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SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions

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FOREWORD

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Abstract

This Standard specifies the Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) family of functions on binary data. Each of the SHA-3 functions is based on an instance of the KECCAK algorithm that NIST selected as the winner of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition. This Standard also specifies the KECCAK-*p* family of mathematical permutations, including the permutation that underlies KECCAK, in order to facilitate the development of additional permutation-based cryptographic functions.

The SHA-3 family consists of four cryptographic hash functions, called SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, and two extendable-output functions (XOFs), called SHAKE128 and SHAKE256.

Hash functions are components for many important information security applications, including 1) the generation and verification of digital signatures, 2) key derivation, and 3) pseudorandom bit generation. The hash functions specified in this Standard supplement the SHA-1 hash function and the SHA-2 family of hash functions that are specified in FIPS 180-4, the Secure Hash Standard.

Extendable-output functions are different from hash functions, but it is possible to use them in similar ways, with the flexibility to be adapted directly to the requirements of individual applications, subject to additional security considerations.

Key words: computer security, cryptography, extendable-output function, Federal Information Processing Standard, hash algorithm, hash function, information security, KECCAK, message digest, permutation, SHA-3, sponge construction, sponge function, XOF.

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Announcing the

SHA-3 STANDARD: PERMUTATION-BASED HASH AND EXTENDABLE OUTPUT FUNCTIONS

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- **1. Name of Standard**: SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions (FIPS PUB 202).
- 2. Category of Standard: Computer Security Standard, Cryptography.
- **3. Explanation**: This Standard (FIPS 202) specifies the Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) family of functions on binary data. Each of the SHA-3 functions is based on an instance of the KECCAK algorithm that NIST selected as the winner of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition. This Standard also specifies the KECCAK-*p* family of mathematical permutations, including the permutation that underlies KECCAK, which can serve as the main components of additional cryptographic functions that may be specified in the future.

The SHA-3 family consists of six functions. Four are cryptographic hash functions, called SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512; two are extendable-output functions (XOFs), called SHAKE128 and SHAKE256.

For hash functions, the input is called the *message*, and the output is called the (message) *digest* or the *hash value*. The length of the message can vary; the length of the digest is fixed. A cryptographic hash function is a hash function that is designed to provide special properties, including collision resistance and preimage resistance, that are important for many applications in information security. For example, a cryptographic hash function increases the security and efficiency of a digital signature scheme when the digest is digitally signed instead of the message itself. In this context, the collision resistance of the hash function provides assurance that the original message could not have been altered to a different message with the same hash value, and hence, the same signature. Other applications of cryptographic hash functions include pseudorandom bit generation, message authentication codes, and password security.

The four SHA-3 hash functions in this Standard supplement the hash functions that are specified in FIPS 180-4 [1]: SHA-1 and the SHA-2 family. Together, both Standards provide resilience against future advances in hash function analysis, because they rely on fundamentally different design principles. In addition to design diversity, the hash functions in this Standard provide some complementary implementation and performance characteristics to those in FIPS 180-4.

For XOFs, the length of the output can be chosen to meet the requirements of individual applications. The XOFs can be specialized to hash functions, subject to additional security considerations, or used in a variety of other applications. The approved uses of XOFs will be specified in NIST Special Publications.

The Keccak-p permutations were designed to be suitable main components for a variety of cryptographic functions, including keyed functions for authentication and/or encryption. The six SHA-3 functions can be considered as modes of operation (modes) of the Keccak-p[1600,24] permutation. In the future, additional modes of this permutation or other Keccak-p permutations may be specified and approved in FIPS publications or in NIST Special Publications.

- **4. Approving Authority**: Secretary of Commerce.
- **5. Maintenance Agency**: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Information Technology Laboratory (ITL).
- **6. Applicability**: This Standard is applicable to all Federal departments and agencies for the protection of sensitive unclassified information that is not subject to Title 10 United States Code Section 2315 (10 USC 2315) and that is not within a national security system as defined in Title 44 United States Code Section 3502(2) (44 USC 3502(2)). The functions in this Standard may be implemented wherever a secure hash or XOF is required for Federal applications, including as a component within other cryptographic algorithms and protocols. The adoption and use of this Standard is available to private and commercial organizations.
- **7. Specifications**: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions (affixed).
- **8. Implementations:** The Keccak-*p* permutations shall only be implemented within FIPS-approved or NIST-recommended modes of operation, such as the SHA-3 functions that are specified in this Standard. The SHA-3 functions may be implemented in software, firmware, hardware or any combination thereof. Only implementations of these functions that are validated by the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program will be considered as complying with this Standard. Information about the validation program can be obtained at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/index.html.
- **9. Implementation Schedule**: This Standard becomes effective on [].
- **10. Patents**: Implementations of the SHA-3 functions in this Standard may be covered by U.S. or foreign patents.

- **11. Export Control**: Certain cryptographic devices and technical data regarding them are subject to Federal export controls. Exports of cryptographic modules implementing this Standard and technical data regarding them must comply with these Federal regulations and be licensed by the Bureau of Export Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Information about export regulations is available at: http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.htm.
- **12. Qualifications:** Although this Standard specifies mathematical functions that are suitable components for information security applications, conformance to this Standard does not assure that a particular implementation is secure. The responsible authority in each agency or department shall assure that an overall implementation provides an acceptable level of security. This Standard will be reviewed every five years in order to assess its adequacy.
- **13. Waiver Procedure:** The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) does not allow for waivers to a FIPS that is made mandatory by the Secretary of Commerce. Both FIPS 180-4 and this Standard (i.e., FIPS 202) specify cryptographic hash algorithms. FIPS 180-4 specifies SHA-1 and the SHA-2 family of hash functions, and FIPS 202 specifies the SHA-3 family of hash and extendable-output functions. The use of one of the functions in these two standards is mandatory for applications that require a cryptographic hash function. The *NIST Policy on Hash Functions*, available at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/policy.html, gives guidance on the choice of hash functions for specific applications.
- **14.** Where to Obtain Copies of the Standard: This publication is available electronically at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/. Other computer security publications issued by NIST are available at the same web site.

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 202

Specifications for the

SHA-3 STANDARD: PERMUTATION-BASED HASH AND EXTENDABLE-OUTPUT FUNCTIONS

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1 INTRODUCTION

This Standard specifies a new family of functions that supplement SHA-1 and the SHA-2 family of hash functions specified in FIPS 180-4 [1]. This family, called SHA-3 (Secure Hash Algorithm-3) is based on Keccak [2], the algorithm¹ that NIST selected as the winner of the public SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition [3]. The SHA-3 family consists of four cryptographic hash functions and two extendable-output functions. These six functions share the structure that is described in [4], namely, the *sponge construction*; functions with this structure are called *sponge* functions.

