

伦理学导论

导论

·西方伦理学的独特性

- 将伦理作为一门科学来讨论
- 哲学体系的奠基结构：第一哲学/人性论/伦理学

·西方思想史视野中的伦理学

- 三个阶段：古代、中世纪（基督教，希腊精神，普遍性）、现代
- 两个起源：希腊、希伯来（犹太教，民主性，游牧，摧毁古典）
- 三个关键人物：亚里士多德、奥古斯丁、康德

·课程说明

- 导论课性质：集中于古代传统，不涉及现代前沿 >> 从完整文本出发
- 伦理学意义上：历史未必是进步的
- 人物与著作的代表性

一、什么是导论？

根本问题 fundamental questions: 善、恶、道德准则

→ 根本文本 fundamental texts:

亚里士多德的《尼各马可伦理学》、奥古斯丁的《忏悔录》、康德的《道德形而上学的奠基》

二、进一步学习

现当代伦理学:

程炼-《伦理学导论》、徐向东-《自我、他人与道德》、梯利-《伦理学导论》

Bernard Williams: *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, Moral Luck*

西方伦理学史:

麦金太尔:《伦理学简史》、《追寻美德》

Henry Sidgwick: *Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers*

三、Williams 的思路=普及伦理(ought to do)的思路:

“This is a vital point: this man is capable of thinking in terms of others' interests, and his failure to be a moral agent lies (partly) in the fact that he is only intermittently and capriciously disposed to do so. But there is no bottomless gulf between this state and the basic dispositions of morality.”

——*Morality: An Introduction to Ethics*

正常人: care for someone, 否则就是 psychopath

道德的起点: extension of sympathy

cf. 卢梭: 怜悯是社会道德的自然起点 (纯粹反感→躲避而非帮助)

cf. 孟子: 老吾老, 以及人之老; 幼吾幼, 以及人之幼 (已经充分道德化的论述)

这是一个很有力的论证, 但亚里士多德、奥古斯丁、康德都没有采用这种论证; 差异的原因在于他们对于“ (正常) 人是什么”具有不同的观念, 而共同点在于他们都需要追溯到这个问题。

四、 作为哲学的伦理学

传统逻辑架构：

“第一哲学”（什么是存在）→人性论（什么是人）→伦理学（什么是好）

现代自然科学的挑战和打断：

化约论 reductionism（心理学）

二元论 dualism（笛卡尔、休谟 Hume、康德 Kant）

西方哲学家看中国，以莱布尼茨为例：

“在思维的深邃和理论科学方面，我们明显更深一筹……尽管他们认为我们是‘一只眼睛’，但我们还有另外一只眼睛，即中国人还不够熟悉的‘第一哲学’”

——莱布尼茨：《中国近事》，致读者

由于没有第一哲学的奠基，中国伦理学只是关于人性和伦理的世俗意见，只是把日常伦理观念用严肃典雅的文字写出来罢了，而不是关于伦理的哲学。

五、 中国伦理学

孟子的伦理学——杞柳-栝櫨之辩、湍水之辩（现象学）

告子曰：“性，犹杞柳也，义，犹栝櫨也；以人性为仁义，犹以杞柳为栝櫨。”

孟子曰：“子能顺杞柳之性而以为栝櫨乎？将戕贼杞柳而后以栝櫨也？如将戕贼杞柳而以为栝櫨，则亦将戕贼人以为仁义与？率天下之人而祸仁义者，必子之言夫！”

人性 = 柳枝，仁义 = 木杯

告子：柳枝是柳树生命的一部分，它的本性不是成为木杯

孟子：柳枝的质地柔韧，正适合制作木杯

告子曰：“性犹湍水也，决诸东方则东流，决诸西方则西流。人性之无分于善不善也，犹水之无分于东西也。”孟子曰：“水信无分于东西，无分于上下乎？人性之善也，犹水之就下也。人无有不善，水无有不下。今夫水，搏而跃之，可使过颡；激而行之，可使在山。是岂水之性哉？其势则然也。人之可使为不善，其性亦犹是也。”

人性 = 水流，仁义 = 方向

告子：水流不分东西，向东向西是人为

孟子：水流分上下，向下是自然，向上是人为（情势）

六、 西方伦理学

西方举例：亚里士多德

体系化、不可证明亦不可证伪、自然科学无法有效反驳的前提

Life seems to belong even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be shared even by the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has reason....the function (ergon) of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies reason.

Actuality (energeia) is prior to potentiality...actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potentiality is acquired.

七、实践中的伦理学

然而，莱布尼茨接着说：“在实践哲学方面，即在人类生活及日常风俗的伦理道德和政治学说方面，我不得不汗颜地承认他们远胜于我们”

——莱布尼茨：《中国近事》，致读者

中国哲学的回复：

（一）中国也有第一哲学以及完备的哲学体系，为中国伦理学奠基

（二）中国伦理学不需要奠基，试图以第一哲学为伦理学奠基的做法无益于实际伦理的改善

中国和西方的伦理（学）孰优孰劣，仍然值得讨论

《尼各马可伦理学》

第一卷

柏拉图、亚里士多德对于政治辉煌的总结：“密涅瓦的猫头鹰总是在黄昏起飞”

“秩序”：cosmos（宇宙）

↑亚里士多德的哲学体系强调秩序，但仍存在“柔性”的成分

←→尼采：古希腊精神是“悲剧精神”，不是秩序，而是要瓦解秩序（狄奥尼索斯）

一、亚里士多德其人

生平：“出生，毕生从事哲学，死去……”（by 海德格尔）

医学背景：哲学作为对灵魂的治疗 >> 古希腊人灵魂的疾病

把哲学比作医学，哲学作为对灵魂的治疗；强调客观因果关系

希腊人：充满血气的民族；哲学家给出的解药：给血气找到相对合理的出口--德性的卓越

柏拉图的学生：“我爱老师，但我更爱真理”>> 深受柏拉图影响

强调自身原创性、理性的超越性

柏拉图：爱的阶梯 V.S 亚里士多德：每个人天然地渴望知识、真理

吕克昂学院（漫步学派）：内传与外传 >> 建立“学园”

马其顿人，回归雅典讲学；内传与外传学说的分类问题

亚历山大的老师：哲学与政治 >> 马其顿为希腊文化所征服，而后征服希腊（希腊化）

亚历山大征服时代：亚历山大摧毁了希腊政治，却传播了希腊文化；希腊化时代

亚里士多德与亚历山大

His temperance, as to the pleasures of the body, was apparent in him in his very childhood, as he was with much difficulty incited to them, and always used them with great moderation; though in other things he was extremely eager and vehement, and in his love of glory, and the pursuit of it, he showed a solidity of high spirit and magnanimity(*thumos*) far above his age.

(Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*, 4.4)

Alexander to Aristotle, greeting. You have not done well to publish your books of oral doctrine; for what is there now that we excel others in, if those things which we have been particularly instructed in be laid open to all? For my part, I assure you, I had rather excel others in the knowledge of what is excellent, than in the extent of my power and dominion. Farewell.

(Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*, 7.4)

亚里士多德更加强调对血气（*thumos*）的疏导而非压抑 >> 基督教圣训

向自身灵魂的完善与德性

cf. 福山：“西方的胜利就是血气的胜利。”——《历史的终结与最后的人》

二、《尼各马可伦理学》的结构

✧ 从政治到哲学的运动

卷 1-6 论述德性（政治），而后四卷追求快乐（面向哲学家）

↓——食色性也——→精神快乐——↑

- 卷1：幸福是符合德性的实践活动
 - 卷2 - 3.5：德性和实践概论
 - 卷3.6 - 5：各种具体的伦理德性
 - 卷6：各种理智德性（实践智慧、哲学智慧）
 - -----
 - 卷7.1-10：不自制； 7.11-14：快乐
 - 卷8-9：友爱； 卷10.1-5：快乐； 10.6-8：幸福
 - 10.9：教育与立法（过渡到《政治学》）
- []中的是重点章节

三、《尼各马可伦理学》第一章

[1.1] the end and the order of life


Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at *some good*; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim... But where such arts fall under a single capacity—as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others—in all of these the **ends** of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate **ends**; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued.

