

# Supporting Document

## Mandatory Technical Document



PP-Module for Host Agent  
Version: 2.0  
2026-01-13  
**National Information Assurance Partnership**

## Foreword

This is a Supporting Document (SD), intended to complement the Common Criteria version 3 and the associated Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.

SDs may be “Guidance Documents”, that highlight specific approaches and application of the standard to areas where no mutual recognition of its application is required, and as such, are not of normative nature, or “Mandatory Technical Documents”, whose application is mandatory for evaluations whose scope is covered by that of the SD. The usage of the latter class is not only mandatory, but certificates issued as a result of their application are recognized under the CCRA.

### Technical Editor:

National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)

### Document history:

Version	Date	Comment
1.0	2020-10-23	First version released
2.0	2026-01-13	CC:2022 Conversion

### General Purpose:

The purpose of this SD is to define evaluation methods for the functional behavior of Host Agent products.

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# Table of Contents

- 1 Introduction
  - 1.1 Technology Area and Scope of Supporting Document
  - 1.2 Structure of the Document
  - 1.3 Terms
    - 1.3.1 Common Criteria Terms
    - 1.3.2 Technical Terms
- 2 Evaluation Activities for SFRs
  - 2.1 Application Software
    - 2.1.1 Modified SFRs
  - 2.2 TOE SFR Evaluation Activities
    - 2.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)
    - 2.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
    - 2.2.3 Host Agent (FHA)
    - 2.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
  - 2.3 Evaluation Activities for Optional SFRs
  - 2.4 Evaluation Activities for Selection-Based SFRs
    - 2.4.1 Host Agent (FHA)
    - 2.4.2 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
  - 2.5 Evaluation Activities for Objective SFRs
    - 2.5.1 Security Management (FMT)
  - 2.6 Evaluation Activities for Implementation-dependent SFRs
- 3 Evaluation Activities for SARs
- 4 Required Supplementary Information
- Appendix A - References

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Technology Area and Scope of Supporting Document

The scope of the PP-Module for Host Agent is to describe the security functionality of Host Agent products in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for them. The PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PP:

- Application Software, version 2.0.

This SD is mandatory for evaluations of TOEs that claim conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the PP-Module for :

- Host Agent, Version 2.0

As such it defines Evaluation Activities for the functionality described in the PP-Module as well as any impacts to the Evaluation Activities to the Base-PP(s) it modifies.

Although Evaluation Activities are defined mainly for the evaluators to follow, in general they also help developers to prepare for evaluation by identifying specific requirements for their TOE. The specific requirements in Evaluation Activities may in some cases clarify the meaning of Security Functional Requirements (SFR), and may identify particular requirements for the content of Security Targets (ST) (especially the TOE Summary Specification), user guidance documentation, and possibly supplementary information (e.g. for entropy analysis or cryptographic key management architecture).

## 1.2 Structure of the Document

Evaluation Activities can be defined for both SFRs and Security Assurance Requirements (SAR), which are themselves defined in separate sections of the SD.

If any Evaluation Activity cannot be successfully completed in an evaluation, then the overall verdict for the evaluation is a 'fail'. In rare cases there may be acceptable reasons why an Evaluation Activity may be modified or deemed not applicable for a particular TOE, but this must be approved by the Certification Body for the evaluation.

In general, if all Evaluation Activities (for both SFRs and SARs) are successfully completed in an evaluation then it would be expected that the overall verdict for the evaluation is a 'pass'. To reach a 'fail' verdict when the Evaluation Activities have been successfully completed would require a specific justification from the evaluator as to why the Evaluation Activities were not sufficient for that TOE.

Similarly, at the more granular level of assurance components, if the Evaluation Activities for an assurance component and all of its related SFR Evaluation Activities are successfully completed in an evaluation then it would be expected that the verdict for the assurance component is a 'pass'. To reach a 'fail' verdict for the assurance component when these Evaluation Activities have been successfully completed would require a specific justification from the evaluator as to why the Evaluation Activities were not sufficient for that TOE.

## 1.3 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

### 1.3.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance	Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].
Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)	Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)	A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.

Direct Rationale	A type of Protection Profile, PP-Module, or Security Target in which the security problem definition (SPD) elements are mapped directly to the SFRs and possibly to the security objectives for the operational environment. There are no security objectives for the TOE.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Extended Package (EP)	A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages.
Functional Package (FP)	A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.

### 1.3.2 Technical Terms

Endpoint	A computing device that runs a general purpose OS, mobile device OS, or network device OS. Endpoints can include desktops, servers, and mobile devices.
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)	A system that analyzes collected EDR Host Agent data for detecting, investigating, and remediating unauthorized activities on endpoints.
Enrolled State	The state in which an endpoint with a running Host Agent is managed by an ESM. Also, referred to as Onboarding.

