








1. Security Governance + Principles + Policies



Availability \propto Integrity + Confidentiality





Accounting



Logs

vs

Auditing

Trails
Logs + user activity



vs

Monitoring



Also watch at per end
PTO (not recording to file)

Possible to monitor without Auditing. But, we can't audit without monitoring.

Something → you do
Something → you have
Something → you know
Something → you are

Access Control

Subject + object


Security control =
counter measures



→ RBAE

CRITICAL


- ② Accounting :- Review log files to check compliance & violations in order to hold subjects accountable for their actions.
- ① Auditing :- Recording log of events and activities related to subjects & objects.



Layering - (Defense of Depth)



Serial config.

- immigration



Parallel config.

- shopping mall



Def. Hiding = security through obscurity

specific function = ABSTRACTION

Think Encryption

(A)

xxxx
Data in transit



(B)







In use


Application memory

Governance = Vision | Broader Risk














DUE CARE + DD → PROOF TO RISK MGMT





APPROACHES

Threat Modeling

1. ↳ Proactive /
Defensive

2. ↳ Reactive /
Adversarial

(IDENTIFY)

Identifying Threats

Implement Access controls

1. ↳ Focus on Assets - - -
valuations,

2. ↳ Focus on Applications /
softwares

3. ↳ Focus on Attacker's goals,
'

Understand
ETHICAL
HACKING

consider
OWASP - - -
TOP 10

0A9

SOFTWARE
FOCUSED

Microsoft's

(CATEGORIZE)

STRIDE threat model methodology

S - Spoofing → why not add
"Social Engineering"

T - Tampering

R - Repudiation


I - Information Disclosure

D - DDoS

E - Elevation of Privileges




Threat Model Methodologies




(ANALYZE) = Data Flow Diagram

Think with
each
^ with
STRIDE
Perspective



Threat Reduction
(MITIGATE)

= Decompose or
Dissection




THINK!


- How Data is entered
- What happens to Data inside
- How Data is stored?
- How Data is secured inside
- How Data is secured?
- How Data is coming out?



threat reduction / decomposition process


- REDUCTION ANALYSIS ↓
- ↳ 1. Threat Boundaries = VPCSC
 - ↳ 2. Data Flow Path → movement of data b/w locations
 - ↳ 3. Input Points → location where external input is received
→ after ANC (PAM) *
 - ↳ 4. Privileged Operations = SA | Admin Alcs.
 - ↳ 5. Seizing chance & Approach = Align with sec. polig.



2. Personal Security + Risk Mgt.









RISK MANAGEMENT

CONCEPTS




RISK MANAGEMENT



CONCEPTS




Risk Management

Primary goal:
To reduce the
risk to
acceptable level.






$$\text{Threat} * \text{Vulnerabilities} * \text{Asset Value}$$



Countermereve /
Security control

4. Refers to RISK mitigation.



3. Physical.

2. Technical /
logical

1. Administrative

**SECURITY
MAIN
CATEGORIES**

**CONTROL
CATEGORIES**

other
controls.
P.f.o.

Applicable Types of controls



(1) Deterrent → Physical

(2) Preventive → physical + technical.

(3) Detective →

(4) Compensating → defense of assets

(5) Corrective.

(6) Recovery → RAID

Backup & Restore

(7) Directive

Force
supplier
compliance

SIEM

- monitoring

Ex/IT
SInv.

virus → quarantine

fixed.

→ BCP

- Backup & Restore

- Hot / warm / cold sites

S.

Monitoring.

Before safeguards

After safeguards.

RMF - RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

NIST
800-37

of STEPS.

with 2

PERSPECTIVE

NIST
800-53

Information
SYSTEM

Security
CONTROL

- ↳ ① Prepare
- ↳ ② Categorize
- ↳ ③ Select
- ↳ ④ Implement
- ↳ ⑤ Assess
- ↳ ⑥ Authorise
- ↳ ⑦ Monitor

People can see IT AM
Always Monitoring

CISSP = NIST 800-37
RMF

Other RMFs

↳ OCTAVE

↳ TARA

↳ FAIR




Old
me

Training +
Awareness +
Education



New
me

Behavior Modification
at fundamental level



QUANTATIVE * RISK ANALYSIS STEPS:

① Inventory Assets — find AV (Asset value)
 $\$200K$

② Identify Threats — calculate EF & SLE

$$SLE = AV * EF$$
$$= 200 \times 50\%$$
$$= 100K$$

③ Perform Threat Analysis — calculate the likelihood of verified threat (ARO) — $10\% (0.10)$
 $10\% \rightarrow 1 \text{ in every 10 year}$

④ Estimate the potential loss — $ALE = SLE * ARO$
 $= \$10K$

⑤ Research countermeasures for each threat — security controls to reduce risk

$$ALE1 - ALE2 - ACS (\text{Annual maintenance cost}) = \text{Total value at safeguard}$$

⑥ Perform cost/benefit Analysis

— For each countermeasures for each threat for each asset.

Total Safeguard value
should not exceed more
than \$10K.

Risk = Threat * Vulnerability

→ This is absolute


Exposure = is a possibility

↳ low exposure can result to high risk

↳ high exposure can result to low risk

Safeguards
Not only purchasing
new products

Removing elements
from Infra.
Reconfigure
existing elements





if bullet still hit with body armour, you still die



=
if safeguard fails, the loss of Asset
is same as there is no safeguard.

3. BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANNING





L3 Trees are
of energy



BCP: Focus on
Business
operation


Focus on IT Activities : DR ----- ch: 18

- ↳ Strategic (long term)
- ↳ 10,000 ft
- ↳ high-level
- ↳ (Business) mgmt related



I BCP Project Scope & Planning








*Mgmt. don't want
to invest
\$\$ for
BCP?
ASIC pris
question -*

SEAT-OF-THE-PANTS ATTITUDE

How long seat-of-the-pants recovery might take \$1M
when compare to actual planned continuity of operations → consider disaster business cost & indirect cost of lost opportunities.

BCP
\$200K

ENFORCE BCP AS LAW + REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS



• *Get BCP policy documented & get a formal approval from the management.*

WHAT IS BIA ANYWAY?

BIA identifies RESOURCES that are critical to those RESOURCES, threats to those RESOURCES, likelihood of impact those threats on business



2 BCP BIA

STEP-1

Business Impact Analysis
STEP-2 = HEART

P.T.O.
STEP-3

P.T.O.
STEP-4

P.T.O.
STEP-5

Plan made
TESTES


YOU ARE HERE

Analysis


Quantitative
(Numbers + Factors +
figures)

Qualitative
(scenari + intuicion
+ experience)

Decision



BALANCE



Data loss tolerance =
defined back up strategy

RPO =
Recovery
of
Data

P.T.O. for
INT/OUTAGE
SKETCH

NETFLIX IS DOWN

MTD / MTO
Maximum Tolerable
Downtime or outage


2 hours

1 hour

MTD RTO

— should be



RTO = Recovery of
mission critical
process





3. Risks +
4. Likelihood

② Produce overall Business Impact.



BUILDING
\$500K

AV = Asset Value

$$SLE = AV * EF$$

$$= \$500K * 70\%$$

$$SLE = \$350K$$

Annualized Loss
Expectancy - Business
can expect loss of
\$10,500 every year
due to fire in building.

one fire = $\frac{70\% \text{ damage}}{\text{Single time loss due to fire}}$

EF = Exposure Factor






Single time loss due to fire


SLE

fire occurs once
every 30 years

$$\begin{aligned} ARO &= \frac{1}{30} \\ &= 0.03 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} ALE &= SLE * ARO \\ &= \$350K * 0.03 \\ &= \$10,500 \end{aligned}$$






- Whatever impact we realized from ① & ②

↳ How BCP strategy will be


DEVELOPED + IMPLEMENTED.



1. STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

BIA's Step (s)

Priority list



RISK Accepted = NO Problem

RISK to be mitigated

↳ Who will mitigate?
(Resource)

↳ How it will mitigate?
(Plan + Implementation)

2. PROVISION & PROCESSES

Because this is where we mitigate

MEAT OF BCP

Saves 3 types of ASSETS

- 1. People
- 2. Building & Facilities
- 3. Infrastructure

HUMAN = MOST VALUABLE ASSET

Building facilities → Hardening provisions → Existing site → Fix leaking roof

Hot, cold, warm sites → Alternative site → if Existing site hardening fails,

Infrastructure

Physical Hardening

- UPS x Racks
- Fire Alarms
- Sprinklers

Alternate Systems

Redundancy

DC1
sydney

DC2
melb.

