

Schizophrenic files

AREA 41



Ange Albertini
Gynvael Coldwind

2014/06/02
Zürich, Switzerland

GYNAEEL COLDWIND

SECURITY RESEARCHER, GOOGLE



DRAGON SECTOR CAPTAIN

LIKES HAMBURGERS

[HTTP://GYNAEEL.COLDWIND.PL/](http://gynaeael.coldwind.pl/)

*All opinions expressed during this presentation are mine and mine alone.
They are not opinions of my lawyer, barber and especially not my employer.*



ANGE ALBERTINI
reverse engineering
&
VISUAL DOCUMENTATIONS



corkami.com

1 file + 2 tools
⇒ 2 different documents

No active detection in the file.

abusing parsers for

- fun
- bypassing security
 - same-origin policy
 - evade detection
 - exfiltration
 - signing
 - Android Master Key





excerpt from Gynvael's talk:
"Dziesięć tysięcy pułapek: ZIP, RAR, etc."
(<http://gynvael.coldwind.pl/?id=523>)

ZIP

trick 1
a glitch in the matrix

file names in ZIP

a couple of files with the same name?

update:

for an awesome example see:

Android: One Root to Own Them All


Jeff Forristal / Bluebox

ZIP

trick 2
abstract kitty

Let's start with simple stuff - the ZIP format


A ZIP file begins with letters **PK**.



	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	01234
00000000	50	4B	03	04	14	00	02	00	08	00	15	4F	AA	42	PK...
0000000E	3C	CF	51	68	46	00	00	00	44	00	00	00	0A	00	<.Qhf
0000001C	00	00	72	61	63	69	65	2E	74	65	73	74	8B	30	..rac
0000002A	F5	57	0C	50	75	70	0C	88	36	89	09	88	8A	30	.W.Pu
00000038	35	D1	08	88	D3	34	77	76	D6	34	AF	55	71	F5	5....

Let's start with simple stuff - the ZIP format

A ZIP file begins with letters **PK**.



	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	B	C	D	01234
00000000	50	4	3	04	14	00	00	08	00		4F	AA	42	PK...
0000000E	3C	C	1	68	46	00	0	44	00		00	0A	00	<.QhF
0000001C	00	00	0	61	63	69	65	74	65		74	8B	30	..rac
0000002A	F5	57	5	50	75	70	0C	80	89		88	8A	30	.W.Pu
00000038	35	D1	38	D3	34	77	76				FF	55	71	F5

WRONG

ZIP - second attempt :)

.zip file

**last 65557 bytes of the file
the "header" is
"somewhere" here**

ZIP - "somewhere" ?!

4.3.16 End of central directory record:

22 bajty	end of central dir signature	4 bytes	(0x06054b50)
	number of this disk	2 bytes	
	number of the disk with the		
	start of the central directory	2 bytes	
	total number of entries in the		
	central directory on this disk	2 bytes	
	total number of entries in		
	the central directory	2 bytes	
	size of the central directory	4 bytes	
	offset of start of central		
	directory with respect to		
	the starting disk number	4 bytes	\$0000-\$FFFF
	.ZIP file comment length	2 bytes	0-65535
	.ZIP file comment	(variable size)	


Total: from 22 to 65557 bytes

(aka: PK\5\6 magic will be somewhere between EOF-65557 and EOF-22)


you begin ZIP parsing
from this; it MUST be
at the end of the file

ZIP - looking for the "header"?

"From the START"
Begin at **EOF-65557**,
and move forward.



"From the END"
(ZIPs usually don't have comments)
Begin at **EOF-22**,
and move backward.



The show will
continue in a
moment.



Larch
Something completely different

ZIP Format - LFH

4.3.7 Local file header:

random stuff	local file header signature	4 bytes	(0x04034b50)
	version needed to extract	2 bytes	
	general purpose bit flag	2 bytes	
	compression method	2 bytes	
	last mod file time	2 bytes	
	last mod file date	2 bytes	
	crc-32	4 bytes	
	compressed size	4 bytes	
	uncompressed size	4 bytes	
	file name length	2 bytes	
	extra field length	2 bytes	
	file name (variable size)		
	extra field (variable size)		PK\3\4... LFH + data
	file data (variable size)		

Each file/directory in a ZIP has LFH + data.

