

Introduction

The course is split into two parts:

- Logic: syntax and semantics.
- Set theory: what does the universe of sets look like?

Course structure

- (I) Propositional logic (logic)
- (II) Well-orderings & ordinals (set theory)
- (III) Posets & Zorn's lemma (set theory)
- (IV) Predicate logic (logic)
- (V) Set theory (set theory)
- (VI) Cardinals (set theory)

Books:

- 1. Johnstone, *Notes on Logic & Set Theory*
- 2. Van Dalen, *Logic & Structure* (Chapter 4 and what 'goes next')
- 3. Hajnal & Hamburger, *Set Theory* (Chapters 2 and 6)
- 4. Forster, *Logic, Induction & Sets*

1 Propositional Logic

Let P be a set of *primitive propositions*. Unless otherwise stated, $P = \{p_1, p_2, \dots\}$. The *language* L or $L(P)$ is defined inductively by

- 1. If $p \in P$, then $p \in L$
- 2. $\perp \in L$ (\perp is read 'false')
- 3. If $p, q \in L$ then $(p \Rightarrow q) \in L$.

e.g. $((p_1 \Rightarrow p_2) \Rightarrow (p_1 \Rightarrow p_3)), (p_4 \Rightarrow \perp), (\perp \Rightarrow \perp)$.

Notes.

- 1. Each proposition (member of L) is a finite string of symbols from language: $\vdash, \Rightarrow, \perp, p_1, p_2, \dots$ (for clarity often omit outer brackets, use other types of bracket, etc).
- 2. ' L is defined inductively' means, more precisely, the following

- Put $L_1 = P \cup (\perp)$;
- Having defined L_n , put $L_{n+1} = L_n \cup \{(p \Rightarrow q) : p, q \in L_n\}$;
- Set $L = \bigcup_{n \geq 1} L_n$.

3. Every $p \in L$ is uniquely built up from steps 1,2 using 3. For example, $((p_1 \Rightarrow p_2) \Rightarrow (p_1 \Rightarrow p_3))$ can from $(p_1 \Rightarrow p_2)$ and $(p_1 \Rightarrow p_3)$.

We can now introduce $\neg p$ ('not p ') as an abbreviation for $(p \Rightarrow \perp)$; $p \vee q$ (' p or q ') as an abbreviation for $(\neg p) \Rightarrow q$; $p \wedge q$ (' p and q ') as an abbreviation for $\neg(p \Rightarrow (\neg q))$.

1.1 Semantic Implication

Definition. A *valuation* is a function $v : L \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ (thinking of 0 as ‘False’ and 1 as ‘True’) such that

$$(i) \quad v(\perp) = 0$$

$$(ii) \quad v(p \Rightarrow q) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } v(p) = 1, v(q) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Remark. On $\{0, 1\}$, could define a constant $\perp = 0$ and an operation \Rightarrow by

$$(a \Rightarrow b) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } a = 1, b = 0 \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Then a valuation is precisely a mapping $L \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that preserves (\perp and \Rightarrow).

Proposition 1.1.

- (i) If v, v' are valuations with $v(p) = v'(p)$ for all $p \in P$, then $v = v'$.
- (ii) For any function $w : P \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, there exists a valuation v with $v(p) = w(p)$ for all $p \in P$.

Proof.

- (i) Have $v(p) = v'(p)$ for all $p \in L_1$. But if $v(p) = v'(p)$ and $v(q) = v'(q)$, then $v(p \Rightarrow q) = v'(p \Rightarrow q)$, so $v(p) = v'(p)$ for all $p \in L_2$. Continuing inductively we obtain $v(p) = v'(p)$ for all $p \in L_n$ for each n .
- (ii) Set $v(p) = w(p)$ for all $p \in P$ and $v(\perp) = 0$ to obtain v on L_1 . Now put

$$v(p \Rightarrow q) = \begin{cases} 0 & v(p) = 1, v(q) = 0 \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

to obtain v on L_2 , then induction.

□

Example. Let v be the valuation with $v(p_1) = v(p_3) = 1$, $v(p_n) = 0$ for all $n \neq 1, 3$. Then $v((p_1 \Rightarrow p_2) \Rightarrow p_3) = 0$.

Definition. A *tautology* is an element $t \in L$ such that $v(t) = 1$ for any valuation v . We write $\models t$.

Examples.

1. $p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow p)$

$v(p)$	$v(q)$	$v(p \Rightarrow q)$	$v(p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow p))$
0	0	1	1
0	1	0	1
1	0	1	1
1	1	1	1

So this is a tautology.

