

# PP-Module for Email Client



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**National Information Assurance Partnership**

## Revision History

Version	Date	Comment
1.0	2021-06-18	Initial release as PP-Module
1.1	2023-08-18	Updates to conform to CC:2022

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

The scope of the PP-Module for Email Clients, Version 1.1 is to describe the security functionality of email client applications in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for the specific email-related capabilities of email client applications. Email clients are user applications that provide functionality to send, receive, access, and manage email. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PP:

- Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 2.0

This Base-PP is valid because email clients are a specific type of software application.

## 1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

### 1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)	A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Extended Package (EP)	A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages.
Functional Package (FP)	A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.

### 1.2.2 Technical Terms

ActiveSync	Microsoft protocol for synchronizing messaging and calendar data between mobile clients and email servers.
Add-on	Capability or functionality added to an application including plug-ins, extensions or other controls.

Email Client	Application used to send, receive, access and manage email provided by an email server. The terms email client and TOE are interchangeable in this document.
Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP)	Protocol for an email client to retrieve email from an email server over TCP/IP; IMAP4 defined in RFC 3501.
Messaging Application Programming Interface (MAPI)	Open specification used by email clients such as Microsoft Outlook and Thunderbird; defined in <a href="#">[MS-OXCMAPIHTTP]</a> .
Post Office Protocol (POP)	Protocol for an email client to retrieve email from an email server over TCP/IP; POP3 defined in RFC 1939.
Remote Procedure Call (RPC)	Protocol used by Microsoft Exchange to send/receive MAPI commands; defined in <a href="#">[MS-OXCRPC]</a> .
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)	Used to sign or encrypt messages at the request of the user upon sending email and to verify digital signature on a signed message upon receipt.
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)	Protocol for an email client to send email to an email server over TCP/IP; SMTP defined in RFC 5321.

### 1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) in this PP-Module is an email client application running on a desktop or mobile operating system.

The complexity of email content and email clients has grown over time. Modern email clients can render HTML as well as plaintext, and may include functionality to display common attachment formats, such as Adobe PDF and Microsoft Word documents. Some email clients allow their functionality to be modified by users through the addition of add-ons. Protocols have also been defined for communicating between email clients and servers. Some clients support multiple protocols for doing the same task, allowing them to be configured according to email server specifications.

The complexity and rich feature set of modern email clients make them a target for attackers, which introduces security concerns. This document is intended to facilitate the improvement of email client security by requiring use of operating system security services, cryptographic standards, and environmental mitigations. Additionally, the requirements in this document define acceptable behavior for email clients regardless of the security features provided by the operating system.

This Module along with the Protection Profile for Application Software [\[App PP\]](#) provides a baseline set of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) for email clients running on any operating system regardless of the composition of the underlying platform.

#### 1.3.1 TOE Boundary

The physical boundary of the email client is a software application running on a general-purpose operating system. The TOE boundary may include third-party add-ons, but these are non-interfering with respect to security; add-ons provide features that are outside the TOE's logical boundary but must be implemented in such a manner that their inclusion does not compromise the security of the TSF. The figure below shows the TOE's interaction with remote external interfaces that are used to transfer mail between clients. Two separate email clients are shown to show how the TOE can function as both a sender and a receiver using different protocols.



Figure 1: Sending and Delivering Email over TLS

### 1.4 Use Cases

Email clients perform tasks associated primarily with the following use case.

#### [USE CASE 1] Sending, receiving, accessing, managing, and viewing email

Email clients are used for sending, receiving, viewing, accessing, and managing email in coordination with a mail server. Email clients can render HTML as well as plaintext, and can display common attachment formats.

# 2 Conformance Claims

## Conformance Statement

An ST must claim exact conformance to this PP-Module.

The evaluation methods used for evaluating the TOE are a combination of the workunits defined in [\[CEM\]](#) as well as the Evaluation Activities for ensuring that individual SFRs have sufficient level of supporting evidence in the Security Target and guidance documentation and have been sufficiently tested by the laboratory as part of completing ATE\_IND.1. Any functional packages which this PP-Module claims similarly contain their own Evaluation Activities that are used in this manner.

## CC Conformance Claims

This PP is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (extended) of Common Criteria CC:2022, Revision 1.

## PP Claim

This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any other Protection Profile.

No other PPs or PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module beyond its Base-PP.

## Package Claim

- This PP-Module is Functional Package for TLS Version 1.1 Conformant.
- This PP-Module is Functional Package for TLS Version 2.0 Conformant.
- This PP-Module conforms to the EAL1 assurance package augmented with ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1, ASE\_OBJ.2, ASE\_REQ.2, and ASE\_SPD.1.

The functional packages to which the PP-Module conforms include SFRs that are not mandatory to claim for the sake of conformance. An ST that claims one or more of these functional packages may include whatever non-mandatory SFRs are appropriate to claim based on the capabilities of the TSF and on any triggers on their inclusion based inherently on the SFR selections made. All security requirements in these packages are intended to satisfy the O.PROTECTED\_COMMS TOE security objective of the Base-PP.

## 3 Security Problem Description

The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the email client is expected to address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational security policies that it is expected to enforce.

### 3.1 Threats

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The following threat is specific to email clients, and represents an addition to those identified in the Base-PP.

#### **T.FLAWED\_ADDON**

Email client functionality can be extended with integration of third-party utilities and tools. This expanded set of capabilities is made possible via the use of add-ons. The tight integration between the basic email client code and the new capabilities that add-ons provide increases the risk that malefactors could inject serious flaws into the email client application, either maliciously by an attacker, or accidentally by a developer. These flaws enable undesirable behaviors including, but not limited to, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive information in the email client, unauthorized access to the device's file system, or even privilege escalation that enables unauthorized access to other applications or the operating system.

### 3.2 Assumptions

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This document does not define any additional assumptions.

### 3.3 Organizational Security Policies

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An organization deploying the TOE is expected to satisfy the organizational security policy listed below in addition to all organizational security policies defined by the claimed Base-PP.

This document does not define any additional OSPs.

# 4 Security Objectives

This PP-Module adds SFRs to objectives identified in the Base-PP and describes an additional objective specific to this PP-Module.

## 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

### O.EMAIL\_MANAGEMENT

A general version of this objective is defined in the Base-PP. This PP-Module defines a version of the objective that is specific to the functionality that may be managed by an email client application specifically.

### O.EMAIL\_PROTECTED\_STORAGE

A general version of this objective is defined in the Base-PP. This PP-Module defines a version of the objective that applies to the data at rest protection functionality and considerations that are specific to email client applications.

### O.EMAIL\_PROTECTED\_COMMS

A general version of this objective is defined in the Base-PP. This PP-Module defines a version of the objective that applies to the data in transit protection functionality and considerations that are specific to email client applications.

### O.ADDON\_INTEGRITY

To address issues associated with malicious or flawed plug-ins or extensions, conformant email clients implement mechanisms to ensure their integrity. This includes verification at installation time and update.

## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

This PP-Module does not define any objectives for the OE.

No environmental security objectives have been identified that are specific to email clients. However, any environmental security objectives defined in the Base-PP will also apply to the portion of the TOE that implements email client functionality.

## 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies map to the security objectives.

**Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale**

Threat, Assumption, or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.FLAWED_ADDON	O.ADDON_INTEGRITY	The ability to prevent the installation of untrusted add-ons (or to prevent the use of add-ons entirely) reduces the likelihood that an add-on that is installed on top of the TOE is flawed or malicious.
	O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT	The ability to manage the TOE allows for only authorized users to install add-ons, to enable/disable the ability to install add-ons, or to not have any support for add-ons at all.
T.NETWORK_ATTACK (from AppPP)	O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for protection of transmitted data related to email client network activity.
	O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the email client to defend against network attack.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP (from AppPP)	O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS as this provides for protection of transmitted data related to email client network activity.
	O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT	The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the email client to protect the confidentiality of its transmitted data.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS (from AppPP)	O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_STORAGE	The objective O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_STORAGE protects against unauthorized attempts to access physical storage used by the TOE as a method to bypass the TSF to access sensitive data.

