Comment: Comment-1-

# PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryptions


Version: 1.0
2022-12-16
**National Information Assurance Partnership**

## Revision History

| Version | Date | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | 2022-12-16 | Initial Release |

## Contents



1.0 National Information Assurance Partnership 2022-12-16 MACsec Ethernet Encryption 1.0 2022-12-16 Initial Release

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

The scope of this PP-Module is to describe the security functionality of Media Access Control Security (MACsec) encryption in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PPs:

- collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e (NDcPP)

This Base-PP is valid because a device that implements MACsec encryption is a specific type of network device, and there is nothing about the implementation of MACsec that would prevent any of the security capabilities defined by the Base-PP from being satisfied.

A TOE that conforms to a PP-Configuration containing this PP-Module may be a 'Distributed TOE' as defined in the NDcPP. This PP-Module does not prohibit the TOE from implementing other security functionality in a distributed manner. For example, a TOE may be deployed in such a manner that distributed nodes establish MACsec connectivity with physically separated networks while a centralized management device is used to configure the behavior of individual nodes.

## 1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

### 1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

| | |
|---|---|
| Assurance | Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC]. |
| Base Protection Profile (Base-PP) | Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration. |
| Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) | A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes. |
| Common Criteria (CC) | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408). |
| Common Criteria Testing Laboratory | Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations. |
| Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) | Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation. |
| Distributed TOE | A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole. |
| Operational Environment (OE) | Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy. |
| Protection Profile (PP) | An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products. |
| Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration) | A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module. |
| Protection Profile Module (PP-Module) | An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs. |
| Security Assurance Requirement (SAR) | A requirement to assure the security of the TOE. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Security Functional Requirement (SFR) | A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE. |
| Security Target (ST) | A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product. |
| Target of Evaluation (TOE) | The product under evaluation. |
| TOE Security Functionality (TSF) | The security functionality of the product under evaluation. |
| TOE Summary Specification (TSS) | A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST. |

### 1.2.2 Technical Terms

| | |
|---|---|
| Carrier Ethernet | MEF Carrier Ethernet standards define technology-agnostic layer-2 services. The standards include services aimed at end users (Subscriber Ethernet Services) and service providers (Operator Ethernet Services). Other related terms include Metro Ethernet Services, Provider Bridging and Provider Backbone Bridging. |
| Connectivity Association Key (CAK) | A symmetric key that is used as the master key for MACsec connectivity and is shared between connected MACsec endpoints. |
| Connectivity Association Key Name (CKN) | A unique identifier for a specific Connectivity Association Key. |
| Ethernet Private Line (EPL) | A service transporting customer data form one User Network Interface (UNI) to another UNI. |
| Ethernet Virtual Private Line (EVPL) | A Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) based service transporting customer data. The UNI is capable of service multiplexing. |
| Extended Packet Numbering | A scheme that allows MACsec communications to persist using a single Secure Association Key for a larger number of frames to reduce overhead and latency associated with key agreement. |
| Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL) | A port authentication protocol specified in IEEE 802.1X that is used to facilitate network authentication. |
| MAC Security Entity | An entity (e.g. computer) that is implementing MACsec. |
| MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) | A key agreement protocol used for distribution of MACsec keys to distributed peers. |
| MACsec protocol Data Unit (MPDU) | The basic MACsec frame structure that contains protcol and payload data. |
| Media Access Control Security (MACsec) | A standard for connectionless data confidentiality and integrity protection at the data link layer of a network connection. Formally defined in IEEE 802.1AE. |
| Metro Ethernet Forum (MEF) | A non-profit international industry consortium. |
| Packet Number (PN) | A monotonically increasing value that is guranteed to be unique for each MACsec frame transmitted using a given Secure Association Key (SAK) |
| | |

| | |
|---|---|
| SecTag | MAC Security Tag - a protocol header comprising a number of octets, beginning with an EtherType, that is prepended to the service data unit supplied by the client of the protocol and is used to provide security guarantees. |
| Secure Association (SA) | A mechanism that uses a Secure Assocation Key (SAK) to provide the MACsec service guarantees and security services for a sequence of transmitted frames. |
| Secure Association Key (SAK) | A key derived from the CAK that is used to encrypt/decrypt traffic for a given SA. |
| Secure Channel (SC) | A unidirectional channel (one to one or one to many) that uses symmetric key cryptography to provide a (possibly long lived) Secure Channel. |
| Secure Device Identifier | A device authentication credential that can be used for EAPOL and is formally defined in IEEE 802.1AR. |

## 1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

This PP-Module specifically addresses MACsec, which allows authorized systems using Ethernet Transport to maintain confidentiality of transmitted data and to take measures against frames that are transmitted or modified by unauthorized devices.

MACsec protects communication between trusted components of the network infrastructure, thus protecting the network operation. It facilitates maintenance of correct network connectivity and services as well as isolation of denial of service attacks.

The hardware, firmware, and software of the MACsec device define the physical boundary. All of the security functionality is contained and executed within the physical boundary of the device. For example, given a device with an Ethernet card, the whole device is considered to be within the boundary.