(1094a1-16)


First then about these things we must enjoin every one that has the power to live according to his own choice to set up for himself some object for the good life to aim at (whether honour or reputation or wealth or culture), *with reference to which he will then do all his acts*, since not to have one's life organized in view of some **end (telos)** is a mark of much folly.

(EE 1.2 1214b7 ff)

【比较-单一目的 v.s 多领域义务整体】



← e.g 日本：
将人生划分为若干领域



← 亚里士多德：
人生一切服务于一个目的

日本人的的人生观表现在他们的忠、孝、义理、仁、人情等德行规定之中。他们似乎认为，“人的义务的整体”像在地图上划分势力范围一样分成若干领域。用他们的话来说，人生是由“忠的世界”、“孝的世界”、“义理的世界”、“仁的世界”、“人情的世界”及其他许多世界组成的。各个世界都有自己的、特殊的、详细的准则，一个人对其同伴不是把他归之于一个完整的人格，而是说他“不懂孝”或“不懂义理”等等。他们不像美国人那样用“不正派”来批评某人，而是明确指出他在哪个领域中行为不当。他们不用“自私”、“冷漠”之类的评语，而是明确指出在哪个特定领域违反准则。他们不诉诸于绝对命令和金箴。一个得到赞许的行动总是与该行动所表现的世界相联系的。一个人“为了孝”而行动时是一种方式，而只是“为了义理”或者“仁的世界”行动时——在西欧人看来——就会完全是另一种方式。甚至各个世界的准则也会随着其内中情况的变化而可能要求采取很不相同的适当行动。

（《菊与刀》，推荐阅读第十章“道德的困境”）

[1.2] philosophy and politics

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we **desire for its own sake** (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly **this (philosophy)** must be the good and the chief good.

(1094a19-24)

It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly **the master art**. And **politics** appears to be of this nature, for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric.

(1094a27-b4)

[1.1-2] Telos: final or complete?


telos 的双重含义:

作形容词: final, ultimate 终极的 / complete, perfect, 完整的

作名词: end, 目的

生活秩序的组织原则:

手段-目标的递进



部分-整体

Two Understandings of *Cosmos*:

complete/perfect→part-whole→politics V.S final/ultimate→measure-end→philosophy

哲学家追求的善是人生的终极目标，哲学家认为，这种善不是其他任何事情的手段，相比之下，政治家追求的善不是终极的，它摆脱不了手段的色彩。但是在政治家看来，哲学家追求的善是局部的，它终归只属于一个人，只属于人生的某些时刻，而政治家追求的善才是整全的。

→ 西方传统下的“哲学家” V.S 日本文化中的“政治家”

[1.5] 从德性到幸福——三种生活秩序

生活秩序与灵魂秩序	沉思生活	理智	reason / logos
	政治生活	血气	spirit / thumos
	享乐生活	欲求	desire / epithumia

cf. 西塞罗《图斯库伦争辩集》5.3, 毕达哥拉斯对“哲学家”的解释:

然而毕达哥拉斯回答道，人类的生命在他看来就与那伴着竞技的盛况由整个希腊的群众举行的节庆集会类似；因为就像一些人在那里凭借训练有素的身体求取荣耀和花冠[所代表]的优异，另一些人被买卖的收益和利润牵动，还有一类人——而这是最卓犖自在的一类——他们既不求取掌声也不求取利润，而是为了观察的缘故前来并勤勉地审视[人们]所做何事、如何做事，同样，我们就好像从某座城市来到节庆集会中的一处人群这里，从另外一个生命和自然中来到这个生命——[我们中的]一些人给荣耀当奴隶，另一些人给钱财当奴隶，[不过]存在极少的某些人，由于[他们]把其他一切视为虚妄，就勤勉地凝神于万物的本性；这些人把自己称作勤勉于智慧的人——其实就是哲人；并且，正如在那里最高雅的做法是在不为自己带来任何利益的情况下注视，同样，生活中对万物的沉思和认知也远远胜过一切追求。

(《图斯库伦争辩集》顾枝鹰译本)

做买卖的人：大众——享乐生活、欲望

参赛以争取荣誉/优胜的人：政治家——政治生活、血气

观众（纯粹享乐的观看、精神的享受）：哲学家——哲学生活、理性

cf. 柏拉图：《理想国》第四卷，苏格拉底对灵魂秩序的三层划分¹，尤其是是对血气的分析

亚里士多德对政治生活的批判和改造：

┌ 从荣誉到德性（从外在到内在）：荣誉是为了德性的确证
└ 从德性到活动（从潜能到现实）：将内在德性发挥出来，cf. NE“睡着的好人与坏人”

→ [1.7] 幸福是符合德性的实现活动

享乐→荣誉→德性

从现实上升到哲学→幸福是符合德性的实现活动

·“Everything has an end.”

=A→B→C→…→infinity→“the chief good”

the master art → politics

[1.7] 幸福的两个形式特征

(1) 幸福是终极的善 (1097a25-b7)

“只为了他物而被欲求的事物”——财富

“既为了自身也为了他物而被欲求的事物”——快乐

“只为了自身而被欲求的事物”——幸福

Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. – *philosophy*

(2) 幸福是自足的善[整全]

并非个体的，而是社会的（城邦的）

仅凭靠自身就让人无所缺乏

并非具体的善，而是善的整体（不能并列之善→整全性）

Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship...acking in nothing...we think it most desirable of all things, not a thing counted as one good thing among others — if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods.

polis is the naturel community, and man is by nature political animal

¹ Plato: reason-logos; spiritedness-thumos; desires-eros

[1.7] 从幸福到德性——幸福的定义（活动论证）

(1097b22-1098a18)

(1) 如果人有本质活动，幸福就在于本质活动（*ergon*）

>> 论证的前提，来自于亚里士多德的世界观：万事万物都有 *ergon*

✧ 自然目的论的一般表达-*ergon* 的本质性：

所有生命体的善都在于 *ergon*，天体的 *ergon* 是完美的圆周运动，石头的 *ergon* 是落地，水的 *ergon* 则是向下流……万物都要寻找自己本性所在的自然位置，人亦不例外¹。

(2) 正如工匠和器官有本质活动，人也有本质活动

“Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain *functions or activities (ergon)*, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a *function (ergon) apart from all these?*”

——Teleology view of nature

看似：医生、工匠、雕刻家、老师、器官有 *ergon* → 人也有 *ergon*

cf. 海德格尔的解读：源自于工匠与工具的功能世界 >> 最容易辨认出 *ergon*

csy 的解读：不是从工匠这些职业有 *ergon* 推得人有 *ergon*，而是从万事万物有 *ergon* 推得人也不例外

>> ↑不过是修辞，背后是形而上学的目的论世界观

实体目的论（万物皆有自己的 *ergon*）←→整体目的论（基督教，将一切目的收归为上帝的目的）

(3) 人独特的本质活动是理性（*logos*）的活动

“There remains, then, an active life of the element that has *reason (logos)*; of this, one part has it in the sense of *being obedient to reason*, the other in the sense of *possessing reason and exercising thought*. And, as ‘life of the rational element’ also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term.”

——The order of soul

两个层面“reason”：

1) being obedient to reason (desire -兽性)；

>> 以更高的 reason 统摄更低的、能听从理性的 *desire*

不是化约论的思想，而是提升的思想 → 称人为“理性的存在”

cf. 理性和欲望的互动就是选择(6.2)²：

Choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an origin of action is a man.

[也即只讨论伦理学关涉的 *desire*]

2) possessing reason and exercising thought (reason -神性)

>> 将人界定为一种有选择的存在，可选择范围就属于人的 *ergon*

(4) 幸福³是以符合德性（*arete*）的方式完成上述活动⁴

¹ 亚里士多德对人有无 *ergon* 并没有直接肯定，因为人是相当复杂的事物

² 如果人=理性（*reason*）+欲望（*desire*），而选择是二者互动的结果，那么亚里士多德就是将人定义为“有选择的存在”

³ 幸福或至善=以良好的方式从事人类的本质活动；善=目的，最好=最具目的性（最终极或最完整）

⁴ 整个论证是形式化的，暂时不包含实质的道德信息：“人的 *ergon* 是理性，幸福就是把 *ergon* 做好，而做好就是根据德性，而德性就是 *arete*，如↓”→“如何是好，以好的方式去做就是好”

“If any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate virtue (*arete*¹): if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting virtue.”

