

# PP-Module for Redaction Tools



Version: 1.0-Draft  
2022-04-29

**National Information Assurance Partnership**

# Revision History

Version	Date	Comment
1.0-Draft	2022-04-29	Initial publication

# Contents

- 1 Introduction
  - 1.1 Overview
  - 1.2 Terms
    - 1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms
    - 1.2.2 Technical Terms
  - 1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation
    - 1.3.1 TOE Boundary
  - 1.4 Use Cases
- 2 Conformance Claims
- 3 Security Problem Description
  - 3.1 Threats
  - 3.2 Assumptions
- 4 Security Objectives
  - 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
  - 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
  - 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
- 5 Security Requirements
  - 5.0.1 Security Audit (FAU)
  - 5.0.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
  - 5.0.3 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

1.0-Draft National Information Assurance Partnership 2022-04-29 Redaction 1.0-Draft 2022-04-29 Initial publication

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

The scope of this Protection Profile Module (PP-Module) is to describe the security functionality of redaction tools in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PPs:

- Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4 (App PP or PP\_APP\_V1.4)

This Base-PP is valid a redaction tool is a specific type of software application and can therefore be reasonably expected to implement security functionality that is typical of application software. Redaction is the process of selectively removing and replacing information from a document or other logical container of data for release to an audience not intended to view that information. Redacted information is not limited to classified material; other examples include privacy data, proprietary information, trade secrets, and legal strategy. Instances of redaction include replacing classified text with a black box to release a document to an unclassified environment, replacing privacy-related data such as telephone numbers with all Xs to release a database to a contractor, converting a proprietary format document to Portable Document Format (PDF) to release a what-you-see-is-what-you-get (WYSIWYG) document. The risk from improper or incomplete redaction is the inadvertent disclosure of classified or sensitive data.

Redaction is not sanitization. In the sanitization process, information is removed with no indication that the sanitization process took place. In the redaction process, selected visible information is removed and replaced with something innocuous (e.g. black box or text) so that the reader knows redaction took place. This replacement is a critical part of the process not shared with sanitization. Redaction is not sanitization. In the sanitization process, information is removed with no indication that the sanitization process took place. In the redaction process, selected visible information is removed and replaced with something innocuous (e.g. black box or text) so that the reader knows redaction took place. This replacement is a critical part of the process not shared with sanitization.



**Figure 1: Figure 1: One possible workflow of an electronic document through the redaction process.**

Figure 1 shows the typical workflow of a document from source to destination and through the redaction process. Other workflows are possible. Software vendors have the flexibility to devise their own workflow solutions for their target consumer. However, in any workflow, this PP-Module applies only to the part of the workflow that is performed by the redaction tool and only to the redaction functionality in that tool. Other functionality in the redaction tool, other tools used in the workflow, the organization's redaction policy as well as security requirements and security policies that apply to other parts of the workflow are beyond the scope of this PP-Module.

## 1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

### 1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)	A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.

Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Extended Package (EP)	A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages.
Functional Package (FP)	A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.

### 1.2.2 Technical Terms

Attachments	An electronic document or data file that is part of the main file but is logically distinct and separable from the main electronic document.
Complex Objects	Objects that may have their own static or functional metadata and may differ between the stored and visible form, such as images, attachments, Microsoft OLE objects, Microsoft ActiveX controls, and temporal objects.
Functional data	Forms, scripts, link Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), workflow data, action buttons, formulas in a spreadsheet, macros or any type of executable content.
Images	The actual image data stored in the file as opposed to what is visible; the visible image can be

