Aquinas Reader On Aristotle or The Philosopher

St. Thomas Aquinas is often referred to as one of the greatest commentators of Aristotle. The aim of this work is to make St. Thomas the philosopher more accessible for a concentrated study. In order to accomplish this, his principle work, the Summa Theologica has been currated to only sections including the mention of 'Aristotle' or 'The Philosopher'. This subset of articles has been further divided by book from the Aristotelian corpus. Keywords and a simple summary have been added to enrich the learning experience with overarching snapshots. We have added a reference distribution to illustrate the prominence of his citations. The sections presented are as they appear in the Summa Theologica for each reference book identified by headers. Each reference book in study is highlighted throughout in yellow for convenience. Books identified with multiple matching references have been adjudicated arbitrarily.

This is a smaller reader of Aquinas in so far as Aristotle is referenced in **Rhet.**

We hope you enjoy this study of Aristotle as he is depicted through the lens of St. Thomas.

# Rhet

**Keywords:**

objects, goodness, thing, man, naturally, evils, virtues, anger, parts wherefore, accords, saying, certain, rhet, fearful, men, regards, stated, calls, causing, likeness, contraries, viz, reasoning, iii, tully, matters, reckonings, considering, hopes, sorrowful, ethic, secondly, consequently, desirable, passions, pleasures, taking, denote, accordingly, acted, suffer, powers, arise, giving, philosopher, signify, easily, unwonted, mentioned, cicero.

## Volume 2 - Question 7. The circumstances of human acts

**Article 1. Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act?**

Objection 1. It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**or. i) that a circumstance is that from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument." But oratorical arguments are derived principally from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which also Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a circumstance is not an accident of a human act.

## Volume 3 - Question 1. Faith

**Article 6. Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain articles?**

I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek; for the Greek arthron [Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says (**Rhet**. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes."

**Article 3. Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of Ethics?**

I answer that, Tully, in his **Rhet**oric (De Invent. **Rhet**or. i), gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:

## Volume 5 - Question 6. Confession, as regards its necessity

**Article 2. Whether confession is according to the natural law?**

I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the sacraments. And since "the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but a product of a certain innate power," as Tully states (De Inv. **Rhet**. ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature. But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is according to Divine, but not according to natural law.

## Volume 3 - Question 19. The gift of fear

**Article 1. Whether God can be feared?**

Objection 3. Further, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 5), "we fear those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from God, but from ourselves, according to Hosea 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be feared.

## Volume 4 - Question 15. The defects of soul assumed by Christ

**Article 7. Whether there was fear in Christ?**

I answer that, As sorrow is caused by the apprehension of a present evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil. Now the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain, does not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that we do not fear a thing unless there is some hope of avoiding it. For when there is no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present, and thus it causes sorrow rather than fear. Hence fear may be considered in two ways. First, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite naturally shrinks from bodily hurt, by sorrow if it is present, and by fear if it is future; and thus fear was in Christ, even as sorrow. Secondly, fear may be considered in the uncertainty of the future event, as when at night we are frightened at a sound, not knowing what it is; and in this way there was no fear in Christ, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23).

## Volume 3 - Question 20. Despair

**Article 4. Whether despair arises from sloth?**

Reply to Objection 2. According to the Philosopher (**Rhet**. i, 11), just as hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope: and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into despair, according to 2 Corinthians 2:7: "Lest . . . such an one be swallowed up by overmuch sorrow." Yet, since the object of hope is good, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not naturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the contrary despair is born of sorrow.

## Volume 2 - Question 23. How the passions differ from one another

**Article 3. Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?**

Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.

## Volume 2 - Question 27. The cause of love

**Article 1. Whether good is the only cause of love?**

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4) that "we love those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil is the cause of love.

**Article 3. Whether likeness is a cause of love?**

Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4) that "we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

## Volume 2 - Question 26. The passions of the soul in particular: and first, of love

**Article 4. Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?**

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4), "to love is to wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly, man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.

## Volume 2 - Question 28. The effects of love

**Article 2. Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?**

As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the other hand, the lover is in the beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends "to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and **Rhet**. ii, 4). Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover.

## Volume 3 - Question 27. The principle act of charity, which is to love

**Article 2. Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?**

Objection 1. It would seem that to love, considered as an act of charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.

## Volume 2 - Question 30. Concupiscence

**Article 1. Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?**

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 11), "concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, as we shall state later on (I-II:31:4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ: wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word "concupiscentia." Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it.