Since this PP-Module builds on the NDcPP, conformant TOEs are obligated to implement the functionality required in the NDcPP along with the additional functionality defined in this PP-Module in response to the threat environment discussed later in this document.

## 1.4 TOE Boundary

The physical boundary for a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module is a hardware appliance that also provides generalized network device functionality, such as auditing, I&A, and cryptographic services for network communications. The TOE’s logical boundary includes all functionality required by the claimed Base-PP as well as the MACsec functionality and related capabilities that are defined in this PP-Module. Any functionality that is provided by the network device that is not relevant to the security requirements defined by this PP-Module or the Base-PP is considered to be outside the scope of the TOE.

## 1.5 Use Cases

A pair of MACsec devices connected by a physical medium can protect Ethernet frames switched or routed from one device to the other. The two MACsec devices are provided with a Connectivity Association Key (CAK) and utilize the MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) protocol to create a secure tunnel. MKA is used by the two MACsec devices to agree upon MACsec keys. A policy should be installed to protect traffic between the devices, with the exception of the MKA or Ethernet control traffic such as EAP over LAN (EAPOL) frames.

This PP-Module defines two potential use cases for the MACsec TOE.

**[USE CASE 1] Classic Hop by Hop Deployment**

MACsec can be deployed in a hop by hop manner between Ethernet devices. Two devices will protect traffic originating in protected networks traversing an untrusted link between them. The devices will first exchange MKA frames, which serve to determine the peer is an authorized peer, and agree upon a shared key and MACsec cipher suite used to set up a transmit (Tx) Secure Association (SA) and a receive (Rx) SA. Once the SAs are set up, MACsec-protected frames traverse the unprotected link.

**[USE CASE 2] Over Carrier Ethernet Services**

In some markets network service providers have standardized their offerings according to various versions of the Metro Ethernet Forum (MEF) specifications. One recent MEF specification is the “E-Line” (*) service type which is based on the use of point to point Ethernet Virtual Circuits (EVCs). A port based service is known as an Ethernet Private Line and a VLAN based service is known as an Ethernet Virtual Private Line (EVPL). EPL provides a point-to-point Ethernet virtual connection (EVC) between a pair of dedicated user–network interfaces (UNIs), with a high degree of transparency. EVPL provides a point-to-point or point-to-multipoint connection between UNIs. A difference between the EVPL and EPL is the degree of transparency - while EPL is highly transparent, filtering only the pause frames, EVPL is required to either peer or drop most of the Layer 2 Control Protocols. The MEF has also defined other service types such as E-LAN and E-Tree.

(*) From MEF 6.3 – Subscriber Ethernet Services Definition – November 2019 – Table 3

# 2 Conformance Claims

### Conformance Statement

This PP-Module inherits exact conformance as required from the specified Base-PP and as defined in the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017).

The following PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module:

- PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625 (MOD_FW)
- PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways Version 1.2 (MOD_VPNGW) This previously said 1.1 but that has been sunset

### CC Conformance Claims

This PP-Module is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria Version 3.1, Release 5 [CC].

### Package Claims

This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any packages.

# 3 Security Problem Description

The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the TOE is expected to address, assumptions about its Operational Environment, and any organizational security policies that the TOE is expected to enforce.

## 3.1 Threats

The following threats that are defined in this PP-Module extend the threats that are defined by the Base-PP.

**T.DATA_INTEGRITY**

An attacker may modify data transmitted over the layer 2 link in a way that is not detected by the recipient.

Devices on a network may be exposed to attacks that attempt to corrupt or modify data in transit without authorization. If malicious devices are able to modify and replay data that is transmitted over a layer 2 link, then the data contained within the communications may be susceptible to a loss of integrity.

**T.NETWORK_ACCESS**

An attacker may send traffic through the TOE that enables them to access devices in the TOE's operational environment without authorization.

A MACsec device may sit on the periphery of a network, which means that it may have an externally-facing interface to a public network. Devices located in the public network may attempt to exercise services located on the internal network that are intended to be accessed only from within the internal network or externally accessible only from specifically authorized devices. If the MACsec device allows unauthorized external devices access to the internal network, these devices on the internal network may be subject to compromise. Similarly, if two MACsec devices are deployed to facilitate end-to-end encryption of traffic that is contained within a single network, an attacker could use an insecure MACsec device as a method to access devices on a specific segment of that network such as an individual LAN.

**T.UNTRUSTED_MACSEC_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS**

An attacker may acquire sensitive TOE or user data that is transmitted to or from the TOE because an untrusted communication channel causes a disclosure of data in transit.

A generic network device may be threatened by the use of insecure communications channels to transmit sensitive data. The attack surface of a MACsec device also includes the MACsec trusted channels. Inability to secure communications channels, or failure to do so correctly, would expose user data that is assumed to be secure to the threat of unauthorized disclosure.

## 3.2 Assumptions

All assumptions for the OE of the Base-PP also apply to this PP-Module. A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION is still operative, but only for the interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the Base-PP and not the PP-Module. This document does not define any additional assumptions.