(5) 若存在多个德性，幸福是以**最具目的性的** (*most telos*) 德性的方式完成上述活动。

“If there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most final/complete (*teleiotes*, or most telos).”

→结论：幸福²是符合德性的**实现活动** (*energeia*) **从哲学下降到对本质的逐步论证**

Conclusion: happiness is **activity** (*energeia*) of soul exhibiting virtue

>> 实现活动 = 正在从事本质活动，即：现实性存在

on the way of practicing *ergon*→*energeia*; *energeia* = being-at-work

典型的现代误解 1

对 *ergon* 功能性、工具性的理解

For according to that tradition to be a man is to fill a set of roles each of which has its own point and purpose: member of a family, citizen, soldier, philosopher, servant of God. It is only when man is thought of as an individual prior to and apart from all roles that “man” ceases to be a functional concept.

(Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*)

这种观点理解为，人有个 function，前提是扮演一个角色，如家庭成员、公民、哲学家、上帝的仆人……；而纯粹的个体是没有 function(*ergon*)的。但亚里士多德探讨的并不是人作为种种社会角色的“功能” (function)，而恰是人之为作为理性动物的“本质活动” (essential activity)。

虽然亚里士多德认为自己探讨的是人性，但他确实对“人”的角色提出了诸多限定：自由人、男性、古希腊城邦公民：“灵魂中负责理性思虑的部分，奴隶完全不具备，女性具备但是不具备权威，儿童具备但尚未完善。”指女性具有理性，但理性在女性身上没有权威

>> 女权主义的思考：女性是否更有理性/理性是否是界定人的关键？

典型的现代误解 2

“人是没有本质的存在”

The more highly specialized something is, the easier it is to assign it a specific, or proper, or essential, function, on perfectly clear criteria. And the more versatile the thing, the more difficult - and pointless - it is to make such assignments. But man is immensely versatile.

(Bernard Suits, “Aristotle on the Function of Man”)

古典意义上的本质主义者（认为人一定有本质 *ergon*），但很多现代哲学家，如 Suits 认为人是没有本质的存在，人是自由的——人恰恰是摆脱了本质，才是自由的存在。

¹ *arete*: goodness, excellence, virtue (善, 卓越, 德性), 强调 *excellence* 而未包含 *morality*

² *eudaimonia*: 不是一时一事的幸福感受，而是客观的生命状态/生命质量 *well-being/flourishing*
eu 好+ *daimon*: 中性的“精灵”，被基督教变更为贬义的“魔鬼”；喻指决定每个人命运的守护神 >> “性格决定命运”

“自由”>> 奥古斯丁、康德哲学的继承

[一份辩护]

虽然亚里士多德认为人的本质是理性活动，但这种活动并非 specialized 的。如果人之为人的 ergon 是“选择”，那么亚里士多德的论证就并未抹杀人类具体活动的多样性，也并未忽视人的自由，而是指出人之所以能够如此自由而丰富的根本原因在于人具有理性。

理性与自由，究竟是谁规定谁，这才是古典思想与现代思想真正的分歧所在。

然而，亚里士多德确实更加重视人类理性本质的普遍性，强调人作为整体的生活选择，如享乐、政治、哲学生活，至于个体自由选择的多样性，并非其所关注的。

亚里士多德 vs 休谟

事实与价值之分——从“是”走向“应该”

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with *an ought*, or *an ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

(David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 3.1.1)

存在观的分歧：否认从“人的本质是理性”推得“人应当按照理性行动”的可行性

>> 价值善恶是超事实的独立存在

事实与价值之分：现代科学的兴起已经垄断了“事实”的含义，肌肉骨骼当然不可以从“人是什么”推向价值，因此休谟才走向了二元论的解决，将事实（自然科学）与价值（伦理学）分离；而在亚里士多德的语境下，事实本身就包含着“应然”。在目的论之下，本就没有“事实”与“价值”之分。

亚里士多德：“你是这样”→“你的善是这样”≠“你应该这样”

古典伦理学并不强调“应该”，并没有想说服人要去追求善，没有那么强道德戒律的色彩；默认一切都会自然而然地去追求自己的善，伦理学只是告诉人善是什么。

休谟：重视“应该”

给事实一个科学的定义，给价值一个**应该**的定义→ 撕裂的二元论

基督教文化的结果

古典伦理学与基督教伦理学间的断裂

cf. Morality of Happiness V.S Ten Commandments

“一只钟表走错了，那么它就不是一个好的表”：

休谟的否认——人不同于物，不能从事实推出价值，本质上共享了第二份批评：人没有固定的“功能”，而是自由的，所以才不能从“实然”推向“应然”。

[第一卷]幸福是符合德性的活动→[第二卷]德性是什么？

[2.1] nature, habit, virtue

From this it is also plain that none of the **moral virtues**¹ arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its **nature**². For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another.

(1103a19-23)

cf. 告子和孟子“湍水之辩”——将人性比作自然物 \longleftrightarrow 亚里士多德：人性具备**习塑潜能**³ (habituate)

>> 告子认为人本性无善恶，但“理性”并非人的根本，不过是更好实现“食色性也”的工具理性，是社会使人异化了；亚里士多德认为**人的天性是有方向的**，因为构成人之本质的理性**并非工具理性**。

和告子一样，亚里士多德也非常重视后天的教化对于人的塑造，他认为**德性不是自然，而是一种习性**。然而，二者的区别也同样明显：告子不仅否认人性本善，而且认为，人性的潜能要么是没有方向的（正如水流无所谓向东还是向西），要么朝向与仁义道德相悖的方向（正如柳枝不是为了被制成木杯，而是为了柳树的生命所需），亚里士多德却说，“我们自然地适于获得德性”，也就是说，人天性就具备养成德性的潜能⁴，德性的养成不只是对于人性的改变，更不是对于人性的戕害，而是对于人性的完善和成全。

>> 孟子认为“恻隐之心”是人的本性，只不过是后天被遮蔽了（cf.卢梭-高贵的野蛮人）；亚里士多德认为**人的本质在于理性**，其作为道德根本是需要后天形塑的（cf.卢梭-可完善性）

在根本立场上，亚里士多德的观点与孟子是相通的，但他会把孟子讲的“人性本善”改为“**人性潜在向善**”，几乎不会说“人性也潜在向善”。

Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.

(1103a24-26)

亚里士多德既不是性善论也不是性恶论，而是主张**人性潜在为善**[规范性命题]；

→**伦理**（*ēthikē*）的重点不在于**人性**（*nature*），而在于**习惯**（*ethos*⁵），德性的养成是一个**习塑自然**（*habituation of nature*）的过程；

习塑的关键在于实现**行为驱动力的上升**和**理性对于行为目标的构建**。

欲望、激情、情感

logos（反思）

¹ 德性（moral virtue）：不是完全自然的，因为完全自然的事物是无法改变的

² nature：人的自然（人性）

³ habituation：本性的、行为模式的改变，而非 habit 的改变→在这件事上只有人具有潜能

⁴ 亚里士多德：“潜能-现实理论”

⁵ Ethos: ethics 的词根

[2.3] pleasure, nobility, advantage

There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance, **the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant**, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong.