2. $(\neg\neg p) \Rightarrow p$, i.e. $((p \Rightarrow \perp) \Rightarrow \perp) \Rightarrow p$ ('law of excluded middle')

$v(p)$	$v(p \Rightarrow \perp)$	$v((p \Rightarrow \perp) \Rightarrow \perp)$	$v(((p \Rightarrow \perp) \Rightarrow \perp) \Rightarrow p)$
0	1	0	1
1	0	1	1

3. $(p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)) \Rightarrow ((p \Rightarrow q) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow r))$ ("how implicatino chains").
 Suppose this is not a tautology. Then we have a v with $v(p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)) = 1$ and $v((p \Rightarrow q) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow r)) = 0$. Then $v(p \Rightarrow q) = 1$ and $v(p \Rightarrow r) = 0$. Hence $v(p) = 1$ and $v(r) = 0$, so $v(q) = 1$. Hence $v(p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)) = 0$, contradiction.

Definition. For $S \subseteq L$, $t \in L$, we say S *entails* or *semantically implies* t , written $S \models t$ if every valuation with $v(s) = 1$ for all $s \in S$ has $v(t) = 1$.

Example. $\{p \Rightarrow q, q \Rightarrow r\}$ entails $p \Rightarrow r$. Indeed, suppose we have v with $v(p \Rightarrow q), v(q \Rightarrow r) = 1$ but $v(p \Rightarrow r) = 0$. Then $v(p) = 1, v(r) = 0$. Hence $v(q) = 1$, contradicting $v(q \Rightarrow r) = 1$.

Definition. We say v is a *model* of $S \subseteq L$ or S is *true* in v , if $v(s) = 1$ for all $s \in S$. Thus S entails t means: every model of S is also a model of $\{t\}$.

Remark. $\models t$ says $\emptyset \models t$.

1.2 Syntactic implication

For a notion of proof, we'll need axioms and deduction rules. As axioms, we'll take:

1. $p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow p)$ for all $p, q \in L$;
2. $[p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)] \Rightarrow [(p \Rightarrow q) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow r)]$ for all $p, q \in L$;
3. $(\neg\neg p) \Rightarrow p$ for all $p \in L$.

Notes.

1. Sometimes we call these 'axiom schemes' since each is actually a set of axioms.
2. Each of these are tautologies.

For deduction rules, we'll have only *modus ponens*: from each p and $p \Rightarrow q$ we can deduce q .

Definition. For $S \subseteq L$, and $t \in S$, say S *proves* or *syntactically implies* t , written $S \vdash t$ if there exists a sequence t_1, \dots, t_n in L with $t_n = t$ such that every t_i is either

- (i) An axiom; or
- (ii) A member of S ; or
- (iii) Such that there exist $j, k < i$ with $t_k \Rightarrow (t_j \Rightarrow t_n)$ (modus ponens).

Say S consists of the *hypotheses* or *premises*, and t the *conclusion*.

Example. $\{p \Rightarrow q, q \Rightarrow r\} \vdash p \Rightarrow r$:

1. $q \Rightarrow r$ (hypothesis)
2. $(q \Rightarrow r) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r))$ (axiom 1)
3. $p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)$ (modus ponens' on 2,3)
4. $[p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)] \Rightarrow [(p \Rightarrow q) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow r)]$ (axiom 2)
5. $(p \Rightarrow q) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow r)$ (modus ponens' on 3,4)
6. $p \Rightarrow q$ (hypothesis)
7. $p \Rightarrow r$ (modus ponens on 5,6)

Definition. If $\emptyset \vdash t$, say t is a *theorem*, written $\vdash t$.

Example. $\vdash (p \Rightarrow p)$. We want to try to get to $(p \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow p)) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow p)$ using axiom 2.

1. $[p \Rightarrow ((p \Rightarrow p) \Rightarrow p)] \Rightarrow [(p \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow p)) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow p)]$ (axiom 2)
2. $p \Rightarrow ((p \Rightarrow p) \Rightarrow p)$ (axiom 1)
3. $(p \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow p)) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow p)$ (modus ponens on 1,2)
4. $p \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow p)$ (axiom 1)
5. $p \Rightarrow p$ (modus ponens on 3,4)

Often, showing $S \vdash p$ is made easier by:

Proposition 1.2 (Deduction Theorem). *Let $S \subseteq L$ and $p, q \in L$. Then $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow q)$ if and only if $S \cup \{p\} \vdash q$. Informally: “provability corresponds to the connective ‘ \Rightarrow ’ in L ”.*

Proof. First we show (\Rightarrow) : given a proof of $p \Rightarrow q$ from S , write down:

1. p (hypothesis)
2. q (modus ponens)

Which is a proof of q from $S \cup \{p\}$.