Availability

4 BCP Plan Approval + Implementation

1	B
2	C

Business continuity planning
5 BCP
BRIDGE

GET APPROVAL FROM SENIOR MGMT.

① Plan Approval



Try to get endorsed by top executive such as CEO for BCP importance + WEIGHT

② Plan Implementation

↳ Deploy BCP resources

③ Training & Education

↳ BCP resource

↳ Backup resource


④ BCP Documentation

↳ Event of Emergency
↳ Historic records

Important components of BCP


1 Statement of Importance

Signal why BCP is important?
with CEO signature




2 Statement of Priorities

- critical business functions
of priority for continue operatn




3 Statement of Organization Responsibility

SENTIMENT:
BCP IS EVERYONE'S
RESPONSIBILITY.




4 Statement of Urgency & Timing

shows why BCP is critical.



5 Risk Assessment

All that Formulas of risks.




6 Risk Acceptance / Mitigation

ASK BUSINESS LEADER A QUESTION
Why RISK is accepted?
(residual risk)

7 Vital Records Program

→ How to retrieve Docs | records
in Disaster?

↳ where is it stored?



8 Maintenance

It's good practice to include BCP components in job descriptions, etc.
if remains fresh.

- ↳ Living Document for BCP
- ↳ Periodic update
- ↳ Version control
- ↳ Destroy old versions.

9 Emergency Response Guidelines

- ↳ Need employee should be easily accessible & organized in the organization
- ↳ Employee should be able to respond to emergency situations
- ↳ Organize response procedures
- ↳ whom to contact / notified of the incident
- ↳ secondary response procedures.

10 Testing & Exercise

--- chap: 18

BCP doc to ensure that personnel are trained to perform their duties in the event of disaster.


Slow down continuity
product will blow MTD !!

BCP / DRP Planning High level steps

Blueprint

BCP / DRP
Ultimate
Goal

To resume normal business operations
after disaster struck using effective and secure
strategies.



BCP / DR

Deals with

Availability
of CIA Tries

You really need a BCP coordinator who would liaise with employees, mgmt

Business Impact Analysis is different than Risk Analysis

Identify critical business process & functions & assign criticality score to those processes

if router is down,
what's the MTD?
what's the RTO?
Before business losing \$48

Identify Assets & assign criticality or risk score

Router has higher risk score than desktop computer

BIA's two exclusive thoughts → if it won't happen, that doesn't mean we can't plan for it.

→ if it most likely won't happen, that doesn't mean we can't assign the risk score. just assign the lower risk score
if ($>100M$ file won't be saved)
(for mediocre = 100 since)

location, location,
location

mantra Best
case off



Downy, Downy,
Downy



IT
mantra

BIA General steps

- who is going to be interviewed? (Identify Stakeholders)
- What techniques to gather data?
 - ↳ Q&A / interview
 - ↳ quantitative + qualitative Analysis
- Why are business critical functions?
 - ↳ Amazon APP - Product
(Netflix) — movie portal
- Why critical resources each critical function requires?
 - ↳ Front End UI Box

How long each critical functions survive
without critical resources?

↳ without Web UI, how impact will be
for Amazon (Netflix)

What are the
THREATS to
these critical
functions?

- Hack
- DDoS
- Misconfiguration
- Human Error / mistake

Amazon
(Netflix) Front UI = mission
critical

Assign MTD
rating to each
critical function

Document & Submit to Senior management.

THIS IS LUCKY AHMED'S BIA PERSPECTIVE

BCP DEVELOPMENT PROCESS


- ① Develop BCP Policy statement (RMF Prepare)
 - High-level executive direction on what BCP accomplish + required resources
- ② Conduct BIA
 - || (below :-)
 - How to mitigate & their associated cost
- ③ Identify Preventive Controls (above :-) (NIST-800-53)
 - ↓ Identify critical business process & function (MTD, RTO, RPO, RPT)
- ④ Develop Recovery Strategies — IT staff develop DRP
 - How IT service will be restored in order of priority.
This includes:
- ⑤ Develop an IT contingency plan ←
- ⑥ Perform DRP testing & training
 - Test DRP to ensure method & identify gaps.
- ⑦ Perform BCP / DRP maintenance. (RMF Phase 6)
 - Review BCP & DRP process every three months
 - Audit annually.

Development of BCP starts from these steps.

4. LAWS, REGULATIONS, & COMPLIANCE

PERSPECTIVE

Four Security Issues



To govern these issues

WE HAVE

LAWS

... overlapping
laws

+
multiple
jurisdictions

=

CONFUSION

Criminal Law

Civil Law

Administrative Law



↳ ^{100%.}
Federal + state
government.


- ↳ computer fraud
- ↳ Abuse Act
- ↳ Electronic & commons, privacy Act
- ↳ Identity Theft
- ↳ Digital Millennium
copyright



Min.
Govt
involvement

Branch


Transaction



organization

↳ Trademark

↳ Patent laws



Government
Agencies

↳ Day to day
activities

↳ HIPPA :

↳ /
Specific industry
+ Data Types

COMPUTER CRIME

- ① Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (CFAA)
+ CFAA Amendments
- ② Federal sentencing Guidelines
- ③ National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996
- ④ Federal Information Security Mgmt. Act
- ⑤ Federal Cybersecurity Laws of 2014

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

↳ Copyright & the
Digital Millennium
Copyright Act
↳ CHINA :-)

↳ Trademarks
↳ Patents
↳ Trade Secrets

PRIVACY

LICENSING

* Import / Export

↳ Computer export controls

↳ Encryption
Export controls

Copyright

Protects the original work of author

Protects the work, not the creator

Trademark

Name, slogan, logo

Patent

Protection of creators of new inventions

Trade secret

Protects the operating know-how of firms


protects the creator
rights of distribution

Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998



- prohibits copy protection mechanism placed in digital media + limits the liability of ISP for activities of their users

Economic Espionage Act of 1996

- extreme penalty to individuals who found guilty of the theft of trade secret
(if it's a benefit of foreign govt)






NOTES FROM PGS



DATA IN
DATA OUT

5. PROTECTING SECURITY OF DATA





VS CAN STOP TERRORISM

1	Top Secret	Confidential	\$1B marvel Leak movie service grave damage
2	Secret	Private	Service damage = Payroll data breach
3	Confidential	Sensitive	Damage = Any technical / nontechnical data breach that causes affect & job exp.
4	Sketchy		No damage = No need to protect CTA but still a loss of integrity
5	Unclassified	Public	


Classified Data?




What's next?

- ↳ Security control + practices
- ↳ Proper handling / table
- ↳ Handling, storing & destroying data + Assets based on classification.

SECURE EMAIL EXAMPLES WITH SECURITY CONTROLS / MEASURES



DATA STATES IN EXAMPLE




1. Web App request data from web server
2. Web server request data from Database server
3. DB server retrieves encrypted data from Database, convert to (decrypt) format so web APP can understand.
→ Data At Rest (AES 256)
4. DB server again encrypt the data & send to web server
→ Data In Transit (TLS 1.2)
5. Web Server decrypt the data & send it to web App. If stored some temp data buffer while authorizing transaction & purge / delete data when ~~use app~~ no longer requires.
→ Data In Use (TLS 1.2)

REGARDLESS OF SECURITY CONTROLS

DATA BREACH.

happens --

To prevent data breach, we need to manage sensitive data



Useful for DLP

- Don't downgrade description, instead destroy it.



TD Bank paid \$850K for losing 2 Backup Types.

\$# of Sensitive Data
➤
of media holding sensitive data

4

Destroying Sensitive Data

High classified Data

=

complete destruction

lower classified Data

=

overwrite

It's not just about destroying data, it's how we destroy it.
Method matters.

Remaince

(ex: ex girlfriend's memory trace)

Traces of Data

Residue even after deleting it.

destroying data methods

Erase

Erasing

- Not secure

Cleaning / Overwriting

Phase 1 1010

Degaussing

- Works for magnetic tapes + harddisks

Destruction

Physical destruction = most secure

Purging



- Cleaning process multiple times
- Not ideal for top secret data

Phase 2 0101

Phase 3 1101
Create random digits.)


