

# **collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component**



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2020-09-10

**National Information Assurance Partnership**

## Revision History

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Version	Date	Comment
1.0	2020-09-10	First published release version.
1.0x	2021-04-06	Start of first XML version.

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## 1 PP introduction

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### 1.1 PP Reference Identification

PP Reference: collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component

PP Version: 1.0

PP Date: September 10, 2020

### 1.2 Overview

The scope of this Protection Profile (PP) is to describe the security functionality of QQQQ products in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products.

### 1.3 Terms

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The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

#### 1.3.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance      Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].

Base Protection      Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.

Profile (Base-PP)	
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility, accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base Protection Profiles.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.


### 1.3.2 Technical Terms

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)	An anti-exploitation feature which loads memory mappings into unpredictable locations. ASLR makes it more difficult for an attacker to redirect control to code that they have introduced into the address space of a process.
Administrator	An administrator is responsible for management activities, including setting policies that are applied by the enterprise on the operating system. This administrator could be acting remotely through a management server, from which the system receives configuration policies. An administrator can enforce settings on the system which cannot be overridden by non-administrator users.
Application (app)	Software that runs on a platform and performs tasks on behalf of the user or owner of the platform, as well as its supporting documentation.
Application Programming Interface (API)	A specification of routines, data structures, object classes, and variables that allows an application to make use of services provided by another software component, such as a library. APIs are often provided for a set of libraries included with the platform.
Credential	Data that establishes the identity of a user, e.g. a cryptographic key or password.
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)	Information that is either user or system defined and is used to operate a cryptographic module in processing encryption functions including cryptographic keys and authentication data, such as passwords, the disclosure or modification of which can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the

	module.
DAR Protection	Countermeasures that prevent attackers, even those with physical access, from extracting data from non-volatile storage. Common techniques include data encryption and wiping.
Data Execution Prevention (DEP)	An anti-exploitation feature of modern operating systems executing on modern computer hardware, which enforces a non-execute permission on pages of memory. DEP prevents pages of memory from containing both data and instructions, which makes it more difficult for an attacker to introduce and execute code.
Developer	An entity that writes OS software. For the purposes of this document, vendors and developers are the same.
General Purpose Operating System	A class of OSes designed to support a wide-variety of workloads consisting of many concurrent applications or services. Typical characteristics for OSes in this class include support for third-party applications, support for multiple users, and security separation between users and their respective resources. General Purpose Operating Systems also lack the real-time constraint that defines Real Time Operating Systems (RTOS). RTOSes typically power routers, switches, and embedded devices.
Host-based Firewall	A software-based firewall implementation running on the OS for filtering inbound and outbound network traffic to and from processes running on the OS.
Operating System (OS)	Software that manages physical and logical resources and provides services for applications. The terms <i>TOE</i> and <i>OS</i> are interchangeable in this document.
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)	Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information which is linked or linkable to an individual. [OMB]
Sensitive Data	Sensitive data may include all user or enterprise data or may be specific application data such as PII, emails, messaging, documents, calendar items, and contacts. Sensitive data must minimally include credentials and keys. Sensitive data shall be identified in the OS's TSS by the ST author.
User	A user is subject to configuration policies applied to the operating system by administrators. On some systems under certain configurations, a normal user can temporarily elevate privileges to that of an administrator. At that time, such a user should be considered an administrator.
Virtual Machine (VM)	Blah Blah Blah

## 1.4 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

### 1.4.1 TOE Boundary



Replace this image with a diagram of the Target of Evaluation.

**Figure 1: General TOE**

### 1.4.2 TOE Platform

## 1.5 Use Cases

Requirements in this Protection Profile are designed to address the security problems in at least the following use cases. These use cases are intentionally very broad, as many specific use cases exist for an operating system. These use cases may also overlap with one another. An operating system's functionality may even be effectively extended by privileged applications installed onto it. However, these are out of scope of this PP.

### [USE CASE 1] Elephant-own device

This is everything we need to describe in words about this use case.

For a the list of appropriate selections and acceptable assignment values for this configuration, see [E.1 Elephant-own device](#).

## 2 Conformance Claims

### Conformance Statement

An ST must claim exact conformance to this , as defined in the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017).

### CC Conformance Claims

#### **PP Claim**

This does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

#### **Package Claim**

This is Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 1.1 Conformant and Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), version 1.0 Conformant .

## **3 Security Problem Description**

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The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the OS is expected to address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational security policies that the OS is expected to enforce.

### **3.1 Threats**

#### **T.NETWORK\_ATTACK**

An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with applications and services running on or part of the OS with the intent of compromise. Engagement may consist of altering existing legitimate communications.

#### **T.NETWORK\_EAVESDROP**

An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged between applications and services that are running on or part of the OS.

#### **T.LOCAL\_ATTACK**

An attacker may compromise applications running on the OS. The compromised application may provide maliciously formatted input to the OS through a variety of channels including unprivileged system calls and messaging via the file system.

#### **T.LIMITED\_PHYSICAL\_ACCESS**

An attacker may attempt to access data on the OS while having a limited amount of time with the physical device.

### **3.2 Assumptions**

#### **A.PLATFORM**

The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This underlying platform is out of scope of this PP.

#### **A.PROPER\_USER**

The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy. At the same time, malicious software could act as the user, so requirements which confine malicious subjects are still in scope.

#### **A.PROPER\_ADMIN**

The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

## **4 Security Objectives**

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### **4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE**

#### **O.ACCEPTABILITY**

Conformant OSes ensure that information exists that allows administrators to discover unintentional issues with the configuration and operation of the operating system and discover its cause. Gathering event information and immediately transmitting it to another system can also enable incident response in the event of system compromise.

#### **O.INTEGRITY**

Conformant OSes ensure the integrity of their update packages. OSes are seldom if ever shipped without errors, and the ability to deploy patches and updates with integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Conformant OSes provide execution environment-based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of compromising systems.

#### **O.MANAGEMENT**

To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant OSes provide consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes the deployment of applications and application updates through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as well as providing mechanisms for configuration and application execution control.

#### **O.PROTECTED\_STORAGE**

To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of credentials in the event of loss of physical control of the storage medium, conformant OSes provide data-at-rest protection for credentials. Conformant OSes also provide access controls which allow users to keep their files private from other users of the same system.

#### **O.PROTECTED\_COMMs**

To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network attack threats, conformant OSes provide mechanisms to create trusted channels for CSP and sensitive data. Both CSP and sensitive data should not be exposed outside of the platform.

### **4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment**

The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the OS in correctly providing its security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.

**OE.PLATFORM**

The OS relies on being installed on trusted hardware.

**OE.PROPER\_USER**

The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy. Standard user accounts are provisioned in accordance with the least privilege model. Users requiring higher levels of access should have a separate account dedicated for that use.

**OE.PROPER\_ADMIN**

The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.

## 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

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This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organization security policies map to the security objectives.

**Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale**

Threat, Assumption, or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
T.NETWORK_ATTACK	O.PROTECTED_COMM	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMM as this provides for integrity of transmitted data.
	O.INTEGRITY	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.INTEGRITY as this provides for integrity of software that is installed onto the system from the network.
	O.MANAGEMENT	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to defend against network attack.
	O.ACCOUNTABILITY	The threat T.NETWORK_ATTACK is countered by O.ACCOUNTABILITY as this provides a mechanism for the OS to report behavior that may indicate a network attack has occurred.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP	O.PROTECTED_COMM	The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.PROTECTED_COMM as this provides for confidentiality of transmitted data.
	O.MANAGEMENT	The threat T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP is countered by O.MANAGEMENT as this provides for the ability to configure the OS to protect the confidentiality of its transmitted data.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK	O.INTEGRITY	The objective O.INTEGRITY protects against the use of mechanisms that weaken the TOE with regard to attack by other software on the platform.
	O.ACCOUNTABILITY	The objective O.ACCOUNTABILITY protects against local attacks by providing a mechanism to report behavior that may indicate a local attack is occurring or has occurred.
T.LIMITED_PHYSICAL_ACCESS	O.PROTECTED_STORAGE	The objective O.PROTECTED_STORAGE protects against unauthorized attempts to access physical storage used by the TOE.
A.PLATFORM	OE.PLATFORM	The operational environment objective OE.PLATFORM is realized through A.PLATFORM.
A.PROPER_USER	OE.PROPER_USER	The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_USER is realized through A.PROPER_USER.
A.PROPER_ADMIN	OE.PROPER_ADMIN	The operational environment objective OE.PROPER_ADMIN is realized through A.PROPER_ADMIN.

## 5 Security Requirements

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This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of

[CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text** or ~~strikethrough text~~): is used to add details to a requirement (including replacing an assignment with a more restrictive selection) or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

## 5.1 Security Functional Requirements

### 5.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

#### FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

##### FCS\_CKM.1.1

The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys by [parsing in accordance with [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) and [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2](#), **[selection]**: asymmetric key generation in accordance with [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#), symmetric key generation in accordance to [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#), no other methods] in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

**Application Note #1:** Parsing of keys can refer to both the act of importing keys from outside the TOE boundary and to the act of issuing commands or parameters to the TOE that trigger the TSF to perform a key generation function.

If asymmetric key generation in accordance with [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

If symmetric key generation in accordance with [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

#### Evaluation Activities ▾

##### [FCS\\_CKM.1](#):

###### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the TOE obtains a cryptographic key through importation of keys from external sources as specified in [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) and [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2](#). The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to determine whether it describes any supported asymmetric or symmetric key generation functionality consistent with the claims made in [FCS\\_CKM.1.1](#).

###### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key types for all uses identified in the ST.

###### **KMD**

The evaluator shall confirm that the KMD describes:

- The parsing interface and how the TSF imports keys for internal use
- The asymmetric key generation interfaces and how the TSF internally creates asymmetric keys, if claimed
- The symmetric key generation interfaces and how the TSF internally creates symmetric keys, if claimed

If the TOE uses the generated key in a key chain/hierarchy then the KMD shall describe how the key is used as part of the key chain/hierarchy.

###### **Tests**

Testing for this function is performed in conjunction with [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) and [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2](#). If asymmetric or symmetric key generation functionality is claimed, testing for this function is also performed in conjunction with [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#) or [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#).

#### FCS\_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys)

##### FCS\_CKM.1.1/AK

The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys using the methods defined by the following rows in [Table 2](#): **[selection]**: AK1, AK2, AK3, AK4, AK5].

**Table 2: Supported Methods for Asymmetric Key Generation**

Identifier	Key Type	Key Sizes	List of Standards
AK1	RSA	[ <b>selection</b> : 2048 bit, 3072-bit]	FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.3)
AK2	ECC-N	[ <b>selection</b> : 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 521 (P-521)]	FIPS PUB 186-4

AK3	ECC-B	[ <b>selection:</b> 256 ( <i>brainpoolP256r1</i> ), 384 ( <i>brainpoolP384r1</i> ), 512 ( <i>brainpoolP512r1</i> )]	RFC5639 (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves)
AK4	DSA	DSA Bit lengths of p and q respectively (L, N) [ <b>selection:</b> (1024, 160), (2048, 224), (2048, 256), (3027, 256)]	FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.1
AK5	Curve25519	256 bits	RFC 7748

**Application Note #2:** This requirement is included for the purposes of encryption and decryption operations only. To support ITE protected communications requirement for the transfer of encrypted data, this requirement mandates implementation compliance to FIPS 186-4 only. Implementations according to FIPS 186-2 or FIPS 186-3 will not be accepted.

This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of [FCS\\_CKM.1](#) or [FCS\\_CKM.1/KEK](#) chooses a selection related to generation of asymmetric keys.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK:](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the TOE generates an asymmetric key based on the methods selected from cPP Table 13: "Supported Methods for Asymmetric Key Generation". The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the TOE invokes the methods selected in the ST from the same table. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it identifies the usage for each row identifier (key type, key size, and list of standards) selected in the ST.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key types for all uses identified in the ST.

#### **KMD**

If the TOE uses the generated key in a key chain/hierarchy then the evaluator shall confirm that the KMD describes:

- If AK1 is selected, then the KMD describes which methods for generating p and q are used
- How the key is used as part of the key chain/hierarchy.

#### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

#### **AK1: RSA Key Generation**

The below tests are derived from The 186-4 RSA Validation System (RSA2VS), Updated 8 July 2014, Section 6.2, from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of RSA Key Generation by the TOE using the Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the key components including the public verification exponent e, the private prime factors p and q, the public modulus n and the calculation of the private signature exponent d.

[FIPS 186-4](#) Key Pair generation specifies 5 methods for generating the primes p and q.

These are:

1. Random Primes:
  - Provable primes
  - Probable primes
2. Primes with Conditions:
  - Primes p1, p2, q1, q2, p and q shall all be provable primes.
  - Primes p1, p2, q1, and q2 shall be provable primes and p and q shall be probable primes
  - Primes p1, p2, q1, q2, p and q shall all be probable primes.

To test the key generation method for the Random Provable primes method and for all the Primes with Conditions methods, the evaluator must seed the TSF key generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the RSA key pair.

For each key length supported, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 25 key pairs. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated by a known good implementation using the same input parameters.

If the TOE generates Random Probable Primes then if possible, the Random Probable primes method should also be verified against a known good implementation as described above. If verification against a known good implementation is not possible, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 25 key pairs for each supported key length nlen and verify that all of the following are true:

- $n = p * q$
- p and q are probably prime according to Miller-Rabin tests with error probability  $< 2^{(-125)}$
- $2^{16} < e < 2^{256}$  and e is an odd integer

- $GCD(p-1, e) = 1$
- $GCD(q-1, e) = 1$
- $|p-q| > 2^{(nlen/2 - 100)}$
- $p \geq squareRoot(2) * (2^{(nlen/2 - 1)})$
- $q \geq squareRoot(2) * (2^{(nlen/2 - 1)})$
- $2^{(nlen/2)} < d < LCM(p-1, q-1)$
- $e*d = 1 \text{ mod } LCM(p-1, q-1)$

#### **AK2 & AK3: ECC Key Generation with NIST and Brainpool Curves**

These tests are derived from The FIPS 186-4 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm Validation System (ECDSA2VS), Updated 18 Mar 2014, Section 6.

#### **ECC Key Generation Test**

For each selected curve, and for each key pair generation method as described in FIPS 186-4, section B.4, the evaluator shall require the implementation under test to generate 10 private/public key pairs ( $d, Q$ ). The private key,  $d$ , shall be generated using a random bit generator as specified in [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1](#). The private key,  $d$ , is used to compute the public key,  $Q'$ . The evaluator shall confirm that  $0 < d < n$  (where  $n$  is the order of the group), and the computed value  $Q'$  is then compared to the generated public/private key pairs' public key,  $Q$ , to confirm that  $Q$  is equal to  $Q'$ .

#### **Public Key Validation (PKV) Test**

For each supported curve, the evaluator shall generate 12 private/public key pairs using the key generation function of a known good implementation and modify six of the public key values so that they are incorrect, leaving six values unchanged (i.e., correct). To determine correctness, the evaluator shall submit the 12 key pairs to the public key validation (PKV) function of the TOE and shall confirm that the results correspond as expected to the modified and unmodified values.

#### **AK4: DSA Key Generation using Finite-Field Cryptography (FFC)**

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of the Parameters Generation and the Key Generation for FFC by the TOE using the Parameter Generation and Key Generation test. This test verifies the ability of the TSF to correctly produce values for the field prime  $p$ , the cryptographic prime  $q$  (dividing  $p-1$ ), the cryptographic group generator  $g$ , and the calculation of the private key  $x$  and public key  $y$ .

The Parameter generation specifies 2 ways (or methods) to generate the cryptographic prime  $q$  and the field prime  $p$ :

- Primes  $q$  and  $p$  shall both be provable primes
- Primes  $q$  and field prime  $p$  shall both be probable primes

and two ways to generate the cryptographic group generator  $g$ :

- Generator  $g$  constructed through a verifiable process
- Generator  $g$  constructed through an unverifiable process.

The Key generation specifies 2 ways to generate the private key  $x$ :

- $\text{len}(q)$  bit output of RBG where  $1 \leq x \leq q-1$
- $\text{len}(q) + 64$  bit output of RBG, followed by a mod  $q-1$  operation and a +1 operation, where  $1 \leq x \leq q-1$ .

The security strength of the RBG must be at least that of the security offered by the FFC parameter set.

To test the cryptographic and field prime generation method for the provable primes method or the group generator  $g$  for a verifiable process, the evaluator must seed the TSF parameter generation routine with sufficient data to deterministically generate the parameter set.

For each key length supported, the evaluator shall have the TSF generate 25 parameter sets and key pairs. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation by comparing values generated by the TSF with those generated from a known good implementation.

Verification must also confirm

- $g \neq 0, 1$
- $q$  divides  $p-1$
- $g^q \bmod p = 1$
- $g^x \bmod p = y$

for each FFC parameter set and key pair.

#### **AK5: Curve25519 Key Generation**

The evaluator shall require the implementation under test (IUT) to generate 10 private/public key pairs. The private key shall be generated as specified in RFC 7748 using an approved random bit generator (RBG) and shall be written in little-endian order (least significant byte first). To determine correctness, the evaluator shall submit the generated key pairs to the public key verification (PKV) function of a known good implementation.

Note: Assuming the PKV function of the good implementation will (using little-endian order):

- Confirm the private and public keys are 32-byte values
- Confirm the three least significant bits of the first byte of the private key are zero
- Confirm the most significant bit of the last byte is zero
- Confirm the second most significant bit of the last byte is one
- Calculate the expected public key from the private key and confirm it matches the supplied public key

The evaluator shall generate 10 private/public key pairs using the key generation function of a known good implementation and modify 5 of the public key values so that they are incorrect, leaving five values unchanged (i.e. correct). The evaluator shall obtain in response a set of 10 PASS/FAIL values.

## FCS\_CKM.1/SK Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Encryption Key)

FCS\_CKM.1/SK

The TSF shall generate **symmetric** cryptographic keys using the methods defined by the following rows in **Table 3: [selection: RSK, DSK, PBK]**.

**Table 3: Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Generation**

Identifier	Key Type	Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
RSK	[selection: symmetric key, submask, authorization value]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in <a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a>	[selection: 128, 192, 256, 512] bits	NIST SP 800-133 (Section 7.1) with ISO 18031 as an approved RBG in addition to those in NIST SP 800-133 (Section 5).
DSK	[selection: Key Type identifier from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions]	Derived from a Key Derivation Function as specified in <a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.5</a>	[selection: key sizes from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions]	[selection: List of Standards from Table 16: Key Derivation Functions]
PBK	[selection: submask, authentication token, authorization value]	Derived from a Password Based Key Derivation Function as specified in <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/PBKDF</a>	[selection: key sizes as specified in <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/PBKDF</a> ]	[selection: standards as specified in <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/PBKDF</a> ]

**Application Note #3:** The intent of this requirement is to ensure that attackers cannot recover SKs with less than a full exhaust of the key space. This requirement explains SK generation regardless of how the DSC uses it or when it generates it. The encryption of user data that is not keying material, authentication tokens, or authorization values is outside the scope of this cPP. This cPP assumes that the DSC lacks the required resources to perform bulk encryption/decryption services at a suitable rate for users. The host may use the SK for encrypting user data outside the boundaries of the DSC. On the other hand, the DSC may use the SK on behalf of the user to perform keyed hashes. In this case, all the requirements for generating, controlling access and use, and destroying the key while under the protection of the DSC apply.

The selection of key size 512 bits is for the case of XTS-AES using AES-256. In the case of XTSAES for both AES-128 and AES-256, the developer is expected to ensure that the full key is generated using direct generation from the RBG as in NIST SP 800-133 section.

The ST author selects at least one algorithm from the RSK row if the ST supports creating keys directly from the output of the RBG without further conditioning, at least one algorithm from the DSK row should be selected if the ST supports key derivation functions which are usually seeded from RBG and then further conditioned to the appropriate key size, and at least one algorithm from the PBK row should be selected if the ST supports keys derived from passwords.

If DSK is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

If PBK is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_COP.1/PBKDF](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of [FCS\\_CKM.1](#) or [FCS\\_CKM.1/KEK](#) chooses a selection related to generation of symmetric keys.

### Evaluation Activities

#### [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK:](#)

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the TOE obtains an SK through direct generation as specified in [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1](#), [FCS\\_COP.1/KDF](#), or [FCS\\_COP.1/PBKDF](#). The evaluator shall review the TSS to verify that it describes how the ST invokes the functionality described by [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1](#) and [FCS\\_COP.1/PBKDF](#) where applicable.

[conditional] If the symmetric key is generated by an RBG, the evaluator shall review the TSS to determine that it describes how the functionality described by [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1](#) is invoked. The evaluator uses the description of the RBG functionality in [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1](#) or documentation available for the operational environment to determine that the key size being requested is

greater than or equal to the key size and mode to be used for the encryption/decryption of the data.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key types for all uses identified in the ST.

#### KMD

The evaluator shall confirm that the KMD describes, as applicable:

- The RBG interface and how the ST uses it in symmetric key generation
- The KDF interface and how the ST uses it in symmetric key generation
- The PBKDF interface and how the ST uses it in symmetric key generation
- If the TOE uses the generated key in a key chain/hierarchy then the KMD shall describe how the ST uses the key as part of the key chain/hierarchy.

#### Tests

For each selected key generation method, the evaluator shall configure the selected generation capability. The evaluator shall use the description of the RBG interface to verify that the TOE requests and receives an amount of RBG output greater than or equal to the requested key size. The evaluator shall perform the tests as described for FCS\_COP.1/KDF and FCS\_COP.1/PBKDF.

## FCS\_CKM.1/KEK Cryptographic Key Generation (Key Encryption Key)

### FCS\_CKM.1.1/KEK

The TSF shall generate key encryption keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm corresponding to [selection]:

- Asymmetric KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/AK identifier AK1,
- Symmetric KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/SK,
- Derived KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5

] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

**Application Note #4:** KEKs protect KEKs and Symmetric Keys (SKs). DSCs should use key strengths commensurate with protecting the chosen symmetric encryption key strengths.

If Asymmetric KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/AK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.1/AK must be claimed by the TOE.

If Symmetric KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/SK is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.1/SK must be claimed by the TOE.

If Derived KEKs generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 must be claimed by the TOE.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FCS\_CKM.1/KEK:

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the key hierarchy section of the TSS to ensure that the formation of all KEKs is described and that the key sizes match that described by the ST author. The evaluator shall examine the key hierarchy section of the TSS to ensure that each KEK encrypts keys of equal or lesser security strength using one of the selected methods.

[conditional] If the KEK is generated according to an asymmetric key scheme, the evaluator shall review the TSS to determine that it describes how the functionality described by FCS\_CKM.1/AK is invoked. The evaluator uses the description of the key generation functionality in FCS\_CKM.1/AK or documentation available for the operational environment to determine that the key strength being requested is greater than or equal to 112 bits.

[conditional] If the KEK is generated according to a symmetric key scheme, the evaluator shall review the TSS to determine that it describes how the functionality described by FCS\_CKM.1/SK is invoked. The evaluator uses the description of the RBG functionality in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1, or the key derivation functionality in either FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 or FCS\_COP.1/PBKDF, depending on the key generation method claimed, to determine that the key size being requested is greater than or equal to the key size and mode to be used for the encryption/decryption of the data.

[conditional] If the KEK is formed from derivation, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the method of derivation and that this method is consistent with FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.

#### Guidance

There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component.

#### KMD

The evaluator shall iterate through each of the methods selected by the ST and confirm that the KMD describes the applicable selected methods.

#### Tests

The evaluator shall iterate through each of the methods selected by the ST and perform all applicable tests from the selected methods.

## FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

### FCS\_CKM.2.1

The TSF shall establish cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [selection]:

- RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise

- Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”,*
- RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2”,
  - Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: [selection]:
    - NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”,
    - RFC 7748, “Elliptic Curves for Security”
- J,
- Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”,
  - Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) that meets the following: [selection]:
    - ANSI X9.63 - Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
    - IEEE 1363a - Standard Specification for Public-Key Cryptography - Amendment 1: Additional Techniques,
    - ISO/IEC 18033-2 - Information Technology - Security Techniques - Encryption Algorithms - Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers,
    - SECG SEC1 - Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section 5.1 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
- ]
- ] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].

**Application Note #5:** This is a refinement of the SFR [FCS\\_CKM.2](#) to deal with key establishment rather than key distribution.

The ST author selects all key establishment schemes used for the selected cryptographic protocols.

The RSA-based key establishment schemes are described in Section 8 of NIST SP 800-56B Revision 2 [NIST-RSA]; however, Section 8 relies on implementation of other sections in SP 800-56B Revision 2.

The elliptic curves used for the key establishment scheme correlate with the curves specified in [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#).

The selections in this SFR must be consistent with those for [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#).

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_CKM.2](#):

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that ST supports at least one key establishment scheme. The evaluator also ensures that for each key establishment scheme selected by the ST in [FCS\\_CKM.2.1](#) it also supports one or more corresponding methods selected in [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#). If the ST selects RSA in [FCS\\_CKM.2.1](#), then the TOE must support one or more of “KAS1,” or “KAS2,” “KTS-OAEP,” from [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#). If the ST selects elliptic curve-based, then the TOE must support one or more of “ECDH-NIST” or “ECDH-BPC” from [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#). If the ST selects Diffie-Hellman-based key establishment, then the TOE must support “DH” from [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#).

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key establishment scheme.

#### **KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### **Tests**

Testing for this SFR is performed under the corresponding functions in [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#).

## **FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction**

### **FCS\_CKM.4.1**

The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method

- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection]:
  - single overwrite consisting of [selection: a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF’s RBG, zeroes, ones, a new value of a key, [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP]],
  - removal of power to the memory,
  - removal of all references to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection

]

- For non-volatile memory [selection]:
  - that employs a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection]:

- single overwrite consisting of [**selection**: zeroes, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size, [**assignment**: some value that does not contain any CSP]],
  - block erase
- ],
- that does not employ a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a [**selection**]:
    - [**selection**: single, [**assignment**: ST author-defined multi-pass]] overwrite consisting of [**selection**: zeros, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size, [**assignment**: some value that does not contain any CSP]] followed by a read-verify. If the read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated again up to [**assignment**: number of times to attempt overwrite] times, whereupon an error is returned.
    - block erase
- ]
- ]

that meets the following: [no standard].

**Application Note #6:** A DSC must implement mechanisms to destroy cryptographic keys and key material contained in persistent storage when no longer needed. The term “cryptographic keys” in this SFR includes the authorization data that is the entry point to a key chain and all other cryptographic keys and keying material (whether in plaintext or encrypted form). This SFR does not apply to the public component of asymmetric key pairs, or to keys that are permitted to remain stored such as device identification keys.

In the case of volatile memory, the selection “removal of all references to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection” is used in a situation where the TSF cannot address the specific physical memory locations holding the data to be erased and therefore relies on addressing logical addresses (which frees the relevant physical addresses holding the old data) and then requesting the platform to ensure that the data in the physical addresses is no longer available for reading (i.e. the “garbage collection” referred to in the SFR text). Guidance documentation for the TOE requires users not to allow the TOE to leave the user’s control while a session is active (and hence while the DEK is likely to be in plaintext in volatile memory).

The selection for destruction of data in non-volatile memory includes block erase as an option, and this option applies only to flash memory. A block erase does not require a read verify, since collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Components the mappings of logical addresses to the erased memory locations are erased as well as the data itself.

Where different destruction methods are used for different data or different destruction situations then the different methods and the data/situations they apply to (e.g. different points in time, or power-loss situations) are described in the TSS (and the ST may use separate iterations of the SFR to aid clarity). The TSS includes a table describing all relevant keys and keying material (including authorization data) used in the implementation of the SFRs, stating the source of the data, all memory types in which the data is stored (covering storage both during and outside of a session, and both plaintext and non-plaintext forms of the data), and the applicable destruction method and time of destruction in each case.

