

PP-Module for File Encryption Enterprise Management



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Revision History

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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

The scope of the File Encryption Enterprise Management PP-Module is to describe the security functionality of a file encryption enterprise management product in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for such products. This PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PP.

- Application Software Protection Profile, Version 2.0

This Base-PP is valid because a file encryption enterprise management product is a 3rd party application. The use case for a product conforming to the FE module is to protect data at rest on a device that is lost or stolen while powered off without any prior access by an adversary. The use case where an adversary obtains a device that is in a powered state and is able to make modifications to the environment or the TOE itself (e.g., evil maid attacks) is not addressed by that module. The module does contain protections to mitigate the potential for attack with a powered on device, but they are not sufficient to protect data from a skilled adversary with physical access.

While that use case is still true for the Enterprise Management PP-Module, this PP-module also expands the use case to include protecting the communications between the Enterprise Management Server and the client device through the use of a trusted channel. It also expands the use case to include the optional abilities of the EM to interact with clients (with proper authorization), to direct it to perform sanitation of keys and material on the device, to manage and store parts of the key chain required for decryption on the client, or to issue a recovery credential to reset the authentication factor if it has been lost.

The TOE and Its Supporting Environment:

The environment in which the EM functions is expected to exist is on a back end server, not on the endpoint system. It is expected to have secure access to a management system (e.g. Active Directory) and access to a means of storing key material when not in use. The EM shall not have the ability to access the secured stored key material without verification of access authority by the LDAP.

The Operating System environment may make a full range of services available to the Enterprise Management PP-Module, including hardware drivers, cryptographic libraries, and perhaps other services external to the TOE. The EM TOE may include or leverage features and functions within the operational environment.

1.2 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

1.2.1 Common Criteria Terms

Assurance Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs [CC].

Base Protection Profile Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.
(Base-PP)

Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)	A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.
Common Criteria (CC)	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory	Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Distributed TOE	A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.
Extended Package (EP)	A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages.
Functional Package (FP)	A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality.
Operational Environment (OE)	Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.
Protection Profile (PP)	An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.
Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration)	A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.
Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)	An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.
Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)	A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR)	A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.
Security Target (ST)	A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)	The product under evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)	The security functionality of the product under evaluation.
TOE Summary Specification (TSS)	A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.

1.2.2 Technical Terms

Authorization factor (AF)	A value that a user knows, has, or is (e.g. password, token, etc.) submitted to the TOE to establish that the user is in the community authorized to access the requested material.
Entropy Source	This cryptographic function provides a seed for a random bit generator by accumulating the outputs from one or more noise sources. The functionality includes a measure of the minimum work required to guess a given output and tests to ensure that the noise sources are operating properly.
File Encryption Key (FEK)	The key that is used by the encryption algorithm to encrypt the selected user data on the host machine.
File/Set of files	The user data that is selected to be encrypted, which can include individual file encryption (with a FEK per file) or a set of files encrypted with a single FEK.
Key Chaining	The method of using multiple layers of encryption keys to protect data. A top layer key encrypts a lower layer key which encrypts the data; this method can have any number of layers.
Key Encryption Key (KEK)	The key that is used to encrypt another key.
Key Release Key	A key used to release another key from storage, it is not used for the direct derivation or decryption of another key.
Key Sanitization	A method of sanitizing encrypted data by securely overwriting the key, as described in the key destruction requirement, that was encrypting the data.
Keying Escrow	The process of exporting a key to an alternate location.
Keying Material	Key material is commonly known as critical security parameter (CSP) data, and also includes authorization data, nonces, and metadata.
Noise Source	The component of an RBG that contains the non-deterministic, entropy-producing activity.
Non-Volatile Memory	A type of computer memory that will retain information without power.
Powered-Off State	The device has been shut down.
Protected Data	This refers to all files designated by the user for encryption.
Random Bit Generator (RBG)	A cryptographic function composed of an entropy source and DRBG that is invoked for random bits needed to produce keying material.
Recovery Value	A secondary credential that can be used to validate a user in the event the primary one is lost.
Registration	The initial process of associating an endpoint and/or user with the server.
Submask	A submask is a bit string that can be generated and stored in a number of ways
System Identity	A composition of a series of identifiers that may vary, but aim to identify and associate with a specific system

1.3 Compliant Targets of Evaluation

The target of evaluation for this ~~PP-Module~~ is the Enterprise Management (EM) function of a FE solution. The following section provides an overview of the security functionality of this ~~PP~~-module.

1.3.1 TOE Boundary

The application, which consists of the software provided by its vendor, is installed onto the platform(s) it operates on. It executes on the platform, which may be an operating system, hardware environment, a software based execution environment, or some combination of these. Those platforms may themselves run within other environments, such as virtual machines or operating systems, that completely abstract away the underlying hardware from the application. The ~~TOE~~ is not accountable for security functionality that is implemented by platform layers that are abstracted away. Some evaluation activities are specific to the particular platform on which the application runs, in order to provide precision and repeatability. The only platforms currently recognized by [AppPP] and this module are those specified in ~~SFR~~ Evaluation Activities. To test on a platform for which there are no EAs, a Vendor should contact NIAP with recommended EAs. NIAP will determine if the proposed platform is appropriate for the ~~PP~~ and accept, reject, or develop EAs as necessary in coordination with the technical community.

The ~~TOE~~ includes any software in the application installation package, even those pieces that may extend or modify the functionality of the underlying platform, such as kernel drivers. ~~BIOS~~ and other firmware, the operating system kernel, and other systems software (and drivers) provided as part of the platform are outside the scope of this document.

1.4 Use Cases

[USE CASE 1] Enterprise Management

The use case for this ~~PP-Module~~ is protecting the communications between the Enterprise Management Server and the client device through the use of a trusted channel. Including the optional abilities of the EM to interact with clients (with proper authorization), to direct it to perform sanitation of keys and material on the device, to manage and store parts of the key chain required for decryption on the client, or to issue a recovery credential to reset the authentication factor if it has been lost.

2 Conformance Claims

Conformance Statement

An ~~ST~~ must claim exact conformance to this ~~PP-Module~~.

The evaluation methods used for evaluating the ~~TQE~~ are a combination of the workunits defined in [CEM] as well as the Evaluation Activities for ensuring that individual ~~SFRs~~ and ~~SARs~~ have a sufficient level of supporting evidence in the Security Target and guidance documentation and have been sufficiently tested by the laboratory as part of completing ATE_IND.1. Any functional packages this ~~PP~~ claims similarly contain their own Evaluation Activities that are used in this same manner.

CC Conformance Claims

This ~~PP-Module~~ is conformant to Part 2 (extended) and Part 3 (extended) of Common Criteria CC:2022, Revision 1.

PP Claim

This ~~PP-Module~~ does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.

The following ~~PPs~~ and ~~PP-Modules~~ are allowed to be specified in a ~~PP-Configuration~~ with this ~~PP-Module~~:

- ~~PP-Module~~ for VPN Clients, Version 3.0
- ~~PP-Module~~ for File Encryption, Version 2.0

Package Claim

- This ~~PP-Module~~ is Functional Package for SSH Version 2.0 conformant.
- This ~~PP-Module~~ is Functional Package for TLS Version 2.1 conformant.
- This ~~PP-Module~~ does not conform to any assurance packages.

The functional packages to which the ~~PP~~ conforms may include ~~SFRs~~ that are not mandatory to claim for the sake of conformance. An ~~ST~~ that claims one or more of these functional packages may include any non-mandatory ~~SFRs~~ that are appropriate to claim based on the capabilities of the ~~TSF~~ and on any triggers for their inclusion based inherently on the ~~SFR~~ selections made.

3 Security Problem Definition

The primary asset that is being protected is the sensitive user data stored on a system. The threat model thus focuses on a host machine that has been compromised by an unauthorized user. This section addresses threats to the **TOE** only.

3.1 Threats

T.KEYING_MATERIAL_COMPROMISE_SERVER

Possession of any of the keys, authorization factors, submasks, and random numbers or any other values that contribute to the creation of keys or authorization factors could allow an unauthorized user to defeat the encryption. This **PP-Module** considers possession of key material of equal importance to the data itself. Threat agents may look for key material in unencrypted storage on the Management Server and in external databases in the operating environment (**QE**), e.g. SQL database.

T.MAN_IN_THE_MIDDLE

An attacker listening on the communication between the Management Server and the Client(s) to obtain the user's credential, keys, or recovery material.

T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS

An attacker masquerading as an administrator to the Management Server to gain access to **TOE** management functionality to gain unauthorized access to protected data or prevent legitimate users from gaining authorized access.

T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS

An attacker targeting the Management Server using insecure tunneling protocols or the presence of an unencrypted path to disclose keys, key material, or recovery material transferred between the endpoint and the Management Server.

T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS_ENDPOINT

An attacker accessing the data on the encrypted file(s) by getting access to a protected file(s), attaching it to a host system controlled by the attacker and using the key material, or optionally a recovery credential to access the data. The **PP-Module** for File Encryption addresses the primary threat of unauthorized disclosure of recovery material.

T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS_SERVER

An attacker accessing the Management Server and generating a recovery key chain for an endpoint. The File Encryption **PP-Module** addresses the primary threat of unauthorized disclosure of data protected on the endpoint; this adds the Management Server to the scope of the threat.

3.2 Assumptions

These assumptions are made on the Operational Environment (**QE**) in order to be able to ensure that the security functionality specified in the **PP-Module** can be provided by the **TOE**. If the **TOE** is placed in an **QE** that does not meet these assumptions, the **TOE** may no longer be able to provide all of its security functionality.

A.ENVIRONMENTAL_STORAGE

Any key storage mechanism provided by the Operational Environment is able to provide the same level of security as a TQE-internal storage mechanism that is conformant to this PP-Configuration.

A.PHYSICAL_SERVER

The platform on which the Management Server resides is physically protected in its Operational Environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the platform's correct operation.

A.SECURED_CONFIGURATION

The Management Server and the remote endpoints are installed and configured in accordance with their evaluated configuration.

A.SECURED_ENVIRONMENT

Any environmental components required to support the functionality of the Management Server (e.g. underlying operating system, firewall, database) are installed and configured in accordance with its proper configuration.

3.3 Organizational Security Policies

An organization deploying the TQE is expected to satisfy the organizational security policy listed below in addition to all organizational security policies defined by the claimed Base-PP.

This document does not define any additional OSPs.

4 Security Objectives

The Security Problem described in Section 3 will be addressed by a combination of cryptographic capabilities. Compliant TOEs will provide security functionality that addresses threats to the TOE and enforces policies that are imposed by law and regulation. The following subsections provide a description of the security objectives required to meet the threats/policies previously discussed. The description of these security objectives are in addition to that described in the [AppPP].

Note: in each subsection below particular security objectives are identified (highlighted by O.) and they are matched with the associated security functional requirements (SFRs) that provide the mechanisms to satisfy the objectives.

The Security Objectives are the requirements for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and for the Operational Environment derived from the threats in Section 3.

4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

OE.ENVIRONMENTAL_STORAGE

If the TOE relies on the Operational Environment for key storage, the storage mechanism will provide at least the same level of security as a TOE-internal storage mechanism as defined by FPT_KYP_EXT.1.

OE.PHYSICAL_SERVER

The Operating environment will provide a cryptographic function capability that is commensurate with the requirements and capabilities of the TOE as defined in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.

OE.SECURED_CONFIGURATION

The Management Server and remote endpoints are configured in accordance with its associated operational guidance so that the level of security that is provided by the TOE is consistent with its evaluated configuration.

OE.SECURED_ENVIRONMENT

The components of the Management Server's underlying platform are configured in accordance with their associated operational guidance so that the TOE is deployed in an environment that is consistent with its evaluated configuration.

4.2 Security Objectives Rationale

This section describes how the assumptions and organizational security policies map to operational environment security objectives.

Table 1: Security Objectives Rationale

Assumption or OSP	Security Objectives	Rationale
A.ENVIRONMENTAL_STORAGE	OE.ENVIRONMENTAL_STORAGE	The operational environment objective OE.ENVIRONMENTAL_STORAGE is realized through A.ENVIRONMENTAL_STORAGE.

A.PHYSICAL_SERVER	OE.PHYSICAL_SERVER	The operational environment objective OE.PHYSICAL_SERVER is realized through A.PHYSICAL_SERVER.
A.SECURED_CONFIGURATION	OE.SECURED_CONFIGURATION	The operational environment objective OE.SECURED_CONFIGURATION is realized through A.SECURED_CONFIGURATION.
A.SECURED_ENVIRONMENT	OE.SECURED_ENVIRONMENT	The operational environment objective OE.SECURED_ENVIRONMENT is realized through A.SECURED_ENVIRONMENT.

5 Security Requirements

This chapter describes the security requirements which have to be fulfilled by the product under evaluation. Those requirements comprise functional components from Part 2 and assurance components from Part 3 of [CC]. The following conventions are used for the completion of operations:

- **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text** or ~~strikethrough text~~): Is used to add details to a requirement or to remove part of the requirement that is made irrelevant through the completion of another operation, and thus further restricts a requirement.
- **Selection** (denoted by *italicized text*): Is used to select one or more options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicized text*): Is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. Showing the value in square brackets indicates assignment.
- **Iteration** operation: Is indicated by appending the SFR name with a slash and unique identifier suggesting the purpose of the operation, e.g. "/EXAMPLE1."

5.1 Protection Profile for Application Software Security Functional Requirements Direction

The TOE is expected to rely on some of the security functions implemented by the application as a whole and evaluated against [AppPP]. The following section describe any modifications that the ST author must make to the SFRs defined in the Base-PP in addition to what is mandated by section 5.2.

