Aquinas Reader On Aristotle or The Philosopher

St. Thomas Aquinas is often referred to as one of the greatest commentators of Aristotle. The aim of this work is to make St. Thomas the philosopher more accessible for a concentrated study. In order to accomplish this, his principle work, the Summa Theologica has been currated to only sections including the mention of 'Aristotle' or 'The Philosopher'. This subset of articles has been further divided by book from the Aristotelian corpus. Keywords and a simple summary have been added to enrich the learning experience with overarching snapshots. We have added a reference distribution to illustrate the prominence of his citations. The sections presented are as they appear in the Summa Theologica for each reference book identified by headers. Each reference book in study is highlighted throughout in yellow for convenience. Books identified with multiple matching references have been adjudicated arbitrarily.

This is a smaller reader of Aquinas in so far as Aristotle is referenced in **Topic.**

We hope you enjoy this study of Aristotle as he is depicted through the lens of St. Thomas.

# Topic

**Keywords:**

objects, things, topic, according, says, simply, good, virtues, man, certain, secondly, aristotle, spiritus, gods, manners, acts, like, taking, ends, vision, life, contraries, naturally, better, faculties, reasons, philosopher, times, intellective, specifically, sorrow, hom, gifts, meaning, gratuitously, perfect, comes, sign, work, proofs, evil, testament, ethic, causes, fixed, alms, ghost proceeds, understands, particular, consequent.

## Volume 2 - Question 8. The will, in regard to what it wills

**Article 3. Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?**

Objection 1. It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (**Topic**. iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one." But the will does not will the means save on account of the end. Therefore it is moved to both by the same act.

## Volume 2 - Question 12. Intention

**Article 3. Whether one can intend two things at the same time?**

Objection 3. Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things at the same time," according to the Philosopher (**Topic**. ii, 10). Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things at the same time.

## Volume 2 - Question 14. Counsel, which precedes choice

**Article 4. Whether counsel is about all things that we do?**

I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above (Article 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [Cicero, **Topic**. ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done this or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].

## Volume 1 - Question 14. God's knowledge

**Article 7. Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?**

Objection 1. It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher says (**Topic**. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (Articles 2 and 5), it seems that He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another.

## Volume 2 - Question 17. The acts commanded by the will

**Article 4. Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Topic**. iii, 2) that "where one thing is by reason of another, there is but one." But there is no commanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.

## Volume 1 - Question 12. How God is known by us

**Article 10. Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?**

Objection 1. It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the Philosopher (**Topic**. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood." But what is seen in God, is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time.

## Volume 2 - Question 18. The good and evil of human acts, in general

**Article 4. Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?**

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. **Topic**. ii) that "if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also is evil."

## Volume 4 - Question 18. Christ's unity of will

**Article 2. Whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of reason?**

Reply to Objection 3. "Where there is one thing on account of another, there seems to be only one" (Aristotle, **Topic**. iii); thus a surface which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too, because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ, even as there is but one human nature.

## Volume 2 - Question 22. The subject of the soul's passions

**Article 1. Whether any passion is in the soul?**

Objection 3. Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in **Topic**. vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul.

## Volume 4 - Question 14. God's knowledge

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## Volume 2 - Question 23. How the passions differ from one another

**Article 1. Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?**

Objection 2. Further, on the words of Matthew 13:33, "The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in **Topic**. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and irascible faculties.

## Volume 3 - Question 24. The subject of charity

**Article 1. Whether the will is the subject of charity?**

Objection 1. It would seem that the will is not the subject of charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the Philosopher (**Topic**. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part. Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.

## Volume 2 - Question 26. The passions of the soul in particular: and first, of love

**Article 1. Whether love is in the concupiscible power?**

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (**Topic**. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power."

## Volume 1 - Question 25. The power of God

**Article 3. Whether God is omnipotent?**

Reply to Objection 2. To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (**Topic**. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible—as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.

**Article 4. Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?**

On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, because we desire them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness which he desires"; as stated in **Topic**. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.

## Volume 3 - Question 32. Almsdeeds

**Article 3. Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?**

Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case, when some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher observes (**Topic**. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is better than philosophy," although the latter is better simply.

## Volume 1 - Question 38. The name of the Holy Ghost, as Gift

**Article 2. Whether "Gift" is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?**

In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (**Topic**. iv, 4)—i.e. a thing which is not given with the intention of a return—and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above (I:27:4; I:37:1), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): "By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost, many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ."

## Volume 2 - Question 35. Pain or sorrow, in itself

**Article 5. Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?**

In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow is contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the same (**Topic**. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is no contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of knowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as stated above (I-II:31:1).