## Volume 2 - Question 31. Pleasure considered in itself

**Article 1. Whether delight is a passion?**

I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above (I-II:22:3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (**Rhet**. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing."

**Article 2. Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?**

Objection 1. It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the senses; and this is also the object of concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (**Rhet**. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.

## Volume 3 - Question 30. Mercy

**Article 1. Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy?**

Accordingly the motive of "mercy," being something pertaining to "misery," is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's natural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 8) that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or distressing." Secondly, such like evils are yet more provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 8) that evil excites our pity "when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns out ill, whereas we hoped well of it." Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 8) that "we pity most the distress of one who suffers undeservedly."

Objection 3. Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 8). Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.

Objection 2. Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call for pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive of mercy.

**Article 3. Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?**

Reply to Objection 2. The difference between those concupiscences that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite is the apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing is apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (**Rhet**. i, 11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the Philosopher calls "rational" (**Rhet**. i, 11).

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and **Rhet**or. i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural.

Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to both is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) calls them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the second kind are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are "irrational," but the latter, "rational." And because different men reason differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and acquired," i.e. in addition to those that are natural.

**Article 2. Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities?**

Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.

Objection 3. Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in the person who pities.

## Volume 2 - Question 32. The cause of pleasure

**Article 1. Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?**

Objection 1. It would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 11), "pleasure consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is requisite for pleasure, as stated above (I-II:31:1). But the objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.

**Article 2. Whether delight is in time?**

Objection 1. It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 11). But all movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.

Objection 2. Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is false: for the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 8) that "those who are in a desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.

Objection 3. Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and they are objects of pleasure (**Rhet**. i, 11). Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.

## Volume 3 - Question 26. The order of charity

**Article 6. Whether we ought to love one neighbor more than another?**

Objection 3. Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.

**Article 3. Whether mercy is a virtue?**

Objection 2. Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (**Rhet**. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

## Volume 2 - Question 29. Hatred

**Article 5. Whether a man can hate the truth?**

Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive for this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it.

Reply to Objection 4. Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called nemesis, because "they both proceed from the same character" (**Rhet**. ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in which case they assume the character of a virtue.

**Article 2. Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?**

Objection 3. Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, are pleasant," as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 11). Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis, considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one another on the part of their respective estimation of another's evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well with the undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from the same disposition of character" (**Rhet**. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state further on (II-II:36:3.

I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14 and **Rhet**or. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being consists in a certain measure; and therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode of being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because man desires to know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist together, all would please collectively more than they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively."

**Article 6. Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?**

Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal—for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in general."

**Article 4. Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?**

Objection 1. It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 11) that "delight is a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4) that "anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter."

**Article 6. Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses?**

Objection 2. Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is loved most" [Metaph. i, 1. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.

## Volume 3 - Question 36. Envy

**Article 1. Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?**

Objection 2. Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus, in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation." Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.

## Volume 2 - Question 36. The causes of sorrow or pain

**Article 2. Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?**

Objection 3. Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.

Objection 3. Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (I-II:47:3) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are envious, according to the Philosopher (**Rhet**. ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.

I answer that, The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it may happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and in this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man grieves for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 9).

Objection 4. Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (I-II:32:3) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of envy; for the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 10) that "we envy those who have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we possessed at some time." Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.

**Article 6. Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?**

Objection 3. Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such as overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in punishing them, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 11). Therefore doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure.

Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in so far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good: and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the Philosopher remarks (**Rhet**. ii, 10).

Reply to Objection 4. Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow; and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that others have acquired goods.

**Article 2. Whether envy is a sin?**

Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it, but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 9). And if this zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Corinthians 14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may grieve over another's good, because he who happens to have that good is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow nemesis [The nearest equivalent is "indignation." The use of the word "nemesis" to signify "revenge" does not represent the original Greek.], saying that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he considered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to the teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are unworthy, are so disposed according to God's just ordinance, either for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, according to Psalm 36:1: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere (Psalm 72:2-3): "My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners [Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']." Fourthly, we grieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.

**Article 7. Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?**

Objection 1. It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. But "it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated in **Rhet**or. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.

**Article 3. Whether envy is a mortal sin?**

Objection 3. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to nemesis, which is a passion, according to the Philosopher (**Rhet**. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

**Article 8. Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?**

I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above (I-II:23:4): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it was stated above (Article 3, Reply to Objection 3) that desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered from great danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in **Rhet**or. i, 11.