5.1.1 Modified SFRs

The SFRs listed in this section are defined in the App PP and relevant to the secure operation of the TOE.

5.1.1.1 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)

FTP_DIT_EXT.1: Protection of Data in Transit

This SFR is modified from its definition in the Base-PP by removing the first selection (where the application does not transmit any data or sensitive data). By definition, a TOE that conforms to this PP-Module must have the ability to transmit sensitive data to another trusted IT product.

The text of the requirement is replaced with:

The application shall [selection]:

- *encrypt all transmitted [selection; choose one of: sensitive data, data] with [selection]:*
 - *HTTPS as a client in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1*
 - *HTTPS as a server in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1*
 - *TLS as a server as defined in Functional Package for TLS and also supports functionality for [selection: mutual authentication, none]*
 - *TLS as a client as defined in Functional Package for TLS*
 - *DTLS as a server as defined in Functional Package for TLS and also supports functionality for [selection: mutual authentication,none]*

- *DTLS as a client as defined in Functional Package for TLS*
 - *SSH as defined in the Functional Package for Secure Shell*
 - *IPsec as defined in the VPN Client PP-Module, version 3.0*
-]*for [assignment: function(s)] using certificates as defined in the Functional Package for X.509*
- *invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted sensitive data with [selection: HTTPS, TLS, DTLS, SSH, IPsec] for [assignment: function(s)] using certificates as defined in the Functional Package for X.509*
 - *invoke platform-provided functionality to encrypt all transmitted data with [selection: HTTPS, TLS, DTLS, SSH, IPsec] for [assignment: function(s)] using certificates as defined in the Functional Package for X.509*
-]*between itself and another trusted IT product.*

5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following section describes the SERs that must be satisfied by any TOE that claims conformance to this PP-Module. These SERs must be claimed regardless of which PP-Configuration is used to define the TOE.

5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_CKM.6 Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS_CKM.6.1

The TSF shall destroy [*all keys and key material*] when *no longer needed*.

Application Note: Keys, including intermediate keys and key material that are no longer needed are destroyed by using an approved method, FCS_CKM.6.2. Examples of keys are intermediate keys, submasks. There may be instances where keys or key material that are contained in persistent storage are no longer needed and require destruction. Base on their implementation, vendors will explain when certain keys are no longer needed. There are multiple situations in which key material is no longer necessary, for example, a wrapped key may need to be destroyed when a password is changed. However, there are instances when keys are allowed to remain in memory, for example, a device identification key. If a PIN was used for a smart card and managed by the TOE, ensuring that the PIN was properly destroyed must be addressed.

FCS_CKM.6.2

The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified by FCS_CKM.6.1 in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [*[selection:*

- *For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [selection:*
 - *single overwrite consisting of [selection: a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF's RBG, zeroes, ones, new value of a key, [assignment: any value that does not contain any CSP]]*
 - *removal of power to the memory*
 - *destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection*

]

- For non-volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by [selection]:
 - destruction of all KEKs protecting the target key, where none of the KEKs protecting the target key are derived
 - the invocation of an interface provided by the underlying platform that [selection]:
 - logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [selection: single, [assignment: ST author defined multi-pass]] overwrite consisting of [selection: a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF's RBG, zeroes, ones, new value of a key, [assignment: any value that does not contain any CSP]]
 - instructs the underlying platform to destroy the abstraction that represents the key

]

]

]] that meets the following: [no standard].

Application Note: The interface referenced in the requirement could take different forms, the most likely of which is an application programming interface to an OS kernel. There may be various levels of abstraction visible. For instance, in a given implementation that overwrites a key stored in non-volatile memory, the application may have access to the file system details and may be able to logically address specific memory locations. In another implementation that instructs the underlying platform to destroy the representation of a key stored in non-volatile memory, the application may simply have a handle to a resource and can only ask the platform to delete the resource, as may be the case with a platforms secure key store. The latter implementation should only be used for the most restricted access. The level of detail to which the TOE has access will be reflected in the TSS section of the ST. Several selections allow assignment of a 'value that does not contain any CSP'. This means that the TOE uses some other specified data not drawn from a source that may contain key material or reveal information about key material, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The point of the phrase 'does not contain any CSP' is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general 'pool' that might contain current or residual data that itself requires confidentiality protection.

For the selection "destruction of all KEKs protecting target key, where none of the KEKs protecting the target key are derived", a key can be considered destroyed by destroying the key that protects the key. If a key is wrapped or encrypted it is not necessary to "overwrite" that key, overwriting the key that is used to wrap or encrypt the key used to encrypt/decrypt data, using the appropriate method for the memory type involved, will suffice. For example, if a product uses a Key Encryption Key (KEK) to encrypt a File Encryption Key (FEK), destroying the KEK using one of the methods in [FCS_CKM.6](#) is sufficient, since the FEK would no longer be usable (of course, presumes the FEK is still encrypted and the KEK cannot be recovered or re-derived).

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FCS_CKM.6](#)
[TSS](#)

The evaluator shall verify the TSS provides a high level description of what it means for keys and key material to be no longer needed and when they should be expected to be destroyed. The evaluator shall verify the TSS provides a high level description of what it means for keys and key material to be no longer needed and when then should be expected to be destroyed.

KMD

The evaluator examines the KMD to ensure it describes how the keys are managed in volatile memory. This description includes details of how each identified key is introduced into volatile memory (e.g. by derivation from user input, or by unwrapping a wrapped key stored in non-volatile memory) and how they are overwritten.

The evaluator shall check to ensure the KMD lists each type of key that is stored in non-volatile memory, and identifies how the TOE interacts with the underlying platform to manage keys (e.g., store, retrieve, destroy). The description includes details on the method of how the TOE interacts with the platform, including an identification and description of the interfaces it uses to manage keys (e.g., file system APIs, platform key store APIs).

The evaluator examines the interface description for each different media type to ensure that the interface supports the selection(s) and description in the KMD.

If the ST makes use of the open assignment and fills in the type of pattern that is used, the evaluator examines the KMD to ensure it describes how that pattern is obtained and used. The evaluator shall verify that the pattern does not contain any CSPs.

The evaluator shall check that the KMD identifies any configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement.

If the selection "destruction of all KEKs protecting target key, where none of the KEKs protecting the target key are derived" is included the evaluator shall examine the TOE's keychain in the KMD and identify each instance when a key is destroyed by this method. In each instance the evaluator shall verify all keys capable of decrypting the target key are destroyed in accordance with a specified key destruction method in FCS_CKM.6.2. The evaluator shall verify that all of the keys capable of decrypting the target key are not able to be derived to reestablish the keychain after their destruction.

The evaluator shall verify the KMD includes a description of the areas where keys and key material reside and when the keys and key material are no longer needed.

The evaluator shall verify the KMD includes a key lifecycle, that includes a description where key material reside, how the key material is used, how it is determined that keys and key material are no longer needed, and how the material is destroyed once it is not needed and that the documentation in the KMD follows FCS_CKM.6.2 for the destruction.

Guidance

There are a variety of concerns that may prevent or delay key destruction in some cases.

The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation identifies configurations or circumstances that may not strictly conform to the key destruction requirement, and that this description is consistent with the relevant parts of the TSS and any other relevant Required Supplementary Information.

The evaluator shall check that the guidance documentation provides guidance on situations where key destruction may be delayed at the physical layer and how such situations can be avoided or mitigated if possible.

Some examples of what is expected to be in the documentation are provided here.

*When the **TOE** does not have full access to the physical memory, it is possible that the storage may be implementing wear-leveling and garbage collection. This may create additional copies of the key that are logically inaccessible but persist physically. In this case, to mitigate this the drive should support the TRIM command and implements garbage collection to destroy these persistent copies when not actively engaged in other tasks.*

*Drive vendors implement garbage collection in a variety of different ways, as such there is a variable amount of time until data is truly removed from these solutions. There is a risk that data may persist for a longer amount of time if it is contained in a block with other data not ready for erasure. To reduce this risk, the operating system and file system of the **QE** should support TRIM, instructing the non-volatile memory to erase copies via garbage collection upon their deletion. If a RAID array is being used, only set-ups that support TRIM are utilized. If the drive is connected via PCI-Express, the operating system supports TRIM over that channel.*

The drive should be healthy and contain minimal corrupted data and should be at end-of-life before a significant amount of damage to drive health occurs, this minimizes the risk that small amounts of potentially recoverable data may remain in damaged areas of the drive.

Tests

These tests are only for key destruction provided by the application, test 2 does not apply to any keys using the selection "new value of a key":

- *Test FCS_CKM.6:1: Applied to each key held in volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the **TOE** (whether or not the value is subsequently encrypted for storage in volatile or non-volatile memory). In the case where the only selection made for the key destruction method was removal of power, then this test is unnecessary.*

The evaluator shall:

1. *Record the value of the key in the **TOE** subject to clearing.*
2. *Cause the cause the **TOE** or the underlying platform to dump to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.*
3. *Cause the **TOE** to clear the key.*
4. *Cause the **TOE** to stop the execution but not exit.*
5. *Cause the **TOE** to dump the entire memory of the **TOE** into a binary file.*
6. *Search the content of the binary file created in Step #5 for instances of the known key value from Step #1.*

Steps #1-6 ensure that the complete key does not exist anywhere in volatile memory. If a copy is found, then the test fails.

- *Test FCS_CKM.6:2: [Conditional] If new value of a key is selected this test does not apply. Applied to each key held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by the **TOE**. The evaluator shall use special tools (as needed), provided by the **TOE** developer if necessary, to ensure the tests function as intended.*
 1. *Identify the purpose of the key and what access should fail when it is deleted. (e.g. the file encryption key being deleted would cause data decryption to fail.)*
 2. *Cause the **TOE** to clear the key.*

3. Have the TOE attempt the functionality that the cleared key would be necessary for.
4. The test succeeds if Step #3 fails.

Tests 3 and 4 do not apply for the selection instructing the underlying platform to destroy the representation of the key, as the TOE has no visibility into the inner workings and completely relies on the underlying platform.

- *Test FCS_CKM.6:3: Applied to each key held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE. The evaluator shall use a tool that provides a logical view of the media (e.g., MBR file system):*
 1. Record the value of the key in the TOE subject to clearing.
 2. Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
 3. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
 4. Search the logical view that the key was stored in for instances of the known key value from Step #1. If a copy is found, then the test fails.
- *Test FCS_CKM.6:4: Applied to each key held in non-volatile memory and subject to destruction by overwrite by the TOE. The evaluator shall use a tool that provides a logical view of the media:*
 1. Record the logical storage location of the key in the TOE subject to clearing.
 2. Cause the TOE to perform a normal cryptographic processing with the key from Step #1.
 3. Cause the TOE to clear the key.
 4. Read the logical storage location in Step #1 of non-volatile memory to ensure the appropriate pattern is utilized.

The test succeeds if correct pattern is used to overwrite the key in the memory location. If the pattern is not found the test fails.

FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining and Key Storage

FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall maintain a key chain of [*intermediate keys*] originating from [*one or more initial [selection: submask(s), recovery value(s)]*] to [*the final value returned to the endpoint*] using the following method(s): **[selection]**:

- utilization of the platform key storage
- utilization of platform key storage that performs key wrap with a TSF provided key
- implementation of key establishment as specified in FCS_CKM.2 (from the Base-PP)
- implementation of key derivation as specified in [FCS_KDF_EXT.1](#)
- implementation of key wrapping as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KW](#)
- implementation of key encryption as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KE](#)
- implementation of key combining as specified in [FCS_SMC_EXT.1](#)
- implementation of key transport as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KT](#)

] while maintaining an effective strength of commensurate with the strength of the FEK and **[selection]**:

- no supplemental key chains
- other supplemental key chains that protect a key or keys in the primary key chain using the following method(s): **[selection]**
 - utilization of the platform key storage

- utilization of platform key storage that performs key wrap with a *TSE* provided key
- implementation of key establishment as specified in *FCS_CKM.2* (from the *Base-PP*)
- implementation of key encryption as specified in *FCS_COP.1/KE*
- implementation of key transport as specified in *FCS_COP.1/KT*
- implementation of key wrapping as specified in *FCS_COP.1/KW*
- implementation of key derivation as specified in *FCS_KDF_EXT.1*
- implementation of key combining as specified in *FCS_SMC_EXT.1*

]

].

Application Note: Key Chaining is the method of using multiple layers of encryption keys to ultimately secure the a final key. The number of intermediate keys will vary. The *ST* Author should clearly indicate which portions of the key chain are created and maintained by the enterprise server and which are created and maintained by the endpoint. This requirement is in addition to the same requirement in the *PP-Module* for File Encryption, it covers a different section of the keychain, if both modules are included both requirements must be included.

Evaluation Activities

FCS_KYC_EXT.1

TSS

The evaluator shall verify the *TSS* contains a high-level description of the key sizes that it supports key outputs of no fewer 128 bits for products that support only AES128, and no fewer than 256 bits for products that support AES-256. The evaluator shall verify the *TSS* contains a description of the controls preventing a key from being provided to the endpoint before validation has occurred.

The evaluator shall verify the *TSS* includes a description of the key chain used to protect encryption keys associated with endpoints. The description of the key chains shall be reviewed to ensure it maintains a chain of keys using the methods listed in the *SFR*.

The evaluator shall ensure the chain of keys is maintained from the authorization factor or recovery value to the value returned to the endpoint. The evaluator shall examine the *TSS* to ensure that it describes how the key chain process functions, such that it does not expose any material that might compromise any key in the chain. This description must include a diagram illustrating the key chain implemented and detail where all keys and keying material is stored or what it is derived from. The evaluator shall examine the key chain to ensure that at no point the chain could be broken without a cryptographic exhaust, the initial authorization value, recovery value or a compromise of the *TOE* server and the effective strength of the keys are maintained throughout the key chain.