Some selections allow assignment of “some value that does not contain any CSP.” This means that the TOE uses some specified data not drawn from an RBG meeting FCS\_RBG\_EXT requirements, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The point of the phrase “does not contain any sensitive data” is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general pool that might contain current or residual data (e.g. SDOs or intermediate key chain values) that itself requires confidentiality protection.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FCS\_CKM.4:

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it lists all relevant keys and keying material (describing the source of the data, all memory types in which the data is stored (covering storage both during and outside of a session, and both plaintext and non-plaintext forms of the data)), all relevant destruction situations (including the point in time at which the destruction occurs; e.g. factory reset or device wipe function, change of authorization data, change of DEK, completion of use of an intermediate key) and the destruction method used in each case. The evaluator shall confirm that the description of the data and storage locations is consistent with the functions carried out by the TOE (e.g. that all keys in the key chain are accounted for). (Where keys are stored encrypted or wrapped under another key then this may need to be explained in order to allow the evaluator to confirm the consistency of the description of keys with the TOE functions).

The evaluator shall check that the TSS identifies any configurations or circumstances that may not conform to the key destruction requirement (see further discussion in the AGD section below). Note that reference may be made to the AGD for description of the detail of such cases

where destruction may be prevented or delayed.

Where the ST specifies the use of “a value that does not contain any sensitive data” to overwrite keys, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how that pattern is obtained and used, and that this justifies the claim that the pattern does not contain any sensitive data.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation for the TOE requires users to ensure that the TOE remains under the user’s control while a session is active.

A TOE may be subject to situations that could prevent or delay data destruction in some cases. The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation identifies configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement, and that this description is consistent with the relevant parts of the TSS (and KMD). The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation provides guidance on situations where key destruction may be delayed at the physical layer, identifying any additional mitigation actions for the user (e.g. there might be some operation the user can invoke, or the user might be advised to retain control of the device for some particular time to maximise the probability that garbage collection will have occurred).

For example, when the TOE does not have full access to the physical memory, it is possible that the storage may implement wear-levelling and garbage collection. This may result in additional copies of the data that are logically inaccessible but persist physically. Where available, the TOE might then describe use of the TRIM command and garbage collection to destroy these persistent copies upon their deletion (this would be explained in TSS and guidance documentation).

Where TRIM is used then the TSS or guidance documentation is also expected to describe how the keys are stored such that they are not inaccessible to TRIM, (e.g. they would need not to be contained in a file less than 982 bytes which would be completely contained in the master file table).

#### **KMD**

The evaluator shall examine the KMD to verify that it identifies and describes the interfaces that are used to service commands to read/write memory. The evaluator shall examine the interface description for each different media type to ensure that the interface supports the selections made by the ST author.

45 The evaluator shall examine the KMD to ensure that all keys and keying material identified in the TSS and KMD have been accounted for.

46 Note that where selections include ‘destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection’ (for volatile memory) then the evaluator shall examine the KMD to ensure that it explains the nature of the destruction of the reference, the request for garbage collection, and of the garbage collection process itself.

#### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** Applied to each key or keying material held as plaintext in volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE (whether or not the plaintext value is subsequently encrypted for storage in volatile or non-volatile memory).

The evaluator shall:

1. Record the value of the key or keying material.
2. Cause the TOE to dump the SDO/SDE memory of the TOE into a binary file.
3. Search the content of the binary file created in Step #2 to locate all instances of the known key value from Step #1.

Note that the primary purpose of Step #3 is to demonstrate that appropriate search commands are being used for Steps #8 and #9.

4. Cause the TOE to perform normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
5. Cause the TOE to destroy the key.
6. Cause the TOE to stop execution but not exit.
7. Cause the TOE to dump the SDO/SDE memory of the TOE into a binary file.
8. Search the content of the binary file created in Step #7 for instances of the known key value from Step #1.
9. Break the key value from Step #1 into an evaluator-chosen set of fragments and perform a search using each fragment. (Note that the evaluator shall first confirm with the developer how the key is normally stored, in order to choose fragment sizes that are the same or smaller than any fragmentation of the data that may be implemented by the TOE. The endianness or byte-order should also be taken into account in the search.)

Steps #1-8 ensure that the complete key does not exist anywhere in volatile memory. If a copy is found, then the test fails.

Step #9 ensures that partial key fragments do not remain in memory. If the evaluator finds a 32-or-greater-consecutive-bit fragment, then fail immediately. Otherwise, there is a chance that it is not within the context of a key (e.g., some random bits that happen to match). If this is the case the test should be repeated with a different key in Step #1. If a fragment is also found in this repeated run then the test fails unless the developer provides a reasonable explanation for the collision, then the evaluator may give a pass on this test.

- **Test 2:** Applied to each key and keying material held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE.

1. Record the value of the key or keying material.
2. Cause the TOE to perform normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step

- #1.
3. Search the non-volatile memory the key was stored in for instances of the known key value from Step #1.  
*Note that the primary purpose of Step #3 is to demonstrate that appropriate search commands are being used for Steps #5 and #6.*
  4. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
  5. Search the non-volatile memory in which the key was stored for instances of the known key value from Step #1. If a copy is found, then the test fails.
  6. Break the key value from Step #1 into an evaluator-chosen set of fragments and perform a search using each fragment. (Note that the evaluator shall first confirm with the developer how the key is normally stored, in order to choose fragment sizes that are the same or smaller than any fragmentation of the data that may be implemented by the TOE. The endianness or byte-order should also be taken into account in the search).

*Step #6 ensures that partial key fragments do not remain in non-volatile memory. If the evaluator finds a 32-or-greater-consecutive-bit fragment, then fail immediately. Otherwise, there is a chance that it is not within the context of a key (e.g., some random bits that happen to match). If this is the case the test should be repeated with a different key in Step #1. If a fragment is also found in this repeated run then the test fails unless the developer provides a reasonable explanation for the collision, then the evaluator may give a pass on this test.*

- **Test 3:** Applied to each key and keying material held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE.
  1. Record memory of the key or keying material.
  2. Cause the TOE to perform normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
  3. Cause the TOE to clear the key. Record the value to be used for the overwrite of the key.
  4. Examine the memory from Step #1 to ensure the appropriate pattern (recorded in Step #3) is used.

*The test succeeds if correct pattern is found in the memory location. If the pattern is not found, then the test fails.*

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction Timing

##### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall destroy all keys and keying material when no longer needed.

**Application Note #7:** The DSC will have mechanisms to destroy keys, including intermediate keys and key material, by using an approved method, [FCS\\_CKM.4](#). Examples of keys include intermediate keys, leaf keys, encryption keys, signing keys, verification keys, authentication tokens, and submasks. The DSC will have mechanisms to destroy keys and key material contained in persistent storage when no longer needed. Based on their implementation, vendors will explain when certain keys are no longer needed. An example in which key is no longer necessary includes a wrapped key whose password has changed. However, there are instances when keys are allowed to remain in memory, for example, a device identification key.

#### Evaluation Activities

##### [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.4:](#)

###### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall verify the TSS provides a high-level description of what it means for keys and key material to be no longer needed and when this data should be expected to be destroyed.*

###### **Guidance**

*There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component.*

###### **KMD**

*The evaluator shall verify that the KMD includes a description of the areas where keys and key material reside and when this data is no longer needed.*

*The evaluator shall verify that the KMD includes a key lifecycle that includes a description where key materials reside, how the key materials are used, how it is determined that keys and key material are no longer needed, and how the data is destroyed once it is no longer needed. The evaluator shall also verify that all key destruction operations are performed in a manner specified by [FCS\\_CKM.4](#).*

###### **Tests**

*There are no test evaluation activities for this component*

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation

##### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.5.1

The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys using the Key Derivation Functions defined by the following rows of [Table 4](#): [selection: KeyDrv1, KeyDrv2, KeyDrv3, KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, KeyDrv6, KeyDrv7, KeyDrv8].

**Table 4: Key Derivation Functions**

Identifier	Key Type	Input Parameters	Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Stan
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KeyDrv1	<b>[selection:</b> symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in <a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a>	KDF in Counter Mode using <b>[selection:</b> CMAC- AES-128, CMAC- AES-192, CMAC- AES-256, HMAC- SHA-1, HMAC- SHA-256, HMAC- SHA-512]as the PRF	<b>[selection:</b> 128, 192, 256]bits	NIST SP 800 (Section 5.1) in Counter M
KeyDrv2	<b>[selection:</b> symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in <a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a>	KDF in Feedback Mode using <b>[selection:</b> CMAC- AES-128, CMAC- AES-192, CMAC- AES-256, HMAC- SHA-1, HMAC- SHA-256, HMAC- SHA-512]as the PRF	<b>[selection:</b> 128, 192, 256]bits	NIST SP 800 (Section 5.2) in Feedback
KeyDrv3	<b>[selection:</b> symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key]	Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in <a href="#">FCS_RBG_EXT.1</a>	KDF in Double Pipeline Iteration Mode using <b>[selection:</b> CMAC- AES-128, CMAC- AES-192, CMAC- AES-256, HMAC- SHA-1, HMAC- SHA-256, HMAC- SHA-512]as the PRF	<b>[selection:</b> 128, 192, 256]bits	NIST SP 800 (Section 5.3) in n Double Pipeline Iter Mode)
KeyDrv4	<b>[selection:</b> symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key]	Intermediary keys	<b>[selection:</b> exclusive OR (XOR), SHA256, SHA-512]	<b>[selection:</b> 128, 192, 256]bits	<b>[selection:</b> i HASH, FIPS
KeyDrv5	<b>[selection:</b> symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key]	Concatenated keys	KDF in <b>[selection:</b> Counter Mode, Feedback Mode, Double Pipeline Iteration Mode] using <b>[selection:</b> CMAC-AES-128, CMAC-AES-192, CMAC-AES-256, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512]as the PRF	<b>[selection:</b> 128, 192, 256]bits	NIST SP 800 [selection: (§ 5.1) (KDF in Counter Mod (Section 5.2; in Feedback Mode); (Section 5.3 in Double-Pi Iteration Mo <b>[selection:</b> i CMAC, NIST CMAC, ISO- ISO-HMAC, HMAC, ISO- FIPS-SHA]
KeyDrv6	<b>[selection:</b> symmetric key, initialization vector, authentication token, authorization value, HMAC key, KMAC key]	Two keys	<b>[selection:</b> AES- CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES- KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM- CCM, CAM-GCM] from <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/SKC</a> Symmetric Key table	<b>[selection:</b> 128, 192, 256]bits	[selection: s of Standards <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/</a> Symmetric K table]
KeyDrv7	<b>[selection:</b> symmetric key, secret IV, seed]	Shared secret, salt, output length, fixed information	<b>[selection:</b> hash function from <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/Hash</a> , keyed hash from <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/HMAC</a>	<b>[selection:</b> 128, 192, 256]bits	(NIST-KDRV <b>[selection:</b> s List of Stan in <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/</a> and

KeyDrv8	<b>[selection:</b> symmetric key, secret IV, seed]	Shared secret, salt, IV, output length, fixed information	<b>[selection: keyed hash from</b> <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/HMAC</a>	<b>[selection:</b> 128, 192, 256]bits	(NIST-KDRV <b>[selection:</b> : List of Stan in <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/</a> and <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/</a>
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**Application Note #8:** Note that Camellia algorithms do not support 192-bit key sizes.

The interface referenced in the requirement could take different forms, the most likely of which is an application programming interface to an OS kernel. There may be various levels of abstraction. For Authorization Factor Submasks, the key size to be used in the HMAC falls into a range between L1 and L2 defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function (for example for SHA-256 L1 = 512, L2 = 256) where L2 = k = L1.

General note: in order to use a NIST SP 800-108 conformant method of key derivation, the TOE is permitted to implement this with keys as derived as indicated in Key Derivation Functions table above, and with the algorithms as indicated in the same table.

NIST SP 800-131A Rev 1 allows the use of SHA-1 in these use cases.

KeyDrv5, KeyDrv6, and the XOR option in KeyDrv4 will create an “inverted key hierarchy” in which the TSF will combine two or more keys to create a third key. These same KDFs may also use a submask key as input, which could be an authorization factor or derived from a PBKDF. In these cases the ST author must explicitly declare this option and should present a reasonable argument that the entropy of the inputs to the KDFs will result in full entropy of the expected output.

If keys are combined, the ST author shall describe which method of combination is used in order to justify that the effective entropy of each factor is preserved.

The documentation of the product’s encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product’s key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagrams. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS; it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.

SP 800-56C specifies a two-step key derivation procedure that employs an extraction-the-expansion technique for deriving keying material from a shared secret generated during a key establishment scheme. The Randomness Extraction step as described in Section 5 of SP 800-56C is followed by Key Expansion using the key derivation functions defined in SP 800-108.

This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if at least one of [FCS\\_CKM.1/KEK](#), [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#), or [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc](#) chooses a selection related to key derivation.

If at least one of KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, or KeyDrv6 is selected AND password-based key derivation is used to create at least one of the inputs, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_COP.1/PBKDF](#) must also be claimed.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall check that the TSS includes a description of the key derivation functions and shall check that this uses a key derivation algorithm and key sizes according to the specification selected in the ST out of the table as provided in the cPP table per row. The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS supports the selected methods.*

*If KeyDrv5 is selected, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS shows that the total length of the concatenated keys used as input to the KDF is greater than or equal to the length of the output from the KDF.*

*[conditional] If key combination is used to form a KEK, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the method of combination and that this method is either an XOR, a KDF, or encryption.*

*[conditional] If a KDF is used to form a KEK, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSS includes a description of the key derivation function and shall verify the key derivation uses an approved derivation mode and key expansion algorithm according to SP 800-108.*

*[conditional] If key concatenation is used to derive KEKs (KeyDrv5), the evaluator shall ensure the TSS includes a description of the randomness extraction step, including the following:*

- *The description must include how an approved untruncated MAC function is being used for the randomness extraction step and the evaluator must verify the TSS describes that the output length (in bits) of the MAC function is at least as large as the targeted security strength (in bits) of the parameter set employed by the key establishment scheme (see Tables 1-3 of SP 800-56C).*
- *The description must include how the MAC function being used for the randomness extraction step is related to the PRF used in the key expansion and verify the TSS*

*description includes the correct MAC function:*

- If an HMAC-hash is used in the randomness extraction step, then the same HMAC-hash (with the same hash function hash) is used as the PRF in the key expansion step.
- If an AES-CMAC (with key length 128, 192, or 256 bits) is used in the randomness extraction step, then AES-CMAC with a 128-bit key is used as the PRF in the key expansion step.
- The description must include the lengths of the salt values being used in the randomness extraction step and the evaluator shall verify the TSS description includes correct salt lengths:
  - If an HMAC-hash is being used as the MAC, the salt length can be any value up to the maximum bit length permitted for input to the hash function hash.
  - If an AES-CMAC is being used as the MAC, the salt length shall be the same length as the AES key (i.e. 128, 192, or 256 bits).

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator how to configure the TOE to use the selected key types for all uses identified in the ST.

#### **KMD**

The evaluator shall examine the KMD to ensure that:

- The KMD describes the complete key derivation chain and the description must be consistent with the description in the TSS. For all key derivations the TOE must use a method as described in the cPP table. There should be no uncertainty about how a key is derived from another in the chain.
- The length of the key derivation key is defined by the PRF. The evaluator should check whether the key derivation key length is consistent with the length provided by the selected PRF.
- If a key is used as an input to several KDFs, each invocation must use a distinct context string. If the output of a KDF execution is used for multiple cryptographic keys, those keys must be disjoint segments of the output.

#### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

The evaluator shall perform one or more of the following tests to verify the correctness of the key derivation function, depending on the specific functions that are supported:

Preconditions for testing:

- Specification of input parameter to the key derivation function to be tested
- Specification of further required input parameters
- Access to derived keys

The following table maps the data fields in the tests below to the notations used in SP 800-108 and SP 800-56C

Data Fields	Notations	
	SP 800-108	SP 800-56C
Pseudorandom function	PRF	PRF
Counter length	r	r
Length of output of PRF	r	r
Length of derived keying material	L	L
Length of input values	I_length	I_length
Pseudorandom input values I	K1 (key derivation key)	Z (shared secret)
Pseudorandom salt values		S
Randomness extraction MAC	n/a	MAC

The below tests are derived from Key Derivation using Pseudorandom Functions (SP 800-108), Validation System (KBKDFVS), Updated 4 January 2016, Section 6.2, from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

#### **KeyDrv1: Counter Mode Tests:**

The evaluator shall determine the following characteristics of the key derivation function:

- One or more pseudorandom functions that are supported by the implementation (PRF).
- One or more of the values {8, 16, 24, 32} that equal the length of the binary representation of the counter (r).
- The length (in bits) of the output of the PRF (h).
- Minimum and maximum values for the length (in bits) of the derived keying material (L). These values can be equal if only one value of L is supported. These must be evenly divisible by h.
- Up to two values of L that are NOT evenly divisible by h.
- Location of the counter relative to fixed input data: before, after, or in the middle.
  - Counter before fixed input data: fixed input data string length (in bytes), fixed input data string value.
  - Counter after fixed input data: fixed input data string length (in bytes), fixed input data string value.
  - Counter in the middle of fixed input data: length of data before counter (in bytes), length of data after counter (in bytes), value of string input before counter, value of string input after counter.
- The length (I\_length) of the input values I.

For each supported combination of I\_length, MAC, salt, PRF, counter location, value of r, and value of L, the evaluator shall generate 10 test vectors that include pseudorandom input values

*I*, and pseudorandom salt values. If there is only one value of *L* that is evenly divisible by *h*, the evaluator shall generate 20 test vectors for it. For each test vector, the evaluator shall supply this data to the TOE in order to produce the keying material output.

The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

#### **KeyDrv2: Feedback Mode Tests:**

The evaluator shall determine the following characteristics of the key derivation function:

- One or more pseudorandom functions that are supported by the implementation (PRF).
- The length (in bits) of the output of the PRF (*h*).
- Minimum and maximum values for the length (in bits) of the derived keying material (*L*). These values can be equal if only one value of *L* is supported. These must be evenly divisible by *h*.
- Up to two values of *L* that are NOT evenly divisible by *h*.
- Whether or not zero-length IVs are supported.
- Whether or not a counter is used, and if so:
  - One or more of the values {8, 16, 24, 32} that equal the length of the binary representation of the counter (*r*).
  - Location of the counter relative to fixed input data: before, after, or in the middle.
    - Counter before fixed input data: fixed input data string length (in bytes), fixed input data string value.
    - Counter after fixed input data: fixed input data string length (in bytes), fixed input data string value.
    - Counter in the middle of fixed input data: length of data before counter (in bytes), length of data after counter (in bytes), value of string input before counter, value of string input after counter.
- The length (*I\_length*) of the input values *I*.

For each supported combination of *I\_length*, MAC, salt, PRF, counter location (if a counter is used), value of *r* (if a counter is used), and value of *L*, the evaluator shall generate 10 test vectors that include pseudorandom input values *I* and pseudorandom salt values. If the KDF supports zero-length IVs, five of these test vectors will be accompanied by pseudorandom IVs and the other five will use zero-length IVs. If zero-length IVs are not supported, each test vector will be accompanied by an pseudorandom IV. If there is only one value of *L* that is evenly divisible by *h*, the evaluator shall generate 20 test vectors for it.

For each test vector, the evaluator shall supply this data to the TOE in order to produce the keying material output. The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

#### **KeyDrv3: Double Pipeline Iteration Mode Tests:**

The evaluator shall determine the following characteristics of the key derivation function:

- One or more pseudorandom functions that are supported by the implementation (PRF).
- The length (in bits) of the output of the PRF (*h*).
- Minimum and maximum values for the length (in bits) of the derived keying material (*L*). These values can be equal if only one value of *L* is supported. These must be evenly divisible by *h*.
- Up to two values of *L* that are NOT evenly divisible by *h*.
- Whether or not a counter is used, and if so:
  - One or more of the values {8, 16, 24, 32} that equal the length of the binary representation of the counter (*r*).
  - Location of the counter relative to fixed input data: before, after, or in the middle.
    - Counter before fixed input data: fixed input data string length (in bytes), fixed input data string value.
    - Counter after fixed input data: fixed input data string length (in bytes), fixed input data string value.
    - Counter in the middle of fixed input data: length of data before counter (in bytes), length of data after counter (in bytes), value of string input before counter, value of string input after counter.
- The length (*I\_length*) of the input values *I*.

For each supported combination of *I\_length*, MAC, salt, PRF, counter location (if a counter is used), value of *r* (if a counter is used), and value of *L*, the evaluator shall generate 10 test vectors that include pseudorandom input values *I*, and pseudorandom salt values. If there is only one value of *L* that is evenly divisible by *h*, the evaluator shall generate 20 test vectors for it.

For each test vector, the evaluator shall supply this data to the TOE in order to produce the keying material output. The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

#### **KeyDrv4: Intermediate Keys Method**

If the selected algorithm is a hash then the testing of the hash primitive is the only required Evaluation Activity. If the selected algorithm is XOR then no separate primitive testing is necessary.

#### **KeyDrv5: Concatenated Keys Method**

The evaluator should confirm that the combined length of the concatenated keys should be at least as long as the keysize of the selected methods. There are no other tests other than for the

methods selected for this row performed for KeyDrv1, KeyDrv2, and KeyDrv3.

#### **KeyDrv6: Two Keys Method**

The evaluator should confirm that the combined length of the two keys should be at least as long as the keysize of the selected methods. There are no other tests other than for the methods selected for this row from FCD\_COP.1/SK.

#### **KeyDrv7: Shared Secret, Salt, Output Length, Fixed Information Method**

For each supported selection of PRF, length of shared secret (Z) [selection: 128, 256] bits, length of salt (S) [selection: length of input block of PRF, one-half length of input block of PRF, 0] bits, output length (L) [selection: 128, 256] bits, and length of fixed information (FixedInfo) [selection: length of on input block of PRF, onehalf length of input block of PRF, 0] bits, the evaluator shall generate 10 test vectors that include pseudorandom input values for Z, salt values (for non-zero lengths, otherwise, omit) and fixed information (for non-zero lengths, otherwise, omit).

For each test vector, the evaluator shall supply this data to the TOE in order to produce the keying material output. The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

#### **KeyDrv8: Shared Secret, Salt, IV, Output Length, Fixed Information Method**

For each supported selection of PRF, length of shared secret (Z), length of salt, length of initialization vector (IV), output length (L), and length of fixed information (FixedInfo), the evaluator shall generate 10 test vectors that include pseudorandom input values for Z, salt values (for non-zero lengths, otherwise, omit), IV (for non-zero lengths, otherwise, use a vector of length equal to length of input block of PRF and fill with zeros), and fixed information (for non-zero lengths, otherwise, omit).

For each test vector, the evaluator shall supply this data to the TOE in order to produce the keying material output. The results from each test may either be obtained by the evaluator directly or by supplying the inputs to the implementer and receiving the results in response. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known good implementation.

### **FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)**

#### **FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash**

The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512] that meets the following: [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS 180-4].

**Application Note #9:** The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for signature generation. For example, the DSC should choose SHA-256 for 2048-bit RSA or ECC with P-256, SHA-384 for 3072-bit RSA, 4096-bit RSA, or ECC with P-384, and SHA-512 for ECC with P-521. The ST author selects the standard based on the algorithms selected.

SHA-1 may be used for the following applications: generating and verifying hash-based message authentication codes (HMACs), key derivation functions (KDFs), and random bit/number generation (In certain cases, SHA-1 may also be used for verifying old digital signatures and time stamps, provided that this is explicitly allowed by the application domain).

### **Evaluation Activities ▼**

#### **FCS\_COP.1/Hash:**

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall check that the association of the hash function with other TSF cryptographic functions (for example, the digital signature verification function) is documented in the TSS. The evaluator shall also check that the TSS identifies whether the implementation is bit-oriented or byte-oriented.

##### **Guidance**

The evaluator checks the AGD documents to determine that any configuration that is required to configure the required hash sizes is present. The evaluator also checks the AGD documents to confirm that the instructions for establishing the evaluated configuration use only those hash algorithms selected in the ST.

##### **KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

##### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

##### **SHA-1 and SHA-2 Tests**

The tests below are derived from the "The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS), Updated: May 21, 2014" from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

The TSF hashing functions can be implemented with one of two orientations. The first is a byte-oriented implementation: this hashes messages that are an integral number of bytes in length (i.e., the length (in bits) of the message to be hashed is divisible by 8). The second is a bit-oriented implementation: this hashes messages of arbitrary length. Separate tests for each orientation are given below.

The evaluator shall perform all of the following tests for each hash algorithm and orientation implemented by the TSF and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP. The evaluator shall compare digest values produced by a known-good SHA implementation against those generated by running the same values through the TSF.

#### **Short Messages Test, Bit-oriented Implementation**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $m+1$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm in bits (see SHA Properties Table). The length of the messages ranges sequentially from 0 to  $m$  bits. The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Short Messages Test, Byte-oriented Implementation**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $m/8+1$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm in bits (see SHA Properties Table). The length of the messages ranges sequentially from 0 to  $m/8$  bytes, with each message being an integral number of bytes. The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Selected Long Messages Test, Bit-oriented Implementation**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $m$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm in bits (see SHA Properties Table). The length of the  $i$ th message is  $m + 99*i$ , where  $1 \leq i \leq m$ . The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Selected Long Messages Test, Byte-oriented Implementation**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $m/8$  messages, where  $m$  is the block length of the hash algorithm in bits (see SHA Properties Table). The length of the  $i$ th message is  $m + 8*99*i$ , where  $1 \leq i \leq m/8$ . The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Pseudo-randomly Generated Messages Test**

The evaluators randomly generate a seed that is  $n$  bits long, where  $n$  is the length of the message digest produced by the hash function to be tested. The evaluators then formulate a set of 100 messages and associated digests by following the algorithm provided in Figure 1 of SHAVS, section 6.4. The evaluators then ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **SHA-3 Tests**

The tests below are derived from the The Secure Hash Algorithm-3 Validation System (SHA3VS), Updated: April 7, 2016, from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

For each SHA-3-XXX implementation, XXX represents  $d$ , the digest length in bits. The capacity,  $c$ , is equal to  $2d$  bits. The rate is equal to  $1600-c$  bits.

65 The TSF hashing functions can be implemented with one of two orientations. The first is a bit-oriented mode that hashes messages of arbitrary length. The second is a byte-oriented mode that hashes messages that are an integral number of bytes in length (i.e., the length (in bits) of the message to be hashed is divisible by 8). Separate tests for each orientation are given below.

The evaluator shall perform all of the following tests for each hash algorithm and orientation implemented by the TSF and used to satisfy the requirements of this PP. The evaluator shall compare digest values produced by a known-good SHA-3 implementation against those generated by running the same values through the TSF.

#### **Short Messages Test, Bit-oriented Mode**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $rate+1$  short messages. The length of the messages ranges sequentially from 0 to  $rate$  bits. The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF. The message of length 0 is omitted if the TOE does not support zero-length messages.

#### **Short Messages Test, Byte-oriented Mode**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of  $rate/8+1$  short messages. The length of the messages ranges sequentially from 0 to  $rate/8$  bytes, with each message being an integral number of bytes. The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF. The message of length 0 is omitted if the TOE does not support zero-length messages.

#### **Selected Long Messages Test, Bit-oriented Mode**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of 100 long messages ranging in size from  $rate+(rate+1)$  to  $rate+(100*(rate+1))$ , incrementing by  $rate+1$ . (For example, SHA-3-256 has a rate of 1088 bits. Therefore, 100 messages will be generated with lengths 2177, 3266, ..., 109988 bits.) The message text shall be pseudo-randomly generated. The evaluators compute the message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### **Selected Long Messages Test, Byte-oriented Mode**

The evaluators devise an input set consisting of 100 messages ranging in size from  $(rate+(rate+8))$  to  $(rate+100*(rate+8))$ , incrementing by  $rate+8$ . (For example, SHA-3-256 has a rate of 1088 bits. Therefore 100 messages will be generated of lengths 2184, 3280, 4376, ..., 110688 bits.) The message text shall be pseudorandomly generated. The evaluators compute the

message digest for each of the messages and ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are provided to the TSF.

#### Pseudo-randomly Generated Messages Monte Carlo) Test, Byte-oriented Mode

The evaluators supply a seed of  $d$  bits (where  $d$  is the length of the message digest produced by the hash function to be tested). This seed is used by a pseudorandom function to generate 100,000 message digests. One hundred of the digests (every 1000th digest) are recorded as checkpoints. The TOE then uses the same procedure to generate the same 100,000 message digests and 100 checkpoint values. The evaluators then compare the results generated ensure that the correct result is produced when the messages are generated by the TSF.