A *hash function* is a function on binary data (i.e., bit strings)² for which the length of the output is fixed. The input to a hash function is called the *message*, and the output is called the *(message) digest* or *hash value*. The digest often serves as a condensed representation of the message. The four SHA-3 hash functions are named SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512; in each case, the numerical suffix indicates the fixed length of the digest, e.g., SHA3-256 produces 256-bit digests. The SHA-2 functions, i.e., SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 SHA-512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256, offer the same set of digest lengths. Thus, the SHA-3 hash functions can be implemented as alternatives to the SHA-2 functions, or vice versa.

An extendable-output function (XOF) is a function on binary data in which the output can be extended to any desired length. The two SHA-3 XOFs are named SHAKE128 and SHAKE256.³ The suffixes "128" and "256" indicate the security strengths that these two functions can generally support, in contrast to the suffixes for the hash functions above, which indicate the digest lengths. SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are the first XOFs that NIST has standardized.

The six SHA-3 functions are designed to provide special properties, such as resistance to collision, preimage, and second preimage attacks. The level of resistance to these three types of attacks is summarized in Appendix A.1.1. Cryptographic hash functions are fundamental components in a variety of information security applications, such as digital signature generation and verification, key derivation, and pseudorandom bit generation.

The digest lengths in FIPS-approved hash functions are 160, 224, 256, 384, and 512 bits. When an application requires a cryptographic hash function with a non-standard digest length, an XOF is a natural alternative to constructions that involve multiple invocations of a hash function and/or truncation of the output bits. However, XOFs are subject to the additional security consideration that is described in Appendix A.1.2.

³ The name "SHAKE" was proposed in [5] to combine the term "Secure Hash Algorithm" with "KECCAK."

¹ More precisely, the competition called for four hash functions, and **K**ECCAK is a larger family of functions.

² For many hash functions, there is a (very large) bound on the length of the input data.

⁴ An exception is when the output length is relatively small; see the discussion in Appendix A.1.1.

Each of the six SHA-3 functions employs the same underlying permutation as the main component in the sponge construction. In effect, the SHA-3 functions are *modes of operation* (modes) of the permutation. In this Standard, the permutation is specified as an instance of a family of permutations, called Keccak-p, in order to provide the flexibility to modify its size and security parameters in the development of any additional modes in future documents.

The four SHA-3 hash functions differ slightly from the instances of KECCAK that were proposed for the SHA-3 competition [3]. In particular, two additional bits are appended to the messages, in order to distinguish the SHA-3 hash functions from the SHA-3 XOFs, and to facilitate the development of new variants of the SHA-3 functions that can be dedicated to individual application domains. The mechanism for achieving these goals is called *domain separation*; see Sec. 2.1.

The two SHA-3 XOFs are also specified in a manner that allows for the development of dedicated variants. Moreover, the SHA-3 XOFs are compatible with the Sakura coding scheme [6] for tree hashing [7], in order to support the development of parallelizable extensions, to be specified in a separate document.

Most of the notation and terminology in this Standard is consistent with the specification of KECCAK in [8].

2 GLOSSARY

2.1 Terms and Acronyms

bit A binary digit: 0 or 1. In this Standard, bits are indicated in the Courier

New font.

byte A sequence of eight bits.

capacity In the sponge construction, the width of the underlying function minus the

rate.

column For a state array, a sub-array of five bits with constant x and z coordinates.

digest The output of a cryptographic hash function. Also called the hash value.

domain separation For a function, a partitioning of the inputs to different application domains

so that no input is assigned to more than one domain.

extendable-output A function on bit strings in which the output can be extended to any

function (XOF) desired length.

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard.

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act.

hash function A function on bit strings in which the length of the output is fixed. The

output often serves as a condensed representation of the input.

hash value See digest.

KDF Key derivation function.

KECCAK The family of all sponge functions with a KECCAK-f permutation as the

underlying function and multi-rate padding as the padding rule. KECCAK

was originally specified in [8].

lane For a state array of a KECCAK-p permutation with width b, a sub-array of

b/25 bits with constant x and y coordinates.

message A bit string of any length.

multi-rate padding The padding rule pad10*1, whose output is a 1, followed by a (possibly

empty) string of 0s, followed by a 1.

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.

plane For a state array of a Keccak-p permutation with width b, a sub-array of

b/5 bits with a constant y coordinate.

rate In the sponge construction, the number of input bits processed or output

bits generated per invocation of the underlying function.

round The sequence of step mappings that is iterated in the calculation of a

Keccak-*p* permutation.

round constant For each round of a KECCAK-p permutation, a lane value that is

determined by the round index. The round constant is the second input to

the t step mapping.

round index The value of the integer index for the rounds of a KECCAK-p permutation.

row For a state array, a sub-array of five bits with constant y and z coordinates.

SHA-3 Secure Hash Algorithm-3.

SHAKE Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK.

sheet For a state array of a KECCAK-p permutation with width b, a sub-array of

b/5 bits with a constant x coordinate.

slice For a state array, a sub-array of 25 bits with a constant z coordinate.

sponge construction The method originally specified in [4] for defining a function from the

following: 1) an underlying function on bit strings of a fixed length, 2) a padding rule, and 3) a rate. Both the input and the output of the resulting

function are bit strings that can be arbitrarily long.

sponge function A function that is defined according to the sponge construction, possibly

specialized to a fixed output length.

state An array of bits that is repeatedly updated within a computational

procedure. For a Keccak-p permutation, the state is represented either as

a three-dimensional array or as a string.

state array For a Keccak-p permutation, a 5-by-5-by-w array of bits that represents

the state. The indices for the x, y, and z coordinates range from 0 to 4, 0 to

4, and 0 to w-1, respectively.

step mapping One of the five components of a round of a KECCAK-p permutation: θ , ρ ,

 π , χ , or ι .

string A sequence of bits.

width In the sponge construction, the fixed length of the inputs and the outputs

of the underlying function.

XOF See extendable-output function.

XOR The Boolean Exclusive-OR operation, denoted by the symbol \oplus .

2.2 Algorithm Parameters and Other Variables

A A state array.

A[x, y, z] For a state array A, the bit that corresponds to the triple (x, y, z).

b The width of a KECCAK-p permutation in bits.

c The capacity of a sponge function.

d The length of the digest of a hash function or the requested length of the

output of an XOF, in bits.

The generic underlying function for the sponge construction.

 i_r The round index for a KECCAK-p permutation.

for a Keccak-p permutation, the binary logarithm of the lane size, i.e.,

 $\log_2(w)$.