KMD

None.

Guidance

If there are configurations to enable or disable use of enterprise server, which modify the key chain, they shall be described. If there are configurations on to enable recovery mechanisms, they shall be

described.

Tests

None.

FCS_VAL_EXT.1/Admin Validation (Server Administrator)

FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1/Admin

The TSF shall perform validation of the [admin] by [selection]:

- *receiving assertion of the subject's validity from [assignment: Operational Environment component responsible for authentication]*
- *validating the [selection: submask, intermediate key] using the following methods: [selection]:*
 - *key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1/KW*
 - *hash the [selection: submask, intermediate key, FEK] as specified in FCS_COP.1/Hash (from AppPP) and compare it to a stored hash*
 - *decrypt a known value using the [selection: submask, intermediate key, FEK] as specified in FCS_COP.1/SKC (from AppPP) and compare it against a stored known value*

]

].

FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2/Admin

The TSF shall require validation of the [admin] prior to [permitting the actions described in [FMT_MTD.1.1](#) and [FMT_SMF.1.1/FEEM](#)].

Application Note: This PP-Module performs validation of any administrator credential on the management server, as described in [FIA_AUT_EXT.1.1](#), used to log in to the EM in accordance with this SFR.

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FCS_VAL_EXT.1/Admin](#)

TSS

Conditional:

If 'validating' is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it states which authorization factors support validation.

The evaluator shall also examine the TSS to ensure that it includes a high-level description of how how the submasks are validated. If multiple submasks are used within the TQE, the evaluator shall confirm that the TSS describes how each is validated (e.g., each submask validated before combining, once combined validation takes place).

Conditional:

If 'receiving assertion of the subject's validity' is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes the environments that can be leveraged with the TQE and how each claims to perform validation. The evaluator shall also ensure that none of the stated platform validation mechanisms weaken the key chain of the product.

KMD

None.

Guidance

If the validation functionality is configurable, the evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to ensure it describes how to configure the TOE to ensure the limits regarding validation attempts can be established.

Tests

There are no test activities for this requirement.

FCS_VAL_EXT.1/User Validation (User)

FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1/User

The TSF shall perform validation of the [user] by [selection]:

- receiving assertion of the subject's validity from [assignment: Operational Environment component responsible for authentication]
- validating the [selection: submask, intermediate key] using the following methods: [selection:
 - key wrap as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KW](#)
 - hash the [selection: submask, intermediate key, FEK] as specified in [FCS_COP.1/Hash \(from AppPPI\)](#) and compare it to a stored hash
 - decrypt a known value using the [selection: submask, intermediate key, FEK] as specified in [FCS_COP.1/SKC \(from AppPPI\)](#) and compare it against a stored known value

]

].

FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2/User

The TSF shall require validation of the [user] prior to [transmitting submasks, FEKs, or keys to decrypt FEKs to the endpoint].

Application Note: This references the validation of an endpoint user to the server. These activities are performed by the server.

Evaluation Activities

[FCS_VAL_EXT.1/User](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine which component of the Operational Environment is used to assert the User's identity.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine how the TOE responds to an assertion by the Operational Environment. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how validation is performed. The evaluator shall verify the TSS ensures that the validation process does not expose any material that might compromise key material or expose protected data.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to ensure it describes how to configure the TOE and Operational Environment to enable the QE to provide User identity assertions to the TOE.

(conditional) If the number of User authentication attempts is configurable in the TOE, the examiner shall examine the operational guidance to ensure it describes how to configure the TOE.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FCS_VAL_EXT.1/User:1: The evaluator shall determine the limit on the average rate of the number of consecutive failed authorization attempts. The evaluator will test the TOE by entering that number of incorrect authorization factors in consecutive attempts to access the protected data. If the limit mechanism includes any “lockout” period, the time period tested should include at least one such period. Then the evaluator will verify that the TOE behaves as described in the TSS.
- Test FCS_VAL_EXT.1/User:2: For each validated authorization factor, ensure that when the user provides an incorrect authorization factor, the TOE prevents FEKs or keys that decrypt FEKs from being forwarded to the endpoint.

FCS_VAL_EXT.2/User Validation Remediation (User)

FCS_VAL_EXT.2.1/User

The TSF shall [selection]:

- institute a delay such that only [assignment: ST author specified number or configurable range of] validation attempts can be made within a 24 hour period
 - block validation after [assignment: ST author specified number or configurable range of] consecutive failed validation attempts
 - [terminate the session] upon [assignment: ST author specified number or configurable range of] consecutive failed validation attempts
 - [[selection: direct the endpoint to perform key sanitization, perform key sanitization] of FEK(s) or an intermediate key] upon [assignment: ST specified number or configurable range of] consecutive failed validation attempts
-].

Evaluation Activities

[FCS_VAL_EXT.2/User](#)

TSS

This SFR is evaluated through the activities defined for [FCS_VAL_EXT.1/User](#).

KMD

None.

Guidance

This SFR is evaluated through the activities defined for [FCS_VAL_EXT.1/User](#).

Tests

This SFR is evaluated through the activities defined for [FCS_VAL_EXT.1/User](#).

5.2.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_AUT_EXT.1 Subject Authorization

FIA_AUT_EXT.1.1

The TSE shall [selection: receive assertion of the user's validity from: [assignment: Operational Environment component responsible for user authentication], provide authorization] based on [selection]:

- a password authorization factor conditioned as defined in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6](#)
- an external smart card factor that is at least the same bit-length as the EEK(s), and is protecting a submask that is [selection: generated by the TOE (using the RBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (from [\[AppPP\]](#)), generated by the platform] protected using asymmetric keys as defined in FCS_CKM.1.1/AK (from [\[AppPP\]](#)) with user presence proved by presentation of the smart card and [selection: no PIN, an QE defined PIN, a configurable PIN]
- an external USB token factor that is at least the same security strength as the EEK(s), and is providing a submask generated by the [selection: TOE, using the RBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (from [\[AppPP\]](#)), platform]

].

Application Note: This applies to the authorization of administrators on the enterprise server.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 is in the Application Software Protection Profile.

This requirement specifies what authorization factors the TOE accepts from the user. A password entered by the user is one authorization factor that the TOE must be able to condition, as specified in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6](#). Another option is a smart card authorization factor, with the differentiating feature being how the value is generated – either by the TOE's RBG or by the platform. An external USB token may also be used, with the submask value generated either by the TOE's RBG or by the platform.

The TOE may accept any number of authorization factors, and these are categorized as "submasks". The ST author selects the authorization factors they support, and there may be multiple methods for a selection.

Use of multiple authorization factors is preferable; if more than one authorization factor is used, the submasks produced must be combined using [FCS_SMC_EXT.1](#).

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FIA_AUT_EXT.1](#)

The evaluation activities for this component will be driven by the *ST* author. This section describes evaluation activities for all possible selections in an *ST*; it should be understood that if a capability is not selected in the *ST*, the noted assurance activity does not need to be performed.

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the *TSS* to ensure that it describes how user authentication is performed. The evaluator shall verify that the authorization methods listed in the *TSS* are specified and included in the requirements in the *ST*.

Requirement met by the TOE:

The evaluator shall first examine the *TSS* to ensure that the authorization factors specified in the *ST* are described. For password-based factors the examination of the *TSS* section is performed as part of [FCS_CKM_EXT.6 Evaluation Activities](#). Additionally in this case, the evaluator shall verify that the operational guidance discusses the characteristics of external authorization factors (e.g., how the authorization factor must be generated; format(s) or standards that the authorization factor must meet) that are able to be used by the *TOE*.

If other authorization factors are specified, then for each factor, the *TSS* specifies how the factors are input into the *TOE*.

Requirement met by the OE:

The evaluator shall examine the *TSS* to ensure a description is included for how the *TOE* is invoking the *OE* functionality and how it is getting an authorization value that has appropriate entropy.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance includes instructions for all of the authorization factors. The AGD will discuss the characteristics of external authorization factors (e.g., how the authorization factor is generated; format(s) or standards that the authorization factor must meet, configuration of the TPM device used) that are able to be used by the *TOE*.

Tests

The evaluator shall ensure that authorization using each selected method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the method as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that authorization is successful and that failure to provide an authorization factor results in denial to access to plaintext data.

[conditional]: If there is more than one authorization factor, ensure that failure to supply a required authorization factor does not result in access to the decrypted plaintext data.

FIA_REC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall [selection: provide the ability to enable and disable the use of recovery credentials, not support recovery].

FIA_REC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support the following recovery mechanisms [selection: Challenge Response Recovery as defined in [FIA_CHR_EXT.1](#), None].

Application Note: This requirement defines the recovery options supported between the endpoint(s) and the enterprise server. This does not prevent the QE from providing recovery if the QE is managing the authentication of the users.

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FIA_REC_EXT.1](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that types of supported recovery credential are specified.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation contains instructions for turning off the ability of the server to return a recovery credential.

Tests

The evaluator shall disable the ability of a server to return a recovery credential. The evaluator should then attempt to obtain the recovery credential and this should fail.

FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication

FIA_UAU.1.1

The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf of the **administrator** to be performed before the administrator is authenticated.

FIA_UAU.1.2

The TSF shall require each **administrator** to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that **administrator**.

Application Note: This requirement defines the timing of administrator capabilities on the enterprise server.

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FIA_UAU.1](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the list of actions that are performed on behalf of the administrator prior to login of the administrator. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the list of actions that require administrator authentication.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to determine that any necessary preparatory steps (e.g., establishing credential material such as pre- shared keys, tunnels, certificates, etc.) to logging in are described. For each supported login method, the evaluator shall ensure the guidance documentation provides clear instructions for successfully logging on. If configuration is necessary to ensure the services provided before login are limited, the evaluator shall determine that the guidance documentation provides sufficient instruction on limiting the allowed services.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- *Test FIA_UAU.1:1: The evaluator shall verify that the list of actions allowed without administrator login completes successfully without requiring administrator login and make sure this list is consistent with the TSS.*
- *Test FIA_UAU.1:2: The evaluator shall verify that attempting any other action requires successful entry of an administrator credential.*
- *Test FIA_UAU.1:3: The evaluator shall use the guidance documentation to configure the appropriate credential supported for the login method. For that credential/login method, the evaluator shall show that providing correct I&A information results in the ability to access the system, while providing incorrect information results in denial of access.*
- *Test FIA_UAU.1:4: The evaluator shall configure the services allowed (if any) according to the guidance documentation, and then determine the services available to an external remote entity. The evaluator shall determine that the list of services available is limited to those specified in the requirement.*

FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification

FIA_UID.1.1

The TSF shall allow [**assignment**: *list of TSF-mediated actions*] on behalf of the administrator to be performed before the **administrator** is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2

The TSF shall require each **administrator** to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that **administrator**.

Application Note: This requirement defines the timing of administrator capabilities on the enterprise server.

Evaluation Activities ▾

FIA_UID.1

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the list of actions that are performed on behalf of the administrator prior to identification of the administrator.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall examine the guidance documentation to determine that any necessary preparatory steps for creating and configuring administrator accounts are described.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- *Test FIA_UID.1:1: The evaluator shall verify that the list of actions allowed without administrator identification completes successfully without requiring the administrator to be identified and make sure this list is consistent with the TSS.*
- *Test FIA_UID.1:2: The evaluator shall verify that attempting any other action requires successful entry of an administrator account name and successful entry of the administrator account credential.*

5.2.3 Security Management (FMT)

FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour

FMT_MOF.1.1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of] the functions [selection: encryption algorithms used, key sizes used] to [selection: no users, [administrators]].

Application Note: The intent of this SFR is to define a mechanism to distinguish administrators (who have the ability to configure the TSF and its data) from users (individuals in the enterprise who have FEs on their systems).

The TSF does not need to provide roles that are explicitly called ‘administrator’ or ‘user’; the ST must logically define the administrator as a combination of one or more roles that are provided by the TOE. A user as defined by this PP-Module may be either a user that is specifically assigned an unprivileged role by the TSF or it may be characterized by an individual that lacks an administrator account on the TOE

The TSF may optionally provide the ability to rely on an external authentication mechanism to identify users in the case of a user requesting distribution of a recovery credential. In this situation, the TOE’s reliance on the Operational

Environment is functionally equivalent to the TSF maintaining the user role as defined by [FMT_SMR.2.1](#).

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FMT_MOF.1](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine that the TSS details how Administrators are authenticated and identified by all TOE components. The evaluator shall examine that authentication and identification of Administrators cannot be compromised for any TOE component in this case.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall review the guidance documentation to ensure that it contains instructions for administering the TOE both locally and remotely, including any configuration that needs to be performed on the client for remote administration.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

In the course of performing the testing activities for the evaluation, the evaluator shall use all supported interfaces, although it is not necessary to repeat each test involving an administrative action with each interface. The evaluator shall ensure, however, that each supported method of administering the TOE that conforms to the requirements of this PP-Module be tested; for instance, if the TOE can be administered through a local hardware interface, SSH, and TLS/HTTPS, then all three methods of administration must be exercised during the evaluation team's test activities.

FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data

FMT_MTD.1.1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to [**selection**: *change default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]*] the [**encryption keys and intermediate values**] to [**administrators**] **at the following times**: [**selection**: *never, during initial provisioning, during recovery*].

Application Note: These restrictions apply to modifications on the enterprise server.

