

# PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption



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**National Information Assurance Partnership**

# Revision History

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Version	Date	Comment
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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

The scope of this Protection Profile Module (PP-Module) is to describe the security functionality of Media Access Control Security (MACsec) encryption in terms of the Common Criteria [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base Protection Profiles (Base-PPs):

- collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e (NDcPP)

This Base-PP is valid because a device that implements MACsec encryption is a specific type of network device, and there is nothing about the implementation of MACsec that would prevent any of the security capabilities defined by the Base-PP from being satisfied.

A Target of Evaluation (TOE) that conforms to a PP-Configuration containing this PP-Module may be a 'Distributed TOE' as defined in the NDcPP. This PP-Module does not prohibit the TOE from implementing other security functionality in a distributed manner. For example, a TOE may be deployed in such a manner that distributed nodes establish MACsec connectivity with physically separated networks while a centralized management device is used to configure the behavior of individual nodes.

## 1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

### 1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)	A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.

(SAR)	
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.

### 1.2.2 Technical Terms

Carrier Ethernet	Metro Ethernet Forum (MEF) Carrier Ethernet standards define technology-agnostic layer-2 services. The standards include services aimed at end users (Subscriber Ethernet Services) and service providers (Operator Ethernet Services). Other related terms include Metro Ethernet Services, Provider Bridging and Provider Backbone Bridging.
Connectivity Association Key (CAK)	A symmetric key that is used as the master key for MACsec connectivity and is shared between connected MACsec endpoints.
Connectivity Association Key Name (CKN)	A unique identifier for a specific Connectivity Association Key.
Ethernet Private Line (EPL)	A service transporting customer data form one User Network Interface (UNI) to another UNI.
Ethernet Virtual Private Line (EVPL)	A Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN)-based service transporting customer data. The UNI is capable of service multiplexing.
Extended Packet Numbering (XPN)	A scheme that allows MACsec communications to persist using a single Secure Association Key for a larger number of frames to reduce overhead and latency associated with key agreement.
Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL)	A port authentication protocol specified in IEEE 802.1X that is used to facilitate network authentication.
MACsec Key Agreement (MKA)	A key agreement protocol used for distribution of MACsec keys to distributed peers.
MACsec Protocol Data Unit (MPDU)	The basic MACsec frame structure that contains protcol and payload data.
Media Access Control (MAC) Security Entity	An entity (e.g., computer) that is implementing MACsec.
Media Access Control Security (MACsec)	A standard for connectionless data confidentiality and integrity protection at the data link layer of a network connection. Formally defined in IEEE 802.1AE.
Metro Ethernet	A non-profit international industry consortium.

Forum (MEF)	
Packet Number (PN)	A monotonically increasing value that is guaranteed to be unique for each MACsec frame transmitted using a given Secure Association Key (SAK)
SecTag	MAC Security Tag - a protocol header comprising a number of octets, beginning with an EtherType, that is prepended to the service data unit supplied by the client of the protocol and is used to provide security guarantees.
Secure Association (SA)	A mechanism that uses a SAK to provide the MACsec service guarantees and security services for a sequence of transmitted frames.
Secure Association Key (SAK)	A key derived from the CAK that is used to encrypt and decrypt traffic for a given SA.
Secure Channel (SC)	A unidirectional channel (one to one or one to many) that uses symmetric key cryptography to provide a (possibly long lived) Secure Channel.
Secure Device Identifier	A device authentication credential that can be used for EAPOL and is formally defined in IEEE 802.1AR.

### 1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

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This PP-Module specifically addresses MACsec, which allows authorized systems using Ethernet Transport to maintain confidentiality of transmitted data and to take measures against frames that are transmitted or modified by unauthorized devices.

MACsec protects communication between trusted components of the network infrastructure, thus protecting the network operation. It facilitates maintenance of correct network connectivity and services as well as isolation of denial of service attacks.

The hardware, firmware, and software of the MACsec device define the physical boundary. All of the security functionality is contained and executed within the physical boundary of the device. For example, given a device with an Ethernet card, the whole device is considered to be within the boundary.

Since this PP-Module builds on the NDcPP, conformant TOEs are obligated to implement the functionality required in the NDcPP along with the additional functionality defined in this PP-Module in response to the threat environment discussed later in this document.

### 1.4 TOE Boundary

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The physical boundary for a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module is a hardware appliance that also provides generalized network device functionality, such as auditing, I&A, and cryptographic services for network communications. The TOE's logical boundary includes all functionality required by the claimed Base-PP as well as the MACsec functionality and related capabilities that are defined in this PP-Module. Any functionality that is provided by the network device that is not relevant to the security requirements defined by this PP-Module or the Base-PP is considered to be outside the scope of the TOE.

### 1.5 Use Cases

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A pair of MACsec devices connected by a physical medium can protect Ethernet frames switched or routed from one device to the other. The two MACsec devices are provided with a CAK and use the MKA protocol to create a secure tunnel. MKA is used by the two MACsec devices to agree upon MACsec keys. A policy should be installed to protect traffic between the devices, with the exception of the MKA or Ethernet control traffic such as Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) over LAN (EAPOL) frames.

This PP-Module defines two potential use cases for the MACsec TOE.

#### [USE CASE 1] Classic Hop by Hop Deployment

MACsec can be deployed in a hop by hop manner between Ethernet devices. Two devices will protect traffic originating in protected networks traversing an untrusted link between them. The devices will first exchange MKA frames, which serve to determine the peer is an authorized peer, and agree upon a shared key and MACsec ciphersuite used to set up a transmit (Tx) SA and a receive (Rx) SA. Once the SAs are set up, MACsec-protected frames traverse the unprotected link.

#### [USE CASE 2] Over Carrier Ethernet Services

In some markets network service providers have standardized their offerings according to various versions of the MEF specifications. One recent MEF specification is the "E-Line" (\*) service type which is based on the use of point-to-point (P2P) Ethernet Virtual Circuits. A port-based service is known as an EPL and a VLAN-based service is known as an EVPL. EPL provides a P2P Ethernet virtual connection between a pair of dedicated user-network interfaces (UNIs), with a high degree of transparency. EVPL

provides a P2P or point-to-multipoint connection between UNIs. A difference between the EVPL and EPL is the degree of transparency - while EPL is highly transparent, filtering only the pause frames, EVPL is required to either peer or drop most of the Layer 2 Control Protocols. The MEF has also defined other service types such as E-LAN and E-Tree.

(\*) From MEF 6.3 - Subscriber Ethernet Services Definition - November 2019 - Table 3

# 2 Conformance Claims

## Conformance Statement

This PP-Module inherits exact conformance as required from the specified Base-PP and as defined in the CC and CEM addenda for Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, and Optional SFRs (dated May 2017).

The following PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module:

- PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625 (MOD\_FW)
- PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways Version 1.2 (MOD\_VPNGW)

## CC Conformance Claims

This PP-Module is conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (conformant) of Common Criteria Version 3.1, Release 5 [CC].

## Package Claims

This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any packages.



# 3 Security Problem Description

The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the TOE is expected to address, assumptions about its Operational Environment, and any organizational security policies that the TOE is expected to enforce.

## 3.1 Threats

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The following threats that are defined in this PP-Module extend the threats that are defined by the Base-PP.