## Volume 3 - Question 38. Contention

**Article 1. Whether contention is a mortal sin?**

Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De **Rhet**. ad Heren. iii) that "contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation"—or whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is blameworthy.

Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher (**Rhet**. ii, 9), envy is contrary both to nemesis and to pity, but for different reasons. For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is contrary to nemesis on the part of the man whose good grieves the envious man, for nemesis is sorrow for the good of the undeserving according to Psalm 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners" [Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners'], whereas the envious grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is contrary to pity and charity.

I answer that, To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various contrary things in a speech, this is called "contentio," which Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De **Rhet**. ad Heren. iv), where he says that "it consists in developing a speech from contrary things," for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter end."

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 11) that wonder is the cause of pleasure.

## Volume 2 - Question 35. Pain or sorrow, in itself

**Article 6. Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?**

Objection 3. Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised." Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure.

## Volume 3 - Question 34. Hatred

**Article 6. Whether hatred arises from envy?**

Objection 2. Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above (II-II:25:1; II-II:26:2). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii). Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

**Article 4. Whether envy is a capital vice?**

Objection 1. It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 10) that "those who love honor and glory are more envious." Therefore envy is not a capital vice.

## Volume 2 - Question 42. The object of fear

**Article 1. Whether the object of fear is good or evil?**

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "power and to be above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good thing. Therefore good is the object of fear.

## Volume 2 - Question 41. Fear, in itself

**Article 2. Whether fear is a special passion?**

Reply to Objection 3. Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (I-II:25:01); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from what has been said above (I-II:25:2; I-II:29:2; I-II:36:2).

**Article 8. Whether there are only four species of sorrow?**

Objection 2. Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are "indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division is insufficient.

Objection 3. Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: since the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is "a power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (I-II:23:4). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it belongs to different powers.

**Article 2. Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?**

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5), fear is caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear.

Objection 1. It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not an object of fear.

## Volume 2 - Question 43. The cause of fear

**Article 1. Whether love is the cause of fear?**

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "those are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil." But the dread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love him. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than by love.

**Article 3. Whether there is a natural fear?**

And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5), there is a fear of "corruptive evil," which nature shrinks from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a fear of "painful evil," which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In this sense we have stated above (I-II:26:1; I-II:30:3; I-II:31:7) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural.

But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not." Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him."

**Article 3. Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow."

**Article 2. Whether defect is the cause of fear?**

On the contrary, Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But "wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" (**Rhet**. ii, 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these.

**Article 4. Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?**

Objection 1. It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil." Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (I-II:35:8). Therefore there should only be four species of fear corresponding to them.

Objection 2. Further, the defect of those who are already being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in **Rhet**. ii, 5. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.

## Volume 2 - Question 40. The irascible passions, and first, of hope and despair

**Article 5. Whether experience is a cause of hope?**

Reply to Objection 2. The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in so far as experience makes them think something impossible. Hence he adds (**Rhet**. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen them."

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 13) that "the old are slow to hope, on account of their experience"; whence it seems to follow that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive of opposites. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.

Objection 3. Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But "those who contend fear those who contend with them" (**Rhet**. ii, 5). Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.

## Volume 5 - Question 41. The sacrament of Matrimony as directed to an office of nature

**Article 1. Whether matrimony is of natural law?**

Objection 1. Further, that which is of natural law is found in all men with regard to their every state. But matrimony was not in every state of man, for as Tully says (De Inv. **Rhet**.), "at the beginning men were savages and then no man knew his own children, nor was he bound by any marriage tie," wherein matrimony consists. Therefore it is not natural.

## Volume 2 - Question 44. The effects of fear

**Article 2. Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel."

**Article 6. Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men are hopeful": and (**Rhet**. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope."

## Volume 2 - Question 45. Daring

**Article 1. Whether daring is contrary to fear?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "daring is contrary to fear."

Reply to Objection 3. Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above.

I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the Philosopher states in **Rhet**. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of hope—namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated above (Article 1). For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope. Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands: and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful. Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink—viz. heat and high spirits, on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons attempt everything and are full of hope.

## Volume 2 - Question 46. Anger, in itself

**Article 1. Whether anger is a special passion?**

Objection 3. Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a special passion.

**Article 5. Whether sudden things are especially feared?**

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be feared.

**Article 2. Whether daring ensues from hope?**

Objection 2. Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result from hope.

Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated above (I-II:23:4). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above (I-II:27:4). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible." Consequently if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).

**Article 3. Whether some defect is a cause of daring?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off." But anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring.

## Volume 2 - Question 47. The cause that provokes anger, and the remedies of anger

**Article 1. Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such."

On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of friends or any other means of help, especially if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it is well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed others.

**Article 6. Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy?**

Objection 2. Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from death to life. And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5). Therefore those things are not feared most, for which there is no remedy.

Objection 3. Further, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry.

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "those who have no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience is a defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.

Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) "those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the assistance of those who suffer unjustly."

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy."

**Article 2. Whether the object of anger is good or evil?**

Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.

**Article 2. Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?**

I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in **Rhet**. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," "despiteful treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and "insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 3) that "men are not angry—if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just." Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or through passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because they do not seem to have acted slightingly."

**Article 4. Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?**

Objection 3. Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "anger makes man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring.

**Article 3. Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?**

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:23:1), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated (Article 2) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (**Rhet**. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty.

Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher (**Rhet**. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore being slighted is not the only motive for being angry.

The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence: because "men think little of things that are not worth much ado" (**Rhet**. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly."

## Volume 2 - Question 48. The effects of anger

**Article 1. Whether anger causes pleasure?**

Objection 3. Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in **Rhet**. ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.

**Article 2. Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?**

Objection 2. Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor, increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer it lasts. But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger." Therefore fervor is not the proper effect of anger.

**Article 3. Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger.

Objection 3. Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But "the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger," as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor.

Objection 3. Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 3) that "men are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and well-founded hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 2) that "some are very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but if they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble." But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence is a cause of a man being angry.

## Volume 3 - Question 48. The parts of prudence

**Article 1. Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?**

Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53) assigns three parts of prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight." Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding," "circumspection," "foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and "gnome" belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And another Greek philosopher [Andronicus; Cf. 80, Objection 4] says that ten things are connected with prudence, namely, "good counsel," "shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative [Regnativa]," "military," "political" and "domestic prudence," "dialectics," "rhetoric" and "physics." Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is either excessive or deficient.

Objection 1. It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 2) that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed." But these things seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one prone to anger.

**Article 4. Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like manner the prince is angry with his subject."

Objection 1. It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down." But these things savor of littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less angry with him.

**Article 5. Whether anger is more natural than desire?**

Objection 1. It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man.

**Article 3. Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?**

Objection 3. Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger: for the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 2) that "men are more angry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be dishonored": and so forth. Therefore the same cause increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does not hinder the judgment of reason.

## Volume 3 - Question 49. Each quasi-integral part of prudence

**Article 1. Whether memory is a part of prudence?**

There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other." Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his **Rhet**oric [Ad Herenn. de Arte **Rhet**. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that "reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of natural order.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53) places memory among the parts of prudence.

Reply to Objection 2. Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says in his **Rhet**oric [Ad Herenn. de Arte **Rhet**. iii, 16,24, memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.

**Article 6. Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?**

Objection 2. Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred.

**Article 2. Whether understanding is a part of prudence? Understanding: Otherwise intuition; Aristotle's word is nous**

On the contrary, Tully [De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53 accounts "intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [In Somn. Scip. i, 8 mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.

Reply to Objection 3. That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger."

Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, that an evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (**Rhet**. ii, 4).

Reply to Objection 1. In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence it is written (Sirach 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never appeased."

**Article 7. Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice?**

Objection 3. Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 4). Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice.

Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (Article 4, Reply to Objection 2), anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by their imagination to something like rational action. Since then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that which occurs in animals against anything that injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (**Rhet**. ii, 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since they can do us no harm.

The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (**Rhet**. ii, 2,3).

Reply to Objection 3. The Philosopher (**Rhet**. ii, 4) assigns as one difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class, as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards an individual." The reason is that hatred arises from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his action. Now all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual. When the whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one individual [Cf. I-II:29:6].

**Article 4. Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?**

Reply to Objection 3. **Rhet**oric also reasons about practical matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.

## Volume 3 - Question 47. Prudence, considered in itself

**Article 7. Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?**

Objection 3. Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as Tully states (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not appoint the mean to moral virtues.

## Volume 2 - Question 58. The difference between moral and intellectual virtues

**Article 1. Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?**

Objection 3. Further, Cicero says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

## Volume 2 - Question 56. The subject of virtue

**Article 5. Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?**

I answer that, In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second nature." Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue in his **Rhet**oric that "it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet, in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above (I-II:50:4 ad 3).