Enrollment	The process of transitioning an endpoint from an unenrolled to an enrolled state.
Enterprise Security Management (ESM)	A type of application hosted on a server or cloud service that provides support for security management, information flows, reporting, policy, and data analytics in complex enterprise environments.
Host Agent	A logical piece of software that executes on endpoints to collect data about the endpoint and executes commands sent to the endpoint from an ESM server or service. An example command sent to an endpoint could be to enforce a policy from an ESM, to collect some files, or to run an OS command.
Operating System (OS)	Software that manages physical and logical resources and provides services for applications.
Unenrolled State	The state in which an endpoint, with or without a Host Agent, is not managed by an ESM. Also, referred to as Offboarding.

## 2 Evaluation Activities for SFRs

The EAs presented in this section capture the actions the evaluator performs to address technology specific aspects covering specific SARs (e.g. ASE\_TSS.1, ADV\_FSP.1, AGD\_OPE.1, and ATE\_IND.1) – this is in addition to the CEM workunits that are performed in Section [3 Evaluation Activities for SARs](#).

Regarding design descriptions (designated by the subsections labeled TSS, as well as any required supplementary material that may be treated as proprietary), the evaluator must ensure there is specific information that satisfies the EA. For findings regarding the TSS section, the evaluator’s verdicts will be associated with the CEM workunit ASE\_TSS.1-1. Evaluator verdicts associated with the supplementary evidence will also be associated with ASE\_TSS.1-1, since the requirement to provide such evidence is specified in ASE in the PP.

For ensuring the guidance documentation provides sufficient information for the administrators/users as it pertains to SFRs, the evaluator’s verdicts will be associated with CEM workunits ADV\_FSP.1-7, AGD\_OPE.1-4, and AGD\_OPE.1-5.

Finally, the subsection labeled Tests is where the authors have determined that testing of the product in the context of the associated SFR is necessary. While the evaluator is expected to develop tests, there may be instances where it is more practical for the developer to construct tests, or where the developer may have existing tests. Therefore, it is acceptable for the evaluator to witness developer-generated tests in lieu of executing the tests. In this case, the evaluator must ensure the developer’s tests are executing both in the manner declared by the developer and as mandated by the EA. The CEM workunits that are associated with the EAs specified in this section are: ATE\_IND.1-3, ATE\_IND.1-4, ATE\_IND.1-5, ATE\_IND.1-6, and ATE\_IND.1-7.

### 2.1 Application Software

The EAs defined in this section are only applicable in cases where the TOE claims conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the App PP.

#### 2.1.1 Modified SFRs

The PP-Module does not modify any requirements when the App PP is the base.

### 2.2 TOE SFR Evaluation Activities

## 2.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)

### FAU\_GEN.1/HA Audit Data Generation

FAU\_GEN.1/HA

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify the TSS lists all record types that are recorded.

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS lists all the auditable event types and all audit information that the TOE records.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it lists all of the auditable events. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type selected in the ST is included.

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field. The evaluator shall ensure that the fields contain the information required.

#### **Tests**

- Test FAU\_GEN.1/HA:1: The evaluator shall test the Host Agent's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the Host Agent generate audit records for each type of event listed in the ST.
- Test FAU\_GEN.1/HA:2: The evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record provide the required information.

### FAU\_STO\_EXT.1 Audit Data Storage

FAU\_STO\_EXT.1

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify the TSS contains details of where all audit data is stored.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that the list of auditable events are stored in the platform-provided logging mechanism.

#### **Tests**

The evaluator shall test the Host Agent's ability to correctly generate audit records by having the TOE generate audit records for the events listed in the ST. This should include all instance types of an event specified. When verifying the test results, the evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing are stored in the platform-provided logging mechanism.

On Linux based platforms this would be in var/logs. On Windows based platforms this would be the Windows Event Log.

No specific locations are defined for other platforms.

## 2.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)

### FDP\_NET\_EXT.2 Network Communications

FDP\_NET\_EXT.2

### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall confirm the TSS lists network communication destinations and that it matches the selections made in the SFR.

### ***Guidance***

The evaluator shall confirm that guidance is provided for any configuration needed to limit network communications.

### ***Tests***

The evaluator shall run the application. While the application is running, the evaluator shall sniff network traffic ignoring all non-application associated traffic and verify that any network communications witnessed are limited to the selection made in the SFR.

## **2.2.3 Host Agent (FHA)**

### **FHA\_HAD\_EXT.1 Host Agent Declaration**

FHA\_HAD\_EXT.1

#### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall verify the TSS lists all classes of products the Host Agent is designed to function with.

#### ***Guidance***

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that guidance exists for enrollment with all compatible ESM products identified in the ST.

#### ***Tests***

Conditional: If "EDR" is selected, the evaluator shall install the Host Agent and enroll it with the EDR management system. The evaluator shall verify that enrollment was successful and that the Host Agent is communicating with the EDR.

## **2.2.4 Security Management (FMT)**

### **FMT\_SMF.1/HA Specification of Management Functions (Configuration of Host Agent)**

FMT\_SMF.1/HA

#### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall verify the TSS contains all frequencies for sending Host Agent data to an ESM and all labels that are permitted.

#### ***Guidance***

The evaluator shall verify that every management function mandated by the PP-Module is described in the operational guidance and that the description contains the information required to perform the management duties associated with the management function.