### **T.DATA\_INTEGRITY**

An attacker may modify data transmitted over the layer 2 link in a way that is not detected by the recipient.

Devices on a network may be exposed to attacks that attempt to corrupt or modify data in transit without authorization. If malicious devices are able to modify and replay data that is transmitted over a layer 2 link, then the data contained within the communications may be susceptible to a loss of integrity.

### **T.NETWORK\_ACCESS**

An attacker may send traffic through the TOE that enables them to access devices in the TOE's operational environment without authorization.

A MACsec device may sit on the periphery of a network, which means that it may have an externally-facing interface to a public network. Devices located in the public network may attempt to exercise services located on the internal network that are intended to be accessed only from within the internal network or externally accessible only from specifically authorized devices. If the MACsec device allows unauthorized external devices access to the internal network, these devices on the internal network may be subject to compromise. Similarly, if two MACsec devices are deployed to facilitate end-to-end encryption of traffic that is contained within a single network, an attacker could use an insecure MACsec device as a method to access devices on a specific segment of that network such as an individual LAN.

### **T.UNTRUSTED\_MACSEC\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS**

An attacker may acquire sensitive TOE or user data that is transmitted to or from the TOE because an untrusted communication channel causes a disclosure of data in transit.

A generic network device may be threatened by the use of insecure communications channels to transmit sensitive data. The attack surface of a MACsec device also includes the MACsec trusted channels.

Inability to secure communications channels, or failure to do so correctly, would expose user data that is assumed to be secure to the threat of unauthorized disclosure.

## 3.2 Assumptions

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All assumptions for the OE of the Base-PP also apply to this PP-Module. A.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION is still operative, but only for the interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the Base-PP and not the PP-Module. This document does not define any additional assumptions.

## 3.3 Organizational Security Policies

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An organization deploying the TOE is expected to satisfy the organizational security policy listed below in addition to all organizational security policies defined by the claimed Base-PP.

This document does not define any additional OSPs.

# 4 Security Objectives

## 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

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### O.AUTHENTICATION\_MACSEC

To further address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, a compliant TOE's authentication ability (MKA) will allow a MACsec peer to establish connectivity associations (CAs) with another MACsec peer. MACsec endpoints authenticate each other to ensure they are communicating with an authorized MAC Security Entity (SecY) entity.

**Addressed by:** [FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.4](#), [FCS\\_MKA\\_EXT.1](#), [FIA\\_PSK\\_EXT.1](#), [FCS\\_DEVID\\_EXT.1](#) (selection-based), [FCS\\_EAP-TLS\\_EXT.1](#) (selection-based)

### O.AUTHORIZED\_ADMINISTRATION

All network devices are expected to provide services that allow the security functionality of the device to be managed. The MACsec device, as a specific type of network device, has a refined set of management functions to address its specialized behavior. In order to further mitigate the threat of a compromise of its security functionality, the MACsec device prescribes the ability to limit brute-force authentication attempts by enforcing lockout of accounts that experience excessive failures and by limiting access to security-relevant data that administrators do not need to view.

**Addressed by:** [FMT\\_SMF.1/MACSEC](#), [FPT\\_CAK\\_EXT.1](#), [FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1](#) (optional), [FTP\\_TRP.1/MACSEC](#) (optional), [FMT\\_SNMP\\_EXT.1](#) (selection-based)

### O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC\_FUNCTIONS\_MACSEC

To address the issues associated with unauthorized modification and disclosure of information, compliant TOEs will implement cryptographic capabilities. These capabilities are intended to maintain confidentiality and allow for detection and modification of data that is transmitted outside of the TOE.

**Addressed by:** [FCS\\_COP.1/CMAC](#), [FCS\\_COP.1/MACSEC](#), [FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.2](#), [FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.3](#), [FTP\\_ITC.1/MACSEC](#), [FTP\\_TRP.1/MACSEC](#) (optional), [FCS\\_SNMP\\_EXT.1](#) (selection-based)

### O.PORT\_FILTERING\_MACSEC

To further address the issues associated with unauthorized network access, a compliant TOE's port filtering capability will restrict the flow of network traffic through the TOE based on layer 2 frame characteristics and whether or not the traffic represents valid MACsec frames and MACsec Key Agreement Protocol Data Units (MKPDUs).

**Addressed by:** [FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.1](#), [FIA\\_PSK\\_EXT.1](#), [FPT\\_DDP\\_EXT.1](#)

### O.REPLAY\_DETECTION

A MACsec device is expected to help mitigate the threat of MACsec data integrity violations by providing a mechanism to detect and discard replayed traffic for MPDUs.

**Addressed by:** [FPT\\_RPL.1](#), [FPT\\_RPL\\_EXT.1](#) (optional)

### O.SYSTEM\_MONITORING\_MACSEC

To address the issues of administrators being able to monitor the operations of the MACsec device, compliant TOEs will implement the ability to log the flow of Ethernet traffic. Specifically, the TOE will provide the means for administrators to configure rules to 'log' when Ethernet traffic grants or restricts access. As a result, the 'log' will result in informative event logs whenever a match occurs. In addition, the establishment of security CAs is auditable, not only between MACsec devices, but also with MAC Security Key Agreement Entities (KaYs).

**Addressed by:** [FAU\\_GEN.1/MACSEC](#)

### O.TSF\_INTEGRITY

To mitigate the security risk that the MACsec device may fail during startup, it is required to fail-secure if any self-test failures occur during startup. This ensures that the device will only operate when it is in a known state.

**Addressed by:** [FPT\\_FLS.1](#)

## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

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All objectives for the operational environment of the Base-PP also apply to this PP-Module.

OE.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION is still operative, but only for the interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the Base-PP and not the PP-Module.

## 4.3 Security Objectives Rationale

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This section describes how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies map to the security objectives.

**Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale**

<b>Threat, Assumption, or OSP</b>	<b>Security Objectives</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
T.DATA_INTEGRITY	O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS_MACSEC	The TOE mitigates the threat of data integrity violations by implementing cryptographic functionality that includes integrity protection.
	O.REPLAY_DETECTION	The TOE mitigates the threat of data integrity violations by providing a mechanism to detect and discard replayed traffic for MPDUs.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS	O.PORT_FILTERING_MACSEC	The TOE's port filtering capability reduces the threat of unauthorized access to devices in the TOE's operational environment by restricting the flow of network traffic entering through the TOE interfaces based on layer 2 frame characteristics and whether or not the traffic represents valid MACsec frames and MKPDUs.
T.UNTRUSTED_MACSEC_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS	O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS_MACSEC	The TOE mitigates the threat of unauthorized disclosure of information via untrusted thru traffic by providing MKA authentication functions to authorize endpoints.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS (from NDcPP)	O.AUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATION	The TOE further mitigates this threat originally defined in the Base-PP by defining additional management functions that require authorization and additional interfaces that can be used securely to execute management activities.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY (from NDcPP)	O.SYSTEM_MONITORING_MACSEC	The TOE further mitigates this threat originally defined in the Base-PP by implementing measures to generate audit records for security-relevant events that are specific to the functionality defined by this PP-Module.

