European Sociological Review, 2017, Vol. 33, No. 4, 563–575
doi: 10.1093/esr/jcx059
Advance Access Publication Date: 26 July 2017
Original Article

OXFORD

Equal Treatment Regulations and Ethnic Minority Social Trust

Conrad Ziller*

Institute of Sociology and Social Psychology, University of Cologne, 50923 Köln, Germany

*Corresponding author. Email: ziller@wiso.uni-koeln.de

Submitted June 2016; revised April 2017; accepted May 2017

Abstract

Immigrants and ethnic minority members typically hold lower levels of social trust than majority members due to fewer socio-economic resources and a higher risk of discrimination. While institutional factors are a strong predictor for different levels of social trust across countries, we know little about whether and how institutional and political contexts influence group-related differences in trust within societies. This study examines how institutional fairness and anti-discrimination policies influence social trust gaps between natives and immigrants as well as ethnic minority members. Offering a nuanced perspective, I argue that regulations promoting equal treatment may also have unintended consequences on ethnic minority trust by increasing the sensitivity towards remaining inequalities and discriminatory practices. Multilevel models test the theoretical arguments using repeated cross-sectional survey data from European countries merged with time series information on political context. The results show that an increase in institutional fairness is related to widening social trust gaps. Findings from additional tests on potential mechanisms suggest that institutional fairness promotes norms of equal treatment which in turn magnify the extent to which ethnic discrimination impedes social trust.

Introduction

Social trust reflects the degree to which people assess their fellow citizens as trustworthy. Social trust is related to a number of desirable individual- and aggregate-level outcomes, including civic engagement, life satisfaction, and economic and democratic development (Nannestad, 2008). Nonetheless, the distribution of trust varies substantively within societies as it is related to socio-economic and group-related characteristics, such as education, income, or ethnic background (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2003). At the societal level, social trust levels vary considerably across countries, as historical and institutional factors matter for the development of trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Uslaner, 2008; Rothstein, 2011). Similarly, different levels of immigrants' social trust can be explained by the institutional quality of the receiving societies (Dinesen, 2013). This has led to the prevailing view that impartiality and equality before the law—core dimensions of institutional quality—have predominantly positive effects on social cohesion.

While this is certainly true with regard to overall trust levels, equal treatment regulations may nonetheless yield unintended consequences by reproducing group-based inequalities within societies (Apfelbaum, Norton and Sommers, 2012). In a related vein, such regulations potentially induce norms of equal treatment and non-discrimination, which increase the salience and sensitivity towards (remaining) group division and inequalities—a proposition that is also known as Tocqueville paradox.

Offering a nuanced perspective on institutional and policy effects, this study examines how social trust differences between natives and immigrants as well as ethnic minority members are influenced by political contexts promoting equal treatment. Specifically, I focus on institutional fairness and anti-discrimination policies. Institutional fairness ensures that individuals are treated equally in public life, regardless of personal or group-related characteristics (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Anti-discrimination policies are particularly targeted at groups discriminated against and designed to reduce discrimination as well as existing inequalities (Amiraux and Guiraudon, 2010). This way, institutional fairness mainly refers to equal treatment as a procedural principle (i.e. equal treatment, regardless of existing inequalities), while anti-discrimination policies also encompass distributional elements (i.e. aiming at equal outcomes). Incorporating these two types of measures should provide information on whether the scope and range of equal treatment regulations matter for group-related trust gaps.

The focus on, yet largely overlooked, within-country differences in trust is also motivated through increasing empirical evidence of immigrants adapting their attitudes to average public opinion levels held in the receiving country. This has been demonstrated for various attitudinal domains, including gender attitudes (Röder and Mühlau, 2014), attitudes towards homosexuality (Van der Bracht and Van der Putte, 2014), preferences for redistribution (Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2015), and social trust (Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010). From the perspective of acculturation, it thus seems adequate to compare *trust gaps* between immigrants (or ethnic minorities) and natives rather than comparing *levels of* immigrant trust across countries.

In methodological terms, I employ a longitudinal research design that focuses on the relationship between *changes in* political context and *changes in* trust gaps. To test the arguments, I use multilevel models on repeated cross-sectional survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) merged with time series country-level information on institutional fairness and anti-discrimination policies. The results show that an increase in institutional fairness is related to increasing social trust gaps. Additional tests show that institutional fairness promotes norms of equal treatment which in turn amplify the trust-eroding effect of ethnic discrimination.

Ethnic Minority Status and Social Trust

Immigrants and members of ethnic minority groups have been found to express lower levels of social trust compared to majority members (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010; Smith, 2010). Social (or general) trust essentially refers to trust in unknown people, whereas particular trust refers to trust in acquaintances, friends, and family members (Putnam, 2000; Delhey, Newton, and Welzel, 2011). While it would be useful to examine different forms of trust, the data used in this study contain items on social trust only and in terms of social integration general social trust is of exposed theoretical relevance (Nannestad, 2008).

A number of factors have been identified in the literature that may explain group-related gaps in social trust. Most importantly, these factors refer to (i) socio-economic status, (ii) intergroup relations, and (iii) institutional and political factors. (i) The first bundle of factors accounting for ethnic gaps in social trust centres on socio-economic resources. Several individual factors are substantially related to differences in social trust, including age, education, income, and occupational status (Brandt, Wetherell and Henry, 2015; Laurence, 2015). Newton (1999: pp. 185) notes in this regard: 'Social trust is most strongly expressed [...] by the winners in society, in so far as it correlates most strongly with education, satisfaction with life, income, class, and race'. Because low socio-economic status is systematically related to low levels of social trust, and because immigrant and ethnic minority groups have a lower socio-economic status than majority members, on average, differences in social status should partly or fully account for group differences in social trust (De Vroome, Hooghe, and Marien, 2013).

Moreover, neighbourhood and community characteristics, such as poverty, the quality of housing, residential segregation, schooling, and collective efficacy, have been found to predict levels of social trust (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997; Ross, Mirowsky, and Pribesh, 2001; Uslaner, 2012). If immigrants and ethnic minority members systematically move (due to low socio-economic resources) to areas characterized by residential segregation, economic deprivation, and low collective efficacy, this may additionally consolidate group-specific trust differences. Empirically, social class and neighbourhood indicators explain only a part of ethnic gaps in social trust, which points to the relevance of further explanatory factors (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002).

Another (ii) underlying mechanism refers to group-related differences in trust-relevant social interactions and experiences of discrimination. Immigrants and ethnic minority members may have less frequent trust-relevant social interactions than majority members and experience more social rejection and discrimination due to language or cultural barriers, intergroup resentment, and group-specific

norms and preferences (Habyarimana *et al.*, 2007; Ziller, 2015). In turn, fewer social interaction experiences and higher rates of discrimination should lead to lower social trust levels of minority members (Smith, 2010; Glanville, Andersson and Paxton, 2013; Van Lange, 2015).

Moreover (iii), institutional and political factors should be expected to influence group differences in social trust. According to the literature on institutional foundations of trust, fair and reliable institutions (e.g. the parliament, judiciary, and the police) shape citizens' social trust by ensuring that dishonest and corruptive behaviour will be sanctioned (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008; Uslaner, 2008; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). Institutional fairness indicates that the state treats citizens equally and with respect, which also signals about the moral fabric of the society at large. People build their perceptions of institutional fairness from encounters with representatives of the state such as public officials, policemen, and school teachers. While institutional fairness is considered to elevate the general level of trust, it may also yield particular relevance for trust gaps between ethnic minorities and the majority population. In a Swedish study, Kumlin and Rothstein (2010) find that natives and immigrants hold similar trust levels when both groups reported equal treatment by public officials, whereas in the case of unequal treatment, immigrants express particularly low levels of social trust. This means that ethnic minority members profit overproportionally from equal treatment in terms of social trust or, put differently, institutional discrimination hampers minority groups stronger than natives.

There are possible interrelations between political factors and material or social aspects that may additionally contribute to group-related differences in trust. For example, institutional discrimination or restrictive labour market policies influence minority social trust by diminishing job market chances and economic resources (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Smith, 2010). Moreover, anti-discrimination laws or multiculturalist policies provide signals about how intergroup relations should be which may decrease out-group prejudice and social discrimination and thus strengthens ethnic minority social trust (Schlueter, Meuleman and Davidov, 2013; Guimond, La Sablonnière and Nugier, 2014).

The Politics of Equal Treatment

This study focuses on institutional fairness and anti-discrimination policies as equal treatment regulations. While both factors are centred on the notion of preventing unequal treatment, they differ regarding their scope and range.

Institutional fairness or impartiality is an operating principle of institutions and public officials and reflects a crucial feature of institutional quality (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). It is characterized by the maintenance of standards of political equality at both sides of the political process, the input side of preference building, aggregation, and articulation, as well as the output side of the implementation of laws and policies. Public authorities (e.g. judges, civil servants, or politicians) are conceived as impartial when they comply with the law and treat citizens equally without any privileging out of personal reasons (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008: pp. 170). This is why empirical approaches commonly employ indicators on governmental effectiveness and (lack of) corruption to measure institutional fairness. Differences in institutional fairness across countries are largely rooted in historical trajectories related to democratic traditions and political culture. However, institutional fairness may also vary over time as consequence of changing political conditions within countries.

Anti-discrimination policies are designed to ensure citizens' access to various services and material goods, without discrimination based on gender, ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation. In the European Union, anti-discrimination legislation is substantively determined by European Union legislation. Since the 1970s, the European Community has essentially shaped gender equality laws and policies through a number of directives and programs. During the 1990s, a debate arose about missing corresponding laws referring to other sources of inequality, such as disability or ethnicity. The Amsterdam Treaty and successive treaties set the legal foundation of the European Union (EU) combating various forms of discrimination.[1] Bell (2008) finds that all member states have implemented anti-discrimination measures, but that their scope and effectiveness vary substantially across countries.

In comparison, institutional fairness has no group-specific focus and refers to society at large, whereas anti-discrimination policies are largely targeted at specific groups discriminated against (or at risk of being discriminated). Another difference is that anti-discrimination measures have a stronger proactive connotation than institutional fairness. Institutional fairness aims at preventing discrimination from occurring and for the most part refers to forms of institutional discrimination. The premise that everyone should be treated equally without notice of their ethnic background refers to the principle of 'color blindness' (Apfelbaum, Norton and Sommers, 2012). However, anti-discrimination legislation in Europe contains elements of an active promotion of equality in the

way that it not only covers legal protection from discrimination but also the implementation of public agencies promoting equal treatment, protection measures against victimization, shift in burden of proof, and positive action measures (Amiraux and Guiraudon, 2010). Moreover, these laws also provide legal protection in the private sector and thus address inequalities related to the distribution of resources (e.g. labour market entrance) and forms of social discrimination.

Functional Logic *Versus* Shifting Frame of Reference

According to their functional logic, equal treatment regulations should effectively decrease discriminatory practices. Institutional fairness is expected to prevent institutional discrimination from occurring. Anti-discrimination policies provide measures to effectively combat unequal treatment. Strong equal treatment regulations therefore increase the confidence groups at risk of discrimination place in institutions, which should in turn strengthen their social trust (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2010; Ziller and Helbling, 2017). Moreover, these regulations may contribute to ethnic minority members' trust by reducing labour market discrimination and enhancing economic resources and status. It has also been argued that inclusive policies induce norms of intergroup relations that lead to more intergroup contact and reduced prejudice (Schlueter, Meuleman and Davidov, 2013; Guimond, La Sablonnière and Nugier, 2014). In turn, a minority-friendly social climate may improve the trust of ethnic minority members.

Apart from notions of policy intention, equal treatment regulations may also have unintended consequences that run counter to established arguments. Social psychological research finds that the practice of racial colour blindness (i.e. the neglect of ethnic group membership) in the American context has only limited potential to reduce discrimination and tends to replicate existing inequalities (Apfelbaum, Norton and Sommers, 2012). This may particularly apply for institutional fairness as it reflects a procedural principle rather than a policy containing remedial measures aiming at the integration of disadvantaged groups.