# 5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text** or ~~strikethrough text~~): Is used to add details to a requirement (including replacing an assignment with a more restrictive selection) or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): Is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): Is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: Is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

## 5.1 App PP Security Functional Requirements Direction

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In a PP-Configuration that includes the App PP, the TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the Email Client as a whole and evaluated against the App PP. The following sections describe any modifications that the ST author must make to the SFRs defined in the App PP in addition to what is mandated by [Section 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements](#).

### 5.1.1 Modified SFRs

The SFRs listed in this section are defined in the App PP and relevant to the secure operation of the TOE.

#### 5.1.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

##### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services

FCS\_CKM\_EXT.1.1

The application shall [selection:

- *invoke platform-provided functionality for asymmetric key generation*
- *implement asymmetric key generation*

].

**Application Note:** This SFR is modified from its Base-PP definition to remove the selection for the TOE not requiring asymmetric key generation.

##### FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1

The application shall [selection:

- *invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality*
- *implement DRBG functionality*

] for its cryptographic operations.

**Application Note:** This SFR is modified from its Base-PP definition to remove the selection for the TOE using no DRBG functionality.

#### 5.1.1.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1

This SFR is selection-based in the App PP. When the TOE conforms to this PP-Module, it is mandatory because of the modifications that this PP-Module makes to [FTP\\_DIT\\_EXT.1](#).

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1

This SFR is selection-based in the App PP. When the TOE conforms to this PP-Module, it is mandatory because of the modifications that this PP-Module makes to [FTP\\_DIT\\_EXT.1](#).

#### 5.1.1.3 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

##### FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit

FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1.1

The application shall [selection:

- *encrypt all transmitted [sensitive data] with [TLS as defined in the TLS Package]*
- *invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted sensitive data with [TLS]*

] between itself and another trusted IT product.

**Application Note:** This SFR is modified from its definition in the App PP to require that the TOE supports TLS and that its use of TLS is only limited to sensitive data. A conformant TOE must support the use of TLS for email encryption but is permitted to send and receive non-sensitive email messages over an untrusted channel.

Either the TOE or its platform is permitted to implement TLS. If the TOE implements TLS, FCS\_TLS\_EXT.1 and FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 from the TLS package must be claimed at minimum.

## 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

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The following section describes the SFRs that must be satisfied by any TOE that claims conformance to this PP-Module. These SFRs must be claimed regardless of which PP-Configuration is used to define the TOE.

### 5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)



### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3 Protection of Key and Key Material

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall [selection:

- not store keys in non-volatile memory
- only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped as specified in [FCS\\_COP\\_EXT.2](#) unless the key meets any one of following criteria:  
[selection:
  - The plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in [FCS\\_KYC\\_EXT.1](#)
  - The plaintext key will no longer provide access to the encrypted data after initial provisioning
  - The plaintext key is a key split that is combined as specified in [FCS\\_SMC\\_EXT.1](#), and the other half of the key split is either [selection: wrapped as specified in [FCS\\_COP\\_EXT.2](#), derived and not stored in non-volatile memory ]
  - The plaintext key is stored on an external storage device for use as an authorization factor
  - The plaintext key is used to wrap a key as specified in [FCS\\_COP\\_EXT.2](#) that is already wrapped as specified in [FCS\\_COP\\_EXT.2](#)
  - The plaintext key is the public portion of the key pair]

]

].

**Application Note:** This SFR references the selection-based SFRs [FCS\\_COP\\_EXT.2](#) and [FCS\\_SMC\\_EXT.1](#). If any selections that references these SFRs are chosen, the ST must also claim all corresponding selection-based SFRs.

The plaintext key storage in non-volatile memory is allowed for several reasons. If the keys exist within protected memory that is not user accessible on the email client or operational environment, the only methods that allow it to play a security relevant role is if it is a key split or providing additional layers of wrapping or encryption on keys that have already been protected.

### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall [selection:

- invoke platform-provided key destruction
  - implement key destruction using [selection:
    - For volatile memory, the erasure shall be executed by a [selection:
      - single direct overwrite [selection:
        - consisting of a pseudo-random pattern using the email client's RBG
        - consisting of a pseudo-random pattern using the host platform's RBG
        - consisting of zeroes]
  - For non-volatile storage, the erasure shall be executed by [selection:
    - single
    - three or more times]  
] overwrite of key data storage location consisting of [selection:
    - a pseudo-random pattern using the email client's RBG (as specified in [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.2](#) of [App PP]
    - a pseudo-random pattern using the host platform's RBG
    - a static pattern]
- ]

] that meets the following:[selection:

- NIST SP 800-88
- no standard

] for destroying all keying material and cryptographic security parameters when no longer needed.

**Application Note:** For the purposes of this requirement, keying material refers to authentication data, passwords, symmetric keys, data used to derive keys, etc. The destruction indicated above applies to each intermediate storage area for key/cryptographic critical security parameters (i.e., any storage, such as memory buffers, that is included in the path of such data) upon the transfer of the key/cryptographic critical security parameter to another memory location.

### FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1 Key Chaining

#### FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection:

- one
- a key stored in platform key storage
- intermediate keys originating from: [selection:
  - a password as specified in [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#)
  - one or more other authorization factor(s)
  - credentials stored in platform key storage]

]

] to the data encryption/decryption key(s) using the following method(s):

[selection:

- use of the platform key storage
- use of platform key storage that performs key wrap with a TSF provided key
- implement key wrapping as specified in [FCS\\_COP\\_EXT.2](#)
- implement key combining as specified in [FCS\\_SMC\\_EXT.1](#)

] while maintaining an effective strength of [selection:

- 128 bits

- 256 bits

]

**Application Note:** This SFR references the selection-based SFRs [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#), [FCS\\_COP\\_EXT.2](#), and [FCS\\_SMC\\_EXT.1](#). If any selections that references these SFRs are chosen, the ST must also claim all corresponding selection-based SFRs.

Key Chaining is the method of using multiple layers of encryption keys to ultimately secure the data encryption key. The number of intermediate keys will vary. This applies to all keys that contribute to the ultimate wrapping or derivation of the data encryption key; including those in protected areas. This requirement also describes how keys are stored.

### **FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)**

FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement both a sending and receiving S/MIME v4.0 Agent as defined in RFC 8551, using CMS as defined in RFCs 5652, 5754, and 3565.

**Application Note:** The RFCs allow for an agent to be either sending or receiving, or to include both capabilities. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the email client is capable of both sending and receiving S/MIME v4.0 messages.

FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall transmit the ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier for AES-128 CBC, AES-256 CBC, and **[selection: AES-128 GCM, AES-256 GCM, no other ]** as part of the S/MIME protocol.

**Application Note:** Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was added to Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as defined in RFC 3565.

FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall present the digestAlgorithm field with the following Message Digest Algorithm identifiers **[selection: id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512 ]** and no others as part of the S/MIME protocol.

FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall present the signatureAlgorithm field with the following: sha256withRSAEncryption and **[selection:**

- sha384WithRSAEncryption
- sha512WithRSAEncryption
- ecdsawithsha256
- ecdsawithsha384
- ecdsawithsha512

**]** and no other algorithms as part of the S/MIME protocol.

**Application Note:** RFC 8551 mandates that receiving and sending agents support RSA with SHA256. The algorithms to be tested in the evaluated configuration are limited to the algorithms specified in the [FCS\\_SMIME\\_EXT.1.4](#) selection. Any other algorithms implemented that do not comply with these requirements should not be included in an evaluated email client.