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FMT_MTD.1](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that, for each administrative function identified in the guidance documentation; those that are available to the administrator are identified. For each of these functions, the evaluator shall also confirm that the TSS details when changes may be made to

the encryption keys and/or intermediate values.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall verify that the guidance document describes what operations on the encryption keys and intermediate values are allowed to the administrator at what times.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- *Test FMT_MTD.1:1: The evaluator shall try to perform at least one of the related actions without prior authentication as administrator (either by authentication as a user with no administrator privileges or without user authentication at all – depending on the configuration of the TOE). This test should fail.*
- *Test FMT_MTD.1:2: The evaluator shall try to perform at least one of the related actions with prior authentication as administrator. This test should pass.*
- *Test FMT_MTD.1:3: The evaluator shall try to perform at least one of the actions at the times that are not permitted. This test should fail.*
- *Test FMT_MTD.1:4: The evaluator shall try to perform at least one of the actions at the times are permitted. This test should pass.*

FMT_SMF.1/FEEM Specification of Management Functions (Management Server)

FMT_SMF.1.1/FEEM

*The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[selection:*

- *register new user*
- *revoke registration of user*
- *initiate key generation*
- *initiate keying escrow*
- *initiate key zeroization*
- *initiate key recovery*
- *set encryption policy (supported algorithms and key sizes)*
- *change administrator passwords*
- *change user passwords*
- *change recovery credentials*
- *define administrators of the TOE*
- *enable/disable use of recovery credential*
- *configure number of failed authentication attempts before issuing a key destruction of the F.E.K(s)*
- *configure the number of authentication attempts that can be made within a 24 hour period*
- *configure the number of failed authentication attempts required to begin blocking subsequent attempts*
- *ability to enable or disable one or more of the following functions:
[selection: configure cryptographic functionality, change authentication*

factors, perform a cryptographic erase of the data by the destruction of FEKs or KEKs protecting the FEKs, configure the number of failed validation attempts required to trigger corrective behavior, configure the corrective behavior to issue in the event of an excessive number of failed validation attempts, [assignment: other management functions provided by the TSF]]

].

Application Note: This SFR refers specifically to the management functions that can be performed by the Management Server. Functions that are performed by the rest of the TOE are addressed by the FMT_SMF.1/FEEM SFR in the File Encryption PP-Module. The final two assignments provide the ST author the ability to indicate when the PP-Module for File Encryption functionality (such as configuration of power saving states) can be configured by the Management Server.

The TSF's ability to initiate key generation, escrow, zeroization, and/or recovery may be accomplished either by the TOE performing those functions or by the TOE issuing a request to a remote client to perform the functions. The ST author must indicate which case is provided by the TSF. If the TOE performs any of the cryptographic functions that are selected as being initiated in this SFR, the ST author must include the equivalent FCS SFRs from the File Encryption PP-Module as part of the TOE, specifically indicating that these functions are provided by the Management Server component of the TOE.

If the TSF supports the use of a recovery credential, the ST author must include the 'enable/disable use of recovery credential' selection.

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FMT_SMF.1/FEEM](#)

[TSS](#)

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes which of the selections are provided by the TOE. Additionally, the TSS shall describe which of the configurable selections can be disabled on the Enterprise Management Server. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it describes whether the TOE provides the ability to initiate key generation, escrow, zeroization and/or recovery or whether it requests the client to perform those functions.

[KMD](#)

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall examine the Guidance Documents to ensure that, if supported, configuration of the following options is described, including any reliance on the Operational Environment if applicable:

- *Register new user*
- *Revoke registration of an user*
- *Initiate key generation*
- *Initiate keying escrow*
- *Initiate key recovery*
- *Initiate key zeroization*

- Set encryption policy (supported algorithms and key sizes)
- Change Administrator passwords
- Change user passwords
- Change Recovery Credentials
- Define Administrators of the *TOE*
- Enable/Disable the use of recovery credentials (end users)
- Configure the number of failed authentication attempts before issuing a key destruction of the FEK(s)
- Configure the number of authentication attempts that can be made in a 24 hour period
- Configure the number of failed authentication attempts required to begin blocking subsequent attempts
- The ability to enable/disable one or more functions defined in the *PP-Module* for File Encryption
- The ability to authorize whether or not users can perform one or more of the functions in the File Encryption *PP-Module*.
- ability to enable or disable one or more of the following functions (configure cryptographic functionality, change authentication factors, perform a cryptograph erase of the data by the destruction of FEKs or KEKs protecting the FEKs, configure the number of failed validation attempts required to trigger corrective behavior, configure the corrective behavior to issue in the event of an excessive number of failed validation attempts, [other management functions provided by the *TSF*])
- ability to perform one or more of the following functions (configure cryptographic functionality, change authentication factors, perform a cryptograph erase of the data by the destruction of FEKs or KEKs protecting the FEKs, configure the number of failed validation attempts required to trigger corrective behavior, configure the corrective behavior to issue in the event of an excessive number of failed validation attempts, [other management functions provided by the *TSF*])
- ability to authorize whether or not users can perform one or more of the following functions (configure cryptographic functionality, change authentication factors, perform a cryptograph erase of the data by the destruction of FEKs or KEKs protecting the FEKs, configure the number of failed validation attempts required to trigger corrective behavior, configure the corrective behavior to issue in the event of an excessive number of failed validation attempts, [other management functions provided by the *TSF*])

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests for each claimed management function:

- Test FMT_SMF.1/FEEM:1: The evaluator shall configure the management server and two users according to the guidance documents. The evaluator shall register the users with the management server. The evaluator shall verify that the users are identified by the management server as defined in the guidance documents. This test shall pass.
- Test FMT_SMF.1/FEEM:2: The evaluator shall disconnect the second user from the network. The evaluator shall revoke the registration of the second user in the management server. The evaluator shall attempt to connect the second user to the network and verify the endpoint fails to connect or is displayed as revoked in the console.
- Test FMT_SMF.1/FEEM:3: The evaluator shall verify that the *TOE* performs the actions (e.g. generate key) and sends the result to the user's client. The user's client shall perform the actions necessary to accept the updated configuration (e.g. encrypt the data with the new key, update the encryption algorithm key size or mode and re-encrypt).
- Test FMT_SMF.1/FEEM:4: For each item that is initiated by the *TOE* but performed on the endpoint, the evaluator shall verify that the *TOE* requests the user's client to perform the action (generate a key and encrypt the data, zeroize a key).
- Test FMT_SMF.1/FEEM:5: For each method of changing a credential, the evaluator shall first provision the initial authorization factor(s) in the Enterprise Server, and then verify all authorization values supported allow the user access to the encrypted data on the user's

client. Then the evaluator shall exercise the management functions to change the authorization factor values to a new one on the Enterprise Server. Then he or she will verify that the user's client denies access to the user's encrypted data when he or she uses the old or original authorization factor values to gain access.

- Test FMT_SMF.1/FEEM:6: The evaluator shall add two administrators to the administrator group in the Enterprise Server and provision authorization factor(s) for each administrator. The evaluator shall verify that both administrators can log into the Enterprise Server using the provided authorization factors. The evaluator shall then exercise the management functions to change the authorization factor values for the first administrator to a new one on the Enterprise Server. Then he or she will verify that the Enterprise Server denies the first administrator access to the Management Console when the first administrator logs in with the old or original authorization factor to gain access. The evaluator shall also verify that the second administrator is still able to log in to the Enterprise Server with their original authorization factor.
- Test FMT_SMF.1/FEEM:7: The evaluator shall verify that an administrator can configure each of the supported authorization factors attempts limits and shall verify that the user is denied access after surpassing that limit.
- Test FMT_SMF.1/FEEM:8: If the TOE provides the capability to disable management of any capability allowed in the EM PP-Module, the evaluator shall devise a test that ensures that each capability which can be disabled has been or can be disabled following guidance provided by the vendor.
- Test FMT_SMF.1/FEEM:9: If the TOE provides the capability to manage capabilities in place of the File Encryption Clients, where those administrative capabilities are then disabled in the File Encryption Clients, the evaluator shall devise a test that ensures that each capability which can be disabled in the File Encryption Clients and can be subsequently managed by the EM is tested as follows: Disable the administrative capability in a File Encryption Client and enable it in the EM. Verify that the administration of the capability in the EM is successful.
- Test FMT_SMF.1/FEEM:10: The evaluator shall verify the encryption policy enforcement by changing the permitted algorithms and verifying the changes take place.

FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles

FMT_SMR.2.1

The TSF shall maintain the roles [administrator, user].

FMT_SMR.2.2

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_SMR.2.3

The TSF shall ensure that the conditions **[selection: the administrator role shall be able to administer the Management Server locally , the administrator role shall be able to administer the Management Server remotely as specified in FTP_TRP.1, the administrator role shall be able to administer the endpoint(s) locally, the administrator role shall be able to administer the endpoint(s) remotely]** are satisfied.

Application Note: The intent of this SFR is to define a mechanism to distinguish administrators (who have the ability to configure the TSF and its data) from users (individuals in the enterprise who have FEs on their systems).

The TSF does not need to provide roles that are explicitly called 'administrator' or 'user'; the ST must logically define the administrator as a combination of one or more roles that are provided by the TOE. A user as defined by this PP-Module may

be either a user that is specifically assigned an unprivileged role by the TSF or it may be characterized by an individual that lacks an administrator account on the TOE.

The TSF may optionally provide the ability to rely on an external authentication mechanism to identify users in the case of a user requesting distribution of a recovery credential. In this situation, the TOE's reliance on the Operational Environment is functionally equivalent to the TSF maintaining the user role as defined by [FMT_SMR.2.1](#).

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FMT_SMR.2](#)

TSS

Refer to the evaluation activities for [FMT_MOF.1](#).

Guidance

Refer to the evaluation activities for [FMT_MOF.1](#).

Tests

Refer to the evaluation activities for [FMT_MOF.1](#).

5.2.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

FPT_ITT.1.1

The TSF shall protect TSF data from [*disclosure, modification*] when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE through the use of **[selection: IPsec as defined in the PP-Module for VPN Client, HTTPS in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 (from [AppPP]), TLS as defined in the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 2.1, SSH as defined in the Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), version 2.0]**].

Application Note: This SFR is intended to define protected communications between the Management Server and the endpoints.

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FPT_ITT.1](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that, for all communications between components of a distributed TOE, each communications mechanism is identified in terms of the allowed protocols and intra-TOE configurations for that IT entity. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS for these inter-component communications are specified and included in the requirements in the ST.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation contains instructions for establishing the relevant allowed communication channels and protocols between each pair of authorized TOE components, and that it contains instructions to reestablish a connection should a connection be unintentionally broken.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FPT_ITT.1:1: The evaluator shall ensure that communications using each supported protocol between each pair of authorized TOE components is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the guidance documentation and ensuring that communication is successful.
- Test FPT_ITT.1:2: The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with an endpoint or server, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.
- Test FPT_ITT.1:3: The evaluator shall, for each protocol associated with each authorized IT entity tested during Test 1, physically interrupt the connection. The evaluator shall ensure that when physical connectivity is restored, communications are appropriately protected.

Further evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols.

FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Protection of Keys and Key Material

FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall store keys in non-volatile memory only when [selection]:

- wrapped, as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KW](#)
- encrypted, as specified in [FCS_COP.1/SKC](#) (from [\[AppPP\]](#))
- the plaintext key is stored in the underlying platform's keystore as specified by [FCS_STO_EXT.1](#) ([from \[AppPP\]](#))
- the plaintext key is stored in a SQL database in the Operational Environment
- the plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in [FCS_KYC_EXT.1](#).
- the plaintext key will no longer provide access to the encrypted data after initial provisioning
- the plaintext key is a key split that is combined as specified in [FCS_SMC_EXT.1](#) and another contribution to the split is [selection: wrapped as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KW](#), derived and not stored in non-volatile memory]
- the plaintext key is stored on an external storage device for use as an authorization factor.
- the plaintext key is used to wrap a key as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KW](#) that is already wrapped as specified in [FCS_COP.1/KW](#)

].

Application Note: This details the key storage requirements for the enterprise server. The plaintext key storage in non-volatile memory is allowed for several reasons. If the keys exist within protected memory that is not user accessible on the TOE or OE, the only methods that allow it to play a security relevant role for

protecting the FEK is if it is a key split or providing additional layers of wrapping or encryption on keys that have already been protected.

Evaluation Activities ▾

FPT_KYP_EXT.1

TSS

The evaluator shall verify the TSS for a high level description of the method(s) used to protect keys stored in non-volatile memory.

KMD

The evaluator shall verify the KMD to ensure it describes the storage location of all keys and the protection of all keys stored in non-volatile memory. The description of the key chain shall be reviewed to ensure FCS_COP.1/KW is followed for the storage of wrapped or encrypted keys in non-volatile memory and plaintext keys in non-volatile memory meet one of the criteria for storage.

Guidance

None.

Tests

None.

FPT_KYP_EXT.2 Attribution of Key and Key Material

FPT_KYP_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall maintain an association between stored endpoint keys and user identity, [selection: remote endpoints, recovery credential, system identity, no other subjects].

Application Note: The intent of this SFR is that at minimum, keys are associated with the users for which it was explicitly created by the TSE. If the TOE has the ability to maintain an association to keys for a user, this SFR is intended to require an association between the key chain and a user through the user account name(s) that are authorized to use it.

Likewise, if the TOE supports the use of a recovery credential, this SFR is intended to require an association between user and the recovery credential used to recover that data.

FPT_KYP_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide the ability to register users by exchange of [assignment: mutually identifying information that allows for an association to be made].