#### ***Tests***

The evaluator shall test the ability to configure the Host Agent and test each function listed in the SFR. The evaluator is expected to test these functions in all the ways in which the ST and guidance documentation state the configuration can be managed.

### **FMT\_UNR\_EXT.1 User Unenrollment Prevention**

FMT\_UNR\_EXT.1

### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes the mechanism used to prevent users from unenrolling the Host Agent.

### ***Guidance***

There are no guidance EAs for this component.

### ***Tests***

The evaluator shall attempt to unenroll the Host Agent from the ESM system as an unprivileged user and verify that the attempt fails.

## **2.3 Evaluation Activities for Optional SFRs**

The PP-Module does not define any optional requirements.

## **2.4 Evaluation Activities for Selection-Based SFRs**

### **2.4.1 Host Agent (FHA)**

#### **FHA\_CHA\_EXT.1 Cache Host Agent Collected Data**

##### **FHA\_CHA\_EXT.1**

### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall verify the TSS details how data is cached, any rules that would affect data caching, and how cached data will be affected if storage limits are reached.

### ***Guidance***

The evaluator shall verify that any configuration options related to data caching are listed in the guidance.

### ***Tests***

The evaluator shall test the Host Agent's ability to cache data by disconnecting the endpoint from the network to simulate a network connectivity failure, these should be actual hours not via changing system time. The evaluator shall exercise behaviors on the endpoint during the outage to generate Host Agent data. Example behaviors could be running programs, performing some authentications, installing/uninstalling software, or sample test cases provided by the vendor to generate Host Agent data. The evaluator will then reconnect the endpoint to the network and verify on the ESM system that the missing data from the outage is available on the ESM management portal.

#### **FHA\_COL\_EXT.1 Collected Audit**

##### **FHA\_COL\_EXT.1**

### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall verify the TSS contains a full list of endpoint data that can be collected.

### ***Guidance***

The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it lists all of the collectable types of endpoint event data. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every endpoint event type listed in the ST is included in the administrative guidance.

### ***Tests***

The evaluator shall run the systems causing multiple events to occur and then review the items collected by the Host Agent to verify that all items in the minimum set are included.



## 2.4.2 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

### FTP\_DIT\_EXT.2 Protection of Data in Transit for Peer-to-Peer Host Agents

FTP\_DIT\_EXT.2

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS contains a description of all data transmitted to other Host Agents and that all such data is protected according to FPT\_DIT\_EXT.1.

#### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall ensure the guidance contains any configuration details required for ensuring data transmitted to other Host Agents is protected according to FPT\_DIT\_EXT.1.

#### **Tests**

The tests in FTP\_DIT\_EXT.1.1 shall be repeated for data transmitted between two Host Agents.

## 2.5 Evaluation Activities for Objective SFRs

### 2.5.1 Security Management (FMT)

#### FMT\_POL\_EXT.1 Trusted Policy Update

FMT\_POL\_EXT.1

#### **TSS**

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes how the candidate policies or commands are sent to the Host Agent; the processing associated with verifying the digital signature of the policies or commands; and the actions that take place for successful (signature was verified) and unsuccessful (signature could not be verified) cases. The software components that are performing the processing must also be identified in the TSS and verified by the evaluators (this could be the Host Agent or the underlying platform).

#### **Guidance**

There are no guidance EAs for this component.

#### **Tests**

- Test FMT\_POL\_EXT.1:1:

The evaluator shall perform or wait for a policy update or commands from an ESM server to be sent to a Host Agent. The evaluator shall verify the policy or command is signed and is provided to the Host Agent. The evaluator shall verify the Host Agent accepts the digitally signed policy.

The execution of this test may require some configuration or a test version of either the Host Agent of the ESM system in order to view the incoming policy or command and verify that the content is digitally signed.

- Test FMT\_POL\_EXT.1:2: The evaluator shall alter a policy update or command and verify the Host Agent rejects the altered policy.

## 2.6 Evaluation Activities for Implementation-dependent SFRs

The PP-Module does not define any implementation-dependent requirements.

# 3 Evaluation Activities for SARs

The PP-Module does not define any SARs beyond those defined within the base App PP to which it must claim conformance. It is important to note that a TOE that is evaluated against the PP-Module is inherently evaluated against this Base-PP as well. The App PP includes a number of Evaluation Activities associated with both SFRs and SARs. Additionally, the PP-Module includes a number of SFR-based Evaluation Activities that similarly refine the SARs of the Base-PPs. The evaluation laboratory will evaluate the TOE against the Base-PP and supplement that evaluation with the necessary SFRs that are taken from the PP-Module.

# 4 Required Supplementary Information

This Supporting Document has no required supplementary information beyond the ST, operational guidance, and testing.

# Appendix A - References

Identifier	Title
[AppPP]	<a href="#">Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 2.0, June 16, 2025</a>
[EDR]	<a href="#">PP-Module for Endpoint Detection and Response</a> , Version 2.0, January 13, 2026