of an identified WLAN threat by using triangulation:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy a non-allowlisted AP or EUD within range of the TSF.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the TSF can track and locate the AP or EUD to within 25 feet.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:27: **Detection of an SSID using weak/unsupported/disallowed encryption options:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP and configure its encryption options.
  - **Step 2:** Change the encryption options the AP advertises.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF detects when the AP's encryption options change.
- Test FAU\_SAA.1:28: **Detection of AP SSID larger than 32 bytes:**
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP and configure its SSID to be larger than 32 bytes.

- **Step 2:** Configure a user defined signature on the WIDS to detect when an SSID is larger than 32 bytes.
- **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF detects when the AP's SSID is larger than 32 bytes.

## FAU\_WID\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Malicious Environmental Objects

### FAU\_WID\_EXT.1

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes how the TOE detects malicious APs/EUDs and whether the TOE supports automatic detection. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes how the TOE determines if a given SSID is authorized.

#### **Guidance**

If TOE supports automatic detection, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance contains instructions for configuring the automatic detection metrics. The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to configure SSIDs as authorized.

#### **Tests**

For test 1 and 2 below the evaluator shall verify that the TOE detects and appropriately classifies the APs and EUDs. It is acceptable if the TOE uses different but equivalent descriptors for the classification. If the TOE does not support automatic detection metrics and equates a non-allowlisted AP/EUD as malicious, then it is sufficient that the classification given to the AP/EUD in step 1 is the same as in step 2. If the TOE supports automatic detection metrics and distinguishes between a non-allowlisted AP/EUD and a malicious AP/EUD, then the classification for the AP/EUD should differ between step 1 and step 2.

- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.1:1:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy a non-allowlisted AP in the area of the WIDS sensor, but take no action against the network. Verify that the AP is classified as non-authorized.
  - **Step 2:** Deploy a non-allowlisted AP in the area of the WIDS sensor and launch an attack against the network. This can be any variation of Fake AP, Spoof AP, Flood or DoS attack.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the AP is classified as malicious.
- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.1:2:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy a non-allowlisted EUD in the area of the WIDS sensor, but take no action against the network. Verify that the EUD is classified as non-authorized.
  - **Step 2:** Launch an RF Flooding, DoS/DDoS, masqueraded or spoofing attack against authorized AP with an unauthorized EUD.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the EUD is classified as malicious.
- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.1:3:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an AP with an unauthorized SSID in the area of the WIDS sensor.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the TOE detects the unauthorized SSID.

## FAU\_WID\_EXT.2 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Passive Information Flow Monitoring

### FAU\_WID\_EXT.2

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes which channels the TOE can detect and monitor. Additionally, the TSS shall include whether the TOE simultaneously or nonsimultaneously monitors network traffic across these channels. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes information on if the sensors are completely passive, by default, or if the sensors ability to transmit data is configurable.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance for how to configure the TOE to monitor the channels as selected in the SFR. If the sensor ability to transmits data is configurable, the evaluator shall review the operational guidance for how to disable wireless transmissions from the sensor. The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to specify and confirm that stateful frame capture and inspection is being performed.

#### **Tests**

#### **Channels Monitored**

- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.2:1: Channels on On 5 GHz band
  - **Step 1:** Configure the TSF to monitor the channels as selected in the SFR.
  - **Step 2:** Deploy an AP on at least 2 different channels within the regulatory domain on 5 GHz band.
  - **Step 3:** Deploy an AP on at least 2 different channels outside the regulatory domain on 5 GHz band.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that the AP gets detected on each channel tested.
- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.2:2: Channels on 2.4 GHz band
  - **Step 1:** Configure the TSF to monitor the channels as selected in the SFR.
  - **Step 2:** Deploy AP on at least 2 different channels within the regulatory domain on 2.4 GHz band.
  - **Step 3:** Deploy AP on at least 2 different channels outside the regulatory domain on 2.4 GHz band.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that the AP gets detected on each channel tested.
- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.2:3: Channels on 4.9 GHz band (if selected)
  - **Step 1:** Configure the TSF to monitor the channels specified in the SFR.
  - **Step 2:** Deploy AP and set to channels within the 4.9 GHz band outlined in the TSS.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the AP gets detected on each channel tested.
- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.2:4: Channels on 6 GHz band (if selected)
  - **Step 1:** Configure the TSF to monitor the channels specified in the SFR.