### FCS\_COP.1/HMAC Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)

#### FCS\_COP.1.1/HMAC

The TSF shall perform [keyed hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection**: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, KMAC128, KMAC256] and cryptographic key sizes [**assignment**: key size (in bits)] that meet the following: [**selection**: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2", [NIST-KDV] section 4 "KMAC"].

**Application Note #10:** The HMAC key size falls into a range between L1 and L2 defined in ISO/IEC 10118 for the appropriate hash function (for example for SHA-256 L1 = 512, L2 = 256) where  $L2 \leq k \leq L1$ .

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

##### FCS\_COP.1/HMAC:

###### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it specifies the following values used by the HMAC and KMAC functions: output MAC length used.

###### Guidance

There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component.

###### KMD

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

###### Tests

The following test requires the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

This test is derived from The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code Validation System (HMACVS), updated 6 May 2016.

The evaluator shall provide 15 sets of messages and keys for each selected hash algorithm and hash length/key size/MAC size combination. The evaluator shall have the TSF generate HMAC or KMAC tags for these sets of test data. The evaluator shall verify that the resulting HMAC or KMAC tags match the results from submitting the same inputs to a known-good implementation of the HMAC or KMAC function, having the same characteristics.

### FCS\_COP.1/KAT Cryptographic Operation (Key Agreement/Transport)

#### FCS\_COP.1.1/KAT

The TSF shall perform [cryptographic key agreement/transport] using the supported methods for key agreement/transport defined by the following rows of **Table 5**: [**selection**: KAS1, KAS2, KTS-OAEP, RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5, ECDH-NIST, ECDH-BPC, DH, Curve25519, ECIES].

**Table 5: Supported Methods for Key Agreement/Transport Operation**

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
KAS1	RSA-single party	[ <b>selection</b> : 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits	NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 8.2
KAS2	RSA-both party	[ <b>selection</b> : 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits	NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 8.3
KTS-OAEP	RSA	[ <b>selection</b> : 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits	NIST SP 800-56Br2 section 9
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5	RSA	[ <b>selection</b> : 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits	RFC 8017 Section 7.2
ECDH-NIST	ECDH with NIST curves	[ <b>selection</b> : 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 512 (P-521)]	NIST SP 800-56Ar3
ECDH-BPC	ECDH with	[ <b>selection</b> : 256]	RFC 5639 (Section 3)

	Brainpool curves	(brainpoolP256r1), 384 (brainpoolP384r1), 512 (brainpoolP512r1)]	
DH	Diffie-Hellman	[selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192]bits	NIST SP 800-56A rev 3, [selection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• RFC 3526 Section [selection: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7],</li><li>• RFC 7919 Appendices [selection: A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5]</li></ul> ]
Curve25519	ECDH	256 bits	RFC 7748
ECIES	ECIES	[selection: 256, 384, 512]bits	[selection: ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363a, ISO/IEC 18033-2 Part 2, SEC G SEC1 sec 5.1]

**Application Note #11:** The selections in this SFR should be consistent with the algorithms selected in [FCS\\_CKM.2](#).

## Evaluation Activities ▾

### [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT:](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall ensure that the selected RSA and ECDH key agreement/transport schemes correspond to the key generation schemes selected in [FCS\\_CKM.1/AK](#), and the key establishment schemes selected in [FCS\\_CKM.2](#). If the ST selects DH, the TSS shall describe how the implementation meets the relevant sections of RFC 3526 (Section 3-7) and RFC 7919 (Appendices A.1-A.5). If the ST selects ECIES, the TSS shall describe the key sizes and algorithms (e.g. elliptic curve point multiplication, ECDH with either NIST or Brainpool curves, AES in a mode permitted by [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#), a SHA-2 hash algorithm permitted by [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#), and a MAC algorithm permitted by [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#)) that are supported for the ECIES implementation.

The evaluator shall ensure that, for each key agreement/transport scheme, the size of the derived keying material is at least the same as the intended strength of the key agreement/transport scheme, and where feasible this should be twice the intended security strength of the key agreement/transport scheme.

Table 2 of NIST SP 800-57 identifies the key strengths for the different algorithms that can be used for the various key agreement/transport schemes.

#### **Guidance**

There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component.

#### **KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

The evaluator shall verify the implementation of the key generation routines of the supported schemes using the following tests:

#### **If ECDH-NIST or ECDH-BPC is claimed:**

#### **SP800-56A Key Agreement Schemes**

The evaluator shall verify a TOE's implementation of SP800-56A key agreement schemes using the following Function and Validity tests. These validation tests for each key agreement scheme verify that a TOE has implemented the components of the key agreement scheme according to the specifications in the Recommendation. These components include the calculation of the DLC primitives (the shared secret value Z) and the calculation of the derived keying material (DKM) via the Key Derivation Function (KDF). If key confirmation is supported, the evaluator shall also verify that the components of key confirmation have been implemented correctly, using the test procedures described below. This includes the parsing of the DKM, the generation of MACdata and the calculation of MACtag.

#### **Function Test**

The Function test verifies the ability of the TOE to implement the key agreement schemes correctly. To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each supported key agreement scheme-key agreement role combination, KDF type, and, if supported, key confirmation role-key confirmation type combination, the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. The data set consists of one set of domain parameter values (FFC) or the NIST approved curve (ECC) per 10 sets of public keys. These keys are static, ephemeral or both depending on the scheme being tested.

The evaluator shall obtain the DKM, the corresponding TOE's public keys (static or ephemeral),

the MAC tags, and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the Other Information field OI and TOE id fields.

If the TOE does not use a KDF defined in SP 800-56A, the evaluator shall obtain only the public keys and the hashed value of the shared secret.

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of a given scheme by using a known good implementation to calculate the shared secret value, derive the keying material DKM, and compare hashes or MAC tags generated from these values.

If key confirmation is supported, the TSF shall perform the above for each implemented approved MAC algorithm.

#### Validity Test

The Validity test verifies the ability of the TOE to recognize another party's valid and invalid key agreement results with or without key confirmation. To conduct this test, the evaluator shall obtain a list of the supporting cryptographic functions included in the SP800-56A key agreement implementation to determine which errors the TOE should be able to recognize. The evaluator generates a set of 24 (FFC) or 30 (ECC) test vectors consisting of data sets including domain parameter values or NIST approved curves, the evaluator's public keys, the TOE's public/private key pairs, MACTag, and any inputs used in the KDF, such as the other info and TOE id fields.

The evaluator shall inject an error in some of the test vectors to test that the TOE recognizes invalid key agreement results caused by the following fields being incorrect: the shared secret value Z, the DKM, the other information field OI, the data to be MACed, or the generated MACTag. If the TOE contains the full or partial (only ECC) public key validation, The evaluator shall also individually inject errors in both parties' static public keys, both parties' ephemeral public keys and the TOE's static private key to assure the TOE detects errors in the public key validation function or the partial key validation function (in ECC only). At least two of the test vectors shall remain unmodified and therefore should result in valid key agreement results (they should pass).

The TOE shall use these modified test vectors to emulate the key agreement scheme using the corresponding parameters. The evaluator shall compare the TOE's results with the results using a known good implementation verifying that the TOE detects these errors.

#### If KAS1, KAS2, KTS-OAEP, or RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 is claimed:

##### SP800-56B and PKCS#1 Key Establishment Schemes

If the TOE acts as a sender, the following evaluation activity shall be performed to ensure the proper operation of every TOE supported combination of RSA-based key establishment scheme:

To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each combination of supported key establishment scheme and its options (with or without key confirmation if supported, for each supported key confirmation MAC function if key confirmation is supported, and for each supported mask generation function if KTS-OAEP is supported), the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. Each test vector shall include the RSA public key, the plaintext keying material, any additional input parameters if applicable, the MacKey and MacTag if key confirmation is incorporated, and the outputted ciphertext. For each test vector, the evaluator shall perform a key establishment encryption operation on the TOE with the same inputs (in cases where key confirmation is incorporated, the test shall use the MacKey from the test vector instead of the randomly generated MacKey used in normal operation) and ensure that the outputted ciphertext is equivalent to the ciphertext in the test vector.

If the TOE acts as a receiver, the following evaluation activities shall be performed to ensure the proper operation of every TOE supported combination of RSA-based key establishment scheme:

To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each combination of supported key establishment scheme and its options (with or without key confirmation if supported, for each supported key confirmation MAC function if key confirmation is supported, and for each supported mask generation function if KTS-OAEP is supported), the tester shall generate 10 sets of test vectors. Each test vector shall include the RSA private key, the plaintext keying material (KeyData), any additional input parameters if applicable, the MacTag in cases where key confirmation is incorporated, and the outputted ciphertext. For each test vector, the evaluator shall perform the key establishment decryption operation on the TOE and ensure that the outputted plaintext keying material (KeyData) is equivalent to the plain text keying material in the test vector. In cases where key confirmation is incorporated, the evaluator shall perform the key confirmation steps and ensure that the outputted MacTag is equivalent to the MacTag in the test vector.

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the TOE handles decryption errors. In accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-56B, the TOE must not reveal the particular error that occurred, either through the contents of any outputted or logged error message or through timing variations. If KTS-OAEP is supported, the evaluator shall create separate contrived ciphertext values that trigger each of the three decryption error checks described in NIST Special Publication 800-56B section 7.2.2.3, ensure that each decryption attempt results in an error, and ensure that any outputted or logged error message is identical for each.

#### DH:

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of each TSF implementation of each supported Diffie-Hellman group by comparison with a known good implementation.

#### Curve25519:

The evaluator shall verify a TOE's implementation of the key agreement scheme using the following Function and Validity tests. These validation tests for each key agreement scheme verify that a TOE has implemented the components of the key agreement scheme according to the specification. These components include the calculation of the shared secret K and the hash of K.

### Function Test

The Function test verifies the ability of the TOE to implement the key agreement schemes correctly. To conduct this test the evaluator shall generate or obtain test vectors from a known good implementation of the TOE supported schemes. For each supported key agreement role and hash function combination, the tester shall generate 10 sets of public keys. These keys are static, ephemeral or both depending on the scheme being tested.

The evaluator shall obtain the shared secret value K, and the hash of K. The evaluator shall verify the correctness of the TSF's implementation of a given scheme by using a known good implementation to calculate the shared secret value K and compare the hash generated from this value.

### Validity Test

The Validity test verifies the ability of the TOE to recognize another party's valid and invalid key agreement results. To conduct this test, the evaluator generates a set of 30 test vectors consisting of data sets including the evaluator's public keys and the TOE's public/private key pairs.

The evaluator shall inject an error in some of the test vectors to test that the TOE recognizes invalid key agreement results caused by the following fields being incorrect: the shared secret value K or the hash of K. At least two of the test vectors shall remain unmodified and therefore should result in valid key agreement results (they should pass).

The TOE shall use these modified test vectors to emulate the key agreement scheme using the corresponding parameters. The evaluator shall compare the TOE's results with the results using a known good implementation verifying that the TOE detects these errors.

### ECIES:

The evaluator shall verify the correctness of each TSF implementation of each supported use of ECIES by comparison with a known good implementation.

## FCS\_COP.1/KeyEnc Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyEnc

The TSF shall perform [key encryption and decryption] using the methods defined in the following rows of **Table 6**: [**selection**: SE1, AE1, SE2, XOR]

**Table 6: Supported Methods for Key Encryption Operation**

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
SE1	Symmetric [ <b>selection</b> : AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-CTR, AES-KWP, AESKW]	[ <b>selection</b> : 128, 192, 256] bits	See <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/SKC</a>
AE1	Asymmetric KTS-OAEP	[ <b>selection</b> : 2048, 3072] bits	See <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/SKC</a>
SE2	Symmetric [ <b>selection</b> : CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM]	[ <b>selection</b> : 128, 256] bits	See <a href="#">FCS_COP.1/KAT</a>
XOR	Exclusive OR operation	[ <b>selection</b> : 128, 192, 256] bits	See <a href="#">FCS_CKM_EXT.5</a>

**Application Note #12:** A TOE will use this requirement to specify how the Key Encryption Key (KEK) wraps a symmetric encryption key. A TOE will always need this requirement in order to capture the last stage of the key chain in which the Key Encryption Key (KEK) wraps the symmetric encryption key.

If XOR is selected, the selection-based SFR [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#) must be claimed by the TOE.

## Evaluation Activities

### [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc](#):

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it identifies whether the implementation of this cryptographic operation for key encryption (including key lengths and modes) is an implementation that is tested in [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#).

The evaluator shall check that the TSS includes a description of the key wrap functions and shall check that this uses a key wrap algorithm and key sizes according to the specification selected in the ST out of the table as provided in the CPP table.

#### Guidance

The evaluator checks the AGD documents to confirm that the instructions for establishing the evaluated configuration use only those key wrap functions selected in the ST. If multiple key access modes are supported, the evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to determine that the method of choosing a specific mode/key size by the end user is described.

#### KMD

The evaluator shall examine the KMD to ensure that it describes when the key wrapping occurs, that the KMD description is consistent with the description in the TSS, and that for all keys that are wrapped the TOE uses a method as described in the cPP table. No uncertainty should be left over which is the wrapping key and the key to be wrapped and where the wrapping key potentially comes from i.e. is derived from.

If "AES-GCM" or "AES-CCM" is used the evaluator shall examine the KMD to ensure that it describes how the IV is generated and that the same IV is never reused to encrypt different plaintext pairs under the same key. Moreover in the case of GCM, he must ensure that, at each invocation of GCM, the length of the plaintext is at most (2<sup>32</sup>-2) blocks.

#### Tests

Refer to [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#) for the required testing for each symmetric key wrapping method selected from the table and to [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#) for the required testing for each asymmetric key wrapping method selected from the table. Each distinct implementation shall be tested separately.

If the implementation of the key encryption operation is the same implementation tested under [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#) or [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#), and it has been tested with the same key lengths and modes, then no further testing is required. If key encryption uses a different implementation, (where "different implementation" includes the use of different key lengths or modes), then the evaluator shall additionally test the key encryption implementation using the corresponding tests specified for [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#) or [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#).

## FCS\_COP.1/PBKDF Cryptographic Operation (Password-Based Key Derivation Functions)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/PBKDF

The TSF shall perform [password-based key derivation functions] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC- **selection**: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512]], with [**assignment**: integer number greater than or equal to 1000] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [**selection**: 128, 192, 256] bits that meet the following standard: [NIST SP 800-132].

**Application Note #13:** The ST must condition a password into a string of bits prior to using it as input to algorithms that form SKs and KEKs. The ST can perform conditioning using one of the identified hash functions or the process described in NIST SP 800-132; the ST author selects the method used. NIST SP 800-132 requires the use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) consisting of HMAC with an approved hash function.

Appendix A of NIST SP 800-132 recommends setting the iteration count in order to increase the computation needed to derive a key from a password and, therefore, increase the workload of performing a dictionary attack.

The TOE must claim this requirement if it claims [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#) and selects an algorithm in the PBK row or claims [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#) and selects at least one of KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, or KeyDrv6 AND uses password-based key derivation to create at least one of the inputs.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_COP.1/PBKDF](#):

#### TSS

The evaluator shall review the TSS to verify that it contains a description of the PBKDF. The evaluator shall also confirm the ST supports the selected hash function itself. The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS contains a description of how the TOE ensures that the output of the PBKDF is at least the same length as that specified in [FCS\\_CKM.1/SK](#) and for the KeyDrv4, KeyDrv5, or KeyDrv6 in [FCS\\_CKM\\_EXT.5](#).

If the ST performs additional conditioning, whitening, or manipulation of the password or passphrase before applying the PBKDF, or to the output of the PBKDF, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes the actions and provides assurance that the TSF does not negatively impact the entropy of the PBKDF output.

If any manipulation of the key is performed in forming the submask that will be used to form the KEK, that process shall be described in the TSS.

#### Guidance

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

#### KMD

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### Tests

No explicit testing of the formation of the submask from the input password is required.

For the NIST SP 800-132-based conditioning of the passphrase, the required evaluation activities will be performed when doing the evaluation activities for the appropriate requirements ([FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#)).

The evaluator shall verify that the iteration count for PBKDFs performed by the TOE comply with NIST SP 800-132 by ensuring that the TSS contains a description of the estimated time required to derive key material from passwords and how the TOE increases the computation time for password-based key derivation (including but not limited to increasing the iteration count).

## FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen

The TSF shall perform [digital signature generation] using the supported

methods for signature generation defined in the following rows of [Table 7](#)  
**[selection]:** *SigGen1, SigGen2, SigGen3, SigGen4, SigGen5*.

**Table 7: Supported Methods for Signature Generation Operation**

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
SigGen1	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using [selection: <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i> ]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[selection: <i>RFC 8017, PKCS #1 v2.2 (Section 8.2), FIPS186-4, (Section 5.5)</i> (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)  [selection: <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)</i> (SHA)]
SigGen2	Digital signature scheme 2 using [selection: <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i> ]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 9) (Digital signature scheme 2)  [selection: <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)</i> (SHA)]
SigGen3	Digital signature scheme 3 using [selection: <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i> ]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 10) (Digital signature scheme 3)  [selection: <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)</i> (SHA)]
SigGen4	RSASSA-PSS using [selection: <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i> ]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[RFC8017, PKCS#1v2.2 (Section 8.1)] (RSASSAPSS)  [selection: <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)</i> (SHA)]
SigGen5	ECDSA on [selection: <i>brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, NIST P-256, NIST P-384, NIST P-521</i> ] using [selection: <i>SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512</i> ]	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[selection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [selection: <i>ISO14888-3, FIPS186-4 (Section 6)</i> (EDCSA),</li><li>• <i>RFC5639 (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves)</i>,</li><li>• <i>FIPS186-4 (Appendix D.1.2) (NIST Curves)</i></li></ul> ]  [selection: <i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)</i>

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_COP.1/SigGen:](#)

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that all signature generation functions use the approved algorithms and key sizes.

#### **Guidance**

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

#### **KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

Each section below contains tests the evaluators must perform for each selected digital signature scheme. Based on the assignments and selections in the requirement, the evaluators choose the specific activities that correspond to those selections.

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are not found on the TOE in its evaluated configuration.

#### **If SigGen1: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 or SigGen4: RSASSA-PSS is claimed:**

The below test is derived from The 186-4 RSA Validation System (RSA2VS). Updated 8 July 2014, Section 6.3, from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

To test the implementation of RSA signature generation the evaluator uses the system under test to generate signatures for 10 messages for each combination of modulus size and SHA algorithm. The evaluator then uses a known-good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.

#### **If SigGen2: Digital Signature Scheme 2 (DSS2) or SigGen3: Digital Signature Scheme 3 (DSS3):**

To test the implementation of DSS2/3 signature generation the evaluator uses the system under test to generate signatures for 10 messages for each combination of SHA algorithm, hash size and key size. The evaluator then uses a known-good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.

#### **If SigGen5: ECDSA is claimed:**

The below test is derived from The FIPS 186-4 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm Validation System (ECDSA2VS). Updated 18 March 2014, Section 6.4, from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

To test the implementation of ECDSA signature generation the evaluator uses the system under test to generate signatures for 10 messages for each combination of curve, SHA algorithm, hash size, and key size. The evaluator then uses a known-good implementation and the associated public keys to verify the signatures.

## FCS\_COP.1/SigVer Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/SigVer

The TSF shall perform [digital signature verification] using the supported methods for signature verification defined in the following rows of [Table 8](#) [**selection**: SigVer1, SigVer2, SigVer3, SigVer4, SigVer5].

**Table 8: Supported Methods for Signature Verification Operation**

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
SigVer1	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using [ <b>selection</b> : SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[ <b>selection</b> : 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[ <b>selection</b> : RFC 8017, PKCS #1 v2.2 (Section 8.2), FIPS186-4, (Section 5.5)] (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)  [ <b>selection</b> : ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigVer2	Digital signature scheme 2 using [ <b>selection</b> : SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[ <b>selection</b> : 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 9) (Digital signature scheme 2)  [ <b>selection</b> :

			<i>ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)</i>
SigVer3	Digital signature scheme 3 using <b>[selection:</b> SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	<b>[selection:</b> 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	ISO9796-2, (Clause 10) (Digital signature scheme 3)  <b>[selection:</b> ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigVer4	RSASSA-PSS using <b>[selection:</b> SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	<b>[selection:</b> 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	[RFC8017, PKCS#1v2.2 (Section 8.1)] (RSASSAPSS)  <b>[selection:</b> ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)
SigVer5	ECDSA on <b>[selection:</b> brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, NIST P-256, NIST P-384, NIST P-521] using <b>[selection:</b> SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	<b>[selection:</b> 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	<b>[selection:</b> [selection: • <b>[selection:</b> ISO14888- 3, FIPS186-4 (Section 6)] (EDCSA), • RFC5639 (Section 3) (Brainpool Curves), • FIPS186-4 (Appendix D.1.2) (NIST Curves) ]  <b>[selection:</b> ISO10118-3 (Clause 10, 11), FIPS180-4 (Section 6)] (SHA)

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### *FCS\_COP.1/SigVer:*

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it describes the overall flow of the signature verification. This should at least include identification of the format and general location (e.g., "firmware on the hard drive device" rather than "memory location 0x000007A4B") of the data to be used in verifying the digital signature; how the data received from the operational environment are brought onto the device; and any processing that is performed that is not part of the digital signature algorithm (for instance, checking of certificate revocation lists).

#### **Guidance**

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

#### **KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### **Tests**

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

Each section below contains tests the evaluators must perform for each selected digital signature scheme. Based on the assignments and selections in the requirement, the evaluators choose the specific activities that correspond to those selections.

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are not found on the TOE in its evaluated configuration.

#### **SigVer1: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 and SigVer4: RSASSA-PSS**

These tests are derived from The 186-4 RSA Validation System (RSA2VS), updated 8 Jul 2014, Section 6.4.

The FIPS 186-4 RSA Signature Verification Test tests the ability of the TSF to recognize valid and invalid signatures. The evaluator shall provide a modulus and three associated key pairs ( $d$ ,  $e$ ) for each combination of selected SHA algorithm, modulus size and hash size. Each private key  $d$  is used to sign six pseudorandom messages each of 1024 bits. For five of the six messages, the public key ( $e$ ), message, IR format, padding, or signature is altered so that signature verification should fail. The test passes only if all the signatures made using unaltered parameters result in successful signature verification, and all the signatures made using altered parameters result in unsuccessful signature verification.

### **SigVer5: ECDSA on NIST and Brainpool Curves**

These tests are derived from The FIPS 186-4 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm Validation System (ECDSA2VS), updated 18 Mar 2014, Section 6.5.

The FIPS 186-4 ECC Signature Verification Test tests the ability of the TSF to recognize valid and invalid signatures. The evaluator shall provide a modulus and associated key pair ( $x$ ,  $y$ ) for each combination of selected curve, SHA algorithm, modulus size, and hash size. Each private key ( $x$ ) is used to sign 15 pseudorandom messages of 1024 bits. For eight of the fifteen messages, the message, IR format, padding, or signature is altered so that signature verification should fail. The test passes only if all the signatures made using unaltered parameters result in successful signature verification, and all the signatures made using altered parameters result in unsuccessful signature verification.

### **SigVer2: Digital Signature Scheme 2**

The following or equivalent steps shall be taken to test the TSF.

For each supported modulus size, underlying hash algorithm, and length of the trailer field (1- or 2-byte), the evaluator shall generate  $N_T$  sets of recoverable message ( $M_1$ ), non-recoverable message ( $M_2$ ), salt, public key and signature ( $\Sigma$ ).

1.  $N_T$  shall be greater than or equal to 20.
2. The length of salts shall be selected from its supported length range of salt. The typical length of salt is equal to the output block length of underlying hash algorithm (see 9.2.2 of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010).
3. The length of recoverable messages should be selected by considering modulus size, output block length of underlying hash algorithm, and length of salt ( $L_S$ ). As described in Annex D of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010, it is desirable to maximise the length of recoverable message. The following table shows the maximum bit-length of recoverable message that is divisible by 512, for some combinations of modulus size, underlying hash algorithm, and length of salt. Note that 2-byte trailer field is assumed in calculating the maximum length of recoverable message

Maximum length of recoverable message divisible by 512 (bits)	Modulus size (bits)	Underlying hash algorithm (bits)	Length of salt $L_S$ (bits)
1536	2048	SHA-256	128
1024			256
1024	SHA-512	128	
1024		256	
512			512
2560	3072	SHA-256	128
2048			256
2048	SHA-512	128	
2048		256	
1536			512

4. The length of non-recoverable messages should be selected by considering the underlying hash algorithm and usages. If the TSF is used for verifying the authenticity of software/firmware updates, the length of non-recoverable messages should be selected greater than or equal to 2048-bit. With this length range, it means that the underlying hash algorithm is also tested for two or more input blocks.
5. The evaluator shall select approximately one half of  $N_T$  sets and shall alter one of the values (non-recoverable message, public key exponent or signature) in the sets. In altering public key exponent, the evaluator shall alter the public key exponent while keeping the exponent odd. In altering signatures, the following ways should be considered.
  - a. Altering a signature just by replacing a bit in the bit-string representation of the signature
  - b. Altering a signature so that the trailer in the message representative cannot be interpreted. This can be achieved by following ways:
    - Setting the rightmost four bits of the message representative to the values other than '1100'.
    - In the case when 1-byte trailer is used, setting the rightmost byte of the message representative to the values other than '0xbc', while keeping the rightmost four bits to '1100'.
    - In the case when 2-byte trailer is used, setting the rightmost byte of the message representative to the values other than '0xcc', while keeping the rightmost four bits to '1100'.
  - c. In the case when 2-byte trailer is used, altering a signature so that the hash algorithm identifier in the trailer (i.e. the left most byte of the trailer) does not correspond to hash algorithms identified in the SFR. The hash algorithm identifiers are 0x34 for SHA-

256 (see Clause 10 of ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018), and 0x35 for SHA-512 (see Clause 11 of ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018).

- d. Let  $L_S$  be the length of salt, altering a signature so that the intermediate bit string  $D$  in the message representative is set to all zeroes except for the rightmost  $L_S$  bits of  $D$ .
- e. (non-conformant signature length) Altering a signature so that the length of signature  $\Sigma$  is changed to modulus size and the most significant bit of signature  $\Sigma$  is set equal to '1'.
- f. (non-conformant signature) Altering a signature so that the integer converted from signature  $\Sigma$  is greater than modulus  $n$ .

The evaluator shall supply the NT sets to the TSF and obtain in response a set of NT Verification-Success or Verification-Fail values. When the VerificationSuccess is obtained, the evaluator shall also obtain recovered message (M 1\*).

The evaluator shall verify that Verification-Success results correspond to the unaltered sets and Verification-Fail results correspond to the altered sets.

For each recovered message, the evaluator shall compare the recovered message (M1\*) with the corresponding recoverable message (M 1) in the unaltered sets.

The test passes only if all the signatures made using unaltered sets result in Verification-Success, each recovered message (M 1\*) is equal to corresponding M 1 in the unaltered sets, and all the signatures made using altered sets result in Verification-Fail.

### **SigVer3: Digital Signature Scheme 3**

The evaluator shall perform the test described in SigVer2: Digital Signature Scheme 2 while using a fixed salt for NT sets.

## **FCS\_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric Key Cryptography)**

### FCS\_COP.1.1/SKC

The TSF shall perform [data encryption/decryption] using the supported symmetric-key cryptography methods defined in the following rows of **Table 9** [**selection**: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-CTR, XTS-AES, AES-KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM, XTS-CAM].