Lane(i, j) For a state array A, a string of all the bits of the lane whose x and y

coordinates are *i* and *j*.

M The input message to a SHA-3 function.

 n_r The number of rounds for a KECCAK-p permutation.

pad The generic padding rule for the sponge construction.

Plane(j) For a state array A, a string of all the bits of the plane whose y coordinate

is j.

r The rate of a sponge function.

RC For a round of a Keccak-p permutation, the round constant.

W The lane size of a Keccak-p permutation in bits, i.e., b/25.

2.3 Basic Operations and Functions

 0^s For a positive integer s, 0^s is the string that consists of s consecutive 0s.

len(X) For a string X, len(X) is the length of X in bits.

X[i] For a string X and an integer i such that $0 \le i < len(X)$, X[i] is the bit of X

with index i. Bit strings are depicted with indices increasing from left to right, so that X[0] appears at the left, followed by X[1], etc. For example,

if X = 101000, then X[2] = 1.

Trunc_s (X) For a positive integer s and a string X, Trunc_s (X) is the string comprised of

bits X[0] to X[s-1]. For example, Trunc₂(10100)=10.

 $X \oplus Y$ For strings X and Y of equal bit length, $X \oplus Y$ is the string that results from

applying the Boolean exclusive-OR operation to X and Y at each bit

position. For example, $1100 \oplus 1010 = 0110$.

 $X \parallel Y$ For strings X and Y, $X \parallel Y$ is the concatenation of X and Y. For example,

11001 | 010=11001010.

m/n For integers m and n, m/n is the quotient, i.e., m divided by n.

m mod n For integers m and n, m mod n is the integer r for which $0 \le r < n$ and m-r

is a multiple of n. For example, 11 mod 5=1, and -11 mod 5=4.

[x] For a real number x, [x] is the least integer that is not strictly less than x.

For example, [3.2]=4, [-3.2]=-3, and [6]=6.

 $\log_2(x)$ For a positive real number x, $\log_2(x)$ is the real number y such that $2^y = x$.

min(x, y) For real numbers x and y, min(x, y) is the minimum of x and y. For

example, min(9, 33) = 9.

2.4 Specified Functions

The following higher-level functions are specified in this Standard:

 θ , ρ , π , χ , ι The five step mappings that comprise a round.

KECCAK[c] The KECCAK instance with KECCAK-f[1600] as the underlying permutation

and capacity c.

KECCAK-f[b] The family of seven permutations originally specified in [8] as the

underlying function for KECCAK. The set of values for the width b of the

permutations is {25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600}.

KECCAK- $p[b, n_r]$ The generalization of the KECCAK-f[b] permutations that is defined in this

Standard by converting the number of rounds n_r to an input parameter.

pad10*1 The multi-rate padding rule for KECCAK, originally specified in [8].

RawSHAKE128 An intermediate function in the definition of SHAKE128.

RawSHAKE256 An intermediate function in the definition of SHAKE256.

rc The function that generates the variable bits of the round constants.

Rnd The round function of a KECCAK-*p* permutation.

SHA3-224 The SHA-3 hash function that produces 224-bit digests.

SHA3-256 The SHA-3 hash function that produces 256-bit digests.

SHA3-384 The SHA-3 hash function that produces 384-bit digests.

SHA3-512 The SHA-3 hash function that produces 512-bit digests.

SHAKE128 The SHA-3 XOF that generally supports 128 bits of security strength, if

the output is sufficiently long; see Appendix A.1.1.

SHAKE256 The SHA-3 XOF that generally supports 256 bits of security strength, if

the output is sufficiently long; see Appendix A.1.1.

SPONGE[f, pad, r] The sponge function in which the underlying function is f, the padding

rule is pad, and the rate is r.

3 Keccak-p PERMUTATIONS

In this section, the KECCAK-p permutations are specified, with two parameters: 1) the fixed length of the strings that are permuted, called the *width* of the permutation, and 2) the number of iterations of an internal transformation, called a *round*. The width is denoted by b, and the number of rounds is denoted by n_r . The KECCAK-p permutation with n_r rounds and width b is denoted by KECCAK- $p[b, n_r]$; the permutation is defined for any $b \in \{25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600\}$ and any positive integer n_r .

A round of a Keccak-p permutation, denoted by Rnd, consists of a sequence of five transformations, which are called the *step mappings*. The set of values for the b-bit input to the permutation, as it undergoes successive applications of the step mappings, culminating in the output, is called the *state*.

The notation and terminology for the state are described in Sec. 3.1. The step mappings are specified in Sec. 3.2. The KECCAK-*p* permutations are specified in Sec. 3.3. The relationship of the KECCAK-*p* permutations to the KECCAK-*f* permutations that were defined for KECCAK in [8] is described in Sec. 3.4.

3.1 State

The state for the KECCAK- $p[b, n_r]$ permutation is comprised of b bits. The specifications in this Standard contain two other quantities related to b: b/25 and $\log_2(b/25)$, denoted by w and ℓ , respectively. The seven possible values for these variables that are defined for the KECCAK-p permutations are given in the columns of Table 1 below.

| b | 25 | 50 | 100 | 200 | 400 | 800 | 1600 |
|---|----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|
| w | 1 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 16 | 32 | 64 |
| l | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

Table 1: Keccak-p permutation widths and related quantities

It is convenient to represent the input and output states of the permutation as *b*-bit strings, and to represent the input and output states of the step mappings as 5-by-5-by-*w* arrays of bits.

If S denotes a string that represents the state, then its bits are indexed from 0 to b-1, so that

$$S = S[0] || S[1] || ... || S[b-2] || S[b-1].$$

If **A** denotes a 5-by-5-by-w array of bits that represents the state, then its indices are the integer triples (x, y, z) for which $0 \le x < 4$, $0 \le y < 4$, and $0 \le z < w - 1$. The bit that corresponds to (x, y, z) is denoted by $\mathbf{A}[x, y, z]$. A *state array* is a representation of the state by a three-dimensional array that is indexed in this manner.

3.1.1 Parts of the State Array




Figure 1: Parts of the state array, organized by dimension [8]

The state array for a Keccak-p permutation, and its lower-dimensional sub-arrays, are illustrated in Figure 1 above for the case b = 200, so that w = 8. The two-dimensional sub-arrays are called *sheets*, *planes*, and *slices*, and the single-dimensional sub-arrays are called *rows*, *columns*, and *lanes*. The algebraic definitions of these sub-arrays are given in the Glossary, in Sec. 2.1.

