| Lending Ad RIN: 317 | mendments to Federal Mortgage Disclosure Requirements Under the Truth in tr (Regulation Z) 10-AA61 Ition Date: | | |
|------------------------|---|---|---|
| | 22 (and GIPRA): Universe – Does the analysis assess the costs and benefits to persons identified by the Act, including consumers, covered persons, 1026 covered persons, and consumers in rural areas? | | |
| | Yes. | | |
| 2. | Content – Does the analysis assess the potential loss of access to consumer financial products and services? | | |
| | There is a statement, but not an assessment. | | |
| | enefit analysis best practices (based on OMB Circular A-4): Is there a clear statement of the problem the rule is intended to address? | | |
| | Yes. | | |
| 4. | Does the analysis identify a market failure? | | |
| | No. | 1 | Commented [RR(1]: This is kind of a clean up rule, so |
| | NO. | | |
| <i>5.</i> | | | maybe not necessary. |
| 5. | Does the analysis present evidence of a market failure? | | |
| 5. | Does the analysis present evidence of a market failure? No. | | |
| 5. 6. | Does the analysis present evidence of a market failure? | | |
| | Does the analysis present evidence of a market failure? No. | | |
| 6. | Does the analysis present evidence of a market failure? No. Does the analysis define an appropriate baseline? Does it use the baseline consistently? | | |
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| 6. | Does the analysis present evidence of a market failure? No. Does the analysis define an appropriate baseline? Does it use the baseline consistently? No. Does the analysis define an appropriate time horizon? | | |
| 6. 7. | Does the analysis present evidence of a market failure? No. Does the analysis define an appropriate baseline? Does it use the baseline consistently? No. Does the analysis define an appropriate time horizon? No. Does the analysis identify a range of regulatory alternatives, including potential alternatives to regulation? What alternatives to regulation were identified (such as additional | | |

| 10. | Does the analysis assess the potential effectiveness of the regulation? |
|-----|--|
| | No. |
| 11. | Does the analysis correctly identify and account for costs, benefits, and transfers for each alternative? Does it explicitly identify and account for impacts on credit access and availability? |
| | Yes. No. |
| 12. | Are costs, benefits, and transfers quantified for each alternative? Does it explicitly identify and account for impacts on credit access and availability? |
| | No. |
| 13. | Are costs, benefits, and transfers monetized for each alternative? Does it explicitly identify and account for impacts on credit access and availability? |
| | No. |
| 14. | Are future costs and benefits discounted to present value using appropriate rates? |
| | No. |
| 15. | Does the analysis identify key sources of uncertainty? |
| | No. |
| 16. | Does the analysis conduct sensitivity analyses for sources of uncertainty? |
| | No. |
| 17. | Was the analysis put out for public comment prior to finalizing? |
| | No. |
| 18. | The following questions should be included in a thorough evaluation, but are more difficult, time-consuming, and/or less-objective: Is the analysis transparent and reproducible? Is it transparent in its assumptions? Does it rely on the best available science and evidence? Does it comply with data quality standards? |
| | |

No – but this is more of a clean-up rule that might be deregulatory.