

# Supporting Document

## Mandatory Technical Document



PP-Module for MDM Agents

Version: 1.0

2019-04-25

**National Information Assurance Partnership**

## Foreword

This is a Supporting Document (SD), intended to complement the Common Criteria version 3 and the associated Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.

SDs may be “Guidance Documents”, that highlight specific approaches and application of the standard to areas where no mutual recognition of its application is required, and as such, are not of normative nature, or “Mandatory Technical Documents”, whose application is mandatory for evaluations whose scope is covered by that of the SD. The usage of the latter class is not only mandatory, but certificates issued as a result of their application are recognized under the CCRA.

### Technical Editor:

National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)

### Document history:

| Version | Date       | Comment  |
|---------|------------|--|
| 1.0     | 2013-10-21 | Initial Release  |
| 1.1     | 2014-02-07 | Typographical changes and clarifications to front-matter   |
| 2.0     | 2014-12-31 | Separation of MDM Agent SFRs. Updated cryptography, protocol, X.509 requirements. Added objective requirement for Agent audit storage. New requirement for unenrollment prevention. Initial Release of MDM Agent EP. |
| 3.0     | 2016-11-21 | Updates to align with Technical Decisions. Added requirements to support BYOD use case.  |
| 4.0     | 2019-03-01 | Convert to PP-Module.  |

### General Purpose:

The purpose of this SD is to define evaluation methods for the functional behavior of MDM Agent products.

### Acknowledgments:

This SD was developed with support from NIAP MDM Agents Technical Community members, with representatives from industry, government agencies, Common Criteria Test Laboratories, and members of academia.

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Technology Area and Scope of Supporting Document

The scope of the PP-Module for MDM Agents is to describe the security functionality of MDM Agents products in terms of [CC] and to define functional and assurance requirements for them. The PP-Module is intended for use with the following Base-PPs:

- [Mobile Device Fundamentals, version 3.2](#)
- [Mobile Device Management, version 4.0](#)

This SD is mandatory for evaluations of TOEs that claim conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the PP-Module for :

- MDM Agents, Version 1.0

As such it defines Evaluation Activities for the functionality described in the PP-Module as well as any impacts to the Evaluation Activities to the Base-PP(s) it modifies.

Although Evaluation Activities are defined mainly for the evaluators to follow, in general they also help developers to prepare for evaluation by identifying specific requirements for their TOE. The specific requirements in Evaluation Activities may in some cases clarify the meaning of Security Functional Requirements (SFR), and may identify particular requirements for the content of Security Targets (ST) (especially the TOE Summary Specification), user guidance documentation, and possibly supplementary information (e.g. for entropy analysis or cryptographic key management architecture).

## 1.2 Structure of the Document

Evaluation Activities can be defined for both SFRs and Security Assurance Requirements (SAR), which are themselves defined in separate sections of the SD.

If any Evaluation Activity cannot be successfully completed in an evaluation, then the overall verdict for the evaluation is a 'fail'. In rare cases there may be acceptable reasons why an Evaluation Activity may be modified or deemed not applicable for a particular TOE, but this must be approved by the Certification Body for the evaluation.

In general, if all Evaluation Activities (for both SFRs and SARs) are successfully completed in an evaluation then it would be expected that the overall verdict for the evaluation is a 'pass'. To reach a 'fail' verdict when the Evaluation Activities have been successfully completed would require a specific justification from the evaluator as to why the Evaluation Activities were not sufficient for that TOE.

Similarly, at the more granular level of assurance components, if the Evaluation Activities for an assurance component and all of its related SFR Evaluation Activities are successfully completed in an evaluation then it would be expected that the verdict for the assurance component is a 'pass'. To reach a 'fail' verdict for the

assurance component when these Evaluation Activities have been successfully completed would require a specific justification from the evaluator as to why the Evaluation Activities were not sufficient for that TOE.

## 1.3 Terms

The following sections list Common Criteria and technology terms used in this document.