Alternatively, the 'shifting frame of reference' argument posits that effects opposite to the functional logic perspective may occur because equal treatment regulations shape normative standards of non-discrimination. Specifically, this assertion holds that people adjust to norms of non-discrimination and equal treatment, which increases the salience of (remaining) discrimination. The discrepancy between normative expectation and reality then leads to an erosion of social trust for ethnic minority members as well as extended social trust gaps. That a reduction in inequalities can paradoxically lead to increasing salience of remaining inequalities has become known as Tocqueville paradox.[2] In a related vein, Klašnja and Tucker (2013) provide experimental evidence that voters from low-corruption countries are more sensitive towards political corruption than those who live in high-corruption countries.

With regard to minority–majority relations, research on the integration paradox finds that particularly well-integrated immigrants and ethnic minority members express high levels of perceived discrimination (Ten Teije, Coenders and Verkuyten, 2013; De Vroome, Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2014). This contradicts assimilation theory which suggests that acculturation diminishes perceptions of group-based boundaries and discrimination rather than reinforcing it (Portes, Parker and Cobas, 1980). Summarizing the debate on underlying mechanism, Schaeffer (2016) distinguishes between awareness- and sensitivity-related explanations. The awareness argument holds that well-integrated immigrants have a more accurate account of the actual discrimination they face mainly because they are more frequently exposed to natives and have more opportunities to experience discrimination. According to the sensitivity argument, well-integrated ethnic minorities overstate the extent of discrimination against them. Similarly to that, the shifting frame of reference perspective refers to how minorities evaluate discrimination in light of prevalent social norms. More specifically, equal treatment regulations are expected to enhance norms about equal treatment, which in turn reinforce the negative relationship between discrimination and social trust.

Empirical Strategy

Data and Variables

For the empirical analyses, I use survey data from five waves of the ESS: 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. The ESS covers a wide range of European countries and contains information on social trust, immigration and ethnic minority-related characteristics, and relevant individual-level control variables. The dependent variable social trust is located at the individual level and refers to the three items: trustworthiness ('most people can be trusted'), fairness ('most people try to be fair'), and helpfulness ('most of the time people try to be helpful'). All three items are measured on 11-point scales. An important prerequisite in comparative research is that indicators are comparable across different

populations such as country contexts, sub-groups of respondents, and repeated measures over time (Davidov *et al.*, 2014). Supplementary analyses (see Part A.1 of the Supplementary Appendix) show that the three trust items have the same factor loadings across country contexts, across sub-groups (natives, immigrants, and ethnic minority members), and over time and thus can be used as latent variable scores in multilevel regression analyses. Hence, the outcome variable social trust consists of latent factor scores obtained from a confirmatory factor analysis of the three trust items, which were then rescaled to range between 0 ('low trust') and 10 ('high trust'). Using a conventional mean index on the three trust items leads to similar results as reported below.

Respondent's ethnic minority background is measured using dummy variables on (i) being born in a foreign country (1 = foreign born) and (ii) self-identification with an ethnic minority group[3] (1 = ethnic minority). The foreign-born indicator is further divided into being foreign-born in an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) *versus* non-OECD country. Immigrants from non-OECD countries are expected to possess lower trust levels, on average, because trust is closely related to economic wealth and democratic institutions (Delhey and Newton, 2005). The non-OECD immigrant indicator is included to control for trust-relevant differences in the composition of immigrant populations. Additional analyses also test the main models for these sub-groups. Country-specific descriptives on immigrants and ethnic minority members are presented in Part A.2 of the Supplementary Appendix.

As indicator of institutional fairness, I use an indicator on government effectiveness derived from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2011). The WGI data refer to various aspects of institutional quality, are based on assessments of citizens and experts, and cover a broad range of countries and time points. Government effectiveness captures the quality of public and civil services, the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The indicator ranges from −2.5 to +2.5 (higher values indicate higher effectiveness), and was merged to the corresponding ESS country-years. For alternative specifications gauging the robustness of the findings, I employ indicators on public perceptions of corruption obtained from the Global Corruption Barometer as well as an indicator of government quality from the International Country Risk Guide. Results on these alternative specifications as well as analyses on extended time periods using survey data from the World Values Survey are presented in Part C of the Supplementary Appendix.

Data on anti-discrimination policies come from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, Huddleston *et al.*, 2015). I use the country-specific anti-discrimination sub-indicator scores which are based on expert ratings of current legislation in the four fields definition and concepts, fields of application (e.g. employment, social services, etc.), enforcement mechanisms (e.g. resolution procedures, shift in burden of proof, etc.), and implementation of equality policies and agencies with specific responsibilities (e.g. victims assistance or positive action measures). It is important to note that the MIPEX measures what is stipulated in laws and not necessarily their specific application or actual discriminatory practices in a given country. The index ranges from 0 to 1 (rescaled as original scores/100), where higher values indicate more comprehensive anti-discrimination laws. The MIPEX data are available as a yearly time series (2007–2014) and were merged to the respective ESS country-years.[4] To test the robustness of the results, I use anti-discrimination scores from the Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants.

MIPEX anti-discrimination policy scores and the WGI institutional fairness indicator are virtually uncorrelated (Pearson's $r = 0.09$). Moreover, while both variables mostly vary across countries, 4 per cent of the total variance can be attributed to over-time variations within countries (see Part A.4 of the Supplementary Appendix).

To trace possible underlying mechanisms that are mainly centred on the role of discrimination and norms of equal treatment, I use measures on being discriminated and egalitarianism in a supplementary analysis. Discrimination is based on grounds of colour or race, nationality, religion, language, or ethnic group membership (1 = one or more grounds mentioned). The question wording is: 'Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?' Egalitarian beliefs are measured with a question on how similar respondents assess themselves to fictive persons with the following attributes: 'He/She thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He/She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life' (from 1 'not like me at all', to 6, 'very much like me'). As individual-level control variables, I include age in years, gender (1 = female), education in years, employment status (1 = being unemployed), and coping on present household income (four-point rating scale, from 0 = 'Finding it very difficult on present income', to 3, 'Living comfortably on present income'). The latter three variables indicate socio-economic status, which is an important predictor of social trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003). To control for negative

experiences of ethnic minority members, I include the ethnic discrimination variable. Moreover, as immigrants' exposure to policy measures may vary over time, I include dummy variables on their length of stay (less than 1 year; 1–5 years; 6–10 years; 11–20 years; more than 20 years).

As time-varying macro-level control variables, I include gross domestic product per capita (World Bank) and unemployment rates (International Labour Organization) to control for changes in a country's economic situation potentially confounding the relationships under study. Income inequality—previously found to predict social trust—is measured by the Gini of equivalized household disposable incomes derived from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2016). To further control for (changes in) differences of the composition of foreign-born populations, I include a Herfindahl index[5] of ethnic diversity.

Methods

To test relationships between political contexts and group-specific trust gaps, I first present macro-level descriptives and bivariate analyses. To do so, social trust scores were aggregated to group-specific averages (i.e. foreign-born immigrants, ethnic minority members, and all other respondents labelled as majority population, henceforth) per country and country-year.

In a second step, I estimate multilevel regression models on repeated waves of cross-sectional survey data in which individual responses are nested within country-years and countries (Fairbrother, 2014). The main interest of the present study is on how differences in equal treatment regulations explain trust gaps between groups. I thus interact the immigrant and ethnic minority identifier with political context variables. The coefficient estimates of the interaction terms indicate to what extent group-related trust gaps differ across political contexts. All models include a random intercept at the country-year level, a country-year random slope for the minority characteristic, and country and time fixed effects. This model relates individual social trust with a linear combination of individual and country-year variables and is given as:

$$Trust_{itj} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{100}\mathrm{EM_{itj}} + \gamma_{010}\mathrm{PC_{tj}} + \gamma_{110}\mathrm{EM_{itj}} \times \mathrm{PC_{tj}} + \sum_k^o \gamma_k C_{k,itj} + \sum_l^p \gamma_l C_{l,tj} + , \sum_m^q \gamma_m CD_{m,j} + \sum_n^r \gamma_n T_{n,tj} + u_{1tj}EM_{itj} + u_{0tj} + u_{itj}$$

where i refers to individuals, t to time points, and j to countries; γ_{000} is the grand mean, γ_{100} the coefficient of the ethnic minority characteristic, γ_{010} the coefficient of political context, and γ_{110} the coefficient of the interaction term. $C_{k,itj}$ and $C_{l,tj}$ denote individual and contextual control variables; $CD_{m,j}$ denotes country dummies and $T_{n,tj}$ time dummies. u_{1tj} refers to the random slope, u_{otj} to the country-year random intercept, and u_{itj} is the residual. The random effects are assumed independent and normally distributed with zero means and constant variances.

Country fixed effects eliminate the influence of country-specific time-constant factors such as historical trajectories, political culture, and institutional factors. This means that the estimates of political context are based on over-time variation only. Time fixed effects remove the risk of spurious results due to overall time trends or temporal shocks that may have an overall influence on social trust levels. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, all continuous predictor variables were linearly transformed to range between 0 and 1. Hence, the coefficient estimates reflect differences between the observed minimum and maximum, which can be interpreted as maximum effect size. Moreover, the analysis only includes country-years with more than 20 immigrants and ethnic minority members. Note that using all available contexts or those with more than 50 per minority group leads to comparative results as reported below.

Thirdly, to trace underlying mechanisms, I run a number of supplementary analyses. To test whether changes in equal treatment regulations are related to changes in perceived discrimination (functional-logic argument), I estimate multilevel logit models on ethnic minority respondents only and ethnic discrimination as outcome variable. Alternatively, I examine whether equal treatment regulations impact norms of equal treatment, which then influences how sensitive ethnic minority members respond to unequal treatment (shift-of-frame argument). I therefore estimate the main models using egalitarian beliefs as outcome. Differences in egalitarianism between ethnic minority members and the majority population in turn serve as moderator of the relationship between discrimination and social trust. Fourthly, a number of additional tests evaluate the robustness of the results.

Empirical Results

In a first step, I summarize group-related trust differences for the countries under study and relate them to (changes) in the core explanatory variables, government effectiveness and anti-discrimination policies. Figure 1 contrasts trust levels of immigrants and ethnic minority members with those of the majority population. The 45-degree line indicates correspondence between group-specific country means. In most countries, social trust of



Figure 1. Social trust gaps across countries
BE, Belgium; CH, Switzerland; CY, Cyprus; CZ, Czech Republic; DE, Germany; DK, Denmark; EE, Estonia; ES, Spain; FI, Finland; FR, France; GR, Greece; HU, Hungary; IE, Ireland; LT, Lithuania; NL, the Netherlands; NO, Norway; PT, Portugal; SE, Sweden; SK, Slovakia; UK, the United Kingdom.

majority members is considerably higher than trust levels of immigrants or ethnic minority members. However, in some Eastern and Southern European countries with low overall trust, immigrants and ethnic minorities have higher trust levels than natives.[6] Nonetheless, the graphical inspection indicates no overall floor or ceiling effect, which would mean that group-related trust gaps are only observed in high-trust or low-trust countries. Figure 2 illustrates changes in social trust gaps over time, showing a considerable variability for both group-related trust gaps. In most cases, these variations exhibit a similar trend pattern for immigrants and ethnic minority members.

To approach the explanatory capacity of political context, Figure 3 presents the bivariate relationships of country-specific trust gaps and political context. On the left side, the cross-sectional pattern indicates a positive relationship between government effectiveness and social trust gaps, while the relationship for anti-discrimination policy is negative. This pattern is largely resembled by the bivariate plots of over-time change scores displayed on the right side. Together, the bivariate relationships suggest that group-related trust differences tend to be higher in contexts of high institutional fairness which is in line with the shifting frame of reference perspective. In contrast, trust gaps are lower in contexts of comprehensive anti-discrimination laws which provide evidence for the functional logic argument.