ZIP Format - CDH

[central directory header n]

central file header signature	4 bytes	(0x02014b50)
version made by	2 bytes	
version needed to extract	2 bytes	
general purpose bit flag	2 bytes	
compression method	2 bytes	
last mod file time	2 bytes	
last mod file date	2 bytes	
crc-32	4 bytes	
compressed size	4 bytes	
uncompressed size	4 bytes	
file name length	2 bytes	
extra field length	2 bytes	
file comment length	2 bytes	
disk number start	2 bytes	
internal file attributes	2 bytes	
external file attributes	4 bytes	
relative offset of local header	4 bytes	
file name (variable size)		
extra field (variable size)		
file comment (variable size)		


thanks to the redundancy you can recover LFH using CDH, or CDH using LFH

similar stuff to LFH


PK\2\1... CDH

Each file/directory has a CDH entry in the Central Directory

ZIP - a complete file




ZIP - a complete file (continued)



If the list of the files has pointers to files...
... the ZIP structure can be more relaxed.

ZIP - a complete file (continued)



You can even do an "inception"
(some parsers may allow EOCD (CHD (LFH)))



And now back
to our show!

(we were looking
for the EOCD)



Larch
Something completely different

ZIP - looking for the "header"?


(who cares...)

"stream"

Let's ignore EOCD!

(it's sometimes faster)

(99.9% of ZIPs out there can be parsed this way)




ZIP - looking for the "header"?

(who cares...)

"aggressive stream"
We ignore the "garbage"!

(forensics)




Let's test the parsers!

abstract.zip



abstract.zip



abstract.zip

```
from zipfile import ZipFile  
ZipFile("abstract.zip", "r").  
printdir()
```

```
gynvael:haven-windows> zip.py  
File Name  
readme_EndFirst.txt
```

abstract.zip

```
<?php
$za = new ZipArchive();
$za->open('abstract.zip');
for ($i=0; $i<$za->numFiles;$i++) {
    echo "index: $i\n";
    print_r($za->statIndex($i));
}
echo "numFile:" . $za->numFiles . "\n";
```

```
gynvael:haven-windows> php zip.php
```

```
index: 0
```

```
Array
```

```
(
```

```
    [name] => readme_StartFirst.txt
```

```
    [index] => 0
```

```
    [crc] => 543868170
```

```
    [size] => 259
```

```
    [mtime] => 312764400
```

```
    [comp_size] => 259
```

```
    [comp_method] => 0
```

```
)
```

```
numFile:1
```

abstract.zip

```
import java.io.FileInputStream;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.util.zip.ZipEntry;
import java.util.zip.ZipInputStream;

public class zip {
    public static void main(String args[]) throws
        java.io.IOException, java.io.FileNotFoundException {
        InputStream f = new FileInputStream("abstract.zip");
        ZipInputStream z = new ZipInputStream(f);

        ZipEntry e;
        while((e = z.getNextEntry()) != null) {
            System.out.println(e.getName());
        }
    }
}
```

```
gynvael:haven-windows> java zip
readme_Stream.txt
```

abstract.zip

```
22:51:26 gynvael:haven-linux> binwalk abstract.zip
```

DECIMAL	HEX	DESCRIPTION
0	0x0	Zip archive data, at least v1.0 to extract, compressed size: 179, uncompresed size: 179, name: "readme_Stream.txt"
251	0xFB	Zip archive data, at least v1.0 to extract, compressed size: 1059, uncompresed size: 1059, name: "readme_AggressiveStream.txt"
600	0x258	Zip archive data, at least v1.0 to extract, compressed size: 259, uncompresed size: 259, name: "readme_StartFirst.txt"
1367	0x557	End of Zip archive , comment:
1000	0x3E8	Zip archive data, at least v1.0 to extract, compressed size: 231, uncompresed size: 231, name: "readme_EndFirst.txt"
1367	0x557	End of Zip archive

abstract.zip

readme_Stream.txt

syntax breaker

readme_AggressiveStream.txt

readme_StartFirst.txt

CDH

EOCD

readme_EndFirst.txt

CDH

EOCD

Total Commander 8.01

UnZip 6.00 (Debian)

Midnight Commander

Windows 7 Explorer

ALZip

KGB Archiver

7-zip

b1.org

Python zipfile

JSZip

C# DotNetZip

perl Archive::Zip

Jeffrey's Exif Viewer

WOZIP

GNOME File Roller

WinRAR

OSX UnZip

zip.vim v25

Emacs Zip-Archive mode

Ada Zip-Ada v45

Go archive/zip

Pharo smalltalk 2.0 ZipArchive

Ubuntu less

Java ZipFile

abstract.zip

readme_Stream.txt

syntax breaker

readme_AggressiveStream.txt

readme_StartFirst.txt

CDH

EOCD

readme_EndFirst.txt

CDH

EOCD

PHP ZipArchive

PHP zip_open ...