3.1.2 Converting Strings to State Arrays

Let S denote a string of b bits that represents the state for the KECCAK- $p[b, n_r]$ permutation. The corresponding state array, denoted by A, is defined as follows:

For all triples (x, y, z) such that $0 \le x < 4$, $0 \le y < 4$, and $0 \le z < w$,

$$A[x, y, z] = S[w(5y+x)+z].$$

For example, if b=1600, so that w=64, then

| A[0,0,0]=S[0] | A[1,0,0]=S[64] | A[2,0,0]=S[128] | A[3,0,0]=S[192] |
|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| A[0,0,1]=S[1] | A[1,0,1]=S[65] | A[2,0,1]=S[129] | A[3,0,1]=S[193] |
| A[0,0,2]=S[2] | A[1,0,2]=S[66] | A[2,0,2]=S[130] | A[3,0,2]=S[194] |
| : | : | : | : |
| A[0, 0, 62] = S[62] | A[1, 0, 62] = S[126] | A[2, 0, 62] = S[190] | A[3, 0, 62] = S[254] |
| A[0,0,63]=S[63] | A[1,0,63]=S[127] | A[2, 0, 63] = S[191] | A[3, 0, 63] = S[255] |

and

etc.

3.1.3 Converting State Arrays to Strings

Let A denote a state array. The corresponding string representation, denoted by S, can be constructed from the lanes and planes of A, as follows:

For each pair of integers (i, j) such that $0 \le i < 4$ and $0 \le j < 4$, define the string Lane(i, j) by

$$Lane(i,j) = A[i,j,0] \parallel A[i,j,1] \parallel A[i,j,2] \parallel ... \parallel A[i,j,w-2] \parallel A[i,j,w-1].$$

For example, if b=1600, so that w=64, then

Lane
$$(0,0) = A[0,0,0] \parallel A[0,0,1] \parallel A[0,0,2] \parallel ... \parallel A[0,0,62] \parallel A[0,0,63]$$

Lane $(1,0) = A[1,0,0] \parallel A[1,0,1] \parallel A[1,0,2] \parallel ... \parallel A[1,0,62] \parallel A[1,0,63]$
Lane $(2,0) = A[2,0,0] \parallel A[2,0,1] \parallel A[2,0,2] \parallel ... \parallel A[2,0,62] \parallel A[2,0,63]$

etc.

For each integer j such that $0 \le j \le 4$, define the string Plane(j) by

$$Plane(j) = Lane(0,j) \parallel Lane(1,j) \parallel Lane(2,j) \parallel Lane(3,j) \parallel Lane(4,j).$$

Then

$$S = Plane(0) || Plane(1) || Plane(2) || Plane(3) || Plane(4).$$

For example, if b = 1600, so that w = 64, then

$$S = \mathbf{A}[0,0,0] \| \mathbf{A}[0,0,1] \| \mathbf{A}[0,0,2] \| \dots \| \mathbf{A}[0,0,62] \| \mathbf{A}[0,0,63] \\ \| \mathbf{A}[1,0,0] \| \mathbf{A}[1,0,1] \| \mathbf{A}[1,0,2] \| \dots \| \mathbf{A}[1,0,62] \| \mathbf{A}[1,0,63] \\ \| \mathbf{A}[2,0,0] \| \mathbf{A}[2,0,1] \| \mathbf{A}[2,0,2] \| \dots \| \mathbf{A}[2,0,62] \| \mathbf{A}[2,0,63] \\ \| \mathbf{A}[3,0,0] \| \mathbf{A}[3,0,1] \| \mathbf{A}[3,0,2] \| \dots \| \mathbf{A}[3,0,62] \| \mathbf{A}[3,0,63] \\ \vdots \\ \| \mathbf{A}[3,4,0] \| \mathbf{A}[3,4,1] \| \mathbf{A}[3,4,2] \| \dots \| \mathbf{A}[3,4,62] \| \mathbf{A}[3,4,63] \\ \| \mathbf{A}[4,4,0] \| \mathbf{A}[4,4,1] \| \mathbf{A}[4,4,2] \| \dots \| \mathbf{A}[4,4,62] \| \mathbf{A}[4,4,63] .$$

3.1.4 Labeling Convention for the State Array

In the diagrams of the state that accompany the specifications of the step mappings, the lane that corresponds to the coordinates (x, y) = (0, 0) is depicted at the center of the slices. The complete labeling of the x, y, and z coordinates for those diagrams is shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2: The x, y, and z coordinates for the diagrams of the step mappings

3.2 Step Mappings

The five step mappings that comprise a round of KECCAK- $p[b, n_r]$ are denoted by θ , ρ , π , χ , and ι . Specifications for these functions are given in Secs. 3.2.1-3.2.5.

The algorithm for each step mapping takes a state array, denoted by A, as an input and returns an updated state array, denoted by A', as the output. The size of the state is a parameter that is omitted from the notation, because b is always specified when the step mappings are invoked.

The ι mapping i_r has a second input: an integer called the *round index*, denoted by i_r , which is defined in Algorithm 7 for Keccak- $p[b, n_r]$ (Sec. 3.3). The other step mappings do not depend on the round index.

3.2.1 Specification of θ

Algorithm 1: $\theta(\mathbf{A})$

Input:

state array A.

Output:

state array A'.

Steps:

- 1. For all pairs (x, z) such that $0 \le x < 4$ and $0 \le z < w$, let $C[x, z] = \mathbf{A}[x, 0, z] \oplus \mathbf{A}[x, 1, z] \oplus \mathbf{A}[x, 2, z] \oplus \mathbf{A}[x, 3, z] \oplus \mathbf{A}[x, 4, z]$.
- 2. For all pairs (x, z) such that $0 \le x < 4$ and $0 \le z < w$ let

 $D[x,z] = C[(x-1) \mod 5, z] \oplus C[(x+1) \mod 5, (z-1) \mod w].$

3. For all triples (x, y, z) such that $0 \le x < 4$, $0 \le y < 4$, and $0 \le z < w$, let $\mathbf{A'}[x, y, z] = \mathbf{A}[x, y, z] \oplus D[x, z]$.




Figure 3: Illustration of θ applied to a single bit [8]

The θ step mapping is illustrated in Figure 3 above.

The effect of θ is to XOR each bit in the state with the parities of two columns in the array. In particular, for the bit $A[x_0, y_0, z_0]$, the x-coordinate of one of the columns is x_0 -1 mod 5, with the same z-coordinate, z_0 , while the x-coordinate of the other column is x_0 +1 mod 5, with z-coordinate z_0 -1 mod w. In Figure 3, the summation symbol, Σ , indicates the parity, i.e., the XOR sum of all the bits in the column.

3.2.2 Specification of ρ

Algorithm 2: $\rho(A)$

Input:

state array A.