### 1.3.1 Common Criteria Terms

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Assurance   | Grounds for confidence that a TOE meets the SFRs <a href="#">[CC]</a> .   |
| Base Protection Profile (Base-PP)                   | Protection Profile used as a basis to build a PP-Configuration.   |
| Collaborative Protection Profile (cPP)              | A Protection Profile developed by international technical communities and approved by multiple schemes.   |
| Common Criteria (CC)                                | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (International Standard ISO/IEC 15408).  |
| Common Criteria Testing Laboratory                  | Within the context of the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS), an IT security evaluation facility accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the NIAP Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations. |
| Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)                 | Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation.   |
| Distributed TOE                                     | A TOE composed of multiple components operating as a logical whole.   |
| Extended Package (EP)                               | A deprecated document form for collecting SFRs that implement a particular protocol, technology, or functionality. See Functional Packages.   |
| Functional Package (FP)                             | A document that collects SFRs for a particular protocol, technology, or functionality.  |
| Operational Environment (OE)                        | Hardware and software that are outside the TOE boundary that support the TOE functionality and security policy.   |
| Protection Profile (PP)                             | An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of products.  |
| Protection Profile Configuration (PP-Configuration) | A comprehensive set of security requirements for a product type that consists of at least one Base-PP and at least one PP-Module.   |
| Protection Profile Module (PP-Module)               | An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type complementary to one or more Base-PPs.   |
| Security Assurance Requirement (SAR)                | A requirement to assure the security of the TOE.  |
| Security Functional Requirement (SFR)               | A requirement for security enforcement by the TOE.  |
| Security Target (ST)                                | A set of implementation-dependent security requirements for a specific product.   |
| Target of Evaluation (TOE)                          | The product under evaluation.   |
|   |   |

|                                  |   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| TOE Security Functionality (TSF) | The security functionality of the product under evaluation. |
| TOE Summary Specification (TSS)  | A description of how a TOE satisfies the SFRs in an ST.     |

### 1.3.2 Technical Terms

|                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Administrator                  | The person who is responsible for management activities, including setting the policy that is applied by the enterprise on the mobile device.   |
| Enrolled State                 | The state in which a mobile device is managed by a policy from an MDM.  |
| Mobile Application Store (MAS) | Mobile Application Store  |
| Mobile Device Management (MDM) | Mobile Device Management  |
| Mobile Device User             | The person who uses and is held responsible for a mobile device.  |
| Operating System               | Software which runs at the highest privilege level and can directly control hardware resources. Modern mobile devices typically have at least two primary operating systems: one which runs on the cellular baseband processor and one which runs on the application processor. The platform of the application processor handles most user interaction and provides the execution environment for apps. The platform of the cellular baseband processor handles communications with the cellular network and may control other peripherals. The term OS, without context, may be assumed to refer to the platform of the application |
| Unenrolled State               | The state in which a mobile device is not managed by an MDM system.   |
| User                           | See Mobile Device User.   |

## 2 Evaluation Activities for SFRs

The EAs presented in this section capture the actions the evaluator performs to address technology specific aspects covering specific SARs (e.g. ASE\_TSS.1, ADV\_FSP.1, AGD\_OPE.1, and ATE\_IND.1) - this is in addition to the CEM workunits that are performed in [Section 3 Evaluation Activities for SARs](#).

Regarding design descriptions (designated by the subsections labeled TSS, as well as any required supplementary material that may be treated as proprietary), the evaluator must ensure there is specific information that satisfies the EA. For findings regarding the TSS section, the evaluator's verdicts will be associated with the CEM workunit ASE\_TSS.1-1. Evaluator verdicts associated with the supplementary evidence will also be associated with ASE\_TSS.1-1, since the requirement to provide such evidence is specified in ASE in the PP.

For ensuring the guidance documentation provides sufficient information for the administrators/users as it pertains to SFRs, the evaluator's verdicts will be associated with CEM workunits ADV\_FSP.1-7, AGD\_OPE.1-4, and AGD\_OPE.1-5.

Finally, the subsection labeled Tests is where the authors have determined that testing of the product in the context of the associated SFR is necessary. While the evaluator is expected to develop tests, there may be instances where it is more practical for the developer to construct tests, or where the developer may have existing tests. Therefore, it is acceptable for the evaluator to witness developer-generated tests in lieu of executing the tests. In this case, the evaluator must ensure the developer's tests are executing both in the manner declared by the developer and as mandated by the EA. The CEM workunits that are associated with the EAs specified in this section are: ATE\_IND.1-3, ATE\_IND.1-4, ATE\_IND.1-5, ATE\_IND.1-6, and ATE\_IND.1-7.

### 2.1 Protection Profile for MDM Agents

The EAs defined in this section are only applicable in cases where the TOE claims conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the MDM Agents PP.

### 2.1.1 Modified SFRs

The PP-Module does not modify any requirements when the MDM Agents PP is the base.

### 2.1.2 Additional SFRs

#### 2.1.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

##### FCS\_STG\_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Storage

FCS\_STG\_EXT.4

###### **TSS**

The evaluator will verify that the TSS lists each persistent secret (credential, secret key) and private key needed to meet the requirements in the ST. For each of these items, the evaluator will confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it is used, and, for each platform listed as supported in the ST, how it is stored. The evaluator shall verify that the Agent calls a platform-provided API to store persistent secrets and private keys.