PHP zip:// wrapper

tcl + tclvfs + tclunzip

abstract.zip

readme_Stream.txt

syntax breaker

readme_AggressiveStream.txt

readme_StartFirst.txt

CDH

EOCD

readme_EndFirst.txt

CDH

EOCD

Ruby rubyzip2

Java ZipArchiveInputStream

java.util.zip.ZipInputStream

abstract.zip

readme_Stream.txt

syntax breaker

readme_AggressiveStream.txt

readme_StartFirst.txt

CDH

EOCD

readme_EndFirst.txt

CDH

EOCD

binwalk (found all)

abstract.zip - result summary

readme_Stream.txt

syntax breaker

readme_AggressiveStream.txt

readme_StartFirst.txt

CDH

EOCD

readme_EndFirst.txt

CDH

EOCD

Thanks!

- Mulander
- Felix Groebert
- Salvation
- j00ru

abstract.zip - who cares?


- verify files via End-First
- unpack via Stream

Oops.

abstract.zip - AV

EICAR test results (using VT):

- most End-First
- some Aggressive
- Stream-only:
 - VBA32
 - NANO-Antivirus
 - Norman
 - F-Prot
 - Agnitum
 - Commtouch



PDF 101

basics of the PDF file format

Part II / III



<http://youtu.be/JQrBgVRgqtc?t=11m15s>

<https://speakerdeck.com/ange/pdf-secrets-hiding-and-revealing-secrets-in-pdf-documents?slide=44>

```
%PDF-1.1
```

```
1 0 obj
<<
/Pages 2 0 R
>>
endobj

2 0 obj
<<
/Type /Pages
/Count 1
/Kids [3 0 R]
>>
endobj


3 0 obj
<<
/Type /Page
/Contents 4 0 R
/Parent 2 0 R
/Resources <<
/Font <<
/F1 <<
/Type /Font
/Subtype /Type1
/BaseFont /Arial
>>
>>
>>
endobj

4 0 obj
<< /Length 50 >>
stream
BT
/F1 110 Tf
10 400 Td
(Hello World!)Tj
ET
endstream
endobj

xref
0 5
0000000000 65535 f
0000000010 00000 n
0000000047 00000 n
0000000111 00000 n
0000000313 00000 n

trailer
<<
/Root 1 0 R
>>

startxref
413
%%EOF
```



7.5.5 File Trailer

The *trailer* of a PDF file enables a conforming reader to quickly find the cross-reference table and certain special objects. Conforming readers should read a PDF file from its end. The last line of the file shall contain only the end-of-file marker, **%%EOF**. The two preceding lines shall contain, one per line and in order, the keyword **startxref** and the byte offset in the decoded stream from the beginning of the file to the beginning of the **xref** keyword in the last cross-reference section. The **startxref** line shall be preceded by the *trailer dictionary*, consisting of the keyword **trailer** followed by a series of key-value pairs enclosed in double angle brackets (<<...>>) (using LESS-THAN SIGNs (3Ch) and GREATER-THAN SIGNs (3Eh)). Thus, the trailer has the following overall structure:

```
trailer
<< key1 value1
    key2 value2
    ...
    keyn valuen
>>
startxref
Byte_offset_of_last_cross-reference_section
%%EOF
```

% trailer <</Root ...>>

trailer <</Root ...>>

<</Root ...>>


% trailer <</Root ...>>



trailer <</Root ...>>




<</Root ...>>




**sometimes,
it's in the specs**

obscurity via over-specification?



notice anything unusual?




WYSIWYG

PDF Layers 1/2

“Optional Content Configuration”

- principles
 - define layered content via various /Forms
 - enable/disable layers on viewing/printing
- no warning when printing
- “you can see the preview!”
 - bypass preview by keeping page 1 unchanged
 - just do a minor change in the file



PDF Layers 2/2

- it's Adobe only
 - what's displayed varies with readers
 - could be hidden via previous schizophrenic trick
- it was in the specs all along
 - very rarely used
 - can be abused

BMP


Trick 1

(originally published in Gynvael's "Format BMP okiem hakera" article in 2008)

bfOffBits

Specifies the offset, in bytes, from the BITMAPFILEHEADER structure to the bitmap bits

([MSDN](#))





bfOffBits

Specifies the offset, in bytes, from the BITMAPFILEHEADER structure to the bitmap bits

([MSDN](#))


- Some image viewers ignore **bfOffBits** and look for data immediately after the headers.





PIXEL DATA

PIXEL DATA
(secondary)



Different images, depending on
which pixel data is used.

BMP

Trick 2

Something I've learnt about because it spoiled my steg100 task for a CTF (thankfully during testing).