- **Step 2:** Deploy AP and set to channels within the 6 GHz band outlined in the TSS.
- **Step 3:** Verify that the AP gets detected on each channel tested.
- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.2:5: Non-standard channel frequencies (if selected)
  - **Step 1:** Configure the TSF to monitor the channels as selected in the SFR.
  - **Step 2:** Deploy AP on at least 2 different channels on non-standard channel frequencies.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the AP gets detected on each channel tested.

## Wireless Sensor Transmission of Data

If the TOE provides the ability to disable wireless transmission, the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to configure the sensor to not transmit wirelessly. The evaluator shall then deploy a signal analyzer in order to check for wireless emanations from the TOE.

Repeat the two tests below, for both the 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz, and 6 GHz band.

- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.2:6:
  - **Step 1:** Boot a sensor and using the signal analyzer observe to check if any emanations are coming from the sensor.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the signal analyzer does not pick up emanations from the sensor.
- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.2:7:
  - **Step 1:** During normal sensor operations, observe the analyzer for about 10 minutes to check if any emanations are coming from the sensor.
  - **Step 2:** Verify that the signal analyzer does not pick up emanations from the sensor.

## Stateful Frame Inspection

- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.2:8:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy allowlisted AP.
  - **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to the AP.
  - **Step 3:** Deploy a protocol analyzer or native capability within the WIDS Controller between the AP and EUD.
  - **Step 4:** Verify from the network traffic packet capture that all frames are being inspected to validate their connection state from the TSF

## 2.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

### FDP\_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control

FDP\_IFC.1

#### TSS

There are no TSS evaluation activities for this SFR.

#### Guidance

If this functionality is configurable, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to configure the TOE to monitor different types of IEEE 802.11 frame types and subtypes.

#### Tests

- Test FDP\_IFC.1:1:
  - Deploy an allowlisted AP/WIDS
  - Start a traffic capture from the AP/WIDS sensor
  - Send a set number of frames to the sensor for all IEEE 802.11 a, b, g, n, ac frame types and subtypes from/to the following:
    - *authorized APs and authorized EUDs*
    - *authorized APs and unauthorized EUDs*
    - *unauthorized APs and authorized EUDs*
  - Verify that there are frames from all the types and subtypes in the capture.

## 2.2.3 Security Management (FMT)

### FMT\_SMF.1/WIDS Specification of Management Functions (WIDS)

FMT\_SMF.1/WIDS

#### TSS

The evaluator shall review the TSS to verify that it includes information the ability of the TOE to define inventory of authorized APs and EUDs.

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to allow authorized administrators to define authorized WLAN authentication schemes.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance for instructions on how to configure and change classification of APs and EUDs to indicate that they are part of the allowlist.

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to determine how to configure which SSIDs are permitted

on the network.

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify that it provides instructions on how to define a WLAN authentication scheme as authorized or unauthorized for the purposes of detection.

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify that it provides instructions on how to define a WLAN encryption scheme as authorized or unauthorized for the purposes of detection.