Objection 3. Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. **Rhet**or. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension.

## Volume 4 - Question 55. The manifestation of the Resurrection

**Article 5. Whether Christ should have demonstrated the truth of His Resurrection by proofs?**

I answer that, The word "proof" is susceptible of a twofold meaning: sometimes it is employed to designate any sort "of reason in confirmation of what is a matter of doubt" [Tully, Topic. ii]: and sometimes it means a sensible sign employed to manifest the truth; thus also Aristotle occasionally uses the term in his works [Cf. Prior. Anal. ii; **Rhet**or. i]. Taking "proof" in the first sense, Christ did not demonstrate His Resurrection to the disciples by proofs, because such argumentative proof would have to be grounded on some principles: and if these were not known to the disciples, nothing would thereby be demonstrated to them, because nothing can be known from the unknown. And if such principles were known to them, they would not go beyond human reason, and consequently would not be efficacious for establishing faith in the Resurrection, which is beyond human reason, since principles must be assumed which are of the same order, according to 1 Poster. But it was from the authority of the Sacred Scriptures that He proved to them the truth of His Resurrection, which authority is the basis of faith, when He said: "All things must needs be fulfilled which are written in the Law, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning Me": as is set forth Luke 24:44.

**Article 4. Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?**

Objection 1. It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) is "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue.

**Article 6. Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?**

Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his **Rhet**oric, is a "habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue.

## Volume 2 - Question 57. The intellectual virtues

**Article 6. Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? [euboulia, synesis, gnome]**

Objection 4. Further, Cicero (De Invent. **Rhet**. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence.

## Volume 3 - Question 60. Judgment

**Article 3. Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?**

I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii), suspicion denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think evil of others, according to Ecclesiastes 10:3, "The fool when he walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools." Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards another: for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 13) that "old people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults of others." The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the third diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it is.

## Volume 2 - Question 61. The cardinal virtues

**Article 3. Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?**

On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii).

## Volume 3 - Question 55. Vices opposed to prudence by way of resemblance

**Article 8. Whether these vices arise from covetousness?**

Reply to Objection 3. Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 2,3) [Cf. Ethic. vii, 6.

## Volume 3 - Question 57. The intellectual virtues

**Article 6. Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? [euboulia, synesis, gnome]**

Objection 4. Further, Cicero (De Invent. **Rhet**. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence.

## Volume 3 - Question 61. The cardinal virtues

**Article 3. Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?**

On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii).

## Volume 3 - Question 65. Other injuries committed on the person

**Article 2. Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves?**

Reply to Objection 1. Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.

## Volume 5 - Question 65. Plurality of wives

**Article 1. Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?**

Reply to Objection 2. As Tully says (De Inv. **Rhet**. ii), "fear of the law and religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and are approved by custom." Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of the natural law, which are derived from the first principles as it were of the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute commandment, except when they have been sanctioned by Divine or human law. This is what Augustine means by saying that "they did not disobey the commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law."

Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of children, and this end is competent to man according to his generic nature, wherefore it is common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and thus it is that the "offspring" is assigned as a marriage good. But for its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has, among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life, as stated above (Supplement:41:1). And in reference to this they owe one another "fidelity" which is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore it has another end, as regards marriage between believers, namely the signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the "sacrament" is said to be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch as he is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer. Accordingly plurality of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient to get children of several wives, and to rear the children born of them. But though it does not wholly destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the requisitions of several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: thus "potters quarrel with one another" [Aristotle, **Rhet**. ii, 4], and in like manner the several wives of one husband. The third end, it removes altogether, because as Christ is one, so also is the Church one. It is therefore evident from what has been said that plurality of wives is in a way against the law of nature, and in a way not against it.

Reply to Objection 1. Custom does not prejudice the law of nature as regards the first precepts of the latter, which are like the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. But those which are drawn like conclusions from these custom enforces, as Tully declares (De Inv. **Rhet**. ii), or weakens. Such is the precept of nature in the matter of having one wife.