## 3.3 Organizational Security Policies

An organization deploying the TOE is expected to satisfy the organizational security policy listed below in addition to all organizational security policies defined by the claimed Base-PP.

This document does not define any additional OSPs.

# 4 Security Objectives

## 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

**O.AUTHENTICATION_MACSEC**

To further address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, a compliant TOE's authentication ability (MKA) will allow a MACsec peer to establish connectivity associations (CA) with another MACsec peer. MACsec endpoints authenticate each other to ensure they are communicating with an authorized MAC Security Entity (SecY) entity.

**Addressed by:** FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4, FCS_MKA_EXT.1, FIA_PSK_EXT.1, FCS_DEVID_EXT.1 (selection-based), FCS_EAP-TLS_EXT.1 (selection-based)

**O.AUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATION**

All network devices are expected to provide services that allow the security functionality of the device to be managed. The MACsec device, as a specific type of network device, has a refined set of management functions to address its specialized behavior. In order to further mitigate the threat of a compromise of its security functionality, the MACsec device prescribes the ability to limit brute-force authentication attempts by enforcing lockout of accounts that experience excessive failures and by limiting access to security-relevant data that administrators do not need to view.

**Addressed by:** FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC, FPT_CAK_EXT.1, FIA_AFL_EXT.1 (optional), FTP_TRP.1/MACSEC (optional), FMT_SNMP_EXT.1 (selection-based)

**O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS_MACSEC**

To address the issues associated with unauthorized modification and disclosure of information, compliant TOEs will implement cryptographic capabilities. These capabilities are intended to maintain confidentiality and allow for detection and modification of data that is transmitted outside of the TOE.

**Addressed by:** FCS_COP.1/CMAC, FCS_COP.1/MACSEC, FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2, FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3, FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC, FTP_TRP.1/MACSEC (optional), FCS_SNMP_EXT.1 (selection-based)

**O.PORT_FILTERING_MACSEC**

To further address the issues associated with unauthorized network access, a compliant TOE's port filtering capability will restrict the flow of network traffic through the TOE based on layer 2 frame characteristics and whether or not the traffic represents valid MACsec frames and MACsec Key Agreement Protocol Data Units (MKPDUs).

**Addressed by:** FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1, FIA_PSK_EXT.1, FPT_DDP_EXT.1

**O.REPLAY_DETECTION**

A MACsec device is expected to help mitigate the threat of MACsec data integrity violations by providing a mechanism to detect and discard replayed traffic for MACsec protocol data units (MPDUs).

**Addressed by:** FPT_RPL.1, FPT_RPL_EXT.1 (optional)

**O.SYSTEM_MONITORING_MACSEC**

To address the issues of administrators being able to monitor the operations of the MACsec device, compliant TOEs will implement the ability to log the flow of Ethernet traffic. Specifically, the TOE will provide the means for administrators to configure rules to 'log' when Ethernet traffic grants or restricts access. As a result, the 'log' will result in informative event logs whenever a match occurs. In addition, the establishment of security CAs is auditable, not only between MACsec devices, but also with MAC Security Key Agreement Entities (KaYs).

**Addressed by:** FAU_GEN.1/MACSEC

**O.TSF_INTEGRITY**

To mitigate the security risk that the MACsec device may fail during startup, it is required to fail-secure in the event that any self-test failures occur during startup. This ensures that the device will only operate when it is in a known state.

**Addressed by:** FPT_FLS.1

## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

All objectives for the operational environment of the Base-PP also apply to this PP-Module. OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION is still operative, but only for the interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the Base-PP and not the PP-Module.

## 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies map to the security objectives.

**Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale**

| Threat, Assumption, or OSP | Security Objectives | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| T.DATA_INTEGRITY | O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS_MACSEC | The TOE mitigates the threat of data integrity violations by implementing cryptographic functionality that includes integrity protection. |
| | O.REPLAY_DETECTION | The TOE mitigates the threat of data integrity violations by providing a mechanism to detect and discard replayed traffic for MPDUs. |
| T.NETWORK_ACCESS | O.PORT_FILTERING_MACSEC | The TOE's port filtering capability reduces the threat of unauthorized access to devices in the TOE's operational environment by restricting the flow of network traffic entering through the TOE interfaces based on layer 2 frame characteristics and whether or not the traffic represents valid MACsec frames and MKPDUs. |
| T.UNTRUSTED_MACSEC_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS | O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS_MACSEC | The TOE mitigates the threat of unauthorized disclosure of information via untrusted thru traffic by providing MKA authentication functions to authorize endpoints. |

# 5 Security Requirements

https://www.niap-ccevs.org/profile/Info.cfm?PPID=447&id=447 When this PP-Module is used to extend the NDcPP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a network device. The TOE boundary is simply extended to include MACsec functionality that is provided by the network device. The threats defined by this PP-Module (see section 3.1) supplement those defined in the NDcPP as follows: The threat of data integrity compromise at the layer 2 level is a specific threat that can be countered by MACsec technology. The threat of a malicious entity accessing protected network resources without authorization is a specific example of the T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS threat defined in the Base-PP. The threat of disclosure of data in protected communications channels is the same as the T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS threat in the NDcPP. This PP-Module expands on that by introducing additional logical interfaces (MACsec, SNMP) that this threat applies to. The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it. The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it. The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it. The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it. The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it. The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it. The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it.