Additional algorithms supported by RFC 8551 will be reviewed and considered by the TC in a future version of this PP-Module.

FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall support use of different private keys (and associated certificates) for signature and for encryption as part of the S/MIME protocol.

FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.6

The TSF shall only accept a signature from a certificate with the digitalSignature bit set as part of the S/MIME protocol.

**Application Note:** It is acceptable to assume that the digitalSignature bit is set in cases where there is no keyUsage extension.

FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.7

The TSF shall implement mechanisms to retrieve certificates and certificate revocation information **[selection: for each signed/encrypted message sent/received, [assignment: frequency] ]** as part of the S/MIME protocol.

**Application Note:** In accordance with [FIA\\_X509\\_EXT.1.1](#) in [\[App PP\]](#), certificate revocation may use a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). The email client can define how this mechanism behaves, including whether it uses the underlying OS, but it is required that a mechanism exists such that revocation status is supported and so that certificates can be retrieved for sending/receiving messages. Frequency is configurable in [FMT\\_MOF\\_EXT.1.1](#). In this requirement, frequency can be interpreted as a one-time function with local storage, as a regularly scheduled retrieval, or as a mechanism that requires manual intervention. If the retrieval mechanism is periodic in nature, then the ST author will need to include an iteration of FCS for storage of revocation information; storage of certificates is covered in FCS\_CKM. The import of certificates and certificate chains is not included in this requirement, but is covered in FIA\_X509 and FMT\_MOF.

## **5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)**

### **FDP\_NOT\_EXT.1 Notification of S/MIME Status**

FDP\_NOT\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall display a notification of the S/MIME status of received emails upon viewing.

**Application Note:** S/MIME status is whether the email has been signed or encrypted and whether the signature can be verified and the associated certificate can be validated. This notification must at least display when the email content is viewed. Many implementations also display the S/MIME status of each email when all emails are viewed as a list.

### **FDP\_SMIME\_EXT.1 S/MIME**

The TSF shall use S/MIME to sign, verify, encrypt, and decrypt mail.

**Application Note:** Note that this requirement does not mandate that S/MIME be used for all incoming/outgoing messages, or that the email client automatically encrypt or sign/verify all sent or received messages. This requirement only specifies that the mechanism for digital signature and encryption must be S/MIME.

## 5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### FIA\_X509\_EXT.3 X.509 Authentication and Encryption

FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support encryption and authentication for S/MIME.

FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall prevent the establishment of a trusted communication channel when the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

**Application Note:** Validity is determined by the certificate path, the expiration date, and the revocation status in accordance with RFC 5280.

FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.3

The TSF shall prevent the installation of code if the code signing certificate is deemed invalid.

FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.4

The TSF shall prevent the encryption of email if the email protection certificate is deemed invalid.

FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.5

The TSF shall prevent the signing of email if the email protection certificate is deemed invalid.

## 5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)

### FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Functions Behavior

FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions, controlled by the user or administrator as shown:

- X: Mandatory
- O: Optional

#	Management Function	Administrator	User
1	Enable/disable downloading embedded objects globally and by [ <b>selection:</b> <i>domain, sender, no other method</i> ]	O	O
2	Enable/disable plaintext-only mode globally and by [ <b>selection:</b> <i>domain, sender, no other method</i> ]	O	O
3	Enable/disable rendering and execution of attachments globally and by [ <b>selection:</b> <i>domain, sender, no other method</i> ]	O	O
4	Enable/disable email notifications	O	O
5	Configure a certificate repository for encryption	O	O
6	Configure whether to establish a trusted channel or disallow establishment if the email client cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate	O	O
7	Configure message sending/receiving to only use cryptographic algorithms defined in <a href="#">FCS_SMIME_EXT.1</a>	O	O
8	Configure CRL retrieval frequency	O	O
9	Enable/disable support for add-ons	O	O
10	Change password/passphrase authentication credential	O	O
11	Disable key recovery functionality	O	O
12	Configure cryptographic functionality	O	O
13	[ <b>assignment:</b> <i>Other management functions</i> ]	O	O

**Application Note:** For these management functions, the term "Administrator" refers to the administrator of a non-mobile device or the device owner of a mobile device. The Administrator is responsible for management activities, including setting the policy that is applied by the enterprise on the email client. The Administrator could be acting remotely and could be the mail transfer agent (MTA) administrator acting through a centralized management console or dashboard. Applications used to configure enterprise policy should have their own identification and authorization and additional security requirements to ensure that the remote administration is trusted.

The intent of this requirement is to allow the Administrator to configure the email client with a policy that may not be over-ridden by the user. If the Administrator has not set a policy for a particular function, the user may still perform that function. Enforcement of the policy is done by the email client itself, or the email client and the email client platform in coordination with each other.

The function to configure whether to establish a trusted channel corresponds to

the functionality described in [FIA\\_X509\\_EXT.2.2](#) (from the Base-PP). The Administrator has the option of accepting or rejecting all certificates that cannot be validated, accepting a given certificate that cannot be validated, or not accepting a given certificate that cannot be validated. Depending on the choice that the Administrator has made in [FIA\\_X509\\_EXT.2.2](#) (from the Base-PP), the trusted connection will either be allowed for all certificates that cannot be validated, disallowed for all certificates that cannot be validated, allowed for a given certificate that cannot be validated, or disallowed for a given certificate that cannot be validated.

If password or passphrase authorization factors are implemented by the email client, then the appropriate "change" selection must be included.

If the email client provides configurability of the cryptographic functions (for example, key size), then "configure cryptographic functionality" will be included, and the specifics of the functionality offered can either be written in this requirement as bullet points, or included in the TSS. This applies even if the configuration is in the form of parameters that may be passed to cryptographic functionality implemented on the TOE platform.

If the email client does include a key recovery function, the email client must provide the capability for the user to turn this functionality off so that no recovery key is generated and no keys are permitted to be exported.

5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT\_AON\_EXT.1 Support for Only Trusted Add-ons

FPT\_AON\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall include the capability to load [**selection:** *trusted add-ons, no add-ons* ].

**Application Note:** If "trusted add-ons" is selected in [FPT\\_AON\\_EXT.1.1](#), the TOE must also claim the selection-based SFR [FPT\\_AON\\_EXT.2](#).

If the email client does not include support for installing only trusted add-ons, this requirement can be met by demonstrating the ability to disable all support for add-ons as specified in [FMT\\_MOF\\_EXT.1](#).

5.2.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall initiate or receive communication via the trusted channel.

FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall communicate via the trusted channel for [**selection:**

- *IMAP*
- *SMTP*
- *POP*
- *MAPI Extensions for HTTP*
- *MAPI/RPC*
- *ActiveSync*
- [**assignment:** *other protocol (reference RFC or specification)*]

].

**Application Note:** If IMAP, SMTP, or POP is selected, the selection-based SFR [FIA\\_SASL\\_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

Selections must include at least one sending and one receiving protocol. If the assignment is used, the ST author must also include a reference for the protocol (e.g., an RFC number).