In a next step, I conduct multilevel analyses on repeated cross-sectional survey data. The results are presented in Table 1. Model 1 tests the average effects of individual and macro-level variables. Regarding individual-level predictors, being foreign-born, identifying as ethnic minority member, and being discriminated against are related to lower social trust. Among the foreign-born population, those who recently immigrated or live up to 10 years in the receiving society express more social trust than those who live more than 20 years in the country. Moreover, being older, being female, and having a high socio-economic status are positively related to social trust. At the macro level, only changes in ethnic diversity yield a negative relationship with social trust corroborating findings from previous longitudinal studies. Changes in government effectiveness over time are not systematically related to changes in overall levels of social trust.

Because of the rescaling of all continuous predictor variables, the coefficient estimates indicate the maximum effect, that is moving from the observed minimum to the observed maximum value. In comparison, education yields the strongest effect (about 1.5 standard deviations in trust [SD = 1.9]), followed by ethnic diversity (about 0.5 SDs in trust), coping on present income (about 0.5 SDs in trust), and discrimination (about 0.25 SDs in trust).

Model 2 tests how political context factors moderate the effect of being foreign-born on social trust. The results show a negative and statistically significant interaction with government effectiveness, which also resembles the pattern found from the bivariate relationship. A graphical depiction of this interactive relationship appears as marginal effects plot in Figure 4. It shows that the relationship between being foreign-born and social trust becomes increasingly negative (i.e. trust gaps widen) under increasing institutional fairness. The interaction with anti-discrimination policy is positive (and marginally significant), which provides suggestive evidence that the negative relationship between being foreign born and social trust becomes less negative in contexts of expanding anti-



Figure 2. Development of social trust gaps over time

discrimination measures. This is in line with the bivariate relationships found at the macro level. Model 3 tests the interaction between ethnic minority membership and political context. The relationship between being ethnic minority and social trust is negatively and significantly moderated by government effectiveness. The marginal effects plot shows that also the relationship between ethnic minority status and social trust becomes increasingly negative under increasing institutional fairness. The interaction with anti-discrimination policy is positive and marginally significant.

In terms of effect size, the interaction terms indicate how trust gaps differ when moving from the lowest to the highest score of the political context variable. For government effectiveness, the found differences equal about one-fourth of an SD in social trust. Against the background of the moderate average effects of being foreign-born (−0.12) and ethnic minority (−0.14), government effectiveness appear to substantially moderate the relationship between minority status and social trust.

Thirdly, I test potential underlying mechanisms with additional analyses. All procedures and results are presented in Part B of the Supplementary Appendix. Using ethnic discrimination as outcome, over-time changes in government effectiveness or anti-discrimination policy are not systematically related to ethnic discrimination reported by immigrants or ethnic minority members (Supplementary Table B1). This means that I find no evidence that the policy effects on social trust gaps are mediated by changes in reported discrimination. As another specification, I examine the relationship between changes in political context and egalitarianism (Supplementary Table B2). The results show that an increase in institutional fairness is systematically related to an increase in egalitarian beliefs for immigrants as well as ethnic minority members (in relation to the majority population). In turn, an increase in aggregated egalitarianism (or norms of equal treatment) amplifies the negative relationship between ethnic discrimination and social trust (Supplementary Table B3). The results thus lend strong support for the shifting frame of reference mechanism.

To ensure the robustness of the results, I run additional model specifications presented in Part C of the Supplementary Appendix. Distinguishing between immigrants from OECD and non-OECD countries, I find



Figure 3. Social trust gaps by political context
Note: Grey lines reflect fitted values. Change scores were calculated using the available minimum and maximum observed time period per country.

comparative results to those reported especially for immigrants from non-OECD countries (Supplementary Table C1). To explicitly account for country-specific differences in (the over-time development of) majority social trust, I run models with country-year averages of majority trust as additional predictor variable (Supplementary Table C2). The results from these models are similar to those obtained from the main models. The graphical depiction of the cross-sectional and longitudinal bivariate relationships (Figure 3) suggests a number of potential outliers mainly from Eastern and Southern European countries. Supplementary Table C3 presents results of models estimated without eight potentially outlying countries. The findings for institutional fairness remain intact. However, the interaction of ethnic minority members and anti-discrimination policies becomes negative and statistically significant. This means that the tentative evidence of comprehensive anti-discrimination measures being related to narrowing trust gaps largely hinges on Eastern and Southern European countries. Once excluded, expanding anti-discrimination policies appear to be unsystematically related to social trust gaps (immigrants) or even to widen them (ethnic minorities). In a similar vein, using an alternative anti-discrimination policy indicator on a subset of countries and one time point (due to data restrictions) indicates no systematic relationships with social trust gaps (Supplementary Table C4). Using alternative indicators for institutional fairness produces results similar to those obtained from the main models (Supplementary Table C5). Moreover, examining the moderating role of institutional fairness for an extended observational period leads to comparative results as in the main models (Supplementary Tables C6 and C7). Finally, interacting wealth or income inequality with ethnic minority characteristics yields no significant interaction terms for the economic variables, but leaves the found interactive relationships of political contexts intact (Supplementary Table C8).

Conclusion

This study examines whether and how political contexts promoting equal treatment affect group-related social trust differences in Europe. Moving beyond the established argument that well-functioning institutions generally have positive effects on social cohesion, I present a differentiated narrative contending that well-intended policies may also yield unintended consequences. Equal treatment regulations may reproduce existing inequalities or increase ethnic minority members' sensitivity towards discrimination and inequalities, which should

Table 1. Multilevel models

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Intercept	4.688***	(0.393)	4.665***	(0.398)	4.667***	(0.390)
Respondent level						
Foreign-born	−0.122***	(0.027)	0.137*	(0.078)	−0.115***	(0.027)
Foreign-born non-OECD country	0.028	(0.031)	−0.034	(0.033)	0.038	(0.031)
Ethnic minority	−0.143***	(0.023)	−0.130***	(0.023)	−0.048	(0.083)
Discrimination	−0.439***	(0.027)	−0.445***	(0.027)	−0.445***	(0.027)
Length of stay in country (reference 20 years or longer)						
Less than 1 year	0.377***	(0.090)	0.390***	(0.091)	0.374***	(0.090)
1–5 years	0.205***	(0.047)	0.218***	(0.049)	0.198***	(0.047)
6–10 years	0.213***	(0.046)	0.212***	(0.047)	0.203***	(0.046)
11–20 years	0.052	(0.039)	0.061	(0.041)	0.047	(0.040)
Age	0.341***	(0.027)	0.340***	(0.027)	0.341***	(0.027)
Female	0.099***	(0.009)	0.099***	(0.009)	0.099***	(0.009)
Education in years	2.518***	(0.065)	2.516***	(0.065)	2.525***	(0.065)
Coping on income	1.008***	(0.018)	1.005***	(0.018)	1.008***	(0.018)
Being unemployed	−0.185***	(0.018)	−0.186***	(0.018)	−0.186***	(0.018)
Country-year level						
Government effectiveness	−0.140	(0.225)	−0.120	(0.227)	−0.130	(0.223)
Anti-discrimination policy	−0.224	(0.265)	−0.245	(0.268)	−0.248	(0.263)
Gross domestic product per capita	0.074	(0.504)	0.106	(0.511)	0.071	(0.500)
Unemployment rates	0.102	(0.151)	0.094	(0.153)	0.093	(0.150)
Income inequality	−0.302	(0.217)	−0.271	(0.220)	−0.287	(0.215)
Ethnic diversity	−1.030***	(0.359)	−1.005***	(0.363)	−0.959***	(0.356)
Interaction effects						
Government effectiveness × foreign-born			−0.546***	(0.092)		
Anti-discrimination policy × foreign-born			0.136*	(0.081)		
Government effectiveness × ethnic minority					−0.373***	(0.105)
Anti-discrimination policy × ethnic minority					0.165*	(0.097)
Random effects (SDs)						
Country-years	0.092***	(0.009)	0.132***	(0.025)	0.154***	(0.031)
Random slope (minority characteristic)			0.093***	(0.009)	0.091***	(0.009)
Residual	1.686***	(0.003)	1.686***	(0.003)	1.686***	(0.003)
N (country)	20		20		20	
N (country years)	91		91		91	
N (respondents)	146,681		146,681		146,681	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country and time fixed effects.
*$P < 0.1$, **$P < 0.05$, ***$P < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

particularly apply for colour-blind measures that do not contain elements to overcome existing inequalities. In turn, this leads to widening group-related differences in social trust.

Focusing on institutional fairness and anti-discrimination policies, the empirical results show that an increase in institutional fairness is related to an increase in trust differences between the majority population and immigrants as well as ethnic minority members. Tests on potential underlying mechanisms suggest that institutional fairness induces norms of equal treatment and non-discrimination. In light of these changing norms, discrimination and group-based inequalities have an even stronger trust-eroding effect. In other words, modern democracies produce shifting frames of reference in norms of equal treatment that are hard to keep and may paradoxically lead to growing rather than decreasing social disparities between groups.

The findings also provide tentative evidence that an expansion of anti-discrimination policies is related to narrowing trust gaps, which suggests that these measures fulfil their functional logic. However, robustness checks suggest that this is not the case when Eastern and Southern European are excluded. Future studies should therefore focus on in-depth case studies and extend the observational period to better identify potential policy



Figure 4. Marginal effects plots minority characteristic × government effectiveness
Note: Dashed lines represent 95per cent confidence intervals. Histograms show density of country-year observations.

effects. An important qualification in this regard is to further investigate the role of individual exposure to as well as knowledge of policy content (Ziller, 2014; Ziller and Helbling, 2017). Equally important, subsequent studies should investigate specific measures of equal treatment regulations focusing on, for instance, whether they address individual- or group-related rights. Some scholars argue that strong ethnic minority group rights (in combination with a strong welfare state) hinder immigrant integration, whereas strong individual rights promote integration outcomes (Koopmans, 2010). On the other hand, an emphasize on individual rights (rather than group rights) may impede the protective function of attributing unequal treatment to group membership (Crocker and Major, 1989) and lowers collective action and social cohesion among ethnic minority members (Dixon and Levine, 2012). With regard to the populations of interest, future studies should improve upon the measurement of immigrant and ethnic minority status introducing more fine-grained indicators. This includes, for example, the specific country background, causes of immigration (refugees or labour immigrants), and socio-economic status before migration.

Against the background of recent and constantly high influxes of immigrants to Europe, it is important to evaluate how policies and regulations affect social integration. This study shed light on how equal treatment regulations shape the trust of ethnic minority members, showing that institutional fairness as a rather colour-blind regulation of equal treatment yield unintended consequences by reinforcing trust gaps between majority and minority populations. In practical terms, subsequent studies should address how gaps in social trust are related to further integration outcomes as well as immigrants' social and political behaviour. As integration has two sides to it, this includes investigating how (different segments of) the general population responds to equal treatment regulations and group-related trust differences.

Supplementary Data

Supplementary data are available at *ESR* online.

Acknowledgements

I thank André Kaiser, Elmar Schlüter, Merlin Schaeffer, Marc Helbling, and five anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. This study uses data from the 2015 release of the anonymized EU Labour Force Survey (LFS), provided by the European Commission, Eurostat. Eurostat has no responsibility for the results and/or conclusions of this study.

Funding

I acknowledge a doctoral scholarship of the Research Training Group SOCLIFE at the University of Cologne (GRK 1461, funded by the German Research Foundation) during my work on this research project.

Notes

1 The most important acts are the directives 2000/43 ('Racial Equality Directive'), 2000/78 ('Employment Equality Directive'), and 2004/113/EC and 2006/54/EC on gender equality.

2 'When inequality of conditions is the common law of society, the most marked inequalities do not strike the eye; when everything is nearly on the same level, the slightest are marked enough to hurt

it. Hence the desire of equality always becomes more insatiable in proportion as equality is more complete' (Alexis de Tocqueville [1840] in 'Democracy in America'. 2nd book, Chapter 13).