### 5.0.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### FAU_GEN.1/SBC Audit Data Generation (Session Border Controller)

FAU_GEN.1.1/SBC

The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b. All auditable events for the [*not specified*] level of audit;
c. **All administrative actions;**
d. **[*Specifically defined auditable events listed in the Auditable Events table (Table 2)*]**

| Requirement | Auditable Events | Additional Audit Record Contents |
|---|---|---|
| FAU_ARP_EXT.1 | None | |
| FAU_SAA.1 | None | |
| FAU_SEL.1 | None | |
| FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 | None | |
| FDP_IFC.1 | None | |
| FDP_IFF.1 | Any modifications to the B2BUA policy | None |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.1 | Application of traffic filtering rules | Source and destination of observed traffic |
| | | Rule relevant to observed traffic |
| | | Result of rule evaluation |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.2 | Application of traffic filtering rules | Source and destination of observed traffic |
| | | Rule relevant to observed traffic |
| | | Result of rule evaluation |
| FFW_DPI_EXT.1 | Application of deep packet inspection rules | Source and destination of observed traffic |
| | | Rule relevant to observed traffic |
| | | Result of rule evaluation |
| FFW_NAT_EXT.1 | None | |
| FIA_SIPS_EXT.1 | Call Detail Record (CDR) | Calling party |
| | | Called party |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | Start time of the call |
| | | Call duration |
| | | Call type |
| FIA_SIPT_EXT.1 | All SIP trunk authentication attempts | Username and IP address of the service provider |
| FMT_SMF.1/SBC | All management actions | Identifier of initiator |
| FRU_PRS_EXT.1 | None | |
| FRU_RSA.1 | None | |
| FTP_ITC.1/ESC | Initiation of the trusted channel | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel |
| | Termination of the trusted channel | |
| | Failure of the trusted channel functions | |
| FTP_ITC.1/H323 (selection-based) | Initiation of the trusted channel | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel |
| | Termination of the trusted channel | |
| | Failure of the trusted channel functions | |
| FTP_ITC.1/VVoIP | Initiation of the trusted channel | Identification of the initiator and target of the trusted channel |
| | Termination of the trusted channel | |
| | Failure of the trusted channel functions | |

Table 2: Auditable Events

**Application Note #1:** The auditable events defined in the Auditable Events table are for the SFRs that are explicitly defined in this PP-Module. For any SFRs that are included as part of the TOE based on the claimed Base-PP, it is expected that any applicable auditable events defined for those SFRs in the Base-PP are also claimed as part of the TSF. The Base-PP iteration of the SFR also requires “all administrative actions” to be audited. When the TOE includes this PP-Module, it is expected that this will also include the administrative actions that support the PP-Module defined in FMT_SMF.1/SBC.

For SFRs labeled as optional or selection-based, the auditable event is required only if the corresponding SFR is claimed.

A CDR is expected to be generated at the start of a session, at the end of a session, and during a session at an interval or time period specified by the ST author.

FAU_GEN.1.2/SBC

The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP-**Module**/ST, [*information specified in column three of the Auditable Events table (Table 2)*].

## 5.0.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### FCS_COP.1/CMAC Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm)

FCS_COP.1.1/CMAC

The TSF shall perform [*keyed-hash message authentication*] in accordance with

a specified cryptographic algorithm [*AES-CMAC*] and cryptographic key sizes **[selection: *128, 256* ] bits and message digest size of 128 bits** that meets the following: [*NIST SP 800-38B*].

**Application Note #2:** AES-CMAC is a keyed hash function that is used as part of the key derivation function (KDF) that is used for key generation.

### FCS_COP.1/MACSEC Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

FCS_COP.1.1/MACSEC

The TSF shall perform [*encryption/decryption*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*AES used in AES Key Wrap, GCM*] and cryptographic key sizes **[selection: *128, 256* ] bits** that meets the following: [*AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, AES Key Wrap as specified in NIST SP 800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO 19772*].

### FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1 MACsec

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement MACsec in accordance with IEEE Standard 802.1AE-2018.

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall derive a Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) from a peer's MAC address and port to uniquely identify the originator of a MACsec Protocol Data Unit (MPDU).

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall reject any MPDUs during a given session that contain an SCI other than the one used to establish that session.

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall permit only EAPOL (PAE EtherType 88-8E), MACsec frames (EtherType 88-E5), control frames (EtherType 88-08) and [**assignment**: *specific VLAN tag frames*] and discard others.

**Application Note #3:** Depending on the Carrier Ethernet service provider a TOE might need basic VLAN tag handling abilities such as a simple add or discard to be suitable for Use Case 2.

### FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2 MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2.1

The TOE shall implement MACsec with support for integrity protection with a confidentiality offset of [**selection**: *0*, *30*, *50* ].

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of protocol data units (MPDUs) using an Integrity Check Value (ICV) derived with the Secure Association Key (SAK).

**Application Note #4:** The length of the ICV is dependent on the cipher suite used but will not be less than 8 octets or more than 16 octets at the end of the MPDU. The ICV protects the destination and source MAC address parameters, as well as all the fields of the MPDU.

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a CAK using a KDF.

### FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3 MACsec Randomness

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall generate unique Secure Association Keys (SAKs) using [**assignment**: *key generation or derivation method*] such that the likelihood of a repeating SAK is no less than 1 in 2 to the power of the size of the generated key.

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall generate unique nonce for the derivation of SAKs using the TOE's random bit generator as specified by FCS_RBG_EXT.1.

**Application Note #5:** FCS_RBG_EXT.1 is defined in the Base-PP so a conformant MACsec TOE will include this dependency.

### FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4 MACsec Key Usage

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.1

The TSF shall support peer authentication using pre-shared keys [**selection**: *EAP-TLS with DevIDs, no other method* ].

**Application Note #6:** The definition of the peer's CAK as defined by IEEE 802.1X-2010 is synonymous with the peer authentication performed here. If EAP-TLS with DevIDs is selected, the FCS_DEVID_EXT.1 and FCS_EAPTLS_EXT.1 SFRs defined in must be claimed.

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.2

The TSF shall distribute SAKs between MACsec peers using AES key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1**/MACSEC**.

**Application Note #7:** This requirement applies to the SAKs that are generated by the TOE. They must be wrapped by the AES Key Wrap method specified in NIST SP 800-38F.

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.3

The TSF shall support specifying a lifetime for CAKs.

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.4

The TSF shall associate Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with Secure Association Key (SAK)s that are defined by the key derivation function using the CAK as input data (per IEEE 802.1X-2010, Section 9.8.1).

FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.5

The TSF shall associate Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with CAKs. The length of the CKN shall be an integer number of octets, between 1 and 32 (inclusive).

### 5.0.3 User Data Protection (FDP)

#### FDP_IFC.1 Subset Information Flow Control

FDP_IFC.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [*B2BUA policy*] on [*caller-callee pairs attempting to communicate through the TOE*].

#### FDP_IFF.1 Simple Security Attributes

FDP_IFF.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [*B2BUA policy*] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [**assignment**: *method by which the TSF identifies each endpoint for a call*].

FDP_IFF.1.2

The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [*when valid communication through the TOE is attempted, the TSF will establish a connection between itself and the caller; the TSF will establish a second connection between itself and the callee; and the TSF will redirect all communications that it receives between the two endpoints out through the proper connection*].

FDP_IFF.1.3

The TSF shall enforce the [*following configurable behavioral rules: [**selection**:*

- *Default-deny (allowlist) posture: If configured, the TSF will implicitly deny all information flows except for those explicitly authorized by the TSF*
- *Default-allow (denylist) posture: If configured, the TSF will implicitly allow all information flows except for those explicitly denied by the TSF*

*]*].

FDP_IFF.1.4

The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules: [*if the TSF is operating in an allowlist posture, any calling parties that are present on the allowlist (identifiable by calling number, source IP address, or communications protocols) are explicitly authorized*].

FDP_IFF.1.5

The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [*if the TSF is operating in a denylist posture, any calling parties that are present on the denylist (identifiable by calling number or source IP address, or communications protocols) are explicitly denied*].

### 5.0.4 Firewall (FFW)

#### FFW_ACL_EXT.1 Real-Time Communications Traffic Filtering

FFW_ACL_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform traffic filtering on network packets processed by the TOE.

FFW_ACL_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall allow the definition of traffic filtering for real-time communications traffic using the following network protocol fields:

- IPv4
  - source address
  - destination address
  - transport layer protocol
- IPv6
  - source address
  - destination address
  - transport layer protocol
- TCP **(for signaling channel)**
  - source port
  - destination port
- UDP **(for signaling channel)**
  - source port
  - destination port
- Distinct Interface **(physical versus virtual or trust zone, e.g., trusted versus untrusted)**
- [*Application (Real-Time Communications Protocol)*
  - *signaling protocols: [**selection**: SIP, H.323 ]]*

**Application Note #8:** Real-time communications traffic can use multiple transport protocols and ports. Therefore, traffic filtering rules should be defined using the network protocol fields above, and one type of traffic may require multiple rules to be applied. If “H.323” is selected in this requirement, the ST must include the selection-based SFR FTP_ITC.1/H323.

FFW_ACL_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall allow the following operations to be associated with traffic filtering rules: permit or drop with the capability to log the operation **for each specific rule defined**.

**Application Note #9:** Whether or not logging is performed may be applied to individual rules or groups of rules on an independent basis. For example, if there are six rules defined, the TOE should allow for any subset of these rules to be logged, independent of one another.

FFW_ACL_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall allow the traffic filtering rules to be assigned to each distinct network interface.