- Not for CD/DVD/SSD.

Browsing
BAD =
discovering body.



How can we protect Data?




1 - more in domain 3




Ownership

who owns the DATA?

who owns the asset?






7 Privacy Shield Principles

→ Organization can self-certify using these principles.


- ↳ (1) **Notice** :-
from organization
To customers on
what info they collect
why they collect
- ↳ (2) **choice** :-
To opt-out / unsubscribe
kind of.
- ↳ (3) **Accountability for onward transfer** :-
organization = comply
① Notice +
② choice
forward / transfer info
to 3rd party
- ↳ (4) **Security** of Personal Data
- ↳ (5) **Data Integrity & Purpose Limitation** :-
only collect info as what's needed
- ↳ (6) **Access** : Individual to convert, amend, delete their PII
- ↳ (7) **Recourse, Enforcement & Liability** :- Mechanism to handle individual's complaints.



Pseudonymization

-- similar to Tokenisation

! -- GDPR context = Replacing data with Artificial Identifiers.




Name	==
DOB	==
Medcity	==
~	==

Actual Data

Dave46

Pseudo value


6



-- Removing all relevant data so it's impossible to identify the original data subject / person.

BUT,

DATA INFERENCE TECHNIQUE can identify individual even if personal data is removed.



Actors
Leonardo

Movies
→ 1
→ 2
→ 3

Amount
\$100M
\$110M
\$119M

Even if Leo is anonymized, we can still find how much he paid for his movies.

Data Munging

Pseudonymization Tokenisation

once munged, it cannot return to original state.

7

DATA Administrator

Assign permissions based on
RBAC / least privilege

8

DATA Custodians

Data owner delegate dg to
data tier to custodians.

- maintains integrity and security of data
- Data is broken up.
- Data logs maintenance for audits.

9

Users

Have access to data they only need

Data + Asset owner

Data Administrator

Data processing

KINERELSHIP

business owners

Users

Anonymization

Data custodians

Pseudonymization

To Protect PRIVACY

consider

Security Baseline

↳ NIST 800-53

↳ CIS

software
environments

ch: 16


Security Standards

↳ ISO 27001

↳ PCI DSS

↳ MAS

↳ GDPR



BASELINE
SECURITY
CONTROLS


Selecting controls for protection only ↗ SCOPING

→ 6, 16, 17, 23
6, 5 →
compensating
control
(modified)


↗ TAILORING

* Inventories

① Tracking Hardware



② Tracking Software



Solutions

Solution of software tracking problem = **MULTIFACETED**

Application whitelisting

Using Gold master
- standard image
for authorised software

Device management
Software
- Unified Endpoint mgmt (UEM)

Enforce PoP

- Not everybody should install s/w.

Authorized scanning
- Periodic Val. Scen.

DATA RETENTION

what data
to retain?

Where to retain
Data?

How we
Retain Data

To ensure data is available in
timely manner, consider four
issues:

① TAXONOMY

- Based on various categories
- 2020, HR, IT, Marketing

② Classification


- Search data based on
sensitivity

③ Normalization

- Tagging scheme that
make data searchable

④ Indexing

INFORMATION | DATA LIFE CYCLE



Note - Introducing Cryptography can add value to data life cycle

↳ USE = hashing for integrity

↳ ARCHIVE + DESTROY = Encryption for confidentiality.

6. CRYPTOGRAPHY & SYMMETRIC KEY ALGORITHMS

CRYPTOGRAPHY GOALS (- P.T.O.)

- confidentiality
- Authentication
- Nonrepudiation
- Integrity

of sensitive information
AT rest,
in transit,
in use

HISTORY

Caesar cipher

$$\begin{array}{l} A \rightarrow D \\ B \rightarrow E \end{array} \quad \text{ROT3}$$

→ Vulnerable to
frequency analysis
attack


Note

→ If you can decode using
Frequency Analysis, then it's
transposition cipher.

→ Substitution cipher are more
prone to Periodic Analysis.

Examination of
frequency based on
repeated use of key

1. Confidentiality — what it means?



2 Types of Cryptosystems

Symmetric
Cryptosystem

Asymmetric
Cryptosystem.

→ shared
key

→ private &
public key

Think different kinds of Data with Attacks.


↳ Data at Rest — theft or loss of physical device

↳ Data in Transit — Eavesdropping

↳ Data in use — Unauthorized Access


2. Integrity — what it means?

Data is not altered from the time it was created to and the time it was accessed.




3. Authentication — what it means?

To make sure person is genuine what he meant to be




- Both parties have a secret code to establish secure comm
- Uses challenge-response authentication technique.


4. Nonrepudiation



Hey! But I didn't tell that.

- ↳ Symmetric key \neq Nonrepudiation (Authenticity)
- ↳ Asymmetric key = Nonrepudiation





Cryptography Concepts

X	Y	$X \wedge Y$
0	0	0
0	1	0
1	0	0
1	1	1

AND

X	Y	$X \oplus Y$
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	0

Modulo Function

X	Y	$X \vee Y$
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	1

OR

X	$\neg X$
0	1
1	0

$$8 \bmod 2 = 0$$

$$15 \bmod 3 = 0$$

$$10 \bmod 3 = 1$$

$$33 \bmod 8 = 1$$

$$6 \bmod 8 = 2$$

$$6 \bmod 8 = ?$$

One-way Functions

- Produce large prime numbers as output so finding input value becomes IMPOSSIBLE!

core N concept

Salt

If N is not used, then two identical plaintext that are encrypted with same key will create same ciphertext. Algorithm use N & key to provide randomness in Encryption process.

- IV creates unique ciphertext each time message is encrypted using same key.

An estimation how long attacker will take to break a cryptosystem

(work factor)

P.T.O - WORK

Function

Strength of Crypto system

= cost & time of 100K function



\$100K worth of data
\$100K worth of
cryptographic
solution

\$105K
worth of
cryptography
solution

Split Knowledge
M of N control
($M \leq N$)
separation
of
Digits

E.g. Key Escrow Database

Work function \geq Attack value

CRYPTOGRAPHY CONCEPTS (contd ...)

Don't confuse with
CODE

- ↳ Not all codes are secret
- ↳ "Eagle has landed" to report arrival of Energy craft

This conveys confidential message but may not achieve confidentiality

CIPHER

↳ Meant to hide true meaning of message

↳ Achieves confidentiality with variety of techniques.

→ codes work on words and phrases while ciphers focus on individual characters and bits.

1. Transposition cipher - scramble

- ↳ Scrambling / rearranging letters of plaintext \Rightarrow ciphertext
- ↳ Can use "columnar transposition" for more complexity

Block cipher


2. Substitution Cipher

- ↳ Real caesar cipher (ROT3)
- ↳ Uses encryption algorithm to replace characters of plaintext with other characters.
- ↳ Polyalphabetic : Another substitution cipher
 - Protects against direct frequency analysis but vulnerable to periodic analysis.

3. One-time Pads — The only perfect cryptosystem

↳ Vernam cipher

↳ The key length is as long as message!


↳ impossible to break when used correctly

↳ need physical protection

↳ one time pads must be randomly generated values

↳ one pad = one time use

↳ long keys = difficult to distribute

↳ Secretly distributed to its destination

VENONA

Entire soviet union project was declassified
as one-time pad didn't generate reoccurring
key instead of random one.

4. Running Key cipher

↳ Book cipher

Moby Dick

↳ page 46

Last page

↳ Unlike one time pad which requires physical exchange of pads, two parties need a common book.

P.T.O
End
10,000 ft.

2 types of symmetric algorithms

Block cipher

stream cipher

5. Block Cipher



Encryption Algorithm

↳ Transposition, as example of block cipher
+ many modern encryption algorithms.

6. Stream Ciphers

↳ one character at a time

Caesar

one time pad

↳ Even block cipher but buffer fills all data at once at a time

Cryptographic algorithm's 2 basic operation to obscure plaintext message

Confusion

- Attacker can't determine relationship between cipher text and plaintext to determine key

P.T.O
End


Diffusion

buffer clarity

- change in plaintext results in multiple changes throughout the ciphertext


MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY.

I.



Cryptography perspective



THEN



↑
Hide from
public

"Security through
obscenity"

NOW




Available to public
=
improve security

the length of the
key directly relates
to work function of
the cryptosystem.