## Volume 2 - Question 39. The goodness and malice of sorrow or pain

**Article 3. Whether sorrow can be a useful good?**

Objection 2. Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (**Topic**. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.

## Volume 1 - Question 46. The beginning of the duration of creatures

**Article 1. Whether the universe of creatures always existed?**

Thirdly, because he expressly says (**Topic**. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal."

## Volume 1 - Question 48. The distinction of things in particular

**Article 2. Whether evil is found in things?**

Objection 3. Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the Philosopher says (**Topic**. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is no evil.

## Volume 5 - Question 48. The object of the consent

**Article 2. Whether marriage can result from one person's consent to take another for a base motive?**

Objection 4. Further, according to Boethius (De Diff., **Topic**. ii) "a thing is good if its end be good." But matrimony is always good. Therefore it is not matrimony if it is done for an evil end.

## Volume 4 - Question 46. The passion of Christ

**Article 7. Whether Christ suffered in His whole soul?**

Objection 4. Further, suffering causes pain: but there is no pain in the speculative intellect, because, as the Philosopher says (**Topic**. i), "there is no sadness in opposition to the pleasure which comes of consideration." Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul.

## Volume 4 - Question 50. The death of Christ

**Article 5. Whether Christ's was identically the same body living and dead?**

I answer that, The expression "simply" can be taken in two senses. In the first instance by taking "simply" to be the same as "absolutely"; thus "that is said simply which is said without addition," as the Philosopher put it (**Topic**. ii): and in this way the dead and living body of Christ was simply identically the same: since a thing is said to be "simply" identically the same from the identity of the subject. But Christ's body living and dead was identical in its suppositum because alive and dead it had none other besides the Word of God, as was stated above (Article 2). And it is in this sense that Athanasius is speaking in the passage quoted.

## Volume 2 - Question 54. The distinction of habits

**Article 3. Whether habits are divided into good and bad?**

Objection 2. Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares (**Topic**. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.

## Volume 2 - Question 57. The intellectual virtues

**Article 1. Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?**

Objection 3. Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, as the Philosopher proves in **Topic**. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues.

## Volume 3 - Question 57. The intellectual virtues

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## Volume 1 - Question 58. The mode of angelic knowledge

**Article 2. Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time?**

Objection 1. It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the Philosopher says (**Topic**. ii, 4) that "it may happen that we know many things, but understand only one."

## Volume 2 - Question 59. Moral virtue in relation to the passions

**Article 2. Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?**

Objection 1. It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (**Topic**. iv) that "a gentle man is one who is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all moral virtues are without passion.

## Volume 3 - Question 47. Prudence, considered in itself

**Article 14. Whether prudence is in all who have grace?**

Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (**Topic**. iii, 2) that "young people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace. Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.

## Volume 4 - Question 55. The manifestation of the Resurrection

**Article 5. Whether Christ should have demonstrated the truth of His Resurrection by proofs?**

I answer that, The word "proof" is susceptible of a twofold meaning: sometimes it is employed to designate any sort "of reason in confirmation of what is a matter of doubt" [Tully, **Topic**. ii]: and sometimes it means a sensible sign employed to manifest the truth; thus also Aristotle occasionally uses the term in his works [Cf. Prior. Anal. ii; Rhetor. i]. Taking "proof" in the first sense, Christ did not demonstrate His Resurrection to the disciples by proofs, because such argumentative proof would have to be grounded on some principles: and if these were not known to the disciples, nothing would thereby be demonstrated to them, because nothing can be known from the unknown. And if such principles were known to them, they would not go beyond human reason, and consequently would not be efficacious for establishing faith in the Resurrection, which is beyond human reason, since principles must be assumed which are of the same order, according to 1 Poster. But it was from the authority of the Sacred Scriptures that He proved to them the truth of His Resurrection, which authority is the basis of faith, when He said: "All things must needs be fulfilled which are written in the Law, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning Me": as is set forth Luke 24:44.

## Volume 1 - Question 67. The work of distinction in itself

**Article 2. Whether light is a body?**

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Topic**. v, 2) that "light is a species of fire." But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.

## Volume 2 - Question 68. The gifts

**Article 1. Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?**

Objection 3. Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc. [Cf. I-II:55:4]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to the Philosopher (**Topic**. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one another.

## Volume 2 - Question 66. Equality among the virtues

**Article 3. Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?**

I answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [Aristotle, **Topic**. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as explained above (I-II:54:2; I-II:60:1). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite.

## Volume 1 - Question 68. The work of the second day

**Article 3. Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?**

Objection 1. It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters from waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have naturally one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (**Topic**. i, 6): "All water is the same species." Water therefore cannot be distinct from water by place.