Now we show (\Leftarrow) : we have a proof t_1, \dots, t_n of q from $S \cup \{p\}$. We’ll show that $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow t_i)$ for all i .

If t_i is an axiom, write down

1. t_i (axiom)
2. $t_i \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow t_i)$ (axiom 1)
3. $p \Rightarrow t_i$ (modus ponens)

So $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow t_i)$.

If $t_i \in S$, do the same thing except step 1 will be “ t_i (hypothesis)” instead of “ t_i (axiom)”.

If $t_i := p$, we have $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow p)$, since $\vdash (p \Rightarrow p)$.

If t_i is obtained by modus ponens, we have t_j and $t_k = (t_j \Rightarrow t_i)$ for some $j, k < n$. By induction, we can assume $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow t_j)$ and $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow (t_j \Rightarrow t_i))$. So write down

1. $[p \Rightarrow (t_j \Rightarrow t_i)] \Rightarrow [(p \Rightarrow t_j) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow t_i)]$ (axiom 2)
2. $(p \Rightarrow t_j) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow t_i)$ (modus ponens)

3. $p \Rightarrow t_i$ (modus ponens)

So $S \vdash p \Rightarrow t$. □

Example. To show $\{p \Rightarrow q, q \Rightarrow r\} \vdash (p \Rightarrow r)$, it is sufficient to show $\{p \Rightarrow q, q \Rightarrow r, p\} \vdash r$, which is just modus ponens twice.

Question: how are \models and \vdash related?

Aim: $S \models t \iff S \vdash t$ (Completeness Theorem).

This is made up of:

- $S \vdash t \Rightarrow S \models t$ (soundness) i.e “our axioms and deduction rule are not silly”;
- $S \models t \Rightarrow S \vdash t$ (adequacy) “our axioms are strong enough to deduce from S , every semantic consequence of S ”.

Proposition 1.3 (Soundness). *Let $S \subseteq L$, $t \in L$. Then $S \vdash t \Rightarrow S \models t$.*

Proof. We have a proof t_1, \dots, t_n of t from S . So we must show that every model of S is a model of t , i.e if v is a valuation with $v(s) = 1$ for all $s \in S$, then $v(t) = 1$. But $v(p) = 1$ for each axiom p (each axiom is a tautology), and for each $p \in S$ whenever $v(p) = v(p \Rightarrow q) = 1$, we have $v(q)$. So $v(t_i) = 1$ for all i (induction). □

One case of adequacy is: if $S \models \perp$, then $S \vdash \perp$. We say S is *consistent* if $S \not\models \perp$. So our statement is: S has no model $\Rightarrow S$ inconsistent, i.e S consistent $\Rightarrow S$ has a model.

In fact, this implies adequacy in general. Indeed, if $S \models t$ then $S \cup \{\neg t\}$ has no model. Hence (by the special case) $S \cup \{\neg t\} \vdash \perp$. So $S \vdash (\neg t \Rightarrow \perp)$, i.e $S \vdash (\neg \neg t)$. But $S \vdash (\neg \neg t) \Rightarrow t$ (axiom 3), so $S \vdash t$.

So our task is: given S consistent, find a model of S . Could try: define

$$v(t) = \begin{cases} 1 & t \in S \\ 0 & t \notin S \end{cases}.$$

But this fails, since S might not be *deductively closed*, meaning $S \vdash p \Rightarrow p \in S$. So we could first replace S with its deductive closure $\{t \in L : S \vdash t\}$ (which is consistent, because S is). However, this still fails: if S does not ‘mention’ p_3 , then $S \not\models p_3$ and $S \not\models \neg p_3$, so $v(p_3) = v(\neg p_3) = 0$ which is impossible.

Theorem 1.4 (Model Existence Theorem). *Let $S \subseteq L$ be consistent. Then S has a model.*

Idea: extend S to ‘swallow up’, for each p , one of p and $\neg p$.

Proof. Claim: for any consistent $S \subseteq L$ and $p \in L$, $S \cup \{p\}$ or $S \cup \{\neg p\}$ is consistent.