Cryptographic keys

1. Symmetric key
Algorithms.

→ **private Key Cryptography**



Not to confused with private-public
key pair.

- Private key means two people
share same secret (to encrypt
& decrypt message).

↳ Problem with symmetric key cryptography

- ↳ No nonrepudiation but provides confidentiality
 - Key distribution = problem → QKD: one day quantum key distribution will solve this problem
 - Not scalable
 - Frequent key generation
 - n^2 keys
- HOW MANY KEYS?
-
- $$\frac{n(n-1)}{2}$$


2. Asymmetric Key Algorithms --- ch 7

- best part:**
- ↳ ^{Sender} Encrypt message with Receiver's public key
 - ↳ ^{Receiver} Decrypt message with its own private key.
 - once sender encrypt, he/she/they can't decrypt it with their private key

How many keys?


↳ **DOUBLE IT!**

that's happen when we browser
we have to generate
public key (with P257)
browser sets ~~public key~~ generates
symmetric key & encrypt with
public key



→ Web server decrypt
with its private key ✓

↳ Asymmetric key algorth = support for digital signature



How B verify that msg come from A?

- = A ~~sender~~ creates message digest with hashing algorithm
- = A Encrypt msg with ^{own} private key
- = B decrypt msg with A's public key.

↳ Asymmetric strengths


- Every new user = one pair of public-private key
- Generate key if private key is compromised
- Easy key revocation / removing user from system
- * - Provides nonrepudiation, integrity & confidentiality, authentication
- * - Easy key distribution process = make your public key available on internet.
- * - No preexisting communication link needs to exist = Batman vs joker can be friends
- * - Scalable

↳ Asymmetric weakness = slow

3. Hashing Algorithms --- ch: 7

↳ Recv MESSAGE DIGEST as part of
Digital signature support from
Asymmetric Key Algorithm.

Hash algorithm produces MD.



* Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- Insecure, but still a building block of 3DES
- ~~64-bit block~~ cipher for all five modes of operation technically

* It uses 56-bit Key to drive encryption & Decryption process.

Remaining 8-bits are used for detecting tampering or corruption of the key.


→ 2¹¹ 64-bit block

5 modes for DES operation:

i) ECB - Electronic code book

- Encrypts the block with chosen key. If algorithm encounters same block, it produces same encrypted block.
 - Used to exchange small amount of data.
- Using same key + lock for 2¹¹ the door
↓
least secure

ii) CBC - Cipher block chaining




- Implements IV & XOR: produces unique output everytime operation is performed
- If block is corrupted during transmission, it's impossible to decrypt that block & following blocks.

chaining
Output Feedback Mode solves this problem

iii) Cipher Feedback - CFB

- Stream version of CBC, uses XOR
- Instead of blocks, it uses memory buffers
- It uses IV and chaining.



iv) Output feedback - OFB

- Similar to CFB, instead of XORING encrypted version of previous block of cipher text, DES XORs plaintext with seed value
- * Advantage: No chain reaction or ~~loss~~ like transmission error in CBC

v) Counter mode - CTR

- ideal for parallel computing as it allows encryption & decryption into multiple independent steps.
- Use stream cipher similar to CFB. Instead of creating seed value for Enc/Dec. operation, it simply use counter increments for each operation.

* Triple DES (3DES)


- Because DES' 56-bit Key length was insecure.

4 Versions

1 DES-EDE3

Plaintext

× three-times Encryption
with different keys



Encryption - $E(P, K)$
Plaintext

Effective key $K_L = 168\text{-bit}$
After Attack $K_L = 112\text{-bits.}$

$E(K_1, E(K_2, E(K_3, P)))$

2 DES-EDE3

- same as **1** but replace second encryption operation with decryption

$E(K_1, D(K_2, E(K_3, P)))$

$K_L = 112\text{-bit}$

only two keys used

3 DES-EDE2

Effective $K_L = 112\text{-bit}$


After Attack $K_L = 80\text{-bit}$

4 DES-EDE2

$E(K_1, D(K_2, E(K_1, P)))$

$E(K_1, E(K_2, E(K_1, P)))$

* International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)

- Developed to respond insufficient KL in DES
 - Like DES, it uses 64-bit cipher block of plaintext / ciphertext
 - Unlike DES' 56-bit KL, IDEA uses 128-bit KL.
 - IDEA consists of using 5 rounds of DES operations
-  → broken up into a series of operations into 5 256-bit subkeys
- IDEA implementation: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) for secure email exchange.

* Blowfish $\xrightarrow{\text{more secure}}$ Twofish

- Bruce Schneier's alternative to DES & IDES
- 64-bit block { fast
 - 128-bit block
 - KL: 256-bit
 - 2 techniques
 - Prewhitening
 - Postwhitening
- KL range: 32-bit to 448-bit

* Skipjack - - - - -

- 64-bit block of text
- KL: 80-bit
- Supports DES's 5 operation modes
- Embraced by US Government

Twist

Not embraced
by cryptographic
community due to
mistrust of Escrow
procedures within
US government.

{ Supports ESCROW
of Encryption keys.

* RC5 (Rivest cipher)

- From people who developed RSA Algorithm
- Block size: 32, 64 or 128 bits
- KL: 0 to 2048 bits

* AES - Advanced Encryption Standard

- 2000: NIST announced AES / Rijndael

- KL: 128-bits, 192-bits, 256-bits
 - |
 - |
 - |
 - 10 rounds 12 rounds 14 rounds
 - of Encryption

- Only allows 128-bit blocks

* Skipjack - - - - -

- 64-bit block of text
 - KL : 80-bit
 - Supports DES's operation modes
 - Embraced by US Government

TWIST

Not considered
by cryptographic
community due to
misuse of Escrow
procedure within
US government.

Supports ESCROW
of Encryptions keys.

* R C S (Rivero cipher)

- From People who developed RSA Asymmetric Algorithm
 - Block size: 32, 64 or 128 bits
 - KL: 0 to 2048 bits

* AES - Advanced Encryption Standard

- 2000: Nist announced AES / Rijndael

- KL: 128-bits, 192-bits, 256-bits
 - 10 rounds
 - 12 rounds
 - 14 rounds


of Encryption

- Only allow 128-bit blocks

ZT13 212421 - Symmetric
Memonization chart

Name	Block size	Key size
Data Encry. Standard (DES)	64-bit block cipher	56 bits
3DES	64	112 or 168
IDEA (used in PHP) - uses DES's 5 modes	64	128
Blowfish — new variable key strength	64	<u>32 - 448</u>
Twofish Prewhitening Post whitening	128	1-256
AES	128 (10) (12) (14)	128, 192, 256
Skipjack	64	80
Rijndael	variable	128, 192, 256
Rivest cipher 2 (RC2)	64	128
Rivest cipher 5 (RC5)	22, 64, 128	0-2040

SYMMETRIC KEY MANAGEMENT




Diffr-Hellman

- Page 227

out-of-band method
offline Distribution
 |
 | love letter
 | in her hand

Public Key Encryption
- IPsec

Seaver-RPC (S-RPC)
employs Diffr-Hellman
for key exchange.




Principle of split knowledge

Vault

consider key rotations

- Never store Encryplion key where Encryplion data resides




- When government wanted to obtain cryptographic key under court order

2 APPROACHES

Fair Cryptosystem

- Secret key divided into 2 or more pieces & given to independent 3rd parties



1

2

3

Escrowed Encryption Standard

- idea behind skipjack
- technology is available but likely to happen where government can decrypt the ciphertext.

To Enforce Confidentiality

Symmetric → Shared key

Asymmetric → Private | Public key

To Enforce Integrity

Digital signature

To Enforce Authentication

challenge-response technique

To Enforce Nonrepudiation

Separation of Duties

Split Knowledge → $M \leq N \rightarrow$ Key escrow
Distribute


3 of 8 require to launch Justice attack

min. 3 person required out of 8


- $3(M) < N(8)$

codes → words & phrases

ciphers → bits & characters



Cryptographic algorithm's two operations



- confusion makes relationship b/w plaintext & keys complicated
 - plaintext has influence over ciphertext.
- Diffusion occurs when change in plaintext reflects multiple changes throughout in ciphertext.


Symmetric → Confidentiality.