Application Note: The ST author will complete the assignment with information on the method used by the Management Server portion of the TOE to establish the association with the endpoint portion of the TOE described in FPT_KYP_EXT.2.1.

FPT_KYP_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall provide the ability to revoke the registration of users by [**assignment**: *method of removing and/or exchanging information that prevents further communications between the TOE and the endpoint*].

FPT_KYP_EXT.2.4

The TSF shall transmit any secure or private cryptographic information that is transferred between the TOE and a user's endpoint in order to establish or disestablish an association using a communications channel with a security strength at least as great as the strength of the information being transmitted.

Application Note: The channel used to transmit this data is defined in [FPT_ITT.1](#).

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FPT_KYP_EXT.2](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes the method by which an association is maintained and verify it matches the selections.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall verify the guidance documentation provides instructions on how to configure the association, if any configuration is necessary.

Tests

For each method of association, the evaluator shall change the configuration so that the associate is broken and verify that enterprise functions do not work.

5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each SFR for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to address the specified threats:

Table 2: SFR Rationale

Threat	Addressed by	Rationale
T.KEYING_MATERIAL_COMPROMISE_SERVER	FCS_CKM.1/SK (from <u>Base-PP</u>)	Mitigates the threat by securely generating symmetric encryption keys.
	FCS_CKM.1 (from <u>Base-PP</u>)	Mitigates the threat by securely generating asymmetric encryption keys.

	FCS_CKM.2 (from Base-PP)	Mitigates the threat by securely establishing cryptographic keys between entities.
	FCS_IV_EXT.1	Mitigates the threat by securely and unpredictably generating IVs.
	FTP_DIT_EXT.1 (modified from Base-PP)	Mitigates the threat by encrypting data transmitted to an external entity.
	FCS_CKM.6	Mitigates the threat by securely destroying keys and key material when no longer needed.
	FCS_KYC_EXT.1	Mitigates the threat by securely storing keys & key chain material.
	FPT_KYP_EXT.1	Mitigates the threat by limiting the situations in which plaintext keys may be stored, and storing the keys protected in all other situations.
	FIA_AUT_EXT.1	Mitigates the threat by authorizing a user based on a secure credential.
	FMT_MOF.1	Mitigates the threat by restricting the ability to manage encryption parameters to administrators.
	FMT_SMF.1/FEEM	Mitigates the threat by restricting the ability to manage the Management Server to administrators.
	FPT_ITT.1	Mitigates the threat by protecting data transmitted within different parts of the TOE.
	FCS_COP.1/KW (selection-based)	Mitigates the threat by securely wrapping cryptographic keys using a cryptographic algorithm.
	FCS_COP.1/KT (selection-based)	Mitigates the threat by securely transmitting keys using a cryptographic algorithm.
	FCS_KDF_EXT.1 (selection-based)	Mitigates the threat by securely deriving cryptographic keys.
	FCS_SMC_EXT.1 (selection-based)	Mitigates the threat by securely generating intermediate keys by combining submasks.
T.MAN_IN_THE_MIDDLE	FTP_DIT_EXT.1 (modified from Base-PP)	Mitigates the threat by encrypting sensitive or all data transmitted to an external entity.
	FCS_CKM.1 (from Base-PP)	Mitigates the threat by securely generating asymmetric encryption keys.
	FCS_COP.1/SKC (from Base-PP)	Mitigates the threat by utilizing symmetric encryption in communications between

		servers and clients.
	FCS_COP.1/Sig (from Base-PP)	Mitigates the threat by cryptographically signing communications between servers and clients.
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (from Base-PP)"	Mitigates the threat by using a secure RBG to support secure communication.
	FIA_X509_EXT.1 (from Base-PP)"	Mitigates the threat by preventing connection to servers or clients with malformed or invalid X.509 certificates.
	FIA_X509_EXT.2 (from Base-PP)	Mitigates the threat by authenticating entities using X.509 certificates.
	FPT_ITT.1	Mitigates the threat by encrypting data transmitted between different parts of the TOE.
	FCS_CKM_EXT.6 (selection-based)	Mitigates the threat by conditioning passwords or other credentials to an unreadable form.
	FTP_TRP.1 (selection-based)	Mitigates the threat by protecting communication with an appropriate secure protocol.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS	FCS_VAL_EXT.1/Admin	Mitigates the threat by validating the administrator before allowing any administrative actions.
	FIA_UAU.1	Mitigates the threat by limiting the administrative actions that can be taken before the authentication process must succeed.
	FIA_UID.1	Mitigates the threat by limiting the administrative actions that can be taken before the identification process must succeed.
	FCS_VAL_EXT.2/Admin (selection-based)	Mitigates the threat by preventing excessive unsuccessful validation attempts.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS_ENDPOINT	FPT_KYP_EXT.2	Mitigates the threat by associating keys to user identities and providing a method for revocation of the association.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS_SERVER	FCS_COP.1/SKC (from Base-PP)	Mitigates the threat by identifying users with a securely-encrypted value.
	FIA_X509_EXT.1 (from Base-PP)	Mitigates the threat by preventing connection to servers or clients with malformed or invalid X.509 certificates.
	FIA_X509_EXT.2 (from Base-PP)	Mitigates the threat by authenticating a remote entity using X.509 certificates.

FCS_VAL_EXT.1/User	Mitigates the threat by validating the user before decryption of any data or key.
FCS_VAL_EXT.2/User	Mitigates the threat by preventing excessive unsuccessful validation attempts.
FIA_REC_EXT.1	Mitigates the threat by providing a secure recovery mechanism.
FIA_UAU.1	Mitigates the threat by limiting the administrative actions that can be taken before the authentication process must succeed.
FIA_UID.1	Mitigates the threat by limiting the administrative actions that can be taken before the identification process must succeed.
FMT_MTD.1	Mitigates the threat by restricting the times at which certain cryptographic parameters can be modified on the server.
FMT_SMR.2	Mitigates the threat by maintaining separate security roles for administrators and users.
FIA_CHR_EXT.1 (selection-based)	Mitigates the threat by providing a limited-time and limited-scope challenge-response recovery credential.

6 Consistency Rationale

6.1 Protection Profile for Application Software

6.1.1 Consistency of TOE Type

When this PP-Module is used to extend the App PP, the TOE type for the overall TOE is still a software application. The TOE boundary is simply extended to include the enterprise management functionality for software file encryption that the application performs.

6.1.2 Consistency of Security Problem Definition

Table 3: Consistency of Security Problem Definition (App PP base)

PP-Module Threat, Assumption, OSP	Consistency Rationale
T.KEYING_MATERIAL_COMPROMISE_SERVER	This threat is a specific example of T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS defined in the Base-PP. Specifically, this PP-Module defines a method of maliciously gaining access to sensitive data at rest that is particular to the technology type of this PP-Module.
T.MAN_IN_THE_MIDDLE	This threat is a specific example of T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP defined in the Base-PP. Specifically, the attacker performs network eavesdropping to gain access to key data in transit between TOE components.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS	This threat is a variation on T.LOCAL_ATTACK defined in the Base-PP. The Base-PP does not define access-controlled management functions so this PP-Module goes beyond it by specifying misuse of the management interface as a threat to the TSF.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS	This threat is a variation on T.NETWORK_ATTACK and T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP defined in the Base-PP. The threat of untrusted communication channels allows for exploitation of the TSF in different ways, depending on how the lack of trust is manifested.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS_ENDPOINT	This threat is a variation on T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS defined in the Base-PP. In this case, the "sensitive data at rest" is the data that the TOE is intended to protect.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_DATA_ACCESS_SERVER	This threat is a variation on T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS defined in the Base-PP. In this case, the "sensitive data at rest" is the data that the TOE is intended to protect.
A.ENVIRONMENTAL_STORAGE	

A.PHYSICAL_SERVER

A.SECURED_CONFIGURATION

A.SECURED_ENVIRONMENT

6.1.3 Consistency of OE Objectives

Table 4: Consistency of OE Objectives (App PP base)

PP-Module OE Objective	Consistency Rationale
OE.ENVIRONMENTAL_STORAGE	This objective is consistent with the Base-PP because the Base-PP allows for the TOE to use platform-provided key storage.
OE.PHYSICAL_SERVER	This objective is consistent with the Base-PP because it is an extension of the Base-PP's OE.PLATFORM objective that is specific to this technology type. It is also consistent because the Base-PP permits the TSF to use platform-provided cryptography.
OE.SECURED_CONFIGURATION	This objective is consistent with the Base-PP because it expects the TOE's operational guidance to be responsibly followed in the same manner as OE.PROPER_ADMIN in the Base-PP.
OE.SECURED_ENVIRONMENT	This objective is consistent with the Base-PP because it is an extension of the Base-PP's OE.PLATFORM objective that is specific to this technology type.

6.1.4 Consistency of Requirements

This PP-Module identifies several SFRs from the App PP that are needed to support File Encryption Enterprise Management functionality. This is considered to be consistent because the functionality provided by the App PP is being used for its intended purpose. The rationale for why this does not conflict with the claims defined by the App PP are as follows:

Table 5: Consistency of Requirements (App PP base)

PP-Module Requirement	Consistency Rationale
Modified SFRs	
FTP_DIT_EXT.1	This SFR is defined in the Base-PP. This PP-Module modifies it by removing the option not to transmit sensitive data because this particular TOE type will always have that capability. It is still consistent with the Base-PP because all selections that the ST author is permitted to make are available options in the Base-PP version of the SFR.
Additional SFRs	
	This PP-Module does not add any requirements when the App PP is the base.
Mandatory SFRs	
FCS_CKM.6	This SFR requires destruction of cryptographic keys when they are no longer needed. The Base-PP does not mandate key destruction but it also does not prohibit

it.

FCS_KYC_EXT.1	The Base-PP defines how stored keys are protected. This SFR extends that functionality by defining the logical hierarchy of how keys are logically protected by other keys or other secret data.
FCS_VAL_EXT.1/Admin	This SFR goes beyond the functionality defined by the Base-PP by defining a method by which the TSF can validate the correctness of data input to it.
FCS_VAL_EXT.1/User	This SFR goes beyond the functionality defined by the Base-PP by defining a method by which the TSF can validate the correctness of data input to it.
FCS_VAL_EXT.2/User	This SFR goes beyond the functionality defined by the Base-PP by defining a method by which the TSF can take security-relevant action if some data input to it is invalid.
FIA_AUT_EXT.1	This SFR defines how administrator requests to access protected data are authorized. It uses FCS_RBG_EXT.1 from the Base-PP in a manner consistent with its definition, but otherwise does not relate to functionality defined by the Base-PP .
FIA_REC_EXT.1	This SFR defines the TOE 's potential support for recovery credentials. This functionality does not relate to any behavior defined in the Base-PP .
FIA_UAU.1	This SFR requires administrators to be authenticated prior to accessing management functionality. The Base-PP does not mandate identification and authentication measures for a management interface but it also does not prohibit them.
FIA_UID.1	This SFR requires administrators to be identified prior to accessing management functionality. The Base-PP does not mandate identification and authentication measures for a management interface but it also does not prohibit them.
FMT_MOF.1	This SFR defines access restrictions for TOE management functions. This is not defined in the Base-PP but there is nothing in the Base-PP that prohibits it.
FMT_MTD.1	This SFR defines access restrictions for management of TSF data. This is not defined in the Base-PP but there is nothing in the Base-PP that prohibits it.
FMT_SMF.1/FEEM	This SFR defines management functions for the TOE for functionality specific to this PP-Module . These functions are defined in addition to what the Base-PP defines for its own operation.
FMT_SMR.2	This SFR defines administrative roles, which are used by other SFRs to derive privileges to interact with the TOE 's management functionality. This is not defined in the Base-PP but there is nothing in the Base-PP that prohibits it.
FPT_ITT.1	This SFR uses a subset of the protocols defined in the Base-PP for secure communications. This PP-Module extends the functionality by explicitly defining a communications channel where both endpoints are TOE components.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1	The Base-PP defines an SFR for secure storage of sensitive data. This SFR expands on that definition by describing the supported logical methods for storage of key data.

FPT_KYP_EXT.2	This SFR relates to key attribution such that stored keys can be associated with the users that 'own' them. This does not relate to functionality that is defined in the Base-PP so it does not interfere with the implementation of any Base-PP SFRs.
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Optional SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any Optional requirements.

Objective SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any Objective requirements.

Implementation-dependent SFRs

This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-dependent requirements.

Selection-based SFRs

FCS_COP.1/KT	This SFR defines key transport functionality that is outside the scope of the original cryptographic operations defined in the Base-PP.
FCS_COP.1/KW	This SFR defines usage of AES functionality not defined by the Base-PP. However, this functionality is only used in certain situations that are specific to this PP-Module and do not affect the ability of any Base-PP SFRs to be enforced.
FCS_CKM_EXT.6	This SFR defines a key derivation method based on passphrase conditioning. It uses the FCS_RBG_EXT.1 SFR from the Base-PP in its intended manner but otherwise does not relate to the Base-PP's functionality.
FCS_KDF_EXT.1	This SFR defines key transport functionality. It uses random bit generation and keyed-hash message authentication functionality from the Base-PP as they are intended but is otherwise outside the scope of the original cryptographic operations defined in the Base-PP.
FCS_SMC_EXT.1	This SFR relates to submask combining as a method of generating intermediate keys. Key hierarchy functionality is outside the scope of the Base-PP.
FCS_VAL_EXT.2/Admin	This SFR goes beyond the functionality defined by the Base-PP by defining a method by which the TSF can take security-relevant action if some data input to it is invalid.
FIA_CHR_EXT.1	This SFR defines the TOE's implementation of recovery credentials. This functionality does not relate to any behavior defined in the Base-PP.
FTP_TRP.1	This SFR uses a subset of the protocols defined in the Base-PP for secure communications. This PP-Module extends the functionality by explicitly defining a communications path between a remote administrator and the TOE.