3 The question wording is: 'Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]?' Using this self-description indicator allows for considering ethnic minority members without personal immigration experience.

4 MIPEX 2007 scores were merged to the ESS 2006 wave.

5 This index describes the likelihood that two randomly drawn individuals do not belong to the same ethnic category. It is computed as $ED = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2$, where p_i is the proportion of ethnic category i, and n is the number of ethnic categories. Proportions of immigrants were aggregated using data from the European Union Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat, 2015). Categories refer to (i) the survey country; (ii) the EU15 and member states of the European Free Trade Association; (iii) the new 12 EU members as of 2004; (iv) other Europe (including countries of the former Soviet Union and Turkey); (v) MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries; (vi) Sub-Saharan Africa; (vii) South and East Asia; (viii) North America; and (ix) Central and South America.

6 It is noteworthy that initial invariance tests (Part A.1 in the supplementary appendix) indicate that regression results as well as comparisons of country-specific change scores over time are valid. However, due to lack of scalar invariance across countries, latent means should not be compared. Hence, the univariate and bivariate plots rather serve as approximate illustration.

References

Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2002). Who trusts others? *Journal of Public Economics*, **85**, 207–234.

Altonji, J. G. and Blank, R. M. (1999). Race and gender in the labor market. In Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (Eds.), *Handbook of Labor Economics*. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp. 3143–3259.

Amiraux, V. and Guiraudon, V. (2010). Discrimination in comparative perspective: policies and practices. *American Behavioral Scientist*, **53**, 1691–1714.

Apfelbaum, E. P., Norton, M. I. and Sommers, S. R. (2012). Racial color blindness: emergence, practice, and implications. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, **21**, 205–209.

Bell, M. (2008). The implementation of European anti-discrimination directives: converging towards a common model? *The Political Quarterly*, **79**, 36–44.

Brandt, M. J., Wetherell, G. and Henry, P. J. (2015). Changes in income predict change in social trust: a longitudinal analysis. *Political Psychology*, **36**, 761–768.

Crocker, J. and Major, B. (1989). Social stigma and self-esteem: the self-protective properties of stigma. *Psychological Review*, **96**, 608.

Davidov, E. *et al.* (2014). Measurement equivalence in cross-national research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, **40**, 55–75.

Delhey, J. and Newton, K. (2003). Who trusts? The origins of social trust in seven societies. *European Societies*, **5**, 93–137.

Delhey, J. and Newton, K. (2005). Predicting cross-national levels of social trust: global pattern or nordic exceptionalism? *European Sociological Review*, **21**, 311–327.

Delhey, J., Newton, K. and Welzel, C. (2011). How general is trust in "most people"? Solving the radius of trust problem. *American Sociological Review*, **76**, 786–807.

De Vroome, T., Hooghe, M. and Marien, S. (2013). The origins of generalized and political trust among immigrant minorities and the majority population in the Netherlands. *European Sociological Review*, **29**, 1336–1350.

De Vroome, T., Martinovic, B. and Verkuyten, M. (2014). The integration paradox: Level of education and immigrants' attitudes towards natives and the host society. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, **20**, 166.

Dinesen, P. T. (2013). Where you come from or where you live? Examining the cultural and institutional explanation of generalized trust using migration as a natural experiment. *European Sociological Review*, **29**, 114–128.

Dinesen, P. T. and Hooghe, M. (2010). When in Rome, do as the Romans do: the acculturation of generalized trust among immigrants in Western Europe. *International Migration Review*, **44**, 697–727.

Dixon, J. and Levine, M. (2012). *Beyond Prejudice: Extending the Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict, Inequality and Social Change*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

European Commission. (2014). *Joint Report on the Application of Council Directive 2000/43/EC and of Council Directive 2000/78/EC.* available from ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/com_2014_2_en.pdf

Eurostat. (2015). *European Commission, 2015 Release of Anonymised EU LFS Microdata*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

Fairbrother, M. (2014). Two multilevel modeling techniques for analyzing comparative longitudinal survey datasets. *Political Science Research and Methods*, **2**, 119–140.

Freitag, M. and Bühlmann, M. (2009). Crafting trust: the role of political institutions in a comparative perspective. *Comparative Political Studies*, **42**, 1537–1566.

Glanville, J. L., Andersson, M. A. and Paxton, P. (2013). Do social connections create trust? An examination using new longitudinal data. *Social Forces*, **92**, 545–562.

Guimond, S., La Sablonnière, R. D. and Nugier, A. (2014). Living in a multicultural world: intergroup ideologies and the societal context of intergroup relations. *European Review of Social Psychology*, **25**, 142–188.

Habyarimana, J. *et al*. (2007). Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? *American Political Science Review*, **101**, 709–725.

Huddleston, T. *et al*. (2015). Migrant integration policy index 2015. Available from <http://www.mipex.eu>

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2011). The worldwide governance indicators: methodology and analytical issues. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, **3**, 220–246.

Klašnja, M. and Tucker, J. A. (2013). The economy, corruption, and the vote: evidence from experiments in Sweden and Moldova. *Economics and Elections: Effects Deep and Wide*, **32**, 536–543.

Koopmans, R. (2010). Trade-offs between equality and difference: immigrant integration, multiculturalism and the welfare state in cross-national perspective. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, **36**, 1–26.

Kumlin, S. and Rothstein, B. (2010). Questioning the new liberal dilemma: immigrants, social networks, and institutional fairness. *Comparative Politics*, **43**, 63–80.

Laurence, J. (2015). (Dis)placing trust: the long-term effects of job displacement on generalised trust over the adult lifecourse. *Social Science Research*, **50**, 46–59.

Nannestad, P. (2008). What have we learned about generalized trust, if anything? *Annual Review of Political Science*, **11**, 413–436.

Newton, K. (1999). Social and political trust in established democracies. In Norris P. (Ed.), *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford University Press, pp. 169–187, available from <http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/34509/>

Portes, A., Parker, R. N. and Cobas, J. A. (1980). Assimilation or consciousness: perceptions of US society among recent Latin American immigrants to the United States. *Social Forces*, **59**, 200–224.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Reeskens, T. and van Oorschot, W. (2015). Immigrants' attitudes towards welfare redistribution. An exploration of role of government preferences among immigrants and natives across 18 European welfare states. *European Sociological Review*, **31**, 433–445.

Röder, A. and Mühlau, P. (2014). Are they acculturating? Europe's immigrants and gender egalitarianism. *Social Forces*, **92**, 899–928.

Ross, C. E., Mirowsky, J. and Pribesh, S. (2001). Powerlessness and the amplification of threat: neighborhood disadvantage, disorder, and mistrust. *American Sociological Review*, **66**, 568–591.

Rothstein, B. (2011). *The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rothstein, B. and Stolle, D. (2008). The state and social capital: an institutional theory of generalized trust. *Comparative Politics*, **40**, 441–459.

Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. (2008). What is quality of government? A theory of impartial government institutions. *Governance*, **21**, 165–190.

Sampson, R. J., Raudenbush, S. W. and Earls, F. (1997). Neighborhoods and violent crime: a multilevel study of collective efficacy. *Science*, **277**, 918–924.

Schaeffer, M. (2016) Status aspirations, anti-discrimination policy and perceived discrimination. comparing the 'integration paradox' among classical European immigration countries. *Working Paper*, 2016. Available from <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/vykkz/>

Schlueter, E., Meuleman, B. and Davidov, E. (2013). Immigrant integration policies and perceived group threat: a multilevel study of 27 Western and Eastern European countries. *Social Science Research*, **42**, 670–682.

Smith, S. S. (2010). Race and trust. *Annual Review of Sociology*, **36**, 453–475.

Solt, F. (2016). The standardized world income inequality database. *Social Science Quarterly*, **97**, 1267–1281.

Ten Teije, I., Coenders, M. and Verkuyten, M. (2013). The paradox of integration: immigrants and their attitude toward the native population. *Social Psychology*, **44**, 278–288.

Uslaner, E. M. (2008). *Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Uslaner, E. M. (2012). *Segregation and Mistrust: Diversity, Isolation, and Social Cohesion*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Van der Bracht, K. and Van de Putte, B. (2014). Homonegativity among first and second generation migrants in Europe: the interplay of time trends, origin, destination and religion. *Social Science Research*, **48**, 108–120.

Van Lange, P. A. M. (2015). Generalized trust: four lessons from genetics and culture. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, **24**, 71–76.

Ziller, C. (2014). Societal implications of antidiscrimination policy in Europe. *Research and Politics*, **1**, 1–9.

Ziller, C. (2015). Ethnic diversity, economic and cultural contexts, and social trust: cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence from European regions, 2002–2010. *Social Forces*, **93**, 1211–1240.

Ziller, C. and Helbling, M. (2017). Antidiscrimination laws, policy knowledge and political support. *British Journal of Political Science*, doi: 10.1017/S0007123417000163.

Conrad Ziller is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Sociology and Social Psychology, University of Cologne. His work has been published in *Social Forces* and *the British Journal of Political Science*.

Equal Treatment Regulations and Ethnic Minority Social Trust

Online Appendix

PART A—Measurement and Descriptives

A.1 Measurement Invariance of Social Trust

An important prerequisite in comparative research is that indicators are comparable across different populations such as country contexts, sub-groups of respondents, or repeated measurement over time (Davidov et al. 2014). For continuous indicator variables, measurement equivalence is usually tested using multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA). Equivalence levels typically comprise configural, metric, and scalar equivalence. The least demanding level is configural equivalence, which requires an equal factor structure across groups. The next level is metric equivalence, which requires equal factor loadings across groups. This means that the same latent construct is measured and that "an increase of one unit on the measurement scale has the same meaning in population A as in population B" (Davidov et al. 2014: 63). Metric equivalence of an instrument is a requirement for conducting correlational studies. This means that once metric invariance is established, latent variable scores can be used in multilevel regression analyses (Hox et al. 2012). Scalar equivalence refers to equal factor loadings and equal indicator intercepts across groups, which is a prerequisite for also comparing latent means across groups. In a stepwise procedure, MGCFA models with different parameter constraints are estimated and assessed (Chen 2007).

With regard to social trust, Reeskens and Hooghe (2008) demonstrate that the three trust items in the ESS measure the same latent construct across countries (i.e., metric equivalence) and thus can be used in (multilevel) regression analysis. Using Danish survey data, Dinesen (2011) provides empirical evidence that social trust refers to the same phenomenon for both natives and immigrants (scalar equivalence). In the present study, measurement equivalence is tested across countries, across sub-groups (natives versus immigrants and natives versus ethnic minority members), as well as over time (2006-2014). Model fit is assessed using (changes in) comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA),

and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Model fit has also been assessed using chi-square (difference) tests. Because chi-square tests are sensitive to sample size, employing them to larges samples such as the ESS may lead to the rejection of a model due to trivial discrepancies (Chen 2007: 465).

Table A1 presents the model fits from a stepwise procedure testing measurement invariance of social trust. Since the ESS contains only three items, the most fundamental assumption of configural invariance cannot be assessed through model fit, but is reflected in substantially high factor loadings of the three indicators ($\beta > .65$). In a second step, factor loadings are restricted to equality. The fit for this model specification is reasonably good across all specifications (countries, groups, and time) yielding RMSEA smaller than .05, CFI greater than .95, and SRMR smaller than .03. This means that analogously to previous research (Reeskens and Hooghe 2008), social trust is metrically invariant across countries, groups, and time and can thus be used in correlational studies.

To test for scalar invariance, loadings and intercepts are restricted to equality. Model fit is assessed using the following cut-off values suggested by Chen (2007: 501): A change of less or equal than -.01 in CFI, supplemented by a change of less or equal than .015 in RMSEA or a change of less or equal than .01 in SRMR indicates invariance. The model fit indices (Table A1) indicate that this is not the case across countries, whereas scalar invariance can be established with regard to sub-groups and over time. Chi-square difference tests are uninformative because of the large sample size. Moreover, model fit for sub-groups and over time is similar when running country-specific tests. Here, chi-square difference tests become informative again and are for the most part insignificant, which provides additional evidence that the assumption of scalar invariance holds and also latent means may be compared across sub-groups and over time.