	cropped or resized but the full image could still be retained in the file format and may or may not match the visible image; some image formats can have their own metadata, such as Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPG) and Tagged Image File Format (TIFF).
Metadata of objects or embedded objects	Data associated with an object to describe or identify the contents of the object such as exchangeable image file format (EXIF) data of images; images themselves can contain other images and their own metadata.
Obscured visible data	Content that could be visible but is obscured in some way such as content that runs off an edge of the container, text in a black font on black background (or any color of font on a similar color background), very small fonts, cropped or clipped graphics or images, hidden layers, portions of an embedded object (e.g. Microsoft Object Linking and Embedding (OLE)) that are outside the view container.
Remnant data	Artifacts of the original application or source file format such as remnant or unreferenced data from fast saves, unreferenced or unused elements, malformed elements that cannot be fixed, garbage data in the file structure.
Static data or metadata	File properties such as author or creation date, stored form field data, undo cache or any data kept to revert to a prior version of an element or the document itself, incremental updates, collaboration data such as comments, tracked changes, workflow data, embedded search indexes, bookmarks, document info added by 3rd-party apps, accessibility data such as alternate text, etc.
Structural data	Data that is part of the file format structure, such as a file header or fonts, and is necessary to interpret the file properly for display or print.
Temporal Objects	A particular type of complex object whose representation extends through a time interval, such as video, audio, flash animation, slide shows, etc. References to “complex objects” in the requirements section of this paper include temporal objects.
Visible contents	The visible contents of the file; the visual representation of text, images and complex objects.

## 1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) described by this PP-Module is limited to the redaction of electronic documents defined in standards such as the series International Organization for Standards (ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)-29500 (Office OpenXML Markup Language (XML), e.g. Microsoft Word, PowerPoint, and Excel documents) and ISO/IEC-32000 (PDF), or the definitive standard for a format. Mail guards, filters, and batch redaction tools are beyond the scope of this PP-module. Requirements that apply to features such as administrative control over particular redaction settings, multi-person review prior to release, etc., are outside the scope of this PP-Module. The TOE may have those features but is not required to have them and their use and enforcement is governed by the organization’s redaction policy.

This PP-Module covers the software functionality of the redaction process; it does not include requirements for how users should decide what to redact or other policy issues. Analysis of documents for covert data transfer is part of the decision-making process for what to redact and so occurs prior to the redaction itself. The requirements in this document are independent of requirements levied on document release by statute or the judiciary.

Data execution risks inherent in some file formats are beyond the scope of this PP-Module. This PP-Module assumes that scanning for such risks occurs prior to the document entering the redaction functionality of the TOE.

Documents to be redacted may contain objects that are vulnerable to steganography, such as images or video. Functional data such as scripts can contain strings or images that may not be accessible to the redaction tool. Analysis of such objects for attacks or covert data transfer will occur outside of the redaction process. An organization’s security policy will determine whether such objects are released or redacted in their entirety.

### 1.3.1 TOE Boundary

The physical boundary for a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module is a software application that installed on top of a general-purpose or mobile operating system. The TOE’s logical boundary includes all functionality required by the claimed Base-PP as well as the redaction functionality and related capabilities that are defined in this PP-Module. Any functionality that is provided by the application that is not relevant to the security requirements defined by this PP-Module or the Base-PP is considered to be outside the scope of the TOE.

## 1.4 Use Cases

Redaction Tools perform tasks associated primarily with the following use case.

## **[USE CASE 1] Content Redaction**

Redaction tools are used for the redaction of user selected content from a document.

## 2 Conformance Claims

### **Conformance Statement**

This PP-Module inherits exact conformance as required from the specified Base-PPs and as defined in the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017).

### **CC Conformance Claims**

This PP-Module is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (extended) of Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5 [CC].

### **PP Claim**

This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any PP.

### **Package Claim**

This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any packages.

# 3 Security Problem Description

The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the TOE is expected to address, assumptions about its operational environment (OE), and any organizational security policies that the TOE is expected to enforce.

## 3.1 Threats

---

The following threats defined in this PP-Module extend the threats defined by the Base-PP.

### **T.CLUES\_TO\_ORIGINAL\_DATA**

Text or graphics placed in the redacted area by the TOE may contain clues to the nature of the original redacted information.