Appendix A - Optional SFRs

A.1 Strictly Optional Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Strictly Optional SFRs or SARs.

A.2 Objective Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Objective SFRs.

A.3 Implementation-dependent Requirements

This PP-Module does not define any Implementation-dependent SFRs.

Appendix B - Selection-based Requirements

B.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_COP.1/KT Cryptographic operation (Key Transport)

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1.

FCS_COP.1.1/KT

The ~~TSF~~ shall perform [key transport] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **[selection]**:

- CNSA 2.0 Compliant Algorithms:
 - [Hybrid Key-Transport Method] that meets the following: [Section 9.3 of NIST SP 800-56B, Revision 2] **using a key establishment algorithm [ML-KEM] as specified in FCS_CKM.2 (from the Base-PP) and a key wrapping algorithm as specified in FCS_COP.1/KW**
- CNSA 1.0 Compliant Algorithms:
 - [KTS-OAEP] using cryptographic algorithm [RSA] with cryptographic key sizes **[selection: 3072, 4096] bits that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-56B, Revision 2]**

].

Application Note: This requirement is used in the body of the ~~ST~~ if the ~~ST~~ author chooses to use key transport in the key chaining approach that is specified in [FCS_KYC_EXT.1](#).

When describing the hybrid key-transport methods, Section 9.3 of NIST SP 800-56B only mentions using the key establishment schemes contained in SP800-56B to establish a shared symmetric key encryption key (KEK) for the transport; however any approved symmetric key establishment method could easily be substituted. This ~~PP-Module~~ allows the use of ML-KEM key establishment schemes with the hybrid key-transport methods described in SP800-56B to provide a CNSA2-compliant key-transport method.

Evaluation Activities

[FCS_COP.1/KT](#)

Tests

For each supported key transport schema, the evaluator shall initiate at least 25 sessions that require key transport with an independently developed remote instance of a key transport entity, using known RSA key-pairs. The evaluator shall observe traffic passed from the sender-side and to the receiver-side of the ~~TQE~~, and shall perform the following tests, specific to which key transport

scheme was employed.

- Test FCS_COP.1/KT:1: The evaluator shall inspect each cipher text, C , produced by the RSA-OAEP encryption operation of the ~~TOE~~ and make sure it is the correct length, either 256 or 384 bytes depending on RSA key size. The evaluator shall also feed into the ~~TOE~~'s RSA-OEAP decryption operation some cipher texts that are the wrong length and verify that the erroneous input is detected and that the decryption operation exits with an error code.
- Test FCS_COP.1/KT:2: The evaluator shall convert each cipher text, C , produced by the RSA-OAEP encryption operation of the ~~TOE~~ to the correct cipher text integer, c , and use the decryption primitive to compute $em = RSADP((n,d),c)$ and convert em to the encoded message EM . The evaluator shall then check that the first byte of EM is $0x00$. The evaluator shall also feed into the ~~TOE~~'s RSA-OEAP decryption operation some cipher texts where the first byte of EM was set to a value other than $0x00$, and verify that the erroneous input is detected and that the decryption operation exits with an error code.
- Test FCS_COP.1/KT:3: The evaluator shall decrypt each cipher text, C , produced by the RSA-OAEP encryption operation of the ~~TOE~~ using RSADP, and perform the OAEP decoding operation (described in NIST SP 800-56B section 7.2.2.4) to recover $HA' \parallel X$. For each HA' , the evaluator shall take the corresponding A and the specified hash algorithm and verify that $HA' = \text{Hash}(A)$. The evaluator shall also force the ~~TOE~~ to perform some RSA-OAEP decryption where the A value is passed incorrectly, and the evaluator shall verify that an error is detected.
- Test FCS_COP.1/KT:4: The evaluator shall check the format of the ' X ' string recovered in OAEP.Test.3 to ensure that the format is of the form $PS \parallel 01 \parallel K$, where PS consists of zero or more consecutive $0x00$ bytes and K is the transported keying material. The evaluator shall also feed into the ~~TOE~~'s RSA-OEAP decryption operation some cipher texts for which the resulting ' X ' strings do not have the correct format (i.e., the leftmost non-zero byte is not $0x01$). These incorrectly formatted ' X ' variables shall be detected by the RSA-OEAP decrypt function.
- Test FCS_COP.1/KT:5: The evaluator shall trigger all detectable decryption errors and validate that the returned error codes are the same and that no information is given back to the sender on which type of error occurred. The evaluator shall also validate that no intermediate results from the ~~TOE~~'s receiver-side operations are revealed to the sender.

FCS_COP.1/KW Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping)

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1](#), [FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1/Admin](#), [FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1/User](#).

FCS_COP.1.1/KW

The ~~TSF~~ shall perform [[selection: use platform-provided functionality to perform Key Wrapping, implement functionality to perform Key Wrapping]] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES] in the following mode [selection:

- Key Wrap
- Key Wrap with Padding
- GCM mode
- CCM mode

]] and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits (AES)] that meet the following: [[selection:

- “NIST SP 800-38C”
- “NIST SP 800-38D”

- “NIST SP 800-38F”
 - “NIST SP 800-38A”
-]].

Application Note: This applies to any key wrapping occurring on the enterprise server. This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to use key wrapping in the key chaining approach that is specified in [FCS_KYC_EXT.1](#), key wrap in the admin validation approach that is specified in [FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1/Admin](#), or key wrap in the user validation approach that is specified in [FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1/User](#).

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FCS_COP.1/KW](#)

TSS

Conditional: If use platform provided functionality was selected, then the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes how the FEK encryption/decryption is invoked.

Conditional: If implement functionality was selected, the evaluator shall check that the TSS includes a description of encryption function(s) used for key wrapping. The evaluator should check that this description of the selected encryption function includes the key sizes and modes of operations as specified in the selections above. The evaluator shall check that the TSS describes the means by which the TOE satisfies constraints on algorithm parameters included in the selections made for ‘cryptographic algorithm’ and ‘list of standards’.

The evaluator shall verify the TSS includes a description of the key wrap function(s) and shall verify the key wrap uses an approved key wrap algorithm according to the appropriate specification.

KMD

The evaluator shall review the KMD to ensure that all keys are wrapped using the approved method and a description of when the key wrapping occurs.

Guidance

If multiple encryption modes are supported, the evaluator examines the guidance documentation to determine that the method of choosing a specific mode/key size is described.

Tests

The assurance activity tests specified for AES in GCM mode in the underlying [AppPP] shall be performed in the case that "GCM" is selected in the requirement.

The assurance activity tests specified for AES in CBC mode in the underlying [AppPP] shall be performed in the case that "CBC" is selected in the requirement.

AES Key Wrap (AES-KW) and Key Wrap with Padding (AES-KWP) Test

The evaluator will test the authenticated encryption functionality of AES-KW for EACH combination of the following input parameter lengths:

- 128 and 256 bit key encryption keys (KEKs)

- Three plaintext lengths. One of the plaintext lengths shall be two semi-blocks (128 bits). One of the plaintext lengths shall be three semi-blocks (192 bits). The third data unit length shall be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 64 semi-blocks (4096 bits).

using a set of 100 key and plaintext pairs and obtain the ciphertext that results from AES-KW authenticated encryption. To determine correctness, the evaluator will use the AES-KW authenticated-encryption function of a known good implementation.

The evaluator will test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KW using the same test as for authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KW authenticated-encryption with AES-KW authenticated-decryption.

The evaluator will test the authenticated-encryption functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KW authenticated-encryption with the following change in the three plaintext lengths:

- One plaintext length shall be one octet. One plaintext length shall be 20 octets (160 bits).
- One plaintext length shall be the longest supported plaintext length less than or equal to 512 octets (4096 bits).

The evaluator will test the authenticated-decryption functionality of AES-KWP using the same test as for AES-KWP authenticated-encryption, replacing plaintext values with ciphertext values and AES-KWP authenticated-encryption with AES-KWP authenticated-decryption.

AES-CCM Tests

It is not recommended that evaluators use values obtained from static sources such as <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/mac/ccmtestvectors.zip> or use values not generated expressly to exercise the AES-CCM implementation.

The evaluator shall test the generation-encryption and decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM for the following input parameter and tag lengths:

Keys: All supported and selected key sizes (e.g., 128, 256 bits).

Associated Data: Two or three values for associated data length: The minimum (≥ 0 bytes) and maximum (≤ 32 bytes) supported associated data lengths, and 2^{16} (65536) bytes, if supported.

Payload: Two values for payload length: The minimum (≥ 0 bytes) and maximum (≤ 32 bytes) supported payload lengths.

Nonces: All supported nonce lengths (7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13) in bytes.

Tag: All supported tag lengths (4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16) in bytes.

The testing for CCM consists of five tests. To determine correctness in each of the below tests, the evaluator shall compare the ciphertext with the result of encryption of the same inputs with a known good implementation.

Variable Associated Data Test

For each supported key size and associated data length, and any supported payload length, nonce length, and tag length, the evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value, and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values, and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

Variable Payload Test

For each supported key size and payload length, and any supported associated data length, nonce length, and tag length, the evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value, and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values, and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

Variable Nonce Test

For each supported key size and nonce length, and any supported associated data length, payload length, and tag length, the evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value, and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values, and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

Variable Tag Test

For each supported key size and tag length, and any supported associated data length, payload length, and nonce length, the evaluator shall supply one key value, one nonce value, and 10 pairs of associated data and payload values, and obtain the resulting ciphertext.

Decryption-Verification Process Test

To test the decryption-verification functionality of AES-CCM, for each combination of supported associated data length, payload length, nonce length, and tag length, the evaluator shall supply a key value and 15 sets of input plus ciphertext, and obtain the decrypted payload. Ten of the 15 input sets supplied should fail verification and five should pass.

FCS_CKM_EXT.6 Cryptographic Password/Passphrase Conditioning

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in FIA_AUT_EXT.1.1.

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1

The TSF shall support a password/passphrase of up to [**assignment: maximum password size, positive integer of 64 or more**] characters used to generate a password authorization factor.

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.2

The TSF shall allow passwords to be composed of any combination of upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and the following special characters: “!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(, and “)”, and [**selection: [assignment: other supported special characters], no other characters**].

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.3

The TSF shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC- [**selection: SHA-384, SHA-512**], with [**assignment: positive integer of 4096 or more**] iterations, and output cryptographic key sizes [256] bits that meet the following: [*NIST SP 800-132*].

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.4

The TSF shall not accept passwords less than [**selection: a value settable by the administrator, [assignment: minimum password length accepted by the TOE, must be >= 1]**] and greater than the maximum password length defined in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1](#).

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.5

The TSF shall generate all salts using an RBG that meets FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (**from AppPP**) and with entropy corresponding to the security strength selected for PBKDF in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.3](#).

Application Note: This applies to passwords on the enterprise server.

The password/passphrase is represented on the host machine as a sequence of characters whose encoding depends on the TOE and the underlying OS. This sequence must be conditioned into a string of bits that is to be used as a KEK that is

the same size as the ~~FEK~~.

For [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1](#), the ~~ST~~ author assigns the maximum size of the password/passphrase it supports; it must support at least 64 characters.

For [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.2](#), the ~~ST~~ author assigns any other supported characters; if there are no other supported characters, they should select “no other characters”.

For [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.3](#), the ~~ST~~ author selects the parameters based on the PBKDF used by the ~~TSE~~. The key cryptographic key sizes in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.3](#) are made to correspond to the ~~KEK~~ key sizes selected in [FCS_KYC_EXT.1](#).

The password/passphrase must be conditioned into a string of bits that forms the submask to be used as input into the ~~KEK~~. Conditioning is performed using one of the identified hash functions in accordance with the process described in NIST SP 800-132. SP 800-132 requires the use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) consisting of HMAC with an approved hash function.

Appendix A of SP 800-132 recommends setting the iteration count in order to increase the computation needed to derive a key from a password and, therefore, increase the workload of performing a password recovery attack. However, for this ~~PP-Module~~, a minimum iteration count of 4096 is required in order to ensure that twelve bits of security is added to the password/passphrase value. A significantly higher value is recommended to ensure optimal security.

For [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.4](#) If the minimum password length is settable, then ~~ST~~ author chooses “a value settable by the administrator for this component for [FMT_SMF.1.1/FEEM](#). If the minimum length is not settable, the ~~ST~~ author fills in the assignment with the minimum length the password must be (zero-length passwords are not allowed for compliant ~~TQEs~~).

This requirement is selection dependent on [FIA_AUT_EXT.1.1](#).

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FCS_CKM_EXT.6](#)

~~TSS~~

There are two aspects of this component that require evaluation: passwords/passphrases of the length specified in the requirement (at least 64 characters) are supported, and that the characters that are input are subject to the selected conditioning function. These activities are separately addressed in the text below.

Support for minimum length: The evaluator shall check to ensure that the ~~TSS~~ describes the allowable ranges for password/passphrase lengths, and that at least 64 characters may be specified by the user.

Support for character set: The evaluator shall check to ensure that the ~~TSS~~ describes the allowable character set and that it contains the characters listed in the ~~SFR~~.

Support for PBKDF: The evaluator shall examine the ~~TSS~~ to ensure that the formation of all KEKs or FEKs (as decided in the [FCS_CKM_EXT.3](#) selection) is described and that the key sizes match that described by the ~~ST~~ author.

