

PROOF THEORY, RULES AND MEANING

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AIMS

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1. Accessible presentation of core results
in proof theory — for philosophers.

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3. Answering Prie's challenge concerning task.
4. Applying the results to issues in philosophical logic, semantics, metaphysics & beyond.

ACCESSIBILITY

6.4 | ELIMINATING CUT

Now we will proceed to the second step of our argument, eliminating *Cut*. To make clear the scope of the setting, we need to pay a little more attention to the transition from our starting language \mathcal{L}_1 to our new language \mathcal{L}_2 with the addition of a newly definable connective \sharp , given by a defining rule. To be more general, we will no longer suppose that our starting language has no concepts which allow for the formation of complex formulas out of simpler formulas. We will allow this, with one constraint. These concepts allowing for the formulation of complex formulas will *themselves* be given by defining rules. So, the bounds in \mathcal{L}_1 are given by a set of *axiomatic sequents*, themselves closed under *Identity* and *Cut* (and perhaps *Contraction* and *Weakening*, according to taste), and we have already added some number (perhaps zero, perhaps more) of connectives by way of defining rules.

The argument of this section will show that the addition of a new connective \sharp by way of its defining rule $\sharp Df$, to form the language \mathcal{L}_2 , is conservative, by showing how to eliminate *Cut* from derivations of the bounds in the new language, using the left and right rules for each of the connectives in \mathcal{L}_2 . We show that any sequent derivable in \mathcal{L}_2 , using the bounds of \mathcal{L}_1 , *Identity*, *Cut*, and the left and right rules for the connectives in \mathcal{L}_2 can be derived without appeal to the *Cut* rule. Then, inspecting the rules which remain — the original bounds from \mathcal{L}_1 , including *Identity*, the left and right rules (arising out of defining rules), and perhaps *Contraction* and *Weakening*—we see that all of the rules *introduce* concepts but never *eliminate* them, so the only *Cut-free* derivations of \mathcal{L}_2 -sequents were already present in \mathcal{L}_1 . It follows that the addition of

One can see ... main technical limitations in current proof-theory: The lack in *modularity*: in general, neighbouring problems can be attacked by neighbouring methods; but it is only exceptionally that one of the problems will be a corollary of the other ... Most of the time, a completely new proof will be necessary (but without any new idea). This renders work in the domain quite long and tedious. For instance, if we prove a cut-elimination theorem for a certain system of rules, and then consider a new system including just a new pair of rules, then it is necessary to make a complete new proof from the beginning. Of course 90% of the two proofs will be identical, but it is rather shocking not to have a reasonable «modular» approach to such a question: a main theorem, to which one could add various «modules» corresponding to various directions. Maybe this is inherent in the subject; one may hope that this only reflects the rather low level of our conceptualization!

— Jean-Yves Girard, *Proof Theory and Logical Complexity*, Vol. 1, pp. 16–17 [92]

DUALITY

PROOF THEORY



MODEL THEORY



PROOF THEORY



MODEL THEORY




TRUTH CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS


REPRESENTATIONALISM

INFERENTIAlISM

NORMATIVE PRAGMATICS



PROOF THEORY



MODEL THEORY



TRUTH CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS

REPRESENTATIONALISM

I. TOOLS



II. THE CORE ARGUMENT



III. INSIGHTS

I. TOOLS

1. NATURAL DEDUCTION

Proofs for Conditionals

Normal Proofs

Strong Normalisation & Terms

2. SEQUENT CALCULUS

Derivations for $\lambda/\vee (A \rightarrow B)$

Eliminating Id & Cut

($X \succ A, X \succ Y$ Segments for $\lambda, \vee, \otimes, \oplus, \rightarrow, \neg, t, f, T, L$)

Consequences of Cut Elimination

3. FROM PROOFS TO MODELS

Positions & Valuations

Soundness & Completeness

Cut Admissibility

The Significance of Valuations

II. THE CORE ARGUMENT

4. TONK

Prior's Challenge
What Could Count as a Response?
Answering with Model Theory
Conservative Extension
Uniqueness → Harmony

5. POSITIONS

Language → Assertion & its Norms
Assertion, Denial & Other Speech Acts
Positions & Structural Rules
Bounds, Cut & Inference → Challenges

6. DEFINING RULES

Defining a Biconditional
Defining Rules Defined
Defining Rules & UR Rules
Eliminating Cut
Answering Prior's Question