Output:

state array A'.

Steps:

- 1. For all z such that $0 \le z \le w$, let A'[0,0,z] = A[0,0,z].
- 2. Let (x, y) = (1, 0).
- 3. For *t* from 0 to 23:
 - a. for all z such that $0 \le z \le w$, let $\mathbf{A}'[x, y, z] = \mathbf{A}[x, y, (z-(t+1)(t+2)/2) \mod w]$;
 - b. let $(x, y) = (y, (2x+3y) \mod 5)$.
- 4. Return A'.

The effect of ρ is to rotate the bits of each lane by a length, called the *offset*, which depends on the fixed x and y coordinates of the lane. Equivalently, for each bit in the lane, the z coordinate is modified by adding the offset, modulo the lane size. The offsets for each lane that result from the computation in Step 3a in Algorithm 2 are listed in Table 2.

| | x = 3 | x = 4 | x = 0 | x = 1 | x = 2 |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| y=2 | 153 | 231 | 3 | 10 | 171 |
| y=1 | 55 | 276 | 36 | 300 | 6 |
| y = 0 | 28 | 91 | 0 | 1 | 190 |
| y = 4 | 120 | 78 | 210 | 66 | 253 |
| y=3 | 21 | 136 | 105 | 45 | 15 |

Table 2: Offsets of ρ [8]

An illustration of ρ for the case w = 8 is given in Figure 4 below. The labeling convention for the x and y coordinates in Figure 4 is given explicitly in Figure 2, corresponding to the rows and columns in Table 2. For example, the lane A[0, 0] is depicted in the middle of the middle sheet, and the lane A[2, 3] is depicted at the bottom of the right-most sheet.




Figure 4: Illustration of ρ for b=200 [8]

For each lane in Figure 4, the black dot indicates the bit whose z coordinate is 0, and the shaded cube indicates the position of that bit after the execution of ρ . The other bits of the lane shift by the same offset, and the shift is circular. For example, the offset for the lane A[1,0] is 1, so the last bit, whose z coordinate is 7, shifts to the front position, whose z coordinate is 0. Consequently, the offsets may be reduced modulo the lane size; e.g., the lane for A[3, 2], at the top of the left-most sheet, has an offset of 153 mod 8, i.e., 1.

3.2.3 Specification of π

Algorithm 3: $\pi(A)$

Input:

state array A.

Output:

state array A'.

Steps:

- 1. For all triples (x, y, z) such that $0 \le x < 4$, $0 \le y < 4$, and $0 \le z < w$, let $\mathbf{A'}[x, y, z] = \mathbf{A}[(x + 3y) \mod 5, x, z]$.
- 2. Return A'.

The effect of π is to rearrange the positions of the lanes, as illustrated for any slice in Figure 5 below. The convention for the labeling of the coordinates is depicted in Figure 2 above; for example, the bit with coordinates x = y = 0 is depicted at the center of the slice.




Figure 5: Illustration of π applied to a single slice [8]

3.2.4 Specification of χ

Algorithm 4: $\chi(\mathbf{A})$

Input:

state array A.

Output:

state array A'.

Steps:

- 1. For all triples (x, y, z) such that $0 \le x < 4$, $0 \le y < 4$, and $0 \le z < w$, let $\mathbf{A'}[x, y, z] = \mathbf{A}[x, y, z] \oplus ((\mathbf{A}[(x+1) \bmod 5, y, z] \oplus 1) \cdot \mathbf{A}[(x+2) \bmod 5, y, z])$.
- 2. Return A'.

The dot in the right side of the assignment for Step 1 indicates integer multiplication, which in this case is equivalent to the intended Boolean "AND" operation.

The effect of χ is to XOR each bit with a non-linear function of two other bits in its row, as illustrated in Figure 6 below.




Figure 6: Illustration of χ applied to a single row [8]

3.2.5 Specification of ι

In the specification of KECCAK- $p[b, n_r]$ in Algorithm 7, the step mapping ι is parameterized by the round index, i_r . In the specification of ι in Algorithm 6, this parameter determines $\ell+1$ bits of a lane value called the *round constant*, denoted by RC. Each of these $\ell+1$ bits is generated by a function that is based on a linear feedback shift register. This function, denoted by rc, is specified in Algorithm 5.

Algorithm 5: rc(t)

Input:

integer t.

Output:

bit rc(t).

Steps:

- 1. If $t \mod 255 = 0$, return 1.
- 2. Let R = 10000000.
- 3. For *i* from 1 to *t* mod 255, let:
 - a. R = 0 || R;
 - b. R[0] = R[0] + R[8];
 - c. R[4] = R[4] + R[8];
 - d. R[5] = R[5] + R[8];
 - e. R[6] = R[6] + R[8];
 - f. $R = \text{Trunc}_8[R]$.
- 4. Return *R*[0].

Algorithm 6: $\iota(\mathbf{A}, i_r)$

Input:

state array A; round index i_r .

Output:

state array A'.

Steps:

- 1. For all triples (x, y, z) such that $0 \le x < 4$, $0 \le y < 4$, and $0 \le z < w$, let $\mathbf{A}'[x, y, z] = \mathbf{A}[x, y, z]$.
- 2. Let $RC = 0^w$.
- 3. For *j* from 0 to ℓ , let $RC[2^{j}-1]=rc(j+7i_r)$.
- 4. For all z such that $0 \le z \le w$, let $\mathbf{A'}[0, 0, z] = \mathbf{A'}[0, 0, z] \oplus RC[z]$.
- 5. Return A'.

The effect of ι is to modify some of the bits of Lane(0,0) in a manner that depends on the round index i_r . The other 24 lanes are not affected by ι .

3.3 KECCAK- $p[b, n_r]$

Given a state array **A** and a round index i_r , the round function Rnd is the transformation that results from applying the step mappings θ , ρ , π , χ , and ι , in that order, i.e.,:

Rnd(
$$\mathbf{A}, i_r$$
) = $\iota(\chi(\pi(\rho(\theta(\mathbf{A})))), i_r)$.

The Keccak- $p[b, n_r]$ permutation consists of n_r iterations of Rnd, as specified in Algorithm 7.

Algorithm 7: KECCAK- $p[b, n_r](S)$

Input:

string S of length b; number of rounds n_r .

Output:

string S' of length b.

Steps:

- 1. Convert S into a state array, A, as described in Sec. 3.1.2.
- 2. For i_r from $2\ell + 12 n_r$ to $2\ell + 12 1$, let $A = \text{Rnd}(A, i_r)$.
- 3. Convert **A** into a string S' of length b, as described in Sec. 3.1.3.
- 4. Return S'.