Asymmetric → Confidentiality, Nonrepudiation,
Authentication, Integrity

why symmetric ≠ Nonrepudiation
Encryption

Any communication party can encrypt and
decrypt message with shared key, etc
there is no way to know where
message is originated from.

Domain correlation example



SYMMETRIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY

Symmetric Algorithms

AES
Blowfish, Twofish
Serpent
IDEA
DES + 3DES



Stream cipher

Strong cipher
contains two
Attributes

confusion - Substitution

Diffusion - Transposition

... related concept
"Avalanche Effect"
- A tiny input to
Algorithm significantly
change the output

640 bits
of message → 10 individuals
chopped
into block of
64-bits

Individual bits of plaintext XORed
to produce ciphertext

→ Uses
Keystream generators

- Requires randomness (refer to IV concept)
- Require more processing power,
so need at hardware level while
block cipher takes less processing power
Excluded at software level.

STREAM
CIPHER

Symmetric Key
Cryptography

E.K.C

Secret Key Cryptography


Session Key Cryptography

Shared Key Cryptography

Private Key Cryptography


7. PKI & CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPLICATIONS

PER SPECTIVE



ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY


Three most common public key cryptography system used today:



- Public key freely available to anyone with whom they want to communicate.
(BATMAN VS JOKER)

'Beauty of public key cryptography'


CRYPTOSYSTEM	KL
RSA	1024 bits
DSA	1024 bits
Elliptic curve	160 bits



- 1024 bits KL
- has one-way function
- Factors large prime numbers into their original prime numbers.

group:- RSA often used as key exchange protocol, means it can encrypt symmetric key for secure delivery to destination.
(RSA often used with AES)

ELGAMAL DOUBLE





Plaintext $\xrightarrow{\text{Encrypted}}$ ciphertext
2048-bits 4096-bits

- ~~Efficient~~ it doubles the length of message if encrypted, data transmission becomes hard for narrow bandwidth circuits.

Any input
fixed output \Rightarrow HASH FUNCTIONS

--- ONE-WAY
--- collision-free



Recipient can use same hash function to recompute MD.
If values same = good.
If values are different = message was tampered.


MD can be used to implement

Digital Signature

INTEGRITY

NON REPUDIATION

* Four common hashing



DIGITAL SIGNATURES

one of the reason why message digest (MD) is created. To implement digital signatures.

2 Goals

To enforce
Nonrepudiation


To maintain
Integrity of
the message

Digital signature
Algorithm

1. Public Key Cryptography

2. Hashing Functions

Process (Refer to remarkable notes)



④ Receiver decrypts msg with sender's public key


Receiver also creates MD with same hashing function & plaintext

⑤

match?

⑥ Receiver compares his MD with sender's MD

Don't match



Triviz: What can sender do / add extra step for message privacy / confidentiality?

Ans: We can encrypt entire Digital Sig. process with Asymmetric encryption

Need Partial Digital Signature?

HMAC
(Hashed message authentication code)

Relies on shared secret key

✓ Integrity

[symmetric key cryptography]

✗ Nonrepudiation

Digital Signature Standard. (DSS)

Acceptable for Federal Information processing standard (FIPS) 186-4

must use SHA-1 Hashing Function

3 Approved standard Encryption Algorithms

↳ Digital signature Algorithm --- FIPS 186-4
(DSA)

↳ RSA Algorithm --- ANSI X9.31

↳ Elliptic-curve DSA (ECDSA) --- ANSI X9.62


PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI)

Nonrepudiation, Integrity, Authentication & Confidentiality: provides


$$\text{PKI} = \text{ifscatbit}$$

To establish communication b/w two parties that are previously unknown to each other.

* certificates = Endorsed copy of individual



Certificate Path Validation (CPV)



* Certificate Generation & Destruction

nothing but a
public key

Verification

- ① Prove your identity to CA / VicRoad

- ② Provide your public key to CA

- ③ CA creates X.509 digital certificate that contains your identity + public key

- ④ CA signs (digitally) certificate with CA's private key

- ⑤ We can safely distribute with other parties / drive on the road.

we can decrypt with our public key
(or) this could be CA's public key

Certificate Revocation List (CRL)

- Part of CA's inventory
- Most common method but huge latency.


Note - CRL contains serial number of digital certificates, serial number must be part of CRL

Revocation

must provide private key & certificate revocation list (CRL) in order to verify cert

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)

- Removes CRL's latency
- Real-time verification



ASYMMETRIC KEY MANAGEMENT

Consider
Key length

Store key
in Vault

Key
Rotation

Backup
key

Retire
key
after
use

Use Key Escrow
Service

HSM


Hardware security
modules

cloud-based
HSMs

- Hardware devices to store & manage encryption keys

YUBIKEY

APPLY
CRYPTOGRAPHY



REAL WORLD APPLICATIONS

APPLIED


CRYPTOGRAPHY

Date &
Rev
(

Portable devices

- most OS = Encryption file system + smartphones
- Modern computers = TPM (Trusted platform modules)
 - storage & origin of keys used for full disk encryption (FDE) solutions.



Data in transit



Integrity → Hash the message


Authentication + Integrity +
Non-repudiation +
Confidentiality →

Encrypt the msg +
digital signature



why this approach
is failing
Up to End

DRM - S/PD uses ENCRYPTION to enforce copyright restriction on digital media.



Circuit Encryption

2 encryption techniques to protect data while traveling over networks

Link End-to-end Encryption


- Protects corners b/w two parties

Link End-to-end Encryption

- Protects entire circuit

Encoder → Tunnel → Decoder

IPSec



TLS 1.2
SSH

WPA2 uses AES Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)
cryptography

Wireless Security



WEP

- 64 & 128-bit encryption
- Not secure

WPA

- Eliminates weaknesses of WEP with TKIP

OSI layers



* IP Sec

- Use public key cryptography
- Provides Encryption, access control, nonrepudiation & message authentication using IP Protocols.
- Prime use: VPN
- 2 operations
 - (P2P) **Transport mode**
 - only packet payload is encrypted. Good for P2P.
 - **Tunnel mode**
 - entire packet + header is encrypted
 - ideal for gateway-to-gateway connections.
- IP Sec relies on **Security Associations (SA)**
 - AH
 - ESP
- Authentication Header
 - provides message integrity, nonrepudiation, access control to prevent replay attacks.
- Encapsulating Security Payload
 - provides confidentiality & integrity of message
 - Mixed encryption & Authentication to prevent replay attacks.

IPSec runtime

- ↳ Creates SA
 - To represent communication session
 - Record configuration about session.
- Requires 2 SA for bidirectional
 - ① → ②
 - ② → ①

ISAKMP (manages SA)

- Internal Security Association & Key mgmt protocol
- ISAKMP: provide background support for IPSec
 - ↳ negotiate, establish, modify & delete SAs
- ↳ 4 requirements.

- ① Authenticate communicating peers
- ② Create + manage SAs
- ③ Provide key generation mechanisms
- ④ Protect against threats: DDoS, Replay.

CRYPTOGRAPHIC ATTACKS

↳ Analytic Attack

↳ **Timing Attack**
side channel Attack
- stalk her to find out
where she works, why
she does for living.

↳ **Implementation Attack** - exploits implementation flaws

↳ e.g. Heartbleed Bug + Reverse Engg.

↳ SCA (Source code Analysis), most common method to find

↳ **Statistical Attack (Frequency Analysis Attack)**
- identifies the pattern

↳ **Brute Force**

- Randomly find correct cryptographic keys

- KL is important

Enhanced
Attack

Rainbow Table

Use cryptographic SALT

Password	Random number
----------	---------------

↳ ~~Frequency Analysis~~

Cipher text only Attack

Attacker has cipher text &
their goal is to find key
used in Encryption process

→ Known plaintext : Attacker has copy of
 (ciphertext)
 Encrypted + plaintext
 message

To know how
 the key generated from
 cipher text

→ chosen ciphertext

Attacker Q : Ability to know
 portions of cipher = key

→ chosen plaintext

Plaintext
 Corresponding ciphertext

Attacker Q : Ability to extract plaintext portion
 to determine which encryption algorithm is used.

→ Meet in the middle

→ 2DES is vulnerable of this.

