

Applied Security

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Cardinal Health

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
Verica

@aaronrinehart

Crafting Secure and Resilient Distributed Systems using Chaos Engineering

AARON RINEHART, CTO, FOUNDER

- FORMER CHIEF SECURITY ARCHITECT @UNITEDHEALTH
- FORMER DOD, NASA SAFETY + RELIABILITY ENGINEERING
- FREQUENT SPEAKER AND AUTHOR ON CHAOS ENGINEERING + SECURITY
- O'REILLY AUTHOR: CHAOS ENGINEERING, SECURITY CHAOS ENGINEERING BOOKS
- PIONEER BEHIND SECURITY CHAOS ENGINEERING
- LED CHAOSLINGR TEAM AT UNITEDHEALTH



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@verica_io #chaosengineering

VERICA



JAMIE DICKEN

- MANAGER, SECURITY ENGINEERING AT CARDINAL HEALTH
- FORMER SOFTWARE ENGINEER AND SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT MANAGER
- 11 YEARS IN HEALTHCARE
- SPEAKER ON UNITING DISCIPLINES: SOFTWARE ENGINEERING AND INFOSEC, INFOSEC AND SRE
- FUTURE O'REILLY CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR: SECURITY CHAOS ENGINEERING REPORT

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AGENDA

New Approaches to Security

Chaos Engineering

Continuous Learning

Security Chaos Engineering

Getting Started with Applied Security


Resilience Engineering & Security



PROBLEM




THE
STRUGGLE
IS REAL



A photograph of a server room or data center. The left side of the image is dominated by a massive, sprawling mess of colorful network cables (yellow, orange, red, blue, green) that are tangled and draped across multiple server racks. The cables appear to be Ethernet or optical fibers. In the background, more server racks are visible, along with a large black industrial fan on the floor and some office furniture like desks and shelves on the right. The overall atmosphere is one of technical complexity and physical clutter.

SYSTEM ENGINEERING IS
MESSY

IN THE BEGINNING...



After a few months...

Rolling Sevl Outage on
Portal

Code Freeze

Regulatory
Audit

Lead Software Engineer
finds a new job at Amazon

Hard Coded Passwords

New Security Tool

Identity Conflicts

Expired Certificate

300 Microservices $\Delta \rightarrow$ 850 Microservices

Scalability Issues

Delayed Features

Network is Unreliable

Autoscaling Keeps
Breaking

Refactor Pricing

Cloud Provider API Outage

DNS Resolution
Errors

WAF Outage \rightarrow Disabled


Large Customer
Outage

Years?





THE DESIGN-ORIENTED
MINDSET IS OLD-SCHOOL



Documentation stored in team
archives

Oh yeah... Forgot about these!

- There is an API Gateway in place for some APIs, but not the legacy ones.
- Some APIs are publicly accessible and used by our customers directly.
- There's a monthly batch process that runs directly on the database and saves to an SFTP directory.
- Not all microservices are independent. Some level of synchronicity is required.




"The only way to understand a complex system is to interact with it."

--Dave Snowden

A NEW
APPROACH
TO LEARNING



CONTINUOUS LEARNING





**CONTINUOUS
FIXING !=
CONTINUOUS
LEARNING**



How does a
System become
stable?




A
CHANGE
IN
MINDSET



People **OPERATE**

DIFFERENTLY

when they
expect things to
fail



Cognitive Load + Tradeoffs Under Pressure








INSTRUMENTING CHAOS



Testing VS. Experimentation



CHAOS ENGINEERING

Is about establishing order from Chaos

SECURITY
CHAOS
ENGINEERING

Hope is Not an Effective Strategy

"It worked in Star Wars but it
won't work here"

**"UNDERSTAND YOUR SYSTEM AND
WHERE ITS SECURITY GAPS ARE
BEFORE AN ADVERSARY DOES"**



WE OFTEN MISREMEMBER WHAT OUR
SYSTEMS REALLY ARE, AND AS A
RESULT THE OPPORTUNITY FOR
ACCIDENTS & MISTAKES INCREASES



continuous Security Verification




**REDUCE UNCERTAINTY BY
BUILDING CONFIDENCE
IN HOW THE SYSTEM
ACTUALLY FUNCTIONS**

USE CASES

USE CASES

- INCIDENT RESPONSE
- SECURITY CONTROL
- VALIDATION
- SECURITY
- OBSERVABILITY
- COMPLIANCE
- MONITORING



INCIDENT RESPONSE

"RESPONSE" IS THE PROBLEM
WITH INCIDENT RESPONSE.

SECURITY INCIDENTS ARE SUBJECTIVE

No matter how much we prepare...

We really don't know very much

WHERE? WHY? WHO?

HOW? WHAT?

FLIP THE MODEL



POST MORTEM = PREPARATION




ChaoSlingr

- ChatOps Integration
- Configuration-as-Code
- Example Code & Open Framework
- Serverless App in AWS
- 100% Native AWS
- Configurable Operational Mode & Frequency
- Opt-In | Opt-Out Model



HashiCorp
Terraform






Applied Security Journey



The Cardinal Health foray into
Security Chaos Engineering



GETTING STARTED with SECURITY CHAOS ENGINEERING

**COMING
LATER
THIS YEAR...**


O'REILLY®

Security Chaos Engineering


Continuous Security Verification in Practice


Early
Release

RAW &
UNEDITED



Aaron Rinehart
& Kelly Shortridge





Hypothesis: If someone accidentally or maliciously introduced a misconfigured port then we would immediately detect, block, and alert on the event.

SECURITY + RESILIENCE ENGINEERING

SHALL WE PLAY A GAME?

THE CASE FOR SECURITY CHAOS ENGINEERING

CONCLUSION