3.4 Comparison with Keccak-f

The Keccak-f family of permutations, originally defined in [8], is the specialization of the Keccak-f family to the case that $n_r = 12 + 2\ell$:

$$KECCAK-f[b] = KECCAK-p[b, 12+2\ell].$$

Consequently, the KECCAK-p[1600, 24] permutation, which underlies the six SHA-3 functions, is equivalent to KECCAK-f[1600].

The rounds of KECCAK-f[b] are indexed from 0 to $11+2\ell$. A result of the indexing within Step 2 of Algorithm 7 is that the rounds of KECCAK- $p[b, n_r]$ match the last rounds of KECCAK-f[b], or vice versa. For example, KECCAK-p[1600, 19] is equivalent to the last nineteen rounds of KECCAK-f[1600]. Similarly, KECCAK-f[1600] is equivalent to the last twenty-four rounds of KECCAK-p[1600, 30]; in this case, the preceding rounds for KECCAK-p[1600, 30] are indexed by the integers from -6 to -1.

4 SPONGE CONSTRUCTION

The sponge construction [4] is a framework for specifying functions on binary data with arbitrary output length. The construction employs the following three components:

- An underlying function on fixed-length strings, denoted by f,
- A parameter called the *rate*, denoted by *r*, and
- A padding rule, denoted by pad.

The sponge construction is illustrated in Figure 7 below, adapted from [4].




Figure 7: The sponge construction: Z=SPONGE[f, pad, r](M, d) [4]

The function that is constructed from these components, denoted by SPONGE[f, pad, r], is called a *sponge* function. The analogy to a sponge is that the function "absorbs" an arbitrary number of input bits into its state, after which an arbitrary number of output bits are "squeezed" out of its state.

The function f maps strings of a single, fixed length, denoted by b, to strings of the same length. As in Sec. 3, b is called the *width* of f. The SHA-3 functions, specified in Sec. 6 are instances of the sponge construction in which the underlying function f is invertible, i.e., a permutation, although the sponge construction does not require f to be invertible.

The rate r is a positive integer that is strictly less than the width b. The *capacity*, denoted by c, is the positive integer b-r. Thus, r+c=b.

The padding rule, pad, is a function that produces padding, i.e., a string with an appropriate length to append to another string. Within the sponge construction, padding is appended to the message to ensure that it can be partitioned into a sequence of r-bit strings. In general, given a positive integer x and a non-negative integer m, the output pad(x, m) is a string with the property that m + len(pad(x, m)) is a positive multiple of x. Algorithm 9 in Sec. 5.1 specifies the padding rule for the Keccak functions and, hence, the SHA-3 functions.

Given these three components, f, pad, and r, as described above, the SPONGE[f, pad, r] function is specified by Algorithm 8 on (M, d), where M is the input message to the sponge function, and d is the desired length of the output in bits. The width b is determined by the choice of f.

Algorithm 8: SPONGE[f, pad, r](M, d)

```
Input:
```

string M,

nonnegative integer d.

Output:

string Z such that len(Z)=d.

Steps:

- 1. Let $P=M \parallel \operatorname{pad}(r, \operatorname{len}(M))$.
- 2. Let n = len(P)/r.
- 3. Let c=b-r.
- 4. Let P_0, \ldots, P_{n-1} be the unique sequence of strings of length r such that $P = P_0 \parallel \ldots \parallel P_{n-1}$.
- 5. Let $S = 0^b$.
- 6. For *i* from 0 to n-1, let $S=f(S \oplus (P_i \parallel 0^c))$.
- 7. Let Z be the empty string.
- 8. Let $Z=Z \parallel \operatorname{Trunc}_r(S)$.
- 9. If $d \le |Z|$, then return Trunc_d(Z); else continue.
- 10. Let S = f(S), and continue with Step 8.

Note that the input d determines the number of the bits that Algorithm 8 returns, but it does not affect their values. In principle, the output can be regarded as an infinite string, whose computation, in practice, is halted after the desired number of output bits is produced.

5 KECCAK

KECCAK is a family of sponge functions, originally defined in [8]. The padding rule for KECCAK, called *multi-rate padding*, is specified in Sec. 5.1. The parameters and the underlying permutations for KECCAK are described in Sec. 5.2, and a smaller family of KECCAK functions is specified explicitly, which will suffice to define the SHA-3 functions in Sec. 6.

5.1 Specification of pad10*1

The multi-rate padding rule, denoted by pad10*1, is specified in Algorithm 9.

Algorithm 9: pad10*1(x, m)

Input:

positive integer *x*; non-negative integer *m*.

Output:

string Z such that m + len(Z) is a positive multiple of x.

Steps:

- 1. Let $j = (-m-2) \mod x$.
- 2. Return $1 \| 0^j \| 1$.

Thus, the asterisk in "pad10*1" indicates that the "0" bit is either omitted or repeated as necessary in order to produce an output string of the desired length.

5.2 Specification of Keccak[c]

KECCAK is the family of sponge functions with the KECCAK- $p[b, 2\ell+12]$ permutation (defined in Sec. 3.3) as the underlying function and padding rule pad10*1 (defined in Sec. 5.1) as the padding rule. The family is parameterized by any choices of the rate r and the capacity c such that r+c is in {25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600}, i.e., one of the seven values for b in Table 1.

When restricted to the case b = 1600, the KECCAK family is denoted by KECCAK[c]; in this case r is determined by the choice of c. In particular,

$$KECCAK[c] = SPONGE[KECCAK-p[1600, 24], pad10*1, 1600-c].$$

Thus, given a message M and an output length d,

```
KECCAK[c](M, d) = SPONGE[KECCAK-p[1600, 24], pad10*1, 1600-c](M, d).
```

In Sec. 6, the variable "M" also represents the message input to the SHA-3 functions, but either two or four bits are appended to this string before KECCAK[c] is invoked.

6 SHA-3 FUNCTION SPECIFICATIONS

In Sec. 6.1, the four SHA-3 hash functions are defined, and in Sec. 6.2, the two SHA-3 XOFs are defined, via an intermediate function.

6.1 SHA-3 Hash Functions

The four SHA-3 hash functions are defined from the Keccak[c] function specified in Sec. 5.2 by appending two bits to the message and by specifying the length of the output, as follows:

```
SHA3-224(M) = KECCAK[448] (M \parallel 01, 224);

SHA3-256(M) = KECCAK[512] (M \parallel 01, 256);

SHA3-384(M) = KECCAK[768] (M \parallel 01, 384);

SHA3-512(M) = KECCAK[1024] (M \parallel 01, 512).
```

In each case, the capacity is double the digest length, i.e., c = 2d. The two bits that are appended to the message (i.e., 01) support *domain separation*; i.e., they distinguish the messages for the SHA-3 hash functions from messages for the SHA-3 XOFs discussed in Sec. 6.2, as well as other domains that may be defined in the future.