Proof of claim: if not, then $S \cup \{p\} \vdash \perp$ and $S \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash \perp$. So $S \vdash (p \Rightarrow \perp)$ (deduction theorem), i.e. $S \vdash (\neg p)$. Hence from $S \cup \{\neg p\} \vdash \perp$ we obtain $S \vdash \perp$.

Now, L is countable (as each L_n is countable) so we can list L as t_1, t_2, \dots . Let $S_0 = S$. Let $S_1 = S_0 \cup \{t_1\}$ or $S_1 = S_0 \cup \{\neg t_1\}$ with S_1 consistent. In general, given S_{n-1} let $S_n = S_{n-1} \cup \{t_n\}$ or $S_n = S_{n-1} \cup \{\neg t_n\}$ so that S_n is consistent. Now set $\bar{S} = S_0 \cup S_1 \cup S_2 \cup \dots$. Thus for all $t \in L$, either $t \in \bar{S}$ or $(\neg t) \in \bar{S}$.

Now \bar{S} is consistent: if $\bar{S} \vdash \perp$ then, since proofs are finite, we’d have $S_n \vdash \perp$ for some n , a contradiction.

Also, \bar{S} is deductively closed: if $\bar{S} \vdash p$, must have $p \in \bar{S}$, since otherwise $(\neg p) \in \bar{S}$, so $\bar{S} \vdash (p \Rightarrow \perp)$ and $\bar{S} \vdash \perp$.

Now define $v : L \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by

$$t \mapsto \begin{cases} 1 & t \in \bar{S} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

We’ll show v is a valuation (then we’re done as $v = 1$ on S).

$v(\perp)$: have $\perp \notin \bar{S}$ (since \bar{S} is consistent), so $v(\perp) = 0$.

$v(p \Rightarrow q)$: if $v(p) = 1$, $v(q) = 0$, then have $p \in \bar{S}$, $q \notin \bar{S}$. But if $(p \Rightarrow q) \in \bar{S}$, then since $p \in \bar{S}$, $q \in \bar{S}$ (since \bar{S} is deductively closed). Now if $v(q) = 1$, $q \in \bar{S}$. But $\bar{S} \vdash (q \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow q))$ (axiom 1), so $\bar{S} \vdash (p \Rightarrow q)$ hence $(p \Rightarrow q) \in \bar{S}$ (\bar{S} is deductively closed). Finally, if $v(p) = 0$, we have $p \notin \bar{S}$ and want to show $(p \Rightarrow q) \in \bar{S}$. Then $(p \Rightarrow \perp) \in \bar{S}$, so it is enough to show $(p \Rightarrow \perp) \vdash (p \Rightarrow q)$. So it’s enough to show $(p, p \Rightarrow \perp) \vdash q$, so enough to show $\perp \vdash q$. But $\perp \vdash (\neg \neg q)$ (axiom 1), and $(\neg \neg q) \vdash q$ (axiom 3), so $\perp \vdash q$ as required. \square

Remarks.

1. We used $P = (p_1, p_2, \dots)$, in saying L is countable. In fact, it also holds if P is uncountable (see later in course).
2. Sometimes this theorem is called ‘The Completeness Theorem’

By the remarks stated before this theorem, we have

Corollary 1.5 (Adequacy). *Let $S \subseteq L$, $t \in L$, with $S \models t$. Then $S \vdash t$.*

Hence we have

Theorem 1.6 (Completeness Theorem). *Let $S \subseteq L$, $t \in L$. Then $S \vdash t \iff S \models t$.*

Corollary 1.7 (Compactness Theorem). *Let $S \subseteq L$, $t \in L$ with $S \models t$. Then some finite $S' \subseteq S$ has $S' \models t$.*

Proof. This is trivial if we replace \models by \vdash (as all proofs are finite). \square

For $t = \perp$, the theorem says: if $S \models \perp$ then some finite $S' \subseteq S$ has $S' \vdash \perp$, i.e. if every finite $S' \subseteq S$ has a model then S has a model. In fact, this is equivalent to compactness in general: $S \models t$ says $S \cup \{-t\}$ has no model, and $S' \models t$ says $S' \cup \{-t\}$ has no model.

Corollary 1.8 (Compactness Theorem equivalent form). *Let $S \subseteq L$. Then if every finite subset of S has a model, so does S .*

Another application:

Corollary 1.9 (Decidability Theorem). *Let $S \subseteq L$ be finite and $t \in L$. Then there is an algorithm to decide, in finite time, whether or not $S \vdash t$.*

Remark. This is a very surprising result.