# 5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text** or ~~striktthrough-text~~): Is used to add details to a requirement (including replacing an assignment with a more restrictive selection) or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): Is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): Is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: Is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

## 5.1 NDcPP Security Functional Requirements Direction

In a PP-Configuration that includes the NDcPP, the TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the MACsec Ethernet Encryption as a whole and evaluated against the NDcPP. The following sections describe any modifications that the ST author must make to the SFRs defined in the NDcPP in addition to what is mandated by [Section 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements](#).

### 5.1.1 Modified SFRs

This PP-Module does not modify any SFRs defined by the NDcPP.

## 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following section describes the SFRs that must be satisfied by any TOE that claims conformance to this PP-Module. These SFRs must be claimed regardless of which PP-Configuration is used to define the TOE.

### 5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### FAU\_GEN.1/MACSEC Audit Data Generation (MACsec)

##### FAU\_GEN.1.1/MACSEC

- The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
- a. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
  - b. All auditable events for the [*not specified*] level of audit;
  - c. **All administrative actions;**
  - d. [*Specifically defined auditable events listed in the Auditable Events table (Table 2)*]

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1</a>	Session establishment	Secure Channel Identifier (SCI)
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3</a>	Creation and update of SAK	Creation and update times
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4</a>	Creation of CA	Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs)
<a href="#">FPT_RPL.1</a>	Detected replay attempt	None

Table 2: Auditable Events

##### FAU\_GEN.1.2/MACSEC

- The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
- a. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
  - b. For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP-**Module**/ST, [*information specified in column three of the Auditable Events table (Table 2)*].

## 5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### FCS\_COP.1/CMAC Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm)

FCS\_COP.1.1/CMAC

The TSF shall perform [*keyed-hash message authentication*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*AES-CMAC*] and cryptographic key sizes **[selection: 128, 256 ] bits and message digest size of 128 bits** that meets the following: [*NIST SP 800-38B*].

**Application Note:** AES-CMAC is a keyed hash function that is used as part of the key derivation function (KDF) that is used for key generation.

### FCS\_COP.1/MACSEC Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption and Decryption)

FCS\_COP.1.1/MACSEC

The TSF shall perform [*encryption and decryption*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*AES used in AES Key Wrap, GCM*] and cryptographic key sizes **[selection: 128, 256 ] bits** that meets the following: [*AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, AES Key Wrap as specified in NIST SP 800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO 19772*].

### FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1 MACsec

FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement MACsec in accordance with IEEE Standard 802.1AE-2018.

FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall derive a Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) from a peer's MAC address and port to uniquely identify the originator of an MPDU.

FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall reject any MPDUs during a given session that contain an SCI other than the one used to establish that session.

FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall permit only EAPOL (Port Access Entity (PAE) EtherType 88-8E), MACsec frames (EtherType 88-E5), and MAC control frames (EtherType is 88-08) and shall discard others.

**Application Note:** Depending on the Carrier Ethernet service provider a TOE might need basic VLAN tag handling abilities such as a simple add or discard to be suitable for Use Case 2.

### FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2 MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality

FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.1

The TOE shall implement MACsec with support for integrity protection with a confidentiality offset of **[selection: 0, 30, 50 ]**.

FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of protocol data units (MPDUs) using an Integrity Check Value (ICV) derived with the SAK.

**Application Note:** The length of the ICV is dependent on the ciphersuite used but will not be less than 8 octets or more than 16 octets at the end of the MPDU. The ICV protects the destination and source MAC address parameters, as well as all the fields of the MPDU.

FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a Connectivity Association Key (CAK) using a KDF.

### FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3 MACsec Randomness

FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall generate unique Secure Association Keys (SAKs) using **[selection: key derivation from Connectivity Association Key (CAK) per section 9.8.1 of IEEE 802.1X-2010, the TOE's random bit generator as specified by FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 ]** such that the likelihood of a repeating SAK is no less than 1 in 2 to the power of the size of the generated key.

FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3.2

The TSF shall generate unique nonces for the derivation of SAKs using the TOE's random bit generator as specified by FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.

**Application Note:** FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 is defined in the Base-PP so a conformant MACsec TOE will include this dependency.

## **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4 MACsec Key Usage**

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall support peer authentication using pre-shared keys (PSKs) [**selection:** *EAP-TLS with DevIDs, no other method* ].

**Application Note:** The definition of the peer's CAK as defined by IEEE 802.1X-2010 is synonymous with the peer authentication performed here. If "EAP-TLS with DevIDs" is selected, the [FCS\\_DEVID\\_EXT.1](#) and [FCS\\_EAPTLS\\_EXT.1](#) SFRs must be claimed.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.2**

The TSF shall distribute SAKs between MACsec peers using AES key wrap as specified in FCS\_COP.1/MACSEC.

**Application Note:** This requirement applies to the SAKs that are generated by the TOE. They must be wrapped by the AES Key Wrap method specified in NIST SP 800-38F.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.3**

The TSF shall support specifying a lifetime for CAKs.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.4**

The TSF shall associate Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with SAKs that are defined by the KDF using the CAK as input data (per IEEE 802.1X-2010, Section 9.8.1).

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.5**

The TSF shall associate CKNs with CAKs. The length of the CKN shall be an integer number of octets, between 1 and 32 (inclusive).

## **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1 MACsec Key Agreement**

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement Key Agreement Protocol (MKA) in accordance with IEEE 802.1X-2010 and 802.1Xbx-2014.

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of MKA protocol data units (MKPDUs) using an Integrity Check Value (ICV) derived from an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK).

**Application Note:** The ICV has length 128 bits and is computed according to Section 9.4.1 of IEEE 802.1X-2010. The ICV protects the destination and source MAC address parameters, as well as all the fields of the MAC Service Data Unit of the MKPDU including the allocated EtherType, and up to but not including, the generated ICV.

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a CAK using a KDF.

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall enforce an MKA Lifetime Timeout limit of 6.0 seconds and MKA Bounded Hello Timeout limit of 0.5 seconds.

**Application Note:** The key server may also distribute a group CAK established by pairwise CAKs.

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.5**

The key server shall refresh a SAK when it expires. The key server shall distribute a SAK by [**selection:**

- *a group CAK, distributed by a group CAK*
- *a group CAK, distributed by pairwise CAKs derived from MKA*
- *a group CAK, distributed by pre-shared key (PSK)*
- *pairwise CAKs, derived from MKA*
- *pairwise CAKs that are PSKs*

].

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.6**

The key server shall distribute a fresh SAK whenever a member is added to or removed from the live membership of the CA.

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.7**

The TSF shall validate MKPDUs according to IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 11.11.2. In particular, the TSF shall discard without further processing any MKPDUs to which any of the following conditions apply:

- a. The destination address of the MKPDU was an individual address
- b. The MKPDU is less than 32 octets long
- c. The MKPDU comprises fewer octets than indicated by the Basic Parameter Set body length, as encoded in bits 4 through 1 of octet 3 and bits 8 through 1 of octet 4, plus 16 octets of ICV
- d. The CAK Name is not recognized

If an MKPDU passes these tests, then the TSF will begin processing it as follows:

- a. If the Algorithm Agility parameter identifies an algorithm that has been implemented by the receiver, the ICV shall be verified as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 9.4.1.
- b. If the Algorithm Agility parameter is unrecognized or not implemented by the receiver, its value can be recorded for diagnosis but the received MKPDU shall be discarded without further processing.