6.2 SHA-3 Extendable-Output Functions

The two SHA-3 XOFs, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined from two intermediate functions below, called RawSHAKE128 and RawSHAKE256, which are defined from the KECCAK[c] function specified in Sec. 5.2.

In particular, if the message is denoted by M, and the output length is denoted by d, then

RawSHAKE128(
$$M$$
, d) = KECCAK[256] ($M \parallel 11$, d),
RawSHAKE256(M , d) = KECCAK[512] ($M \parallel 11$, d).

The two bits that are appended to the message, i.e., 11 in this case, support domain separation.

The two SHA-3 XOFs are

SHAKE128(
$$M$$
, d) = RawSHAKE128 ($M \parallel 11$, d),

```
SHAKE256(M, d) = RawSHAKE256 (M || 11, d).
```

In this case, the bits 11 are appended to the message for compatibility with the Sakura coding scheme [6]. This scheme will facilitate the development of an extension of the functions, called tree hashing [7], in which parallel processing can be applied to compute, and update, digests of long messages more efficiently.

The two SHA-3 XOFs can also be defined directly from KECCAK, as follows:

```
SHAKE128(M, d) = Keccak[256] (M \parallel 1111, d),
SHAKE256(M, d) = Keccak[512] (M \parallel 1111, d).
```

7 Conformance

Implementations of the KECCAK-*p*[1600, 24] permutation and the six SHA-3 modes of this permutation—SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, and SHAKE256—may be tested for conformance to this Standard under the auspices of the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program [9].

SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 are approved hash functions, for which approved uses are already specified. SHAKE128, and SHAKE256 are approved XOFs, whose approved uses will be specified in NIST Special Publications.

The KECCAK-p[1600, 24] permutation is only approved for use in the context of approved modes of operations, such as the SHA-3 functions. Similarly, the other intermediate functions that are defined in this Standard—e.g., KECCAK[c], RawSHAKE128, and RawSHAKE256—are only approved in the context of an approved mode of operation of the underlying KECCAK-p permutation.

Other KECCAK-p permutations may become approved if any modes of operation for them are developed and approved within a FIPS Publication or a NIST Special Publication.

For every computational procedure that is specified in this Standard, a conforming implementation may replace the given set of steps with any mathematically equivalent set of steps. In other words, different procedures that produce the correct output for every input are permitted.

APPENDIX A: Additional Information

A.1 Security Analysis

The detailed analysis of the security properties of KECCAK in [8] applies to the SHA-3 family of hash and extendable output functions. The SHA-3 family also inherits security properties from the sponge construction; these properties are analyzed in detail in [4].

Applications of hash functions often require the properties of collision resistance, preimage resistance, and/or second preimage resistance; these properties are summarized for the SHA-3 family of hash functions and XOFs in Sec. A.1.1. XOFs differ from hash functions in the generation of closely related outputs; this important security consideration is discussed in Sec. A.1.2.

A.1.1 Security Summary

As of the publication of this Standard, the security strengths of the SHA-1, SHA-2, and SHA-3 functions are summarized in Table 3 and discussed below. For the security strength against second preimage attacks on a message M, the function L(M) is defined as $\lceil \log_2(\ln(M)/B) \rceil$, where B is the block length of the function, i.e., 512 bits for SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256, and 1024 bits for SHA-512.

| Function | Output | Security Strengths in Bits | | | | | |
|-------------|--------|----------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|--|--|--|
| runction | Size | Collision | Preimage | 2nd Preimage | | | |
| SHA-1 | 160 | < 80 | 160 | 160- <i>L</i> (<i>M</i>) | | | |
| SHA-224 | 224 | 112 | 224 | min(224, 256-L(M)) | | | |
| SHA-512/224 | 224 | 112 | 224 | 224 | | | |
| SHA-256 | 256 | 128 | 256 | 256-L(M) | | | |
| SHA-512/256 | 256 | 128 | 256 | 256 | | | |
| SHA-384 | 384 | 192 | 384 | 384 | | | |
| SHA-512 | 512 | 256 | 512 | 512-L(M) | | | |
| SHA3-224 | 224 | 112 | 224 | 224 | | | |
| SHA3-256 | 256 | 128 | 256 | 256 | | | |
| SHA3-384 | 384 | 192 | 384 | 384 | | | |
| SHA3-512 | 512 | 256 | 512 | 512 | | | |
| SHAKE128 | d | min(d/2, 128) | $\geq \min(d, 128)$ | $\min(d, 128)$ | | | |
| SHAKE256 | d | min(d/2, 256) | $\geq \min(d, 256)$ | $\min(d, 256)$ | | | |

Table 3: Security strengths of SHA-1, SHA-2, and SHA-3 functions

The four SHA-3 hash functions are alternatives to the SHA-2 functions, and they are designed to provide resistance against preimage, second preimage, and collision attacks which equals or exceeds the resistance that the corresponding SHA-2 functions provide. The SHA-3 functions are also designed to resist other attacks, such as length-extension attacks, that would be resisted by a random function of the same output length, providing security strength up to the hash function's output length in bits, when possible.

The two SHA-3 XOFs are designed to resist collision, preimage, second- preimage attacks, and other attacks that would be resisted by a random function of the requested output length, up to the security strength of 128 bits for SHAKE128, and 256 bits for SHAKE256. A random function whose output length is d bits cannot provide more than d/2 bits of security against collision attacks and d bits of security against preimage and second preimage attacks, so SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 will provide less than 128 and 256 bits of security, respectively, when d is sufficiently small, as described in Table 3.

A.1.2 Additional Consideration for Extendable-Output Functions

XOFs are a powerful new kind of cryptographic primitive that offers the flexibility to produce outputs with any desired length. It is possible to use XOFs as hash functions by selecting a fixed output length. However, XOFs have the potential for generating related outputs—a property that designers of security applications/protocols/systems may not expect of hash functions. This property is important to consider in the development of applications of XOFs.

By design, the output length for an XOF does not affect the bits that it produces, which means that the output length is not a necessary input to the function. Conceptually, the output can be an infinite string, and the application/protocol/system that invokes the function simply computes the desired number of initial bits of that string. In terms of previously standardized cryptographic primitives, these functions behave like a hash function when they are processing input and like a stream function when they are producing output.

Consequently, when two different output lengths are chosen for a common message, the two outputs are closely related: the longer output is an extension of the shorter output. For example, given any positive integers d and e, and any message M, $Trunc_d(SHAKE128(M, d+e))$ is identical to SHAKE128(M, d). The same property holds for SHAKE256.