(1104b30-33; 希腊人倾向于把最重要的一项 advantageous 放在中心位置)

(cf.1.7 对于灵魂而言的善恶) 有利/有害 —— 理性

(荣誉) 高贵/卑劣 —— 血气 养成德性→习塑人性

(趋乐避苦) 快乐/痛苦 —— 欲求

三种目标(快乐/痛苦、高贵/卑劣、有利/有害)构成驱动力从低到高的秩序;对于人性的习塑是为实现行为驱动力层次的上升,同时要求理性越来越深入地参与行为目标的建构。

习塑的具体方法和最终结果

[2.1-2] 通过活动来养成德性

“通过做正义的事情,我们变得正义;通过做节制的事情,我们变得节制;通过做勇敢的事情,我们变得勇敢……我们是通过克制快乐而变得节制的,而变得节制了就最能克制快乐;勇敢也一样”

(1103b1-2; 1104a33-35)

➤ “如果我还没有正义,又如何做正义的事呢?”

行为是外在的,因此可以通过立法者的德性教育,实现由外而内的 habituation

社会习俗、法律

[2.4] 成功养成德性的标志

“(1)他必须知道那种行为;(2)他必须是经过选择而那样做,并且是因为那行为自身的缘故而选择它;(3)他必须是出于一种确定的、稳定的品质而那样选择” 理性 logos

telos 的终极性——哲学在最高的程度上满足这一点

(1105a31-34)

道德:学会享受德性,为德性本身的缘故而选择它(类似哲学之于哲学家)

➤ 亚里士多德是唯动机论者吗?(勇敢√胜利√奖赏×)

唯后果论 v.s 唯动机论(=不顾后果)

德性是以自身为目的,具体体现为德性是为了高贵(nobility),例如:【勇敢是为了高贵】brave men act for the sake of the noble (3.8);【节制是为了高贵】Hence the appetitive element in a temperate man should harmonize with reason; for the noble is the mark at which both aim (3.12).

亚里士多德并非唯动机论,而只是排除外在的奖赏和名誉——“勇敢而不顾后果是鲁莽”

cf. P.9-注释 4: 德性 arete 的本意是卓越 excellence,而卓越是血气的属性

→ cf. P.4-“强调对血气(thumos)的疏导而非压抑”

亚里士多德在本质上是鼓励血气的,只是通过哲学将血气进行了改造

[2.6] 德性的定义

“德性是一种关于选择的品质，存在于相对于我们的中道，这种中道是由逻辑斯规定的，也就是说，是像一个具有实践智慧的人会做的那样去规定的。德性是两种劣性即过度与不及之间的中道。”

(1106b36-1107a3)

“中道¹就是在恰当的时间地点，对恰当的人，以恰当的方式感受和行动……”

亚里士多德的伦理学论述的确是形式（formal）重于实质（substantive）的²，然而形式论述不一定是空洞的，因为亚里士多德的形式（eidos）概念本身就是一个具有实质规范性的概念。

[柏拉图的]理念 or 相

[2.6] 相对于我们的中道

...the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all; by the intermediate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little — and this is not one, nor the same for all.

(1106a28-33)

For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way³, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate.

(1106b18-24)

cf. 喜怒哀乐之未发谓之中，发而皆中节谓之和；君子而时中

平淡温和

←——

时机，权变

[2.6] 德性与技艺的类比

Every art does its work well — by looking to the intermediate and judging its works by this standard (so that we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate.

(1106b8-15)

亚里士多德将德性类比于技艺 art 来说明何谓中道，正如技艺 art 的中道是作品的形式，伦理的中道是人生的形式⁴→整体规范部分[美学标准]。

¹ “中道学说是亚里士多德体系里最出名的学说之一，也是最没用的学说之一”。（威廉斯：《伦理学与哲学的限度》，陈嘉映译，商务印书馆，2017年，第47页）

² 幸福是符合德性的活动，德性就是中道，中道就是恰当→完全空洞的论证？

>> 形式化的论证：意为通过现实实践的追随和仿效，而非清规戒律来养成德性

³ 强调喜怒哀乐之“恰当”，而非所谓“平淡温和”


⁴ 根据亚里士多德对技艺的哲学理解，技艺产品的形式就是使得该产品能够发挥其本质功用的结构和秩序，而良好的结构和秩序正是技艺中道所维护的技艺产品之善。这样看来，匠师“着眼于”技艺中道进行制作的

因此，中道的规范源自 telos 的整全性（——政治在最完全的意义上规定实践的中道¹）

cf. 中庸的规范源自于“喜怒哀乐之未发谓之中”

并非一个整体，而是一个状态

cf. 福柯：“亚里士多德的伦理是生存美学。”



从德性的定义看伦理学的意义

伦理学理论终究是抽象层面上的，是无法直接帮助我们实现中道的。然而，中道所关涉的对象恰恰取决于个别情形，这正是实践智慧作为“人生技艺”发挥作用的领域。

伦理学并不是实践智慧，而是关于实践智慧的理论；

联系[1.2]的比喻：伦理学对实践生活有重大的作用，它就像在靶子上标记出靶心，让射手更容易击中目标，但射术的高低最终取决于实践（habitation）的训练。

[3.1] 行动的自愿

自愿行动 [voluntary action] = 负责

违反意愿的行动 [involuntary action] = 不负责

>> 尽可能扩大负责的范畴（只要有选择，就要负责），减小不负责（只有强力干扰）

（1）行动者自身是行动的本原（origin）

“如果本原是外在的，即行为者就如同被飓风裹挟或受他人强制而对本原完全无助，就是被迫的行为。但是，如果人们所做的行为是由于惧怕某种更大的恶，或是出于某种高贵的目的，那么它究竟是自愿的还是不自愿的，就有可能争论。”

（1110a1-8）

（2）对行动的具体情形具备知识（knowledge）

Of people, then, who act by reason of ignorance he who regrets is thought an involuntary agent [...] Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different from acting in ignorance; for the man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act as a result not of ignorance but of one of the causes mentioned, yet not knowingly but in ignorance. [...] it is not mistaken purpose that makes

过程，就是将产品的形式赋予相应的质料，从而建立相关结构和秩序的过程。亚里士多德将伦理德性类比为技艺来说明中道的意涵，这意味着，正如技艺中道是技艺产品的形式，实践中道也是实践生活的形式，也就是有德性的人赋予其实践生活的良好结构与健康秩序。在这个意义上，中道并非一种完全空洞的观念，而是揭示出伦理德性的要旨在于人赋予自身生活以道德形式的努力。（陈斯一：《从政治到哲学的运动》，第46页）

¹ It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. (1.2)

an action involuntary (it makes men wicked), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are blamed), but ignorance of particulars.

e.g 以“给另一个人一杯开水，烫到了对方”为例

“出于无知的行为.....只是在引起了痛苦或者悔恨时才是违反意愿的.....出于无知而做出的行为（不知道水烫）和处于无知状态的行为（不知道不该烫人）也存在区别.....违反意愿的行为并不产生于对于普遍原则的无知（醉酒）。”

(1110b20ff)

[3.5] 品质的自愿

➤ 德性（virtue）与劣性（vice）的品质是否是自愿的？

“一个病人不可能希望病好就病好。当然，他可能是出于意愿地、由于生活不节制或者不听从医生的话而得的病。如若这样，他曾经是能够不得病的，但一旦他丢掉了那个机会，他就不再能不得病了。”

(1114a13-17)

联系第二卷：

由于德性与劣性是由习塑形成的，而习塑是由反复的自愿行动构成的，因此德性与劣性的品质也是自愿形成的。

[3.5]呼应[3.1]：让人尽可能承担道德责任

亚里士多德承认“道德困境”但故意忽视“道德运气”moral luck (Williams)

3.2-4 实践三段论

实践三段论：希望 wish →思虑 deliberation →选择 choice

实践三段论的基本模式：（DA 434a17-19）

大前提：这样的人应该做这样的事 希望 wish

小前提：A 是这样的人，B 是这样的事 思虑 deliberation

结论：A 应该做 B 选择 choice

“医生并不思虑是否要使一个人健康，演说家并不思虑是否要去说服他的听众，政治家也并不思虑是否要建立良好的法律和秩序。”

(1112b10-15)

人的思虑能否针对人生的目的？思虑理性是不是工具理性？

思虑的两种模式：目的→手段 vs 抽象目的→具体目的

《忏悔录》第一-十卷

全书结构：“前十卷是关于我自己，后三卷是关于圣经”（《回顾篇》）

前九卷：过去的“我”