Each received MKPDU that is validated as specified in this clause and verified as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 9.4.1 shall be decoded as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 11.11.4.

### 5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

#### FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition

FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use PSKs for MKA as defined by IEEE 802.1X-2010, [**selection:** *no other protocols*, [**assignment:** *other protocols that use PSKs*] ].

**Application Note:** If other protocols can use PSKs, they should be listed in the assignment as well; otherwise “no other protocols” should be chosen.

FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall be able to [**selection:** *accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1* ] bit-based PSKs.

**Application Note:** The ST author specifies whether the TSF merely accepts bit-based PSKs or if it is also capable of generating them. If it generates them, the requirement specifies that they must be generated using the RBG provided by the TOE.

### 5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)

#### FMT\_SMF.1/MACSEC Specification of Management Functions (MACsec)

FMT\_SMF.1.1/MACSEC

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions **related to MACsec functionality:** [*Ability of a Security Administrator to:*

- *Manage a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device*
- *Manage the key server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants* [**selection:** *as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2020, Sections 9.13 and 9.16 (cf. MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaParticipant Entry) and section 12.2 (cf. function createMKA()),* [**assignment:** *other management function*] ]
- *Specify the lifetime of a CAK*
- *Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using* [**selection:** *the MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaPartActivateControl,* [**assignment:** *other management function*] ]

[**selection:**

- *Cause key server to generate a new group CAK (i.e., rekey the CA) using* [**selection:** *MIB object ieee8021XKayCreateNewGroup,* [**assignment:** *other management function*] ]
- *Manage generation of a PSK-based CAK*
- *No other MACsec management functions*

]].

**Application Note:** IEEE 802.1X-2010 specifies Management Information Base (MIB) objects for management functionality but configuration of management functions via other approved methods is acceptable. The ST author should select either the MIB object or provide the function used to achieve this management functionality.

If a selection containing “group CAK” is chosen in [FCS\\_MKA\\_EXT.1.5](#), then



“Cause key server to generate a new group CAK...” must be selected.

## 5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

### FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1 Protection of CAK Data

FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall prevent reading of CAK values by administrators.

**Application Note:** The intent is for the TOE to protect CAK data from unauthorized disclosure. This data should only be accessed for the purposes of its assigned security functionality and there is no need for it to be displayed or accessed at any other time. This requirement does not prevent the device from providing indication that these exist, are in use, or are still valid. It does, however, restrict the reading of the values outright.

### FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State

FPT\_FLS.1.1

The TSF shall **fail-secure** when **any of** the following types of failures occur: *[failure of the power-on self-tests, failure of integrity check of the TSF executable image, failure of noise source health tests]*.

**Application Note:** The intent of this requirement is to express the fail secure capabilities that the TOE possesses. This means that the TOE must be able to attain a secure/safe state (shutdown) when any of the identified failures occur. For a TOE with redundant failover capability (that continues to operate if power-on self-test (POST) passes on the redundant component), in the event of a POST failure on a redundant component, the specific component that received the POST failure will be shut down. For conformance with other PP-Modules it might be a requirement for the fail-secure state to be “shut down.”

### FPT\_RPL.1 Replay Detection

FPT\_RPL.1.1

The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: *[MPDUs, MKA frames]*.

FPT\_RPL.1.2

The TSF shall perform *[discarding of the replayed data, logging of the detected replay attempt]* when replay is detected.

**Application Note:** As per IEEE 802.1AE-2018, replay is detected by examining the PN value that is embedded in the SecTag that is at the header of the MPDU. The PN is encoded in octets 5 through 8 of the SecTag to support replay protection.

## 5.2.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

### FTP\_ITC.1/MACSEC Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MACsec Communications)

FTP\_ITC.1.1/MACSEC

The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a **MACsec peer** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.

FTP\_ITC.1.2/MACSEC

The TSF shall permit [**selection:** *the TSF, another trusted IT product* ] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP\_ITC.1.3/MACSEC

The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for *[communications with MACsec peers that require the use of MACsec]*.

## 5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:

**Table 3: SFR Rationale**

Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
<a href="#">O.AUTHENTICATION_MACSEC</a>	<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4</a>	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining the methods used for MACsec peer authentication and the handling of MACsec keys.



	FCS_MKA_EXT.1	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining the method used to perform MACsec key agreement.
	FIA_PSK_EXT.1	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining requirements for the composition and use of PSKs that can be used for MACsec peer authentication.
	FCS_DEVID_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by optionally implementing DevIDs as a method for authenticating MACsec peers.
	FCS_EAPTLS_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by optionally implementing EAP-TLS as a method for authenticating MACsec peers.
O.AUTHORIZED_ ADMINISTRATION	FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining management functions that are applicable to MACsec functionality.
	FPT_CAK_EXT.1	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by protecting data that could be used to compromise the security of remote administration.
	FIA_AFL_EXT.1 (optional)	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by optionally enforcing specific limitations on how the TSF throttles local authentication attempts to prevent brute-force impersonation.
	FTP_TRP.1/MACSEC (optional)	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining an optional method of remote administration for the management functionality defined in this PP-Module.
	FMT_SNMP_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining how Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) must be securely implemented if it is used for remote administration.
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_ FUNCTIONS_ MACSEC	FCS_COP.1/CMAC	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining the AES-CMAC algorithm that is used for MACsec communications.
	FCS_COP.1/MACSEC	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining the AES Key Wrap algorithm that is used for MACsec communications.
	FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by implementing integrity protection for MACsec.
	FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by randomizing keys used for MACsec with sufficient entropy.
	FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining the ability of the TOE to interact with external entities using MACsec, which is a cryptographically-secured communications channel.
	FTP_TRP.1/MACSEC (optional)	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining additional optional methods of secure remote administration for the TOE beyond those specified in the Base-PP.
	FCS_SNMP_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by ensuring that SNMP, if implemented, is implemented securely using TLS.
O.PORT_FILTERING_ MACSEC	FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by implementing MACsec functionality in such a way that only authorized packet frames are permitted.
	FIA_PSK_EXT.1	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by using PSKs to determine which connections are authenticated and should therefore not be filtered.
	FPT_DDP_EXT.1 (optional)	This SFR adds a time-based port filtering function.
O.REPLAY_	FPT_RPL.1	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by requiring the

DETECTION		TSF to detect and discard replayed MACsec traffic.
	FPT_RPL_EXT.1 (optional)	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by optionally defining the ability of the TSF to use XPN for replay detection.
O.SYSTEM_MONITORING_MACSEC	FAU_GEN.1/MACSEC	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining auditable events for security-relevant functions that are specific to this PP-Module.
O.TSF_INTEGRITY	FPT_FLS.1	This SFR helps satisfy the TOE objective by defining a fail-secure method that preserves the integrity of the TSF by ensuring that it does not operate when it's in an insecure or unknown state.

## 5.4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Security Assurance requirements. The SARs from the Base-PP must be satisfied.

# 6 Consistency Rationale

## 6.1 Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices

### 6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

When this PP-Module is used to extend the NDcPP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a network device. The TOE boundary is simply extended to include MACsec functionality that is provided by the network device.