Table A1: Measurement Invariance Across Countries, Groups, and Time

Group: countries	Type of invariance	Chi-square	Df	Chi- square diff	Df diff	p-value	RMSEA	CFI	SRMR	RMSEA diff	CFI diff	SRMR diff
	Metric	444.493	38				0.038	0.996	0.020			
	Scalar	8282.591	76	7838.10	38	0.00	0.121	0.913	0.065	0.08	-0.08	0.05
Group: majority	**Type of invariance**	**Chi- square**	**Df**	**Chi- square diff**	**Df diff**	**p-value**	**RMSEA**	**CFI**	**SRMR**	**RMSEA diff**	**CFI diff**	**SRMR diff**
v. foreign born	Metric	4.37	2				0.004	1.000	0.004			
	Scalar	102.72	4	98.35	2	0.00	0.018	0.999	0.016	0.01	0.00	0.01
v. ethnic minority	Metric	6.23	2				0.005	1.000	0.006			
	Scalar	82.01	4	75.78	2	0.00	0.016	0.999	0.021	0.01	0.00	0.02
Group: time	**Type of invariance**	**Chi- square**	**Df**	**Chi- square diff**	**Df diff**	**p-value**	**RMSEA**	**CFI**	**SRMR**	**RMSEA diff**	**CFI diff**	**SRMR diff**
	Metric	37.87	8				0.011	1.000	0.005			
	Scalar	156.20	16	118.33	8	0.00	0.017	0.999	0.009	0.01	0.00	0.00

A.2 Sample Statistics on Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities

The ESS data consist of random samples of the population and have no oversampling of immigrants or ethnic minority members. While this may limit the merit of certain types of sub-sample analysis, I can rely on previous studies that focused on immigrant attitudes and immigrant integration using ESS data (e.g., Dinesen and Hooghe 2010; Röder and Mühlau 2014). As a most recent example, Reeskens and van Oorschot (2015: 436) compare proportions of immigrants from ESS country samples with official figures in a preliminary analysis and find almost perfect congruence between both.

Table A2 presents sample sizes and proportions of immigrants and ethnic minority members of the ESS country years included in the analyses. Note that due to missing values on included items, observations may differ in the main multilevel models. Overall, proportions of the minority populations are consistent over time (i.e., no outliers). It is possible to compare proportions of immigrants with official census figures on the foreign-born population of 2011 (see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/population-and-housing-census/census-data/database). Comparing census figures with the 2010 ESS figures indicates rather small deviations, except for Cyprus and Czech Republic. Here, deviations are quite substantial. This also yields influence when correlating census and ESS figures. Using all available information Pearson's r = .79, whereas an exclusion of Cyprus and Czech Republic leads to a correlation of r = .98.

Table A2: European Social Survey—Sample Description

Country	Minority characteristic	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2011 census figures (foreign born)
BE	Sample size	1,798	1,760	1,704	1,869	1,769	
	Foreign-born	8.5	9.9	11.0	14.0	12.8	
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	3.8	3.9	5.2	7.1	6.3	
	Ethnic minority	2.4	4.1	3.9	5.6	5.0	
CH	Sample size	1,804	1,819	1,506	1,493	1,532	
	Foreign-born	19.9	23.5	23.3	22.5	25.7	27.8
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	6.9	8.0	9.3	8.0	9.8	
	Ethnic minority	6.7	9.0	6.6	9.0	8.0	
CY	Sample size		1,215	1,083	1,116		
	Foreign-born		6.9	5.9	10.1		23.4
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)		3.3	3.1	6.0		
	Ethnic minority		3.1	2.7	3.8		
CZ	Sample size		2,018	2,386	2,009	2,148	
	Foreign-born		1.6	2.0	2.4	2.0	6.6
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)		0.2	0.6	0.5	0.4	
	Ethnic minority		2.8	2.7	2.6	2.3	
DE	Sample size	2,916	2,751	3,031	2,958	3,045	
	Foreign-born	9.0	9.6	10.9	11.8	11.2	13.7
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	4.8	5.9	5.9	6.6	5.8	
	Ethnic minority	4.7	4.7	4.6	5.2	5.3	
DK	Sample size	1,505	1,610	1,576	1,650	1,502	
	Foreign-born	6.1	6.2	6.4	6.9	7.9	9.0
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	3.2	2.9	3.1	3.9	3.2	
	Ethnic minority	2.6	3.1	2.7	3.5	3.9	
EE	Sample size	1,517	1,661	1,793	2,380	2,051	
	Foreign-born	21.0	19.6	15.4	16.3	19.5	15.2
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	20.5	19.1	14.6	15.7	19.0	
	Ethnic minority	29.8	21.1	13.3	20.4	24.8	
ES	Sample size	1,876	2,576	1,885	1,889	1,925	
	Foreign-born	7.8	9.6	9.9	11.4	8.8	12.1
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	6.5	8.0	7.8	9.1	7.4	
	Ethnic minority	3.8	3.2	3.0	3.0	1.9	
FI	Sample size	1,896	2,195	1,878	2,197	2,087	
	Foreign-born	3.1	2.6	3.5	4.3	4.8	3.5
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	1.7	1.4	1.9	2.3	2.3	
	Ethnic minority	1.3	1.5	1.4	2.1	1.6	
FR	Sample size	1,986	2,073	1,728	1,968	1,917	
	Foreign-born	9.7	8.1	9.1	10.7	10.8	11.3
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	6.6	5.0	6.4	6.7	7.6	
	Ethnic minority	3.4	4.1	4.6	4.6	4.8	
GB (UK)	Sample size	2,394	2,352	2,422	2,286	2,264	
	Foreign-born	10.7	11.4	12.1	13.1	15.2	12.6
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	6.7	7.0	8.0	8.9	12.0	
	Ethnic minority	6.3	7.9	8.3	9.1	9.6	
GR	Sample size		2,072	2,715			
	Foreign-born		6.8	9.7			11.9
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)		5.4	8.6			
	Ethnic minority		4.6	5.9			
HU	Sample size	1,518	1,544	1,561	2,014	1,698	
	Foreign-born	2.1	1.8	2.7	1.3	1.6	3.9
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	1.7	1.5	2.3	1.1	1.3	
	Ethnic minority	5.5	5.4	4.7	5.9	5.4	
IE	Sample size	1,800	1,764	2,576	2,628	2,390	
	Foreign-born	13.1	16.2	15.8	14.5	12.9	
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	3.3	4.6	5.2	4.1	3.8	
	Ethnic minority	3.9	4.2	5.5	3.1	4.0	
LT	Sample size			1,677	2,109	2,250	
	Foreign-born			6.7	2.8	3.4	5.9
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)			6.1	2.5	3.2	
	Ethnic minority			8.4	7.5	7.9	

(Continued)

Table A2: *continued*

NL	Sample size	1,889	1,778	1,829	1,845	1,919	
	Foreign-born	9.4	8.4	7.5	8.9	9.7	11.2
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	7.1	4.8	4.6	5.8	6.4	
	Ethnic minority	6.6	6.7	5.8	6.7	8.1	
NO	Sample size	1,750	1,549	1,548	1,624	1,436	
	Foreign-born	7.1	8.4	10.0	12.5	11.8	12.3
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	3.0	4.1	4.2	8.4	7.2	
	Ethnic minority	2.9	4.0	4.9	6.4	5.0	
PT	Sample size	2,222	2,367	2,150	2,151	1,265	
	Foreign-born	6.8	5.9	6.2	5.2	7.1	8.3
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	5.7	5.2	5.2	4.2	5.5	
	Ethnic minority	5.2	2.5	1.6	1.4	1.9	
SE	Sample size	1,927	1,830	1,497	1,847	1,791	
	Foreign-born	11.3	11.7	11.6	12.7	13.2	14.1
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	4.8	4.5	5.7	6.4	6.8	
	Ethnic minority	2.5	3.1	3.0	3.1	4.1	
SK	Sample size	1,766	1,810	1,856	1,847		
	Foreign-born	3.2	2.4	2.4	1.9		2.8
	Foreign-born (non-OECD)	1.0	0.5	0.4	0.5		
	Ethnic minority	9.2	5.4	4.8	4.2		

Note: No available census data for Belgium and Ireland. Empty cells reflect non-availability of ESS or macro-level data.

A.3 Descriptives of Used Variables

Table A3: Descriptives

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Social trust	146,681	5.42	1.91	0	10
Foreign born	146,681	0.09	0.28	0	1
Foreign born non-OECD country	146,681	0.05	0.22	0	1
Ethnic minority	146,681	0.05	0.22	0	1
Discrimination	146,681	0.03	0.17	0	1
Length of stay in country					
less than 1 year	146,681	0.00	0.05	0	1
1 to 5 years	146,681	0.01	0.11	0	1
6 to 10 years	146,681	0.01	0.11	0	1
11 to 20 years	146,681	0.02	0.13	0	1
20 years or longer	146,681	0.04	0.20	0	1
Age (original scores)	146,681	49.35	19.06	14	123
Age (used in regression)	146,681	0.32	0.17	0	1
Female	146,681	0.53	0.50	0	1
Education in years (original scores)	146,681	12.44	4.24	0	56
Education in years (used in regression)	146,681	0.22	0.08	0	1
Coping on income (original scores)	146,681	2.01	0.86	0	3
Coping on income (used in regression)	146,681	0.67	0.29	0	1
Being unemployed	146,681	0.07	0.26	0	1
Egalitarian values	143,188	4.96	1.02	1	6
Antidiscrimination policy (original scores/100)	91	0.63	0.18	0.17	0.88
Antidiscrimination policy (used in regression)	91	0.65	0.26	0	1
Government effectiveness (original scores)	91	1.45	0.46	0.53	2.25
Government effectiveness (used in regression)	91	0.53	0.27	0	1
GDP per capita (original scores)	91	36646.74	9894.66	18664.19	66363.37
GDP per capita (used in regression)	91	0.38	0.21	0	1
Unemployment rates (original scores)	91	8.40	4.17	2.60	25.20
Unemployment rates (used in regression)	91	0.26	0.18	0	1
Income inequality (original scores)	91	28.75	3.47	22.51	36.02
Income inequality (used in regression)	91	0.46	0.26	0	1
Ethnic diversity (original scores)	91	0.20	0.10	0.01	0.47
Ethnic diversity (used in regression)	91	0.40	0.23	0	1

Note: Continuous variables used in multilevel regressions were linearly transformed to range between 0-1 in order to facilitate the comparison of coefficients.

A.4 Correlations and Over-Time Development of Political Context Variables

Figure A1: Country Scores of Political Context Variables



Note: Overall country means (2006-2014) are presented. Pearson's r = .09. Change scores (not shown) are correlated at Pearson's r = -.10.

Figure A2: Time Series of Political Context Variables

Note: ICC for MIPEX is .96 (over time variance is 4 percent). ICC for WGI is .96 (over time variance is 4 percent).

PART B—Mechanisms

To examine potential underlying mechanisms, I test intermediary variables expected to mediate the effect of political context on social trust gaps. First, I conduct a multilevel analysis using ethnic discrimination as outcome. The sample is restricted to immigrants and ethnic minority members as reporting of ethnic discrimination among the majority population should be of limited concern. Analogously to the main models presented in Table 1 in the manuscript, individual and country-year variables are included as well as country and time fixed effects. As the dependent variable is categorical, I use a logit-link function for estimation. The results presented in Table B1 show that neither government effectiveness nor antidiscrimination policy are systematically linked to reports of ethnic discrimination for immigrants (Model B1) or ethnic minority members (Model B2). This means that I find no indication that ethnic discrimination can be held accountable for transmitting effects of political context, whether this concerns the role of institutional fairness or antidiscrimination laws. At the same time, it is important to note that the used indicators of discrimination can only serve as a first (and imperfect) approximation. Discrimination is a complex phenomenon that not only refers to perceived group membership, but also to specific occasions in different domains that are hardly covered by the rather broad indicator used in the present study.