**Table 9: Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Cryptography Operation**

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
AES-CCM	AES in CCM mode with unpredictable, nonrepeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits	[ <b>selection</b> : 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) ISO 19772, Clause 8 (CCM) NIST SP800-38C (CCM)
AES-GCM	AES in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs; IV length must be equal to 96 bits; the deterministic IV construction method (SP800-38D, Section 8.2.1) must be used; the MAC length t must be one of the values [ <b>selection</b> : 96, 104, 112, 120, 128]	[ <b>selection</b> : 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) ISO 19772, Clause 11 (GCM) NIST SP800-38D (GCM)
AES-CBC	AES in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	[ <b>selection</b> : 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) ISO 10116 (CBC) NIST SP800-38A (CBC)
AES-CTR	AES in counter mode with a non-repeating initial counter and with no repeated use of counter values across multiple messages with the same secret key	[ <b>selection</b> : 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) ISO 10116 (CTR) NIST SP800-38A (CTR)
XTS-AES	AES in XTS mode with unique [ <b>selection</b> : consecutive non-negative integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer, data unit sequence numbers] tweak values	[ <b>selection</b> : 256 bits, 512 bits] [ <b>selection</b> : IEEE 1619, NIST]	ISO 18033-3 (AES) IEEE 1619, NIST

AES-KWP	KWP based on AES	[selection: ISO 18033-3 (AES) 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]  NIST SP 800-38F, sec. 6.3 (KWP)
AES-KW	KW based on AES	[selection: ISO 18033-3 (AES) 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits]  NIST SP 800-38F, sec. 6.2 (KW)  ISO/IEC 19772, clause 7 (key wrap)
CAM-CBC	Camellia in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	[selection: ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) 128 bits, 256 bits]  ISO 10116 (CBC)
CAM-CCM	Camellia in CCM mode with unpredictable, nonrepeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits	[selection: ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) 128 bits, 256 bits]  ISO 19772, Clause 8 (CCM)  NIST SP800-38C (CCM)
CAM-GCM	Camellia in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs; IV length must be equal to 96 bits; the deterministic IV construction method (SP800-38D, Section 8.2.1) must be used; the MAC length t must be one of the values [selection: 96, 104, 112, 120, 128]	[selection: ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) 128 bits, 256 bits]  ISO 19772, Clause 11 (GCM)  NIST SP800-38D (GCM)
XTS-CAM	Camellia in XTS mode with unique [selection: consecutive non-negative integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer, data unit sequence numbers] tweak values	[selection: ISO 18033-3 (Camellia) 256 bits, 512 bits]  [selection: IEEE 1619, NIST SP800-38E](XTS)

## Evaluation Activities ▾

### FCS\_COP.1/SKC:

#### TSS

The evaluator shall check that the TSS includes a description of encryption functions used for symmetric key encryption. The evaluator should check that this description of the selected encryption function includes the key sizes and modes of operations as specified in the cPP table 9 "Supported Methods for Symmetric Key Cryptography Operation."

The evaluator shall check that the TSS describes the means by which the TOE satisfies constraints on algorithm parameters included in the selections made for 'cryptographic algorithm' and 'list of standards'.

#### Guidance

If the product supports multiple modes, the evaluator shall examine the vendor's documentation to determine that the method of choosing a specific mode/key size by the end user is described.

#### KMD

The evaluator shall examine the KMD to ensure that the points at which symmetric key encryption and decryption occurs are described, and that the complete data path for symmetric key encryption is described. The evaluator checks that this description is consistent with the relevant parts of the TSS.

Assessment of the complete data path for symmetric key encryption includes confirming that the KMD describes the data flow from the device's host interface to the device's non-volatile

memory storing the data, and gives information enabling the user data datapath to be distinguished from those situations in which data bypasses the data encryption engine (e.g. read-write operations to an unencrypted Master Boot Record area). The evaluator shall ensure that the documentation of the data path is detailed enough that it thoroughly describes the parts of the TOE that the data passes through (e.g. different memory types, processors and co-processors), its encryption state (i.e. encrypted or unencrypted) in each part, and any places where the data is stored. For example, any caching or buffering of the data should be identified and distinguished from the final destination in non-volatile memory (the latter represents the location from which the host will expect to retrieve the data in future).

If support for AES-CTR is claimed and the counter value source is internal to the TOE, the evaluator shall verify that the KMD describes the internal counter mechanism used to ensure that it provides unique counter block values.

### Tests

The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.

The following tests are conditional based upon the selections made in the SFR. The evaluator shall perform the following test or witness respective tests executed by the developer. The tests must be executed on a platform that is as close as practically possible to the operational platform (but which may be instrumented in terms of, for example, use of a debug mode). Where the test is not carried out on the TOE itself, the test platform shall be identified and the differences between test environment and TOE execution environment shall be described.

Preconditions for testing:

- Specification of keys as input parameter to the function to be tested
- specification of required input parameters such as modes
- Specification of user data (plaintext)
- Tapping of encrypted user data (ciphertext) directly in the non-volatile memory

### AES-CBC:

For the AES-CBC tests described below, the plaintext, ciphertext, and IV values shall consist of 128-bit blocks. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known-good implementation.

These tests are intended to be equivalent to those described in NIST's AES Algorithm Validation Suite (AESAVS) (<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/aes/AESAVS.pdf>). It is not recommended that evaluators use values obtained from static sources such as the example NIST's AES Known Answer Test Values from the AESAVS document, or use values not generated expressly to exercise the AES-CBC implementation.

### AES-CBC Known Answer Tests

**KAT-1 (GFSBox):** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of five different plaintext values for each selected key size and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of the given plaintext using a key value of all zeros and an IV of all zeros.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of five different ciphertext values for each selected key size and obtain the plaintext value that results from AES-CBC decryption of the given ciphertext using a key value of all zeros and an IV of all zeros.

**KAT-2 (KeySBox):** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of five different key values for each selected key size and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CBC encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value and an IV of all zeros.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of five different key values for each selected key size and obtain the plaintext that results from AES-CBC decryption of an all-zeros ciphertext using the given key and an IV of all zeros.

**KAT-3 (Variable Key):** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall supply a set of keys for each selected key size (as described below) and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using each key and an IV of all zeros.

Key  $i$  in each set shall have the leftmost  $i$  bits set to ones and the remaining bits to zeros, for values of  $i$  from 1 to the key size. The keys and corresponding ciphertext are listed in AESAVS, Appendix E.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, the evaluator shall use the same keys as above to decrypt the ciphertext results from above. Each decryption should result in an all-zeros plaintext.

**KAT-4 (Variable Text):** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CBC, for each selected key size, the evaluator shall supply a set of 128-bit plaintext values (as described below) and obtain the ciphertext values that result from AES-CBC encryption of each plaintext value using a key of each size and IV consisting of all zeros.

Plaintext value  $i$  shall have the leftmost  $i$  bits set to ones and the remaining bits set to zeros, for values of  $i$  from 1 to 128. The plaintext values are listed in AESAVS, Appendix D.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CBC, for each selected key size, use the plaintext values from above as ciphertext input, and AES-CBC decrypt each ciphertext value using key of each size consisting of all zeros and an IV of all zeros.

### AES-CBC Multi-Block Message Test

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality by encrypting nine  $i$ -block messages for each selected key size, for  $2 \leq i \leq 10$ . For each test, the evaluator shall supply a key, an IV, and a plaintext message of length  $i$  blocks, and encrypt the message using AES-CBC. The resulting ciphertext values shall be compared to the results of encrypting the plaintext messages using a known good implementation.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality by decrypting nine  $i$ -block messages for each selected key size, for  $2 \leq i \leq 10$ . For each test, the evaluator shall supply a key, an IV, and a ciphertext message of length  $i$  blocks, and decrypt the message using AES-CBC. The resulting plaintext values shall be compared to the results of decrypting the ciphertext messages using a known good implementation.

### AES-CBC Monte Carlo Tests

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality for each selected key size using 100 3-tuples of pseudo-random values for plaintext, IVs, and keys.

The evaluator shall supply a single 3-tuple of pseudo-random values for each selected key size. This 3-tuple of plaintext, IV, and key is provided as input to the below algorithm to generate the remaining 99 3-tuples, and to run each 3-tuple through 1000 iterations of AES-CBC encryption.

```
# Input: PT, IV, Key
Key[0] = Key
IV[0] = IV
PT[0] = PT
for i = 0 to 99 {
    Output Key[i], IV[i], PT[0]
    for j = 0 to 999 {
        if (j == 0) {
            CT[j] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key[i], IV[i], PT[j])
            PT[j+1] = IV[i]
        } else {
            CT[j] = AES-CBC-Encrypt(Key[i], PT[j])
            PT[j+1] = CT[j-1]
        }
    }
    Output CT[j]
    If (KeySize == 128) Key[i+1] = Key[i] xor CT[j]
    If (KeySize == 192) Key[i+1] = Key[i] xor (last 64 bits of CT[j-1] ||
    If (KeySize == 256) Key[i+1] = Key[i] xor ((CT[j-1] | CT[j])
    IV[i+1] = CT[j]
    PT[0] = CT[j-1]
}
```

The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration ( $CT[999]$ ) is the result for each of the 100 3-tuples for each selected key size. This result shall be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good implementation.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality using the same test as above, exchanging CT and PT, and replacing AES-CBC-Encrypt with AES-CBC-Decrypt.

### AES-CCM:

These tests are intended to be equivalent to those described in the NIST document, "The CCM Validation System (CCMVS)," updated 9 Jan 2012, found at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/mac/CCMVS.pdf>.

It is not recommended that evaluators use values obtained from static sources such as <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/mac/ccmtestvectors.zip> or use values not generated expressly to exercise the AES-CCM implementation.

The evaluator shall test the generation-encryption and decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM for the following input parameter and tag lengths:

- **Keys:** All supported and selected key sizes (e.g., 128, 192, or 256 bits).
- **Associated Data:** Two or three values for associated data length: The minimum ( $\geq 0$  bytes) and maximum ( $\leq 32$  bytes) supported associated data lengths, and  $2^{16}$  (65536) bytes, if supported.
- **Payload:** Two values for payload length: The minimum ( $\geq 0$  bytes) and maximum ( $\leq 32$  bytes) supported payload lengths.
- **Nonces:** All supported nonce lengths (e.g., 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13) in bytes.
- **Tag:** All supported tag lengths (e.g., 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16) in bytes.

The testing for CCM consists of five tests. To determine correctness in each of the below tests, the evaluator shall compare the ciphertext with the result of encryption of the same inputs with a known good implementation.

**Variable Associated Data Test:** For each supported key size and associated data length, and any supported payload length, nonce length, and tag length, the evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value, and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values, and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

**Variable Payload Text:** For each supported key size and payload length, and any supported associated data length, nonce length, and tag length, the evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value, and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values, and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

**Variable Nonce Test:** For each supported key size and nonce length, and any supported associated data length, payload length, and tag length, the evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value, and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values, and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

**Variable Tag Test:** For each supported key size and tag length, and any supported associated data length, payload length, and nonce length, the evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value, and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values, and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

**Decryption-Verification Process Test:** To test the decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM, for each combination of supported associated data length, payload length, nonce length, and tag length, the evaluator shall supply a key value and 15 sets of input plus ciphertext, and obtain the decrypted payload. Ten of the 15 input sets supplied should fail verification and five should pass.

**AES-GCM:** These tests are intended to be equivalent to those described in the NIST document, "The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC Validation System (GCMVS) with the Addition of XPN Validation Testing," rev. 15 Jun 2016, section 6.2, found at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/mac/gcmvs.pdf>.

It is not recommended that evaluators use values obtained from static sources such as <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/mac/gcmtestvectors.zip>, or use values not generated expressly to exercise the AES-GCM implementation.

The evaluator shall test the authenticated encryption functionality of AES-GCM by supplying 15 sets of Key, Plaintext, AAD, IV, and Tag data for every combination of the following parameters as selected in the ST and supported by the implementation under test:

- **Key size in bits:** Each selected and supported key size (e.g., 128, 192, or 256 bits).
- **Plaintext length in bits:** Up to four values for plaintext length: Two values that are non-zero integer multiples of 128, if supported. And two values that are non-multiples of 128, if supported.
- **AAD length in bits:** Up to five values for AAD length: Zero-length, if supported. Two values that are non-zero integer multiples of 128, if supported. And two values that are integer non-multiples of 128, if supported.
- **IV length in bits:** Up to three values for IV length: 96 bits. Minimum and maximum supported lengths, if different.
- **MAC length in bits:** Each supported length (e.g., 128, 120, 112, 104, 96).

To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known-good implementation.

The evaluator shall test the authenticated decrypt functionality of AES-GCM by supplying 15 Ciphertext-Tag pairs for every combination of the above parameters, replacing Plaintext length with Ciphertext length. For each parameter combination the evaluator shall introduce an error into either the Ciphertext or the Tag such that approximately half of the cases are correct and half the cases contain errors. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting pass/fail status and Plaintext values to the results obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known-good implementation.

#### **AES-CTR:**

For the AES-CTR tests described below, the plaintext and ciphertext values shall consist of 128-bit blocks. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the resulting values to those obtained by submitting the same inputs to a known-good implementation.

These tests are intended to be equivalent to those described in NIST's AES Algorithm Validation Suite (AESAVS) (<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/aes/AESAVS.pdf>). It is not recommended that evaluators use values obtained from static sources such as the example NIST's AES Known Answer Test Values from the AESAVS document, or use values not generated expressly to exercise the AES-CTR implementation.

#### **AES-CTR Known Answer Tests**

**KAT-1 (GFSBox):** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CTR, the evaluator shall supply a set of five different plaintext values for each selected key size and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CTR encryption of the given plaintext using a key value of all zeros.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CTR, the evaluator shall supply a set of five different ciphertext values for each selected key size and obtain the plaintext value that results from AES-CTR decryption of the given ciphertext using a key value of all zeros.

**KAT-2 (KeySBox):** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CTR, the evaluator shall supply a set of five different key values for each selected key size and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES-CTR encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using the given key value.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CTR, the evaluator shall supply a set of five different key values for each selected key size and obtain the plaintext that results from AES-CTR decryption of an all-zeros ciphertext using the given key.

**KAT-3 (Variable Key):** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CTR, the evaluator shall supply a set of keys for each selected key size (as described below) and obtain the ciphertext value that results from AES encryption of an all-zeros plaintext using each key.

Key  $i$  in each set shall have the leftmost  $i$  bits set to ones and the remaining bits to zeros, for values of  $i$  from 1 to the key size. The keys and corresponding ciphertext are listed in AESAVS, Appendix E.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CTR, the evaluator shall use the same keys as above to decrypt the ciphertext results from above. Each decryption should result in an all-zeros plaintext.

**KAT-4 (Variable Text):** To test the encrypt functionality of AES-CTR, for each selected key size, the evaluator shall supply a set of 128-bit plaintext values (as described below) and obtain the ciphertext values that result from AES-CTR encryption of each plaintext value using a key of each size.

Plaintext value  $i$  shall have the leftmost  $i$  bits set to ones and the remaining bits set to zeros, for values of  $i$  from 1 to 128. The plaintext values are listed in AESAVS, Appendix D.

To test the decrypt functionality of AES-CTR, for each selected key size, use the plaintext values from above as ciphertext input, and AES-CTR decrypt each ciphertext value using key of each size consisting of all zeros.

#### **AES-CTR Multi-Block Message Test**

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality by encrypting nine  $i$ -block messages for each selected key size, for  $2 \leq i \leq 10$ . For each test, the evaluator shall supply a key and a plaintext message of length  $i$  blocks, and encrypt the message using AES-CTR. The resulting ciphertext values shall be compared to the results of encrypting the plaintext messages using a known good

implementation.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality by decrypting nine  $i$ -block messages for each selected key size, for  $2 \leq i \leq 10$ . For each test, the evaluator shall supply a key and a ciphertext message of length  $i$  blocks, and decrypt the message using AES-CTR. The resulting plaintext values shall be compared to the results of decrypting the ciphertext messages using a known good implementation.

### AES-CTR Monte Carlo Tests

The evaluator shall test the encrypt functionality for each selected key size using 100 2-tuples of pseudo-random values for plaintext and keys.

The evaluator shall supply a single 2-tuple of pseudo-random values for each selected key size. This 2-tuple of plaintext and key is provided as input to the below algorithm to generate the remaining 99 2-tuples, and to run each 2-tuple through 1000 iterations of AES-CTR encryption.

```
# Input: PT, Key
Key[0] = Key
PT[0] = PT
for i = 0 to 99 {
    Output Key[i], PT[0]
    for j = 0 to 999 {
        CT[j] = AES-CTR-Encrypt(Key[i], PT[j])
        PT[j+1] = CT[j]
    }
    Output CT[j]
    If (KeySize == 128) Key[i+1] = Key[i] xor CT[j]
    If (KeySize == 192) Key[i+1] = Key[i] xor (last 64 bits of CT[j-1] ||
    If (KeySize == 256) Key[i+1] = Key[i] xor ((CT[j-1] | CT[j])
    PT[0] = CT[j]
}
```

The ciphertext computed in the 1000th iteration ( $CT[999]$ ) is the result for each of the 100 2-tuples for each selected key size. This result shall be compared to the result of running 1000 iterations with the same values using a known good implementation.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality using the same test as above, exchanging CT and PT, and replacing AES-CTR-Encrypt with AES-CTR-Decrypt. Note additional design considerations for this mode are addressed in the KMD requirements.

**XTS-AES:** These tests are intended to be equivalent to those described in the NIST document, "The XTS-AES Validation System (XTSVS)," updated 5 Sept 2013, found at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/aes/XTSVS.pdf>

It is not recommended that evaluators use values obtained from static sources such as the XTS-AES test vectors at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/aes/XTSTestVectors.zip> or use values not generated expressly to exercise the XTS-AES implementation.

The evaluator shall generate test values as follows:

For each supported key size (256 bit (for AES-128) and 512 bit (for AES-256) keys), the evaluator shall provide up to five data lengths:

- Two data lengths divisible by the 128-bit block size, If data unit lengths of complete block sizes are supported.
- Two data lengths not divisible by the 128-bit block size, if data unit lengths of partial block sizes are supported.
- The largest data length supported by the implementation, or  $2^{16}$  (65536), whichever is larger.

The evaluator shall specify whether the implementation supports tweak values of 128-bit hexadecimal strings or a data unit sequence numbers, or both.

For each combination of key size and data length, the evaluator shall provide 100 sets of input data and obtain the ciphertext that results from XTS-AES encryption. If both kinds of tweak values are supported then each type of tweak value shall be used in half of every 100 sets of input data, for all combinations of key size and data length. The evaluator shall verify that the resulting ciphertext matches the results from submitting the same inputs to a known-good implementation of XTS-AES.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality of XTS-AES using the same test as for encrypt, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and XTS-AES encrypt with XTS- AES decrypt.

The evaluator shall check that the full length keys are created by methods that ensure that the two halves are different and independent.

### AES-KWP:

The tests below are derived from "The Key Wrap Validation System (KWVS), Updated: June 20, 2014" from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

The evaluator shall test the authenticated-encryption functionality of AES-KWP (KWP-AE) using the same test as for AES-KW authenticated-encryption with the following change in the five plaintext lengths:

- Four lengths that are multiples of 8 bits
- The largest supported length less than or equal to 4096 bits.

The evaluator shall test the authenticated-decryption (KWP-AD) functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KWP authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KWP authenticated-encryption with AES-KWP authenticated-decryption. For the Authenticated Decryption test, 20 out of the 100 trials per plaintext length have ciphertext values that fail authentication.

Additionally, the evaluator shall perform the following negative tests:

#### Test 1: (invalid plaintext length):

Determine the valid plaintext lengths of the implementation from the TOE specification. Verify that the implementation of KWP-AE in the TOE rejects plaintexts of invalid length by testing plaintext of the following lengths: 1) plaintext with length greater than 64 semi-blocks, 2) plaintext with bit-length not divisible by 8, and 3) plaintext with length 0.

**Test 2: (invalid ciphertext length):** Determine the valid ciphertext lengths of the implementation from the TOE specification. Verify that the implementation of KWP-AD in the TOE rejects ciphertexts of invalid length by testing ciphertext of the following lengths: 1) ciphertext with length greater than 65 semi-blocks, 2) ciphertext with bit-length not divisible by 64, 3) ciphertext with length 0, and 4) ciphertext with length of one semi-block.

**Test 3: (invalid ICV2):** Test that the implementation detects invalid ICV2 values by encrypting any plaintext value four times using a different value for ICV2 each time as follows: Start with a base ICV2 of 0xA65959A6. For each of the four tests change a different byte of ICV2 to a different value, so that each of the four bytes is changed once. Verify that the implementation of KWP-AD in the TOE outputs FAIL for each test.

**Test 4: (invalid padding length):** Generate one ciphertext using algorithm KWP-AE with substring  $[len(P)/8]32$  of S replaced by each of the following 32-bit values, where  $len(P)$  is the length of P in bits and  $[ ]32$  denotes the representation of an integer in 32 bits:

- [0]32
- [ $len(P)/8-8$ ]32
- [ $len(P)/8+8$ ]32
- [513]32.

Verify that the implementation of KWP-AD in the TOE outputs FAIL on those inputs.

**Test 5: (invalid padding bits):**

If the implementation supports plaintext of length not a multiple of 64-bits, then

```
for each PAD length [1..7]
    for each byte in PAD set a zero PAD value;
        replace current byte by a non-zero value and use the resulting plain-
        input to algorithm KWP-AE to generate ciphertexts;
        verify that the implementation of KWP-AD in the TOE outputs FAIL on
        this input.
```

#### AES-KW:

The tests below are derived from "The Key Wrap Validation System (KWVS), Updated: June 20, 2014" from the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

The evaluator shall test the authenticated-encryption functionality of AES-KW for each combination of the following input parameters:

- Supported key lengths selected in the ST (e.g. 128 bits, 256 bits)
- Five plaintext lengths:
  - Two lengths that are non-zero multiples of 128 bits (two semi-block lengths)
  - Two lengths that are odd multiples of the semi-block length (64 bits)
  - The largest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 4096 bits.

For each set of the above parameters the evaluator shall generate a set of 100 key and plaintext pairs and obtain the ciphertext that results from AES-KW authenticated encryption. To determine correctness, the evaluator shall compare the results with those obtained from the AES-KW authenticated-encryption function of a known good implementation.

The evaluator shall test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KW using the same test as for authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KW authenticated-encryption (KW-AE) with AES-KW authenticated-decryption (KW-AD). For the authenticated-decryption test, 20 out of the 100 trials per plaintext length must have ciphertext values that are not authentic; that is, they fail authentication.

Additionally, the evaluator shall perform the following negative tests:

**Test 1 (invalid plaintext length):**

Determine the valid plaintext lengths of the implementation from the TOE specification. Verify that the implementation of KW-AE in the TOE rejects plaintexts of invalid length by testing plaintext of the following lengths: 1) plaintext length greater than 64 semi-blocks, 2) plaintext bit-length not divisible by 64, 3) plaintext with length 0, and 4) plaintext with one semi-block.

**Test 2 (invalid ciphertext length):**

Determine the valid ciphertext lengths of the implementation from the TOE specification. Verify that the implementation of KW-AD in the TOE rejects ciphertexts of invalid length by testing ciphertext of the following lengths: 1) ciphertext with length greater than 65 semi-blocks, 2) ciphertext with bit-length not divisible by 64, 3) ciphertext with length 0, 4) ciphertext with length of one semiblock, and 5) ciphertext with length of two semi-blocks.

**Test 3 (invalid ICV1):**

222 Test that the implementation detects invalid ICV1 values by encrypting any plaintext value eight times using a different value for ICV1 each time as follows: Start with a base ICV1 of 0xA6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6. For each of the eight tests change a different byte to a different value, so that each of the eight bytes is changed once. Verify that the implementation of KW-AD in the TOE outputs FAIL for each test.

#### CAM-CBC:

To test the encrypt and decrypt functionality of Camellia in CBC mode, the evaluator shall perform the tests as specified in 10.2.1.2 of ISO/IEC 18367:2016.

#### CAM-CCM:

To test the encrypt functionality of Camellia in CCM mode, the evaluator shall perform the tests as specified in 10.6.1.1 of ISO/IEC 18367:2016.

To test the decrypt functionality of Camellia in CCM mode, the evaluator shall perform the tests as specified in 10.6.1.2 of ISO/IEC 18367:2016.

As a prerequisite for these tests, the evaluator shall perform the test for encrypt functionality of Camellia in ECB mode as specified in 10.2.1.2 of ISO/IEC 18367:2016.

#### CAM-GCM:

To test the encrypt functionality of Camellia in GCM, the evaluator shall perform the tests as specified in 10.6.1.1 of ISO/IEC 18367:2016.

To test the decrypt functionality of Camellia in GCM, the evaluator shall perform the tests as specified in 10.6.1.2 of ISO/IEC 18367:2016.

As a prerequisite for these tests, the evaluator shall perform the test for encrypt functionality of Camellia in ECB mode as specified in 10.2.1.2 of ISO/IEC 18367:2016.

#### XTS-CAM:

These tests are intended to be equivalent to those described in the IPA document, ATR-01-B, "Specifications of Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Testing — Symmetric-Key Cryptography", found at [https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/jcmvp/jcmvp\\_e/documents/atr/atr01b\\_en.pdf](https://www.ipa.go.jp/security/jcmvp/jcmvp_e/documents/atr/atr01b_en.pdf).

The evaluator shall generate test values as follows:

For each supported key size (256 bit (for Camellia-128) and 512 bit (for Camellia256) keys), the evaluator shall provide up to five data lengths:

- Two data lengths divisible by the 128-bit block size, If data unit lengths of complete block sizes are supported.
- Two data lengths not divisible by the 128-bit block size, if data unit lengths of partial block sizes are supported.
- The largest data length supported by the implementation, or  $2^{16}$  (65536), whichever is larger.

The evaluator shall specify whether the implementation supports tweak values of 128-bit hexadecimal strings or a data unit sequence numbers, or both.

For each combination of key size and data length, the evaluator shall provide 100 sets of input data and obtain the ciphertext that results from XTS-Camellia encryption. If both kinds of tweak values are supported, 50 of each 100 sets of input data shall use each type of tweak value. The resulting ciphertext shall be compared to the results of a known-good implementation.

As a prerequisite for this test, the evaluator shall perform the test for encrypt functionality of Camellia in ECB mode as specified in 10.2.1.2 of ISO/IEC 18367:2016.

The evaluator shall test the decrypt functionality of XTS-Camellia using the same test as for encrypt, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and XTSCamellia encrypt with XTS-Camellia decrypt.

As a prerequisite for this test, the evaluator shall perform the test for decrypt functionality of Camellia in ECB mode as specified in 10.2.1.2 of ISO/IEC 18367:2016.

## FCS\_ENT\_EXT.1 Entropy for External IT Entities

**This is an optional component. However, applied modules or packages might redefine it as mandatory.**

### FCS\_ENT\_EXT.1.1

[FCS\\_ENT\\_EXT.1.1](#) The TSF shall provide an interface to make entropy that meets [FCS\\_RBGENT.1](#) available to external IT entities.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### [FCS\\_ENT\\_EXT.1:](#)

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS identifies one or more APIs to obtain entropy data from the TOE.

##### **Guidance**

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

##### **KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

##### **Tests**

The evaluator shall develop and execute or verify and observe the developer tooling which requests entropy data from the TSF. The evaluator shall verify that the results from the operation match the expected results according to the API documentation. The evaluator shall also test the entropy data using the Entropy Analysis Report requirements to determine that the entropy is of comparable quality (in terms of min-entropy estimate) to what is documented in the report.

## FCS\_RBGENT.1 Random Bit Generation

### FCS\_RBGENT.1

The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [selection: Hash\_DRBG (any), HMAC\_DRBG (any), CTR\_DRBG (AES)].

## FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2

The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source in accordance with NIST SP 800-90B that accumulates entropy from [**selection**: *[assignment: number of software-based sources] software-based noise source*, *[assignment: number of hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source*] with a minimum of [**selection**: 128, 192, 256] bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011, of the keys and CSPs that it will generate.