### 6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

The threats defined by this PP-Module (see section 3.1) supplement those defined in the NDcPP as follows:

PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSP	Consistency Rationale
T.DATA_INTEGRITY	The threat of data integrity compromise at the layer 2 level is a specific threat that can be countered by MACsec technology.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS	The threat of a malicious entity accessing protected network resources without authorization is a specific example of the T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS threat defined in the Base-PP.
T.UNTRUSTED_MACSEC_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS	The threat of disclosure of data in protected communications channels is the same as the T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS threat in the NDcPP. This PP-Module expands on that by introducing additional logical interfaces (MACsec, SNMP) that this threat applies to.

### 6.1.3 Consistency of Objectives

The objectives for the TOEs are consistent with the NDcPP based on the following rationale:

PP-Module TOE Objective	Consistency Rationale
O.AUTHENTICATION_MACSEC	The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it.
O.AUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATION	The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it.
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS_MACSEC	The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it.
O.PORT_FILTERING_MACSEC	The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it.
O.REPLAY_DETECTION	The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it.
O.SYSTEM_MONITORING_MACSEC	The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it.
O.TSF_INTEGRITY	The Base-PP does not define any TOE objectives so PP-Module objectives do not conflict with it.

This PP-Module does not define any environmental objectives, but does note that OE.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION from the NDcPP only applies to the Base-PP external interfaces. This is because the MACsec interface defined by this PP-Module does enforce through-traffic protection.

### 6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SFRs from the NDcPP that are needed to support MACsec Ethernet Encryption functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the NDcPP is being used for its intended purpose. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the NDcPP are as follows:

PP-Module Requirement	Consistency Rationale
Modified SFRs	

This PP-Module does not modify any requirements when the NDcPP is the base.

#### Additional SFRs

This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the NDcPP is the base.

#### Mandatory SFRs

<a href="#">FAU_GEN.1/MACSEC</a>	This SFR is an iteration of a Base-PP requirement that defines additional auditable events for MACsec functionality that the Base-PP could not be expected to cover.
<a href="#">FCS_COP.1/CMAC</a>	This PP-Module iterates an SFR defined in the Base-PP to define new cryptographic operations that are specific to the protocols defined in the PP-Module.
<a href="#">FCS_COP.1/MACSEC</a>	This PP-Module iterates an SFR defined in the Base-PP to define new cryptographic operations that are specific to the protocols defined in the PP-Module.
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1</a>	This SFR applies to MACsec functionality, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2</a>	This SFR applies to MACsec functionality, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3</a>	This SFR applies to MACsec functionality, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4</a>	This SFR applies to MACsec functionality, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FCS_MKA_EXT.1</a>	This SFR applies to a MACsec peer authentication mechanism, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP, though it is based on the TLS implementation specified in the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FIA_PSK_EXT.1</a>	This SFR applies to PSKs for MKA, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC</a>	This SFR applies to management functions related to MACsec, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FPT_CAK_EXT.1</a>	This SFR requires that keys specific to MACsec be protected. This is similar to <a href="#">FPT_SKP_EXT.1</a> in the Base-PP but applies to keys that were beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FPT_FLS.1</a>	This SFR requires the TSF to react in a specific manner upon failure of specific self-tests. The Base-PP defines <a href="#">FPT_TST_EXT.1</a> for self-test functionality, but does not define specific self-tests. This PP-Module implies that certain self-tests must be done at minimum, but this does not conflict with what is permitted by the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FPT_RPL.1</a>	This SFR applies to replay detection functionality, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FTP_ITC.1/MACSEC</a>	This PP-Module defines an additional trusted channel function for MACsec communications, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.

#### Optional SFRs

<a href="#">FIA_AFL_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines a specific authentication limiting mechanism that exists on top of what <a href="#">FIA_AFL.1</a> in the Base-PP may also require.
<a href="#">FPT_DDP_EXT.1</a>	Data delay protection uses packet counting information from MKA packets to drop differentially delayed MACsec packets at the receiver.
<a href="#">FPT_RPL_EXT.1</a>	This SFR applies to replay detection functionality, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FTP_TRP.1/MACSEC</a>	This PP-Module defines an optional method of administration for MACsec functionality using trusted protocols that are not defined in the Base-PP. As this functionality is optional, a conformant TOE may also use the Base-PP's trusted path to administer these functions.

#### Objective SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any Objective requirements.

#### Implementation-based SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-based requirements.

## Selection-based SFRs

<a href="#">FCS_DEVID_EXT.1</a>	This SFR applies to a MACsec peer authentication mechanism, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FCS_EAPTLS_EXT.1</a>	This SFR applies to a MACsec peer authentication mechanism, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP, though it is based on the TLS implementation specified in the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FCS_SNMP_EXT.1</a>	This SFR applies to implementation of the SNMP protocol, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP, though it is based on the TLS implementation specified in the Base-PP.
<a href="#">FMT_SNMP_EXT.1</a>	This SFR defines requirements for use of SNMP as a management interface, which is beyond the original scope of the Base-PP.

# Appendix A - Optional SFRs

## A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

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### A.1.1 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

#### FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authentication Attempt Limiting

FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.1

When three unsuccessful authentication attempts have been made to the local console, the TSF shall limit the rate of login attempts to one per minute.

**Application Note:** This requirement applies to an administrator at a local console. This anti-hammering requirement is to slow down brute force password guessing.

### A.1.2 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### FPT\_DDP\_EXT.1 Data Delay Protection

FPT\_DDP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall enable data delay protection for MKA that ensures data frames protected by MACsec are not delayed by more than two seconds.

#### FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1 Replay Protection for XPN

FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support extended packet numbering (XPN) as per IEEE 802.1AE-2018.

FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support [**selection:** *GCM-AES-XPN-128, GCM-AES-XPN-256* ] as per IEEE 802.1AE-2018.

**Application Note:** XPN support is expected for devices that are capable of 40Gbps or higher throughput. This SFR is optional because not all conformant TOEs are expected to provide this level of bandwidth. For XPN the full 64-bit PN is recovered using the 32 least significant bits conveyed in the SecTag and the 32 most significant bits are recovered on receipt of a frame.

### A.1.3 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

#### FTP\_TRP.1/MACSEC Trusted Path (MACsec Administration)

FTP\_TRP.1.1/MACSEC

The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [*remote*] users using [**selection:** *MACsec, SNMPv3* ] that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [*modification, disclosure*].

FTP\_TRP.1.2/MACSEC

The TSF shall permit [*remote users*] to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP\_TRP.1.3/MACSEC

The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [*remote administration of MACsec management functions as defined in [FMT\\_SMF.1/MACSEC](#)*].

**Application Note:** This SFR is optional because it is permissible for the management functions defined in this PP-Module to be implemented solely through the trusted path defined in FTP\_TRP.1/Admin in the Base-PP. If SNMP is selected, the [FCS\\_SNMP\\_EXT.1](#) and [FMT\\_SNMP\\_EXT.1](#) SFRs must be claimed.

## A.2 Objective Requirements

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This PP-Module does not define any Objective SFRs.

## A.3 Implementation-based Requirements

---

This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-based SFRs.

# Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements

## B.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1 Secure Device Identifiers

*The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.4.1](#).*

#### FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement Secure Device Identifiers (DevIDs) following IEEE Standard 802.1AR-2018.

#### FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall contain an Initial DevID (IDevID) as specified in Section 6 of IEEE 802.1AR-2018.

#### FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall contain the credential chain as specified in Section 6.3 of IEEE 802.1AR-2018.

#### FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall verify that both the Supplicant and Authenticator DevIDs presented for EAP-TLS have credentials that chain to one of the specified Certificate Authorities.

#### FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the Supplicant DevID is invalid.

#### FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.6

The TSF shall support mutual authentication using DevIDs.

#### FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.7

The TSF shall support the following operations as specified in Section 7.2 of IEEE 802.1AR-2018:

1. Enable or disable DevID credential
2. Enable or disable DevID key

### FCS\_EAPTLS\_EXT.1 EAP-TLS Protocol

*The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.4.1](#).*

#### FCS\_EAPTLS\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) as specified in RFC 3748 and EAP-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) as specified in RFC 5216 as updated by RFC 8996 with TLS implemented using mutual authentication in accordance with **[selection:**

- *FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.1 and FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.2*
- *FCS\_DTLSS\_EXT.1 and FCS\_DTLSS\_EXT.2*
- *FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 and FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2*
- *FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1 and FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2*

**] from the Base-PP.**

**Application Note:** If this SFR is selected, the FCS\_(D)TLSC\_EXT or FCS\_(D)TLSS\_EXT SFRs from the Base-PP must be included.  
RFC 8996 deprecates TLS 1.1.

### FCS\_SNMP\_EXT.1 SNMP Protocol

*The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FTP\\_TRP.1.1/MACSEC](#).*

#### FCS\_SNMP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support SNMP using TLS as specified in RFC 6353 as updated by RFC 8996 with TLS implemented using mutual authentication in accordance with **[selection:**

- *FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.1 and FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.2*
- *FCS\_DTLSS\_EXT.1 and FCS\_DTLSS\_EXT.2*

- *FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 and FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2*
- *FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1 and FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2*

] from the Base-PP.

**Application Note:** If this SFR is selected, the appropriate FCS\_(D)TLSC\_EXT and FCS\_(D)TLSS\_EXT SFRs from the Base-PP must be included.

## B.2 Security Management (FMT)

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### FMT\_SNMP\_EXT.1 SNMP Management

*The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FTP\\_TRP.1.1/MACSEC](#).*

FMT\_SNMP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) with TLS security in conformance with RFC 6353 “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).”

FMT\_SNMP\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall permit access to TSF management functions using only SNMP version 3.

FMT\_SNMP\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall support the following password quality metrics for SNMPv3 passwords: [*character selections and minimum length defined in FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1*].

**Application Note:** FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 is defined in the Base-PP so a conformant MACsec TOE will include this dependency.



# Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP-Module.

## C.1 Extended Components Table

All extended components specified in the PP-Module are listed in this table:

Table 4: Extended Component Definitions	
Functional Class	Functional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)	FCS_DEVID_EXT Secure Device Identifiers FCS_EAPTLS_EXT EAP-TLS Protocol FCS_MACSEC_EXT MACsec FCS_MKA_EXT MACsec Key Agreement FCS_SNMP_EXT SNMP Protocol
Identification and Authentication (FIA)	FIA_AFL_EXT Authentication Failure Handling FIA_PSK_EXT Pre-Shared Key Composition
Protection of the TSF (FPT)	FPT_CAK_EXT Protection of CAK Data FPT_DDP_EXT Data Delay Protection FPT_RPL_EXT Replay Protection
Security Management (FMT)	FMT_SNMP_EXT SNMP Management

## C.2 Extended Component Definitions

### C.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FCS class originally defined by CC Part 2:

#### C.2.1.1 FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT MACsec

##### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for implementation of MACsec functionality.

##### Component Leveling



[FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.1](#), MACsec, requires the TSF to implement MACsec in a specified manner.

[FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.2](#), MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality, requires the TSF to implement MACsec with support for integrity and confidentiality protection.

[FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.3](#), MACsec Randomness, requires the TSF to generate keys and key data using sufficient randomness.

[FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.4](#), MACsec Key Usage, requires the TSF to specify the supported methods of MACsec peer authentication and to define the lifecycle for keys used in support of this.

##### Management: FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

##### Audit: FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Session establishment.

##### FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1 MACsec

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement MACsec in accordance with IEEE Standard 802.1AE-2018.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall derive a Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) from a peer's MAC address and port to uniquely identify the originator of an MPDU.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall reject any MPDUs during a given session that contain an SCI other than the one used to establish that session.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall permit only EAPOL (Port Access Entity (PAE) EtherType 88-8E), MACsec frames (EtherType 88-E5), and MAC control frames (EtherType is 88-08) and shall discard others.

### **Management: FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2 MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.1](#) MACsec

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.1**

The TOE shall implement MACsec with support for integrity protection with a confidentiality offset of [assignment: *supported confidentiality offset value(s)*].

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of protocol data units (MPDUs) using an Integrity Check Value (ICV) derived with the SAK.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a Connectivity Association Key (CAK) using a KDF.

### **Management: FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Creation and update of Secure Association Key.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3 MACsec Randomness**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.1](#) MACsec  
[FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1](#) Random Bit Generation

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall generate unique Secure Association Keys (SAKs) using [assignment: *key generation or derivation method*] such that the likelihood of a repeating SAK is no less than 1 in 2 to the power of the size of the generated key.

### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3.2**

The TSF shall generate unique nonces for the derivation of SAKs using the TOE's random bit generator as specified by [FCS\\_RBG\\_EXT.1](#).

### **Management: FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Specify the lifetime of a CAK.

#### **Audit: FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4**

The following actions should be auditable if FAU\_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Creation of CA.

#### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4 MACsec Key Usage**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

[FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.1](#) MACsec

[FIA\\_PSK\\_EXT.1](#) Pre-Shared Key Composition

##### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.1**

The TSF shall support peer authentication using pre-shared keys (PSKs) [**selection:** *EAP-TLS with DevIDs, no other method* ].

##### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.2**

The TSF shall distribute SAKs between MACsec peers using AES key wrap as specified in FCS\_COP.1.

##### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.3**

The TSF shall support specifying a lifetime for CAKs.

##### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.4**

The TSF shall associate Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with SAKs that are defined by the KDF using the CAK as input data (per IEEE 802.1X-2010, Section 9.8.1).

##### **FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.5**

The TSF shall associate CKNs with CAKs. The length of the CKN shall be an integer number of octets, between 1 and 32 (inclusive).

### **C.2.1.2 FCS\_MKA\_EXT MACsec Key Agreement**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for MKA.

#### **Component Leveling**



[FCS\\_MKA\\_EXT.1](#), MACsec Key Agreement, defines the TSF's implementation of the Key Agreement Protocol.

#### **Management: FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Ability to create, delete, and activate MKA participants.
- Ability to generate a group CAK.

#### **Audit: FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1 MACsec Key Agreement**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.1](#) MACsec

##### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement Key Agreement Protocol (MKA) in accordance with IEEE 802.1X-2010 and 802.1Xbx-2014.

##### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of MKA protocol data units (MKPDUs) using an Integrity Check Value (ICV) derived from an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK).

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a CAK using a KDF.

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall enforce an MKA Lifetime Timeout limit of 6.0 seconds and MKA Bounded Hello Timeout limit of 0.5 seconds.