欲爱问题（第 2-4 卷）

理智问题（第 5-7 卷）：从欲爱到爱智慧——爱的层次的提升

第 6 卷：在米兰的外在生活，冲突在奥古斯丁生活中的体现；摆脱摩尼教

第 7 卷：在米兰的内在生活；信仰基督教（神义论的解决）

意志问题（第 8-9 卷）

第 8 卷：欲爱之罪与理智之罪汇聚，6、7 卷生活的冲突

第十卷：现在的“我”

第十一至十三卷：形而上学，对圣经的阐释（永恒与时间、形式与质料...）

自传体：个体走向皈依的过程→人类的普遍处境

基督教忏悔：承担试探、领受恩典，而非仅有恩典

忏悔内容：向上帝告白，即赞美上帝和悔罪自我

第一卷

[1.1.1] god and man¹

上帝作为第二人称与人的对话

引用圣经开篇：圣言、人言、语言的次序

两个暗示：拒绝骄傲、接受不安，人不应追求卓越/安宁

[1.6.8] will²

婴儿的啼哭：伸张自我、支配他人的意志

[1.7.11] sin³

“婴儿的纯洁不过是肢体的稚弱，而不是本心的无辜。”

意志是人人同等的原罪，婴儿只是因孱弱而缺少作恶的能力

[1.8.13] word⁴

¹ “You are great, Lord, and highly to be praised: great is your power and your wisdom is immeasurable’. Man, a little piece of your creation, desires to praise you, a human being ‘bearing his mortality with him’, carrying with him the witness of his sin and the witness that you ‘resist the proud’. Nevertheless, to praise you is the desire of man, a little piece of your creation. You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you. ... Lord, I would seek you.”

² “Little by little I began to be aware where I was and wanted to manifest my wishes to those who could fulfil them as I could not. For my desires were internal; adults were external to me and had no means of entering into my soul. So I threw my limbs about and uttered sounds, signs resembling my wishes, the small number of signs of which I was capable but such signs as lay in my power to use: for there was no real resemblance. When I did not get my way, either because I was not understood or lest it be harmful to me, I used to be indignant with my seniors for their disobedience, and with free people who were not slaves to my interests; and I would revenge myself upon them by weeping.”

³ “So the feebleness of infant limbs is innocent, not the infant’s mind. I have personally watched and studied a jealous baby. He could not yet speak and, pale with jealousy and bitterness, glared at his brother sharing his mother’s milk. Who is unaware of this fact of experience? Mothers and nurses claim to charm it away by their own private remedies. But it can hardly be innocence, when the source of milk is flowing richly and abundantly, not to endure a share going to one’s blood-brother, who is in profound need, dependent for life exclusively on that one food.”

⁴ “I would endeavour to express the intentions of my heart to persuade people to bow to my will ... when people gave a name to an object and when, following the sound, they moved their body towards that object, I would see and retain the fact that that object received from them this sound which they pronounced when they intended to draw attention to it ... I learnt to articulate my wishes by training my mouth to use these signs. In this way I communicated the signs of my wishes to those around me, and entered more deeply into the stormy society of human life. I was dependent on the authority of my parents and the direction of adult people.”

利用“指称-命名”表达“意志-符号”的关系，揭露背后原罪
将语言视作符号，目的是表达意志：上帝通过意志创造人，人的意志即模仿神（僭越）

[1.13.20-21] literature (matter)⁵

狄多之死：情欲优于政治野心（维吉尔）

为狄多哭泣忏悔：欲爱和友谊都是对上帝的背叛，所有爱都应该给上帝

[1.16.26] literature (form)⁶

区分形式（辞藻）和内容

辞藻是容器，修辞即权力，权力即意志（原罪）

[1.9.15;1.19.30] society⁷

不安的秩序：人生不过是变换犯罪的舞台——对第2-8卷的预告

[1.7.12;1.20.31] confession⁸

∴人为上帝所造

∴对他人的爱=爱被造物甚于爱上帝=对上帝的模仿（僭越）

第二卷：爱与被爱

任务：以圣爱批判欲爱（婚姻/家庭/政治/悲剧/友谊），以死亡揭示欲爱的堕落

[2.1.1;2.2.2] agape/eros

圣爱[agape]：“爱你的爱”=神与人的“呼唤-回应”，是正当的爱

欲爱[eros]：“爱与被爱”=人与人的“需要-分享”，完全世俗

[2.2.3] lust and marriage⁹

“婚姻三好”：生育、圣事、忠贞

生育、圣事：因基督降临而不再必要

⁵ “those first elements of the language were better, because more fundamental. On that foundation I came to acquire the faculty which I had and still possess of being able to read whatever I find written, and to write myself whatever I wish. This was better than the poetry I was later forced to learn about the wanderings of some legendary fellow named Aeneas (forgetful of my own wanderings) and to weep over the death of a Dido who took her own life from love. In reading this, O God my life, I myself was meanwhile dying by my alienation from you, and my miserable condition in that respect brought no tear to my eyes. [...] For the friendship of this world is fornication against you.”

⁶ “The river of custom strikes the rocks and roars: ‘This is why words are learnt; this is why one has to acquire the eloquence wholly necessary for carrying conviction in one’s cause and for developing one’s thoughts.’ ... I bring no charge against the words which are like exquisite and precious vessels, but the wine of error is poured into them for us by drunken teachers. If we failed to drink, we were caned and could not appeal to any sober judge.”

⁷ “As a boy I played ball-games, and that play slowed down the speed at which I learnt letters with which, as an adult, I might play a less creditable game. The schoolmaster who caned me was behaving no better than I when, after being refuted by a fellow-teacher in some pedantic question, he was more tormented by jealousy and envy than I when my opponent overcame me in a ball-game.

These were the moral conventions of the world where I, as a wretched boy, lay on the threshold ... Behaviour does not change when one leaves behind domestic guardians and schoolmasters, nuts and balls and sparrows, to be succeeded by prefects and kings, gold, estates, and slaves, as one advances to later stages in life. Likewise canes are replaced by harsher punishments.”

⁸ “You, Lord my God, are the giver of life and a body to a baby. As we see, you have endowed it with senses. You have co-ordinated the limbs. You have adorned it with a beautiful form, and for the coherence and preservation of the whole you have implanted all the instincts of a living being. You therefore command me to praise you... Yet, Lord, I must give thanks to you, the most excellent and supremely good Creator and Governor of the universe, my God, even though by your will I was merely a child. For at that time I existed, I lived and thought and took care for my selfpreservation (a mark of your profound latent unity whence I derived my being). An inward instinct told me to take care of the integrity of my senses, and even in my little thoughts about little matters I took delight in the truth. I hated to be deceived, I developed a good memory, I acquired the armoury of being skilled with words, friendship softened me, I avoided pain, despondency, ignorance ... My sin consisted in this, that I sought pleasure, sublimity, and truth not in God but in his creatures, in myself and other created beings.”

⁹ “If only someone could have imposed restraint on my disorder. That would have transformed to good purpose the fleeting experiences of beauty in these lowest of things, and fixed limits to indulgence in their charms. Then the stormy waves of my youth would have finally broken on the shore of marriage.”