**Application Note #14:** ISO/IEC 18031:2011 contains three different methods of generating random numbers. Each of these in turn depends on underlying cryptographic primitives (hash functions/ciphers). This cPP allows SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 for Hash\_DRBG or HMAC\_DRBG and only AES-based implementations for CTR\_DRBG.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### *FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1:*

##### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it specifies the DRBG type, identifies the entropy sources seeding the DRBG, and state the assumed or calculated min-entropy supplied either separately by each source or the min-entropy contained in the combined seed value.*

*In addition to the materials below, documentation shall be produced—and the evaluator shall perform the activities—in accordance with Appendix D of [DSCcPP].*

##### **Guidance**

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

##### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

##### **Tests**

*The following tests require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are typically not found on factory products.*

*The evaluator shall perform 15 trials for the RNG implementation. If the RNG is configurable, the evaluator shall perform 15 trials for each configuration.*

*If the RNG has prediction resistance enabled, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) generate a second block of random bits (4) uninstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator shall generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 - 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The next two are additional input and entropy input for the first call to generate. The final two are additional input and entropy input for the second call to generate. These values are randomly generated. "generate one block of random bits" means to generate random bits with number of returned bits equal to the Output Block Length (as defined in NIST SP800-90A).*

*If the RNG does not have prediction resistance, each trial consists of (1) instantiate DRBG, (2) generate the first block of random bits (3) reseed, (4) generate a second block of random bits (5) uninstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator shall generate eight input values for each trial. The first is a count (0 - 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation. The fifth value is additional input to the first call to generate. The sixth and seventh are additional input and entropy input to the call to reseed. The final value is additional input to the second generate call.*

*The following paragraphs contain more information on some of the input values to be generated/selected by the evaluator.*

- **Entropy input:** the length of the entropy input value must equal the seed length.
- **Nonce:** If a nonce is supported (CTR\_DRBG with no Derivation Function does not use a nonce), the nonce bit length is one-half the seed length.
- **Personalization string:** The length of the personalization string must be  $\leq$  seed length. If the implementation only supports one personalization string length, then the same length can be used for both values. If more than one string length is support, the evaluator shall use personalization strings of two different lengths. If the implementation does not use a personalization string, no value needs to be supplied.
- **Additional input:** the additional input bit lengths have the same defaults and restrictions as the personalization string lengths.

## FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2 External Seeding for Random Bit Generation

***This is an optional component. However, applied modules or packages might redefine it as mandatory.***

## FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall provide an interface to allow external seeding of the DRBG with a bit-string of at least the minimum number of bits selected in [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1.2](#) before the DRBG produces any output.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### *FCS\_RBG\_EXT.2:*

**TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that this function is included as an interface to the RBG in the TSS or the proprietary Entropy Analysis Report and that the behavior of the RBG following a call to this interface is described. The evaluator shall also verify that the documentation of the DRBG describes the conditions of use and possible values for the Personalization String input to the SP 800-90A specified DRBG.

**Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance describes the process for supplying an external seed to the TOE's DRBG.

**KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

**Tests**

The evaluator shall develop and execute or verify and observe the developer tooling which adds data to the RBG via the Personalization String. The evaluator shall verify that the request succeeds.

## FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Salt Generation

### FCS\_SLT\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use salts and nonces generated by an RBG as specified in [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1](#).

### Evaluation Activities ▾

#### [FCS\\_SLT\\_EXT.1:](#)

**TSS**

The evaluator shall ensure the TSS describes how salts are generated using the RBG.

**Guidance**

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

**KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

**Tests**

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that the salts obtained in the cryptographic operations that use the salts are of the length specified in [FCS\\_SLT\\_EXT.1](#), are obtained from the RBG, and are fresh on each invocation.

Note: in general these tests may be carried out as part of the tests of the relevant cryptographic operations.

## FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Storage

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide [**selection**: mutable hardware-based, immutable hardware-based, software-based] protected storage for asymmetric private keys and [**selection**: symmetric keys, persistent secrets, no other keys].

**Application Note #15:** If the protected storage is implemented in software that is protected as required by [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2](#), the ST author is expected to select "software-based." If "software-based" is selected, the ST author is expected to select all "software-based key storage" in [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2](#).

Support for protected storage for all symmetric keys and persistent secrets will be required in future revisions.

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.2

[FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.1.2](#) The TSF shall support the capability of [**selection**: importing keys/secrets into the TOE, causing the TOE to generate keys/secrets] upon request of [**selection**: a client application, an administrator].

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys/secrets in the protected storage upon request of [**selection**: a client application, an administrator].

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the user that [**selection**: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated] to use the key/secret. Exceptions may be explicitly authorized only by [**selection**: the client application, the administrator].

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall allow only the user that [**selection**: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated] to request that the key/secret be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [**selection**: the client application, the administrator].

**Application Note #16:** Not all conformant TOEs will have the ability to import pre-generated keys into the TOE. In these cases, the TOE's ability to receive commands to perform key generation is considered to be its implementation of the Parse service. A subject that caused a key to be generated is considered to be the 'owner' of that key in the same manner as they would be if they had imported it directly.

### Evaluation Activities ▾

## [\*FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.1:\*](#)

### **TSS**

The evaluator shall review the TSS to determine that the TOE implements the required protected storage. The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS contains a description of the protected storage mechanism that justifies the selection of mutable hardware-based or software-based.

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to ensure that it describes the process for generating keys, importing keys, or both, based on what is claimed by the ST. The evaluator shall also examine the operational guidance to ensure that it describes the process for destroying keys that have been imported or generated.

### **KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

### **Tests**

The evaluator shall test the functionality of each security function as described below. If the TOE supports both import and generation of keys, the evaluator shall repeat the testing as needed to demonstrate that the keys resulting from both operations are treated in the same manner. The devices used with the tooling may need to be non-production devices in order to enable the execution and gathering of evidence.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall import or generate keys/secrets of each supported type according to the operational guidance. The evaluator shall write, or the developer shall provide access to, an application that generates a key/secret of each supported type and calls the import functions. The evaluator shall verify that no errors occur during import.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall write, or the developer shall provide access to, an application that uses a generated or imported key/secret:
  - For RSA, the secret shall be used to sign data.
  - For ECDSA, the secret shall be used to sign data.

The evaluator shall repeat this test with the application-imported or application-generated keys/secrets and a different application's imported keys/secrets or generated keys/secrets. The evaluator shall verify that the TOE requires approval before allowing the application to use the key/secret imported or generated by the user or by a different application:

- The evaluator shall deny the approvals to verify that the application is not able to use the key/secret as described.
- The evaluator shall repeat the test, allowing the approvals to verify that the application is able to use the key/secret as described.

If the ST author has selected common application developer, this test is performed by either using applications from different developers or appropriately (according to API documentation) not authorizing sharing.

- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall destroy keys/secrets of each supported type according to the operational guidance. The evaluator shall write, or the developer shall provide access to, an application that destroys an imported or generated key/secret. The evaluator shall repeat this test with the application-imported or application-generated keys/secrets and a different application's imported or generated keys/secrets. The evaluator shall verify that the TOE requires approval before allowing the application to destroy the key/secret imported by the administrator or by a different application:
  - The evaluator shall deny the approvals and verify that the application is still able to use the key/secret as described.
  - The evaluator shall repeat the test, allowing the approvals and verifying that the application is no longer able to use the key/secret as described.

If the ST author has selected common application developer, this test is performed by either using applications from different developers or appropriately (according to API documentation) not authorizing sharing.

## **FCS\_STG\_EXT.2 Key Storage Encryption**

### [\*FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2.1\*](#)

The TSF shall encrypt [AKs, SKs, KEKs, and [**selection**: long-term trusted channel key material, all software-based key storage, no other keys]] using one of the following methods: [**assignment**: key encryption methods as specified in [\*FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc\*](#)].

### **Evaluation Activities** ▼

## [\*FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2:\*](#)

### **TSS**

The evaluator shall review the TSS to determine that the TSS describes the protection of symmetric keys, KEKs, long-term trusted channel key material, and software-based key storage as claimed in [\*FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2.1\*](#).

### **Guidance**

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

### **KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component

### **Tests**

There are no test evaluation activities for this component.

## **FCS\_STG\_EXT.3 Key Integrity Protection**

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall protect the integrity of any encrypted [AKs, SKs, KEKs, and **[selection]**: long-term trusted channel key material, all software-based key storage, no other keys] by using [**selection**]:

- Symmetric encryption in [**selection**]: AES\_CCM, AES\_GCM, AES\_KW, AES\_KWP, CAM\_CCM, CAM\_GCM] mode in accordance with [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#),
- A hash of the stored key in accordance with [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#),
- A keyed hash of the stored key in accordance with [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#),
- A digital signature of the stored key in accordance with [FCS\\_COP.1/SigGen](#) using an asymmetric key that is protected in accordance with [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2](#),
- An immediate application of the key for decrypting the protected data followed by a successful verification of the decrypted data with previously known information

].

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the [**selection**: hash, digital signature, MAC] of the stored key prior to use of the key.

**Application Note #17:** This requirement is not applicable to derived keys that are not stored. It is not expected that a single key will be protected from corruption by multiple of these methods; however, a product may use one integrity-protection method for one type of key and a different method for other types of keys.

The documentation of the product's encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product's key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagrams. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS - it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.3:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS and ensure that it contains a description of how the TOE protects the integrity of its keys.*

#### **Guidance**

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*There are no test evaluation activities for this component.*

## 5.1.2 User Data Protection

### FDP\_ACC.1 Subset Access Control

#### FDP\_ACC.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] on [

- Subjects: S.DSC, S.Admin, S.CA, S.EPS
- Objects: OB.P\_SDO, OB.T\_SDO, OB.AuthData, OB.Pstate, OB.FAACntr, OB.AntiReplay, OB.Context
- Operations: OP.Import, OP.Create, OP.Use, OP.Modify, OP.Attest, OP.Store, OP.Export, OP.Destroy

].

**Application Note #18:** The set of operations specified in the assignment can be collectively referred to as "access." Any subsequent use of the term "access" should be interpreted to refer to one or more of these events.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FDP\\_ACC.1:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS contain the access control policy implemented by the TOE. I.e., the ST author lists each object and identifies for each object, which operations the TSF permits for each subject (i.e. what can "admins" do vs "users").*

#### **Guidance**

*There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*Testing for FDP\_ACF includes testing this component.*

### FDP\_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control

### FDP\_ACF.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following: [subjects (defined in [FDP\\_ACC.1.1](#)) attempt to perform operations (defined in [FDP\\_ACC.1.1](#)) against objects (defined in [FDP\\_ACC.1.1](#)). Subject and object attributes may be used to determine whether the desired operations are permitted.]

The following are the SFP-relevant security attributes that are associated with the subjects and objects defined in [FDP\\_ACC.1.1](#), as well as any restrictions on the attribute values:

- *S.DSC*
  - *DSC.ID*
- *S.Admin* – *none*
- *S.CA*
  - *CA.ID*
- *S.EPS*
  - *EPS.ID*
- *OB.P\_SDO*
  - *SDO.ID*
  - *SDO.Type*
  - *SDO.AuthData*
  - *SDO.Reauth*
  - *SDO.Conf*
  - *SDO.Export*
  - *SDO.Integrity*
  - *SDO.Bind*
- *OB.T\_SDO* – same as *OB.P\_SDO*
- *OB.AuthData* – *none*
- *OB.Pstate* – *none*
- *OB.FAACntr* – *none*
- *OB.AntiReplay* – *none*
- *OB.Context* – *none*

[].

### FDP\_ACF.1.2

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [

- Any subject that has been authorized to perform any operation against any *OB.P\_SDO* or *OB.T\_SDO* object can continue to perform this operation if one of the following conditions is true:
  - The object's *SDO.Reauth* attribute has a value of 'none', indicating that reauthorization is not required for subsequent interactions with the *SDO*
  - The object's *SDO.Reauth* attribute has a value of 'each use', indicating that reauthorization is required for each interaction with the *SDO*, and the subject has supplied valid authorization data to the TOE
- [*assignment*: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that always prohibit certain subject-object-operation actions]
- [*assignment*: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that always permit certain subject-object-operation actions]
- [*assignment*: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that conditionally permit certain subject-object-operation actions based on subject security attributes, object security attributes, or other conditions]
- [*selection*: [*assignment*: any configurable rules or parameters that can be modified to affect the behavior of the Access Control SFP], no configurable rules]

[].

### FDP\_ACF.1.3

The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [**assignment**: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].

**Application Note #19:** The expectation of this SFR is that the reader is given sufficient information to determine, for each object controlled by the TOE, the operations that can be performed on it based on the subject attempting to perform the operation, and whether this is conditional based on attribute values or any other circumstances.

It is expected that many of the subject-object-operation combinations will always be prohibited by the TSF, either because the target object is not externally modifiable or because the subject lacks the ability to perform the operation in question.

The ST author is not expected to create an exhaustive list of subject-object-operation combinations; it is sufficient to list those that are always permitted and those that are conditionally permitted with the expectation that all remaining combinations are prohibited.

[FDP\\_ACF.1.3](#) and [FDP\\_ACF.1.4](#) allow the ST author to optionally specify override conditions to resolve otherwise contradictory Access Control SFP rules. For example, the rule "S.Admin may always modify the *SDO.Conf* attribute of any *OB.P\_SDO* or *OB.T\_SDO* object" may be overridden by a statement in

[FDP\\_ACF.1](#) that identifies any particular SDO objects as nonmodifiable regardless of subject authorizations.

The DSC may contain pre-installed SDOs. The DSC will enforce access control for pre-installed SDOs like any other SDO it contains or manages.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FDP\\_ACF.1:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes the policy rules for the Access Control SFP. Specifically, the evaluator should be able to identify, for any arbitrary subject-object-operation pairing, which of the following is true:*

- a. *The subject can always perform the desired operation.*
- b. *The subject can never perform the desired operation, either because they lack sufficient permission or because the TSF includes no interface to support the operation.*
- c. *The subject can only perform the desired operation under certain conditions (which the evaluator shall verify are described in the TSS). For example, "the S.CA subject may only perform the OP.Destroy operation on an OB.SDO object if it was the subject that originally created or imported the SDO."*
- d. *The subject can only perform the desired operation on one or more attributes of the object as opposed to the entire object itself (which the evaluator shall verify are identified in the TSS).*
- e. *Whether the subject can perform the desired operation depends on TSF configuration (which the evaluator shall verify is described in the TSS as part of the evaluation of [FMT\\_SMF.1](#)).*
- f. *Some combination of c, d, and e.*

*Given that this SFR requires a large number of potential subject-object-operation pairings to be identified, it is not the expectation that the TSS contain an exhaustive list of these pairings. It is possible that large numbers of pairings are addressed by blanket statements of policy rules, such as "the subjects S.DSC and S.CA are never able to perform any operation on the OB.AntiReplay object." For any rules that are not addressed in this manner, the evaluator shall verify the TSS includes sufficient data for the evaluator to determine how the TSF will evaluate the action. This can be presented in the form of a table, flowchart, list, or other manner that the ST author finds suitable.*

*Note that the DSC developer may not use the same terminology for its subjects, objects, and operations as the PP. If this is the case, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes a mapping that unambiguously shows how the vendor's preferred terminology corresponds to what the PP defines.*

#### **Guidance**

*For any access control policy enforcement behavior that is configurable, the evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance describes how to perform the configuration, including any restrictions on permissible configurable settings.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*The following testing may require the TOE developer to make a test harness available to the evaluator that allows the evaluator to interface directly with the DSC. Due to the large volume of potential testing that this requires, this test may require the use of an automated script. If a test script is made available, the evaluator shall verify that it includes sufficient detail to validate the claims made in the TSS.*

*For each subject/object/operation/attribute combination, the evaluator shall attempt to perform the operation or determine that no interface is present to attempt the operation, consistent with the limitations described in the TSS.*

*For each case where an operation is always permitted or never permitted, both positive and negative testing will be conducted implicitly by attempting the operation with all possible subjects and determining that the intended results occur in each case.*

*For each case where the operation succeeds or fails based on the target object attribute, the evaluator shall ensure that both positive and negative testing is performed such that only the correct target attributes can be operated upon.*

*For each case where the operation succeeds or fails based on one or more specific conditions, the evaluator shall ensure that both positive and negative testing is performed such that the presence of the conditions causes the test to succeed while the absence of the conditions causes the test to fail.*

*For each case where the operation succeeds or fails based on an administratively configured setting, the evaluator shall ensure that both positive and negative testing is performed such that the configuration setting can be shown to affect whether or not the operation succeeds.*

## FDP\_DAU.1/prove Basic Data Authentication (for Use with The Prove Service)

**This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .**

### FDP\_DAU.1.1/prove

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of [selection: **[assignment:** list of objects or information types] declared valid by the TSF, **[assignment:** list of objects or

*[information types] declared valid by an authenticated user].*

#### FDP\_DAU.1.2/prove

The TSF shall provide [**assignment**: *list of subjects*] with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information.

**Application Note #20:** This SFR describes the output of the Prove service provided by the DSC. The evidence of validity or authenticity, or other evidence derived, is expected to be processed by the RoT for Measurement. Additionally, the use of a RoT for Reporting presupposes a logging capability or other means of generating state information that could be conveyed to external entities. Therefore, FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove must be selected if-and-only-if the RoT for Measurement and the RoT for Reporting are both selected in [FPT\\_ROT\\_EXT.1.1](#). An ‘authenticated user’ in the sense of the selection in FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove means a user who has been authenticated by the DSC according to the mechanisms of [FIA\\_UAU.5](#).

In FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove, the DSC will issue a validity-stamped or authenticity-stamped piece of data. In this case, validity-stamped means that the form of the issued data enables an external entity to verify that the data has been issued via the DSC’s Prove service. The implementation might be via a DSC cryptographic signature, or a MAC using a symmetric key shared with the receiver, for example. Authenticity-stamped means that the receiver of the data can verify that the user providing this data is authentic.

Data that would need to be validity-stamped includes data over which the DSC is the authority, such as the state of its own firmware. Data that would need to be authenticity-stamped includes data about which the DSC knows nothing, but where it will issue the data with a statement that the DSC has authenticated the source of this data.

For data that is validity-stamped, the DSC does nothing but respond to a request to issue the data; thus, authentication of the user issuing the data is not needed and is covered by FDP\_DAU.1/Prove. Otherwise, in the case the DSC has no understanding of this data, a step is needed via [FIA\\_UAU.5](#) by which the DSC authenticates the user for this service, and that the DSC or Prove service will therefore vouch for the user, not the validity of the data itself.

#### Evaluation Activities ▾

##### [FDP\\_DAU.1/prove](#):

###### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS and ensure it describes the data that is validity-stamped and where applicable, authenticity-stamped to the level of understanding the DSC has about the data or its origin (from the user providing it to the Prove service). The evaluator shall also ensure that the TSS describes how the evidence of validity or authenticity is generated, including the subjects who perform the verification, and the form the validity or authenticity stamp is represented (i.e. a cryptographic signature, MAC using a symmetric key shared with the receiver, etc.).*

###### **Guidance**

*The evaluator shall ensure that the operational guidance describes how to configure validity-stamping on the TOE.*

###### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

###### **Tests**

*The following testing may require the TOE developer to make a test harness available to the evaluator that allows the evaluator to interface directly with the DSC. Tests may also require the use of an automated script provided by either the vendor or the evaluator. If a test script is made available, the evaluator shall verify that it includes sufficient detail to validate the claims made in the TSS.*

###### **Test 1: Demonstrate the TOE can validity-stamp data.**

*For each configurable option to validity-stamp data, the evaluator shall configure the TOE to create a data object or import a data object which has not-yet been validity-stamped. The evaluator shall then instruct the TOE to validity-stamp this data object. The evaluator shall then export each data object and demonstrate it has been validity-stamped in accordance with the configured options.*

###### **Test 2: Demonstrate the TOE can disable validity-stamping of data objects.**

*The evaluator shall disable, or ensure validity-stamping has been disabled on the TOE.*

*The evaluator shall create a data object on the TOE or import an already-created data object which has not been validity-signed.*

*The evaluator shall export that data object and verify it has not been validity-stamped.*

#### FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs

##### FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall propagate only SDO references, wrapped authorization data, and wrapped SDOs such that only [**selection**: *the TSF, authorized users*] can access them.

**Application Note #21:** The “SDO reference” is a pointer to an object that resides in the TOE; this can be thought of as a token to the object. The “only the

TSF can unwrap the data" selection refers to data that is stored outside the TOE boundary (i.e., data that has been propagated).

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FDP\\_ETC\\_EXT.2:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how it protects the SDO references, authorization data, against access from unauthorized entities. If the TSF is selected, then it should describe how it provides confidentiality of the data while it resides outside the TOE.*

#### **Guidance**

*There are no guidance evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*There are no test evaluation activities for this component.*

## FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset

### FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall permit a factory reset of the TOE upon: [**selection: activation by external interface, presentation of [assignment: types of authorization data required and reference to their specification], no actions or conditions**].

**Application Note #22:** If the DSC provides factory reset and requires an authorization to carry out the operation then the ST author selects either presentation of... and fills in the authorization data accepted (e.g. a PIN or a cryptographic token based on some specification referenced in the assigned value). If the DSC provides factory reset external to the DSC without requiring authorization then the ST author selects activation by external interface. This selection is intended for use when the device containing the DSC takes responsibility for obtaining and checking the authorization for factory reset.

If any selection other than no actions or conditions is made in [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.1.1](#), the selectionbased SFR [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.2](#) must be claimed.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.1:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes each of the conditions which will lead to a factory reset.*

#### **Guidance**

*The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to ensure that it describes the ways the administrator can set the conditions to initiate a factory reset.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*The evaluator shall identify all functions that resets the DSC to factory setting. For each function, the evaluator shall identify all methods for authorizing the factory reset. For each function and for each authorization method, the evaluator shall create an SDE or SDO. The evaluator shall then verify the presence of the item just created. The evaluator shall initiate a factory reset using the selected function and authorization method and verify the item no longer exists.*

## FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior

**This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .**

### FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2.1

Upon initiation of a factory reset, the TSF shall destroy [all non-persistent SDOs] and restore the following pre-installed SDOs to their factory settings:  
[**assignment: preinstalled SDOs to be restored during a factory reset**].

**Application Note #23:** Not all DSCs permit a factory reset of the TOE, or perform a factory reset in response to excessive failed authentication or authorization attempts. Those that do are expected to perform a factory reset in a manner that prevents any inadvertent disclosure of security-relevant data that was present on the DSC prior to the factory reset. For DSCs that permit factory reset functionality (as indicated by selection of factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 in FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3, or by no actions or conditions NOT being selected in [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.1.1](#)), this SFR must be included in the TOE boundary.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.2:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine the pre-installed SDOs that are reverted to their factory settings when a factory reset occurs, what the factory settings are for those SDOs, and that the TSS states that all non-persistent SDOs are destroyed.*

**Guidance**

*The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance and verify that it identifies the pre-installed SDOs that are reverted to their initial values when a factory reset has been performed.*

**KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

**Tests**

*The evaluator shall perform the following test:*

1. *The evaluator shall use each supported role to create or import an SDE or SDO that has known data.*
2. *The evaluator shall then verify that the created SDE/SDO resides either within the DSC, or under the control of the DSC.*
3. *The evaluator shall perform some action for each created or imported SDE/SDO in step 1 that demonstrates that the SDE/SDO has been set to the indicated value.*
4. *For each pre-installed SDO that is identified in [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.2.1](#), the evaluator shall perform some action to verify what the current value of that SDO is.*
5. *The evaluator shall initiate a factory reset.*
6. *For each operation in step 3, the evaluator shall re-attempt the operation and verify that it no longer completes successfully because the SDE/SDO data has been erased.*
7. *For each pre-installed SDO that is identified in step 4, the evaluator shall reattempt the operation and verify that the SDOs have been set to their factory default values.*

## **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs**

### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall support importing SDEs using [**selection**: physically protected channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITP\\_EXT.1](#), encrypted data buffers as specified in [FTP\\_ITE\\_EXT.1](#), cryptographically protected data channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#)].

### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDE using [**selection**:

- cryptographic hash as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#),
- keyed hash as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#),
- integrity providing encryption algorithm as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc](#) [**selection**: SE1, SE2],
- digital signature as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/SigVer](#),
- integrity verification supported by [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1.1](#)

].

### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall bind SDEs to security attributes using [**assignment**: list of ways the TSF generates security attributes and binds them to the SDEs].

**Application Note #24:** The way the TSF checks the integrity of the SDE depends on the method of importation. For example, the encrypted data channel may provide data integrity as part of its service.

When a TSF parses an SDE, it should generate security attributes and create an SDO by binding the security attributes to the SDE.

If physically protected channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITP\\_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

If encrypted data buffers as specified in [FTP\\_ITE\\_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITE\\_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

If cryptographically protected data channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

## **Evaluation Activities**

### **[FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#):**

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall confirm the TSS contains descriptions of the supported methods the TSF uses to import SDEs into the TOE. For each import method selected, the TSS shall describe integrity verification schemes employed. The TSS shall also list the ways the TSF generates and binds security attributes to the SDEs.*

**Guidance**

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

**KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

**Tests**

*For each supported import method selected in [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1.1](#) and for each supported integrity verification method selected in [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1.2](#), used by the selected import method, provide one SDE with valid integrity credentials, one with invalid integrity credentials (e.g. hash). The operations with invalid integrity credentials must result in error. The operations with*

*valid integrity credentials must return an SDO with valid security attributes in accordance with FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.4.*

## FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs

### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall support importing SDOs using [**selection**: physically protected channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITP\\_EXT.1](#), encrypted data buffers as specified in [FTP\\_ITE\\_EXT.1](#), cryptographically protected data channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#)].

### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDO using [**selection**:

- cryptographic hash as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#),
- keyed hash as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#),
- integrity providing encryption algorithm as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc](#) [**selection**: SE1, SE2],
- digital signature as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/SigVer](#),
- integrity verification supported by [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2.1](#)

].

### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.

### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.4

The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.

### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.5

The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.

**Application Note #25:** The way the TSF checks the integrity of the SDO depends on the method of importation. For example, the encrypted data channel may provide data integrity as part of its service.

When a TSF parses an SDO, it should already have a set of security attributes. However, the TSF may modify these attributes, if authorized, to comply with security policies on the TOE.

If physically protected channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITP\\_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

If encrypted data buffers as specified in [FTP\\_ITE\\_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITE\\_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

If cryptographically protected data channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) is selected, the selection-based SFR [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) must be claimed.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2:

#### TSS

*The evaluator shall confirm the TSS contains descriptions of the supported methods the TSF uses to import SDOs into the TOE. For each import method selected, the TSS shall describe integrity verification schemes employed. The TSS shall also list the ways the TSF generates and binds security attributes to the SDOs.*

#### Guidance

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### Tests

*For each supported import method selected in [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2.1](#) and for each supported integrity verification method selected in [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2.2](#) used by the selected import method, provide one SDO with valid integrity credentials, one with invalid integrity credentials (e.g. hash). The operations with invalid integrity credentials must result in error. The operations with valid integrity credentials must return an SDO with valid security attributes in accordance with [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2.3](#), [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2.4](#), and [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2.5](#).*

## FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware

### FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be maintained as [**selection**: immutable, mutable] firmware.

**Application Note #26:** The ST author must include [FDP\\_MFW\\_EXT.2](#), [FDP\\_MFW\\_EXT.3](#), [FPT\\_FLS.1/FW](#), and [FPT\\_RPL.1/Rollback](#) if mutable is selected.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1:

#### TSS

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS and ensure that details of which firmware components are*

*considered mutable and which firmware components are considered immutable, as well as how these firmware components can/cannot be modified or altered, are described. For example, DSC firmware components that are stored in ROM would be considered immutable.*

**Guidance**

*If the TOE has mutable firmware, the evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to ensure that it describes how to modify the firmware.*

**KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

**Tests**

*If the TOE has mutable firmware, the evaluator shall perform the activities described in the operational guidance to modify the firmware.*

## FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity

**This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .**

### FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall have the ability to verify the integrity of the firmware.

### FDP\_MFW\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the integrity of the firmware.

**Application Note #27:** Data and firmware integrity is not a required component of this cPP in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in [FDP\\_MFW\\_EXT.1.1](#).

The TOE guarantees the integrity of the firmware by verifying its integrity.

Verifying the integrity of the firmware could be accomplished by guaranteeing the validity of firmware within the TOE prior to execution.

This requirement covers the case of ensuring the firmware is trustworthy in immutable form or mutable through any firmware updates, since the integrity and authenticity are checked prior to execution.