### **Tests**

- Test FMT\_SMF.1/WIDS:1: The evaluator shall define an inventory of authorized APs and EUDs. The ability to detect allowlisted and non-allowlisted APs and EUDs will be tested in FAU\_INV\_EXT.1 and FAU\_SAA.1.
- Test FMT\_SMF.1/WIDS:2: The evaluator shall define authorized SSIDs. The ability to detect authorized and unauthorized SSIDs will be tested in FAU\_WID\_EXT.2.3 and FAU\_SAA.1.
- Test FMT\_SMF.1/WIDS:3: The evaluator shall configure the TSF with a set of allowed authentication and encryption schemes. The ability to detect violation of this policy will be tested in FAU\_SAA.1.
- Test FMT\_SMF.1/WIDS:4: (conditional): If "Define the amount of time sensor monitors a specific frequency or channel" is selected:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP and connect it to the protected wired infrastructure via wire.
  - **Step 2:** Confirm that the TSF can observe and capture traffic and events generated by the AP.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF can be configured to capture traffic on a specific channel for specific interval of time, and assign a specified frequency and time interval.
  - **Step 4:** Confirm that the TSF remains on the frequency and channel for the time period specified.

## **2.3 Evaluation Activities for Optional SFRs**

### **2.3.1 Security Audit (FAU)**

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.3 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Non-Wireless Spectrum Monitoring**

FAU\_WID\_EXT.3

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes the set of RF bands and technologies that the TSF can detect the use of. The TSS should also include instructions on how to enable and the hardware that is necessary for the additional band detection.

##### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance describes how to enable and configure detection of the technologies included in the ST as well as the hardware that is needed to perform this function.

##### **Tests**

The evaluator shall enable and configure detection of the selected technologies.

- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.3:1: Deploy a device within the given technology and verify that the TSF detects the device.

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.4 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Wireless Spectrum Analysis**

FAU\_WID\_EXT.4

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS to verify that the TOE provides a dedicated sensor for wireless spectrum analysis.

##### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance describes how to enable and configure dedicated spectrum analysis as well as the hardware that is needed to perform this function.

##### **Tests**

The evaluator shall enable and configure dedicated spectrum analysis and test the capabilities listed in the TSS.

#### **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Bluetooth Spectrum Monitoring**

FAU\_WID\_EXT.5

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes the set of RF bands and technologies that the TSF can detect the use of. The TSS should also include instructions on how to enable and the hardware that is necessary for the additional band detection.

##### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance describes how to enable and configure detection of the technologies included in the ST as well as the hardware that is needed to perform this function.

##### **Tests**

The evaluator shall enable and configure detection of the selected technologies.

- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.5:1: Deploy a device within the given technology and verify that the TSF detects the device.

## **FAU\_WID\_EXT.5 Wireless Intrusion Detection - Cellular Spectrum Monitoring**

FAU\_WID\_EXT.5

### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes the set of RF bands and technologies that the TSF can detect the use of. The TSS should also include instructions on how to enable and the hardware that is necessary for the additional band detection.

### ***Guidance***

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance describes how to enable and configure detection of the technologies included in the ST as well as the hardware that is needed to perform this function.

### ***Tests***

The evaluator shall enable and configure detection of the selected technologies.

- Test FAU\_WID\_EXT.5:1: Deploy a device within the given technology and verify that the TSF detects the device.

## **2.4 Evaluation Activities for Selection-Based SFRs**

### **2.4.1 Security Audit (FAU)**

#### **FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1 Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection**

FAU\_ANO\_EXT.1

### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the composition and construction of baselines or anomaly-based attributes specified in the SFR. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS provides a description of how baselines are defined and implemented by the TSF, or a description of how anomaly-based rules are defined and configured by the administrator.

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the available modes of configuration (manual or automatic) and how to configure or import the baseline.

### ***Guidance***

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance describes how to configure baseline and/or anomalous traffic patterns based on what is stated in the TSS.

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance describes how to perform automatic and/or manual definition of anomaly activity based on what is selected in the ST.

### ***Tests***

The evaluator shall use the instructions in the operational guidance to configure baselines or anomaly-based rules through automated and/or manual means based on what is selected in the ST. The evaluator shall send traffic that does not match the baseline or matches the anomaly-based rule and verify the TSF detects the anomalous behavior and generates an alert.

#### **FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1 Signature-Based Intrusion Detection**

FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1

### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the user-defined and customizable attack signatures that the TOE can define.

### ***Guidance***

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides information on how to configure user-defined and customizable attack signatures, including a description of the customization options that are available.