→ Mitm (Meet in the middle) - Attacker establishes
 secure connection to client so 2nd connection to legitimate
 server goes via his machine -
 prevention:

→ Birthday
 A.K.A - collision or reverse hash matching
 - To find if different msg produce same message digest
 → malicious user intercepts encrypted message b/w two parties & Replay
 the captured message to open new session.
 Preferably
 expiration of msg &
 incorporate timestamp.

To Secure Email

PGP

S/MIME

- Provides good privacy
- Combines CA hierarchy with "Web of trust" concept

|
you have to (must)
become trusted by
one or more PGP
users to begin using
the system.

- Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension

- Uses RSA Encryption Algorithm

- ↳ OS X
- ↳ Windows
- ↳ Mac OS X (native)
- ↳ Mozilla Thunderbird

- Relies on X.509 for exchanging cryptographic keys

- RSA is only public key cryptographic protocol supported by S/MIME

* 2 versions of PGP

commercial

free/share

- Use RSA for key exchange
- IDEA for Encryption / Decryption
- MD5 for digest production

- Use DH for key exchange

- Use CAST 128-bit Encryption / Decryption


- Use SHA-1 hashing function

on OSCP fascinating approach

- Web Browser & web server use private/public key with Asymmetric cryptographic approach but web browser uses symmetric keys for speed.

↳ this is awesome (OSCP part)

Steganography



Art of using cryptographic technique to embed secret message within another message.

Brute-force Attack

- Use salt
- longer key length
- Key stretching

Weak factors — If any of below 3 element is weak, attacker can break the cryptosystem

- ① Algorithm without flaws
- ② Large key size
- ③ Protect the secret key

Pass the Hash — Replay Attack

Countermeasures

- Time stamps
- Sequence numbers

10. PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

PERSPECTIVE

Purpose :: Protection against physical threats.

of
Physical
Security


- Smoke
- Fire
- Water
- Storm

Vandalism,
Explosion,
Building collapse

Theft
Equipment failure
Personal loss



Toxic material
Utility loss

Identity
Physical
Threats



Implement
safeguards


APPLY SECURITY PRINCIPLES TO SITE & FACILITY DESIGN



IMPLEMENT SITE & FACILITY SECURITY CONTROLS

Physical security perspective

Access control perspective



Remember below order when implementing Security for Physical Environment.

- ① Deterrent - Fencing
- ② Denied - Locked doors
- ③ Detect - Sensor Alarms
- ④ Delay - Enough control to delay while police is on the way.

* Equipment Failure

one day it will = Prepare mentally for AVAILABILITY.

Response time
to return system
to functional level

cost involved
in to maintain that
solution

if onsite replacement \neq feasible

lock SLA with vendor.

Aging Hardware = schedule for replacement / repair

MTTF

(mean time to failure)

- router last for
10 years

Replace device
before MTTF expires

MTTR

(mean time for repair)

- Router needs repair /
maintenance every 1 year

while device sent for
repairment,

Prepare
alternate /
Backup
hardware

MTBF (mean time between failures)

- Estimation of time between first and
Subsequent failures

* wiring closet
 (Intermediate distribution facilities- IDF)
 (Premise wire Distribution Room)

Physical security Focus \Rightarrow Prevent Unauthorised Access

Have wiring closet security policy \Rightarrow provide to building mgmt staff


Element of

Cable Plant Management Policy

\hookrightarrow Entrance Facility



Wiring closet in building



Equipment Room

\hookrightarrow Backbone distribution system



\hookrightarrow Telecommunication Room



\hookrightarrow Horizontal Distribution System



WORK AREAS



EE

wiring closet security concern

= prevent physical unauthorised access

Update building mgmt abt. wiring closet

security policy

* Server Rooms / Data Centers

can be human incompatible
=
100 pump, 100 light
Don't put
on ground floor /
Basement = Should be at care of building
(heat)

Technical controls for Data centre

Smartcards

- Used for Authentication purposes
- mostly for multi-factor "something you have"

Proximity Readers

Passive device
- NO electronics

Transponder
device =
self-powered &
transmit signal

Field-based Device

- Has electronic, activated
when device enters to electrostatic
field

Charge Door
Remote

IDS

- only useful when connected to intrusion alarm
- 2 aspects of IDS
 - (a) How it gets power
 - (b) How it communicates

Battery
Backup

Heartbeat
sensor

Access Abuse

Piggybacking

→ masquerading

- Using someone
else's security ID

- Audit trails + access logs
are helpful

menu

Antarctic

- CCTV + security guards.




Emerson Security

TEMPEST

called
TEMPEST
countermeasures

Safeguards to
protect Emerson
Attacks

Read ch: 9
Electromagnetic Radiation
for Basics / Info



→ outside
control zone,
Emerson is
blocked

→ within control
zone, EM
signals are
suppressed.

Blocks electromagnetic
signals (EM)

white
noise

non-confidential
non-sensitive
(low signal)

* Media Storage Facilities

Security concerns

- theft
- corruption
- Data Remnant Recovery

(To Reduce Risk)

How to secure media storage?

Physical security

(from stealing)

- locked cabinet

From
Malware
- Pathing

Higher protection

- fire, flood,
EM field, Temp monitoring

Restrict
Access

Label
media

- classification

Secure
Wiping

(Avoid
Data Remnace)

Zeroization

- Erase data
by replacing
with zeros

Verify media
with Hash-based
integrity

- To ensure
valid file
remains valid

* Evidence storage

Cyber
Crime



Retain logs, audit trails
& records of digital events

offline

Separate
Dedicated
Storage sys

Prod.
Network

Block
Internet
to / from



Track
activities

Patented
Access

Calculate hashes
for all datasets

Encrypt all datasets
stored in system


* Restricted and Work Area Security




Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)

- Concept for restricted work area
- no photography, video allowed
- Purpose: Provide restricted access to only those with business need based on clearance level
 - store, view & update sensitive compartmented information (SCI)

* Utilities and HVAC Considerations



* Noise



2 Types of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)

common mode noise

traverse mode noise

- Generated by difference in power b/w hot & neutral wire of power source


- Generated by difference in power b/w hot & ground wire of power source

- Telephone
- TV
- Camera
- Radio/ Audio
- Network mechanisms

Radio frequency interference (RFI)

- All electronic appliances generate RFI

So far only **Equipment** form



* Temperature, Humidity & Static

 → 15 to 23 °C (60 to 75 °F)
DC — ~~40~~ 40 to 60%.

Too much humidity → corrosion / moisture | Equipment Damage

Too little humidity → static electricity

Static electricity (static voltage) → 2000 volt = system shutdown
17,000 = permanent circuit damage
4000 = printer jam


Min. level of static discharge can destroy electronic equipment.

* Water Issues

leakage
flooding

Water + Electricity = danger

(Series risk of
Electrocution)



Install
water detection
circuit


Be familiar
with shutoff valves
& drainage locations.

monitoring for
plumbing leaks,



* Five prevention, Detection & Suppression

The Five Triangle

- Remove any one of four = fire can be extinguished



Various suppression mechanism exist but consider what aspect of fire triangle it addresses




Most fires due to overloaded electrical distribution or other
in DC

only
air
ionization
no smoke

- Fire Mgt. → Evacuation route (at least two)
- Awareness Training (Suppressing mechanisms)
- Use of Fire Ex.

* Five Extinguishers



* Five Detection Systems

To prevent Fire

Automatic Detection

Suppression System

Fixed Temperature Detection System

Triggers when specific temp is reached.

Riser-or-Rise Detection System

Triggers suppression when the speed at which fire reaches to specific level.
23° → 38°

Flame-Activated System

Suppression based on infrared energy of flames.

Smoke-Activated System

Use of Photoelectric or radioactive ionization sensors to trigger.

* Water Suppression Systems

most common cause
= Human error

4 Types

Wet Pipe System

(closed head)

- Pipe full of water discharge when triggers suppression

Dry Pipe System

- Filled with compressed air
- Sprinklers trigger to escape air = open valve = fill the water

Deluge System

- Large dry pipes but bigger
- Not ideal for offices that has electronics & computers.

Precitation System

- Combination of dry + wet pipes
- Dry in the initial stage of fire, then filled with water


Best for environments that house computers & humans together.

Used for sprinklers head heat activation before dispensing water

* Gas Discharge Systems

↳ Removes oxygen from air =
Don't use where people are located.