忠贞：婚姻的意义，夫妇对彼此情欲的安顿

爱：超越情欲需要，是比情欲更深的罪 >>所有的爱都应该给上帝

[2.3.5-8] parents and family¹⁰

父母的罪：爱被造物（奥古斯丁）胜过爱造物主

父亲：关心学业却不关心灵魂，鼓励性欲

母亲：希望出人头地、安排临终受洗（罪更深）

[2.4.9-2.9.17] philia and polis

偷梨之罪=[community of shame]¹¹+ [evil for its own sake]¹²

错误解释：为追求次要的美好而犯罪[2.5]

正确解释：（自我）对上帝的权能与自由的倒错的模仿[2.6]¹³

上帝权能为创造世界，恶是人对上帝创造的模仿（自由意志的误用）

（社会）为友爱与同伴分享罪恶[2.8]¹⁴

比较亚里士多德：最高的幸福=成为神+分享善

第三卷：爱上了爱

[3.1.1] 离开家乡，来到迦太基

“爱上了爱”：爱是缺乏，“爱上了爱”即不想满足，沉迷欲爱

比较亚里士多德：欲爱悲剧为偶性快乐，欲爱知识是本质快乐

[3.2.2-3.2.4] 迷恋悲剧

亚里士多德：悲剧即对现实的模仿，看悲剧是认知过程，故应快乐

奥古斯丁：人生因原罪而本就是悲剧，幸福者沉于欲望，没能寻找上帝¹⁵

[3.4.7] 爱上哲学

第四卷：欲爱与死亡

[4.1.1-4.3.6] 稳固生活的建立

意义：世俗的上升=基督教视角下危险的堕落

世俗情节：完成学业，回家乡教修辞术，职业、感情、信仰走向正轨

忏悔视角：满足于世俗荣誉、情欲与虚假的迷信（摩尼教）

¹⁰ “Everybody was full of praise for my father because he spent money on his son beyond the means of his estate ... But this same father did not care what character before you I was developing. His delight was that of the intoxication which makes the world oblivious of you, its Creator, and to love your creation instead of you. He was drunk with the invisible wine of his perverse will directed downwards to inferior things; The mother of my flesh already had fled from the centre of Babylon (Jer. 51:6), but still lingered in the outskirts of the city ... for she did not seek to restrain my sexual drive within the limit of the marriage bond ... The reason why she showed no such concern was that she was afraid that the hope she placed in me could be impeded by a wife.”

¹¹ “among my peer group I was ashamed not to be equally guilty of shameful behaviour when I heard them boasting ... they derived pleasure not merely from the lust of the act but also from the admiration it evoked.”

¹² “Now let my heart tell you what it was seeking there in that I became evil for no reason. I had no motive for my wickedness except wickedness itself.”

¹³ “Therefore in that act of theft what was the object of my love, and in what way did I viciously and perversely imitate my Lord? Was my pleasure to break your law, but by deceit since I had not the power to do that by force? Was I acting like a prisoner with restricted liberty who does without punishment what is not permitted, thereby making an assertion of possessing a dim resemblance to omnipotence?”

¹⁴ “Therefore my love in that act was to be associated with the gang in whose company I did it ... As soon as the words are spoken ‘Let us go and do it’, one is ashamed not to be shameless.”

¹⁵ “我还没有爱上什么，但渴望爱，并且由于内心的渴望，我更恨自己渴望得还不够……我得到了爱，我神秘地带上了享受的桎梏，高兴地戴上了苦难的枷锁，为了担受猜忌、怀疑、忧惧、愤恨、争吵等烧红的铁鞭的鞭打”；“我被充满着我的悲惨生活的写照和燃炽我欲火的炉灶一般的戏剧所攫取了”；“现在我哀怜那些沉湎于欢场欲海的人，过于哀怜因丧失罪恶的快乐或不幸的幸福而惘然自失的人。这才是比较真实的同情，而这种同情心不是以悲痛为乐趣”

[4.4.7-4.7.12] death of a friend¹⁶

创造：朋友在奥古斯丁影响下信了摩尼教，“我的灵魂一部分是他”

友谊与死亡：友谊短暂遮蔽了自我的问题，死亡使之再次暴露

普遍处境：无人能逃一死，“我爱上一个要死的人，好像他不会死一样”

亚里士多德：既然要死，人就是可完成的作品，故应以哲学自我完善、追求不朽

奥古斯丁：既然要死，就要爱不死的上帝；将爱汇聚于不死，爱才可以不死

爱智之旅

[3.4-6]《荷尔顿西乌斯》—圣经—摩尼教

《荷尔顿西乌斯》：“不是其风格，而是其内容”¹⁷（3.4.7）

风格：外在符号（修辞）——世俗功名和政治权力

内容：内在实质（哲学）——从爱与被爱（对爱的爱）到对智慧的爱

圣经：语言朴素，真正的智慧

真正的上帝“比我最深的部分更深，比我最高的部分更高”

摩尼教：无内在实质的空洞符号

使人“生活在自己之外”（3.6.10-11）¹⁸

[4.13-16]《论美与适宜》—《范畴篇》

[5-6]自然科学—寓意解经—怀疑论—望教者

摩尼教宇宙论不及自然科学，宗教不应与自然科学结合（5.3.3-6）

自然科学与宗教的分离（5.5.8-9）¹⁹

[7] 新柏拉图主义+圣经

第五—六卷：福斯图斯 vs 安布罗斯

[5.6.10-5.7.13] 福斯图斯

有形式无实质、成为朋友

修辞与内容相互独立²⁰

[5.8] 类比：莫妮卡=狄多=夏娃

¹⁶ “So under my influence this man’s mind was wandering astray, and my soul could not endure to be without him. Everything on which I set my gaze was death. My home town became a torture to me; my father’s house a strange world of unhappiness; all that I had shared with him was without him transformed into a cruel torment ... I had become to myself a vast problem. I had felt that my soul and his soul were ‘one soul in two bodies’. So my life was to me a horror. I did not wish to live with only half of myself, and perhaps the reason why I so feared death was that then the whole of my much loved friend would have died. I could not escape from myself ... yet I fled from my home town.”

¹⁷ “这本书使我的思想转变，使我的祈祷转向你，使我的希望和志愿彻底改变。我突然看到过去虚空的希望真是卑不足道，便怀着一种不可思议的热情，向往着不朽的智慧，我开始起身归向你”

¹⁸ “In seeking for you I followed not the intelligence of the mind, by which you willed that I should surpass the beasts, but the mind of the flesh. But you were more inward than my most inward part and higher than the highest element within me ... She seduced me; for she found me living outside myself, seeing only with the eye of the flesh, and chewing over in myself such food as I had devoured by means of that eye.”

¹⁹ “Mani could be ignorant of religion even if he knew natural science perfectly. But his impudence in daring to teach a matter which he did not understand shows that he could know nothing whatever of piety ... So when he was found out, saying quite mistaken things about the heaven and stars and the movements of sun and moon, though these matters have nothing to do with religion, it was very clear that his bold speculations were sacrilegious.”; “When I hear this or that brother Christian, who is ignorant of these matters and thinks one thing the case when another is correct, with patience I contemplate the man expressing his opinion. I do not see it is any obstacle to him if perhaps he is ignorant of the position and nature of a physical creature, provided that he does not believe something unworthy of you ... But it becomes an obstacle if he thinks his view of nature belongs to the very form of orthodox doctrine, and dares obstinately to affirm something he does not understand.”

²⁰ “智与愚，犹如美与恶的食物，言语的巧拙，不过如杯盘的精粗，不论杯盘精粗，都能盛这两类食物”；“我和他一起阅读他早已耳闻而愿意阅读的、或我认为适合于他的才能的书籍”

[5.13.23-5.14.24; 6.3.3-4] 安布罗斯

形式与实质结合、关系疏远

忽视修辞，恰恰结合了言辞与思想²¹

第七卷：神义论问题

任务：解决上帝全善全能与“恶”的起源间的张力，解答恶的起源、上帝本质及二者关系

摩尼教：善是光明的物质，恶是黑暗的物质

困难：光明之神（至善）的无能否定了上帝的全能

新柏拉图主义：善是万物的原则，恶是善的缺乏

太一是至善，其流溢减少最终成为恶（消极恶）；积极恶源于消极恶的污染

困难：恶是善的后果，否定了上帝的至善

奥古斯丁：上帝创世，除了自由意志外都不可变

人被创造但未完善，有质料无形式，恶即无形质料，来自虚无、居于有无之间

第一次尝试：物质主义一元论（7.1-5）

自由意志（7.3.5）²²：

万物充满上帝，恶无处可居→区分罪与罚

意志的误用（作恶）即罪，理智和爱欲的败坏是罚，体现为无知和无力

转向——“不相似的领域”：

模仿普罗提诺灵修“看见”上帝（7.10.16）²³：

自我深处见上帝，强烈的“爱与怕”，“自我是与上帝不相似的领域”