III. INSIGHTS

7. MEANING & PROOF

Connectives



8. QUANTIFIERS & OBJECTS

Generality

Identity

Positions & Models

Arithmetic, Realism & Anti-Realism

9. MODALITY & WORLDS

Hypersentences

Solving Prior's other Problem

Quantifiers & Identity

Two Dimensions

I. TOOLS

1. NATURAL DEDUCTION

Proofs for Conditionals
Normal Proofs
Strong Normalization & Terms

2. SEQUENT CALCULUS

Derivations for $\wedge/\vee (A \rightarrow B)$
Eliminating Id & Cut
 $X \rightarrow A, X \rightarrow Y$ Segments for $\wedge, \vee, \otimes, \oplus, \rightarrow, \neg, t, f, T, \perp$
Consequences of Cut Elimination

3. FROM PROOFS TO MODELS

Positions & Valuations
Soundness & Completeness
Cut Admissibility
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II. THE CORE ARGUMENT

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What Could Count as a Response?
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Uniqueness
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Assertion & its Norms
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6. DEFINING RULES

Defining a Biconditional
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III. INSIGHTS

7. MEANING & PROOF

Connectives
Proof & Meaning
Necessity
Warrant

8. QUANTIFIERS & OBJECTS

Generality
Identity
Defining Rules for Quantifiers
Positions & Models
Arithmetic, Realism & Anti-Realism

9. MODALITY & WORLDS

Hypsequents
Positions & Worlds
Solving Prior's other Problem
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Two Dimensions

ANSWER
PRIOR

$$\frac{P \quad q}{P \& q}$$
$$\frac{P \& q}{P}$$
$$\frac{P \& q}{q}$$

$$\frac{P \quad q}{P \& q}$$

$$\frac{P \& q}{P}$$

$$\frac{P \& q}{q}$$

$$\frac{P}{p \text{ tank } q}$$


$$\frac{p \text{ tank } q}{q}$$



Conservative

Uniquely Defining

POSITIONS



Derive

X \times Y



Show that $[X:Y]$ is
out of bounds.

Id

$$A \vdash A$$

Cut

$$\frac{x \vdash A, \gamma \quad x, A \vdash \gamma}{x \vdash \gamma}$$

Weakening

$$\frac{x \vdash \gamma}{x, A \vdash \gamma}$$

$$\frac{x \vdash \gamma}{x \vdash A, \gamma}$$

Contraction

$$\frac{x, A, A \vdash \gamma}{x, A \vdash \gamma}$$

$$\frac{x \vdash A, A, \gamma}{x \vdash A, \gamma}$$

Id

$$A \vdash A$$

Cut

$$\frac{x \vdash A, Y \quad X, A \vdash Y}{X \vdash Y}$$

Weakening


$$\frac{x \vdash Y}{X, A \vdash Y}$$


$$\frac{x \vdash Y}{X \vdash A, Y}$$

Contraction

$$\frac{X, A, A \vdash Y}{X, A \vdash Y}$$

$$\frac{X \vdash A, A, Y}{X \vdash A, Y}$$





$$\frac{x, A, B \vdash Y}{x, A \otimes B \vdash Y} \otimes Df$$

Asserting $A \otimes B$

\equiv

Asserting A ,
Asserting B

$$\frac{x, A, B \vdash y}{\otimes \text{Df}}$$

$$x, A \otimes B \vdash y$$

Denying $A \otimes B$?

$$\frac{X, A, B \vdash Y}{X, A \otimes B \vdash Y} \otimes \text{Df}$$

Denying $A \otimes B$?

$$\frac{X, A, B \vdash Y}{X, A \otimes B \vdash Y} \otimes \text{Df}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{A \otimes B \vdash A \otimes B}{A, B \vdash A \otimes B} \text{Id}}{X \vdash A, Y} \otimes \text{Df}}{X, B \vdash A \otimes B, Y} \text{mCut}$$
$$\frac{X' \vdash B, Y'}{X, X' \vdash A \otimes B, Y, Y'} \text{mCut}$$

Denying $A \otimes B$?

$$\frac{X, A, B \vdash Y}{X, A \otimes B \vdash Y} \otimes \text{Df}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{X \vdash A, Y}{A \otimes B \vdash A \otimes B} \text{Id}}{A, B \vdash A \otimes B} \otimes \text{Df}}{X, B \vdash A \otimes B, Y} \text{mCut}$$
$$\frac{X' \vdash B, Y'}{X, X' \vdash A \otimes B, Y, Y'} \text{mCut}$$

$$\text{OR} \frac{X \vdash A, Y \quad X' \vdash B, Y'}{X, X' \vdash A \otimes B, Y, Y'}$$

$$\frac{x, A, B \succ y}{x, A \otimes B \succ y} \otimes \text{df}$$

$$\frac{x, A, B \succ y}{x, A \otimes B \succ y} \otimes \text{C}$$

$$\text{OR } \frac{x \succ A, y \quad x' \succ B, y'}{x, x' \succ A \otimes B, y, y'}$$