The evaluator shall check that the TSS describes the method by which the password/passphrase is first encoded and then fed to the SHA algorithm. The settings for the algorithm (padding, blocking, etc.) shall be described, and the evaluator shall verify that these are supported by the selections in this component as well as the selections concerning the hash function itself. The evaluator shall verify that the TSS contains a description of how the output of the hash function is used to form the submask that will be input into the function and is the same length of the KEK selected in [FCS_KYC_EXT.1](#).

*For the NIST SP 800-132-based conditioning of the password/passphrase, the required evaluation activities will be performed when doing the evaluation activities for the appropriate requirements (FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash). If any manipulation of the key is performed in forming the submask that will be used to form the FEK or KEK, that process shall be described in the TSS.
h:br/>>No explicit testing of the formation of the submask from the input password is required.*

[FCS_CKM_EXT.6.2:](#) *The ST author shall provide a description in the TSS regarding the salt generation. The evaluator shall confirm that the salt is generated using an RNG described in [FCS_RBG_EXT.1](#) (from the [\[AppPP\]](#)).*

KMD

None.

Guidance

Support for minimum length: The evaluators shall check the Operational Guidance to determine that there are instructions on how to generate large passwords/passphrases, and instructions on how to configure the password/passphrase length to provide entropy commensurate with the keys that the authorization factor is protecting.

Tests

Support for Password/Passphrase characteristics: In addition to the analysis above, the evaluator shall also perform the following tests on a TOE configured according to the Operational Guidance:

- *Test FCS_CKM_EXT.6:1: Ensure that the TOE supports passwords/passphrases of a minimum length of 64 characters.*
- *Test FCS_CKM_EXT.6:2: Ensure that the TOE does not accept more than the maximum number of characters specified in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1](#).*
- *Test FCS_CKM_EXT.6:3: Ensure that the TOE does not accept less than the minimum number of characters specified in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.4](#). If the minimum length is settable by the administrator, the evaluator determines the minimum length or lengths to test.*
- *Test FCS_CKM_EXT.6:4: Ensure that the TOE supports passwords consisting of all characters listed in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.2](#).*

Conditioning: No explicit testing of the formation of the authorization factor from the input password/passphrase is required.

FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation Function

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1](#).

FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1

The TSS shall accept [**selection**: a submask generated by an RBG as specified in **FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (from [AppPP])**, a conditioned password, an imported submask] to derive an intermediate key, as defined in [**selection**]:

- NIST SP 800-108 [**selection**: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode]
- NIST SP 800-132

] using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1/**KeyedHash (from [AppPP])**, such that the output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the [FEK(s)] .

Application Note: This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to use key derivation in the key chaining approach that is specified in **FCS_KYC_EXT.1**. This applies to any key derivation occurring on the enterprise server. This requirement establishes acceptable methods for generating a new random key or an existing submask to create a new key along the key chain.

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FCS_KDF_EXT.1](#)

TSS

Conditional: If 'not derive keys' was selected, then the evaluator shall only examine the TSS to verify no key derivation is performed.

The evaluator shall verify the TSS includes a description of the key derivation function and shall verify the key derivation uses an approved derivation mode and key expansion algorithm according to SP 800-108 and SP 800-132.

KMD

The evaluator shall examine the vendor's KMD to ensure that all keys used are derived using an approved method and a description of how and when the keys are derived, including the input values. The evaluator shall confirm the input values are from the sources listed in the requirement. The evaluator will confirm the output is of equivalent strength to the FEK(s) it is protecting.

Guidance

None.

Tests

None.

FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask Combining

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1](#).

The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method: [**selection**: exclusive OR (XOR), SHA-384, SHA-512, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512] to generate an intermediate key .

Application Note: This requirement is used in the body of the ST if the ST author chooses to use key combining in the key chaining approach that is specified in [FCS_KYC_EXT.1](#). This applies to any submask combining occurring on the enterprise server. This requirement specifies the way that a product may combine the various submasks by using either an XOR or an approved SHA-hash.

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FCS_SMC_EXT.1](#)

TSS

If keys are XORed together to form an intermediate key, the TSS section shall identify how this is performed (e.g., if there are ordering requirements, checks performed, etc.). The evaluator shall also confirm that the TSS describes how the length of the output produced is at least the same as that of the FEK.

KMD

None.

Guidance

None.

Tests

None.

[FCS_VAL_EXT.2/Admin Validation Remediation \(Server Administrator\)](#)

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FIA_AUT_EXT.1.1](#).

[FCS_VAL_EXT.2.1/Admin](#)

The TSF shall **[selection]**:

- *institute a delay such that only [**assignment**: ST author specified number or configurable range of attempts] validation attempts can be made within a 24 hour period*
 - *block validation after [**assignment**: ST author specified number or configurable range of attempts] of consecutive failed validation attempts*
-].*

Application Note: This requirement must be claimed by the TOE if the ST author chooses "provide user authorization" in [FIA_AUT_EXT.1.1](#).

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FCS_VAL_EXT.2/Admin](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine which remediation options are supported for which authentication options.

KMD

None.

Guidance

If the remediation functionality is configurable, the evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to ensure it describes how to configure the TOE to ensure the limits regarding validation attempts can be established.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FCS_VAL_EXT.2/Admin:1: The evaluator shall determine the limit on the average rate of the number of consecutive failed authorization attempts. For each authentication factor supported, the evaluator will test the TOE by entering that number of incorrect authorization factors in consecutive attempts to access the protected data. If the limit mechanism includes any "lockout" period, the time period tested should include at least one such period. Then the evaluator will verify that the TOE behaves as described in the TSS.

B.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_CHR_EXT.1 Challenge/Response Recovery Credential

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FIA_REC_EXT.1.2](#).

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall generate a response only if it is able to access recovery information for [selection: the user requesting the recovery, the user requesting recovery and the device for which the recovery was requested].

Application Note: This requires that the TSF has the ability to attribute key chain information to the appropriate user(s).

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.2

The response shall work only for the user to whom it was generated.

Application Note: This mechanism is intended to provide a recovery method for a user who has forgotten their authentication factor and is unable to access their

encrypted data on a system that is fully functional.

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.3

The response shall be used only during the same session in which the request was generated.

Application Note: The intent of this requirement is to limit the attack surface of the recovery credential mechanism by preventing the use of the credential following a reboot of the device.

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall generate an ephemeral response that has at least as many potential values as a corresponding password or PIN.

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall allow a maximum of [**assignment**: *integer value*] response entry attempts per boot cycle.

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.6

The TSF shall perform remediation as defined in [FCS_VAL_EXT.2/User](#) for failed challenge recovery attempts.

Evaluation Activities ▾

[FIA_CHR_EXT.1](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods for requesting a Recovery credential are specified. The TSS shall also describe the methods used to verify user requesting the Recovery credential. The evaluator shall also verify that the TSS contains the estimation of the strength of the ephemeral response and that it has at least as many potential values as a corresponding password or PIN.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation contains instructions for enforcing verification of the user for which the Recovery credential is requested. The guidance shall also describe configuring of the limit for consecutive failed validation attempts if this value is configurable.

Tests

The evaluator shall ensure that a response is only generated if the user for which recovery is requested are verified as specified in TSS. The evaluator shall also ensure that the response is applicable only on behalf of the requesting user with the constraints specified for consecutive failed authentication attempts.

The term “managed” below is used to refer a user or device which is registered on the server, i.e. their identity can be successfully verified by either administrator or TSF. The “unmanaged” presumes that the user/device cannot be successfully verified.

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- Test FIA_CHR_EXT.1:1: The evaluator shall configure the Challenge/Response recovery to validate the user. The evaluator shall then issue a challenge on behalf of a managed user and ensure that TSF successfully generates the response.
- Test FIA_CHR_EXT.1:2: The evaluator shall configure Challenge/Response recovery to validate the user. The evaluator shall then issue a challenge on behalf of managed User A and attempt to use it as an unmanaged User B to obtain a response. This should fail.
- Test FIA_CHR_EXT.1:3: The evaluator shall issue a challenge on behalf of a managed user and ensure that the response received successfully will log the user in on that device.
- Test FIA_CHR_EXT.1:4: The evaluator shall attempt to reuse the response of User A with User B on the same system and it should fail.
- Test FIA_CHR_EXT.1:5: The evaluator shall issue a challenge on behalf of a managed user from a managed system, reboot the system [system terminates the session] and enter the response. This should fail.
- Test FIA_CHR_EXT.1:6: The evaluator shall issue a challenge on behalf of a managed user and attempt to enter an incorrect response on the system the number of times described in the Guidance Documents. The observed behavior shall conform to the assignments/selections in [FIA_CHR_EXT.1.5](#) and [FIA_CHR_EXT.1.6](#).

B.3 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path

The inclusion of this selection-based component depends upon selection in [FMT_SMR.2.3](#).

FTP_TRP.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of using [selection: *IPsec as defined in the PP-Module for VPN Client, HTTPS in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 (from [AppPP]), TLS as defined in the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 2.1, SSH as defined in the Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH), version 2.0*] to provide a communication path between itself and **authorized remote administrators** that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [*modification, disclosure*].

FTP_TRP.1.2

The TSF shall permit **remote administrators** to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3

The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [*initial administrator authentication, [all remote administration actions]*].

Application Note: This SFR is intended to define protected communications between the Management Server and remote administrators.

[FTP_TRP.1](#)

TSS

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods of remote TOE administration are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of TOE administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST.

KMD

None.

Guidance

The evaluator shall confirm that the guidance documentation contains instructions for establishing the remote administrative sessions for each supported method.

Tests

The evaluator shall perform the following tests:

- *Test FTP_TRP.1:1: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the guidance documentation) remote administration method are tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the guidance documentation and ensuring that communication is successful.*
- *Test FTP_TRP.1:2: For each protocol that the TOE can initiate as defined in the requirement, the evaluator shall follow the guidance documentation to ensure that in fact the communication channel can be initiated from the TOE.*
- *Test FTP_TRP.1:3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with an authorized IT entity, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.*
- *Test FTP_TRP.1:4: The evaluator shall ensure that, for each protocol associated with each authorized IT entity tested during test 1, the connection is physically interrupted. The evaluator shall ensure that when physical connectivity is restored, communications are appropriately protected.*

Further evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols.

Appendix C - Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for all extended requirements specified in the PP-Module.

C.1 Extended Components Table

All extended components specified in the PP-Module are listed in this table:

Table 6: Extended Component Definitions

Functional Class	Functional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)	FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Management FCS_KDF_EXT Cryptographic Key Derivation Function FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining and Key Storage FCS_SMC_EXT Submask Combining FCS_VAL_EXT Validation
Identification and Authentication (FIA)	FIA_AUT_EXT Authorization FIA_CHR_EXT Challenge/Response Recovery Credential FIA_REC_EXT Recovery Support
Protection of the TSF (FPT)	FPT_KYP_EXT Protection of Key and Key Material

C.2 Extended Component Definitions

C.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FCS class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.1.1 FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Management

Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for key management activities that are beyond the scope of what is defined in the FCS_CKM family in CC Part 2.

Component Leveling



FCS_CKM_EXT.6, Cryptographic Password/Passphrase Conditioning, requires the TSF to implement password/passphrase conditioning using a specified algorithm and with specific constraints on the password/passphrase composition.

Management: FCS_CKM_EXT.6

There are no specific management functions identified.

Audit: FCS_CKM_EXT.6

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_CKM_EXT.6 Cryptographic Password/Passphrase Conditioning

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1

The TSF shall support a password/passphrase of up to [assignment: *maximum password size, positive integer of 64 or more*] characters used to generate a password authorization factor.

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.2

The TSF shall allow passwords to be composed of any combination of upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and the following special characters: “!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“ and “)”, and [selection: [assignment: *other supported special characters*], no other characters].

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.3

The TSF shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[selection: *SHA-384, SHA-512*], with [selection: [assignment: *positive integer of 4096 or more*] iterations, value supported by the platform, greater than 1000], and output cryptographic key sizes [assignment: *output key size*] that meet the following: [assignment: *applicable standard*].

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.4

The TSF shall not accept passwords less than [selection: *a value settable by the administrator, [assignment: minimum password length accepted by the TOE, must be >= 1]*] and greater than the maximum password length defined in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1](#).

FCS_CKM_EXT.6.5

The TSF shall generate all salts using an RBG that meets FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and with entropy corresponding to the security strength selected for PBKDF in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6.3](#).

C.2.1.2 FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining and Key Storage

Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for the secure storage of keys through the use of a logical key chain.

Component Leveling

[FCS_KYC_EXT.1](#), Key Chaining and Key Storage, requires the [TSF](#) to specify how it implements key chaining.

Management: FCS_KYC_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of the cryptographic functionality.

Audit: FCS_KYC_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining and Key Storage

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FCS_COP.1](#) Cryptographic Operation
[FCS_KDF_EXT.1](#) Cryptographic Key Derivation Function
[FCS_SMC_EXT.1](#) Submask Combining

FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1

The [TSF](#) shall maintain a key chain of: **[selection]**:

- *a conditioned password as the [assignment: key type]*
- *[assignment: key type] originating from [assignment: origin of key] to [assignment: end point of key chain] using the following method(s): [assignment: list of supported key protection methods] while maintaining an effective strength of commensurate with the strength of the [EEK](#)*


] and [selection: no supplemental key chains, other supplemental key chains that protect a key or keys in the primary key chain using the following method(s): [assignment: list of supported key protection methods]].

C.2.1.3 FCS_VAL_EXT Validation

Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for validation of data supplied to the [TOE](#) and any consequences resulting from failed validation attempts.