FFW_ACL_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall:

- Accept a network packet without further processing of traffic filtering rules if it matches an allowed established session for the following protocols: TCP, UDP, based on the following network packet attributes:
  - TCP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, sequence number, flags
  - UDP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports
- Remove existing traffic flows from the set of established traffic flows based on the following: [**selection**: *session inactivity timeout*, *completion of the expected information flow* ].

FFW_ACL_EXT.1.6

The TSF shall process the applicable traffic filtering rules in an administratively defined order.

FFW_ACL_EXT.1.7

The TSF shall deny packet flow if a matching rule is not identified.

### FFW_ACL_EXT.2 Stateful VVoIP Traffic Filtering

FFW_ACL_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall perform stateful traffic filtering on the following VVoIP protocols: [**selection**: *SIP*, *H.323 (H.225, H.245)*, *MGCP* ].

**Application Note #10:** If “H.323” is selected in this requirement, the ST must include the selection-based SFR FTP_ITC.1/H323.

FFW_ACL_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall enforce the following default stateful traffic filtering rules on all network traffic matching protocol types identified in FFW_ACL_EXT.2.1: [**selection**:

- *SIP traffic where a BYE message precedes an INVITE message*
- *H.225 traffic where an RCF reply precedes any other traffic*
- *H.245 traffic where a ResponseMessage precedes a RequestMessage*
- *MGCP traffic where a DLCX message precedes a CRCX message*

].

**Application Note #11:** The stateful traffic filtering rules selected in FFW_ACL_EXT.2.2 must match the selections made for VVoIP protocols in FFW_ACL_EXT.2.1.

FFW_ACL_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall terminate any connection found to be in violation of the default stateful traffic filtering rules and provide the ability to generate an audit record of the event.

**Application Note #12:** Due to the potential for an SBC to receive large amounts of traffic that gets filtered by the default stateful traffic filtering rules, this PP-Module only requires that the TSF have the ability to generate audit records for all events. “Configure traffic filtering rules” in FMT_SMF.1/SBC provides an expectation that the administrator can determine which rules cause audit records to be generated so that the environment is not producing an excessively large volume of audit data.

FFW_ACL_EXT.2.4

The TSF shall dynamically open media ports to VVoIP protocol traffic upon negotiation of a session and close these ports upon termination of a session.

FFW_ACL_EXT.2.5

The TSF shall not define a static range of ports to remain open indefinitely for the purpose of allowing VVoIP protocol traffic.

#### FFW_DPI_EXT.1 Deep Packet Inspection

FFW_DPI_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement DPI for the following protocols: [**selection**: *H.323 (H.225, H.245), SIP, RTP, RTCP* ].

**Application Note #13:** If “H.323” is selected in this requirement, the ST must include the selection-based SFR FTP_ITC.1/H323.

FFW_DPI_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall enforce the following rules for DPI: [**assignment**: *for each protocol listed in FFW_DPI_EXT.1.1, list elements of the packet data that are examined for potentially malicious content or compatibility with the protocol definition*].

FFW_DPI_EXT.1.3

When traffic is found to be in violation of a DPI rule, the TSF shall take the following action: [**selection**: *drop the traffic, generate an audit record, generate an alarm* ].

#### FFW_NAT_EXT.1 Topology Hiding/NAT Traversal

FFW_NAT_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support NAT of signaling and media channel traffic through the TOE that is mediated by the [*B2BUA policy*] defined by FDP_IFC.1.

FFW_NAT_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support NAT for the following protocols: [**selection**: *SIP, SIP-TLS, H.225, H.245* ].

FFW_NAT_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall use NAT to replace the IP address header value of traffic originating from the internal network with [**selection**: *the IP address of the TOE, a [Security Administrator]-defined value* ].

FFW_NAT_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall maintain a NAT table to ensure that traffic bound for the internal network is directed to only the intended recipient.

### 5.0.5 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

#### FIA_SIPT_EXT.1 Session Initiation Protocol Trunking

FIA_SIPT_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide support for SIP trunking.

FIA_SIPT_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall require a service provider to provide valid identification in the form of a [**selection**: *username and password*, *X.509 certificate* ] and IP address in order to establish a SIP trunk.

FIA_SIPT_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall require a service provider to provide a valid authentication credential in order to establish a SIP trunk.

FIA_SIPT_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall require a service provider to encrypt traffic using TLS in order to establish a SIP trunk.

## 5.0.6 Security Management (FMT)

### FMT_SMF.1/SBC Specification of Management Functions (SBC)

FMT_SMF.1.1/SBC

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions **related to SBC functionality**: [*Ability of a Security Administrator to:*

- *Change a user's password*
- *Require a user's password to be changed upon next login*
- *Configure the auditable events that will result in the generation of an alarm*
- *Configure the B2BUA policy*
- *Configure traffic filtering rules*
- *Configure auditable events*
- *Configure NAT*
- *Configure ports and cryptography for signaling and media communications*
- *Configure SIP communications*

].