重新理解：一切存在都是善，恶不是存在，而是意志的颠倒（7.11-16）

第二次尝试：从上帝和自我的关系出发（7.7-16）

上帝、自我、身体的秩序（7.7.11）：

自我服从上帝，身体服从自我；自我背叛上帝（=罪），身体背叛自我（=罚）

根据创世论，**存在=善好**

人被创造但未完善，有质料无形式；

恶即居于“有无之间”的纯粹质料，既不属于存在，也不属于虚无²⁴

²¹ “我全神贯注地谛听着，已被他的词令所吸引，但对于内容并不措意，甚至抱着轻视的态度……但我所忽视的内容，随着我所钦爱的词令一起进入我的思想中”；“在阅读的时候，他的眼睛一页一页浏览下去，他的心体味意义，他的口舌不出声而休息。往往我们到他那里时——因为他从不禁止任何人入内，也没有事先传达的习惯——见他在凝神阅读，我们在静默中坐了片刻，便退出了”

²² “I had no clear and explicit grasp of the cause of evil. Whatever it might be, I saw it had to be investigated, if I were to avoid being forced by this problem to believe the immutable God to be mutable. Otherwise I might myself become the evil I was investigating; Free choice of the will is the reason why we do wrong and suffer your just judgement ... when I willed or did not will something, I was utterly certain that none other than myself was willing or not willing. That there lay the cause of my sin I was now coming to recognize. I saw that when I acted against my wishes, I was passive rather than active; and this condition I judged to be not guilt but a punishment.”

²³ “By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself ... I entered and with my soul's eye, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind ... It was superior because it made me, and I was inferior because I was made by it ... When I first came to know you, you raised me up to make me see that what I saw is Being, and that I who saw am not yet Being. And you gave a shock to the weakness of my sight by the strong radiance of your rays, and I trembled with love and awe. And I found myself far from you 'in the region of dissimilarity', and heard as it were your voice from on high: 'I am the food of the fully grown; grow and you will feed on me. And you will not change me into you like the food your flesh eats, but you will be changed into me.' I said: 'surely truth cannot be nothing, when it is not diffused through space, either finite or infinite?' And you cried from far away: 'Now, I am who I am' (Exod. 3: 14). I heard in the way one hears within the heart, and all doubt left me.”

²⁴ “I applied myself to the bodies themselves and looked more deeply into their mutability, by which they cease to be what they had been and begin to be what they were not. This transition from form to form I had regarded as involving something like a formless condition, though not actual nothingness; let them declare what they merited at thy hands, so that the inchoate and the formless, whether spiritual or corporeal, would deserve to be held in

对比亚里士多德 v 奥古斯丁：

古典：从下及上，神和人是相似的，神是人性的最高点

奥古斯丁：从外到内，上帝比自我的最深处更深，人和神有绝对的距离

第八卷：

[8.1.2] marriage vs conversion

婚姻问题：奥古斯丁的情欲之罪、莫妮卡的野心之罪²⁵

主题：意志的分裂和斗争

[8.2] “眼目的欲求”——维克托利努斯的皈依

[8.5] 对意志的第一次分析

[8.5.10] 善恶意志相争：意志的铁链=意志（罪）—情欲—习惯—必然（罚）²⁶

[8.5.11-12] 睡眠的类比：奥古斯丁 vs 亚里士多德²⁷

亚里士多德：强调无知；在睡眠中，知识得不到实际运用

奥古斯丁：强调无力；明知应该起床，却迟迟拖延

[8.6] “今生的骄傲”——两个罗马官员的皈依

[8.8-9] 对意志的第二次分析²⁸

[8.8.19-8.9.21] 更深的意志：灵魂命令自己，自己却不服从

三种意志的区分：

想要继续过世俗生活的意志（恶的意志）

想要皈依基督教的意志（善的意志）

想要想要皈依基督教的意志（更深的意志 the will to will）

意志只能来源于神的恩典，更深的意志恰恰是最深刻的罪（模仿神）

[8.12] “肉身的情欲”——奥古斯丁自己的皈依

being in spite of the fact that they tend toward disorder and extreme unlikeness to thee; these formless entities are held in their state of being by thee, until they are recalled to thy unity and receive form and being from thee, the one sovereign Good.”

²⁵ “now that I was not burning with my old ambitions in hope of honour and money ... But I was still firmly tied by woman ... and because of this one factor I was inconstant in other respects and was wasting away with nagging anxieties. (8.1.2) Pressure to have me married was not relaxed. Already I submitted my suit, and already a girl was promised to me principally through my mother's efforts. Her hope was that once married I would be washed in the saving water of baptism. (6.13.23) ... The woman with whom I habitually slept was torn away from my side because she was a hindrance to my marriage. (6.15.25)”

²⁶ “I sighed after such freedom, but was bound not by an iron imposed by anyone else but by the iron of my own choice. The enemy had a grip on my will and so made a chain for me to hold me a prisoner. The consequence of a distorted will is passion. By servitude to passion, habit is formed, and habit to which there is no resistance becomes necessity. By these links, as it were, connected one to another (hence my term a chain), a harsh bondage held me under restraint. The new will, which was beginning to be within me a will to serve you freely and to enjoy you, God, the only sure source of pleasure, was not yet strong enough to conquer my older will, which had the strength of old habit. So my two wills, one old, the other new, one carnal, the other spiritual, were in conflict with one another, and their discord robbed my soul of all concentration.”

²⁷ “I no longer had my usual excuse to explain why I did not yet despise the world and serve you, namely, that my perception of the truth was uncertain. By now I was indeed quite sure about it. (8.5.11) The burden of the world weighed me down with a sweet drowsiness such as commonly occurs during sleep. The thoughts with which I meditated about you were like the efforts of those who would like to get up but are overcome by deep sleep and sink back again. No one wants to be asleep all the time, and the sane judgement of everyone judges it better to be awake. Yet often a man defers shaking off sleep when his limbs are heavy with slumber. (8.5.12)”

²⁸ “The mind orders the mind to will. The recipient of the order is itself, yet it does not perform it. What causes this monstrosity and why does this happen? Mind commands, I say, that it should will, and would not give the command if it did not will, yet does not perform what it commands. The willing is not wholehearted, so the command is not wholehearted. The strength of the command lies in the strength of will, and the degree to which the command is not performed lies in the degree to which the will is not engaged. For it is the will that commands the will to exist, and it commands not another will but itself. So the will that commands is incomplete, and therefore what it commands does not happen. If it were complete, it would not need to command the will to exist, since it would exist already.”

[8.12.28-30] 花园皈依

独自听见神的召唤（“拿起来，读吧！”），和阿里比乌斯一起读圣经、受圣言、皈依莫妮卡的“皈依”：彻底的皈依，而非世俗功名与灵魂救赎面面俱到（8.12.30）

第九卷：莫妮卡之死

[9.1.1] 对皈依的总结：“我不再意愿我所意愿的，开始意愿你所意愿的”

[9.4.7] 辞去教职、隐居加西齐亚根：“我的文字为你服务，但还带着学院的高傲气息”

[9.6] 在米兰受洗皈依

[9.8-9] 莫妮卡的生平

[9.8.17] “我不讲她给我的礼物，而是讲你给她的礼物。”

[9.8.18] 酒

[9.9.19] 作为妻子

[9.9.20] 作为儿媳

[9.9.21] 作为教友

[9.9.22] 作为母亲：“自我”已经安放在上帝之中，唯独作为母亲她难免犯罪

[9.10] “奥斯蒂亚异象”

[9.10.23] 归乡之前的休憩，预示死亡

[9.10.24-25] 触摸真理、聆听圣言

[9.10.26] 莫妮卡生命的完满

比较第 7/9 卷两次异象：

第 7 卷是哲学家的孤独沉思，揭示自我与上帝的不相似（怕）

第 9 卷时母子间的亲密交谈，预示自我和上帝在永生中的交融

>> 第 10 卷：类似体验，但已经是“生活之外的目标”