### **T.UNREDACTED\_DATA**

A failure of the redaction tool to remove user selected visible or hidden data could result in the inadvertent dissemination of information.

## 3.2 Assumptions

---

These assumptions are made on the Operational Environment (OE) in order to be able to ensure that the security functionality specified in the PP-Module can be provided by the TOE. If the TOE is placed in an OE that does not meet these assumptions, the TOE may no longer be able to provide all of its security functionality. This PP-Module defines assumptions that extend those defined in the supported Base-PP.

### **A.KNOWLEDGEABLE\_USER**

The user is knowledgeable concerning document management and has appropriate training with the redaction tool. Part of this knowledge and training includes how to prepare a document for the redaction tool, e.g. resolve and turn off tracked changes prior to redaction, work with a copy of the document and preserve the original file, remove passwords and decrypt files, etc.

### **A.INFORMATION\_RELEASE\_POLICY**

There is a redaction or information release policy in place for the organization which the user follows.

### **A.PRESERVE\_DOCUMENT\_LAYOUT**

The TOE will preserve the layout of the document.



# 4 Security Objectives

## 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

---

**O.INSPECTION**

The TOE will analyze the file content for metadata and elements, to include any that are purposely hidden or not immediately visible to the naked eye. This metadata and elements includes, but is not limited to those that are obstructed from view such as shapes on top of text, hidden objects (manual direct formatting or programmatically hidden), and text that is positioned off the margins, and/or is located in header and footer sections of the file.

**O.MANAGEMENT**

placeholder

**O.QUALITY**

placeholder

**O.REDACTION**

The TOE will provide the capability to completely remove any data selected for redaction.

**O.REPORT**

The TOE will provide the capability to produce a report of all data redacted and any errors during redaction.

## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

---

The OE of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality (which is defined by the security objectives for the TOE). The security objectives for the OE consist of a set of statements describing the goals that the OE should achieve. This section defines the security objectives that are to be addressed by the IT domain or by non-technical or procedural means. The assumptions identified in Section 3 are incorporated as security objectives for the environment. This PP-Module defines environmental security objectives that extend those defined in the supported Base-PP.

**OE.PLACEHOLDER**

placeholder

## 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

---

This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies map to the security objectives.

Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale

Threat, Assumption, or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.CLUES_TO_ORIGINAL_DATA	O.PLACEHOLDER	placeholder
T.UNREDACTED_DATA	O.PLACEHOLDER	placeholder
A.KNOWLEDGEABLE_USER	OE.PLACEHOLDER	placeholder
A.INFORMATION_RELEASE_POLICY	OE.PLACEHOLDER	placeholder
A.PRESERVE_DOCUMENT_LAYOUT	OE.PLACEHOLDER	placeholder

## 5 Security Requirements

The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, with additional extended functional components.

The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections, assignments within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC:

- Assignments are indicated with *italicized* text.
- Refinements made by the PP-Module author are indicated with **bold text** for added or substituted text and ~~striktthrough~~ text for removed text. Refinements are only applied to significant technical changes to existing SFRs; minor presentation changes with no technical impact (such as British vs American spelling differences) are not marked as refinements. Refinements are also indicated when an operation is added or substituted for an existing operation (e.g. the PP-Module completes an assignment in such a way that it introduces a selection into the assignment).  
Note that for SFRs that are defined either in CC Part 2 or in this PP-Module's Extended Components Definition, the refinement operation is used to indicate deviations from the defined component. For Base-PP SFRs that are modified by this PP-Module, the refinement operation is used to indicate deviations from the Base-PP's definition of the SFR (i.e. if the Base-PP refined an SFR and that change is not affected by this PP-Module, it is not shown here as a refinement).
- Selections are indicated with *italicized* text.
- Iteration is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the iteration, e.g. 'VPN' for an SFR relating to VPN gateway functionality.
- Extended SFRs are identified by having a label "EXT" after the SFR name.

