

Domain Name System (DNS)

- Internet communication requires IP addresses
- Humans prefer to use computer names
- Automated system available to translate names to addresses
- Known as *Domain Name System (DNS)*
- November 1987
 - RFC 1034: Informational
 - RFC 1035: Implementation details

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DNS Functionality

- Given
 - Name of a computer
- Return
 - Computer's internet (IP) address
- Method
 - Distributed lookup
 - Client contact server(s) as necessary

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Domain Name Syntax

- Alphanumeric segments separated by dots
- Examples:
 - www.tcd.ie
 - ntrg.cs.tcd.ie
 - www.research.att.com
- Most significant part on the right

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Domain Name Acquisition

- Organization
 - Chooses a desired name
 - Must be unique
 - Registers with central authority
 - Placed under one *top-level domain*
- Names subject to international law
 - Trademarks
 - Copyright

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Top-Level Domains (TLDs)

- .com commercial organization
- .edu U.S. educational institution
- .gov U.S. government organization
- .mil U.S. military group
- .net major network provider or other organization other than above
- .arpa temporary ARPA domain (still used)
- .int international organization
- country code A country (e.g. ie or gr (grrr))

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Within Top-Level Domains

- Subdivision possible
- Arbitrary levels possible
- Not standardized
- Controlled locally by organization


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Example Name Structure

- First level: com
- Second level is company name: cisco
- Third level is division within company: security
- Fourth level either
 - Company subdivision: crypto
 - Individual computer: smtp

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DNS Illustrated



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DNS Key Concepts

- The number of segments in a domain name corresponds to the naming hierarchy
- There is no universal standard for this hierarchy; each organization can choose its own naming convention
- Furthermore, names within an organization do not need to follow a uniform pattern; individual groups within the organization can choose a hierarchical structure that is appropriate for that group

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DNS Client/Server Interaction

- Client known as *resolver*
 - Actually a library that applications link against
- Multiple DNS servers used
- Arranged in a hierarchy
- Each server corresponds to an adjacent part of the global naming hierarchy


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Inter-Server Links

- All domain name servers are linked together to form a unified system
- Each server knows how to reach a root server, and
- How to reach servers that are authorities for names further down the hierarchy

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
DNS Hierarchy



- Choice made by organization foobar

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Distributed Hierarchical Database



- Root servers and TLD servers typically do not contain hostname to IP mappings
- They contain mappings for locating authoritative servers

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DNS Root Name Servers

- Contacted by local name server that can not resolve name
- Root name server:
 - Contacts authoritative name server if name mapping not known
 - Gets mapping
 - Returns mapping to local name server

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TLD and Authoritative Servers

- Top-level domain (TLD) servers: Responsible for com, org, net, edu, etc., and all top-level country domains ie, gr, ...
- Authoritative DNS servers: Organization's DNS servers, providing authoritative hostname to IP mappings for organization's servers (e.g., web and mail)
 - Can be maintained by organization or service provider

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Local Name Server

- Each ISP (residential ISP, company, university) has one
 - Also called "default name server"
- When a host makes a DNS query, query is sent to its local DNS server
 - Acts as a proxy, forwards query into hierarchy
 - Reduces lookup latency for commonly searched hostnames

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Caching and Updating Records

- Once (any) name server learns mapping, it *caches* mapping
 - Cache entries timeout (disappear) after some time
 - TLD servers typically cached in local name servers
 - * Thus root name servers not often visited
- Update/notify mechanisms under design by IETF
 - RFC 2136
 - <http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/dnsind-charter.html>

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DNS Records

DNS: Distributed DB storing resource records (RR)

RR format: (name, value, type, ttl)

- Type=A
 - name** is hostname
 - value** is IP address
- Type=NS
 - name** is domain (e.g. foo.com)
 - value** is IP address of authoritative name server for this domain
- Type=CNAME
 - name** is alias name for some ``canonical'' (the real) name
www.ibm.com is really servereast.backup2.ibm.com
 - value** is canonical name
- Type=MX
 - value** is name of mail server associated with **name**


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DNS Protocol and Messages (1/2)

DNS protocol: Query and reply messages, both with same *message format*


Message header:

- Identification: 16 bit # for query, reply to query uses same #
- Flags:
 - Query or reply
 - Reply is authoritative



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DNS Protocol and Messages (2/2)




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Inserting Records Into DNS

- Example: Just created startup ``Network Fun``
- Register name networkfun.com at a registrar (e.g., Network Solutions, Inc.)
 - Need to provide registrar with names and IP addresses of your authoritative name server (primary and secondary)
 - Registrar inserts two RRs into the com TLD server:
 - * (networkfun.com, dns1.networkfun.com, NS)
 - * (dns1.networkfun.com, 212.212.212.1, A)
- Put in authoritative server (dns1.networkfun.com) Type A record for www.networkfun.com and Type MX record for networkfun.com
- How do people get the IP address of your web site?

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DNS Lookup Example




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DNS Caching

- DNS responses are cached:
 - Quick response for repeated translations
 - Other queries may reuse some parts of lookup
 - * NS records for domains
- DNS negative queries are cached
 - Don't have to repeat past mistakes
 - E.g. misspellings
- Cached data periodically times out
 - Lifetime (TTL) of data controlled by owner of data
 - TTL passed along with every record

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Subsequent Lookup Example



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Reverse DNS

- Given numeric IP address, find DNS name
- To find 150.10.20.1:
 - Query 1.20.10.150.in-addr.arpa
 - Get back server.acme.com


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DNS Attacks


- Cache poisoning
- Reverse DNS attack
 - Known as the Bellovin/Mockapetris attack





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



DNS Lookup: A asks D for B's IP address




DNS Lookup: D asks B (or someone who knows about B)









DNS Cache Poisoning Attack: Now A asks for B's address



DNS Cache Poisoning Attack: D ``knows'' the answer already, and returns it



DNS Cache Poisoning Attack: A uses the answer



DNS Cache Poisoning

- Older versions of bind fall for this
- You can even send an answer without a query, to some implementations!
- DNS responses can be spoofed to
 - What if the query gets two answers: Use the first?!
- DNSsec fixes this

Bellovin/Mockapetris Attack

- Trust relationships use DNS names
 - /etc/hosts.equiv contains ntrg.cs.tcd.ie
- Requests come with numeric IP source address
 - Use reverse DNS to find DNS name
 - Decide access based on /etc/hosts.equiv

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Attack

- Gain control of DNS service for domain
- Select target machine in domain
- Find trust relationships
 - SNMP, finger can help find active sessions, etc.
 - Example: Target trusts host1
- Connect:
 - Attempt rlogin from compromised machine
 - Target contacts reverse DNS server with IP addr1
 - Use modified reverse DNS to say addr1 is host1
 - Target allows rlogin

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Defense Against This Attack

- Double-check reverse DNS:
 - Modify rlogind, rshd to query DNS server
 - See if DNS name maps to numeric IP address
- Authenticate entries in DNS tables:
 - DNSsec
 - Requires some form of PKI...

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