Reply to Objection 4. Natural right has several significations. First a right is said to be natural by its principle, because it is instilled by nature: and thus Tully defines it (De Inv. **Rhet**. ii) when he says: "Natural right is not the result of opinion but the product of an innate force." And since even in natural things certain movements are called natural, not that they be from an intrinsic principle, but because they are from a higher moving principle—thus the movements that are caused in the elements by the impress of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the Commentator states (De Coelo et Mundo iii, 28), therefore those things that are of Divine right are said to be of natural right, because they are caused by the impress and influence of a higher principle, namely God. Isidore takes it in this sense, when he says (Etym. v) that "the natural right is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." Thirdly, right is said to be natural not only from its principle but also from its matter, because it is about natural things. And since nature is contradistinguished with reason, whereby man is a man, it follows that if we take natural right in its strictest sense, those things which are dictated by natural reason and pertain to man alone are not said to be of natural right, but only those which are dictated by natural reason and are common to man and other animals. Thus we have the aforesaid definition, namely: "Natural right is what nature has taught all animals." Accordingly plurality of wives, though not contrary to natural right taken in the third sense, is nevertheless against natural right taken in the second sense, because it is forbidden by the Divine law. It is also against natural right taken in the first sense, as appears from what has been said, for such is nature's dictate to every animal according to the mode befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands the care of both, namely the male and female, by natural instinct cling to the union of one with one, for instance the turtle-dove, the dove, and so forth.

## Volume 2 - Question 66. Equality among the virtues

**Article 4. Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?**

I answer that, A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above (Article 1). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above (I-II:8:1; I-II:26:1): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e. fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence also.

## Volume 3 - Question 58. Justice

**Article 12. Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?**

I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person. On this sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace."

## Volume 2 - Question 71. Vice and sin considered in themselves

**Article 2. Whether vice is contrary to nature?**

Reply to Objection 1. Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. **Rhet**. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to nature.

## Volume 3 - Question 72. Reviling

**Article 4. Whether reviling arises from anger?**

Reply to Objection 3. According to the Philosopher (**Rhet**. ii, 4) "an angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about this." Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger rather than to hatred.

## Volume 3 - Question 73. Backbiting

**Article 3. Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's neighbor?**

Reply to Objection 3. Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher states (**Rhet**. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory. Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away from.

## Volume 1 - Question 80. The appetitive powers in general

**Article 2. Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?**

Reply to Objection 2. The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (**Rhet**oric. ii, 4) that hatred can regard a universal, as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.

## Volume 3 - Question 81. Religion

**Article 1. Whether religion directs man to God alone?**

On the contrary, Tully says (**Rhet**. ii, 53) that "religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine."

## Volume 3 - Question 83. Prayer

**Article 3. Whether prayer is an act of religion?**

Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers worship end ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [Cicero, **Rhet**. ii, 53. But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to. ask to obtain something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.

## Volume 4 - Question 85. Penance as a virtue

**Article 3. Whether the virtue of penance is a species of justice?**

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done." But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says (De Inv. **Rhet**. ii) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.

## Volume 3 - Question 89. Oaths

**Article 3. Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned, namely, justice, judgment, and truth?**

Objection 1. It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the other. Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a part of justice, according to Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53): and judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (II-II:60:1). Therefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably assigned.

## Volume 4 - Question 88. The return of sins which have been taken away by Penance

**Article 4. Whether the ingratitude whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of previous sins, is a special sin?**

Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Inv. **Rhet**. ii) that thanksgiving is a special virtue. But ingratitude is opposed to thanksgiving. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

**Article 4. Whether an oath is an act of religion or latria?**

Objection 2. Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53). But he who swears offers nothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.

## Volume 2 - Question 91. The various kinds of law

**Article 3. Whether there is a human law?**

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:90:1 ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above (I-II:90:2-4). Wherefore Tully says in his **Rhet**oric (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."

## Volume 2 - Question 95. Human law

**Article 1. Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?**

Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 1), "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.

**Article 2. Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?**

On the contrary, Tully says (**Rhet**. ii): "Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws."

## Volume 3 - Question 101. Piety

**Article 1. Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?**

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that "it is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country and render them faithful service."

**Article 2. Whether piety provides support for our parents?**

I answer that, We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that "piety gives both duty and homage": "duty" referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said to give homage to those whose memory or presence we honor."

Reply to Objection 3. As Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii), "we offer homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country"; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others according to our means and their personal claims.

## Volume 3 - Question 102. Observance, considered in itself, and its parts

**Article 1. Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?**

Objection 1. It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that "it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity." But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue from piety.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) reckons observance along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.

**Article 2. Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are in positions of dignity?**

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that "it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity."