5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:

Table 2: SFR Rationale		
Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
<a href="#">O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_STORAGE</a>	<a href="#">FDP_NOT_EXT.1</a>	<a href="#">FDP_NOT_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by defining a mechanism for users to determine whether a given email has been signed or encrypted.
	<a href="#">FDP_MOF_EXT.1</a>	<a href="#">FMT_MOF_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by defining the technology-specific management functions that may exist for email client applications.
	<a href="#">FDP_NOT_EXT.2</a> (optional)	<a href="#">FDP_NOT_EXT.2</a> supports the objective by optionally requiring the TSF to enumerate the URI of embedded links in emails so that a user can determine the source of the link.
	<a href="#">FDP_REN_EXT.1</a> (optional)	<a href="#">FDP_REN_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by optionally defining a plaintext-only operational mode that does not allow a user to interact with embedded content in an email message.
<a href="#">O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_STORAGE</a>	<a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.3</a> , <a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.4</a> , <a href="#">FCS_KYC_EXT.1</a> , <a href="#">FCS_IVG_EXT.1</a> (optional), <a href="#">FCS_NOG_EXT.1</a> (optional), <a href="#">FCS_SAG_EXT.1</a> (optional),	<a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.3</a> supports the objective by defining the mechanism by which the TSF

	<p><a href="#">FDP_PST_EXT.1</a> (optional), <a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.5</a> (selection-based), <a href="#">FCS_COP_EXT.2</a> (selection-based), <a href="#">FCS_SMC_EXT.1</a> (selection-based)</p>	<p>protects stored key data from unauthorized disclosure.</p> <p><a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.4</a> supports the objective by defining the mechanism by which the TSF securely destroys stored key data.</p> <p><a href="#">FCS_KYC_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by defining any key chain that the TSF implements to protect a root encryption key.</p> <p><a href="#">FCS_IVG_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by optionally specifying the initialization vectors used for various cryptographic modes if the TOE supports any of these modes.</p> <p><a href="#">FCS_NOG_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by optionally defining the minimum nonce size if the TSF uses any cryptographic algorithms that require the use of nonces.</p> <p><a href="#">FCS_SAG_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by optionally defining the supported methods for salt generation if the TSF uses any cryptographic algorithms that require the use of salts.</p> <p><a href="#">FDP_PST_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by optionally defining the ability of the TOE to operate without persistently storing certain types of data at all.</p> <p><a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.5</a> supports the objective by optionally defining the mechanism by which the TSF can derive key material using a user-supplied password credential.</p> <p><a href="#">FCS_COP_EXT.2</a> supports the objective by defining the supported key wrap mechanisms if the TSF uses key wrapping as part of maintaining a key chain.</p> <p><a href="#">FCS_SMC_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by defining the supported key combination mechanisms if the TSF uses key combining as part of maintaining a key chain.</p>
<a href="#">O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS</a>	<p><a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.1</a> (modified from Base-PP), <a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a> (modified from Base-PP), <a href="#">FIA_X509_EXT.1</a> (from Base-PP), <a href="#">FIA_X509_EXT.2</a> (from Base-PP), <a href="#">FTP_DIT_EXT.1</a> (modified from Base-PP), <a href="#">FCS_SMIME_EXT.1</a>, <a href="#">FDP_SMIME_EXT.1</a>, <a href="#">FIA_X509_EXT.3</a>, <a href="#">FTP_ITC_EXT.1</a>, <a href="#">FIA_SASL_EXT.1</a> (selection-based)</p>	<p><a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by requiring that the TSF provide or invoke a cryptographic function for asymmetric key generation.</p> <p><a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by requiring that the TSF provide or invoke a DRBG for secure key generation.</p> <p><a href="#">FIA_X509_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by requiring the TSF to implement or invoke an X.509 certificate validation service.</p> <p><a href="#">FIA_X509_EXT.2</a> supports the objective by defining the TOE's use of X.509 certificates and what behavior the TOE takes when the revocation status of a certificate cannot be determined.</p> <p><a href="#">FTP_DIT_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by specifying the trusted communications channels used by the TOE to protect data in transit.</p> <p><a href="#">FCS_SMIME_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by defining the TOE's cryptographic implementation of S/MIME to both assert and validate the confidentiality and integrity of secure email messages.</p> <p><a href="#">FDP_SMIME_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by requiring the TSF to use S/MIME to protect email message data in transit.</p> <p><a href="#">FIA_X509_EXT.3</a> supports the objective by requiring the TSF to support the use of X.509 certificates for S/MIME.</p>

		<p><a href="#">FTP_ITC_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by specifying the trusted communications the TSF must implement that are specific to email communications.</p> <p><a href="#">FIA_SASL_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by specifying how SASL is implemented in the case where the TOE claims to support it.</p>
<a href="#">O.ADDON_INTEGRITY</a>	<a href="#">FPT_AON_EXT.1</a> , <a href="#">FPT_AON_EXT.2</a> (selection-based)	<p><a href="#">FPT_AON_EXT.1</a> supports the objective by specifying whether or not the TSF has the ability to load add-ons.</p> <p><a href="#">FPT_AON_EXT.2</a> supports the objective by defining a cryptographic method for the TSF to validate the integrity of add-ons if the TOE supports their use.</p>

# 6 Consistency Rationale

## 6.1 Protection Profile for Email Client

### 6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

If this PP-Module is used to extend the App PP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a software application. The TOE boundary is simply extended to include the email client functionality that is built into the application so that additional security functionality is claimed within the scope of the TOE.

The only asset for the TOE is the software executable and sensitive data that comprises the TOE. The entire TOE as defined by the combination of the Base-PP and this PP-Module is a single asset. The only difference to the threat model is that the PP-Module introduces the concept of add-ons, which introduces the threat of an add-on being flawed in some way.

### 6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

Listed below are the threats, objectives, and OSPs defined in this PP-Module with rationale for their consistency with the App PP. Note that the PP-Module is implicitly consistent with any claimed functional packages because the applicable functional packages do not have security problem definitions of their own; per section 2, any claimed functional package is intended to support the O.PROTECTED\_COMMS objective in the App PP, which helps mitigate the T.NETWORK\_ATTACK and T.NETWORK\_EAVESDROP threats in that PP.

PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSP	Consistency Rationale
<a href="#">T.FLAWED_ADDON</a>	The threat of a user installing a flawed add-on is consistent with the T.LOCAL_ATTACK threat from the Base-PP. A flawed add-on, crafted deliberately or unintentionally, could cause the product to operate in a manner where it or its platform can be compromised.

### 6.1.3 Consistency of Objectives

Listed below are the security objectives defined in this PP-Module with rationale for their consistency with the App PP. The PP-Module shares the executable application asset with the App PP but defines additional security objectives because the PP-Module defines a specific type of software application with security functionality that is common to the application type.

Note that the PP-Module is implicitly consistent with any claimed functional packages because the applicable functional packages do not have TOE objectives of their own; per section 2, any claimed functional package is intended to support the O.PROTECTED\_COMMS objective in the App PP. The objectives for the TOEs are consistent with the App PP based on the following rationale:

PP-Module TOE Objective	Consistency Rationale
<a href="#">O.EMAIL_MANAGEMENT</a>	This objective is an enhancement to the O.MANAGEMENT objective defined in the Base-PP, specifically in regards to the secure administration of functions that are particular to email client applications.
<a href="#">O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_STORAGE</a>	This objective is an enhancement to the O.PROTECTED_STORAGE objective defined in the Base-PP, specifically in regards to the data at rest protection that applies to email client applications.
<a href="#">O.EMAIL_PROTECTED_COMMS</a>	This objective is an enhancement to the O.PROTECTED_COMMS objective defined in the Base-PP, specifically in regards to the data in transit protection that applies to email client applications.
<a href="#">O.ADDON_INTEGRITY</a>	This objective is an enhancement to the O.INTEGRITY objective defined in the Base-PP. Where O.INTEGRITY is concerned with the integrity of the TOE application, <a href="#">O.ADDON_INTEGRITY</a> is concerned with the integrity of third-party add-ons that can be loaded into the TOE.

This PP-Module does not define any objectives for the TOE's operational environment.