### ***Tests***

- Test FAU\_SIG\_EXT.1:1:
  - **Step 1:** Craft a signature with the available fields indicated in the TSS.
  - **Step 2:** Send a crafted frame that matches the signature to an allowlisted EUD
  - **Step 3:** Verify that the TSF triggers an alert based on the newly defined signature.

#### **FAU\_STG\_EXT.1/PCAP Protected Audit Event Storage (Packet Captures)**

FAU\_STG\_EXT.1/PCAP

### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes the list of trusted channels (as specified in FTP\_ITC.1) available in the TSF to transmit packet captures to an external entity. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the ability of the TOE to store packet capture data within itself, how much storage space is available for packet capture data and where that data is stored. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the behavior of the TOE when local storage space for packet capture data is exhausted and whether

this behavior is configurable.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to configure the trusted channel. If the behavior of the TOE when local storage space for packet capture data is exhausted is configurable, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides information on what the configurable behaviors are and how they can be set.

#### **Tests**

- Test FAU\_STG\_EXT.1/PCAP:1: The evaluator shall configure packet captures according to the guidance specified. The evaluator shall then trigger an event that starts a capture and verify through the tests in FTP\_ITC.1 that the captured traffic being sent to the external device is being sent through a trusted channel.
- Test FAU\_STG\_EXT.1/PCAP:2: The evaluator shall configure packet captures to be stored on the TSF according to the guidance specified. The evaluator shall then trigger an event that starts a capture and verify that the packet capture was stored on the TSF.
- Test FAU\_STG\_EXT.1/PCAP:3: The evaluator shall define packet data retention and deletion rules on the TSF according to the guidance specified and test the functionality of the specified rules.

## **2.5 Evaluation Activities for Objective SFRs**

### **2.5.1 Security Audit (FAU)**

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.4 Detection of Unauthorized Connections**

FAU\_INV\_EXT.4

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes guidance on whether the TSF has the capability of detecting APs connecting to the protected wired network infrastructure. If the capability is present the TSS shall include configuration guidance for this feature.

##### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance for instructions on how to configure the WIDS to detect unauthorized APs connected to the protected wired infrastructure.

##### **Tests**

- Test FAU\_INV\_EXT.4:1:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy a non-allowlisted AP.
  - **Step 2:** Connect the AP via wire to the protected network infrastructure.
  - **Step 3:** Check the WIDS user interface for a list of detected APs and EUDs.
  - **Step 4:** Verify that the rogue AP is detected and an alert generated on the detection of an AP connected to the protected wired infrastructure.

#### **FAU\_INV\_EXT.5 Signal Library**

FAU\_INV\_EXT.5

##### **TSS**

There are no TSS evaluation activities for this SFR.

##### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance for instructions on how to locate and verify that the WIDS comes preloaded with a signal library, as well as possesses the ability to import, export, and update the existing signal library if present.

##### **Tests**

Depending on operation guidance provided for the TOE, the evaluator shall confirm and note the existence of the signal library, and test for the ability to import, export, and update the signal library.

- Test FAU\_INV\_EXT.5:1:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy an allowlisted AP and connect it to the protected wired infrastructure via wire.
  - **Step 2:** Confirm and note whether the TSF has an existing signal library.
  - **Step 3:** If existence is confirmed, verify that the TSF can import, export, and update the existing signal library.

#### **FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1 Device Impersonation**

FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the behavior of the TOE when two sensors in non-overlapping locations receive traffic from the same MAC address simultaneously.

##### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to deploy the TOE in a manner that allows the TSF to detect when two sensors in non-overlapping locations receive traffic from the same MAC address simultaneously (i.e. information about the range and placement of sensors to ensure non-overlapping coverage).

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance provides instructions on how to configure the timeframe that should be allowed between two subsequent attempts for an EUD to connect from two separate locations.