**Application Note #14:** This SFR defines additional management functions for the TOE beyond what is defined in the Base-PP as FMT_SMF.1. The TOE may have all management functionality implemented in the same logical interface; it is not necessary for “network device management” and “SBC management” to be implemented in separate interfaces. This PP-Module may rely on management functionality defined in the Base-PP to support the implementation of its functions. For example, the SBC portion of the TOE relies on the reliable time function that must be implemented by the Base-PP portion of the TOE. If the Base-PP implements this using NTP, the “Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps” or “Ability to configure NTP” management function defined in FMT_SMF.1 in the Base-PP can be used to address this PP-Module’s dependency on reliable system time. Note that support for NTP is recommended but not required.

The 'configurable auditable events' function relates to FAU_SEL.1, specifically with respect to allowing a Security Administrator to determine whether a given event is auditable. As this refers to the events for the triggering of various filtering rules, it may be implicitly addressed through the ‘configure traffic filtering rules’ function, for example by explicitly defining a rule with a type that automatically requires it to be logged or a parameter that causes it to be logged if triggered.

## 5.0.7 Resource Utilization (FRU)

### FRU_PRS_EXT.1 Limited Priority of Service

FRU_PRS_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall assign a priority to each type of communications packet that traverses the TSF.

FRU_PRS_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall ensure that each access to network bandwidth shall be mediated on the basis of the subject’s assigned priority.

### FRU_RSA.1 Maximum Quotas

FRU_RSA.1.1

The TSF shall enforce maximum quotas of the following resources: [*CPU, memory, [**assignment**: other resources]*], that [*subjects*] can use [**selection**: *simultaneously*, *over a specified period of time* ].

**Application Note #15:** The intent of this SFR is for the TOE to be resistant to

DoS attacks.

### 5.0.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

#### FTP_ITC.1/ARP Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Automatic Response)

FTP_ITC.1.1/ARP

The TSF shall **be capable of using [selection: *TLS*, *IPsec*, *SSH*, *DTLS*, *HTTPS*, *SNMPv3* ] to** provide a trusted communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: security audit automatic response** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data.

FTP_ITC.1.2/ARP

The TSF shall permit [*the TSF*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/ARP

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [*transmission of potential security violations*].

**Application Note #16:** This SFR is used to specify any trusted protocols that are implemented in support of FAU_ARP_EXT.1.

#### FTP_ITC.1/ESC Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (ESC Communications)

FTP_ITC.1.1/ESC

The TSF shall provide a **signaling** channel between itself and **an ESC using TLS as specified in FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 and FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 and [selection: *DTLS as specified in FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1 and FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2*, *no other protocol* ]** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

**Application Note #17:** FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1, and FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2 are defined in the Base-PP.

FTP_ITC.1.2/ESC

The TSF shall permit [*the TSF*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/ESC

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [*all communications with the ESC*].

#### FTP_ITC.1/VVoIP Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (VVoIP Communications)

FTP_ITC.1.1/VVoIP

The TSF shall **be capable of using SRTP, [selection: *SIP-TLS*, *IPsec*, *H.235*, *[assignment: other protocols]* ]** to provide a **trusted** communication channel between itself and **authorized** IT **entities supporting the following capabilities: VVoIP signaling and media channels** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

**Application Note #18:** FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2, FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1, and FCS_DTLSC_EXT.2 are defined in the Base-PP.

FTP_ITC.1.2/VVoIP

The TSF shall permit [*the TSF, the authorized IT entities*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/VVoIP

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [**assignment**: *list of functions for which a trusted channel is required*].

### 5.0.9 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

#### FTP_ITC.1/H323 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (H.323 Communications)

> ***The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FFW_ACL_EXT.1.2, FFW_ACL_EXT.2.1, FFW_DPI_EXT.1.1, FIA_SIPS_EXT.1.1.***

FTP_ITC.1.1/H323

The TSF shall provide an **H.323** communication channel **in accordance with**

**ITU-REC H.235.0** between itself and **a gatekeeper using TLS as specified in FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 and FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 and [selection: *IPsec as specified in FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, no other protocol* ]** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

**Application Note #19:** FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1, and FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 are defined in the Base-PP.

FTP_ITC.1.2/H323

The TSF shall permit [*the TSF*] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3/H323

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [*all communications with the gatekeeper*].

**Application Note #20:** This SFR is claimed if H.323 is specified as being supported by the TOE in FFW_ACL_EXT.1, FFW_ACL_EXT.2, FFW_DPI_EXT.1, or FIA_SIPS_EXT.1.

## 5.0.10 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### FIA_SIPS_EXT.1 Session Initiation Protocol Registration

FIA_SIPS_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement the [**selection**: *SIP that complies with RFC 3261, H.323 protocol that complies with ITU-REC H.235.0* ] using the Session Description Protocol (SDP) complying with RFC 4566 to describe the multimedia session that will be used to carry the VVoIP traffic.

**Application Note #21:** If “H.323 protocol that complies with ITU-REC H.235.0” is selected in this requirement, the ST must include the selection-based SFR FTP_ITC.1/H323.