[9.11-13] 莫妮卡的死与奥古斯丁的泪

[9.11.27-28] 埋葬

[9.12.31] 双重悲哀

第一重悲哀：母亲死了

第二重悲哀：母亲会上天堂，故不应悲伤；但仍然悲伤，无法爱上帝多于爱母亲

[9.12.33] 双重眼泪

[9.13.34] 第三重眼泪：“另一种眼泪”，为所有人流的眼泪

第三重眼泪：没有谁没有隐秘的罪，没有人能探索上帝的意志（怕）

[9.13.37] 请求所有读者为他父母祈祷

坦诚、承担对父母的私心→不应试图摆脱无法摆脱的“罪”，而应忏悔

第十卷：核心地位

[10.1-5] 何谓忏悔、为何忏悔？

[10.6-27] 自我追寻上帝 = 赞美

[10.6] 在自然秩序中寻找上帝：大地、海洋、空气、天空、日月星辰

上帝创造此，却不在此之中

[10.7-8] 在灵魂内部寻找上帝：生命力、感官、记忆

深浅秩序：感官（10.8）、知识（10.9-13）、情感（10.14）

[10.14] 情感记忆的悖谬：在快乐时记起悲伤，在悲伤时记起快乐

[10.16] 记忆与遗忘：从“比最高的部分更高”到“比最深的部分更深”（自身之内）

[10.17] “超越记忆去寻获”：如果忘了又如何寻获？

[10.18-19] 三种遗忘：记得忘了什么；记得忘了些但忘了忘了什么；忘了遗忘

∴ 最深的自我在记忆与遗忘之间

∴ 哲学家应保证处于第 2 个状态

针对 3：如果什么都没有遗忘，如何知道“遗忘”是什么？

[10.20] 幸福：因追求幸福而记得，因没有实现而遗忘

[10.21.30] 情感记忆的悖谬：在悲伤中记得快乐，在悲惨中记得幸福

[10.24-26] 上帝驻在我记忆之中

[10.27] “你在我里面，我却在我外面；你和我在一起，我却没有和你在一起”

上帝在“我”最深处，而我已遗忘我的最深处，故上帝与我同在，我不同在
寻找上帝，需要离开（遗忘自我的）自我、回到自我

[10.28-39] 生活就是试探 = 悔罪

[10.28.39] “我心中罪恶的悲伤和善良的喜悦在斗争，哪一方将获胜我尚不得知。”

“人生在世岂不就是一场试探吗？”

[10.29.40] 皈依后态度的改变：“按照你的命令来赐予，按照你的意志来命令。”

三种试探：、眼目的欲求、今生的骄傲

[10.30-33] “肉身的情欲”的试探（欲望）

[10.30] 性

[10.31] 饮食

[10.33] 音乐：“我对于我成了一个大问题”

[10.34-35] “眼目的欲求”的试探（理性）

观看（沉思）：从对视觉对象的享受到对自然真理的探究

[10.36-39] “今生的骄傲”的试探（血气）

想要被别人怕和爱

是背离上帝的根本原因，也是对上帝最严重的冒犯

谦卑是最深的骄傲²⁹

[10.40-41] 总结：自我追寻上帝+生活是一场试探

基督徒的生活伦理：在尘世生活的试探中追寻上帝，深入自我、超越自我

基督徒的生活实质：上帝和自我的关联

²⁹ “But if we desire to test our power of doing without praise, must we then live wickedly or lead a life so atrocious and abandoned that everyone who knows us will detest us?; It tempts me, even when I inwardly reprove myself for it, and this precisely because it is reprov'd. For a man may often glory vainly in the very scorn of vainglory -- and in this case it is not any longer the scorn of vainglory in which he glories, for he does not truly despise it when he inwardly glories in it... Within us there is yet another evil arising from the same sort of temptation. By it they become empty who please themselves in themselves, although they do not please or displease or aim at pleasing others.”

《尼各马可伦理学》第七、十卷

[7.11-14] 论快乐

论证目标：快乐不仅可以是善，而且可以是至善（弥合理性和欲望）

反面观点（柏拉图）：快乐不可能是善，更不可能是至善

P1：快乐是生成，而非目的

P2：至善只可能是目的（挠痒的比喻）

C：快乐不可能是善，更不可能是至善

亚里士多德：快乐不是生成，而是实现活动

偶性快乐和本质快乐的区分

重点段落 [1152b33-3a2]

“由于善好既包括实现活动，也包括品质，让我们回归自然品质的过程只在偶性的意义上是快乐的，而发生在欲求中的实现活动（*energeia*）其实是属于那些留存于自然状态的品质。事实上，存在根本不包含痛苦和欲求的快乐，比如沉思的快乐，在这种情形中，自然是没有任何缺乏的。”

e.g “饿”是自然品质的欠缺，导向自然的完善的快乐是偶性的，如学习的快乐、味觉的快感，而是健全自然品质的无碍使用是本质快乐。

重点段落 [1153a7-15]

“快乐是实现活动和目的，并不发生于我们获得能力的过程，而是发生于我们对于能力的使用。也并非所有快乐都有某种异于自身的目的，只有那些导向自然的完善的快乐才是如此。因此我们不应该说快乐是可感的生成，而应该说它是自然品质的实现活动；它不是可感的而是无碍的。”

e.g 味觉是偶性快乐，而肠胃功能的良好运作是本质快乐

亚里士多德的享乐主义

重点段落 [1153b7-12]

“即便有些快乐确实是卑劣的，这也不妨碍至善就是某种快乐……如果每一种品质都有无碍的现实活动，那么不管是所有的品质还是其中的某种品质的无碍活动构成了幸福，这种现实活动都是最值得追求的，而它就是快乐。”

本质快乐：具有自然目的性的实现活动

[10.1-5] 论快乐

思路：区分生成和活动，将快乐与后者联系：

对快乐更严谨的界定

目标：通过提高快乐和实现活动的标准，实现从实践德性到哲学智慧的上升

● 快乐像观看时刻都完整

重点段落 [1174a14-19]

“‘看’似乎在任何时刻都是完善的，它不缺乏任何后续生成的部分来完善自身的形式。快乐似乎也是如此，因为它是一个整体，没有任何时刻的快乐需要更长时间的生成才能完善其形式。正因为这样，快乐不是一种运动。”

● 快乐不像运动需要时间来完成

重点段落 [1174a19-b6]

“所有运动都在时间之中，并且朝向某个目的，例如建造房子，唯有当它制作出它所追求的东西时它才是完善的，也就是说，只有在全部时间中或者在最后一刻它才是完善的。而在任何部分及其相应的时间中，运动都是不完善的，它的部分与整体、各部分之间在形式上是不同的……快乐的形式在任何时候都是完善的。”

第七卷 vs 第十卷

- 第七卷：区分本质快乐/偶性快乐

具备一定内在目的的实现活动，包括符合实践德性的伦理、道德、政治活动

- 第十卷：更严格的界定

目的完全内在的实现活动，仅包含审美和沉思；由于理性高于感官，沉思高于审美。

[10.6] 论消遣娱乐

论证目标：审美只是一种消遣，而消遣并非终极目的

重点段落 [1176b5-37]

“Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity. for amusement is a sort of relaxation, and we need relaxation because we cannot work continuously. Relaxation, then, is not an end; for it is taken for the sake of activity.”

[10.7] 哲学是至高的幸福

[1177a12-21] 总论：哲学智慧是所有德性中最好的

[1177a22-b1, b20-24] 哲学沉思的性质：连续性、快乐、自足、专属自身、有闲暇、不劳累

[1177b1-20] 哲学沉思是唯一目的完全在自身之中的实现活动

“只有这种活动才是因自身之故而被爱的，因为它除了沉思之外不产生任何东西，而我们从实际行动中总是或多或少地寻求行动之外的东西……相比之下，努斯的现实活动，也就是沉思，则是更为严肃的，它不追求任何异于自身的目的。”

[1177b24-26] 哲学的幸福是完善的

[1177b26-1178a2] 哲学的生活是超越人性、属于神性的

努斯即人身的神性，符合属于它的德性的实现活动（沉思）即完美幸福