BMP compression & palette

Run-Length Encoding (each box is 1 byte):

Length >0	Palette Index (color)		
Length 0	RAW Length >2		
Length 0	End of Line 0		
Length 0	End of Bitmap 1		
Length 0	Move Cursor 2	X offset	Y offset

BMP compression & palette

Question: If the opcodes below allow jump over pixels and set no data, how will the pixels look like?

Hint: Please take a look at the presentation title :)

Length 0	End of Line 0
--------------------	-------------------------


Length 0	End of Bitmap 1
--------------------	---------------------------

Length 0	Move Cursor 2	X offset	Y offset
--------------------	-------------------------	-----------------	-----------------

Option 1

The missing data will be filled with **background color**.


(index 0 in the palette)



There is nothing hidden here.

Option 2



The missing data will be **black**.



Option 3

The missing data will be **transparent**.

(pink represents transparency)



PNG



a data schizophren

image data combining


- 2 images
- via 2 palettes

cute PoC by [@reversity](#)




“There shall not be more than one PLTE chunk”



different images depending on which PLTE chunk is used



Relocations types



Type 4
HIGH_ADJ

--

--





Type 9
MIPS_JMPADDR16
IA64_IMM64
MACHINE_SPEC_9

32 bit

64 bit



Relocations on relocations



Type 4
HIGH_ADJ

--

--


Type 9
MIPS_JMPADDR16
IA64_IMM64
MACHINE_SPEC_9

32 bit

64 bit

Type 10
DIR64





Relocation-based PE Schizophren

FOLLOW US INTO THE RABBIT HOLE

```
./hello  
dlrow ,olleH
```



IDA uses sections

Kernel uses segments

```
...  
lic main  
t near DATA WORD _startWithRe  
b rbp, rbp  
    edi, offset hello_2 : "Hello, World!"  
l _putchar  
r rbp  
  
'Hello, World\n'
```

CONFIDENCE 2013



Julian Bangert, Sergey Bratus -- ELF Eccentricities
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LU6N6THh2U>


GIF

Something Gynvael stumbled on in 2008,
but never made a PoC... until now.
(with great input from Ange)

GIF

GIF can be made of many small images.

If "frame speed" is defined, these are frames instead
(and the first frame is treated as background).




GIF


Certain parsers (e.g. browsers) treat "images" as "frames" regardless of "frame speed" not being defined.



Frame 1



Frame 2




Frame 3

GIF


Certain parsers (e.g. browsers) treat "images" as "frames" regardless of "frame speed" not being defined.



Frame 1



Frame 2



Frame 3

GIF

Schizophrenic PoC:




Frame 1






Frames 2-10001

1x1 px




Frame 10002


These apps render the GIF by the specs.



These apps try to force animation.



GIMP says "frames", but allows one to see all the frames, which is nice.




same-tool schizophrenia

1 file + 1 tool = 2 behaviors

it was too simple

- WinRar: different behavior when viewing or extracting
 - opening/failing
 - opening/'nothing'
- Adobe: viewing \Leftrightarrow printing
 - well, it's a *feature*

Failures / Ideas / WIP



Failures / Ideas / WIP

- screen ⇔ printer
 - embedded color profiles?
- JPG
 - IrfanView vs the world
- Video
 - FLV: video fails but still plays sound ?

PNG

Various ancillary chunks (rendering level)

- partially supported:
 - gamma
 - transparency (for palettes)
- never supported?
 - significant bits
 - chromacities
- always supported?
 - physical size

Conclusion

Conclusion

- such a mess
 - specs are messy
 - parsers don't even respect them
- no CVE/blaming for parsing errors?
 - no security bug if no crash or exploit :(

PoCs and slides: <http://goo.gl/Sfjfo4>

ACK

@reversity @travisgoodspeed @sergeybratus
qkumba @internot @pdfkungfoo

@j00ru ise ds vx

thank you


@angealbertini
@gynvael

AREA41



Bonus Round

(not a fully schizophrenic problem in popular
parsers, that's why it's here)



VS



Prezi SWF sanitizer

Prezi allows embedding SWF files.

But it first sanitizes them.



It uses one of two built-in SWF parsers.

There **was** a problem in one of them:


- It allowed huge chunk sizes.
- It just "jumped" (seeked) over these chunk...
- ...which resulted in an integer overflow...
- ...and this lead to schizophrenia.
- As the sanitizer saw a good SWF...
- ...Adobe Flash got its evil twin brother.

Prezi SWF sanitizer

SWF passed to the sanitizer:



and its evil twin brother
kudos to the sanitizer!



Fixed in Q1 2014. For details see:

"Integer overflow into XSS and other fun stuff - a case study of a bug bounty"

<http://gynvael.coldwind.pl/?id=533>