### 6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SFRs from the App PP that are needed to support Email Client functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the App PP is being used for its intended purpose. The PP-Module also identifies a number of modified SFRs from the App PP that are used entirely to provide functionality for Email Client. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the App PP are as follows:

PP-Module Requirement	Consistency Rationale
Modified SFRs	
<a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.1</a>	This SFR is changed from its definition in the App PP to remove one of the available selection options because it will never apply in the case where the TOE conforms to this PP-Module.
<a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a>	This SFR is changed from its definition in the App PP to remove one of the available selection options because it will never apply in the case where the TOE conforms to this PP-Module.
<a href="#">FIA_X509_EXT.1</a>	This SFR is unchanged from its definition in the App PP; the SFR is recategorized from selection-based to mandatory when the TOE conforms to this PP-Module.
<a href="#">FIA_X509_EXT.2</a>	This SFR is unchanged from its definition in the App PP; the SFR is recategorized from selection-based to mandatory when the TOE conforms to this PP-Module.
<a href="#">FTP_DIT_EXT.1</a>	This SFR is changed from its definition in the App PP to modify the selection options such that some options are mandated if another selection is chosen and some are removed entirely, due to the specific cryptographic needs of email client applications.
Additional SFRs	



This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the App PP is the base.

#### **Mandatory SFRs**

<a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.3</a>	This SFR defines how keys and key material are saved by the email client. It does not impact the App PP functionality.
<a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.4</a>	This SFR defines how email messages are formatted when sent and received by the client. It does not impact the App PP functionality.
<a href="#">FCS_KYC_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines how email clients maintain key chains. It does not impact the App PP functionality.
<a href="#">FCS_SMIME_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines how email messages are formatted when sent and received by the client. It does not impact the App PP functionality.
<a href="#">FDP_NOT_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines the behavior an email client exhibits when a message is received. It does not impact the App PP functionality.
<a href="#">FDP_SMIME_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines the format an email client shall use as output for cryptographic operations. It does not impact the App PP functionality.
<a href="#">FIA_X509_EXT.3</a>	This SFR defines the format an email client shall use for certificates to perform encryption and authentication. It does not impact the App PP functionality.
<a href="#">FMT_MOF_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines a specific set of management functions for an email client. It does not impact the App PP functionality.
<a href="#">FPT_AON_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines what types of add-ons an email client may use. It does not impact the App PP functionality.
<a href="#">FTP_ITC_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines which channels for an email client must be considered trusted. It does not impact the App PP functionality.

#### **Optional SFRs**

<a href="#">FCS_IVG_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines how clients generate IVs for cryptographic operations. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FCS_NOG_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines how clients generate nonces for cryptographic operations. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FCS_SAG_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines how clients generate salts for cryptographic operations. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FDP_NOT_EXT.2</a>	This SFR defines how clients display URIs in embedded links. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FDP_PST_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines the persistent information that must be stored for email client functionality to work as intended. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FDP_REN_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines functionality to display message content. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP.

#### **Objective SFRs**

This PP-Module does not define any Objective requirements.

#### **Implementation-based SFRs**

This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-based requirements.

#### **Selection-based SFRs**

<a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.5</a>	This SFR defines restrictions on password composition and key derivation mechanisms. It defines functionality similar to FCS_CKM.1(3) in the Base-PP but has additional details specific to the composition of the actual password authentication factor, rather than just defining a method for key derivation.
<a href="#">FCS_COP_EXT.2</a>	This SFR defines how clients wrap keys. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FCS_SMC_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines how clients combine keys. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FIA_SASL_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines an alternate method of transmitting messages. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FPT_AON_EXT.2</a>	This SFR defines how email clients verify add-ons. It does not impact functionality described by the Base-PP.



# Appendix A - Optional SFRs

## A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

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### A.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

#### FCS\_IVG\_EXT.1 Initialization Vector Generation

FCS\_IVG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner: **[selection:**

- *CBC: IVs shall be non-repeating*
- *CCM: IV shall be non-repeating*
- *XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively, and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer*
- *GCM: IV shall be non-repeating. The number of invocations of GCM shall not exceed  $2^{32}$  for a given secret key.*

]

**Application Note:** [FCS\\_IVG\\_EXT.1.1](#) specifies how the IV should be handled for each encryption mode. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), XTS, and Galois Counter Mode (GCM) are allowed for AES encryption of the data. AES-CCM is an allowed mode for Key Wrapping.

#### FCS\_NOG\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Nonce Generation

FCS\_NOG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall only use unique nonces with a minimum size of [64] bits.

#### FCS\_SAG\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Salt Generation

FCS\_SAG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall only use salts that are generated by a **[selection:**

- *DRBG as specified in [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.2](#) (as defined in the Base-PP)*
- *DRBG provided by the host platform*

]

### A.1.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

#### FDP\_NOT\_EXT.2 Notification of URI

FDP\_NOT\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall display the full Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of any embedded links.

**Application Note:** Embedded links are HTML URI objects which may have a tag (such as a word, phrase, icon, or picture) that obfuscates the URI of the link. The intent of this requirement is to de-obfuscate the link. The URI may be displayed as a "mouse-over" event or may be rendered next to the tag.

#### FDP\_PST\_EXT.1 Storage of Persistent Information

FDP\_PST\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of operating without storing persistent information to the client platform with the following exceptions: **[selection:** *credential information, administrator provided configuration information, certificate revocation information, no exceptions* ].

**Application Note:** Any data that persists after the email client closes, including temporary files, is considered to be persistent data. Satisfying this requirement would require the use of a protocol such as IMAP or MAPI. It is not compatible with POP.

#### FDP\_REN\_EXT.1 Rendering of Message Content

FDP\_REN\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall have a plaintext-only mode which disables the rendering and execution of **[selection:**

- *HTML*
- *JavaScript*
- *[assignment: other embedded content types]*
- *no embedded content types*

].

**Application Note:** Plaintext-only mode prevents the automatic downloading, rendering and execution of images, external resources and embedded objects such as HTML or JavaScript objects. [FMT\\_MOF\\_EXT.1.1](#) addresses configuration of this mode. The ST author must identify all content types supported by the email client through selections and assignments. If the email client only supports plaintext-only mode, no embedded content types should be selected.

## A.2 Objective Requirements

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This PP-Module does not define any Objective SFRs.

## A.3 Implementation-based Requirements

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This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-based SFRs.

# Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements

## B.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation (Password/Passphrase Conditioning)

**The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FCS\\_KYC\\_EXT.1.1](#).**

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.1

The TSF shall support a password/passphrase of up to [**assignment**: *maximum password size, positive integer of 64 or more*] characters used to generate a password authorization factor.

**Application Note:** The password/passphrase is represented on the host machine as a sequence of characters whose encoding depends on the TOE and the underlying OS. The ST author assigns the maximum size of the password/passphrase it supports; it must support at least 64 characters.

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.2

The TSF shall allow passwords to be composed of any combination of upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and the following special characters: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", and ")", and [**selection**: [**assignment**: *other supported special characters*], no other characters ]

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.3

The TSF shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*HMAC*-**selection**: *SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512* ], with [**assignment**: *positive integer of 4096 or more*] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [**selection**: *128, 256* ] bits that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-132].

**Application Note:** The ST author selects the parameters based on the password-based key derivation function (PBKDF) used by the TSF. The password/passphrase must be conditioned into a string of bits that forms the submask to be used as input into a key. Conditioning can be performed using one of the identified hash functions or the process described in NIST SP 800-132; the method used is selected by the ST Author. SP 800-132 requires the use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) consisting of HMAC with an approved hash function. The ST author selects the hash function used, also includes the appropriate requirements for HMAC and the hash function.

Appendix A of SP 800-132 recommends setting the iteration count in order to increase the computation needed to derive a key from a password and, therefore, increase the workload of performing a password recovery attack. However, for this PP-Module, a minimum iteration count of 4096 is required in order to ensure that twelve bits of security is added to the password/passphrase value. A significantly higher value is recommended to ensure optimal security.