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.5**

The key server shall refresh a SAK when it expires. The key server shall distribute a SAK by [assignment: *key type and distribution method*].

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.6**

The key server shall distribute a fresh SAK whenever a member is added to or removed from the live membership of the CA.

### **FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.7**

The TSF shall validate MKPDUs according to IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 11.11.2. In particular, the TSF shall discard without further processing any MKPDUs to which any of the following conditions apply:

- a. The destination address of the MKPDU was an individual address
- b. The MKPDU is less than 32 octets long
- c. The MKPDU comprises fewer octets than indicated by the Basic Parameter Set body length, as encoded in bits 4 through 1 of octet 3 and bits 8 through 1 of octet 4, plus 16 octets of ICV
- d. The CAK Name is not recognized

If an MKPDU passes these tests, then the TSF will begin processing it as follows:

- a. If the Algorithm Agility parameter identifies an algorithm that has been implemented by the receiver, the ICV shall be verified as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 9.4.1.
- b. If the Algorithm Agility parameter is unrecognized or not implemented by the receiver, its value can be recorded for diagnosis but the received MKPDU shall be discarded without further processing.

Each received MKPDU that is validated as specified in this clause and verified as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 9.4.1 shall be decoded as specified in IEEE 802.1X-2010 Section 11.11.4.

## **C.2.1.3 FCS\_DEVID\_EXT Secure Device Identifiers**

### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for the implementation and use of Secure DevIDs.

### **Component Leveling**



[FCS\\_DEVID\\_EXT.1](#), Secure Device Identifiers, requires the TSF to implement and use DevIDs according to acceptable standards.

### **Management: FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

### **Audit: FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1 Secure Device Identifiers**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FCS\\_EAPTLS\\_EXT.1](#) EAP-TLS Protocol

#### **FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement Secure Device Identifiers (DevIDs) following IEEE Standard 802.1AR-2018.

#### **FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall contain an Initial DevID (IDevID) as specified in Section 6 of IEEE 802.1AR-2018.

#### **FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall contain the credential chain as specified in Section 6.3 of IEEE 802.1AR-2018.

#### **FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall verify that both the Supplicant and Authenticator DevIDs presented for EAP-TLS have credentials that chain to one of the specified Certificate Authorities.

#### **FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.5**

The TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the Supplicant DevID is invalid.

#### **FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.6**

The TSF shall support mutual authentication using DevIDs.

#### **FCS\_DEVID\_EXT.1.7**

The TSF shall support the following operations as specified in Section 7.2 of IEEE 802.1AR-2018:

1. Enable or disable DevID credential
2. Enable or disable DevID key

### **C.2.1.4 FCS\_EAPTLS\_EXT EAP-TLS Protocol**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for how the TSF implements EAP and EAP-Transport Layer Security.

#### **Component Leveling**

**FCS\_EAPTLS\_EXT** ———— **[1]**

[FCS\\_EAPTLS\\_EXT.1](#), EAP-TLS Protocol, requires the TSF to implement EAP and EAP-TLS according to appropriate standards.

#### **Management: FCS\_EAPTLS\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

#### **Audit: FCS\_EAPTLS\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FCS\_EAPTLS\_EXT.1 EAP-TLS Protocol**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [(FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.1 DTLS Client Protocol and FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.2 DTLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication), or FCS\_DTLSS\_EXT.1 DTLS Server Protocol and FCS\_DTLSS\_EXT.2 DTLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication), or (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol and FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication), or FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol and FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication)]

#### **FCS\_EAPTLS\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) as specified in RFC 3748 and EAP-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) as specified in RFC 5216 as updated by RFC 8996 with TLS implemented using mutual authentication in accordance with [**assignment:** *TLS or DTLS implementation that supports mutual authentication*].

### **C.2.1.5 FCS\_SNMP\_EXT SNMP Protocol**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for implementation of SNMP.

#### **Component Leveling**

**FCS\_SNMP\_EXT** ———— **[1]**

[FCS\\_SNMP\\_EXT.1](#), SNMP Protocol, requires the TSF to implement and support SNMP using TLS using only algorithms that meet certain standards.

#### **Management: FCS\_SNMP\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

## Audit: FCS\_SNMP\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FCS\_SNMP\_EXT.1 SNMP Protocol

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [(FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.1 DTLS Client Protocol and FCS\_DTLSC\_EXT.2 DTLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication), or FCS\_DTLSS\_EXT.1 DTLS Server Protocol and FCS\_DTLSS\_EXT.2 DTLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication), or (FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol and FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication), or FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol and FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication)]

#### FCS\_SNMP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support SNMP using TLS as specified in RFC 6353 as updated by RFC 8996 with TLS implemented using mutual authentication in accordance with [**assignment:** *TLS or DTLS implementation that supports mutual authentication*].

## C.2.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FIA class originally defined by CC Part 2:

### C.2.2.1 FIA\_PSK\_EXT Pre-Shared Key Composition

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the generation and use of PSKs.

#### Component Leveling



[FIA\\_PSK\\_EXT.1](#), Pre-Shared Key Composition, defines the TSF's uses for PSKs and how they are obtained by the TOE.

#### Management: FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Generate and install a PSK-based CAK.
- Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK.

## Audit: FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Key Composition

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies

#### FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use PSKs for MKA as defined by IEEE 802.1X-2010, [**selection:** *no other protocols*, [**assignment:** *other protocols that use PSKs* ]].

#### FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall be able to [**selection:** *accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1* ] bit-based PSKs.

### C.2.2.2 FIA\_AFL\_EXT Authentication Failure Handling

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for handling of authentication failures beyond those defined in the Part 2 family FIA\_AFL.

#### Component Leveling



[FIA\\_AFL\\_EXT.1](#), Authentication Attempt Limiting, requires the TSF to limit the rate of login attempts to a

certain interval after a certain number of failed authentication attempts have occurred.

**Management: FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authentication Attempt Limiting**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.1**

When three unsuccessful authentication attempts have been made to the local console, the TSF shall limit the rate of login attempts to one per minute.

**C.2.3 Protection of the TSF (FPT)**

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FPT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

**C.2.3.1 FPT\_CAK\_EXT Protection of CAK Data**

**Family Behavior**

This family defines confidentiality requirements for CAK data.

**Component Leveling**



[FPT\\_CAK\\_EXT.1](#), Protection of CAK Data, requires the TSF to prevent administrators from being able to read the CAK values.

**Management: FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1 Protection of CAK Data**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies

**FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1.1**


The TSF shall prevent reading of CAK values by administrators.

**C.2.3.2 FPT\_DDP\_EXT Data Delay Protection**

**Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for enforcement of data delay protection.

**Component Leveling**



[FPT\\_DDP\\_EXT.1](#), Data Delay Protection, requires the TSF to use MKA PN information to enforce a data delay protection check of two seconds on MACsec protected frames.

**Management: FPT\_DDP\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FPT\_DDP\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FPT\_DDP\_EXT.1 Data Delay Protection**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FCS\\_MACSEC\\_EXT.4](#) MACsec Key Usage  
[FCS\\_MKA\\_EXT.1](#) MACsec Key Agreement

#### **FPT\_DDP\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall enable data delay protection for MKA that ensures data frames protected by MACsec are not delayed by more than two seconds.