[FCS\\_COP.1/SigVer](#) applies if the TOE provides the capability to update the TOE firmware and uses digital signatures and MAC verification for update verification. The ST Author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures. For the algorithms chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FDP\\_MFW\\_EXT.2:](#)

**TSS**

*The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes which critical memory is measured for these integrity values and how the measurement is performed (including which TOE software measures the memory integrity values, how that software accesses the critical memory, and which algorithms are used).*

**Guidance**

*If the integrity values are provided to the administrator, the evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance contains instructions for retrieving these values and information for interpreting them. For example, if multiple measurements are taken, what those measurements are and how changes to those values relate to changes in the device state.*

**KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

**Tests**

*Note that the following test may require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are not typically available to end users.*

*The evaluator shall repeat the following test for each measurement:*

*The evaluator shall boot the TOE in an approved state and record the measurement taken. The evaluator shall modify the critical memory or value that is measured. The evaluator shall reboot the TOE and verify that the measurement changed.*

## FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor

**This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .**

### FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall have the ability to verify the authenticity of the firmware.

### FDP\_MFW\_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the authenticity of the firmware.

**Application Note #28:** Firmware authentication is not a required component of this cPP in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in [FDP\\_MFW\\_EXT.1.1](#).

The TOE guarantees the authenticity of the firmware by verifying its signature.

Verifying the authenticity of the firmware could be accomplished by guaranteeing the validity of firmware within the TOE prior to execution.

This requirement covers the case of ensuring the firmware is trustworthy in immutable form or mutable through any firmware updates, since the integrity and authenticity are checked prior to execution.

[FCS\\_COP.1/SigVer](#) applies if the TOE provides the capability to update the TOE firmware and uses digital signatures and MAC verification for update verification. The ST Author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures. For the algorithms chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FDP\\_MFW\\_EXT.3:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes the methods and identities used to verify integrity and authenticity of the firmware. The TSS shall identify the Guarantor and how to verify its identity.*

#### **Guidance**

*There are no guidance activities for this component.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*The TOE guarantees the authenticity of the firmware using the identity of the Guarantor. This prevents impersonating a Guarantor when sending firmware to a device or modifying the firmware in transit.*

#### **Test 1: Verify Authentic Firmware**

*The evaluator shall trigger the TOE to load and evaluate the authenticity of authentic firmware according the methods described in the TSS. The evaluator shall ensure that the TOE provides a clear indication of the success of the evaluation to consider the test a 'Pass', otherwise, the test is a 'Fail'.*

#### **Test 2: Verify Unauthentic Firmware**

*The evaluator shall deliberately modify authentic firmware.*

*The evaluator shall trigger the TOE to load and evaluate the authenticity of the deliberately modified firmware according the methods described in the TSS. The evaluator shall ensure that the TOE provides a clear indication of the failure of the evaluation to consider the test a 'Pass', otherwise, the test is a 'Fail'.*

## **FDP\_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection**

### [FDP\\_RIP.1.1](#)

The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [

- SDOs
- SDEs

].

**Application Note #29:** When an SDE is a key then it is also subject to the key destruction requirements in [FCS\\_CKM.4](#), depending on where and how it is stored. This SFR applies to authorization data that are SDEs and security attributes in SDOs.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FDP\\_RIP.1:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS describes resource deallocation to the extent that they can determine that no data will be reused when reallocating resources following the destruction of an SDE or SDO. The evaluator shall ensure that this description at a minimum describes how the previous data is destroyed. The evaluator shall also ensure that this destruction method is consistent with [FCS\\_CKM.4](#).*

#### **Guidance**

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*Testing for [FCS\\_CKM.4](#) is sufficient to address this component.*

## **FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1 Confidentiality of SDEs**

### [FDP\\_SDC\\_EXT.1.1](#)

The TSF shall use **[selection]**:

- protected storage,

- symmetric encryption using [**selection**: AES-CCM, AES-GCM, AES-CBC, AES-KWP, AES-KW, CAM-CBC, CAM-CCM, CAM-GCM] as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/SK](#),
- key wrapping using [**selection**: KAS1, KAS2, KTS-OAEP] as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#)

] to protect the confidentiality of authorization data and [**assignment**: list of internally and externally stored SDEs identified in the Confidential SDE List attribute of an SDO].

#### FDP\_SDC\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall use [FCS\\_CKM.1/KEK](#) to derive or generate the key to encrypt the SDEs.

**Application Note #30:** This SFR applies to confidential SDEs, especially secret and private keys, Allowed Random Number Generators' state data, and vendor verification reference data. This SFR also applies to all authorization data appearing in the attribute list under SDO.AuthData as well as any administrator authorization data which may be stored implicitly.

If the TOE stores these parameters outside of its boundary, it must encrypt them according to the cryptographic requirements for key encryption, as required by [FDP\\_ETC\\_EXT.2](#).

Vendor pre-installed SDOs includes both objects installed during manufacturing, and those provisioned by the vendor before final release to customer. The administrator and no one else owns and controls these objects.

The confidential-SDE List attribute of the SDO indicates those SDEs that require confidentiality. If SDEs do not require confidentiality, then its omission from this list indicates that confidentiality is not required.

### Evaluation Activities ▾

#### [FDP\\_SDC\\_EXT.1](#):

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the protection for SDEs and authorization data and the methods of protection (e.g. protected storage, symmetric encryption, key wrapping, etc.).

The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to determine whether the TSF stores this data inside the TOE boundary or in its operational environment. If the TSF stores this data inside the TOE boundary, the evaluator shall ensure that TSF uses one of the listed methods to provide confidentiality. If the data is stored in the TOE's operational environment, the evaluator shall ensure that the TSF uses key wrapping to provide confidentiality.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to confirm is sufficiently describes each method used to provide confidentiality for SDEs. The evaluator shall also confirm that the TOE supports all encryption methods selected.

##### **Guidance**

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

##### **KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

##### **Tests**

If the TOE stores SDEs and authorization data inside the TSF, the evaluator shall ensure that external interfaces cannot extract this data in plaintext.

In this case, use the evaluation activities of the [FPT\\_PHP.3](#) if protected storage is selected, [FCS\\_COP.1/SK](#) if symmetric encryption using... is selected, and [FCS\\_COP.1/KAT](#) if key wrapping using... is selected.

If the TOE stores authentication data inside the operational environment, the evaluator shall ensure that plaintext data is not visible on the interface between the TOE and the operational environment.

### FDP\_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action

#### FDP\_SDI.2.1

The TSF shall monitor SDOs and SDEs controlled by the TSF for [integrity errors] on all objects, based on the following attributes: [**selection**:

- [**assignment**: attribute associated with presence in protected storage],
  - cryptographic hash,
  - digital signature,
  - integrity-providing encryption algorithm as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/KeyEnc](#)
- [**selection**: SE1, SE2]

].

#### FDP\_SDI.2.2

Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [

- prohibit the use of the altered data
- send notification of the error where applicable

].

**Application Note #31:** This SFR deals with the mechanism that protects the integrity of the SDEs and security attributes within an SDO. This provides the binding data that ensures the prevention of unauthorized changes to the SDEs

and attributes.

The cryptographic requirements for cryptographic hashes and digital signatures apply here.

No specific requirement is placed here on the nature of the integrity protection data, but the Security Target shall describe this protection measure, and shall identify the iteration of [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#) or [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#) that covers any cryptographic algorithm used.

The integrity protection data in [FDP\\_SDI.2.1](#) is included in the list of attributes identified in [FMT\\_MSA.1](#), and protects the value of the SDEs and of the SDO security attributes.

When an SDO is parsed, its integrity is checked when it is imported into the TOE.

## Evaluation Activities ▾

### [FDP\\_SDI.2:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall confirm that the ST author describes the methods for protecting the integrity of SDOs stored with the TOE, and shall identify the iteration of [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash](#) or [FCS\\_COP.1/HMAC](#) that covers any cryptographic algorithm used. The evaluator shall also confirm that the TSS describes the response upon the detection of an integrity error.*

*The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS describes the actions the TSF takes when the integrity verification fails for an SDO, including the circumstances that cause a notification to be sent when this occurs.*

*The evaluator shall confirm that TSS describes how integrity of SDOs is protected in [FMT\\_MSA.3](#) during initialization, and how the integrity of SDOs are verified during parsing (import) in [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT](#).*

#### **Guidance**

*The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify that it describes the conditions that cause a notification to be sent when an integrity error is detected, and what the contents of the notification are.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*The tests for [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT](#) and [FMT\\_MSA.3](#) shall suffice for this component.*

### 5.1.3 Identification and Authentication

When a platform process requests the ability to create, use, modify, dispose of, etc., an SDE or SDO within the DSC, as a matter of policy, the DSC may expect or request authorization from the platform process, which may include authentication of the requester on whose behalf the platform process is acting. The DSC assumes the requester to be either a person, a process, or a device. The rules on how the requester formats the request will be outside the scope of this cPP. Upon request (or as a matter of an established protocol), the interface (on behalf of the user) presents to the DSC process those authorization values required to authorize execution of the event request. This may include one or more different types of authentication credentials. The DSC validates these items before acting upon the requested event. The validation may simply compare the authorization values to an expected value, or perform a more complex cryptographic protocol to verify the authenticity of the user. After validation, the DSC may then create and subsequently use an authorization value to represent the validation of these authorization values in anticipation of future requests.

Requirements related to the strength, quality, and performance of authorization values supplied to the DSC, such as X.509 certificates and biometric templates, are all outside the scope of the DSC and are expected to be met by the platform, where applicable. The DSC is only expected to enforce quality metrics on any authorization values it generates itself.

## **FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling**

### [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.1](#)

The TSF shall maintain [**selection**:

- a unique counter for [**selection**: each SDO, the following SDOs [**assignment**: list of SDOs]],
- one global counter covering [**selection**: all SDOs, the following SDOs [**assignment**: list of SDOs]]

], called the failed authorization attempt counters, that counts of the number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these **SDOs**.

### [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.2](#)

The TSF shall maintain a [**selection**: static, administrator configurable variable] threshold of the minimal acceptable number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these **SDOs**.

### [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#)

When the failed authorization attempt counters [**selection**: meets, surpasses] the threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, the TSF shall [**selection**:

- prevent future authorization attempts for a static prescribed amount of time,
- prevent future authorization attempts for an administrator configurable amount of time,
- collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Components,

- prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock), as described by [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.2](#),
- factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.2](#)

] for these **SDOs**.

#### FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall increment the failed authorization attempt counter before it verifies the authorization.

**Application Note #32:** The product validates the authorization factors prior to determining whether user (administrator or client application) access to the SDE/SDO is permitted. In cases where validation of the authorization factors fails, the product will not allow access to SDE/SDO. The product validates the authorization factors in such a way that it does not allow an attacker to circumvent the other requirements to gain knowledge about the SDE/SDO or other keying material that protects them from inadvertent exposure.

It is possible for the TOE to have different rules for the treatment of different SDOs or groups of SDOs. For example, some SDOs may trigger a factory reset in the event of excessive authorization failures while others may only temporarily block future authorization attempts. The ST author should iterate this SFR for each distinct response the TSF can make (as defined by the selections in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#)) and the SDOs whose authorization failures will trigger these responses.

If prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock), as described by [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.2](#) is selected in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#), the selection-based SFR [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.2](#) must be claimed.

If factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.2](#) is selected in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#), the selection-based SFR [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.2](#) must be claimed.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1](#):

##### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it contains a description for how successive unsuccessful authorization attempts are detected and tracked. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it contains a description of the actions in the event that the authorization attempt threshold is met or exceeded.*

*The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to determine that it describes how the failed authorization attempt counter is incremented before the authorization is verified.*

*The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to determine the behaviour that will occur if there are excessive failed authorization attempts, specifically whether future attempts are prevented for a static or configurable amount of time, future attempts are prevented indefinitely, or a factory reset is triggered.*

##### **Guidance**

*The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to ensure that instructions for configuring the number of successive unsuccessful authentication attempts and time period (if implemented) are provided, and that the process of unlocking the SDOs is described for each "action" specified (if that option is chosen).*

*The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to confirm that it describes, and identifies the importance of, any actions that are required in order to ensure that access to SDOs can be maintained, unless it is made permanently unavailable due to a factory reset.*

##### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

##### **Tests**

*The evaluator shall perform the following tests for each method by which the TSF authorizes access the SDOs (e.g. any passwords entered as part of establishing authorization):*

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to configure the number of successive unsuccessful authorization attempts allowed by the TOE (and, if the time period selection in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#) is included in the ST, then the evaluator shall also use the operational guidance to configure the time period after which access is re-enabled). The evaluator shall test that once the authorization attempts limit is reached, authorization attempts with valid credentials are no longer successful.
- **Test 2:** After reaching the limit for unsuccessful authorization attempts as in Test 1 above, the evaluator shall proceed as follows. If the action selected in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#) is included in the ST then the evaluator shall confirm by testing that following the operational guidance and performing each action specified in the ST to re-enable access results in successful access. If the time period selection in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#) is included in the ST, then the evaluator shall wait for just less than the time period configured in Test 1 and show that an authorization attempt using valid credentials does not result in successful access. The evaluator shall then wait until just after the time period configured in Test 1 and show that an authorization attempt using valid credentials results in successful access.
- **Test 3:** [conditional]: If factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-persistent SDOs, as described by [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.2](#) is selected in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#), the evaluator shall perform the test required by [FDP\\_FRS\\_EXT.2](#) with step 5 replaced with "The evaluator shall initiate a factory reset by deliberately meeting or surpassing the threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, depending on whether meets or surpasses is selected in [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#)."

## FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response

This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .

### FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2.1

When the TSF locks an **SDO** (i.e. prevents authorization attempts for an SDO) due to a user exceeding the allowed threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, then only an administrator may unlock access to the **SDO** and reset the corresponding failed authorization attempt counter.

**Application Note #33:** This SFR is applicable only when the TSF's response to excessive authorization failures selects prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock) as specified by [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1.3](#).

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.2:](#)

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the method by which access to an SDO is restored following a lockout that results from excessive authentication failures.

##### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall examine the guidance to ensure that it describes the method by which an administrator unlocks access to an SDO following a lockout that results from excessive authentication failures.

##### **KMD**

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

##### **Tests**

The evaluator shall intentionally fail authentication attempts to access an SDO until they are locked out from interacting with it. The evaluator shall then follow the operational guidance to unlock access to the SDO and verify that it was successful by subsequently using valid credentials to access the SDO.

## FIA\_SOS.2 TSF Generation of Secrets

### FIA\_SOS.2.1

The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate authorization data that meet [the following quality metrics:

- For each authentication attempt, the probability shall be less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will be successful
- For multiple attempts to authenticate during a one-minute period, the probability shall be less than one in 100,000 that a series of random attempts will be successful

### FIA\_SOS.2.2

The TSF shall be able to enforce the use of TSF generated authorization data for [**assignment**: non-empty list of TSF functions].

**Application Note #34:** This SFR expects the TSF must generate authorization data from a sufficiently large key space to ensure that users cannot employ random guessing as a statistically plausible method of authorizing actions within the TOE, both for a single event and over a session.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### [FIA\\_SOS.2:](#)

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes for each of the TSF functions listed in [FIA\\_SOS.2.2](#), if the available key space is configurable, and the size (or range) of the key space employed to generate authorization values.

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS states that the quality metrics provided is based on the assumption of sufficient entropy being provided in accordance with the information given in [DSCcPP] Annex D.

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes the restrictions implemented in order to restrict consecutive authentication attempts. (Authentication throttling)

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes the mechanism used to generate authorization values and documents the quality metric that the mechanism provides. The information provided in the TSS shall demonstrate that:

- a. The probability that a random single authentication attempt will be successful is less than one in 1,000,000; and
- b. The probability that random multiple authentication attempts during a one (1) minute period will be successful is less than one in 100,000.

##### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to determine that it describes any configuration necessary to enforce the use of TSF generated authorization values listed in [FIA\\_SOS.2.2](#).

*The evaluator shall ensure that the guidance documentation provides any instructions needed to set parameters affecting the available key spaces.*

**KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

**Tests**

*The evaluator shall perform the following tests.*

- **Test 1:** *The evaluator shall compose a set of 50 authorization values that meet the requirements, and 50 authorization values that fail to meet the requirements.*
  - a. *For each authentication value that meets the requirements, the evaluator shall verify that the TOE supports the authentication value.*
  - b. *For each authentication value that does not meet the requirements, the evaluator shall verify that the TOE does not support the authentication value.*

*While the evaluator is not required (nor is it feasible) to test all possible compositions of authentication values, the evaluator shall ensure that the key space identified in the TSS is valid.*
- **Test 2:** *For each TSF function listed in [FIA\\_SOS.2.2](#) the TOE shall be configured to generate the authentication values; the evaluator shall check that the TOE produces the authentication values.*

## FIA\_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action

### FIA\_UAU.2.1

The TSF shall require each user **and SDO owner** to be successfully authenticated before **authorizing** any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user **or SDO owner**.

**Application Note #35:** This SFR goes with [FDP\\_ACF.1](#), which authorizes access to SDOs (i.e. authorizes operations with or on SDOs). The security policies in [FDP\\_ACF.1](#) may require authentication of the subjects and owners of the SDOs before the TSF authorizes access to them. An authentication token is critical data bound to a user. Such data, when presented to the TOE and successfully verified by it, authenticates the user. The TOE may use the successful authentication of a user as an authorization to execute an action on its behalf, or to perform a requested operation on or with an SDO.

This requirement specifies the TSF exercise an authentication mechanism from [FIA\\_UAU.5](#) by which the TOE authenticates the identity of the user requesting the operation and the owner of the SDO which is an object in the operation. Such authentication is necessary to authorize it to operate with the SDOs. A user could present a unique authentication token. The TSF may accept authentication tokens with no further conditioning. The TSF validates the authentication token prior to granting the authorization to perform the requested operation with the SDO. The SDO security attribute SDO.Reauth determines whether or not the TOE may authenticate the user and the SDO owner only once or each time each time it operates with the SDO.

The means of validation may vary based on the type of authentication token.

## Evaluation Activities ▾

### FIA\_UAU.2:

#### TSS

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the identification and authentication process for each supported method (PIN/try-PIN, salted hash, etc.), the circumstances in which each supported method is used, and constitutes "successful authentication."*

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes which actions are allowed before user identification and authentication. The evaluator shall also determine that the TSS describes, for each action that does require identification and authentication, the method and circumstances by which the authentication is performed (e.g., as per the application note, the TSF may authenticate a user once rather than each time access to an SDO is attempted; the TSS shall describe when authentication is or is not required in order to perform a TSF-mediated action).*

#### Guidance

*The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to determine that any necessary preparatory steps (e.g., establishing valid credential material such as PIN) to logging in are described. For each supported login method, the evaluator shall ensure the guidance documentation provides clear instructions for successfully logging on.*

**KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

**Tests**

*The evaluator shall use the guidance documentation to configure the appropriate credentials supported for each authentication method. For that authentication method, the evaluator shall attempt to perform TSF-mediated actions that require successful use of that authentication method and subsequently show that providing correct I&A information results in the ability to perform the requested action, while providing incorrect information results in denial of access.*

## FIA\_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms

### FIA\_UAU.5.1

The TSF shall provide [**selection: none, authentication token mechanism**,

*cryptographic signature mechanism, [assignment: list of authentication mechanisms]] to support user authentication.*

#### FIA\_UAU.5.2

The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the **[selection: all subject users and SDO owners shall successfully authenticate themselves using one of the mechanisms listed in FIA\_UAU.5.1, the Prove service shall not accept "none" as an authentication method, [assignment: rules describing how each authentication mechanism provides authentication]]**

**Application Note #36:** This SFR describes the authentication mechanisms required for any user of any service as a precondition for providing authorization to execute the service. This includes the authentication of the owner of the SDOs of the service.

### Evaluation Activities ▾

#### [FIA\\_UAU.5:](#)

##### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS and ensure that it describes the authentication mechanisms used to support user authentication for the Prove service as well as how each authentication mechanism provides authentication for the Prove service.*

##### **Guidance**

*If the supported authentication mechanisms are configurable, the evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify that it describes how to configure the authentication mechanisms used to provide authentication for the Prove service.*

##### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

##### **Tests**

*For each supported authentication mechanism, the evaluator shall verify that valid credentials result in successful authentication and invalid credentials result in a rejected authentication attempt. If the supported authentication mechanisms are configurable, the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to enable/disable the various mechanisms and ensure that valid credentials do not result in successful authentication if that mechanism is disabled, or that there is no interface to provide authentication credentials over an external interface when that mechanism is disabled.*

## FIA-UAU.6 Re-Authenticating

#### FIA-UAU.6.1

The TSF shall re-authenticate the user **for access to an SDO** under the conditions:

[

1. Re-authentication and re-authorization by further successful completion of the authentication and authorization methods in [FIA\\_UAU.2](#), in accordance with the value of the SDO.Reauth attribute of the SDO as follows:
  - a. If SDO.Reauth has the value 'each access';
  - b. if SDO.Reauth has the value 'policy' and the TSF determines that the TOE satisfies the policy for re-authentication and reauthorization

]

**Application Note #37:** The allowed values for the SDO.Reauth attribute of an SDO are defined in [FMT\\_MSA.3](#) and the SDO Attributes Initialization Table. The rules in [FDP\\_ACF.1.2](#) and also ensure that the need for re-authorization has been checked before access to an SDO.

An SDO.Reauth value of 'none' indicates that no authentication of the subject user nor of the SDO owners is necessary. It also indicates that no reauthorization for operations using the SDO is necessary.

An SDO.Reauth value of policy indicates that there may be a more complicated set of circumstances that trigger a re-auth (re-authentication of the users and owners as well as reauthorization of the operation). This could be a policy of a time limit for which a user can use an SDO before re-authentication (e.g. 10 minutes or 24 hours). The ST should indicate the policies allowed, and how the TOE evaluates the policies. The ST should also indicate the location of those policies, and how the TOE protects the integrity of those policies.

When the TSF binds a user to access an SDO, this means that the TSF has authenticated the user and that the TSF authorized the user to have the right to exercise one or more of the following actions: generate the SDO, modify the SDO, including its security attributes, use the SDO in a TOE operation, propagate or duplicate the SDO for use by a device external to the DSC, or destroy the SDO. The user may not have exclusive rights to exercise the operations listed.

Policy as represented by the attributes in the SDO dictates whether or not a user must authenticate itself in order to authorize access to the SDO.

It is possible that the attributes of some SDOs should remain unchanged, and that the attributes of other SDOs may be changed by authorized users. If this is the case, then the ST author should iterate this SFR and indicate in the TSS which SDOs apply to each iteration.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FIA-UAU.6:

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes each of the options for reauthorization.

#### Guidance

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

#### KMD

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### Tests

The evaluator shall use the configuration guidance to create an SDO with each of the options for reauthorization, then identify functions to exercise each of these options, then execute these options providing the correct authorization confirming that the operation succeeded with respect to the reauthorization option chosen. The evaluator shall then attempt to execute these functions while providing the incorrect authorization and confirming that the operation fails.

## 5.1.4 Security Management (FMT)

### FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior

#### FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in FMT\_SMF.1 to authenticated administrators.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1:

#### TSS

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes those management functions that may be performed by the Administrator, to include how the client applications are prevented from accessing, performing, or relaxing the function (if applicable), and how they are prevented from modifying the Administrator configuration. The TSS also describes any functionality that is affected by administrator-configured policy and how. This activity will be performed in conjunction with FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1.

#### Guidance

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

#### KMD

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### Tests

For each management function described in FMT\_SMF\_EXT.1.1, the evaluator shall perform the function with administrator authorization data and confirm it succeeds, and again with client application authorization data and confirm that it fails.

### FMT\_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes

#### FMT\_MSA.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes, to include attributes as specified in the Supported Methods for SDO Attributes table] to [the authorized identified roles as specified in the Supported Methods for SDO Attributes table]. **Table 10: Supported Methods for SDO Attributes**

SDO Attribute	Modification Constraints
SDO.ID	Cannot be modified
SDO.Type	Cannot be modified
SDO.AuthData	[assignment: list of roles that are authorized to modify SDO reference authorization data]
SDO.Reauth	[assignment: list of roles that are authorized to ` modify re-authorization conditions]
SDO.Conf	[assignment: assignment: list of roles that are authorized to modify confidential SDElist]
SDO.Export	[assignment: list of roles that are authorized to modify export flag]
SDO.Integrity	Cannot be modified by users (maintained automatically by TSF)
SDO.Bind	Cannot be modified by users (maintained automatically by TSF)

**Application Note #38:** The SDO Attributes Modification Table defines the required constraints on security attribute modification. The Security Target completes the other parts not specified here (along with any other information for other security attributes relevant to a particular TOE).

The assignments of authorized subjects in the SDO Attributes Modification Table may be defined by the ST author in terms of roles or in terms of an action such as presentation of a valid authentication token of a particular type (in this case the ST author identifies in an Application Note the other SFRs that govern the action).

The TSF vendor may pre-install SDOs with default attributes. The Security Target should make clear which attributes the administrators may change or are prohibited from changing. It should also make clear between authorization values required to use pre-installed SDOs and authorization values required to change the attributes of pre-installed SDOs.

The SDO Attributes Modification Table lists SDO ID as “cannot be modified”. In some cases, a change in the attributes may cause a change in the SDO ID. In these cases, a change in the SDO ID causes the creation of a new SDO and possibly the loss of the old SDO.

Only authorized subjects can change the attributes of an SDO, and only as permitted in the SDO Attributes Modification Table.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FMT\\_MSA.1:](#)

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS describes the modification constraints for each SDO security attribute.*

#### **Guidance**

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*The evaluator shall confirm that the evaluation activities for [FDP\\_ACF.1](#) contains tests for the OP.Modify operation on objects OB.P\_SDO, OB.T\_SDO.*

## FMT\_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization

This SFR deals with the initialization of the attributes of an SDO when it is created by parsing or provisioning. The generation process includes SDOs created by the TSF (provisioned) and those imported via [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2](#) (parsed).

The TSF is expected to give an SDO a set of security attributes at the time of its creation. This set is expected to include at least the following attributes:

- SDO identifier
- SDO type
- SDO reference authorization data (i.e. the data that is used when determining whether to grant access to an SDO, for each relevant mode of access, on the basis of an authorization token presented to the DSC)
- Re-authorization conditions (i.e. event after which re-authorization is required)
- Confidential-SDE list (each SDE in this list is held encrypted when the SDO is stored)
- Export Flag (indicating whether the SDO is allowed to be propagated)
- Integrity protection data
- Binding Data (created by the TOE to strongly link or associate the SDO with other entities such as the TOE itself or with other SDOs in a hierarchy such as a child to a parent).

The TSF provides the capability to protect the contents of an SDO (i.e. the set of its SDEs together with the SDO attributes) from unauthorized modification. The DSC shall check for such modifications before using the SDO or any of its SDEs.

### FMT\_MSA.3.1

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to provide [**selection: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]**] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

### FMT\_MSA.3.2

The TSF shall allow the [authorized identified roles, according to the Supported Methods for SDO Attributes Initialization table] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**Table 11: Supported Methods for SDO Attributes Initialization**

SDO Attribute	Property	Authorized Override Role	Initialization Method	Allowed Values
SDO.ID	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[ <b>assignment: range of allowed values</b> ]
SDO.Type	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[ <b>assignment: list of allowed types</b> ]
SDO.AuthData	Permissive	[ <b>selection: admin, client application</b> ]	Import process	[ <b>selection: none, [assignment: list of types of authentication tokens allowed], [assignment: range of authorization values allowed]</b> ]
		None	Generation process	
SDO.Reauth	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	[ <b>selection: none, each access, policy</b> ]
SDO.Conf	Restrictive	None	Import and generation	[ <b>assignment: list of SDEs of which the TOE must provide a confidentiality</b> ]

			process	service]
SDO.Export	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	<b>[selection:</b> exportable, non-exportable]
SDO.Integrity	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	<b>[assignment:</b> range of allowed values]
SDO.Bind	Restrictive	None	Import and generation process	<b>[assignment:</b> range of allowed values]

**Application Note #39:** Both admin and client application roles can initiate the import process. The imported object contains the default values for each attribute, where allowed. The TSF can override default values for the following attributes of imported objects: SDO.ID, SDO.Type, SDO.Reauth, SDO.Export, and SDO.Integrity. The TSF may override default values in these cases to force the objects to comport to established structures within the TOE, or to comply with TOE-wide security policies. In these cases, the defined roles (i.e. admin and client application) cannot override the default values. For SDO.AuthData, the TSF shall allow user roles (i.e. admin and client applications) to override authorization data that may arrive with the object. For SDO.Conf the TSF accepts the imported value for this attribute. SDO.Bind is explained below.