#### 2.1.2.2 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

##### FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1/TRUSTCHAN Trusted Channel Communication

FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1/TRUSTCHAN

###### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods of Agent-Server communication are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of remote TOE administration are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST.

###### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for configuring the communication channel between the MDM Agent and the MDM Server and conditionally, the MAS Server for each supported method.

###### **Tests**

For each supported identifier type (excluding DNs), the evaluator shall repeat the following tests:

- Test FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1/TRUSTCHAN:1: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) Agent-Server communication method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- Test FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1/TRUSTCHAN:2: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of Agent-Server communication, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.
- Test FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1/TRUSTCHAN:3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with the MDM Server, that a protocol analyzer identifies the traffic as the protocol under testing.

Further evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols.

##### FTP\_TRP.1/TRUSTPATH Trusted Path (for Enrollment)

FTP\_TRP.1/TRUSTPATH

###### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods of remote enrollment are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of enrollment are consistent with those specified in the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST.

###### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the enrollment sessions for each supported method.

###### **Tests**

For each MDM Agent/platform listed as supported in the ST:

- Test FTP\_TRP.1/TRUSTPATH:1: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) enrollment method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
- Test FTP\_TRP.1/TRUSTPATH:2: For each method of enrollment supported, the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to ensure that there is no available interface that can be used by a remote user to establish enrollment sessions without invoking the trusted path.

- Test FTP\_TRP.1/TRUSTPATH:3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method enrollment, the channel data is not sent in plaintext.

Further evaluation activities are associated with the specific protocols.

## 2.2 Protection Profile for Mobile Device Management

The EAs defined in this section are only applicable in cases where the TOE claims conformance to a PP-Configuration that includes the MDM PP.

### 2.2.1 Modified SFRs

The PP-Module does not modify any requirements when the MDM PP is the base.

### 2.2.2 Additional SFRs

#### 2.2.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

##### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1/KEYSTO Cryptographic Key Storage

FCS\_STG\_EXT.1/KEYSTO

##### **TSS**

The evaluator will verify that the TSS lists each persistent secret (credential, secret key) and private key needed to meet the requirements in the ST. For each of these items, the evaluator will confirm that the TSS lists for what purpose it is used, and, for each platform listed as supported in the ST, how it is stored. The evaluator shall verify that the Agent calls a platform-provided API to store persistent secrets and private keys.

## 2.3 TOE SFR Evaluation Activities

### 2.3.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### FAU\_ALT\_EXT.2 Agent Alerts

FAU\_ALT\_EXT.2

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and verify that it describes how the alerts are implemented.

The evaluator shall examine the TSS and verify that it describes how the candidate policy updates are obtained and the actions that take place for successful (policy update installed) and unsuccessful (policy update not installed) cases. The software components that are performing the processing must also be identified in the TSS and verified by the evaluator.

The evaluator also ensures that the TSS describes how reachability events are implemented, and if configurable are selected in FMT\_SMF\_EXT.4.2. The evaluator verifies that this description clearly indicates who (MDM Agent or MDM Server) initiates reachability events.

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes under what circumstances, if any, the alert may not be generated (e.g., the device is powered off or disconnected from the trusted channel), how alerts are queued, and the maximum amount of storage for queued messages.

##### **Tests**

- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.2:1: The evaluator shall perform a policy update from the test environment MDM server. The evaluator shall verify the MDM Agent accepts the update, makes the configured changes, and reports the success of the policy update back to the MDM Server.
- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.2:2: The evaluator shall perform each of the actions listed in FAU\_ALT\_EXT.2.1 and verify that the alert does in fact reach the MDM Server.
- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.2:3: The evaluator shall configure the MDM Agent to perform a network reachability test, both with and without such connectivity and ensure that results reflect each.
- Test FAU\_ALT\_EXT.2:4: The evaluator shall remove network connectivity from the MDM Agent and generate an alert/event as defined in FAU\_ALT\_EXT.2.1. The evaluator shall restore network connectivity to the MDM Agent and verify that the alert generated while the TOE was disconnected is sent by the MDM Agent upon re-establishment of the connectivity.

#### FAU\_GEN.1/AUDITGEN Audit Data Generation

FAU\_GEN.1/AUDITGEN

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall check the TSS and ensure that it provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along with a brief description of each field.

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Agent; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity).

### ***Tests***

The evaluator shall use the TOE to perform the auditable events defined in the Auditable Events table in FAU\_GEN.1.1(2) and observe that accurate audit records are generated with contents and formatting consistent with those described in the TSS. Note that this testing can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms directly.