Proof. Trivial if we replace \vdash with \models : to check if $S \models t$ we just draw the truth table. \square

2 Well-ordering & Ordinals

Definition. A *total order* or *linear order* is a pair $(X, <)$ where X is a set and $<$ is a relation on X that is

- (i) *irreflexive*: for all $x \in X$, not $x < x$;
- (ii) *transitive*: for all $x, y, z \in X$, if $x < y$, $y < z$ then $x < z$;
- (iii) *trichotomous*: for all $x, y \in X$, either $x = y$ or $x < y$ or $y < x$.

We sometimes write $x > y$ if $y < x$, and $x \leq y$ if $x < y$ or $x = y$.

We can instead define a total order in terms of \leq as follows:

- (i) *reflexive*: for all $x \in X$, $x \leq x$;
- (ii) *transitive*: for all $x, y, z \in X$, if $x \leq y$, $y \leq z$ then $x \leq z$;
- (iii) *antisymmetric*: for all $x, y \in X$, if $x \leq y$, $y \leq x$ then $x = y$;
- (iv) *trichotomous*: for all $x, y \in X$ either $x \leq y$ or $y \leq x$.

Examples.

1. $\mathbb{N}, <$;
2. \mathbb{Q}, \leq ;
3. \mathbb{R}, \leq ;
4. $\mathbb{N}^+ = \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$ under ‘divides’ is not a total order, e.g 2 and 3 are not related;
5. $\mathcal{P}(S), \subseteq$ is not a total order - fails trichotomy.

Definition. A total order $(X, <)$ is a *well-ordering* if every (non-empty) subset has a least element, i.e for all $S \subseteq X$ if $S \neq \emptyset$ then there exists $x \in S$ such that $x \leq y$ for all $y \in S$.

Examples.

1. $\mathbb{N}, <$;
2. $\mathbb{Z}, <$ is not a well ordering;
3. $\mathbb{Q}, <$ is not a well ordering;
4. $\mathbb{R}, <$ is not a well ordering;
5. $[0, 1] \subseteq \mathbb{R}, <$ is not a well ordering, e.g $(0, 1]$ has no least element;
6. $\{1/2, 2/3, 3/4, \dots\} \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is well ordered;
7. $\{1/2, 2/4, 3/4, \dots\} \cup \{1\}$ is well ordered;

8. $\{1/2, 2/4, 3/4, \dots\} \cup \{2\}$ is well ordered;
9. $\{1/2, 2/3, 3/4, \dots\} \cup \{1 + 1/2, 1 + 2/3, 1 + 3/4, \dots\}$ is well ordered.

Remark. $(X, <)$ is a well ordering if and only if there is no infinite strictly decreasing sequence.

We say total orders X, Y are *isomorphic* if there exists a bijection $f : X \rightarrow Y$ such that $x < y$ if and only if $f(x) < f(y)$. For example, Examples 1&6, 7&8 above are isomorphic. However examples 1&7 are not isomorphic, since in 7 there exists a greatest element, but not in 1.

Proposition 2.1 (Proof by induction). *Let X be well ordered and let $S \subseteq X$ be such that whenever $y \in S$ for all $y < x$, then $x \in S$. Then $S = X$. Equivalently, if $p(x)$ is a property such that $p(y)$ for all $y < x$ implies $p(x)$, then $p(x)$ for all $x \in X$.*

Proof. Suppose $S \neq X$ and let x be least in $X \setminus S$. Then $y \in S$ for all $y < x$ but $x \notin S$, a contradiction. \square

Proposition 2.2. *Let X, Y be isomorphic well-orderings. Then there exists a unique isomorphism.*

Note. Note this is false for general total orders, for example $\mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ could have $x \mapsto x - t$ for any t , or $\mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ could have $x \mapsto x^3$.

Proof. Let $f, g : X \rightarrow Y$ be isomorphisms. We'll show $f(x) = g(x)$ for all x by induction on X . Given $f(y) = g(y)$ for all $y < x$, we want to show $f(x) = g(x)$. We must have $f(x) = a$ where a is the least element of $Y \setminus \{f(y) : y < x\}$ (non-empty since it contains $f(x)$). Indeed, if not then $f(x') = a$ for some $x' > x$, contradicting the fact f is order preserving. Similarly have $g(x) = a$. \square

Definition. A subset I of a total order X is an *initial segment* if $x \in I, y < x$ implies $y \in I$ (i.e I is closed under $<$). For example $I_x = \{y \in X : y < x\}$ is an initial segment for any $x \in X$, however not every initial segment is of this form, e.g in \mathbb{Q} $\{x \in \mathbb{Q} : x \leq 0 \text{ or } x^2 < 2\}$.