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.4

The TSF shall not accept passwords less than [**selection**: *a value settable by the administrator*, **assignment**: *minimum password length accepted by the TOE, must be  $\geq 1$*  ] and greater than the maximum password length defined in [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5.1](#).

**Application Note:** This selection-based SFR is claimed when "a password as specified in [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#)" is selected in [FCS\\_KYC\\_EXT.1.1](#).

If the minimum password length is settable, then the ST author chooses "a value settable by the administrator for this component," as well as the "configure password/passphrase complexity setting" item for FMT\_SMF.1.1. If the minimum length is not settable, the ST author fills in the assignment with the minimum length the password must be (zero-length passwords are not allowed for compliant TOEs).

### FCS\_COP\_EXT.2 Key Wrapping

**The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.3.1](#), [FCS\\_KYC\\_EXT.1.1](#).**

#### FCS\_COP\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall [**selection**:

- *use platform-provided functionality to perform Key Wrapping*
- *implement functionality to perform Key Wrapping*

] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection**:

- *AES Key Wrap*
- *AES Key Wrap with Padding*
- *RSA using the KTS-OAEP-basic scheme*
- *RSA using the KTS-OAEP-receiver-confirmation scheme*
- *ECC CDH*

] and the cryptographic key size [**selection**:

- *128 bits (AES)*
- *256 bits (AES)*
- *2048 (RSA)*
- *4096 (RSA)*
- *256-bit prime*
- *modulus (ECC CDH)*
- *384-bit prime modulus (ECC CDH)*

] that meet the following: [**selection**:

- *"NIST SP 800-38F" for Key Wrap (section 6.2) and Key Wrap with Padding (section 6.3)*
- *"NIST SP 800-56B" for RSA using the KTS-OAEP-basic (section 9.2.3) and KTS-OAEP-receiver-confirmation (section 9.2.4) scheme, "NIST SP 800-56A rev 2" for ECC CDH (sections 5.6.1.2 and 6.2.2.2)*

].

**Application Note:** This selection-based SFR is claimed when any of the selections that explicitly reference [FCS\\_COP\\_EXT.2](#) are selected in [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.3.1](#) or [FCS\\_KYC\\_EXT.1.1](#).

In the first selection, the ST author chooses the entity that performs the decryption/encryption. In the second selection, the ST author chooses the method used for encryption:

- Using one of the two AES-based Key Wrap methods specified in NIST SP 800-38F
- Using one of the two the KTS-OAEP schemes for RSA as described in NIST SP 800-56B (KTSOAEP-basic described in section 9.2.3)
- Using ECC CDH as described in NIST SP 800-56A section 6.2.2.2.

The third selection should be made to reflect the key size. 2048/4096 is used for the RSA-based schemes, while the size of the prime modulus is used for ECC-based schemes. Support for 256-bit AES key sizes will be required for products entering evaluation after Quarter 3, 2015. Based on the method(s) selected, the last selection should be used to select the appropriate reference(s).

#### FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1 Key Combining

**The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.3.1](#), [FCS\\_KYC\\_EXT.1.1](#).**

##### FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method [**selection:**

- *exclusive OR (XOR)*
- *SHA-256*
- *SHA-512*

] to generate another key.

**Application Note:** This selection-based SFR is claimed when any of the selections that explicitly reference [FCS\\_SMC\\_EXT.1](#) are selected in [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.3.1](#) or [FCS\\_KYC\\_EXT.1.1](#).

This requirement specifies the way that a product may combine the various submasks by using either an XOR or an approved SHA-hash.

## B.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

#### FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1 Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)

**The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1.2](#).**

##### FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement support for Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) that complies with RFC 4422.

**Application Note:** SASL is needed if the email implements SMTP to send messages. Clients that do not use SMTP (e.g., ActiveSync or MAPI) would not need to implement support for SASL.

##### FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support the POP3 CAPA and AUTH extensions for the SASL mechanism.

##### FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall support the IMAP CAPABILITY and AUTHENTICATE extensions for the SASL mechanism.

##### FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall support the SMTP AUTH extension for the SASL mechanism.

**Application Note:** This selection-based SFR is claimed when is claimed when IMAP, SMTP, or POP is selected in [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1.2](#).

In order for an email client to support PKI X.509 Certificates for POP3, IMAP, and SMTP as required in this document, the client must support the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) authentication method as described in RFC 4422, the AUTH and CAPA extensions for POP3, as described in RFC 5034, the AUTHENTICATION and CAPABILITY extensions for IMAP, as described in RFC 4959 and the AUTH extension for SMTP, as described in RFC 4954.

## B.3 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### FPT\_AON\_EXT.2 Trusted Installation and Update for Add-ons

**The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FPT\\_AON\\_EXT.1.1](#).**

##### FPT\_AON\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall [**selection:** *provide the ability, leverage the platform*] to provide a means to cryptographically verify add-ons using a digital signature mechanism and [**selection:** *published hash, no other functions*] prior to installation and update.

##### FPT\_AON\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall [**selection:** *provide the ability, leverage the platform*] to query the current version of the add-on.

##### FPT\_AON\_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall prevent the automatic installation of add-ons.

**Application Note:** This selection-based SFR is claimed when "trusted add-ons" is selected in [FPT\\_AON\\_EXT.1.1](#).

# Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP-Module.

## C.1 Extended Components Table

All extended components specified in the PP-Module are listed in this table:

**Table 3: Extended Component Definitions**

Functional Class	Functional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)	FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Management FCS_COP_EXT Cryptographic Operation FCS_IVG_EXT Initialization Vector Generation FCS_KYC_EXT Cryptographic Key Chaining FCS_NOG_EXT Cryptographic Nonce Generation FCS_SAG_EXT Initialization Vector Generation FCS_SMC_EXT Submask Combining FCS_SMIME_EXT Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
Identification and Authentication (FIA)	FIA_SASL_EXT Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) FIA_X509_EXT X.509 Certificate Services
Protection of the TSF (FPT)	FPT_AON_EXT Add-Ons
Security Management (FMT)	FMT_MOF_EXT Management of Functions Behavior
Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)	FTP_ITC_EXT Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
User Data Protection (FDP)	FDP_NOT_EXT Notifications FDP_PST_EXT Storage of Persistent Information FDP_REN_EXT Rendering of Message Content FDP_SMIME_EXT Use of Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)

## C.2 Extended Component Definitions

### C.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FCS class originally defined by CC Part 2:

#### C.2.1.1 FCS\_CKM\_EXT Cryptographic Key Management

##### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for cryptographic key management beyond those which are specified in the Part 2 family FCS\_CKM.

##### Component Leveling



[FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.3](#), Protection of Key and Key Material, requires the TSF to identify the method that it uses to prevent the plaintext storage of secret key data.

[FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.4](#), Cryptographic Key Destruction, requires the TSF to identify the method that it uses to destroy key data.

[FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#), Cryptographic Key Derivation (Password/Passphrase Conditioning), requires the TSF to support password/passphrase credentials with certain strength of secret characteristics and to support the use of such credentials as an input to a password-based key derivation function.

##### Management: FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3

No specific management functions are identified.

##### Audit: FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3

There are no auditable events foreseen.

##### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3 Protection of Key and Key Material

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

##### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall [**assignment:** *method of ensuring plaintext key data is not stored in non-volatile memory*].

##### Management: FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4

No specific management functions are identified.

##### Audit: FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4

There are no auditable events foreseen.

##### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall [assignment: *key destruction method*] that meets the following:[selection:

- *NIST SP 800-88*
- *no standard*

] for destroying all keying material and cryptographic security parameters when no longer needed.

#### Management: FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Change password/passphrase authentication credential.
- Change password/passphrase minimum length.

#### Audit: FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation (Password/Passphrase Conditioning)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.1

The TSF shall support a password/passphrase of up to [assignment: *maximum password size, positive integer of 64 or more*] characters used to generate a password authorization factor.