[illegible]

### 5.0.1 Security Audit (FAU)

## FAU ALR EXT.1 Redaction Failure Notification

FAU ALR EXT.1.1

The TOE must make the user aware when redaction fails for any reason.

## FAU\_REP\_EXT.1 Report Generation

FAU REP EXT.1.1

The TOE must be able to generate a report entry that contains metadata about each element that was redacted, including at least the following: the type of the element that was removed, the location if it was a visible element, and whether the element was selected by the user or removed automatically.

**Application Note:** The report can be a configurable feature that is only generated on user request. Location can be a page number, a cell number for a spreadsheet, or some other indication that allows the user to easily locate the visible element.

## FAU\_SAR\_EXT.1 Report Review

FAU SAR EXT.1.1

The TOE must allow the user to access a report of the data that was redacted.

**Application Note:** This can be satisfied with a dialog box or other simple list of items that were redacted. The report can be a configurable feature that is only generated on user request.

### 5.0.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

## FDP\_DID\_EXT.1 Identification of Data

FDP DID EXT.1.1

The TOE must identify all hidden data in the document, except remnant data and undo or tracked change buffers, and allow the user to review and select each hidden data element individually for redaction.

**Application Note:** Remnant data and undo or tracked change buffers are

removed automatically according to [FDP\\_RIP\\_EXT.1](#). If the file or part of the file is encrypted, the TOE will have to reject the file or decrypt it so that the tool and the user can review the hidden data.

#### FDP\_DID\_EXT.1.2

The TOE must identify all obscured data and must [**selection:** *remove the obscured data automatically, allow the user to redact the obscured data*].

**Application Note:** Obscured data is anything that could be visible but is obscured in some way, such as the cropped portion of an image or graphic. While the user sees only the portion of the graphic in the view container, the document contains the data in the cropped area. The tool must either remove the obscured data automatically or give the user the choice to remove or retain the obscured area.

#### FDP\_DID\_EXT.1.3

The TOE must identify images where the visible representation is reduced in size or resolution from the representation stored in the file format and must [**selection:** *automatically replace the stored data with the visible representation, allow the user to replace the stored data with the visible representation, allow the user to leave the image unaltered*].

### FDP\_DIN\_EXT.1 Deep Inspection

#### FDP\_DIN\_EXT.1.1

For each element of the file format that can contain its own metadata, other elements, or hidden data, the TOE must [**selection:** *recurse through the element chain and apply the PP to each layer, simplify the element, redact the element*].

**Application Note:** For example, JPG images can contain metadata called EXIF data. Some image formats can contain the same image in another format, such as raw which can contain a complete jpg version of the image. A complex object can contain other complex objects (e.g. Microsoft OLE). The tool must apply the requirements to each layer of every element and identify hidden/metadata not just at the top layer of the document but in each element and in all layers within that element. If the TOE cannot recurse through the layers, it must simplify the element at the top level.

### FDP\_LOC\_EXT.1 Redact Content from Every Location

#### FDP\_LOC\_EXT.1.1

The TOE must remove redacted content from every location in the file format where it is stored.

### FDP\_NND\_EXT.1 No New Data Introduced by TOE

#### FDP\_NND\_EXT.1.1

The TOE itself must not introduce new hidden data that was not requested by the user without warning the user of the addition.

**Application Note:** If the redaction process changes the format of an object, such as converting a complex object to an image, the conversion must not introduce new metadata. The TOE can modify or add structural data, including fonts, without alerting the user if the modification is necessary for the proper display or print of the file.

### FDP\_OBJ\_EXT.1 Removal of Objects and Corresponding References

#### FDP\_OBJ\_EXT.1.1

The TOE must remove all references and indicators in the structural data to objects that are completely redacted by the TOE.