$$\frac{x, A, B \vdash Y}{x, A \otimes B \vdash Y} \otimes Df$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \otimes Df & & \otimes L/R \\ Id & \Leftrightarrow & Id \\ Cut & & Cut \end{array}$$


$$\frac{x, A, B \vdash Y}{x, A \otimes B \vdash Y} \otimes Df$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \otimes Df & \leftrightarrow & \otimes L/R \quad \otimes U/R \\ Id & \leftrightarrow & Id \quad Cut \\ Cut & & Cut \end{array}$$

$$\frac{\frac{A \vdash A \quad B \vdash B}{A, B \vdash A \otimes B} \otimes R}{A \otimes B \vdash A \otimes B} \otimes L$$

$$\frac{x, A, B \vdash Y}{x, A \otimes B \vdash Y} \otimes Df$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 \otimes Df & \Leftrightarrow & \otimes L/R \quad \otimes U/R \\
 Id & \Leftrightarrow & Id \quad Cut \quad Cut \Leftrightarrow \otimes L/R \\
 Cut & & Cut
 \end{array}$$



$$\frac{X, A, B \vdash Y}{X, A \otimes B \vdash Y}$$

$$\frac{X, A, B \vdash Y}{X, A \& B \vdash Y}$$

$$\frac{\frac{X, A \& B \vdash Y}{X, A, B \vdash Y}}{X, A \otimes B \vdash Y}$$

APPLICATIONS

III. INSIGHTS

7. MEANING & PROOF

Connectives



8. QUANTIFIERS & OBJECTS


Generality

Identity

Defining Rules for Quantifiers

Positions & Models

Arithmetic, Realism & Anti-Realism



9. MODALITY & WORLDS

Hypesequent

Positions & Worlds

Solving Prior's other Problem

Quantifiers & Identity

Two Dimensions



$$\frac{X \vdash A \mid_m^x, Y}{X \vdash \forall x A, Y} \text{ Adf}$$

(m not present in X, A, Y)

$$\frac{X \vdash A \underset{m}{\overset{x}{\mid}}, Y}{\text{ADF}}$$

$$X \vdash \forall x A, Y$$

(m not present in X, A, Y)

Can this mean "all" — unrestrictedly?

Models


$\langle D, E \rangle$



Domain

Extensions
of predicates &
function symbols


Models



Models for predicate logic are modest

- D is a set, it doesn't contain everything*

Models



Models for predicate logic are modest

- D is a set, it doesn't contain everything*

* Yes there are set theories with a universal set, both classical & non-classical, but proving that any such one models satisfying the usual truth conditions is a significant problem.

A model arises out of a limit position.

$$[X:Y] \subseteq [X_1:Y_1] \subseteq [X_2:Y_2] \subseteq \dots$$

relative to a given language \mathcal{L} .

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If the defining rules fix the meaning, the smallness of models is no bar to absolute generality.

A model arises out of a limit position

$$[X:Y] \subseteq [X_1:Y_1] \subseteq [X_2:Y_2] \subseteq \dots$$

relative to a given language L .

If the defining rules fix the meaning, the smallness of models is no bar to absolute generality. Models are just that: MODELS.

... possible worlds, in the sense of possible states of affairs are not *really* individuals (just as numbers are not *really* individuals).

To say that a state of affairs obtains is just to say that something is the case; to say that something is a possible state of affairs is just to say that something could be the case; and to say that something is the case ‘in’ a possible state of affairs is just to say that the thing in question would necessarily be the case if that state of affairs obtained, i.e. if something else were the case ...

We understand ‘truth in states of affairs’ because we understand ‘necessarily’; not *vice versa*.

— “Worlds, Times and Selves”
(1969)



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(1969)

Well great...
but how ?

$$\frac{X \succ Y \mid I \succ A}{}$$

$$X \succ \Box A, Y$$

$$\frac{\mathcal{A} A \mid X \succ Y \mid \succ A}{\mathcal{A} A \mid X \succ \Box A, Y}$$

$$\frac{\cancel{A} \mid X \succ Y \mid \succ A}{\Box \Box} \text{ Df}$$
$$\cancel{A} \mid X \succ \Box A, Y$$

This rule — and structural rules for hypersequents — give \Box the standard S5 behaviour.

$$\frac{\mathcal{A} A | X \succ Y | \succ A}{\mathcal{A} A | X \succ \Box A, Y}$$

\Box of

This rule — and structural rules for hypersequents — give \Box the standard S5 behaviour.

$$\frac{\mathcal{A} A | X \succ Y | \succ A}{\mathcal{A} A | X \succ \Box A, Y} \Box \text{df}$$

$$\mathcal{A} A | X \succ \Box A, Y$$



We coordinate on \Box because we coordinate on what counts as subjunctive supposition.

THANKS!

<http://consequently.org>
Consequently