Note. In a well-ordering, every proper initial segment I is of the form I_x , for some $x \in X$. Indeed let x be the least element of $X \setminus I$ (non-empty since I is proper). Then $I = I_x$, since if $y < x$ then $y \in I$ (by choice of x), and conversely if $y \in I$, must have $y < x$ or else $y \geq x$ implying $x \in I$ (as I is an initial segment).

Our aim is to show that every subset of a well-ordering X is isomorphic to an initial segment of X .

Note. This is false in general for total orders, e.g. $\{1, 2, 3\}$ in \mathbb{Z} , or \mathbb{Q} in \mathbb{R} .

Theorem 2.3 (Definition by recursion). *Let X be a well-ordering and let Y be any set. Take $G : \mathcal{P}(X \times Y) \rightarrow Y$ (i.e. a ‘rule’). Then there exists a function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ such that $f(x) = G(f|_{I_x})$ for all $x \in X$. Moreover, f is unique.*

Note. In defining $f(x)$, we make use of f on $I_x = \{y : y < x\}$.

Proof. Say h is ‘an attempt’ if $h : I \rightarrow Y$ for some initial segment I of X , and for all $x \in I$ we have $h(x) = G(h|_{I_x})$. [This is the main idea].

Note that if h, h' are attempts both defined at x , then $h(x) = h'(x)$, by induction on x (if $h(y) = h'(y)$ for all $y < x$ then $h(x) = h'(x)$).

Also, for every x , there exists an attempt defined at x , also by induction. Indeed, suppose that for all $y < x$ there exists an attempt defined at y . So for all $y < x$ there exists a unique (by above) attempt h_y with domain $\{z : z \leq y\}$. Now let $h = \bigcup_{y < x} h_y$, this is an attempt with domain I_x (single valued by uniqueness). Thus $h \cup \{(x, G(h))\}$ is an attempt defined at x . Now define $f : X \rightarrow Y$ by setting $f(x) = y$ if there exists an attempt h defined at x such that $h(x) = y$.

Uniqueness of f : if f, f' are both such functions, then $f(x) = f'(x)$ for all x by induction ($f(y) = f'(y)$ for all $y < x$ implies $f(x) = f'(x)$). \square

Proposition 2.4 (Subset collapse). *Let X be a well-ordering and $Y \subseteq X$. Then Y is isomorphic to an initial segment of X . Moreover, I is unique.*

Proof. To have $f : Y \rightarrow X$ an isomorphism with an initial segment of X , we need precisely that for every $x \in Y$ we have that $f(x)$ is the minimum element of $X \setminus \{f(y) : y < x\}$. So we’re done by the previous theorem. \square

Note. We have $X \setminus \{f(y) : y < x\} \neq \emptyset$, since $f(y) \leq y$ for all y (induction), so $x \notin \{f(y) : y < x\}$.

In particular, X itself cannot be isomorphic to a proper initial segment (uniqueness).

How do different well-orderings relate to each other?

Definition. For well-orderings X, Y we write $X \leq Y$ if X is isomorphic to an initial segment of Y .

Example. If $X = \mathbb{N}$, $Y = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{2}{3}, \frac{3}{4}, \dots)$, then $X \leq Y$.

Proposition 2.5. *Let X, Y be well-orderings. Then $X \leq Y$ or $Y \leq X$.*

Proof. Suppose $Y \not\leq X$, we'll show $X \leq Y$. To obtain $f : X \rightarrow Y$ an isomorphism with an initial segment of Y , we need precisely that for every $x \in X$, $f(x)$ is the least element in $Y \setminus \{f(y) : y < x\}$ [note this can only be empty if Y is isomorphic to I_x]. So we're done by recursion. \square

Proposition 2.6. *Let X, Y be well-orderings with $X \leq Y$ and $Y \leq X$. Then X and Y are isomorphic.*

Note. This proposition and the previous one are “the most we could ever hope for”.

Proof. We have isomorphisms f from X to some initial segment of Y , and g from Y to some initial segment of X . Then $g \circ f : X \rightarrow X$ is an isomorphism from X to an initial segment of X (as initial segment of an initial segment of X is itself an initial segment). So by uniqueness $g \circ f = \text{id}_X$. Similarly $f \circ g = \text{id}_Y$. Hence f and g are inverses, thus bijections. \square

New well-ordering from old

For well-orderings X, Y , we say $X < Y$ if $X \leq Y$ and X is not isomorphic to Y . Equivalently, $X < Y$ if and only if X is isomorphic to a proper initial segment of Y .