Component Leveling



FCS_VAL_EXT.1, Validation, requires the [TSF](#) to specify what data is being validated and how the validation is performed.

FCS_VAL_EXT.2, Validation Remediation, requires the [TSF](#) to specify what the [TOE](#)'s response is in the event of a data validation failure.

Management: FCS_VAL_EXT.1

There are no specific management functions identified.

Audit: FCS_VAL_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Minimal: Change to configuration of validation function behavior.

FCS_VAL_EXT.1 Validation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform validation of the [assignment: subject requiring validation] by [selection]:

- receiving assertion of the subject's validity from [assignment: Operational Environment component responsible for authentication]
- validating the [selection: submask, intermediate key] using the following methods: [selection]:
 - key wrap as specified in FCS_COP.1
 - hash the [selection: submask, intermediate key, FEK] as specified in FCS_COP.1 and compare it to a stored hash
 - decrypt a known value using the [selection: submask, intermediate key, FEK] as specified in FCS_COP.1 and compare it against a stored known value

]

].

FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall require validation of the [assignment: subject requiring validation] prior to [assignment: action requiring validation].

Management: FCS_VAL_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of the number of failed validation attempts required to trigger corrective behavior.
- Configuration of the corrective behavior to issue in the event of an excessive number of failed validation attempts.

Audit: FCS_VAL_EXT.2

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Minimal: Triggering of excessive validation failure response behavior.

FCS_VAL_EXT.2 Validation Remediation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS_VAL_EXT.1 Validation

FCS_VAL_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall [selection]:


- institute a delay such that only [**assignment**: specified number of] validation attempts can be made within a 24 hour period
 - block validation after [**assignment**: specified number of] consecutive failed validation attempts
 - [**assignment**: remediation action] upon [**assignment**: specified number of] consecutive failed validation attempts
-].

C.2.1.4 FCS_KDF_EXT Cryptographic Key Derivation Function

Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for the implementation of cryptographic key derivation functions

Component Leveling



FCS_KDF_EXT.1, Cryptographic Key Derivation Function, requires the **TSF** to specify how it performs key derivation.

Management: FCS_KDF_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of the cryptographic functionality.

Audit: FCS_KDF_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation Function

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1

The **TSF** shall accept [**selection**: a submask generated by an **RBG** as specified in **FCS_RBG_EXT.1**, a conditioned password, an imported submask] to derive an intermediate key, as defined in [**selection**:

- NIST SP 800-108 [**selection**: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode]
- NIST SP 800-132

] using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1, such that the output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the [**assignment**: key that is being derived].

C.2.1.5 FCS_SMC_EXT Submask Combining

Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for generation of intermediate keys via submask combining.

Component Leveling



FCS_SMC_EXT.1, Submask Combining, requires the **TSF** to implement submask combining in a specific manner to support the generation of intermediate keys.

Management: FCS_SMC_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of the cryptographic functionality.

Audit: FCS_SMC_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask Combining

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

FCS_SMC_EXT.1.1

The **TSF** shall combine submasks using the following method: [**assignment: submask combination method**] to generate an intermediate key.

C.2.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)


This **PP-Module** defines the following extended components as part of the FIA class originally defined by **CC Part 2**:

C.2.2.1 FIA_AUT_EXT Authorization

Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for how subject authorization is performed. Where FIA_UAU in **CC Part 2** defines circumstances where authentication is required, this family describes the specific computational methods used to determine whether a subject's presented authentication data is valid.

Component Leveling



FIA_AUT_EXT.1, Subject Authorization, specifies the manner in which the **TSF** performs user authorization.

Management: FIA_AUT_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of authentication factors.

Audit: FIA_AUT_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the **PP/ST**:

- Minimal: Failure of authorization function.
- Basic: All use of authorization function.

FIA_AUT_EXT.1 Subject Authorization

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: [FCS_CKM_EXT.6](#) Cryptographic Password/Passphrase Conditioning
[FCS_RBG_EXT.1](#) Random Bit Generation

FIA_AUT_EXT.1.1

The [TSF](#) shall [selection: receive assertion of the user's validity from: [assignment: Operational Environment component responsible for user authentication], provide authorization] based on [selection:


- a password authorization factor conditioned as defined in [FCS_CKM_EXT.6](#)
 - an external smart card factor that is at least the same bit-length as the FEK(s), and is protecting a submask that is [selection: generated by the TOE (using the RBG as specified in [FCS_RBG_EXT.1](#)), generated by the platform] protected using asymmetric keys as defined in [FCS_CKM.1.1/AK](#) (from [\[AppPP\]](#)) with user presence proved by presentation of the smart card and [selection: no PIN, an QE defined PIN, a configurable PIN]
 - an external USB token factor that is at least the same security strength as the FEK(s), and is providing a submask generated by the [selection: TOE, using the RBG as specified in [FCS_RBG_EXT.1](#), platform]
-].

C.2.2.2 FIA_REC_EXT Recovery Support

Family Behavior

Components in this family define the [TOE](#)'s support for recovery credentials as an alternate method for user authorization.

Component Leveling



[FIA_REC_EXT.1](#), Recovery Support, requires the [TSF](#) to specify the supported recovery method and to include a means to enable/disable any supported recovery method.

Management: FIA_REC_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Ability to enable/disable the use of recovery credentials.
- Ability to change recovery credential values.

Audit: FIA_REC_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Minimal: Configuration of recovery methods.

FIA_REC_EXT.1 Recovery Support

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: No dependencies.

FIA_REC_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall [selection: *provide the ability to enable and disable the use of recovery credentials, not support recovery*].

FIA_REC_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support the following recovery mechanisms [selection: *Challenge Response Recovery as defined in FIA_CHR_EXT.1, None*].

C.2.2.3 FIA_CHR_EXT Challenge/Response Recovery Credential

Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for the use of challenge/response as a recovery method.

Component Leveling



FIA_CHR_EXT.1, Challenge/Response Recovery Credential, requires the TSF to implement a challenge/response method to generate recovery credentials for an authorized user.

Management: FIA_CHR_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Ability to enable/disable the user of recovery credentials.
- Ability to change recovery credential values.

Audit: FIA_CHR_EXT.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Minimal: Failure of recovery attempt.
- Basic: All recovery attempts.

FIA_CHR_EXT.1 Challenge/Response Recovery Credential

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS_VAL_EXT.1 Validation
[FIA_REC_EXT.1](#) Recovery Support

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall generate a response only if it is able to access recovery information for [selection: *the user requesting the recovery, the user requesting recovery and the device for which the recovery was requested*].

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.2

The response shall work only for the user to whom it was generated.

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.3

The response shall be used only during the same session in which the request was generated.

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall generate an ephemeral response that has at least as many potential values as a corresponding password or PIN.

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall allow a maximum of [**assignment**: *integer value*] response entry attempts per boot cycle.

FIA_CHR_EXT.1.6

The TSF shall perform remediation as defined in FCS_VAL_EXT.2 for failed challenge recovery attempts.

C.2.3 Protection of the TSF (FPT)


This PP-Module defines the following extended components as part of the FPT class originally defined by CC Part 2:

C.2.3.1 FPT_KYP_EXT Protection of Key and Key Material

Family Behavior

Components in this family define requirements for secure storage of keys.

Component Leveling



FPT_KYP_EXT.1, Protection of Keys and Key Material , requires the TSF to protect stored key data in a specified manner.

FPT_KYP_EXT.2, Attribution of Key and Key Material, requires the TSF to protect stored key data in a specified manner.

Management: FPT_KYP_EXT.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Configuration of the cryptographic functionality.

Audit: FPT_KYP_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Protection of Keys and Key Material

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation Function
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Key Chaining and Key Storage
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask Combining
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials

FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall store keys in non-volatile memory only when [**selection**:

- wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1
- encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1
- the plaintext key is stored in the underlying platform's keystore as specified by FCS_STO_EXT.1
- the plaintext key is stored in a SQL database in the Operational Environment
- the plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
- the plaintext key will no longer provide access to the encrypted data after initial provisioning
- the plaintext key is a key split that is combined as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1 and another contribution to the split is [**selection**: wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1, derived and not stored in non-volatile memory]
- the plaintext key is stored on an external storage device for use as an authorization factor.
- the plaintext key is used to wrap a key as specified in FCS_COP.1 that is already wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1

].

Management: FPT_KYP_EXT.2

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Registration of users.
- Revocation of user registration.

Audit: FPT_KYP_EXT.2

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- Basic: Creation and revocation of user registration.

FPT_KYP_EXT.2 Attribution of Key and Key Material

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies to: FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

FPT_KYP_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall maintain an association between stored endpoint keys and user identity, [**selection**: remote endpoints, recovery credential, system identity, no other subjects].

FPT_KYP_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide the ability to register users by exchange of [**assignment**: mutually identifying information that allows for an association to be made].

FPT_KYP_EXT.2.3

The TSF shall provide the ability to revoke the registration of users by [**assignment**: *method of removing and/or exchanging information that prevents further communications between the TOE and the endpoint*].

FPT_KYP_EXT.2.4

The TSF shall transmit any secure or private cryptographic information that is transferred between the TOE and a user's endpoint in order to establish or disestablish an association using a communications channel with a security strength at least as great as the strength of the information being transmitted.

Appendix D - Key Management Description

This appendix should be combined with the appendix in the ~~PP-Module~~ for File Encryption if it is also being evaluated. The documentation of the product's encryption key management should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the product's key management and how it meets the requirements to ensure the keys are adequately protected. This documentation should include an essay and diagram(s). This documentation is not required to be part of the ~~TSS~~ - it can be submitted as a separate document and marked as developer proprietary.

Essay:

The essay will provide the following information for all keys in the key chain:

The purpose of the key

If the key is stored in non-volatile memory

How and when the key is protected

How and when the key is derived

The strength of the key

When or if the key would be no longer needed, along with a justification

How and when a key may be transmitted

The essay will also describe the following topics:

A description of all authorization factors that are supported by the product and how each factor is handled, including any conditioning and combining performed.

If validation is implemented, the process for validation shall be described, noting what value is used for validation and the process used to perform the validation. It shall describe how this process ensures no keys in the key chain are weakened or exposed by this process.

The authorization process that leads to the recovery or access by an end user or administrator. This section shall detail the key chain used by the product. It shall describe which keys are used in the protection of the ~~FEK~~(s) or ~~KEK~~(s) and how they meet the encryption or derivation requirements, including the direct chain from the initial authorization to the ~~FEK~~(s) or ~~KEK~~(s). It shall also include any values that add into that key chain or interact with the key chain and the protections that ensure those values do not weaken or expose the overall strength of the key chain.

The diagram and essay will clearly illustrate the key hierarchy to ensure that at no point the chain could be broken without a cryptographic exhaust or all of the initial authorization values and the effective strength of the ~~FEK~~(s) is maintained throughout the key chain.

A description of the data encryption engine, its components, and details about its implementation (e.g. initialization of the product, drivers, libraries (if applicable), logical interfaces for encryption/decryption, and how resources to be encrypted are identified. The description should also include the data flow from the device's host interface to the device's persistent media storing the data or transmission to and endpoint, information on those conditions in which the data bypasses the data encryption engine. The description should be detailed enough to verify all platforms ensure that when the user enables encryption, the product encrypts all selected resources.

The process for destroying keys when they are no longer needed by describing the storage location of all keys and the protection of all keys stored in non-volatile memory.

Diagram:

The diagram will include all keys from the initial authorization factor(s) to the **FEK**(s) and any keys or values that contribute into the chain. It must list the cryptographic strength of each key and indicate how each key along the chain is protected with either options from key chaining requirement. The diagram should indicate the input used to derive or decrypt each key in the chain.

A functional (block) diagram showing the main components (such as memories and processors) the initial steps needed for the activities the **TQE** performs to ensure it encrypts the targeted resources when a user or administrator first provisions the product.

Appendix E - Acronyms

Table 7: Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AF	Authorization factor
Base-PP	Base Protection Profile
CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology
cPP	Collaborative Protection Profile
EP	Extended Package
FEK	File Encryption Key
FP	Functional Package
KEK	Key Encryption Key
OE	Operational Environment
PP	Protection Profile
PP-Configuration	Protection Profile Configuration
PP-Module	Protection Profile Module
RBG	Random Bit Generator
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSEI	TSF Interface
TSS	TOE Summary Specification

Appendix F - Bibliography

Table 8: Bibliography

Identifier	Title
[AppPP]	Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 2.0, June 16, 2025
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB-2022-11-001, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.• Part 2: Security functional requirements, CCMB-2022-11-002, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.• Part 3: Security assurance requirements, CCMB-2022-11-003, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.• Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities, CCMB-2022-11-004, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.• Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements, CCMB-2022-11-005, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation - <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Evaluation methodology, CCMB-2022-11-006, CC:2022, Revision 1, November 2022.
[FIPS140-2]	Federal Information Processing Standard Publication (FIPS-PUB) 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, National Institute of Standards and Technology, March 19, 2007
[FIPS180-4]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS-PUB) 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, March, 2012
[FIPS186-5]	Federal Information Processing Standard Publication (FIPS-PUB) 186-5, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), National Institute of Standards and Technology, February 2023
[FIPS197]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS-PUB) 197, Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 26, 2001
[FIPS198-1]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS-PUB) 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), July 2008
[NIST800-132]	NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, December 2010
[NIST800-38A]	NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques, 2001 Edition
[NIST800-38F]	NIST Special Publication 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, December 2012
[NIST800-56A]	NIST Special Publication 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007

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| [NIST800-56B] | NIST Special Publication 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, August 2009 |
| [NIST800-90] | NIST Special Publication 800-90, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised), March 2007 |