Halon = Effective fire suppression compound
but becomes toxic @ 900°F



- low pressure water mist

→ Argon / Argonite / Inertgas / Aerotek

* Damage caused by Fire

Smoke

- damage on/off storage device


Heat

- damage any electronic or computer component


suppression media

- cause short circuit
- initiate corrosion
- render equipment useless

IMPLEMENT & MANAGE PHYSICAL SECURITY.



* Perimeter Security Controls



* Lighting - ~~sense lights~~ - light poles should be placed the same distance apart as diameter of illuminated area

* Security guards

Invisible to social engg attack
+ they are expensive

Dogs

Most effective is deterrent detection.



* Internal Security Controls

Escort assigned to visitors.

Monitor their access + activities closely.

Keys & Combination locks
+ Key card
for shared entry points (building)


Programmable combination locks

Anybody can pick the lock, called Shimming.

Badges

Simple ID with photo
Smartcard or multifactor
AAA

Access to individual entry (storage, cabinets)



more control

Types of Badges

- Deterrent - Alarm
- Repellent A.
- Notification A.
- Local Alarm System
- Central Station System
- Auxiliary station

D.I.O
(contd...)

Secondary Verification
Mechanisms - to get rid off false positives

Sensors
Alarms \Rightarrow False Alarm
(Bird, Animal)
MD

Need more than one trigger to confirm

E.g. CCTV = secondary mechanism
- Need manual review after trigger

CCTV is preventive measure.
Reviewing footage is detective measure.

Environment and life safety

Physical security
Primary focus

- Protect human life

Secondary focus

- Restore IT systems

* First protect people.
Bcp comes later.

- OEP (occupant emergency plan)
used to minimize threat to life

Privacy Responsibilities & legal Requirements

Safety of PII
Address in organization's security policy

NIST 800-122

Privacy = protecting PII from unauthorised access

GDPR from EU

Regulatory Requirements

Country / Jurisdiction	BANK / INDUSTRY
	HEALTH CARE

Foundation of security framework

Notes

→ Soda Acid : Extinguishers work to remove
+ other dry powders: fuel supply

→ water: Suppresses the temperature

→ Halon & CO_2 : Remove oxygen supply from
fire.

is Bad /
Banish

→ Humidity ! DC range 40 - 60 %

lower
= static
electricity

high
= moisture /
Equipment Deterioration

→ Capacitance: Type of motion detector that
monitors the electromagnetic field in
monitored area, it senses the disturbance
that corresponds to motion.

→ Halon use CFC Substitutes material
that was banned in Montreal protocol
because it depletes ozone layer.

SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition


3 kind of devices

Endpoints

Backends

User Stations


CH: 8 PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY MODELS, DESIGN, AND CAPABILITIES



SECURE
SYSTEM
IMPLEMENTATION



IMPLEMENT & MANAGE ENGINEERING PROCESS USING SECURE DESIGN PRINCIPLES



Build security : EASY




Add security : DIFFICULT

* objects and subjects



Transitive trust = serious security issue



* Closed and Opened Systems

- Proprietary + same manif.
+ not easy to integrate
- Secure
- Industry standard +
easy to integrate
- Not secure

Open Design Methodology - refers to Kerchoff's principle -
Security of design shouldn't be secret like cryptosystem -
this approach of open design provides independent security configuration

* Open-source vs. Closed-source

- ✗ Internal logic +
- ✓ Source code open
- ✗ to public

- ✓ Hidden from public

Both can be either open or closed system.

* Techniques for ensuring CIA

(from s/w designer/ perspective but applies program)

to all areas of security)

Confidentiality

Authenticity

Integrity

Control


Trans & Reliance

CONFINEMENT

--- Sandboxing

Confinement in software development is concept of isolation to ensure that running processes / application cannot interact with other entities outside their own.

- Restricts a process or software program to reading from or to certain memory locations.




BOUNDS

Boundary delineating activities places specific limits on memory that prevent external inputs from interacting.

physical
logical


- Bounds are the limits of memory a process cannot exceed when reading or writing.




- Bound is their area where process (kid) is already confined.

ISOLATION --- mode

— where process is confined with memory bound.



--- isolated | safe from
external toxic environment



CONTROLS


--- CH: 14, 629-633

— MAC - (P.I.O End) —
- Subjects & objects have
labels / classification

check control matrix +
model for example


DAC

- All objects have owners
- owner have full permission
- owner can also delegate to data custodian for day-to-day operations.






- GOAL
- To limit access to object by subjects
 - To protect confidentiality & integrity of data

TRUST & ASSURANCE




(once security integrated to design)

IT MUST BE



FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF SECURITY MODELS.

-- Provide a way to formalize SECURITY POLICIES.



These models offer deep understanding of how OS should be designed & developed to support a specific security policy.


Tokens → Every object is separate token associated with resource. Token has security information about object prior accessing access to actual object.

Capabilities → ~~Row that maintains security attributes Table, that which subject can access which objects, for controlled object~~

Security Labels → Permanent label attached to object, can never be altered.

→ Provides safeguard against tampering that tokens & capabilities never provide.

* TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE (TCB)




```

graph LR
    A[Software +  
Hardware +  
controls] --> B[forms]
    B --> C[TCIB]
    C --> D[Enforce]
    D --> E[Security Policy]
    E --> F[Feedback]
    F --> A

```

The diagram illustrates a process flow. It starts with a box containing "Software + Hardware + controls". An arrow labeled "forms" points from this box to another box labeled "TCIB". From "TCIB", an arrow labeled "Enforce" points to a box labeled "Security Policy". Below "Security Policy", there is a small box labeled "Feedback" with an arrow pointing back up to the initial "Software + Hardware + controls" box.



- Immigration officer
 - Stands b/w every subject & object
 - Enforce authorisation with access control such as MAC / DAC / RBAC

Security Kernel

Implementation page is so / now

- Uses trusted path to communicate with subjects
 - Enforce reference monitor functionality and restrict known attacks.

1. STATE MACHINE MODEL

Always boot
in secure
state

All instances
of
subjects




objects

↳ Based on FSM (Finite State Machine)

- system is always secure, no matter which state it is in

snapshot of system = Requirements of security policy


Secure System




- All state transitions must be evaluated.
- New state will be checked against security policy, if it's compliant = secure state.

* 2. INFORMATION FLOW MODEL

Biba
Bell-La
Pedula



Information flow b/w diff. level of security




Address COVERT CHANNEL by excluding undefined flow pathways.

Allows authorised information flow b/w subject & object within same classification or different classification level.


Interesting

Establish relationship b/w two ~~object~~ versions or state of same object at different point of time.



→ Biba + Bell-La Pedula = MAC Models

* 3. NON-INTERFERENCE MODEL.




This type of information leakage creates
COVERT CHANNEL


* Composition Theories

- Kind of Information flow model
- Info. flows b/w systems rather than individual system


Cascading



Feedback



Hookup



* 4. TAKE-GANT MODEL

Focus: Dictates how **rights** are passed from one subject to another or from subject to object.


2 Rules

Take Right

- from subject to other subject / object

Grant Right

- from subject to other subject / object



* 5. ACCESS CONTROL MATRIX

Just a table, lists all subjects & objects.
which, subject can perform on objects
actions

DAC

Subjects	DOC	Printer	File
DANE	Read	No Access	R, W

MATRIX

Column =

ACL
(Access control)
list

Row =
capabilities list

Tied with subject
list actions if can
perform on object.

Tied with object,
list valid actions
each subject can
perform.

Need both
for exec of
an object

Column → Object

Row → Subject

FIRST
REMEMBER
THIS


Addressee
only
confidentiality
of Data

6. BELL-LAPADULA MODEL

Info. Flows made
state machine
concept


from Federal → To protect classified information

- Prevents information flow from low to high security level.



- Prevents information flow from classified level to less secure clearance levels.

|
How!



Bell-Baetzel (contd.)

SPJ wants to cover
message to prevent it,
be org. write-up

Employs STATE MACHINE Concept

LATTICE CONCEPT

3. Properties To maintain confidentiality

1. Simple security Property

NO READ-UP -----

From Information leakage from top to bottom

2. * (star) security property (confinement property)

NO WRITE-DOWN -----

can write at your level and up but not down

3. Discretionary security Property (strong *)

Enforce DAC

only read and write info into your own security level - no up or down


Enforce subject need to know basis in order to access object based on access matrix


- Only supports "C", no "I" & "A"
- Assumes security transitions b/w layers
- No support for Covert channel.