We can ‘make a bigger one’: given a well-ordering X , pick some $x \notin X$ and well-order $X \cup \{x\}$ by setting $y < x$ for all $y \in X$. This is a well-ordering and is $> X$. Call this the *successor* of X , written X^+ .

We can ‘put some together’: given $\{X_i\}_{i \in I}$ well-orderings, seek X with $X \geq X_i$ for all i . For well-orderings $(X, <_X), (Y, <_Y)$ we say Y *extends* X if $X \subseteq Y$, $<_Y|_X = <_X$, and X is an initial segment of $(Y, <_Y)$. Say well-orderings $\{X_i\}_{i \in I}$ are *nested* if for all i, j , X_i extends X_j or X_j extends X_i .

Proposition 2.7. *Let $\{X_i\}_{i \in I}$ be a nested set of well-orderings. Then there exists a well-ordering X such that $X \geq X_i$ for all i .*

Proof. Let $X = \bigcup_{i \in I} X_i$, with ordering $<_X = \bigcup_{i \in I} <_i$, i.e. $x < y$ in X if there exists i such that $x, y \in X_i$ and $x <_i y$. Given $S \subseteq X$ non-empty, we have $S \cap X_i$ non-empty for some $i \in I$. Let x be the least element of $S \cap X_i$ (under $<_i$). Then x is the least element of S in X since X_i is an initial segment of X , by nestedness. So X is a well-ordering, and $X \geq X_i$ for all i . \square

Remark. The above proposition also holds if we don’t know the X_i are nested.

Ordinals

“Does the collection of all well-orderings itself form a well-ordering?”

Definition. An *ordinal* is a well-ordered set, with two well-ordered sets regarded as the same if they are isomorphic.¹

Definition. For a well-ordering X , corresponding to an ordinal α , say X has *order-type* α .

For any $k \in \mathbb{N}$, write k for the order-type of the (unique up to isomorphism) well-ordering on a set of size k . Write ω for the order-type of \mathbb{N} .

Example. In \mathbb{R} :

- $\{-2, 3, \pi, 5\}$ has order-type 4;
- $\{1/2, 2/3, 3/4, \dots\}$ has order-type ω .

¹Just as a rational is an expression m/n with two regarded as the same if $mn' = m'n$. However, cannot formalise this using equivalence classes in the case of ordinals, see later chapter.

Write $\alpha \leq \beta$ if $X \leq Y$, where X has order-type α and Y has order-type β (note this is well defined since it doesn't depend on the choice of X, Y). Similarly define $\alpha < \beta$, α^+ etc.

Hence for all ordinals α, β , $\alpha \leq \beta$ or $\beta \leq \alpha$. Also, if $\alpha \leq \beta$ and $\beta \leq \alpha$, $\alpha = \beta$.

Proposition 2.8. *For any ordinal α , the ordinals $< \alpha$ form a well-ordered set of order-type α .*

Proof. Let X have order-type α . Then the well-ordered sets $< X$ are precisely (up to isomorphism) the proper initial segments of X , i.e they are I_x for $x \in X$. These order biject with X itself, via $I_x \leftrightarrow x$. \square

So for any α , have $I_\alpha = \{\beta : \beta < \alpha\}$ a well-ordered set of order-type α .

Proposition 2.9. *Every non-empty set S of ordinals has a least element.*

Proof. Choose $\alpha \in S$. If α is minimal in S , we're done. Otherwise, $S \cap I_\alpha$ is non-empty, so has a least element in I_α since I_α is well-ordered, and this element is least in all of S . \square

However:

Theorem 2.10 (Burali-Forti Paradox). *The ordinals do not form a set.*

Proof. Suppose X was the set of all ordinals. Then X is a well-ordered set, so has an order type, say α . Thus X is order-isomorphic to I_α , so X is order-isomorphic to a proper initial segment of itself, contradiction. \square

Note. Given a set $S = \{\alpha_i\}_{i \in I}$ of ordinals, there exists an upper bound α for S , by applying proposition 2.7 to the nested family of the $\{I_{\alpha_n}\}_{i \in I}$. Hence by proposition 2.9 it has a least upper bound. We write $\sup S$.

Example. $\sup\{2, 4, 6, \dots\} = \omega$.

We'll give some examples of ordinals

Examples.