### **C.2.3.3 FPT\_RPL\_EXT Replay Protection**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines replay detection methods that are not defined in the Part 2 family FPT\_RPL.

#### **Component Leveling**



[FPT\\_RPL\\_EXT.1](#), Replay Protection for XPN, requires the TSF to support XPN as a method for detection of replayed traffic.

#### **Management: FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

#### **Audit: FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1 Replay Protection for XPN**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FCS\\_COP.1](#) Cryptographic Operation

#### **FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall support extended packet numbering (XPN) as per IEEE 802.1AE-2018.

#### **FPT\_RPL\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall support [**selection:** *GCM-AES-XPN-128*, *GCM-AES-XPN-256* ] as per IEEE 802.1AE-2018.

### **C.2.4 Security Management (FMT)**

This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FMT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

#### **C.2.4.1 FMT\_SNMP\_EXT SNMP Management**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines the TOE's use of SNMP as a management interface.

#### **Component Leveling**



[FMT\\_SNMP\\_EXT.1](#), SNMP Management, requires the TSF to implement SNMP with (D)TLS in conformance with specific standards for use as a management interface.

#### **Management: FMT\_SNMP\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

#### **Audit: FMT\_SNMP\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FMT\_SNMP\_EXT.1 SNMP Management**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FCS\\_SNMP\\_EXT.1](#) SNMP Protocol

#### **FMT\_SNMP\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) with TLS security in



conformance with RFC 6353 “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).”

#### **FMT\_SNMP\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall permit access to TSF management functions using only SNMP version 3.

#### **FMT\_SNMP\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall support the following password quality metrics for SNMPv3 passwords: [**assignment:** *password quality metrics*].

# Appendix D - Implicitly Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this PP-Module. These requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [\[CC\]](#) Part 1, 8.2 Dependencies between components.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the PP-Module provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.

**Table 5: Implicitly Satisfied Requirements**

Requirement	Rationale for Satisfaction
<b>FIA_UAU.1 - Timing of Authentication</b>	<a href="#">FIA_AFL_EXT.1</a> has a dependency on FIA_UAU.1 because the notion of authentication failure handling implies the existence of an authentication mechanism. This dependency is addressed by a conformant TOE through the Base-PP requirement FIA_UAU_EXT.2, which defines authentication mechanisms specific to network devices.

# Appendix E - Allocation of Requirements in Distributed TOEs

For a distributed TOE, the SFRs in this PP-Module need to be met by the TOE as a whole, but not all SFRs will necessarily be implemented by all components. The following categories are defined in order to specify when each SFR must be implemented by a component:

- **All Components ("All"):** All components that comprise the distributed TOE must independently satisfy the requirement.
- **At least one Component ("One"):** This requirement must be fulfilled by at least one component within the distributed TOE.
- **Feature Dependent ("Feature Dependent"):** These requirements will only be fulfilled where the feature is implemented by the distributed TOE component (note that the requirement to meet the PP-Module as a whole requires that at least one component implements these requirements if they are claimed by the TOE).

The table below specifies how each of the SFRs in this PP-Module must be met, using the categories above.

Requirement	Description	Distributed TOE SFR Allocation
<a href="#">FAU_GEN.1/MACSEC</a>	Audit Data Generation (MACsec)	All
<a href="#">FCS_COP.1/CMAC</a>	Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm)	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FCS_COP.1/MACSEC</a>	Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption and Decryption)	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1</a>	MACsec	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.2</a>	MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3</a>	MACsec Randomness	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4</a>	MACsec Key Usage	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FCS_MKA_EXT.1</a>	MACsec Key Agreement	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FIA_PSK_EXT.1</a>	Pre-Shared Key Composition	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FMT_SMF.1/MACSEC</a>	Specification of Management Functions (MACsec)	One
<a href="#">FPT_CAK_EXT.1</a>	Protection of CAK Data	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FPT_FLS.1</a>	Failure with Preservation of Secure State	All
<a href="#">FPT_RPL.1</a>	Replay Detection	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FPT_ITC.1/MACSEC</a>	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (MACsec Communications)	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FIA_AFL_EXT.1</a>	Authentication Attempt Limiting	One
<a href="#">FPT_DDP_EXT.1</a>	Data Delay Protection	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FPT_RPL_EXT.1</a>	Replay Detection for XPN	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FTP_TRP.1/MACSEC</a>	Trusted Path (MACsec Administration)	One
<a href="#">FCS_DEVID_EXT.1</a>	Secure Device Identifiers	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FCS_EAPTLS_EXT.1</a>	EAP-TLS Protocol	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FCS_SNMP_EXT.1</a>	SNMP Protocol	Feature Dependent
<a href="#">FMT_SNMP_EXT.1</a>	SNMP Management	Feature Dependent

# Appendix F - Entropy Documentation and Assessment

The TOE does not require any additional supplementary information to describe its entropy source beyond the requirements outlined in the Base-PP. As with other Base-PP requirements, the only additional requirement is that the entropy documentation also applies to the specific MACsec Ethernet encryption capabilities of the TOE that require random data, in addition to any functionality required by the Base-PP.

# Appendix G - Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
Base-PP	Base Protection Profile
CA	Connectivity Association
CAK	Connectivity Association Key
CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
CKN	Connectivity Association Key Name
CMAC	Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
cPP	Collaborative Protection Profile
DevID	Device Identifier
EA	Evaluation Activity
EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAP-TLS	EAP Transport Layer Security
EAPOL	Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN
EPL	Ethernet Private Line
EVPL	Ethernet Virtual Private Line
ICK	Integrity Check Value Key
ICV	Integrity Check Value
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IV	Initialization Vector
KaY	Key Agreement Entity
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KW	Key Wrap
LAN	Local Area Network
MAC	Media Access Control
MACsec	Media Access Control Security
MEF	Metro Ethernet Forum
MIB	Management Information Base
MKA	MACsec Key Agreement
MKPDU	MACsec Key Agreement Protocol Data Unit
MPDU	MACsec Protocol Data Unit
NDcPP	collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
OE	Operational Environment
P2P	Point-to-Point
PAE	Port Access Entity
PN	Packet Number
POST	Power On Self Test
PP	Protection Profile

PP-Configuration	Protection Profile Configuration
PP-Module	Protection Profile Module
PSK	Pre-Shared Key
RFC	Request for Comment
SA	Secure Association
SAK	Secure Association Key
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SC	Secure Channel
SCI	Secure Channel Identifier
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSFI	TSF Interface
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
UNI	User Network Interface
VLAN	Virtual Local Area Network
XPN	Extended Packet Numbering

# Appendix H - Bibliography

Identifier	Title
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Part 1: Introduction and General Model</a>, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 2: Security Functional Components</a>, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 3: Security Assurance Components</a>, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.</li></ul>
[MOD_FW]	<a href="#">PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls</a> , Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, June 25, 2020
[MOD_VPNGW]	<a href="#">PP-Module for VPN Gateways</a> , Version 1.2, March 31, 2022
[NDcPP]	<a href="#">collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices</a> , Version 2.2e, March 23, 2020
[NDcPP SD]	<a href="#">Supporting Document - Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP</a> , Version 2.2, December 2019