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.2

The TSF shall allow passwords to be composed of any combination of upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and the following special characters: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", and ")", and [selection: [assignment: *other supported special characters*], no other characters ]

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.3

The TSF shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-[selection: *SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512* ]], with [assignment: *positive integer of 4096 or more*] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [selection: *128, 256* ] bits that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-132].

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.4

The TSF shall not accept passwords less than [selection: *a value settable by the administrator, [assignment: minimum password length accepted by the TOE, must be >= 1]* ] and greater than the maximum password length defined in [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5.1](#).

### C.2.1.2 FCS\_KYC\_EXT Cryptographic Key Chaining

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for protection of cryptographic key data through its storage in a hierarchical key chain.

#### Component Leveling

FCS\_KYC\_EXT ———— 1

[FCS\\_KYC\\_EXT.1](#), Key Chaining, requires the TSF to identify the method that it uses to prevent the plaintext storage of secret key data.

#### Management: FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1 Key Chaining

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

#### FCS\_KYC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [assignment: *key hierarchy*] to the data encryption/decryption key(s) using the following method(s): [assignment: *key protection method*] while maintaining an effective strength of [assignment: *key strength*]

### C.2.1.3 FCS\_SMIME\_EXT Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for the secure implementation of S/MIME.

#### Component Leveling

FCS\_SMIME\_EXT ———— 1

[FCS\\_SMIME\\_EXT.1](#), Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), requires the TSF to implement S/MIME in accordance with appropriate RFCs and using appropriate cryptographic functionality.

#### Management: FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configure message sending/receiving to only use specified cryptographic algorithms.

#### **Audit: FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation  
FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

##### **FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement both a sending and receiving S/MIME v4.0 Agent as defined in RFC 8551, using CMS as defined in RFCs 5652, 5754, and 3565.

##### **FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall transmit the ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier for AES-128 CBC, AES-256 CBC, and [selection: AES-128 GCM, AES-256 GCM, no other ] as part of the S/MIME protocol.

##### **FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall present the digestAlgorithm field with the following Message Digest Algorithm identifiers [assignment: message digest algorithm identifiers] and no others as part of the S/MIME protocol.

##### **FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall present the signatureAlgorithm field with the following: sha256withRSAEncryption and [assignment: signatureAlgorithm field values] and no other algorithms as part of the S/MIME protocol.

##### **FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.5**

The TSF shall support use of different private keys (and associated certificates) for signature and for encryption as part of the S/MIME protocol.

##### **FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.6**

The TSF shall only accept a signature from a certificate with the digitalSignature bit set as part of the S/MIME protocol.

##### **FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1.7**

The TSF shall implement mechanisms to retrieve certificates and certificate revocation information [selection: for each signed/encrypted message sent/received, [assignment: frequency] ] as part of the S/MIME protocol.

#### **C.2.1.4 FCS\_IVG\_EXT Initialization Vector Generation**

##### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define requirements for the secure generation of initialization vectors used in support of other cryptographic functions.

##### **Component Leveling**

FCS\_IVG\_EXT ———— 1

FCS\_IVG\_EXT.1, Initialization Vector Generation, requires the TSF to generate initialization vectors in a specified manner.

##### **Management: FCS\_IVG\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

##### **Audit: FCS\_IVG\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

##### **FCS\_IVG\_EXT.1 Initialization Vector Generation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

##### **FCS\_IVG\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner: [assignment: IVs and methods of creation].

#### **C.2.1.5 FCS\_NOG\_EXT Cryptographic Nonce Generation**

##### **Family Behavior**

Components in this family define requirements for the secure generation of nonces used in support of other cryptographic functions.

##### **Component Leveling**

FCS\_NOG\_EXT ———— 1

FCS\_NOG\_EXT.1, Cryptographic Nonce Generation, requires the TSF to generate nonces in a specified manner.

##### **Management: FCS\_NOG\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

##### **Audit: FCS\_NOG\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FCS\_NOG\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Nonce Generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

#### FCS\_NOG\_EXT.1.1


The TSF shall only use unique nonces with a minimum size of [64] bits.

### C.2.1.6 FCS\_SAG\_EXT Initialization Vector Generation

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for the secure generation of salts used in support of other cryptographic functions.

#### Component Leveling



[FCS\\_SAG\\_EXT.1](#), Cryptographic Salt Generation, requires the TSF to generate salts in a specified manner.

#### Management: FCS\_SAG\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FCS\_SAG\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FCS\_SAG\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Salt Generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services

#### FCS\_SAG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall only use salts that are generated by a [assignment: *trusted deterministic random bit generator*].

### C.2.1.7 FCS\_COP\_EXT Cryptographic Operation

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for cryptographic operation beyond those which are specified in the Part 2 family FCS\_COP.

#### Component Leveling



[FCS\\_COP\\_EXT.2](#), Key Wrapping, requires the TSF to implement key wrapping in a specified manner.

#### Management: FCS\_COP\_EXT.2

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FCS\_COP\_EXT.2

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FCS\_COP\_EXT.2 Key Wrapping

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

#### FCS\_COP\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall [selection:

- *use platform-provided functionality to perform Key Wrapping*
- *implement functionality to perform Key Wrapping*

] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: *cryptographic algorithm*] and the cryptographic key size [assignment: *cryptographic key size*] that meet the following: [assignment: *list of standards*]

### C.2.1.8 FCS\_SMC\_EXT Submask Combining

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for key combination used in support of other cryptographic functions.

#### Component Leveling



[FCS\\_SMC\\_EXT.1](#), Key Combining, requires the TSF to implement submask combining in a specified manner.

#### Management: FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.



## FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1 Key Combining

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

### FCS\_SMC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method [**selection:**

- *exclusive OR (XOR)*
- *SHA-256*
- *SHA-512*

] to generate another key.

## C.2.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FIA class originally defined by CC Part 2:

### C.2.2.1 FIA\_X509\_EXT X.509 Certificate Services

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for the use of X.509 certifications in trusted communications.

#### Component Leveling

FIA X509 EXT ———— 3

[FIA\\_X509\\_EXT.3](#), X.509 Authentication and Encryption, requires the TSF to use X.509 certificates for various functions.

#### Management: FIA\_X509\_EXT.3

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FIA\_X509\_EXT.3

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FIA\_X509\_EXT.3 X.509 Authentication and Encryption

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support encryption and authentication for S/MIME.

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall prevent the establishment of a trusted communication channel when the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.3

The TSF shall prevent the installation of code if the code signing certificate is deemed invalid.

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.4

The TSF shall prevent the encryption of email if the email protection certificate is deemed invalid.

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.5

The TSF shall prevent the signing of email if the email protection certificate is deemed invalid.

### C.2.2.2 FIA\_SASL\_EXT Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for the implementation of SASL.

#### Component Leveling

FIA SASL EXT ———— 1

[FIA\\_SASL\\_EXT.1](#), Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL), requires the TSF to implement SASL in a manner that conforms to applicable standards.

#### Management: FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1 Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

##### FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement support for Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) that complies with RFC 4422.

### FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support the POP3 CAPA and AUTH extensions for the SASL mechanism.

### FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall support the IMAP CAPABILITY and AUTHENTICATE extensions for the SASL mechanism.

### FIA\_SASL\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall support the SMTP AUTH extension for the SASL mechanism.

## C.2.3 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FPT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

### C.2.3.1 FPT\_AON\_EXT Add-Ons

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for the secure handling of add-ons that can be installed on top of the TOE.

#### Component Leveling



[FPT\\_AON\\_EXT.1](#), Support for Only Trusted Add-ons, requires the TSF to either support no add-ons or to only support trusted add-ons.

[FPT\\_AON\\_EXT.2](#), Trusted Installation and Update for Add-ons, requires the TSF to implement a method to verify the integrity of add-ons and ensure that untrusted or unknown add-ons are not loaded for use.