- $0, 1, \dots, \omega, \omega + 1, \omega + 2, \omega + 3, \dots, \omega + \omega$ (really $\omega + 1$ is ω^+ and $\omega + \omega = \omega \cdot 2 = \sup\{\omega, \omega + 1, \dots\}$).
- Continuing with $\omega \cdot 2, \omega \cdot 2 + 1, \omega \cdot 2 + 2, \dots, \omega \cdot 3, \dots, \omega \cdot 4, \dots, \omega \cdot \omega^2$ where $\omega^2 = \omega \cdot \omega = \sup\{\omega, \omega \cdot 2, \omega \cdot 3, \dots\}$.
- Now $\omega^2, \omega^2 + 1, \dots, \omega^2 + \omega$ and $\omega^2 + \omega \cdot 2, \omega^2 + \omega \cdot 3, \dots, \omega^2 + \omega^2 = \omega^2 \cdot 2$.
- $\omega^2 \cdot 2, \omega^2 \cdot 3, \dots, \omega^3$.
- $\omega^3, \dots, \omega^3 + \omega^2 \cdot 7 + \omega \cdot 4 + 13$.
- $\omega^\omega = \sup\{\omega, \omega^2, \omega^3, \dots\}$
- $\omega^{\omega+1} = \sup\{\omega^\omega + 1, \omega^\omega + 2, \dots\}$
- $\omega^{\omega \cdot 2}, \omega^{\omega \cdot 3}, \dots, \omega^{\omega^2}$.
- ω^{ω^ω}
- $\omega^{\omega^{\omega^2}}, \omega^{\omega^{\omega^4}}$
- $\omega^{\omega^\omega} = \varepsilon_0 = \sup\{\omega, \omega^\omega, \omega^{\omega^\omega}, \dots\}$.
- $\varepsilon_0, \varepsilon_0 + 1, \dots, \varepsilon_0 + \omega, \dots, \varepsilon_0 + \varepsilon_0$
- $\varepsilon_0 \cdot \omega, \dots, \varepsilon_0^2$
- $\varepsilon_0^{\varepsilon_0} = \sup\{\varepsilon_0^\omega, \varepsilon_0 \omega^\omega, \varepsilon_0^{\omega^\omega}\}$
- $\varepsilon_1 = \sup\{\varepsilon_0, \varepsilon_0^{\varepsilon_0}, \varepsilon_0^{\varepsilon_0^{\varepsilon_0}}\}$.

All of the above are countable (e.g countable union of countable sets). Is there an uncountable ordinal? i.e is there is there an uncountable well-ordering. e.g can well-order \mathbb{N} , can well-order \mathbb{Q} (bijection with \mathbb{N}), can we well-order \mathbb{R} ? Amazingly, we can prove we can.

Theorem 2.11. *There is an uncountable ordinal.*

Proof. Let $A = \{R \in \mathcal{P}(\omega \times \omega) : R \text{ is a well-ordering of a subset of } \omega\}$. Let $B = \{\text{order-type}(R) : R \in A\}$. So $\alpha \in B$ if and only if α is a countable ordinal. Let $\omega_1 = \sup B$. We must have ω_1 uncountable - if it was countable, then it would be the greatest element of B , contradicting $\omega_1 < \omega_1^+$ since ω_1^+ is countable. \square

Remark. Alternatively having the set B , could say that B isn't all ordinals since the set of ordinals is not a set (Burali-Forti), so there exists an uncountable ordinal.

Note. ω_1 is the least uncountable ordinal by definition of B .

The ordering ω_1 has some remarkable properties, e.g

1. ω_1 is uncountable but $\{\beta : \beta < \alpha\}$ is countable for all $\alpha < \omega_1$.
2. Any sequence $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots$ in I_{ω_1} is bounded. Namely, by $\sup\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots\}$ which is countable as a countable union of countable sets.

The same argument shows:

Theorem (Hartogs' Lemma). *For every set X , there exists an ordinal α that does not inject into X .*

We call the least such ordinal as in Hartogs' Lemma $\gamma(X)$, e.g $\gamma(\omega) = \omega_1$.

Definition. Say α is a *successor* if there exists β such that $\alpha = \beta^+$. Otherwise we say α is a *limit*.

Note that α has a greatest element if and only if it is a successor. So α is a limit if and only if α has no greatest element, i.e for all $\beta < \alpha$ there exists $\gamma < \alpha$ with $\beta < \gamma$.

Example. 5 is a successor: 4^+ . $\omega+2$ is a successor: $(\omega^+)^+$. ω is not a successor: no greatest element. 0 is also a limit.