Table B1: Multilevel Models with Discrimination as Outcome

	Model B1		Model B2	
Intercept	8.826	(65.628)	8.393	(67.647)
Respondent level				
Foreign born	-		0.319**	(0.113)
Foreign born non-OECD country	0.300**	(0.069)	0.186+	(0.099)
Ethnic minority	1.598**	(0.061)	-	
Length of stay in country (ref. 20 years or longer)				
less than 1 year	-0.299+	(0.180)	-0.613**	(0.230)
1 to 5 years	-0.005	(0.100)	-0.347**	(0.128)
6 to 10 years	0.049	(0.095)	-0.140	(0.118)
11 to 20 years	-0.040	(0.084)	-0.206+	(0.105)
Age	-1.879**	(0.238)	-2.501**	(0.204)
Female	-0.053	(0.055)	-0.119*	(0.054)
Education in years	0.810*	(0.364)	0.181	(0.385)
Coping on income	-0.871**	(0.098)	-1.053**	(0.097)
Being unemployed	0.214**	(0.081)	0.305**	(0.078)
Country-year level				
Government effectiveness	-0.109	(0.726)	-0.248	(0.764)
Antidiscrimination policy	-0.078	(1.054)	-0.343	(0.860)
GDP per capita	0.605	(1.383)	1.056	(1.471)
Unemployment rates	-0.216	(0.413)	-0.161	(0.444)
Income inequality	0.197	(0.666)	-1.526*	(0.737)
Ethnic diversity	-0.009	(1.116)	-0.418	(1.203)
Random effects (standard deviations)				
Country years	0.027+	(0.014)	0.037*	(0.015)
N (country)	20		20	
N (country years)	91		91	
N (respondents)	12960		7424	

Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and time-fixed effects.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

Second, I examine egalitarian beliefs as intermediary variable.[1] The model specifications are analogously to the main models presented in the Table 1, relating changes in political context to majority-minority differences in egalitarianism. A relational group comparison appears to be reasonable as beliefs about justice and equality are sensitive to contexts of inequality (Sand 2017; Schröder 2016) and immigrants tend to adapt to prevalent beliefs in the receiving societies (Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2015). Table B2 presents the results of multilevel analyses using egalitarian beliefs as outcome. Model 1 shows that immigrants and ethnic

[1] A broad literature is devoted to conceptual similarities and differences between social norms and individual as well as shared beliefs or values (see Frese 2015 as an overview). A detailed discussion of this strand of research cannot be accomplished within the limits of this study. Nonetheless, it can be expected that individual beleifs and values are at least in part shaped by social norms, while prevalent beliefs and values in turn shape social norms due to their relevance for a number of behavioral outcomes (Miles 2015).

minority members advocate equal treatment principles more strongly than the majority population. Moreover, I find no systematic relationship between over-time changes in political context variables and egalitarianism among the general public. However, interactions between political context and foreign born (Model B4) and ethnic minority members (Model B5) are positive and statistically significant for government effectiveness. This means that immigrants and ethnic minority members respond with increasing egalitarianism (compared to the majority population) in contexts of increasing institutional fairness. This is illustrated as marginal effects plots in Figure B1.

Table B2: Multilevel Models with Egalitarian Values as Outcome

	Model B3		Model B4		Model B5	
Intercept	4.689**	(0.221)	4.699**	(0.221)	4.697**	(0.221)
Respondent level						
Foreign born	0.092**	(0.016)	-0.040	(0.036)	0.092**	(0.016)
Foreign born non-OECD country	0.026	(0.019)	0.047*	(0.019)	0.026	(0.019)
Ethnic minority	0.091**	(0.014)	0.090**	(0.014)	0.017	(0.034)
Discrimination	0.088**	(0.016)	0.089**	(0.016)	0.090**	(0.016)
Length of stay in country (ref. 20 years or longer)						
less than 1 year	0.033	(0.054)	0.022	(0.054)	0.028	(0.054)
1 to 5 years	-0.100**	(0.028)	-0.106**	(0.028)	-0.104**	(0.028)
6 to 10 years	-0.082**	(0.027)	-0.087**	(0.028)	-0.086**	(0.028)
11 to 20 years	0.003	(0.024)	-0.007	(0.024)	-0.002	(0.024)
Age	0.001	(0.016)	0.003	(0.016)	0.002	(0.016)
Female	0.140**	(0.005)	0.140**	(0.005)	0.140**	(0.005)
Education in years	0.824**	(0.039)	0.824**	(0.039)	0.823**	(0.039)
Coping on income	-0.078**	(0.011)	-0.078**	(0.011)	-0.078**	(0.011)
Being unemployed	-0.003	(0.011)	-0.003	(0.011)	-0.003	(0.011)
Country-year level						
Government effectiveness	-0.067	(0.127)	-0.080	(0.126)	-0.073	(0.126)
Antidiscrimination policy	0.007	(0.149)	0.002	(0.149)	0.003	(0.149)
GDP per capita	-0.362	(0.284)	-0.366	(0.283)	-0.368	(0.283)
Unemployment rates	-0.103	(0.085)	-0.104	(0.085)	-0.106	(0.085)
Income inequality	0.503**	(0.122)	0.505**	(0.122)	0.506**	(0.122)
Ethnic diversity	0.252	(0.202)	0.254	(0.202)	0.252	(0.202)
Interaction effects						
Government effectiveness × foreign-born			0.153**	(0.042)		
Antidiscrimination policy × foreign-born			0.061+	(0.034)		
Government effectiveness × ethnic minority					0.119*	(0.049)
Antidiscrimination policy × ethnic minority					0.029	(0.041)
Random effects (standard deviations)						
Country years	0.051**	(0.005)	0.051**	(0.005)	0.051**	(0.005)
Residual	0.995**	(0.002)	0.995**	(0.002)	0.995**	(0.002)
N (country)	20		20		20	
N (country years)	91		91		91	
N (respondents)	143,188		143,188		143,188	

Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and time-fixed effects.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

Figure B1: Marginal Effects Plots Minority Characteristic × Government Effectiveness (Egalitarianism as Outcome)



Note: Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

Subsequently, I aggregate egalitarian beliefs to country-year averages separately for immigrants and ethnic minority members as well as for majority members. Country-year-specific majority scores are then subtracted from minority scores in order to build an index of norms of equal treatment.[2] On this index, a zero score reflects correspondence between minority and majority egalitarianism. Positive values indicate contexts in which minorities hold higher egalitarianism than the majority, whereas negative values indicate higher egalitarianism for the majority population. The egalitarian norms index enters another series of multilevel regression models using social trust as outcome. The indicator is interacted with ethnic discrimination (and ethnic minority characteristics) to test to what extent changes in ethnic minority egalitarianism moderate how discrimination is related to social trust.

The results are presented in Table B3. In Model B6, the interaction between differences in egalitarianism and ethnic discrimination is negative and statistically significant. This means that the negative relationship between discrimination and trust is additionally amplified in contexts where immigrants and ethnic minority members increasingly advocate equal

[2] The interest here is on how the impact of political context as a macro-level variable is potentially mediated by norms of equal treatment. Any mediator thus necessarily has to be measured at the country-year level (Preacher, Zyphur, and Zhang 2010: 210). Moreover, examining contextual effects of egalitarianism (i.e., the macro-level coefficient controlled for individual-level egalitarianism) is also conceptually close to social norms (rather than using individual-level predictors only). Note that results are similar when only responses of immigrants or ethnic minority members (and not both) are used in the aggregation process. The descriptives of the norms of equal treatment indicator are M = .14, SD = .12, Min = -.28, Max = .45.

treatment (in relation to the majority population). The results from Models B7 and B8 additionally show that also unspecific ethnic minority characteristics are related to low social trust especially in contexts of expanding egalitarianism. The corresponding relationships are depicted as marginal effects plots in Figure B2.

Table B3: Multilevel Models with Norms of Equal Treatment as Moderator and Social Trust as Outcome

	Model B6		Model B7		Model B8	
Intercept	4.355**	(0.394)	4.343**	(0.394)	4.355**	(0.394)
Respondent level						
Foreign born	-0.133**	(0.027)	-0.094**	(0.034)	-0.132**	(0.027)
Foreign born non-OECD country	0.021	(0.031)	0.026	(0.032)	0.024	(0.032)
Ethnic minority	-0.156**	(0.023)	-0.154**	(0.023)	-0.110**	(0.034)
Discrimination	-0.365**	(0.043)	-0.440**	(0.027)	-0.437**	(0.027)
Length of stay in country (ref. 20 years or longer)						
less than 1 year	0.389**	(0.091)	0.387**	(0.091)	0.389**	(0.091)
1 to 5 years	0.228**	(0.048)	0.226**	(0.048)	0.229**	(0.048)
6 to 10 years	0.236**	(0.046)	0.232**	(0.047)	0.236**	(0.046)
11 to 20 years	0.058	(0.040)	0.056	(0.040)	0.059	(0.040)
Age	0.337**	(0.027)	0.337**	(0.027)	0.336**	(0.027)
Female	0.084**	(0.009)	0.084**	(0.009)	0.084**	(0.009)
Education in years	2.445**	(0.066)	2.445**	(0.066)	2.445**	(0.066)
Coping on income	1.015**	(0.018)	1.016**	(0.018)	1.015**	(0.018)
Being unemployed	-0.186**	(0.018)	-0.186**	(0.018)	-0.186**	(0.018)
Egalitarian beliefs	0.091**	(0.004)	0.091**	(0.004)	0.091**	(0.004)
Country-year level						
Norms of equal treatment	-0.128	(0.133)	-0.123	(0.133)	-0.127	(0.132)
Government effectiveness	-0.149	(0.224)	-0.148	(0.224)	-0.146	(0.224)
Antidiscrimination policy	-0.320	(0.277)	-0.316	(0.277)	-0.324	(0.277)
GDP per capita	0.171	(0.507)	0.179	(0.507)	0.168	(0.507)
Unemployment rates	0.124	(0.150)	0.124	(0.151)	0.121	(0.150)
Income inequality	-0.299	(0.216)	-0.299	(0.216)	-0.298	(0.216)
Ethnic diversity	-1.092**	(0.358)	-1.086**	(0.358)	-1.087**	(0.358)
Interaction effects						
Norms of equal treatment × discrimination	-0.465*	(0.204)				
Norms of equal treatment × foreign born			-0.281*	(0.144)		
Norms of equal treatment × ethnic minority					-0.331+	(0.169)
Random effects (standard deviations)						
Country years	0.091**	(0.009)	0.091**	(0.009)	0.091**	(0.009)
Residual	1.682**	(0.003)	1.682**	(0.003)	1.682**	(0.003)
N (country)	20		20		20	
N (country years)	91		91		91	
N (respondents)	143,188		143,188		143,188	

Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and time-fixed effects as well as individual-level egalitarianism.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

Figure B2: Marginal Effects Plots with Differences in Egalitarianism as Moderator



Note: Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

In summary, the supplementary analyses provide no empirical evidence that changes in perceived ethnic discrimination mediate effects of equal treatment regulations on group-related gaps in social trust. Instead, the two-step approach examining the relationship between political context and egalitarianism, on the one hand, and egalitarianism and social trust gaps, on the other hand, yield systematic results. Equal treatment regulations, particularly in the form of institutional fairness, appear to increase norms about equal treatment, which in turn moderate the relationship between discrimination and social trust. This provides support for the shifting frame of reference perspective according to which it is not discrimination as such, but the evaluation of discrimination in light of prevalent social norms that drives gaps in trust between majority and minority populations.