**Application Note:** In some formats, there are references in the structural data to objects, such as a name dictionary in PDF. If an object in a PDF document, such as an image, is completely redacted (i.e. the user has selected the entire image to be redacted), then not only must the image data be removed, but references to it in a name dictionary as well as all structural references to the image must be removed. If only part of the object is selected for redaction, then the references necessarily remain in the file since the object remains in the file.

### FDP\_REM\_EXT.1 Removal of Redacted Data

#### FDP\_REM\_EXT.1.1

All data that is either selected by the user for redaction or identified by the TOE for redaction must be removed from the document.

**Application Note:** Selected content must be removed, not obscured by

encryption, encoding, conversion to a proprietary format, or any other method.

### **FDP\_RIP\_EXT.1 Residual Information Removal**

FDP\_RIP\_EXT.1.1

The TOE must automatically remove all remnant data, undo buffers, tracked changes buffers, multiple versions of the same object, and any buffer or cache type container of data.

**Application Note:** The user does not have to select this data for removal.

### **FDP\_RPL\_EXT.1 Visible Space Replace**

FDP\_RPL\_EXT.1.1

The TOE must replace the visible space of redacted content in such a way that the visible space conveys no information about the previous contents.

**Application Note:** A vendor may use several different methods to replace content, such as opaque blocks, text, whitespace or some other vendor-defined method. These methods must not convey information about the content being replaced. For example, if text is replaced with text, the replacement text must not indicate length of component words. Blocks of color used to replace parts of images must not show variations in intensity that could convey information about the image content.

### **FDP\_RVW\_EXT.1 Element Review**

FDP\_RVW\_EXT.1.1

The TOE must allow the user to review and select each element of visible data in whole or in part for redaction.

**Application Note:** If the file or part of the file is encrypted, the TOE will have to reject the file or decrypt it so that the user can review the data.

### **FDP\_SEL\_EXT.1 Selected Redaction**

FDP\_SEL\_EXT.1.1

The TOE must [**selection:** *simplify, remove*] any complex object, embedded object or graphic image which is selected for redaction.

**Application Note:** The selection may be of either the whole element or only part of the element. If part of an element is selected, only that part must be simplified or removed.

### **FDP\_VAL\_EXT.1 Validation of Data**

FDP\_VAL\_EXT.1.1

The TOE must remove unrecognized data, unexpected data, and extraneous structural data.

**Application Note:** Structural data is extraneous if it is unnecessary for the printing or display of the document contents, or unnecessary for the functionality of the document. Example - many formats include comments, e.g. PDF allows file format comments which are preceded by %. When these comments are unnecessary, unrelated to the printing or display of the content of the document, or provide no functionality whatsoever they must be removed.

Example - some formats expect a header structure starting at the first byte of a file, but a tool may be able to interpret a file where the header starts at a later byte by ignoring the data that precedes the header structure. In this case, the preceding data must be removed since it is unexpected.

FDP\_VAL\_EXT.1.2

The TOE must [**selection:** *simplify, remove*] any element which it cannot completely interpret.

**Application Note:** For example, if the tool cannot recurse through a stream with embedded OLE objects, it must convert the stream to a single layer image with no metadata or remove it. If the redaction tool cannot interpret or process temporal objects, it must remove the temporal object and replace it with a simplified object or other placeholder. If a stream of data is compressed, encoded or encrypted and the redaction tool cannot uncompress, decode or decrypt the data, the tool must delete the stream.

## **5.0.3 Protection of the TSF (FPT)**

### **FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State**

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:  
[**assignment:** *list of types of failures in the TSF*].

**Application Note:** If the redaction functionality fails for any reason, the TOE must not produce a partially redacted file.

[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -

- [Part 1: Introduction and General Model](#), CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [Part 2: Security Functional Components](#), CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- [Part 3: Security Assurance Components](#), CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.

[App PP] [Protection Profile for Application Software](#), Version 1.4, October 2021