Lattice-Based Access control

- Subjects are assigned with lattice.

- Subject can only access objects that fall into range b/w Lowest upper bound & Highest low bound.





Inverse of

Bell-LaPadula

also called read down from per level (no read down)

Properties

can read security policy (UP)
can write/ change (UP)

Point from source up to
per zone

Simple Integrity Property

NO READ DOWN — Reading up
the latest date allowed

* Integrity Property

NO WRITE UP

make sense, why
allow people to
write at higher level

Involution Rule (P+O End)

* Biba addresses three integrity issues:

(3 tools of integrity)

- ① Prevents unauthorised subjects modifying objects
- ② Prevents authorised subjects modifying unauthorised objects
- ③ Protect internal & external objects consistency.

* G. CLARK-WILSON MODEL


DATA Integrity

(For commercial APPS.)

~~Three-part Model~~

- No state machine or lattice structure

↓
Instead use three-part-program
(triple)



Access-Triple-Subject-Program
(P.t.O object)
End for revised diagram
(concept)

3 [Rules] Principles

Enforced Separation of Duties

- * Restricted interface model
- Uses security levels as classification

Well-formed Transaction


- Each subject can access object via portal (TP)

like a program

- Each program has limitations on what it can / it cannot do to object, hence, limiting subject's capabilities.

- One subject (Confidential)
 - one set of data + function
- second subject (Restricted)
 - another set of data + function

9. BREWER & NASH MODEL



10. GROUNEN - MESSEMER MODEL.

Integrity

Foundation of Noninterference model

Based on

Automation Theory

Domain separation

- predefined subjects
- allows predefined actions against predefined objects

- similar subjects grouped = domain 1
- ↓
- X
- No access to other domain

11. SUTHERLAND MODEL

Integrity

Based on state machine & info. flow model

Prevents interference

Integrity maintained through

PRE DEFINED SECURE STATES

& interference is prohibited.

EXAMPLE

Prevents
COVERT
CHANNEL

OSB Pg 385

- Path / channel normally not used for communication = exploit, violate, bypass security policy



OVERT CHANNEL = Known, Expected, Authorised, Designated, monitored, controlled

12. GRAHAM - DENNIG MODEL

Secure creation & deletion of objects and subjects using eight primary protection rules or actions.


~~SELECT~~

SELECT CONTROLS BASED ON SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS



management's responsibility to accept RISK when system is approved & deployed.

3 main product evaluation models




1. TCSEC classes & Required

Functionality.

TCSEC only
confidentiality.
Address

Trusted computer System Evaluation Criteria
(orange book)

(TCSEC LEVELS)
4 major categories



$$A_1 = B_3$$

similar but difference is in
Development cycle.

* Rainbow Series

orange book : Applies to stand-alone computers,
not attached to a network.

Red book : Interpret TCSEC in networking
context

Green Book : Provides password creation &
management guidelines.

* Problems with TCSEC

→ Replaced with
common criteria
in 2005

- Focus on C, not I
- Doesn't address personnel, physical & procedural policy to implement full security policy.

side notes, not bad.

TCSEC

- Address only confidentiality
- US Domestic
- Narrow scope
- Rigid model
-



Common Criteria (CC)

- Address CIA
- International
- Broader scope
- Allows flexibility

2. ITSEC classes of Required Assurance
of Functionality.

Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria

Initiated for evaluating Security criteria
in EUROPE



- Doesn't rely on TCB (system components)
doesn't need to isolate within TCB)

- changed system requires to be reconfigured

→ don't need TCB

3. COMMON CRITERIA (CC)

Helps customer buy with confidence

Designed as = PRODUCT EVALUATION MODEL

High cc rating \neq secure system, free from VULS.

↳ official standard: ISO 15408
(Evaluation criteriz)
(per info. tech. security)

-- CC process based on two elements:

Protection Profiles (PP)

- For product evaluation that meets security requirements & protections

Security Targets (ST)

- Implemented security measure from vendor built into target of evaluation (TOE)

SECURITY DESIRE
("I want" from customer)

Customer PP

Vendor 1 ST (TOE)


Vendor 2 ST (TOE)

Vendor 3 ST (TOE)

"It will be provided from vendor for specific system such as Cisco ASA"

closest/best match is client purchase

* Cloud-Based Systems and cloud computing



Elasticity

Flexibility of

virtualization resources
on demand

Auto scale

Gmail not responsible
if you leak confidential
info. Use below tools.

CASB

DLP

Cloud concepts

SaaS

PaaS

- AWS Elastic Beanstalk
- Azure
- o GCP

- Google Drive
- MS 365

s/w by 3rd
party on
Internet

IaaS

- AWS EC2
- Google Compute Engine (GCE)

Cloud-based
service, Pay-as-you-go for
storage, networking,
virtualization

H/w & s/w tools
available on Internet

- looks after infra,
physical security, maintenance
but you have to worry about
software & code

Deployment
concepts

Hosted
solution

Organization own & hr
license s/w, then
operate + maintain the
s/w

Private
cloud

Virtual private
cloud

Public
cloud

Hybrid
cloud

Community
cloud

- shared benefit +
collaborative work

organization outsource
h/w + s/w to 3rd party
cloud provider for
monthly fee.

Investigate Security of cloud Provider

Compliant?

- PCI DSS
- HIPPA
- SOX

How they do
disaster
recovery?

Review patch
management
policy

How they
respond to
zero-day
attacks?

Review their
data Encryption
solutions

How data
is backed
up?

How they
destroy data?


How they provide
availability
of
resources?

How often
they
perform
Pen testing?

Is CASB Implemented?

(Cloud Access security Broker)


- To enforce proper security measures are implemented or not.



Security as a Service (SECaaS)


- cloud provider concept
- From managing security locally to online = reduce cost + overhead

cloud shared
Responsibility
Model



* Grid Computing

- Form of parallel distributed processing that loosely groups a significant number of processing nodes to work towards a specific processing goal.



Security concerns

Contents are exposed to the world =
no confidentiality / privacy
of data

Compromise of grid server =
leverage grid members to perform malicious actions.

* Peer to Peer (P2P) - TORRENT

Networking & distributed application solution that share files & workloads among peers.

similar to grid computing with 2 differences

No central management system

provided services = Realtime file collection of computing power

Eavesdrop distributed content



Security concerns

Pirated copy-righted software

No control mgmt / filtering


Can consume all available bandwidth

INTERNET OF THINGS (IoT)



isolate IoTs into separate network

Secure Implementation
for IoT
(THREE DUMB
ROUTERS)



INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM (ICS)

- ICS controls industrial processes and machines.

Distributed control system (DCS)

3 forms

↓

Programmable logic controller (PLC)


Supervisory control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

Needs less human interaction = little security risks built

Until

Stuxnet delivered root kit. in SCADA

ASSESS AND MITIGATE VULNERABILITIES IN WEB-BASED SYSTEMS



Few of OWASP Top 10 Web Risks

INJECTIONS

SQL Injection

Use of unexpected malicious code in query to compromise web application / database.

↓
static to dynamic
web page story
on How did we
reach here.

2 techniques

Input Validation

- type + Format
of input
E.g. six numeric
for DOB
230283

Limit account Privilege

- lesser privilege

SAML = XML USE

LDAP Injection

Focus on LDAP directory, not database

XML injection

Backend target is XML Application

- sanitizing of input & defensive coding as prevention

XML Exploitation

- Programming error either use false information to visitor or cause system to give up information without authorization.


↓
SAML abuse = web-based authentication

↓
Used for web SSO solution


↓
Attacker can falsify SAML communication or steal visitors access token, to bypass authentication & gain unauthorised access to site.

Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

- Malicious code injection attack



- Defense



Cross-site Request Forgery (XSRF)


- Attacker Focus = visiting user's web browser, not visiting website

Purpose

To make user | user's browser to perform
user's browser to perform
unintended action
unintended action
make a purchase → change Ac
download Ac details Information

XSRF

Eg: ZEUS



Defense

- Sensitive action = Reauthenticate (Netcode)
- CAPTCHA ↗ Human
↘ machine
- Nounce : Add random string to each URL + session mgmt
- WAF, HIDS
- Patch browser, clear cookie + temp Intent kies.