**Article 3. Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?**

On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) as a part of justice.

## Volume 3 - Question 103. Dulia

**Article 4. Whether dulia has various species?**

I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. On one way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one another. On another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies servitude, as stated above (Article 3). Taken in this sense it is not divided into different species, but is one of the species of observance, mentioned by Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii), for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer under another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in similar cases.

## Volume 3 - Question 106. Thankfulness or gratitude

**Article 1. Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?**

On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii).

## Volume 3 - Question 108. Vengeance

**Article 2. Whether vengeance is a special virtue?**

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and in general whatever is obscure" ['Obscurum' Cicero wrote 'obfuturum' but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis] "(i.e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it." Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) reckons it a part of justice.

## Volume 3 - Question 109. Truth

**Article 1. Whether truth is a virtue?**

Objection 3. Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that by "truth we faithfully represent things as they are were, or will be." Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.

**Article 3. Whether truth is a part of justice?**

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) reckons truth among the parts of justice.

## Volume 3 - Question 120. "Epikeia" or equity

**Article 2. Whether "epikeia" is a part of justice?**

Objection 3. Further, it seems that "epikeia" is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Philippians 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to all men," the Greek has epieikeia [to epieikes]. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore "epikeia" is not a part of justice.

## Volume 3 - Question 117. Liberality

**Article 6. Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues?**

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems to be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing." The Philosopher also says (**Rhet**. i, 9) that "brave and just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal."

## Volume 3 - Question 123. Fortitude

**Article 2. Whether fortitude is a special virtue?**

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:61:3; I-II:61:4), the term "fortitude" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says (**Rhet**. ii), that "fortitude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils." On this sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter.

**Article 3. Whether fortitude is about fear and daring?**

Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii), that it belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not about fear and daring.

## Volume 3 - Question 128. The parts of fortitude

**Article 1. Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned?**

Objection 1. It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude, namely "magnificence," "confidence," "patience," and "perseverance." Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (II-II:117:5). Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Objection 4. Further, according to Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof.

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (II-II:123:6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. On this respect Tully mentions "confidence," of which he says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that "with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. On this respect Tully mentions "magnificence," which he describes as being "the discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind," so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus "magnificence" is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. On this respect he mentions "patience," which he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to Hebrews 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds." On this respect he mentions "perseverance," which accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

**Article 9. Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?**

Objection 1. It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that "fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil." Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.

## Volume 3 - Question 132. Vainglory

**Article 1. Whether the desire of glory is a sin?**

Objection 3. Further, Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that glory is "consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz. that glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with praise." Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for praise, according to Sirach 41:15, "Take care of a good name," and Romans 12:17, "Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men." Therefore the desire of vainglory is not a sin.

**Article 11. Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue?**

Objection 2. Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says (De Inv. **Rhet**. ii). Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue.

## Volume 3 - Question 129. Magnanimity

**Article 6. Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?**

On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. **Rhet**. ii) seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (Reply to Objection 6) and in the prologue to this.

Reply to Objection 3. Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. **Rhet**. ii), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question.

**Article 12. Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues?**

Objection 5. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 19): "Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others." Now liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a greater virtue.

Reply to Objection 5. Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most beloved, because they are most useful in war and peace."

## Volume 3 - Question 135. Meanness

**Article 1. Whether meanness is a vice?**

Reply to Objection 2. As the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5), "fear makes us take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.

## Volume 3 - Question 134. Magnificence

**Article 2. Whether magnificence is a special virtue?**

On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great, "doing" [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, discussion" referring to the inward intention, and "administration" to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in external matter [factibili].

**Article 7. Whether security belongs to magnanimity?**

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5), "fear makes a man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.

**Article 4. Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?**

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.

## Volume 3 - Question 137. Perseverance

**Article 1. Whether perseverance is a virtue?**

Objection 3. Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.

**Article 2. Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?**

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) reckons perseverance as a part of fortitude.

## Volume 3 - Question 138. The vices opposed to perseverance

**Article 2. Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?**

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is opposed to religion, as stated above (II-II:92:1). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.

## Volume 3 - Question 136. Patience

**Article 4. Whether patience is a part of fortitude?**

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) reckons it a part of fortitude.

**Article 5. Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with magnanimity.]**

For this reason Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) in defining patience, says that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By saying "arduous" he refers to constancy in good; when he says "difficult" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by adding "continued" or "long lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in common with patience.