FIA_SIPS_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall require password authentication for SIP REGISTER function requests as specified in Section 22 of RFC 3261.

FIA_SIPS_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall support ESC authentication passwords that contain at least [**assignment**: *positive integer of 8 or more*] characters in the set of [*upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and the following special characters: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”, and [**assignment**: other supported special characters]*].

FIA_SIPS_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall provide the ability to modify SIP header values for SIP traffic received by the TOE prior to retransmitting the traffic.

**Application Note #22:** This SFR is optional because this functionality is not standard for SBCs because device registration can generally be handled by an ESC in the TOE’s OE. However, in some cases, SIP registration directly to the SBC is required. If an SBC advertises this service, it is expected that this functionality be included within the TOE boundary. This SFR is therefore implementation-based on whether the SBC has the capability to perform its own SIP registration of devices.

# Appendix A - Implicitly Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this PP-Module. These requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [CC] Part 1, 8.2 Dependencies between components.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the PP-Module provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.

**Table 3: Implicitly Satisfied Requirements**

| Requirement | Rationale for Satisfaction |
|---|---|
| **FMT_MSA.3 – Static Attribute Initialization** | FDP_IFF.1 has a dependency on FMT_MSA.3 to define the default security posture of security attributes for the purpose of information flow control enforcement. This SFR has not been defined by this PP-Module because the enforcement of FDP_IFF.1 is not dependent on the initial state of security attributes. For example, FDP_IFF.1.2 requires the TSF to determine if a communication attempt is valid before authorizing it. This is true regardless of whether the default value of security attributes associated with the connection attempt are permissive or restrictive; there is no difference in how the TSF determines “validity” in this case.<br><br>The default values of security attributes do not cause the information flow control policy to behave differently for those rules that must always be enforced by the TSF. FDP_IFF.1.4 requires that all allowlisted calling parties be authorized while all denylisted calling parties be rejected. It does not matter for the purpose of enforcing this SFR whether the absence of a calling party from both the allowlist and the denylist means they are authorized or rejected by default. |

# Appendix B - Allocation of Requirements in Distributed TOEs

For a distributed TOE, the SFRs in this PP-Module need to be met by the TOE as a whole, but not all SFRs will necessarily be implemented by all components. The following categories are defined in order to specify when each SFR must be implemented by a component:

- **All Components ("All"):** All components that comprise the distributed TOE must independently satisfy the requirement.
- **At least one Component ("One"):** This requirement must be fulfilled by at least one component within the distributed TOE.
- **Feature Dependent ("Feature Dependent"):** These requirements will only be fulfilled where the feature is implemented by the distributed TOE component (note that the requirement to meet the PP-Module as a whole requires that at least one component implements these requirements if they are claimed by the TOE).

The table below specifies how each of the SFRs in this PP-Module must be met, using the categories above.

| Requirement | Description | Distributed TOE SFR Allocation |
|---|---|---|
| FAU_ARP_EXT.1 | Security Audit Automatic Response | Feature Dependent |
| FAU_GEN.1/SBC | Audit Data Generation (Session Border Controller) | All |
| FAU_SAA.1 | Potential Violation Analysis | Feature Dependent |
| FAU_SEL.1 | Selective Audit | Feature Dependent |
| FCS_SRTP_EXT.1 | Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol | Feature Dependent |
| FDP_IFC.1 | Subset Information Flow Control | Feature Dependent |
| FDP_IFF.1 | Simple Security Attributes | Feature Dependent |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.1 | Real-Time Communications Traffic Filtering | Feature Dependent |
| FFW_ACL_EXT.2 | Stateful VVoIP Traffic Filtering | Feature Dependent |
| FFW_DPI_EXT.1 | Deep Packet Inspection | Feature Dependent |
| FFW_NAT_EXT.1 | Topology Hiding/NAT Traversal | Feature Dependent |
| FIA_SIPS_EXT.1 (implementation-based) | Session Initiation Protocol Registration | Feature Dependent |
| FIA_SIPT_EXT.1 | Session Initiation Protocol Trunking | Feature Dependent |
| FMT_SMF.1/SBC | Specification of Management Functions (SBC) | Feature Dependent |
| FRU_PRS_EXT.1 | Limited Priority of Service | Feature Dependent |
| FRU_RSA.1 | Maximum Quotas | Feature Dependent |
| FTP_ITC.1/ESC | Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (ESC Communications) | Feature Dependent |
| FTP_ITC.1/H323 (selection-based) | Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (H.323 Communications) | Feature Dependent |
| FTP_ITC.1/VVoIP | Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (VVoIP Communications) | Feature Dependent |

# Appendix C - Entropy Documentation and Assessment

The TOE does not require any additional supplementary information to describe its entropy sources beyond the requirements outlined in the Base-PP. [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -

- Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
- Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.

[NDcPP] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, March 23, 2020 [NDcPP SD] Supporting Document - Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 2.2, December 2019 [MOD_FW] PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, June 25, 2020 [MOD_VPNGW] PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.2, March 31, 2022