Unless otherwise noted, both admin and client application roles can initiate the generation process. The admin and client application will provide the default values for the attributes. This SFR assumes the TSF checks SDO.Type, SDO.AuthData, SDO.Reauth, SDO.Conf, and SDO.Export for compliance with established security policies and refuses to create objects which do not comply and thus will not override the value of any of these attributes. In the cases of the SDO.ID and SDO.Integrity, the TSF generates these values and therefore there is no need to override.

In the case of SDO.Bind for both import and generation processes, the TSF may override values that denote a binding to the TOE, but it should not override values that denote a binding to other keys. In the case of the import process, the defined roles cannot override the default values for any binding.

The SDO Attributes Initialization Table is referenced from [FMT\\_MSA.3](#) and matches the attributes covered by [FMT\\_MSA.1](#) (which defines controls on the modification of the attributes). The initialization of these security attributes occurs when an SDO is either parsed by the TOE or generated on the TOE. The required constraints on security attribute initialization specified in this PP are shown in Table 11; the Security Target completes the selection and assignments in the SFR and adds to the table any other information for other security attributes relevant to a particular TOE.

The SDO.AuthData attribute is data that is required in order to validate authorization of a subject to access the SDO (in each of the modes relevant to that SDO). The nature of this data will depend on the authorization mechanism used in the TOE, as described in [FIA\\_UAU.2](#).

The SDO.Reauth attribute for an individual SDO takes one of the values defined in the selection in the Allowed Values column of Table 11. Examples of TOE-specified events might be explicit revocation of authorization by a user, expiry of a time interval, or completion of a fixed number of uses since the last authorization. The re-authorization conditions are used in [FIA\\_UAU.6](#) and [FDP\\_ACF.1](#). These determine whether a single authorization by the SDO owner will allow any number of uses of the SDO until the end of the user's session (value 'none'), or whether each use of the SDO must be individually authorized (value 'each access'), or whether re-authorization must happen each time one of the TOE-specified events occurs.

The SDO.Conf attribute indicates which SDEs, if any, the TOE should encrypt when not in operational use. The TOE should use the methods in [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#), [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.1](#), or [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2](#) to protect the SDEs in this list.

The SDO.Export attribute takes one of the values 'exportable' or 'non-exportable'.

The SDO.Integrity attribute includes evidence that the TSF can use to protect and verify the integrity of the SDO.

Attributes assigned by the TOE to any parsed SDOs must be described in the Security Target and in operational user guidance.

The TOE uses the Binding Data for an SDO to strongly link the SDO to the TOE, a parent SDO in a hierarchy, or to nothing at all. SDOs bound to nothing may freely travel from one TOE to another without restrictions. If bound to another SDO as a child to a parent in a hierarchy, it may travel only where the parent SDO travels. If bound to the TOE, it may travel to any other TOE for any reason, even if the TOE moves its parent to another TOE. Note that vendors will initialize attributes of pre-installed SDOs with default values. However, authorization values to change the attributes of pre-installed SDOs may differ from the authorization value required to use the pre-installed SDO.

The vendor should document the implicit attributes for pre-installed SDOs and SDOs stored in special locations.

In cases in which the SDO ID is a cryptographic hash of the attributes and SDEs,

that value represents both the ID and projects the integrity of the SDO, including the SDEs. As the TOE unwraps an incoming SDO, it may automatically check the integrity. For pre-installed SDOs in protected storage, the hardware plus the TSF projects the integrity of them.

When a remote peer sends an SDO to the TOE, it properly indicates through the SDEconfidentiality list of any authorization values and authentication tokens present in the SDO, whether they are present in the SDE or as attributes, which control access to the SDE.

When a TOE generates an SDO internally for the first time, it properly indicates through the SDEconfidentiality list any SDEs that are authorization values or authentication tokens. Similarly, if any of the attributes are authorization values or authentication tokens, the TOE will properly indicate through the SDE-confidentiality list that it will encrypt them prior to storing them.

The TOE may contain pre-installed SDOs or SDOs either provisioned the first time the user turns on the TOE or provisioned as the result of a “factory reset” event. TSFs may refer to such persistent SDOs as root keys or trusted anchors. Pre-installed SDOs may reside in immutable hardware and persist across factory resets. Other persistent SDOs may persist until a user issues a “factory reset” which either cryptographically erases the SDOs or overwrites them by provisioning new ones. These SDOs may not contain a confidential SDE list since either these persistent values serve as a root encryption key for a hierarchy of SDOs, or they serve as a KDF seed for generating root encryption keys for a hierarchy of SDOs.

It is possible that the default attributes of some SDOs should be restrictive, and that the default attributes of other SDOs may be permissive. If this is the case, then the ST author should iterate this SFR and indicate in the TSS what the default attribute properties are for each SDO.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FMT\_MSA.3:

#### TSS

*The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS describes the initialization process for importing and generating SDOs. The TSS shall describe each type of SDO Type and any additional attributes that are beyond the ones listed. Additionally, list any further restrictions of the allowed values for the minimum list of attributes.*

*The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS describes the allowed values for each of the attributes.*

#### Guidance

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### Tests

*The evaluator shall confirm that the evaluation activities for FDP\_ACF.1 contains tests for the OP.Import and OP.Create operations on objects OB.P\_SDO, OB.T\_SDO.*

## FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

### FMT\_SMF.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- Set authorization failure parameters for FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1
- Reset TOE to factory state for FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1
- Configure authorization policies for TOE resources [**selection**:
  - update TOE firmware and pre-installed SDOs,
  - unlock access to SDO following excessive failed authorization attempts,
  - no other functions]

**Application Note #40:** If FDP\_MFW\_EXT.1 selects mutable firmware, then FMT\_SMF.1 must select Update TOE firmware and pre-installed SDOs.

Recall that resetting a TOE to factory state also wipes all user data, but may not wipe out preinstalled SDOs. Configuring authorization policies includes setting policies for allowed access to SDOs.

Protections for pre-installed SDEs/SDOs come through the firmware, and by extension, through firmware updates. In the same vein, the authorized updates may also affect the SDEs as well, if the vendor so chooses. One could say that the authorized update binds the attributes present in the functionality of the firmware to the pre-installed SDEs.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FMT\_SMF.1:

#### TSS

*The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes all management functions.*

#### Guidance

*The evaluator shall verify that the AGD describes how the administrator configures the*

*management functions.*

**KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

**Tests**

*Testing for this component is performed through evaluation of [FMT\\_MOF\\_EXT.1](#).*

## FMT\_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles

### FMT\_SMR.2.1

The TSF shall maintain the roles: [administrator, client application].

### FMT\_SMR.2.2

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

### FMT\_SMR.2.3

The TSF shall ensure that the conditions [

- Only client applications can access their own encrypted data,
- Only administrators can perform privileged functions

]

are satisfied.

**Application Note #41:** This cPP uses the term “user” throughout to reference both the administrator and client application roles simultaneously.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FMT\\_SMR.2:](#)

**TSS**

*The evaluator shall confirm that the TSS describes the mechanisms by which client applications can exclusively access their own encrypted data and administrators cannot access client application encrypted data. The evaluator shall also confirm the TSS describes the mechanisms that allow only administrators to perform privileged functions.*

**Guidance**

*The evaluator shall verify that the AGD describes how the administrator configures the management functions.*

**KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

**Tests**

*Testing for this component is performed through evaluation of [FMT\\_MOF\\_EXT.1](#).*

## 5.1.5 Protection of the TSF

### FPT\_FLS.1/FI Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Fault Injection)

#### FPT\_FLS.1.1/FI

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [fault injections].

**Application Note #42:** Note that a secure state does not imply the uninterrupted enforcement of all claimed security functionality it is appropriate for the TSF to “fail closed” and block the execution of securityrelevant behavior if a fault injection attempt or other significant glitch occurs.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FPT\\_FLS.1/FI:](#)

**TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes the actions taken when the TOE experiences fault injection and how the DSC preserves a secure state.*

*The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the state of the DSC when the firmware validity checks fail, including the various failure modes assumed.*

**Guidance**

*The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify that it describes what actions should be taken to attempt to resolve the failed state.*

**KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

**Tests**

*The evaluator shall perform fault injection on the DSC and attempt to extract a known SDO/SDE.*

*The evaluator shall cause the DSC to parse or generate an SDO/SDE with a known value. The evaluator will then cause the TOE to process the SDO/SDE, possibly multiple times, while injecting faults on the TOE.*

*If the evaluator is able to acquire the original SDO/SDE or a known result from the DSC processing the SDO/SDE, the test is a ‘Fail’, otherwise, the test is a ‘Pass’.*

### FPT\_FLS.1/FW Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Firmware)

**This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .**

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of firmware failures occur: [authenticity violation, integrity violation, rollback violation].

**Application Note #43:** A DSC's ability to handle failures related to authenticity, integrity, and invalid versions of firmware is not applicable in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in [FDP\\_MFW\\_EXT.1.1](#).

The phrase "secure state" refers to a state in which the TOE has consistent TSF data and a TSF that can correctly enforce the policy. The TOE must ensure that no further processing of TSF or user data takes place while in an insecure state. This state may be the initial "boot" of a clean system, or it might be some check-pointed state. It is expected that in most cases, the TOE will halt and require a reset or re-initialization to return to a known secure state.

## Evaluation Activities ▾

### FPT\_FLS.1/FW:

#### TSS

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes the actions taken when the TOE experiences each of the stated failures and how these actions ensure the DSC preserves a secure state.*

*The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the state of the DSC when the firmware validity checks fail, including the various failure modes assumed.*

#### Guidance

*For each failure state, the evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify that it describes what actions should be taken to attempt to resolve the failure state.*

#### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### Tests

*Note that this test requires firmware builds that are deliberately invalidated to cause authenticity, integrity, and rollback violation failures.*

*The evaluator shall examine the TOE's behavior when it is loaded with a firmware build that causes a firmware failure. The evaluator shall ensure that when the failure occurs, the TOE prevents further processing of TSF and user data and performs any actions consistent with maintaining a secure state as described in the TSS.*

*The evaluator shall repeat this test as necessary to observe each of the specific firmware failures identified in the SFR.*

## FPT\_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

**This is an optional component. However, applied modules or packages might redefine it as mandatory.**

### FPT\_ITT.1.1

The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure] and [selection: modification, no other actions] when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

## Evaluation Activities ▾

### FPT\_ITT.1:

#### TSS

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the TOE in terms of its distributed components and identifies the communications that take place between these components. The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to ensure that it describes the methods by which each of these communications are protected.*

#### Guidance

*If applicable, the evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation contains instructions for establishing the relevant allowed communication channels between TOE components, and that it contains recovery instructions should a connection be unintentionally broken.*

#### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### Tests

*The evaluator shall perform the following tests:*

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall ensure that all communications between distributed TOE components is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the guidance documentation (if applicable) and ensuring that communication is successful.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel, that the channel data is not sent in plaintext or that there is no interface by which it is possible to extract the channel data.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall, where possible, physically interrupt communications between TOE components. The evaluator shall ensure that when physical connectivity is restored, communications are appropriately protected. Note that this test shall only be performed for those interfaces where physical interruption of communications is typical operational behavior. If the TOE consists of multiple components embedded within the same physical chassis such that interrupting communications requires physical destruction of the device (as opposed to disconnecting a re-connectable wire or temporarily disabling a radio), this

## FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1 Debug Modes

### FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide no access to debug modes.

**Application Note #44:** 'Debug modes' may include, but are not limited to, any alternate mode of operation, such as developer mode, test mode, manufacturer mode, or altered boot mode.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### *FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1:*

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes the mechanisms the TSF employs to prevent access to debug modes with a brief description of each debug mode supported.*

#### **Guidance**

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*The evaluator shall attempt to exercise any single function from each supported debug mode. If the evaluator is able to exercise any function from any of the supported debug modes, the test is a 'Fail', otherwise, the test is a 'Pass'.*

## FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack

### FPT\_PHP.3.1

The TSF shall resist [data extraction via fault injection, extreme temperatures, abnormal voltage] to the [TSF storage elements that contain [**selection**: SDEs, SDOs, firmware]] by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

**Application Note #45:** Physical protection mechanisms as envisioned by this requirement are mechanisms that protect communications to the extent that encryption or other logical protections are not required to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and assured identification of endpoints. Such mechanisms may include, for example, physically isolated traces, or mechanisms that take advantage of physical properties of signals to ensure that communications are receivable only by the intended endpoint.

Any physical external casing or potting material of the TOE is considered an 'external interface', not just those interfaces over which data is transmitted. This ensures that the TSF will respond appropriately if, for example, an attacker penetrates the physical surface of the DSC in an attempt to access its stored data.

The TOE's protection against abnormal temperature and voltage can be considered equivalent to what is required by assertion AS07.77 of [ISO-TR].

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### *FPT\_PHP.3:*

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes the methods used by the TOE to detect physical tampering and how the TOE will respond when physical tampering has been detected.*

*The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to ensure that it documents the temperature and voltage ranges in which the TSF is assured to operate properly.*

#### **Guidance**

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*The evaluator shall perform the following tests:*

##### **Test 1: Fault Injection**

*Refer to the testing for FPT\_FLS.1/FI.*

##### **Test 2: Temperature and Power Analysis**

*The following testing is derived from [ISO 24759] test procedures TE07.77.01 through TE07.77.03:*

*The evaluator shall configure the ambient temperature and voltage close to the approximate extreme of the normal operating ranges specified in the TSS and verify that the TSF continues to function as expected. The evaluator shall determine 'expected functionality' based on how the TSS describes the TOE's reaction to an environmental failure. For example, if the TSS states that the TOE's response is to shut down, it can be assumed that the TOE functions as expected if it does not shut down. If the TSS states that the TOE's response is to zeroize certain data, it can be assumed that the TOE functions as expected if the evaluator performs functions that rely on*

known data values and obtain results that indicate non-zero values.

The evaluator shall then extend the temperature and voltage outside of the specified normal range and verify that the TOE responds in the manner specified in the ST. If the TOE's response is to zeroize known data, the evaluator shall return the ambient temperature and voltage to a normal range, perform functions that rely on known data values, and observe that the results of these functions are consistent with known values of zero.

## FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust

### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall contain an SDO that contains the identity of the Root of Trust.

**Application Note #46:** Every DSC is expected to have a single RoT that comprises the DSC hardware and pre-installed SDOs, from which services (e.g. Storage, Authorization, etc.) can be offered.

Depending on the use case and the way status registers are used, unique identity keys may be bound to the TOE, the TOE platform, or both.

The sole presence of unique identity keys linking to the RoT does not prove authenticity without the use of digital signatures.

### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall maintain Root of Trust data as [**selection: immutable, mutable if and only if its mutability is controlled by a unique identifiable owner**].

**Application Note #47:** One expects that only authorized sources can modify the single RoT, such as through a secure update. A pre-installed SDO may contain the identity of the manufacturer of the RoT.

The process of authenticating the source of a secure update may involve querying the identity of the manufacturer, contained on a pre-installed SDO. If this identity is in the form of an X.509 certificate containing a signature verification key signed by the manufacturer, then the authentication process is sufficient.

A unique identifiable owner is assumed to be one with an administrative role; however, there may be circumstances where the owner does not take on an administrative role, which should be documented.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1:

#### TSS

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes either a pre-installed identity (contained within an SDO), or a process on how the TOE creates an identity. IEEE 802.1ar is one example of a standard which a device can use to create such an identity.

The evaluator shall additionally examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how the Root of Trust is immutable or otherwise mutable if and only if controlled by a unique identifiable owner, the roles this owner assumes in doing so (manufacturer administrator, owner administrator, etc.), as well as the circumstances in which the Root of Trust is mutable.

[conditional] For an immutable Root of Trust, the evaluator shall ensure there are no RoT update functions.

[conditional] For a mutable Root of Trust, the evaluator shall ensure the Root of Trust update mechanism uses an approved method for authenticating the source of the update.

#### Guidance

For mutable Root of Trust data, the evaluator shall confirm the AGD contains an approved authenticated method for modifying the Root of Trust identity.

#### KMD

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### Tests

#### Immutability

For immutable Root of Trust identity, the evaluator shall confirm a successful evaluation of FPT\_PHP.1 (Physical Protection). **Mutability**

For a mutable Root of Trust identity, the evaluator shall perform the following tests:

1. Create or use an authenticated Root of Trust identity, confirm the authenticated method for modifying the Root of Trust identity succeeds.
2. Create or use an unauthenticated Root of Trust identity, confirm the target fails to modify the Root of Trust identity.

## FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2 Data Integrity Measurements

**This is an optional component. However, applied modules or packages might redefine it as mandatory.**

### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall be able to quantify the integrity of the data protected by the TOE by generating integrity measurements and assertions making them available to

authorized entities.

**Application Note #48:** The generation of these integrity measurements and assertions is the creation of OB.Pstate. Data protected by the TOE includes DSC firmware, DSC configuration data, and user data. DSC configuration data may include persistent SDEs or SDOs such as immutable or mutable root keys, authorization values, and authentication tokens (i.e. DSC.ID, OB.P\_SDO, OB.FAACntr, OB.AntiReplay, and OB.Context). User data may include transient SDEs and SDOs as well as authorization values and authentication tokens bound to these SDEs and SDOs (i.e. OB.T\_SDO). Integrity reporting is the process of attesting to integrity measurements (including those recorded in status registers in a DSC).

#### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall accumulate platform characteristics using a consistent [assignment: description of process for accumulating platform characteristics] process in which verified quantifiable measurements are accumulated to prove the integrity of its SDOs.

**Application Note #49:** Although a platform may enter any state possible—including undesirable or insecure states—it can use platform characteristics, including integrity measurements and assertions, along with logging and reporting to accurately report the state derived from data attributing to those states. In this context, platform characteristics can include, but is not limited to, cryptographic hashes of binary data, security-critical configurations, register values (including status registers) and milestones, such as verification of firmware, or transitioning from a boot phase to an operational phase. A platform characteristic may also represent the state of some entity outside the DSC. A process independent from the DSC or the host containing the DSC may evaluate the platform characteristics and determine an appropriate action.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2:

##### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and ensure that it describes the contents and structure of any quantifiable measures of integrity (including but not limited to cryptographic self-tests) as well as the contents and structure of any reports generated, if any, that are used to quantify the integrity of the data integrity measurements stored in the DSC and establish trust. The evaluator shall also ensure that the TSS describes the order and importance of integrity measurements and records that comprise attestation to prove the integrity of the SDOs in the DSC. In addition, the evaluator shall ensure the TSS gives justification as to how the process in accumulating measurements is consistent between restarts.

##### Guidance

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

##### KMD

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

##### Tests

The tests for FDP\_ITC\_EXT and FMT\_MSA.3 shall suffice for this component.

### FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services

#### FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide a Root of Trust for Storage, a Root of Trust for Authorization, and [selection: Root of Trust for Measurement, Root of Trust for Reporting, no others].

**Application Note #50:** This document uses the [GP\_ROT] definitions for RoT for Storage (denoted as the combination of RoT for Confidentiality and RoT for Integrity), Authorization, Measurement, and Reporting. DSCs use Roots of Trust for Storage to protect SDOs. Section 6.5 has a number of requirements for ensuring the TSF has functionality to authorize a user in order to access an SDO, including FIA\_UAU.6.

If both Root of Trust for Measurement and Root of Trust for Reporting are selected in FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1.1, the selection-based SFR FDP\_DAU.1/Prove must also be claimed.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1:

##### TSS

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS identifies the Roots of Trust it uses (including but not limited to the Roots of Trust identified in the selections in this requirement) and describes their function in the context of the TOE.

##### Guidance

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

##### KMD

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

##### Tests

##### Root of Trust for Storage

The evaluator shall confirm a successful evaluation of FCS\_CKM.1/KEK, FCS\_STG\_EXT.1,

## [\*FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2, FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.3, FPT\\_PHP.3. Root of Trust for Authorization\*](#)

*The evaluator shall confirm a successful evaluation of [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1. Root of Trust for Measurement](#)*

*The evaluator shall confirm a successful evaluation of [FCS\\_COP.1/Hash Root of Trust for Reporting](#)*

*The evaluator shall confirm a successful evaluation of [FCS\\_COP.1/SigGen](#).*

## **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2 Root of Trust for Storage**

### FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall prevent unauthorized access to SDOs associated with the Root of Trust for Storage.

**Application Note #51:** TOEs may use shielded locations or cryptographic protections to prevent unauthorized access to SDOs. Use [FDP\\_SDI.2](#) to protect the integrity of SDOs stored in the RoT for Storage.

### Evaluation Activities ▾

#### [FPT\\_ROT\\_EXT.2:](#)

##### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the Root of Trust for Storage prevents unauthorized access to SDOs. The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to verify that it uses approved mechanisms to protect the integrity of SDOs.*

##### **Guidance**

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

##### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

##### **Tests**

*Testing for this component is completed through evaluation of [FCS\\_CKM.1/KEK](#), [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.1](#), [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.2](#), [FCS\\_STG\\_EXT.3](#), and [FPT\\_PHP.3](#).*

## **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3 Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms**

**This is an optional component. However, applied modules or packages might redefine it as mandatory.**

### FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall be able to attest to a state as represented by platform characteristics with a Root of Trust for Reporting mechanism that uses for its identity [selection: a cryptographically verifiable identity in [FPT\\_PRO\\_EXT.1](#), an alias key bound to the cryptographically verifiable identity in [FPT\\_PRO\\_EXT.1](#)] and using a signature algorithm as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/SigGen](#).

**Application Note #52:** While it is possible for a group of components to share a single unique group identifier, it is important to ensure that individual components have their own unique identifiers relative to each other.

Resident keys or aliases are designed such that they are never visible outside the subset of DSC scope containing the RoT services and are only to be used for encryption. Therefore, possession of such aliases or keys can only be proved indirectly by using it to decrypt a value that has been encrypted with a corresponding public key. In this way, these resident keys or aliases can provide for authentication based on decryption operations instead of producing a digital signature.

If non-specialized cryptographic keys used for algorithms in FCS\_COP is selected, it is expected that when used in the context of the RoT for Reporting, these keys are not visible to full DSC scope as described above. While it is possible for a group of components to share a single unique group identifier, it is important to ensure that individual components have their own unique identifiers relative to each other.

The DSC will not expose the private portions of resident keys or aliases outside the subset of DSC scope containing the RoT services. Therefore, possession of such aliases or keys can only be proved indirectly by using it to decrypt a value that has been encrypted with a corresponding public key. In this way, these resident keys or aliases can provide for authentication based on decryption operations instead of producing a digital signature.

The DSC responds to requests from an external entity to attest to the provenance and integrity of platform characteristics contained within the DSC.

Integrity reporting is the process of attesting to platform characteristics (including those recorded in status registers in a DSC). The philosophy behind integrity measurement, logging, and reporting is that a platform may enter any state possible—including undesirable or insecure states—but can still accurately report measurements derived from data attributing to those states. In this context, data can include, but is not limited to, code, security-critical configurations, values of registers, including status registers. An independent process may evaluate the integrity states and determine an appropriate response.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3:

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and ensure that it describes the cryptographically verifiable identities for the Root of Trust for Reporting and how they are used, verifying that they are not visible outside the subset of DSC scope corresponding to the Roots of Trust.

[conditional] If these cryptographically verifiable identities come in the form of resident keys or aliases, the evaluator shall verify that the possession of such aliases or keys can only be proved indirectly by using them to decrypt a value that has been encrypted with a corresponding public key. The evaluator shall also verify that such keys or aliases are not used for producing digital signatures.

In addition, the evaluator shall examine the TSS and ensure that it describes how these cryptographically verifiable identities are unique between individual DSCs. The evaluator shall also ensure that the TSS describes how the Root of Trust for Reporting reports on the state of the platform and how the values reported satisfy the scope indicated by the report.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to confirm it describes how to enable the root of trust for reporting mechanism on the TOE, how to generate a report, and how reports are verified as genuine.

#### KMD

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### Tests

Note that the following test may require the developer to provide access to a test platform that provides the evaluator with tools that are not typically available to end users.

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall enable the root of trust for reporting mechanism on the TOE and generate a report.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall confirm the generated report is valid.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall modify the signature of a valid report and confirm the report is invalid.
- **Test 4:** The evaluator shall modify the contents of a valid report and confirm the report is invalid.

## FPT\_RPL.1/Rollback Replay Detection (Rollback)

This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .

### FPT\_RPL.1.1/Rollback

The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [previous firmware builds].

### FPT\_RPL.1.2/Rollback

The TSF shall prevent the execution of the loaded firmware and perform [selection: [assignment: other actions], no other actions] when replay is detected.

**Application Note #53:** A DSC's ability to detect an attempted rollback (software/firmware downgrade) is not applicable in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware that cannot be modified in any way. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in [FDP\\_MFW\\_EXT.1.1](#).

The TSF data is used as a guarantee of the ordinal identifier of the firmware instance. When a firmware load is requested, the TSF ensures the authenticated firmware ordinal identifier is greater than or equal to the previously authenticated firmware identifier. For example, this could be accomplished by ensuring the validated instance of the firmware to be loaded is greater than or equal to the instance previously validated and loaded into the TOE. By loading a previous instance of firmware, it potentially opens up the device to known vulnerabilities.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FPT\_RPL.1/Rollback:

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and other vendor documentation and ensure that they describe the methods used to guarantee the validity of firmware identifiers and prevents the TSF from executing older instances than that which is currently authorized.

#### Guidance

There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.

#### KMD

There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.

#### Tests

The evaluator shall repeat the following tests to cover all allowed firmware verification mechanisms as described in the TSS. For example, if the firmware verification mechanism replaces an entire partition or subset of the DSC scope containing many separate code files, the evaluator does not need to repeat the test for each individual file.

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall attempt to execute an earlier instance or build of the software (as determined by the vendor). The evaluator shall verify that this attempt fails by checking

*the version identifiers or cryptographic hashes of the firmware against those previously recorded and checking that the values do not correspond to an unauthorized build.*

- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall attempt to execute a current or later instance and shall verify that the firmware execution succeeds.

## FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1 Replay Prevention

### FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall have a mechanism for preventing replay of user authorization of operations on SDOs using the following methods [**selection**: monotonic counters, random nonces, [**assignment**: other methods as specified]].

### FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall detect replay for the following actions: [authorization of operations on SDOs].

### FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall deny the requested operation on the SDO when it detects a replay.

**Application Note #54:** The TSF receives authorization from an external source to the DSC to perform an operation on an SDO. If the operation on the SDO is restricted to authorized users, then anyone observing the communication to the DSC can copy the authorization and replay it. Random nonces and monotonic counters are but two mechanisms the TSF can use to mitigate replay. In this requirement, operations on SDOs include generating, using, modifying, propagating, and destroying. Besides monotonic counters and random nonces, the TSF could employ other methods to prevent replay of user authorizations, which the Security Target should describe.

This requirement does not specify how TSF detects replays.

## Evaluation Activities ▾

### FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1:

#### TSS

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes the mechanism employed for preventing replay of user authorization of operations on SDOs and that access is denied when replay is detected.*

#### Guidance

*The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify that it describes how to enforce Replay Prevention if configuration is necessary.*

#### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### Tests

*The evaluator shall perform an authorization of an operation on an SDO and capture or retain that authorization for reuse. The evaluator shall then attempt to replay that same authorization and ensure that the DSC does not allow the authorization to take place. If the replay of the authorization is allowed to take place for an operation on SDOs, the test is a 'Fail', otherwise, the test is a 'Pass'.*

## FPT\_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps

### FPT\_STM.1.1

The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

**Application Note #55:** It is acceptable for the TSF to provide timestamp data either through an internal clock or a counter. It is also permissible for the TSF to obtain time data from a clock contained within the same physical enclosure as the TOE.