## **FAU\_SEL.1/EVENTSEL Security Audit Event Selection**

FAU\_SEL.1/EVENTSEL

### ***TSS***

If "invoke platform-provided functionality" is selected, the evaluator shall examine the TSS of the ST to verify that it describes (for each supported platform) how this functionality is invoked (it should be noted that this may be through a mechanism that is not implemented by the MDM Agent; nonetheless, that mechanism will be identified in the TSS as part of this evaluation activity).

### ***Guidance***

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to determine that it contains instructions on how to define the set of auditable events as well as explains the syntax for multi-value selection (if applicable). The evaluator shall also verify that the operational guidance shall identify those audit records that are always recorded, regardless of the selection criteria currently being enforced.

### ***Tests***

- Test FAU\_SEL.1/EVENTSEL:1: For each attribute listed in the requirement, the evaluator shall devise a test to show that selecting the attribute causes only audit events with that attribute (or those that are always recorded, as identified in the administrative guidance) to be recorded.
- Test FAU\_SEL.1/EVENTSEL:2: [conditional]: If the TSF supports specification of more complex audit pre-selection criteria (e.g., multiple attributes, logical expressions using attributes) then the evaluator shall devise tests showing that this capability is correctly implemented. The evaluator shall also, in the test plan, provide a short narrative justifying the set of tests as representative and sufficient to exercise the capability.

## **2.3.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)**

### **FIA\_ENR\_EXT.2 Agent Enrollment of Mobile Device into Management**

FIA\_ENR\_EXT.2

### ***TSS***

The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that it describes which types of reference identifiers are acceptable and how the identifier is specified (e.g. preconfigured in the MDM Agent, by the user, by the MDM server, in a policy).

### ***Guidance***

The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to verify that it describes how to configure reference identifier of the MDM Server's certificate and, if different than the reference identifier, the Domain Name or IP address (for connectivity) of the MDM Server.

### ***Tests***

The evaluator shall follow the operational guidance to establish the reference identifier of the MDM server on the MDM Agent and in conjunction with other evaluation activities verify that the MDM Agent can connect to the MDM Server and validate the MDM Server's certificate.

## **2.3.3 Security Management (FMT)**

### **FMT\_POL\_EXT.2 Agent Trusted Policy Update**

FMT\_POL\_EXT.2

### ***TSS***

The evaluator ensures that the TSS describes how the candidate policies are obtained by the MDM Agent, the processing associated with verifying the digital signature of the policy updates, and the actions that take place for successful (signature was verified) and unsuccessful (signature could not be verified) cases. The software components that are performing the processing must also be identified in the TSS and verified by

the evaluators.

### **Tests**

This evaluation activity is performed in conjunction with the evaluation activity for FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 and FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 as defined in the Base-PPs.

- Test FMT\_POL\_EXT.2:1: The evaluator shall perform a policy update from an available configuration interface (such as through a test MDM Server). The evaluator shall verify the update is signed and is provided to the MDM Agent. The evaluator shall verify the MDM Agent accepts the digitally signed policy.
- Test FMT\_POL\_EXT.2:2: The evaluator shall perform a policy update from an available configuration interface (such as through a test MDM Server). The evaluator shall provide an unsigned and an incorrectly signed policy to the MDM Agent. The evaluator shall verify the MDM Agent does not accept the digitally signed policy.

## **FMT\_SMF\_EXT.4 Specification of Management Functions**

### **FMT\_SMF\_EXT.4**

This assurance activity may be performed in conjunction with other assurance activities in the Base-PP.

### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the any assigned functions are described in the TSS and that these functions are documented as supported by the platform. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to verify that any differences between management functions and policies for each supported mobile device are listed.

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the methods in which the MDM Agent can be enrolled.

The TSS description shall make clear if the MDM Agent supports multiple interfaces for enrollment and configuration (for example, both remote configuration and local configuration).

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify the AGD guidance includes detailed instructions for configuring each function in this requirement.

If the MDM Agent is a component of the MDM system (i.e. MDM Server is the Base-PP), the evaluator shall verify, by consulting documentation for the claimed mobile device platforms, that the configurable functions listed for this Agent are supported by the platforms.

If the MDM Agent supports multiple interfaces for configuration (for example, both remote configuration and local configuration), the AGD guidance makes clear whether some functions are restricted to certain interfaces.