**Article 4. Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [Cf. I-II, 109, 10]**

Objection 1. It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (Article 1). Now according to Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.

## Volume 3 - Question 141. Temperance

**Article 3. Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?**

Objection 1. It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 54) that "temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.

## Volume 3 - Question 143. The parts of temperance, in general

**Article 1. Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?**

Objection 1. It would seem that Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.

## Volume 3 - Question 145. Honesty

**Article 1. Whether honesty is the same as virtue?**

Reply to Objection 1. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 52) that "some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge." And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest.

## Volume 3 - Question 144. Shamefacedness

**Article 2. Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?**

The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result of any fault of his own."

Objection 1. It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (I-II:41:2; I-II:42:3), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.

On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; **Rhet**. ii, 53) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.

Reply to Objection 1. Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 6) that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause." Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus." It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is written (Isaiah 51:7): "Fear ye not the reproach of men."

**Article 3. Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him?**

On the contrary, It is stated in **Rhet**. ii, 6 that "man is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him."

Objection 2. Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to **Rhet**. ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself." Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely connected with him.

Objection 1. It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in **Rhet**. ii, 6 that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation." Now men desire this especially from people of the better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him.

Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 6) that "men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time; by those whose friends they wish to become." Now these are less closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are more closely united to him.

**Article 2. Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?**

Objection 1. It would seem that the honest is not the same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [Cicero, De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest.

Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 6) that "men take more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as jokers and fable-tellers." But those who are more closely connected with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame chiefly from them.

**Article 3. Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?**

Objection 1. It would seem that the honest does not differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [Cicero, De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53. Now pleasure is desired for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the pleasant.

Objection 2. Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good: for Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 52): "There is a thing that attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written (Sirach 11:14): "Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God," and (Sirach 13:2): "He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the honest differs not from the useful.

**Article 4. Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?**

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Rhet**. ii, 6) that "men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.

**Article 4. Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?**

Objection 3. Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now "it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to the Philosopher (**Rhet**. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as related in 2 Maccabees 6:28: "I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for the most venerable and most holy laws."

**Article 8. Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Rhet**. i, 9) that the "greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."

Objection 1. It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of honesty," according to Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.

## Volume 3 - Question 151. Chastity

**Article 4. Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?**

I answer that, As stated above (Objection 2), "pudicitia" [purity] takes its name from "pudor," which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the honesty [Cf. II-II:145] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members. Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (**Rhet**. ii, 6). Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless the one is sometimes used to designate the other.

## Volume 3 - Question 155. Continence

**Article 2. Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?**

Objection 3. Further, Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 54): "It is continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel." Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Timothy 6:10, "Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] (philargyria), is the root of all evils." Therefore continence is not properly about the desires for pleasures of touch

## Volume 3 - Question 157. Clemency and meekness

**Article 1. Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?**

Objection 1. It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [Aristotle, **Rhet**. ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in inflicting punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency and meekness are the same.

Objection 2. Further, Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 54) that "clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [Ep. ccxi], hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the same.

## Volume 3 - Question 158. Anger

**Article 1. Whether it is lawful to be angry?**

Objection 3. Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [Aristotle, **Rhet**. ii, 2 according to a gloss on Leviticus 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Deuteronomy 32:35, "Revenge is Mine." Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil.

**Article 4. Whether continence is better than temperance?**

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 54) and Andronicus [De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a principal virtue.

**Article 3. Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?**

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge." Tully also (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of temperance.

## Volume 3 - Question 160. Modesty

**Article 1. Whether modesty is a part of temperance?**

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a part of temperance.

**Article 2. Whether modesty is only about outward actions?**

In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by "humility." The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly [Cf. II-II:145:1], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like.

## Volume 3 - Question 161. Humility

**Article 4. Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?**

I answer that, As stated above (II-II:137:2 ad 1; II-II:157:3 ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given above (II-II:160:2), among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Peter 3:4): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit."

## Volume 3 - Question 168. Modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body

**Article 2. Whether there can be a virtue about games?**

Reply to Objection 1. As stated above, fun should fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. **Rhet**. i, 17) that "when the audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment, according to Proverbs 8:6, "Hear, for I will speak of great things." Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: "Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ?"

## Volume 3 - Question 186. Things in which the religious state properly consists

**Article 1. Whether religion implies a state of perfection?**

Objection 2. Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. **Rhet**. ii, 53) is that "which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature." Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states, as stated above (II-II:40:2; II-II:183:3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.