#### Management: FPT\_AON\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Enable/disable support for add-ons.

#### Audit: FPT\_AON\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FPT\_AON\_EXT.1 Support for Only Trusted Add-ons

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

#### FPT\_AON\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall include the capability to load [**selection:** *trusted add-ons, no add-ons* ].

#### Management: FPT\_AON\_EXT.2

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FPT\_AON\_EXT.2

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FPT\_AON\_EXT.2 Trusted Installation and Update for Add-ons

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation  
FPT\_AON\_EXT.1 Support for Only Trusted Add-Ons

#### FPT\_AON\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall [**selection:** *provide the ability, leverage the platform* ] to provide a means to cryptographically verify add-ons using a digital signature mechanism and [**selection:** *published hash, no other functions* ] prior to installation and update.

#### FPT\_AON\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall [**selection:** *provide the ability, leverage the platform* ] to query the current version of the add-on.

#### FPT\_AON\_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall prevent the automatic installation of add-ons.

## C.2.4 Security Management (FMT)


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FMT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

### C.2.4.1 FMT\_MOF\_EXT Management of Functions Behavior

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for technology-specific management functions that are not enumerated in the Part 2 family FMT\_MOF.

#### Component Leveling



[FMT\\_MOF\\_EXT.1](#), Management of Functions Behavior, requires the TSF to implement management functions specified in the SFR.

**Management: FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Functions Behavior**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

**FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions, controlled by the user or administrator as shown: **[assignment: list of management functions to be performed by role]**.

**C.2.5 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)**


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FTP class originally defined by CC Part 2:

**C.2.5.1 FTP\_ITC\_EXT Inter-TSF Trusted Channel**

**Family Behavior**

Components in this family define technology-specific requirements for trusted communications that are not defined in the Part 2 family FTP\_ITC.

**Component Leveling**



[FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#), Inter-TSF Trusted Channel, requires the TSF to identify the trusted channels it uses for communications with external entities.

**Management: FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

**FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall initiate or receive communication via the trusted channel.

**FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall communicate via the trusted channel for **[assignment: trusted channel protocol]**.

**C.2.6 User Data Protection (FDP)**


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FDP class originally defined by CC Part 2:

**C.2.6.1 FDP\_NOT\_EXT Notifications**

**Family Behavior**

Components in this family define requirements for the TSF's ability to notify users about potential insecure interactions with data.

**Component Leveling**



[FDP\\_NOT\\_EXT.1](#), Notification of S/MIME Status, requires the TSF to present the S/MIME status of received email messages.

[FDP\\_NOT\\_EXT.2](#), Notification of URI, requires the TSF to display the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of any embedded links.

**Management: FDP\_NOT\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FDP\_NOT\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FDP\_NOT\_EXT.1 Notification of S/MIME Status**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)

**FDP\_NOT\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall display a notification of the S/MIME status of received emails upon viewing.

**Management: FDP\_NOT\_EXT.2**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FDP\_NOT\_EXT.2**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FDP\_NOT\_EXT.2 Notification of URI**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

**FDP\_NOT\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall display the full Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of any embedded links.

**C.2.6.2 FDP\_SMIME\_EXT Use of Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)**

**Family Behavior**

Components in this family define requirements to implement S/MIME.

**Component Leveling**

FDP SMIME EXT ————— 1

[FDP\\_SMIME\\_EXT.1](#), S/MIME, requires the TSF to support S/MIME.

**Management: FDP\_SMIME\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FDP\_SMIME\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FDP\_SMIME\_EXT.1 S/MIME**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_SMIME\_EXT.1 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)

**FDP\_SMIME\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall use S/MIME to sign, verify, encrypt, and decrypt mail.

**C.2.6.3 FDP\_PST\_EXT Storage of Persistent Information**

**Family Behavior**

Components in this family define requirements for the enumeration of the minimum set of data the TSF must be able to store in order to implement its required functionality.

**Component Leveling**

FDP PST EXT ————— 1

[FDP\\_PST\\_EXT.1](#), Storage of Persistent Information, requires the TSF to identify the minimum set of data it can store on the TOE platform while maintaining functionality.

**Management: FDP\_PST\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FDP\_PST\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FDP\_PST\_EXT.1 Storage of Persistent Information**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

**FDP\_PST\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall be capable of operating without storing persistent information to the client platform with the following exceptions: **[assignment: data that the TSF must store persistently]**.

**C.2.6.4 FDP\_REN\_EXT Rendering of Message Content**

**Family Behavior**

Components in this family define requirements for the rendering of data presented to a user such that the risk of malicious data transmission is minimized.

**Component Leveling**

FDP REN EXT ————— 1

[FDP\\_REN\\_EXT.1](#), Rendering of Message Content, requires the TSF to implement a plaintext-only mode that prevents non-text content from being rendered.

**Management: FDP\_REN\_EXT.1**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Enable/disable plaintext-only mode.

**Audit: FDP\_REN\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

## **FDP\_REN\_EXT.1 Rendering of Message Content**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

### **FDP\_REN\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall have a plaintext-only mode which disables the rendering and execution of [**assignment:** *embedded content types*].

# Appendix D - Implicitly Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this PP-Module. These requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [CC] Part 1, 8.2 Dependencies between components.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the PP-Module provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.

Requirement	Rationale for Satisfaction
FCS_COP.1 - Cryptographic Operation	Several SFRs in this PP-Module (e.g. <a href="#">FPT_AON_EXT.2</a> ) have a dependency on FCS_COP.1 because they require the existence of other cryptographic functionality to be satisfied. The Base-PP permits either the TOE or its platform to implement cryptographic functions. If the TOE platform implements these functions, FCS_COP.1 is not claimed but all SFRs that depend on it are implicitly satisfied through the TOE platform's ability to provide the required functionality.
FPT_STM.1 - Reliable Time Stamps	<a href="#">FIA_X509_EXT.3</a> has a dependency on FPT_STM.1 because reliable time is needed to validate whether or not an X.509 certificate is expired. This requirement is implicitly satisfied through the Base-PP assumption that the TOE platform can be assumed to be a reliable time source.

## **Appendix E - Entropy Documentation and Assessment**

The TOE does not require any additional supplementary information to describe its entropy sources beyond the requirements outlined in the Base-PP.

## Appendix F - Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
Base-PP	Base Protection Profile
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
CMS	Cryptographic Message Syntax
cPP	Collaborative Protection Profile
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EP	Extended Package
FP	Functional Package
GCM	Galois-Counter Mode
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IMAP	Internet Message Access Protocol
IV	Initialization Vector
MAPI	Messaging Application Programming Interface
MTA	Mail Transfer Agent
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OE	Operational Environment
PBKDF	Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PDF	Portable Document Format
POP	Post Office Protocol
PP	Protection Profile
PP-Configuration	Protection Profile Configuration
PP-Module	Protection Profile Module
PRF	Pseudo-Random Function
RBG	Random Bit Generator
RPC	Remote Procedure Call
S/MIME	Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SASL	Simple Authentication and Security Layer
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SMTP	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSFI	TSF Interface
TSS	TOE Summary Specification



## Appendix G - Bibliography

Identifier	Title
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Part 1: Introduction and General Model</a>, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 2: Security Functional Components</a>, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 3: Security Assurance Components</a>, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li></ul>
[App PP]	<a href="#">Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 2.0</a> , TBD
[CEM]	<a href="#">Common Methodology for Information Technology Security - Evaluation Methodology</a> , CCMB-2022-11-006, CEM:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.
[MS-OXCMAPIHTTP]	<a href="#">Messaging Application Programming Interface (MAPI) Extensions for HTTP</a>
[MS-OXCRPC]	<a href="#">Wire Format Protocol</a>