## Volume 1 - Question 70. The work of adornment, as regards the fourth day

**Article 2. Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?**

Objection 4. Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is inferior to itself, "since the end is better than the means" (**Topic**. iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not made "to enlighten it."

## Volume 5 - Question 70. The quality of the soul after leaving the body, and of the punishment inflicted on it by material fire

**Article 3. Whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire?**

On the contrary, if the soul sees the fire of hell, it cannot see it save by intellectual vision, since it has not the organs by which sensitive or imaginative vision is effected. But it would seem impossible for intellectual vision to be the cause of sorrow, since "there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of considering," according to the Philosopher (**Topic**. i, 13). Therefore the soul is not punished by that vision.

## Volume 4 - Question 76. The way in which Christ is in this sacrament

**Article 6. Whether Christ's body is in this sacrament movably?**

Objection 1. It seems that Christ's body is movably in this sacrament, because the Philosopher says (**Topic**. ii) that "when we are moved, the things within us are moved": and this is true even of the soul's spiritual substance. "But Christ is in this sacrament," as shown above (III:74:1. Therefore He is moved when it is moved.

## Volume 5 - Question 82. The impassibility of the bodies of the blessed after their resurrection

**Article 1. Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?**

On the contrary, Everything passible is corruptible, because "increase of passion results in loss of substance" [Aristotle, **Topic**. vi, 1. Now the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the resurrection, according to 1 Corinthians 15:42, "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption." Therefore they will be impassible.

## Volume 1 - Question 85. The mode and order of understanding

**Article 4. Whether we can understand many things at the same time?**

On the contrary, It is said (**Topic**. ii, 10) that "understanding is of one thing only, knowledge is of many."

**Article 8. Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?**

Objection 2. Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more known," as is said **Topic**. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of a line; for as Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are points"; also unity comes into the definition of number, for "number is multitude measured by one," as is said Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible.

## Volume 5 - Question 86. The conditions under which the bodies of the damned will rise again

**Article 3. Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?**

Objection 1. It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be impassible. For, according to the Philosopher (**Topic**. vi), "increase of passion results in loss of substance." Now "if a finite thing be continually lessened, it must needs at length be done away" (Phys. i, 4). Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible, and will be ever suffering, they will at length be done away and corrupted: and this has been shown to be false (Article 2). Therefore they will be impassible.

## Volume 5 - Question 87. The knowledge which, after rising again, men will have at the judgment concerning merits and demerits

**Article 3. Whether all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance?**

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Topic**. ii) that "we do not arrive at understanding several things at the same time." Now merits and demerits, both our own and those of others, will not be visible save to the intellect. Therefore it will be impossible for them all to be seen at the same time.

## Volume 3 - Question 92. Superstition

**Article 2. Whether there are various species of superstition?**

Objection 1. It would seem that there are not various species of superstition. According to the Philosopher (**Topic**. i, 13), "if one contrary includes many kinds, so does the other." Now religion, to which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has superstition various species.

## Volume 5 - Question 90. The form of the judge in coming to the judgment

**Article 3. Whether the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy?**

Further, if a certain vision is not always delightful, it happens sometimes to be painful. But intellective vision is never painful since "the pleasure we take in objects of understanding has no grief opposed to it," according to the Philosopher (**Topic**. ii). Since then the Godhead cannot be seen save by the intellect, it seems that the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.

## Volume 5 - Question 97. The punishment of the damned

**Article 6. Whether the fire of hell is of the same species as ours?**

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (**Topic**. i, 6), "every water is of the same species as every other water." Therefore in like manner every fire is of the same species as every other fire.

## Volume 1 - Question 116. Fate

**Article 3. Whether fate is unchangeable?**

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (**Topic**. ii, 7): "If we be moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable.

## Volume 3 - Question 176. The grace of tongues

**Article 2. Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy?**

Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper to better persons, according to the Philosopher (**Topic**. iii, 1). Now the gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in the sequence of Pentecost [The sequence: 'Sancti Spiritus adsit nobis gratia' ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author of the 'Veni Sancte Spiritus.' Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]: "On this day Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time": whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament, according to Hebrews 1:1, "God Who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets." Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.

## Volume 3 - Question 182. The active life in comparison with the contemplative life

**Article 1. Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative?**

Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too the Philosopher says (**Topic**. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . ."

## Volume 3 - Question 180. The contemplative life

**Article 8. Whether the contemplative life is continuous?**

I answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in **Topic**. i, 13. But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous—both because it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure after this life—and because in the works of the contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the more able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7).

## Volume 3 - Question 188. The different kinds of religious life

**Article 1. Whether there is only one religious order?**

Since, however, the end imports most in every matter, [Aristotle, **Topic**. vi 8 religious orders differ more especially according to their various ends than according to their various practices.