It should be noted that due to the complex variables relationships entailing moderation and mediation, using a multilevel structural equation model framework in order to evaluate the magnitude and statistical significance of the indirect effects is not feasible. In addition to restrictions regarding the availability of suitable indicators, the exercised supplementary analyses should thus be understood as a first empirical exploration of potential mechanisms that should be further examined in future research.

PART C—Robustness

Table C1: Multilevel Models on Immigrants form OECD and non-OECD countries

	Model C1		Model C2	
Intercept	4.679**	(0.393)	4.681**	(0.393)
Respondent level				
Foreign born	-0.128**	(0.027)	-0.094**	(0.028)
Foreign born non-OECD country	0.301**	(0.091)		
Foreign born OECD country			0.116	(0.109)
Ethnic minority	-0.126**	(0.023)	-0.143**	(0.023)
Discrimination	-0.448**	(0.027)	-0.439**	(0.027)
Length of stay in country (ref. 20 years or longer)				
less than 1 year	0.379**	(0.090)	0.376**	(0.090)
1 to 5 years	0.203**	(0.048)	0.205**	(0.047)
6 to 10 years	0.197**	(0.047)	0.214**	(0.046)
11 to 20 years	0.060	(0.041)	0.051	(0.039)
Age	0.338**	(0.027)	0.341**	(0.027)
Female	0.099**	(0.009)	0.099**	(0.009)
Education in years	2.513**	(0.065)	2.518**	(0.065)
Coping on income	1.006**	(0.018)	1.008**	(0.018)
Being unemployed	-0.187**	(0.018)	-0.185**	(0.018)
Country-year level				
Government effectiveness	-0.120	(0.225)	-0.131	(0.225)
Antidiscrimination policy	-0.240	(0.265)	-0.223	(0.265)
GDP per capita	0.060	(0.504)	0.075	(0.504)
Unemployment rates	0.084	(0.151)	0.101	(0.151)
Income inequality	-0.271	(0.217)	-0.301	(0.217)
Ethnic diversity	-1.003**	(0.359)	-1.031**	(0.359)
Interaction effects				
Government effectiveness × foreign born non-OECD	-0.708**	(0.113)		
Antidiscrimination policy × foreign-born non OECD	0.176+	(0.099)		
Government effectiveness × foreign born OECD			-0.218+	(0.118)
Antidiscrimination policy × foreign-born OECD			-0.005	(0.093)
Random effects (standard deviations)				
Country years	0.091**	(0.009)	0.092**	(0.009)
Random slope (minority characteristic)	0.158**	(0.031)	0.000**	(0.000)
Residual	1.686**	(0.003)	1.686**	(0.003)
N (country)	20		20	
N (country years)	91		91	
N (respondents)	146,681		146,681	

Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and time-fixed effects.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

Table C2: Multilevel Models with Majority Social Trust as Control Variable

	Model C3		Model C4	
Intercept	3.950**	(0.172)	3.963**	(0.170)
Respondent level				
Foreign born	0.138+	(0.078)	-0.115**	(0.027)
Foreign born non-OECD country	-0.034	(0.033)	0.037	(0.031)
Ethnic minority	-0.130**	(0.023)	-0.048	(0.082)
Discrimination	-0.446**	(0.027)	-0.445**	(0.027)
Length of stay in country (ref. 20 years or longer)				
less than 1 year	0.394**	(0.091)	0.382**	(0.090)
1 to 5 years	0.219**	(0.049)	0.199**	(0.047)
6 to 10 years	0.212**	(0.047)	0.204**	(0.046)
11 to 20 years	0.062	(0.041)	0.050	(0.040)
Age	0.339**	(0.027)	0.341**	(0.027)
Female	0.099**	(0.009)	0.099**	(0.009)
Education in years	2.502**	(0.065)	2.513**	(0.065)
Coping on income	1.002**	(0.018)	1.005**	(0.018)
Being unemployed	-0.185**	(0.018)	-0.186**	(0.018)
Country-year level				
Government effectiveness	-0.117	(0.097)	-0.123	(0.096)
Antidiscrimination policy	-0.034	(0.111)	-0.043	(0.112)
GDP per capita	-0.140	(0.216)	-0.153	(0.212)
Unemployment rates	0.151*	(0.063)	0.152*	(0.063)
Income inequality	-0.048	(0.094)	-0.072	(0.093)
Ethnic diversity	0.116	(0.165)	0.128	(0.163)
Majority social trust	1.135**	(0.055)	1.111**	(0.054)
Interaction effects				
Government effectiveness × foreign-born	-0.546**	(0.092)		
Antidiscrimination policy × foreign-born	0.134+	(0.082)		
Government effectiveness × ethnic minority			-0.372**	(0.104)
Antidiscrimination policy × ethnic minority			0.161+	(0.096)
Random effects (standard deviations)				
Country years	0.000**	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)
Random slope (minority characteristic)	0.135**	(0.025)	0.152**	(0.030)
Residual	1.685**	(0.003)	1.685**	(0.003)
N (country)	20		20	
N (country years)	91		91	
N (respondents)	146,681		146,681	

Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and time-fixed effects.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

Table C3: Multilevel Models without Potential Outliers

	Model C5		Model C6		Model C7	
Intercept	3.197**	(0.752)	3.149**	(0.746)	3.183**	(0.750)
Respondent level						
Foreign born	-0.152**	(0.028)	0.303**	(0.082)	-0.146**	(0.028)
Foreign born non-OECD country	0.016	(0.034)	-0.018	(0.034)	0.019	(0.034)
Ethnic minority	-0.094**	(0.028)	-0.079**	(0.028)	0.416**	(0.109)
Discrimination	-0.423**	(0.031)	-0.431**	(0.031)	-0.424**	(0.031)
Length of stay in country (ref. 20 years or longer)						
less than 1 year	0.424**	(0.090)	0.400**	(0.090)	0.419**	(0.090)
1 to 5 years	0.251**	(0.049)	0.214**	(0.049)	0.242**	(0.049)
6 to 10 years	0.232**	(0.048)	0.188**	(0.049)	0.219**	(0.048)
11 to 20 years	0.082+	(0.042)	0.064	(0.043)	0.077+	(0.043)
Age	0.581**	(0.031)	0.580**	(0.031)	0.579**	(0.031)
Female	0.100**	(0.010)	0.101**	(0.010)	0.100**	(0.010)
Education in years	2.674**	(0.075)	2.676**	(0.075)	2.679**	(0.075)
Coping on income	1.079**	(0.021)	1.078**	(0.021)	1.079**	(0.021)
Being unemployed	-0.172**	(0.021)	-0.174**	(0.021)	-0.172**	(0.021)
Country-year level						
Government effectiveness	-0.090	(0.219)	-0.020	(0.218)	-0.068	(0.219)
Antidiscrimination policy	0.923	(0.794)	0.932	(0.787)	0.924	(0.791)
GDP per capita	-0.435	(0.406)	-0.431	(0.403)	-0.440	(0.405)
Unemployment rates	-0.115	(0.131)	-0.116	(0.130)	-0.115	(0.130)
Income inequality	0.079	(0.243)	0.064	(0.241)	0.077	(0.242)
Ethnic diversity	-0.104	(0.312)	-0.106	(0.310)	-0.102	(0.312)
Interaction effects						
Government effectiveness × foreign-born			-0.575**	(0.087)		
Antidiscrimination policy × foreign-born			-0.093	(0.071)		
Government effectiveness × ethnic minority					-0.481**	(0.120)
Antidiscrimination policy × ethnic minority					-0.314**	(0.109)
Random effects (standard deviations)						
Country years	0.056**	(0.008)	0.055**	(0.008)	0.055**	(0.008)
Residual	1.599**	(0.004)	1.599**	(0.004)	1.599**	(0.004)
N (country)	12		12		12	
N (country years)	57		57		57	
N (respondents)	99,221		99,221		99,221	

Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and time-fixed effects. Models exclude Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, and Slovakia.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

Table C4: Multilevel Models Using ICRI Antidiscrimination Scores (ESS 2008)

	Model C8		Model C9		Model C10	
Intercept	2.842**	(0.381)	2.843**	(0.390)	2.839**	(0.381)
Respondent level						
Foreign born	-0.162*	(0.063)	-0.230	(0.145)	-0.162*	(0.063)
Foreign born non-OECD country	0.002	(0.076)	-0.067	(0.079)	0.010	(0.077)
Ethnic minority	-0.114+	(0.061)	-0.094	(0.062)	0.005	(0.108)
Discrimination	-0.473**	(0.067)	-0.477**	(0.067)	-0.472**	(0.067)
Length of stay in country (ref. 20 years or longer)						
less than 1 year	0.718**	(0.271)	0.727**	(0.272)	0.721**	(0.271)
1 to 5 years	0.130	(0.110)	0.100	(0.113)	0.126	(0.110)
6 to 10 years	0.291**	(0.108)	0.263*	(0.110)	0.286**	(0.108)
11 to 20 years	0.039	(0.096)	0.064	(0.098)	0.031	(0.097)
Age	0.487**	(0.068)	0.489**	(0.068)	0.487**	(0.068)
Female	0.112**	(0.022)	0.111**	(0.022)	0.112**	(0.022)
Education in years	2.859**	(0.161)	2.856**	(0.161)	2.862**	(0.161)
Coping on income	0.982**	(0.046)	0.979**	(0.046)	0.982**	(0.046)
Being unemployed	-0.263**	(0.052)	-0.264**	(0.052)	-0.265**	(0.052)
Country level						
Government effectiveness	1.805**	(0.488)	1.817**	(0.500)	1.803**	(0.488)
Antidiscrimination policy (ICRI)	0.033	(0.201)	0.022	(0.206)	0.043	(0.201)
GDP per capita	0.884+	(0.516)	0.877+	(0.529)	0.883+	(0.516)
Unemployment rates	0.391	(0.929)	0.342	(0.953)	0.388	(0.930)
Income inequality	-0.537	(0.330)	-0.539	(0.338)	-0.538	(0.330)
Ethnic diversity	-0.203	(0.498)	-0.176	(0.511)	-0.205	(0.499)
Interaction effects						
Antidiscrimination policy (ICRI) × foreign-born			0.174	(0.203)		
Antidiscrimination policy (ICRI) × ethnic minority					-0.208	(0.157)
Random effects (standard deviations)						
Country	0.217**	(0.046)	0.176**	(0.064)	0.000*	(0.000)
Random slope (minority characteristic)			0.223**	(0.047)	0.218**	(0.046)
Residual	1.657**	(0.008)	1.656**	(0.008)	1.657**	(0.008)
N (country)	12		12		12	
N (respondents)	23,538		23,538		23,538	

Standard errors in parentheses. ICRI antidiscrimination scores are obtained from https://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/u262/icri_indicators_29_countries_worldwide_.xlsx. Survey data come from the ESS 2008. Included countries are Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

Table C5: Multilevel Models Using Alternative Indicators of Institutional Fairness