### **Tests**

- Test FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1:1:
  - **Step 1:** Setup an allowlisted AP (Location 1).
  - **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to AP.
  - **Step 3:** Setup a second allowlisted AP and a non-allowlisted EUD in a separate non-overlapping location where the WIDS also has sensors. Or simulate the distant non-overlapping locations by deploying the second AP in a shielded environment connected to the valid network (Location 2).
  - **Step 4:** Spoof the MAC address of the EUD in location 1 with the EUD in location 2 and connect it to the allowlisted AP in location 2. Make sure both EUDs are connected at the same time.
  - **Step 5:** Verify that the TSF detected and generated an alert.
- Test FAU\_MAC\_EXT.1:2:
  - **Step 1:** Configure the timeframe allowed between connection of two EUDs in two separate locations (Location 1, Location 2).
  - **Step 2:** Setup an allowlisted AP (Location 1).
  - **Step 3:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to AP.
  - **Step 4:** Setup a second allowlisted AP and a non-allowlisted EUD in a separate non-overlapping location where the WIDS also has sensors. Or simulate the distant non-overlapping locations by deploying the second AP in a shielded environment connected to the valid network (Location 2).
  - **Step 5:** Spoof the MAC address of the EUD in location 1 with the EUD in location 2 and connect it to the allowlisted AP in location 2. Make sure that the time between connections is shorter than the time timeframe allowed/configured.
  - **Step 6:** Verify that the TSF detected and generated an alert.

### **FAU\_WIP\_EXT.1 Wireless Intrusion Prevention**

FAU\_WIP\_EXT.1

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes a list of available containment methods on the TSF and how to configure them.

#### **Guidance**

There are no operational guidance activities for this SFR.

#### **Tests**

Configure the containment methods available on the TSF and perform the following test for each method.

- Test FAU\_WIP\_EXT.1:1:
  - **Step 1:** Deploy a non-allowlisted AP and connect to the protected wired infrastructure via wire (make sure it gets classified as rogue, or manually classify as such).
  - **Step 2:** Connect an allowlisted EUD to the AP.
  - **Step 3:** Verify that TSF generates an alert, breaks the connection of the allowlisted EUD from the rogue AP, and contains the rogue AP.

## **2.5.2 Protection of the TSF (FPT)**

### **FPT\_FLS.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection**

FPT\_FLS.1

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall review the TSS section to determine that the TOE's implementation of the fail secure functionality is documented. The evaluator shall examine the TSS section to ensure that all failure modes specified in the ST are described.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to verify that it identifies the potential TOE failures, how the TSF preserves a secure state following these failures, and any actions that are required to restore the TOE to normal operation following the transition to a failure state.

#### **Tests**

- Test FPT\_FLS.1:1: For each failure mode specified in the ST, the evaluator shall ensure that the TOE attains a secure state after initiating each failure mode type.

## **2.6 Evaluation Activities for Implementation-based SFRs**

The PP-Module does not define any implementation-based requirements.

# **3 Evaluation Activities for SARs**

The PP-Module does not define any SARs beyond those defined within the base NDcPP to which it must claim



conformance. It is important to note that a TOE that is evaluated against the PP-Module is inherently evaluated against this Base-PP as well. The NDcPP includes a number of Evaluation Activities associated with both SFRs and SARs. Additionally, the PP-Module includes a number of SFR-based Evaluation Activities that similarly refine the SARs of the Base-PPs. The evaluation laboratory will evaluate the TOE against the Base-PP and supplement that evaluation with the necessary SFRs that are taken from the PP-Module.

## 4 Required Supplementary Information

This Supporting Document has no required supplementary information beyond the ST, operational guidance, and testing.

## Appendix A - References

Identifier	Title
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -
	• <a href="#">Part 1: Introduction and General Model</a> , CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
	• <a href="#">Part 2: Security Functional Components</a> , CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
	• <a href="#">Part 3: Security Assurance Components</a> , CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[NDcPP]	<a href="#">collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices</a> , Version 2.2e, March 23, 2020
[NDcPP SD]	<a href="#">Supporting Document - Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP</a> , Version 2.2, December 2019