## Evaluation Activities ▾

### FPT\_STM.1:

#### TSS

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it lists each security function that makes use of time. The TSS provides a description of how the time is maintained and considered reliable in the context of each of the time related functions.*

#### Guidance

*The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to ensure it instructs the administrator how to set the time or indicates any configuration steps required for the TSF to receive time data from an external source.*

#### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### Tests

*The evaluator shall perform the following tests:*

- **Test 1:** [conditional]: If the TSF provides a mechanism to manually set the time, the evaluator shall use the guidance documentation to set the time. The evaluator shall then use an available interface to observe that the time was set correctly.
- **Test 2:** [conditional]: If the TSF receives time data from some source outside the TOE, the evaluator shall use the guidance documentation to configure the external time source (if applicable). The evaluator shall observe that the time has been set to the expected value.

## FPT\_TST.1 TSF Testing

### FPT\_TST.1.1

The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during power-on start-up, [selection: periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at no other condition, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur] ] to demonstrate the correct operation of [the TSF].

### FPT\_TST.1.2

The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of [TSF data].

### FPT\_TST.1.3

The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of the [TSF].

**Application Note #56:** This requirement intends to cover integrity of the TSF functionality (i.e. runtime checks).

TSF integrity testing provides the ability to test the TSF's correct operation. These tests are expected to be performed automatically and autonomously at start-up but may also be performed periodically during operation, at the request of the authorized user, or when other conditions are met. It also provides the ability to verify the integrity of TSF data and executable code.

All cryptographic functions come with known answer tests (KATs). In addition to verifying the integrity of the firmware executing the TSF, the DSC should also verify the integrity of any data associated with the TSF (such as constants for cryptographic algorithms) as well as performing the KATs.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FPT\_TST.1:

#### TS

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS and other vendor documentation and ensure they describe the methods used to verify integrity of the TSF and TSF data. The evaluator shall also verify that the TSS describes how the tests are performed automatically and autonomously (without intervention).*

#### Guidance

*The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to ensure it provides authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of the TSF and its data.*

#### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### Tests

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall verify that the DSC performs an integrity check of all TSF, including data, as well as performing KATs for those functions. The evaluator shall verify failures using malformed known answer test data (for example, unexpected input or output values).
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall ensure that when an integrity check failure occurs specific to failing KATs and failure to verify the integrity of the TSF, the TOE will prevent any further processing of the current TSF and user data.

## 5.1.6 Resource Utilization (FRU)

### FRU\_FLT.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance

#### FRU\_FLT.1.1

The TSF shall ensure the operation of [protection of TSF data] when the following failures occur: [fault injection].

**Application Note #57:** TSF data may be protected in response to a fault injection either by providing a method to ensure that the data remains protected or by logically destroying the data or any part of a key change that encrypts it. This behavior may differ based on the type of fault.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FRU\_FLT.1:

#### TS

*The evaluator shall examine the TSS and other vendor documentation and ensure they describe the response and state of TSF data to each type of fault injection into the TOE.*

#### Guidance

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### Tests

*The evaluator shall process SDOs/SDEs while applying each type of identified Fault Injection into the TSF. The evaluator will note whether the TSF response is as noted in the TSS and whether the state can be confirmed. If the response and state are as documented, the test is a 'Pass', otherwise, the test is a 'Fail'.*

## 5.1.7 Trusted Paths/Channels

### FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1 CCM Protocol

**This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .**

#### FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement CCMP using [**selection**: AES, Camellia] in CCM mode and key size [**selection**: 128-bits, 256-bits] as defined in [**selection**: IEEE 802.11i, IEEE 802.11ac].

#### FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

#### FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

**Application Note #58:** This SFR must be claimed if CCMP is selected in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.

Inclusion of this SFR requires inclusion of AES-CCM or CAM-CCM in FCS\_COP.1/SKC.

CCMP is defined in IEEE 802.11i. CCMP-256 is defined in IEEE 802.11ac.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1:

##### TSS

*The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes a description of the TOE's expected responses to CCMP authentication failures and malformed or invalid CCMP data units.*

##### Guidance

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

##### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

##### Tests

*The evaluator shall perform the following tests:*

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall attempt to establish a CCMP connection to the TOE from an external entity, observe the return traffic with a network traffic analyzer, and verify that the connection succeeds and that the traffic is identified as properly constructed CCMP data units.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall attempt to establish a CCMP connection to the TOE using five messages with incorrect or invalid authentication factors and verify that an authentication failure or error status is returned.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall attempt to establish a CCMP connection to the TOE using five different messages that are malformed or invalid due to noncompliance with the CCMP standard and observe that all connection attempts are unsuccessful.
- **Test 4:** The evaluator shall establish a valid CCMP connection to the TOE. Once this has been established, the evaluator shall send ten different messages that are malformed or invalid due to noncompliance with the CCMP standard and observe that each of these messages are rejected.

### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1 GCM Protocol

**This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .**

#### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement GCMP using [**selection**: AES, Camellia] in GCM mode and key size [**selection**: 128-bits, 256-bits] as defined in [IEEE 802.11ad].

#### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

#### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

**Application Note #59:** This SFR must be claimed if GCMP is selected in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.

Inclusion of this SFR requires inclusion of AES-GCM or CAM-GCM in FCS\_COP.1/SKC.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1:

##### TSS

*The evaluator shall verify that the TSS includes a description of the TOE's expected responses to GCMP authentication failures and malformed or invalid GCMP data units.*

##### Guidance

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

##### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

**Tests**

*The evaluator shall perform the following tests:*

- **Test 1:** The evaluator shall attempt to establish a GCMP connection to the TOE from an external entity, observe the return traffic with a network traffic analyzer, and verify that the connection succeeds and that the traffic is identified as properly constructed GCMP data units.
- **Test 2:** The evaluator shall attempt to establish a GCMP connection to the TOE using five messages with incorrect or invalid authentication factors and verify that an authentication failure or error status is returned.
- **Test 3:** The evaluator shall attempt to establish a GCMP connection to the TOE using five different messages that are malformed or invalid due to noncompliance with the GCMP standard and observe that all connection attempts are unsuccessful.
- **Test 4:** The evaluator shall establish a valid GCMP connection to the TOE. Once this has been established, the evaluator shall send ten different messages that are malformed or invalid due to noncompliance with the GCMP standard and observe that each of these messages are rejected.

## FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels

**This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .**

### FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use [**selection**: CCMP, GCMP] protocol to provide a communication channel between itself and [**assignment**: list of entities external to the TOE] that protects channel data from disclosure and ensures the integrity of channel data.

**Application Note #60:** This SFR must be claimed if cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 is selected in either FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 or FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.

Entities external to the TOE include applications that communicate with the TOE such as authentication capabilities (e.g. biometrics reader), external storage, and interfaces with an external DSC.

If CCMP is selected, the ST author must include [FTP\\_CCMP\\_EXT.1](#). If GCMP is selected, the ST author must include [FTP\\_GCMP\\_EXT.1](#).

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1:

#### TSS

*The evaluator shall review the TSS to determine that it lists all trusted channels the TOE uses for remote communications, including both the external entities and remote users used for the channel as well as the protocol that is used for each.*

#### Guidance

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### KMD

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### Tests

*The evaluator shall configure the TOE to communicate with each external IT entity or type of remote user identified in the TSS. The evaluator shall monitor network traffic while the TSF performs communication with each of these destinations. The evaluator shall ensure that for each session a trusted channel was established in conformance with the protocols identified in the selection.*

## FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications

**This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .**

### FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall encrypt data for transfer between the TOE and [**assignment**: list of entities external to the TOE] using a cryptographic algorithm and key size as specified in [FCS\\_COP.1/SKC](#), and using [**selection**:

- Pre-shared keys,
- Keys established according to [FCS\\_CKM.2](#),
- Keys exchanged using a physically protected communication mechanism conformant with [FTP\\_ITP\\_EXT.1](#)

].

**Application Note #61:** This SFR must be claimed if encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 is selected in either FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 or FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.

This requirement applies to encrypted data communications between the TOE and external entities that do not use a physically protected mechanism conforming to [FTP\\_ITP\\_EXT.1](#), or a cryptographically protected data channel as conforming to [FTP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#). For example, if data is transferred through

encrypted buffers (or blobs) then this requirement applies. If data is transferred through a physically protected channel, then [FTP\\_ITP\\_EXT.1](#) applies. This requirement would apply, for example, for communications implemented through a shared data buffer.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FTP\\_ITE\\_EXT.1](#):

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall review the TSS to determine that it lists all encryption mechanisms the TOE uses for protected external communications, along with the types of communications protected using each mechanism.*

#### **Guidance**

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*The evaluator shall configure the TOE to communicate with each external entity identified in the TSS. The evaluator shall initiate a transaction that will result in data being transferred to the TOE through the mechanism and other data returned to the initiating entity through the mechanism. The evaluator must verify that the data returned to the entity was encrypted using the documented mechanism when received.*

## **FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel**

***This is a selection-based component. Its inclusion depends upon selection from .***

### [FTP\\_ITP\\_EXT.1.1](#)

The TSF shall provide a physically protected communication channel between itself and **[assignment: list of other IT entities within the same platform]**.

**Application Note #62:** This SFR must be claimed if physically protected channels as specified in [FTP\\_ITP\\_EXT.1](#) is selected in either [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.1](#) or [FDP\\_ITC\\_EXT.2](#).

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### [FTP\\_ITP\\_EXT.1](#):

#### **TSS**

*The evaluator shall review the TSS to determine that it lists all mechanisms the TOE uses for physically protected external communications, along with the types of communications protected using each mechanism.*

#### **Guidance**

*There are no AGD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **KMD**

*There are no KMD evaluation activities for this component.*

#### **Tests**

*There are no test activities for this component.*

## **5.1.8 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale**

The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:

**Table 12: SFR Rationale**

OBJECTIVE	ADDRESSED BY	RATIONALE
O.ACCOUNTABILITY	FAU_GEN.1	'cause FAU_GEN.1 is awesome
	FTP_ITC_EXT.1	Cause FTP reasons
O.INTEGRITY	FPT_SBOP_EXT.1	For reasons
	FPT_ASLR_EXT.1	ASLR For reasons
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1	For reasons
	FPT_TUD_EXT.2	For reasons
	FCS_COP.1/HASH	For reasons
	FCS_COP.1/SIGN	For reasons
	FCS_COP.1/KEYHMAC	For reasons
	FPT_ACF_EXT.1	For reasons

	FPT_SRP_EXT.1	For reasons
	FIA_X509_EXT.1	For reasons
	FPT_TST_EXT.1	For reasons
	FTP_ITC_EXT.1	For reasons
	FPT_W^X_EXT.1	For reasons
	FIA_AFL.1	For reasons
	FIA_UAU.5	For reasons
O.MANAGEMENT	FMT_MOF_EXT.1	For reasons
	FMT_SMF_EXT.1	For reasons
	FTA_TAB.1	For reasons
	FTP_TRP.1	For reasons
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE	FCS_STO_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT, FDP_ACF_EXT.1	Rationale for a big chunk
O.PROTECTED_COMMs	FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.4, FCS_COP.1/ENCRYPT, FCS_COP.1/HASH, FCS_COP.1/SIGN, FCS_COP.1/HMAC, FDP_IFC_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FTP_ITC_EXT.1	Rationale for a big chunk

## 5.2 Security Assurance Requirements

The Security Objectives in [Section 4 Security Objectives](#) were constructed to address threats identified in [Section 3.1 Threats](#). The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) are a formal instantiation of the Security Objectives. The PP identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs independent testing.

This section lists the set of SARs from CC part 3 that are required in evaluations against this PP. Individual Assurance Activities to be performed are specified both in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) as well as in this section.

The general model for evaluation of OSs against STs written to conform to this PP is as follows:

After the ST has been approved for evaluation, the TSEF will obtain the OS, supporting environmental IT, and the administrative/user guides for the OS. The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) for the ASE and ALC SARs. The ITSEF also performs the Assurance Activities contained within [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#), which are intended to be an interpretation of the other CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the OS. The Assurance Activities that are captured in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) also provide clarification as to what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the OS is compliant with the PP.

### 5.2.1 Class ASE: Security Target

As per ASE activities defined in [\[CEM\]](#).

### 5.2.2 Class ADV: Development

The information about the OS is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the TSS portion of the ST. The OS developer must concur with the description of the product that is contained in the TSS as it relates to the functional requirements. The Assurance Activities contained in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) should provide the ST authors with sufficient information to determine the appropriate content for the TSS section.

#### ADV\_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification (ADV\_FSP.1)

The functional specification describes the TSFIs. It is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. Additionally, because OSs conforming to this PP will necessarily have interfaces to the Operational Environment that are not directly invokable by OS users, there is little point specifying that such interfaces be described in and of themselves since only indirect testing of such interfaces may be possible. For this PP, the activities for this family should focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation. No additional “functional specification” documentation is necessary to satisfy the assurance activities specified. The interfaces that need to be evaluated are characterized through the information needed to perform the assurance activities listed, rather than as an independent, abstract list.

#### Developer action elements:

##### ADV\_FSP.1.1D

The developer shall provide a functional specification.

#### Content and presentation elements:

##### ADV\_FSP.1.2C

The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.

**Application Note #63:** As indicated in the introduction to this section, the functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the

AGD\_OPE and AGD\_PRE documentation. The developer may reference a website accessible to application developers and the evaluator. The assurance activities in the functional requirements point to evidence that should exist in the documentation and TSS section; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element **ADV\_FSP.1.2D** is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.

- ADV\_FSP.1.3C  
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
- ADV\_FSP.1.4C  
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
- ADV\_FSP.1.5C  
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
- ADV\_FSP.1.6C  
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.

#### **Evaluator action elements:**

- ADV\_FSP.1.7E  
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
- ADV\_FSP.1.8E  
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.

### **Evaluation Activities** ▾

#### **ADV\_FSP.1:**

*There are no specific assurance activities associated with these SARs, except ensuring the information is provided. The functional specification documentation is provided to support the evaluation activities described in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#), and other activities described for AGD, ATE, and AVA SARs. The requirements on the content of the functional specification information is implicitly assessed by virtue of the other assurance activities being performed; if the evaluator is unable to perform an activity because there is insufficient interface information, then an adequate functional specification has not been provided.*

### **5.2.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation**

The guidance documents will be provided with the ST. Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the IT personnel. Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and Instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment. Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality is also provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in the assurance activities specified with each requirement.

#### **AGD\_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance (AGD\_OPE.1)**

##### **Developer action elements:**

- AGD\_OPE.1.1D  
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
- Application Note #64:** The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages. Rather than repeat information here, the developer should review the assurance activities for this component to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.

##### **Content and presentation elements:**

- AGD\_OPE.1.2C  
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
- Application Note #65:** User and administrator are to be considered in the definition of user role.
- AGD\_OPE.1.3C  
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces provided by the OS in a secure manner.
- AGD\_OPE.1.4C

The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.

**Application Note #66:** This portion of the operational user guidance should be presented in the form of a checklist that can be quickly executed by IT personnel (or end-users, when necessary) and suitable for use in compliance activities. When possible, this guidance is to be expressed in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) to support security automation. Minimally, it should be presented in a structured format which includes a title for each configuration item, instructions for achieving the secure configuration, and any relevant rationale.

#### AGD\_OPE.1.5C

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.

#### AGD\_OPE.1.6C

The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the OS (including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences, and implications for maintaining secure operation.

#### AGD\_OPE.1.7C

The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

#### AGD\_OPE.1.8C

The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.

### Evaluator action elements:

#### AGD\_OPE.1.9E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## Evaluation Activities ▾

### AGD\_OPE.1:

*Some of the contents of the operational guidance are verified by the assurance activities in Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements and evaluation of the OS according to the [CEM]. The following additional information is also required. If cryptographic functions are provided by the OS, the operational guidance shall contain instructions for configuring the cryptographic engine associated with the evaluated configuration of the OS. It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the OS. The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the OS by verifying a digital signature - this may be done by the OS or the underlying platform. The evaluator will verify that this process includes the following steps: Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to the OS (e.g., placement in a specific directory). Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or unsuccessful. This includes generation of the hash/digital signature. The OS will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this PP. The operational guidance shall make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the evaluation activities.*

## AGD\_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures (AGD\_PRE.1)

### Developer action elements:

#### AGD\_PRE.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS, including its preparative procedures.

**Application Note #67:** As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the assurance activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.

### Content and presentation elements:

#### AGD\_PRE.1.2C

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered OS in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.

#### AGD\_PRE.1.3C

The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the OS and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.

### Evaluator action elements:

#### AGD\_PRE.1.4E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements

for content and presentation of evidence.

#### AGD\_PRE.1.5E

The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the OS can be prepared securely for operation.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### AGD\_PRE.1:

*As indicated in the introduction above, there are significant expectations with respect to the documentation—especially when configuring the operational environment to support OS functional requirements. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the guidance provided for the OS adequately addresses all platforms claimed for the OS in the ST.*

## 5.2.4 Class ALC: Life-cycle Support

At the assurance level provided for OSs conformant to this PP, life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life-cycle, rather than an examination of the OS vendor's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it is a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.

### ALC\_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE (ALC\_CMC.1)

This component is targeted at identifying the OS such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user.

#### Developer action elements:

##### ALC\_CMC.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS and a reference for the OS.

#### Content and presentation elements:

##### ALC\_CMC.1.2C

The OS shall be labeled with a unique reference.

**Application Note #68:** Unique reference information includes:

- OS Name
- OS Version
- OS Description
- Software Identification (SWID) tags, if available

#### Evaluator action elements:

##### ALC\_CMC.1.3E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### ALC\_CMC.1:

*The evaluator will check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the ST. Further, the evaluator will check the AGD guidance and OS samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor maintains a web site advertising the OS, the evaluator will examine the information on the web site to ensure that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.*

### ALC\_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage (ALC\_CMS.1)

Given the scope of the OS and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's assurance activities are covered by the assurance activities listed for [ALC\\_CMC.1](#).

#### Developer action elements:

##### ALC\_CMS.1.1D

The developer shall provide a configuration list for the OS.

#### Content and presentation elements:

##### ALC\_CMS.1.2C

The configuration list shall include the following: the OS itself; and the evaluation evidence required by the SARs.

##### ALC\_CMS.1.3C

The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.

#### Evaluator action elements:

##### ALC\_CMS.1.4E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### ALC\_CMS.1:

The "evaluation evidence required by the SARs" in this PP is limited to the information in the ST coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that the OS is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the ST and in the AGD guidance (as done in the assurance activity for ALC\_CMC.1), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this component. Life-cycle support is targeted aspects of the developer's life-cycle and instructions to providers of applications for the developer's devices, rather than an in-depth examination of the TSF manufacturer's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it's a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation.

The evaluator will ensure that the developer has identified (in guidance documentation for application developers concerning the targeted platform) one or more development environments appropriate for use in developing applications for the developer's platform. For each of these development environments, the developer shall provide information on how to configure the environment to ensure that buffer overflow protection mechanisms in the environment(s) are invoked (e.g., compiler and linker flags). The evaluator will ensure that this documentation also includes an indication of whether such protections are on by default, or have to be specifically enabled. The evaluator will ensure that the TSF is uniquely identified (with respect to other products from the TSF vendor), and that documentation provided by the developer in association with the requirements in the ST is associated with the TSF using this unique identification.

### ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates

This component requires the OS developer, in conjunction with any other necessary parties, to provide information as to how the end-user devices are updated to address security issues in a timely manner. The documentation describes the process of providing updates to the public from the time a security flaw is reported/discovered, to the time an update is released. This description includes the parties involved (e.g., the developer, carriers(s)) and the steps that are performed (e.g., developer testing, carrier testing), including worst case time periods, before an update is made available to the public.

#### Developer action elements:

##### ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.1D

The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to the OS.

##### ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.2D

The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how users are notified when updates change security properties or the configuration of the product.

#### Content and presentation elements:

##### ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.3C

The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the OS software.

##### ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.4C

The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues pertaining to the OS.

**Application Note #69:** The reporting mechanism could include web sites, email addresses, as well as a means to protect the sensitive nature of the report (e.g., public keys that could be used to encrypt the details of a proof-of-concept exploit).

#### Evaluator action elements:

##### ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1.5E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### ALC\_TSU\_EXT.1:

The evaluator will verify that the TSS contains a description of the timely security update process used by the developer to create and deploy security updates. The evaluator will verify that this description addresses the entire application. The evaluator will also verify that, in addition to the OS developer's process, any third-party processes are also addressed in the description. The evaluator will also verify that each mechanism for deployment of security updates is described.

The evaluator will verify that, for each deployment mechanism described for the update process, the TSS lists a time between public disclosure of a vulnerability and public availability of the security update to the OS patching this vulnerability, to include any third-party or carrier delays in deployment. The evaluator will verify that this time is expressed in a number or range of days. The evaluator will verify that this description includes the publicly available mechanisms (including either an email address or website) for reporting security issues related to the OS. The evaluator shall verify that the description of this mechanism includes a method for protecting the report either using a public key for encrypting email or a trusted channel for a

### 5.2.5 Class ATE: Tests

Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE\_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA\_VAN family. At the assurance level specified in this PP, testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirements.

#### **ATE\_IND.1 Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE\_IND.1)**

Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the administrative (including configuration and operational) documentation provided. The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in [Section 5.1 Security Functional Requirements](#) being met, although some additional testing is specified for SARs in [Section 5.2 Security Assurance Requirements](#). The Assurance Activities identify the additional testing activities associated with these components. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/OS combinations that are claiming conformance to this PP. Given the scope of the OS and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, this component's assurance activities are covered by the assurance activities listed for [ALC\\_CMC.1](#).

#### **Developer action elements:**

##### ATE\_IND.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS for testing.

#### **Content and presentation elements:**

##### ATE\_IND.1.2C

The OS shall be suitable for testing.

#### **Evaluator action elements:**

##### ATE\_IND.1.3E

The evaluator *shall confirm* that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

##### ATE\_IND.1.4E

The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.

**Application Note #70:** The evaluator will test the OS on the most current fully patched version of the platform.

### **Evaluation Activities** ▼

#### **ATE\_IND.1:**

*The evaluator will prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the system, including any application crashes during testing. The evaluator shall determine the root cause of any application crashes and include that information in the report. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the [CEM] and the body of this PP's Assurance Activities. While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an Assurance Activity, the evaluator must document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST is covered. The test plan identifies the platforms to be tested, and for those platforms not included in the test plan but included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing the platforms. This justification must address the differences between the tested platforms and the untested platforms, and make an argument that the differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have no effect; rationale must be provided. If all platforms claimed in the ST are tested, then no rationale is necessary. The test plan describes the composition of each platform to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the evaluator is expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each platform either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) should be provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the OS and its platform. This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The cryptographic algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by this PP and used by the cryptographic protocols being evaluated (IPsec, TLS). The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those objectives. These procedures include expected results.*

*The test report (which could just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a "fail" and "pass" result (and the supporting details), and not just the "pass" result.*

### 5.2.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment

For the first generation of this protection profile, the evaluation lab is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. Until penetration tools are created and uniformly distributed to the evaluation labs, the evaluator will not be expected to test for these vulnerabilities in the OS. The labs will be expected to comment on the likelihood of these vulnerabilities given

the documentation provided by the vendor. This information will be used in the development of penetration testing tools and for the development of future protection profiles.

### **AVA\_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey (AVA\_VAN.1)**

#### **Developer action elements:**

AVA\_VAN.1.1D

The developer shall provide the OS for testing.

#### **Content and presentation elements:**

AVA\_VAN.1.2C

The OS shall be suitable for testing.

#### **Evaluator action elements:**

AVA\_VAN.1.3E

The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

AVA\_VAN.1.4E

The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the OS.

**Application Note #71:** Public domain sources include the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) dictionary for publicly-known vulnerabilities. Public domain sources also include sites which provide free checking of files for viruses.

AVA\_VAN.1.5E

The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the OS is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.

### **Evaluation Activities ▼**

#### **AVA\_VAN.1:**

*The evaluator will generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE\_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to find vulnerabilities that have been found in similar applications with a particular focus on network protocols the application uses and document formats it parses. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report.*

*For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE\_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.*

# **Appendix A - Implementation-Dependent Requirements**

Implementation-Dependent Requirements are dependent on the TOE implementing a particular function. If the TOE fulfills any of these requirements, the vendor must either add the related SFR or disable the functionality for the evaluated configuration.

## **A.1 Widget Thing**

This is a super description of this certain feature.

If this is implemented by the TOE, the following requirements must be included in the ST:

# Appendix B - Inherently Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this Protection Profile. However, these requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [CC] Part 1, **8.2 Dependencies between components**.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the Protection Profile provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.

## Requirement Rationale for Satisfaction

FIA_UAU.1 - Timing of authentication	FIA_AFL.1 implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been authenticated, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test.
FIA_UID.1 - Timing of identification	FIA_AFL.1 implicitly requires that the OS perform all necessary actions, including those on behalf of the user who has not been identified, in order to authenticate; therefore it is duplicative to include these actions as a separate assignment and test.
FMT_SMR.1 - Security roles	FMT_MOF_EXT.1 specifies role-based management functions that implicitly defines user and privileged accounts; therefore, it is duplicative to include separate role requirements.
FPT_STM.1 - Reliable time stamps	FAU_GEN.1.2 explicitly requires that the OS associate timestamps with audit records; therefore it is duplicative to include a separate timestamp requirement.
FTA_SSL.1 - TSF-initiated session locking	FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines requirements for managing session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement.
FTA_SSL.2 - User-initiated locking	FMT_MOF_EXT.1 defines requirements for user-initiated session locking; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate session locking requirement.
FAU_STG.1 - Protected audit trail storage	FPT_ACF_EXT.1 defines a requirement to protect audit logs; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate protection of audit trail requirements.
FAU_GEN.2 - User identity association	FAU_GEN.1.2 explicitly requires that the OS record any user account associated with each event; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to associate a user account with each event.
FAU_SAR.1 - Audit review	FPT_ACF_EXT.1.2 requires that audit logs (and other objects) are protected from reading by unprivileged users; therefore, it is duplicative to include a separate requirement to protect only the audit information.

## **Appendix C - Acronyms**

## **Appendix D - Selection Rules**

This rules in this appendix define which combinations of selections are considered valid. An ST is considered conforming only if it satisfies all rules.

# **Appendix E - Use Case Templates**

## **E.1 Elephant-own device**

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## Appendix F - Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Programming Interface
API	Application Programming Interface
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization
Base-PP	Base Protection Profile
CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
CESG	Communications-Electronics Security Group
CMC	Certificate Management over CMS
CMS	Cryptographic Message Syntax
CN	Common Names
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSA	Computer Security Act
CSP	Critical Security Parameters
DAR	Data At Rest
DEP	Data Execution Prevention
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DHE	Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
DNS	Domain Name System
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DT	Date/Time Vector
DTLS	Datagram Transport Layer Security
EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
ECDHE	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EST	Enrollment over Secure Transport
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
HMAC	Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IP	Internet Protocol
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OE	Operational Environment
OID	Object Identifier
OMB	Office of Management and Budget

OS	Operating System
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PP	Protection Profile
PP	Protection Profile
PP-Configuration	Protection Profile Configuration
PP-Module	Protection Profile Module
RBG	Random Bit Generator
RFC	Request for Comment
RNG	Random Number Generator
RNGVS	Random Number Generator Validation System
S/MIME	Secure/Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
SAN	Subject Alternative Name
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SIP	Session Initiation Protocol
ST	Security Target
SWID	Software Identification
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSFI	TSF Interface
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
USB	Universal Serial Bus
VM	Virtual Machine
XCCDF	eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format
XOR	Exclusive Or
app	Application

# Appendix G - Bibliography

Identifier	Title
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Part 1: Introduction and General Model</a>, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 2: Security Functional Components</a>, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 3: Security Assurance Components</a>, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li></ul>
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[CESG]	CESG - <a href="#">End User Devices Security and Configuration Guidance</a>
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[OMB]	<a href="#">Reporting Incidents Involving Personally Identifiable Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency Information Technology Investments</a> , OMB M-06-19, July 12, 2006.