	Model C11		Model C12		Model C13		Model C14	
Intercept	5.069**	(0.324)	5.082**	(0.318)	4.678**	(0.414)	4.667**	(0.405)
Respondent level								
Foreign born	-0.256**	(0.063)	-0.104**	(0.033)	0.169**	(0.065)	-0.116**	(0.027)
Foreign born non-OECD country	-0.066	(0.040)	0.006	(0.039)	-0.033	(0.034)	0.036	(0.031)
Ethnic minority	-0.089**	(0.029)	-0.246**	(0.080)	-0.134**	(0.023)	-0.035	(0.063)
Discrimination	-0.412**	(0.033)	-0.412**	(0.033)	-0.444**	(0.027)	-0.442**	(0.027)
Length of stay in country (ref. 20 years or longer)								
less than 1 year	0.316**	(0.109)	0.313**	(0.108)	0.408**	(0.091)	0.378**	(0.090)
1 to 5 years	0.181**	(0.058)	0.165**	(0.056)	0.237**	(0.049)	0.198**	(0.047)
6 to 10 years	0.210**	(0.057)	0.203**	(0.056)	0.230**	(0.048)	0.204**	(0.046)
11 to 20 years	0.053	(0.049)	0.041	(0.049)	0.072+	(0.041)	0.045	(0.040)
Age	0.358**	(0.033)	0.359**	(0.033)	0.338**	(0.027)	0.341**	(0.027)
Female	0.118**	(0.011)	0.118**	(0.011)	0.099**	(0.009)	0.099**	(0.009)
Education in years	2.394**	(0.077)	2.405**	(0.077)	2.519**	(0.065)	2.525**	(0.065)
Coping on income	0.960**	(0.022)	0.964**	(0.022)	1.006**	(0.018)	1.008**	(0.018)
Being unemployed	-0.167**	(0.022)	-0.167**	(0.022)	-0.186**	(0.018)	-0.186**	(0.018)
Country-year level								
Public perception corruption (reversed)	0.310**	(0.111)	0.287**	(0.108)				
ICRG quality of government					-0.224	(0.414)	-0.212	(0.404)
Antidiscrimination policy	-0.713**	(0.230)	-0.691**	(0.226)	-0.215	(0.263)	-0.216	(0.258)
GDP per capita	-0.707+	(0.367)	-0.720*	(0.358)	0.111	(0.519)	0.070	(0.506)
Unemployment rates	-0.239*	(0.117)	-0.224*	(0.114)	0.064	(0.151)	0.065	(0.148)
Income inequality	0.707**	(0.176)	0.658**	(0.172)	-0.240	(0.223)	-0.256	(0.218)
Ethnic diversity	-0.484	(0.380)	-0.533	(0.371)	-0.926*	(0.371)	-0.886*	(0.363)
Interaction effects								
Corruption indicator × foreign born	-0.400**	(0.116)						
Corruption indicator × ethnic minority			-0.304*	(0.147)				
ICRG × foreign born					-0.419**	(0.090)		
ICRG × ethnic minority							-0.182+	(0.099)
Random effects (standard deviations)								
Country years	0.044**	(0.008)	0.042**	(0.008)	0.093**	(0.009)	0.091**	(0.009)
Random slope (minority characteristic)	0.150**	(0.033)	0.195**	(0.043)	0.151**	(0.026)	0.179**	(0.031)
Residual	1.666**	(0.004)	1.666**	(0.004)	1.686**	(0.003)	1.686**	(0.003)
N (country)	20		20		20		20	
N (country years)	57		57		91		91	
N (respondents)	99,694		99,694		146,681		146,681	

Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and time-fixed effects. Model C3 and C4 cover only four time points (2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012). Data on perceptions of corruption as well as the ICRG quality of government index were retrieved from Teorell et al. (2016). The corruption indicator refers to citizens' perceptions of corruption of religious bodies, the educational system, the legal system, medical services, NGOs, registry and permit services, and the police. It was reversely coded to range between 2.01 and 4.03, where higher values indicate less perceived corruption (or higher institutional fairness). Government effectiveness and corruption perception correlate highly with each other (Pearson's r = .85). The ICRG indicator of government quality is based on expert rating on the degrees of corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality. It ranges between .33 and 1, where higher values indicate higher quality of government. WGI government effectiveness and ICRG quality of government correlate highly (Pearson's r = .90).
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

Table C6: Multilevel Models Using all available ESS waves (2002-2014)

	Model C15		Model C16	
Intercept	4.322**	(0.169)	4.326**	(0.166)
Respondent level				
Foreign born	0.177**	(0.052)	-0.145**	(0.023)
Foreign born non-OECD country	-0.013	(0.029)	0.058*	(0.027)
Ethnic minority	-0.121**	(0.020)	0.075	(0.055)
Discrimination	-0.451**	(0.024)	-0.450**	(0.024)
Length of stay in country (ref. 20 years or longer)				
less than 1 year	0.424**	(0.084)	0.419**	(0.083)
1 to 5 years	0.237**	(0.042)	0.216**	(0.041)
6 to 10 years	0.240**	(0.041)	0.234**	(0.040)
11 to 20 years	0.067+	(0.035)	0.060+	(0.034)
Age	0.366**	(0.023)	0.367**	(0.023)
Female	0.090**	(0.007)	0.089**	(0.007)
Education in years	2.578**	(0.056)	2.584**	(0.056)
Coping on income	0.995**	(0.015)	0.998**	(0.015)
Being unemployed	-0.199**	(0.015)	-0.199**	(0.015)
Country-year level				
Government effectiveness	-0.143	(0.154)	-0.150	(0.151)
GDP per capita	-0.434	(0.285)	-0.458	(0.281)
Unemployment rates	0.034	(0.118)	0.031	(0.116)
Income inequality	0.066	(0.149)	0.050	(0.147)
Ethnic diversity	-0.997**	(0.231)	-0.981**	(0.228)
Interaction effects				
Government effectiveness × foreign-born	-0.537**	(0.079)		
Government effectiveness × ethnic minority			-0.404**	(0.097)
Random effects (standard deviations)				
Country years	0.096**	(0.007)	0.094**	(0.007)
Random slope (minority characteristic)	0.145**	(0.021)	0.184**	(0.026)
Residual	1.705**	(0.003)	1.705**	(0.003)
N (country)	22		22	
N (country years)	130		130	
N (respondents)	213,787		213,787	

Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and time-fixed effects. Antidiscrimination indicator excluded due to limited availability of the MIPEX time series. Ethnic diversity indicator is substituted by proportions of immigrants due to data restrictions.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

Table C7: Multilevel Models Using WVS/EVS data

	Model C17		Model C18	
Intercept	-3.255**	(0.270)	-3.286**	(0.269)
Respondent level				
Foreign born	-0.253**	(0.057)	0.000	(0.112)
Age	-0.002*	(0.001)	-0.002*	(0.001)
Female	0.016	(0.031)	0.017	(0.031)
Education in years	0.427**	(0.022)	0.427**	(0.022)
Country-year level				
Government effectiveness	-0.078	(0.157)	-0.083	(0.156)
GDP per capita	0.000**	(0.000)	0.000**	(0.000)
Proportions foreign-born	0.064**	(0.019)	0.062**	(0.019)
Interaction effects				
Government effectiveness × foreign born			-0.247**	(0.095)
Random effects (standard deviations)				
Country years	0.000	(0.002)	0.000	(0.002)
Residual	1.323**	(0.003)	1.323**	(0.003)
N (country)	9		9	
N (country years)	18		18	
N (respondents)	21,444		21,444	

Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and time-fixed effects. Models use survey data from the World Values Survey (1994-1998) and the European Values Study (2008-2010) combined with corresponding WGI government effectiveness data. The resulting data structure consists of nine countries observed in two time periods. Included countries are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Immigration status is assessed using a question of place of birth (G017 and X002_02 , 1 = foreign born).
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

Table C8: Multilevel Models with Interactions with Economic Variables

	Model C19		Model C20	
Intercept	4.667**	(0.398)	4.674**	(0.390)
Respondent level				
Foreign born	0.070	(0.122)	-0.114**	(0.027)
Foreign born non-OECD country	-0.038	(0.034)	0.037	(0.031)
Ethnic minority	-0.130**	(0.023)	-0.149	(0.126)
Discrimination	-0.445**	(0.027)	-0.443**	(0.027)
Length of stay in country (ref. 20 years or longer)				
less than 1 year	0.391**	(0.091)	0.370**	(0.090)
1 to 5 years	0.220**	(0.049)	0.195**	(0.047)
6 to 10 years	0.213**	(0.048)	0.200**	(0.046)
11 to 20 years	0.064	(0.041)	0.047	(0.040)
Age	0.340**	(0.027)	0.341**	(0.027)
Female	0.099**	(0.009)	0.099**	(0.009)
Education in years	2.515**	(0.065)	2.524**	(0.065)
Coping on income	1.005**	(0.018)	1.008**	(0.018)
Being unemployed	-0.186**	(0.018)	-0.186**	(0.018)
Country-year level				
Government effectiveness	-0.124	(0.227)	-0.126	(0.223)
Antidiscrimination policy	-0.245	(0.268)	-0.252	(0.263)
GDP per capita	0.113	(0.511)	0.059	(0.500)
Unemployment rates	0.095	(0.153)	0.093	(0.150)
Income inequality	-0.276	(0.220)	-0.291	(0.215)
Ethnic diversity	-1.004**	(0.363)	-0.959**	(0.356)
Interaction effects				
Government effectiveness × foreign-born	-0.459**	(0.138)		
Antidiscrimination policy × foreign-born	0.148+	(0.082)		
GDP per capita × foreign-born	-0.066	(0.155)		
Income inequality × foreign-born	0.082	(0.105)		
Government effectiveness × ethnic minority			-0.491**	(0.169)
Antidiscrimination policy × ethnic minority			0.179+	(0.098)
GDP per capita × ethnic minority			0.249	(0.194)
Income inequality × ethnic minority			0.125	(0.119)
Random effects (standard deviations)				
Country years	0.093**	(0.009)	0.090**	(0.009)
Random slope (minority characteristic)	0.130**	(0.025)	0.150**	(0.031)
Residual	1.686**	(0.003)	1.686**	(0.003)
N (country)	20		20	
N (country years)	91		91	
N (respondents)	146,681		146,681	

Standard errors in parentheses. Models include country- and time-fixed effects.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided test).

References

Chen, F. F. (2007). Sensitivity of goodness of fit indexes to lack of measurement invariance. *Structural equation modeling*, *14*(3), 464–504.

Davidov, E., Meuleman, B., Cieciuch, J., Schmidt, P., & Billiet, J. (2014). Measurement equivalence in cross-national research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *40*, 55–75.

Dinesen, P. T. (2011). A Note on the Measurement of Generalized Trust of Immigrants and Natives. *Social Indicators Research*, *103*(1), 169–177.

Dinesen, P. T., & Hooghe, M. (2010). When in Rome, Do as the Romans Do: The Acculturation of Generalized Trust among Immigrants in Western Europe. *International Migration Review*, *44*(3), 697–727.

Frese, M. (2015). Cultural Practices, Norms, and Values. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *46*(10), 1327–1330.

Hox J.J., de Leeuw E.D., Brinkhuis M.J., Ooms J. (2012). Multigroup and multilevel approaches to measurement equivalence. In *Methods, Theories, and Empirical Applications in the Social Sciences,* ed. S Salzborn, E Davidov, J Reinecke, pp. 91–96. Wiesbaden, Ger.: Springer VS.

Miles, A. (2015). The (Re)genesis of Values: Examining the Importance of Values for Action. *American Sociological Review*, *80*(4), 680–704.

Portes, A., Parker, R. N., & Cobas, J. A. (1980). Assimilation or consciousness: Perceptions of US society among recent Latin American immigrants to the United States. *Social Forces*, *59*(1), 200–224.

Preacher, K. J., Zyphur, M. J., & Zhang, Z. (2010). A general multilevel SEM framework for assessing multilevel mediation. *Psychological methods*, *15*(3), 209–233.

Reeskens, T., & Hooghe, M. (2008). Cross-cultural measurement equivalence of generalized trust. Evidence from the European Social Survey (2002 and 2004). *Social Indicators Research*, *85*(3), 515–532.

Röder, A., & Mühlau, P. (2014). Are They Acculturating? Europe's Immigrants and Gender Egalitarianism. *Social Forces*, *92*(3), 899–928.

Sands, M. L. (2017). Exposure to inequality affects support for redistribution. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*.

Schröder, M. (2016). Is Income Inequality Related to Tolerance for Inequality? *Social Justice Research*, 1–25.

Teorell, Jan, Dahlberg, Stefan, Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Khomenko, A., & Svensson, R. (2016). The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan16, *University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute*. Retrieved from http://www.qog.pol.gu.se doi:10.18157/QoGStdJan16

Transparency International. (2016). Global Corruption Barometer. Retrieved from http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/overview