### **Tests**

- Test FMT\_SMF\_EXT.4:1: In conjunction with the evaluation activities in the Base-PP, the evaluator shall attempt to configure each administrator-provided management function and shall verify that the mobile device executes the commands and enforces the policies.
- Test FMT\_SMF\_EXT.4:2: The evaluator shall configure the MDM Agent authentication certificate in accordance with the configuration guidance. The evaluator shall verify that the MDM Agent uses this certificate in performing the tests for FPT\_ITT.1(2) (from the MDM PP).
- Test FMT\_SMF\_EXT.4:3: In conjunction with other evaluation activities, the evaluator shall attempt to enroll the MDM Agent in management with each interface identified in the TSS, and verify that the MDM Agent can manage the device and communicate with the MDM Server.
- Test FMT\_SMF\_EXT.4:4: [conditional] In conjunction with the evaluation activity for FAU\_ALT\_EXT.2.1, the evaluator shall configure the periodicity for reachability events for several configured time periods and shall verify that the MDM Server receives alerts on that schedule.
- Test FMT\_SMF\_EXT.4:5: [conditional] The evaluator shall design and perform tests to demonstrate that the assigned function may be configured and that the intended behavior of the function is enacted by the mobile device.

## **FMT\_UNR\_EXT.1 User Unenrollment Prevention**

### **FMT\_UNR\_EXT.1**

### **TSS**

The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS describes the mechanism used to prevent users from unenrolling or the remediation actions applied when unenrolled.

### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall ensure that the administrative guidance instructs administrators in configuring the unenrollment prevention in each available configuration interface. If any configuration allows users to unenroll, the guidance also describes the actions that unenroll the Agent.

### **Tests**



- Test FMT\_UNR\_EXT.1:1: If ‘prevent the unenrollment from occurring’ is selected: The evaluator shall configure the Agent according to the administrative guidance for each available configuration interface, shall attempt to unenroll the device, and shall verify that the attempt fails.
- Test FMT\_UNR\_EXT.1:2: If ‘apply remediation actions’ is selected: If any configuration allows the user to unenroll, the evaluator shall configure the Agent to allow user unenrollment, attempt to unenroll, and verify that the remediation actions are applied.

## 2.4 Evaluation Activities for Optional SFRs

The PP-Module does not define any optional requirements.

## 2.5 Evaluation Activities for Selection-Based SFRs

The PP-Module does not define any selection-based requirements.

## 2.6 Evaluation Activities for Objective SFRs

### 2.6.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### FAU\_STG\_EXT.3 Security Audit Event Storage

FAU\_STG\_EXT.3

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS description of the audit records indicates how the records are stored. The evaluator shall verify that the Agent calls a platform-provided API to store audit records.

### 2.6.2 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### FPT\_NET\_EXT.1 Network Reachability

FPT\_NET\_EXT.1

##### **TSS**

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS contains a description of how the Agent determines how long it has been since the last successful connection with the Server (i.e., total number of missed reachability events or time). If total number of missed reachability events is selected, the evaluator shall verify that the TSS contains a description of how often the reachability events are sent.

##### **Guidance**

The evaluator shall verify that the AGD guidance instructs the administrator, if needed, how to configure the TOE to detect when the time since last successful connection with the server has been reached.

##### **Tests**

The evaluator shall configure the Server configuration policy of the Agent per FMT\_SMF.1.1(1) function 56 within the Mobile Device Management PP. The device shall be placed in airplane mode to prevent connectivity with the Server. The evaluator shall verify that after the configured time, the remediation actions selected in function 56 occur.

## 2.7 Evaluation Activities for Implementation-dependent SFRs

The PP-Module does not define any implementation-dependent requirements.

## 3 Evaluation Activities for SARs

The PP-Module does not define any SARs beyond those defined within the base-PP to which it must claim conformance. It is important to note that a TOE that is evaluated against the PP-Module is inherently evaluated against the Base-PP as well. The Base-PP includes a number of Evaluation Activities associated with both SFRs and SARs. Additionally, the PP-Module includes a number of SFR-based Evaluation Activities that similarly refine the SARs of the Base-PPs. The evaluation laboratory will evaluate the TOE against the chosen Base-PP and supplement that evaluation with the necessary SFRs that are taken from the PP-Module.

## 4 Required Supplementary Information

This Supporting Document has no required supplementary information beyond the ST, operational guidance, and testing.

# Appendix A - References

| Identifier | Title  |
|------------|--|
| [CC]       | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation -   |
|            | • <a href="#">Part 1: Introduction and General Model</a> , CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017. |
|            | • <a href="#">Part 2: Security Functional Components</a> , CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017. |
|            | • <a href="#">Part 3: Security Assurance Components</a> , CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.  |