No two distinct SHA-3 functions would be expected to ever exhibit this property in practice. For example, for a randomly chosen message M, SHA3-256(M) will almost certainly not be an extension of SHA3-224(M), or of SHAKE128(M, 224), even though the three functions have almost identical structure. The same statement applies to previously approved hash functions, including the truncated versions of SHA-512 in FIPS 180-4 (e.g., SHA-512/256).

However, existing mechanisms for constructing functions with arbitrary output length—by concatenating and/or truncating digests from hash functions—generally <u>do</u> exhibit this property.

The possibility of closely related outputs can affect the security of the application/protocol/system that invokes an XOF. For example, a naïve (and non-approved) way for two parties to agree to derive a 112-bit Triple DES key from a message designated as *keymaterial* would be to compute SHAKE128(*keymaterial*, *keylength*), where *keylength* is 112. However, if an attacker is able to induce one of the parties to use a different value for *keylength*, say 168 bits, then the two parties will end up with the following keys:

```
SHAKE128(keymaterial, 112) = fg
SHAKE128(keymaterial, 168) = fgh,
```

where the bolded letters of the digest represent 56-bit strings, e.g., the parts of a Triple DES key. Because of the structure of Triple DES, these keys are vulnerable to attack.

In practice, the use of an XOF as a key derivation function (KDF) could preclude the possibility of related outputs, by incorporating the length and/or type of the derived key into the message input to the KDF. In that case, a disagreement or misunderstanding between two users of the KDF about the type or length of the key they are deriving would almost certainly not lead to related outputs.

Where extended digests are problematic, a more general solution is domain separation, by which different instances of the XOFs could be created and tailored to different purposes. All of the SHA-3 functions are designed to allow for extensions to new, separate domains that NIST may develop in the future.

A.2 Examples

Examples of the five step mappings and of the six SHA-3 functions are available at the examples page at NIST's Computer Security Resource Center web site: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/examples.html.

The bit strings for these examples are represented as strings of the sixteen hexadecimal digits: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, A, B, C, D, E, and F, where A is the digit for ten, B is the digit for eleven, etc. Each digit represents four bits; thus each pair of digits represents eight bits, i.e., a byte. In this section, specific hexadecimal strings are indicated in the Courier New font, preceded by the marker "0x."

The convention for interpreting hexadecimal strings as bit strings for the inputs and outputs of the SHA-3 examples is different from the convention for other functions on the examples page, such as SHA-2: the order of the bits within each complete byte is reversed. Table 4 illustrates the two different interpretations for 0xA3 as a single byte S:

| Family | Interpretation of 0x A3 | <i>S</i> [0] | <i>S</i> [1] | <i>S</i> [2] | <i>S</i> [3] | <i>S</i> [4] | <i>S</i> [5] | <i>S</i> [6] | <i>S</i> [7] |
|--------|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| SHA-2 | 1010 0011 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| SHA-3 | 1100 0101 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

Table 4: Illustration of bit ordering conventions for a single byte

In both cases the pair of hexadecimal digits can be interpreted as an integer in base 16 with the most-significant digit first; thus, 0x A3 represents $10 \cdot 16^1 + 3 \cdot 16^0$, i.e., 163. For SHA-2, the binary expansion of this integer is also written in decreasing order in significance, with the most significant bit first; thus, in this example,

$$10100011 = 1 \cdot 2^7 + 0 \cdot 2^6 + 1 \cdot 2^5 + 0 \cdot 2^4 + 0 \cdot 2^3 + 0 \cdot 2^2 + 1 \cdot 2^1 + 1 \cdot 2^0 = 163.$$

For SHA-3, by contrast, the least significant bit is first, and the bits increase in significance:

$$11000101 = 1 \cdot 2^{0} + 1 \cdot 2^{1} + 0 \cdot 2^{2} + 0 \cdot 2^{3} + 0 \cdot 2^{4} + 1 \cdot 2^{5} + 0 \cdot 2^{6} + 1 \cdot 2^{7} = 163.$$

In general, each pair of hexadecimal digits in the representation of a SHA-3 string is replaced by eight bits, as illustrated above; the truncation function is applied to the result, if necessary. For example, 0x A3 2E represents 1100 0101 0111 0100, so the 14-bit message that is represented by 0xA3 2E is $Trunc_{14}(1100 0101 0111 0100)$, i.e., 1100 0101 0111 01.

The conversion function from hexadecimal strings to the SHA-3 strings that they represent, denoted h2b, is formally specified in Algorithm 10.

Algorithm 10: h2b(H, n).

Input:

positive integer *n*;

hexadecimal string H consisting of 2[n/8] digits.

Output:

bit string S such that len(S)=n.

Steps:

- 1. Let m = [n/8].
- 2. For each integer i such that $0 \le i < 2m-1$, let H_i be the ith hexadecimal digit in H: $H = H_0 H_1 H_2 H_3 \dots H_{2m-2} H_{2m-1}$
- 3. For each integer *i* such that $0 \le i < m$:
 - a. Let $h_i = 16 \cdot H_{2i} + H_{2i+1}$.
 - b. Let $b_{i0} b_{i1} b_{i2} b_{i3} b_{i4} b_{i5} b_{i6} b_{i7}$ be the unique sequence of bits such that $h_i = b_{i0} \cdot 2^0 + b_{i1} \cdot 2^1 + b_{i2} \cdot 2^2 + b_{i3} \cdot 2^3 + b_{i4} \cdot 2^4 + b_{i5} \cdot 2^5 + b_{i6} \cdot 2^6 + b_{i7} \cdot 2^7$.
- 4. For each pair of integers (i, j) such that $0 \le i \le m$ and $0 \le j \le 8$, let $T[8i+j] = b_{ij}$.
- 5. Return $S = \text{Trunc}_n(T)$.

If the bit length n is not specified explicitly, then h2b(H) is assumed to be h2b(H, 4m), where m is the number of hexadecimal digits in H.

The conversion function from SHA-3 strings to the hexadecimal strings that represent them, denoted b2h, is specified in Algorithm 11.

Algorithm 11: b2h(S).

Input:

bit string *S*.

Output:

hexadecimal string H consisting of 2[len(S)/8] digits.

Steps:

- 1.
- Let n = len(S). Let $T = S \parallel 0^{-n \mod 8}$ and $m = \lceil n/8 \rceil$. 2.
- 3. For each pair of integers (i, j) such that $0 \le i \le m$ and $0 \le j \le 8$, let $b_{ij} = T[8i + j]$.
- For each integer *i* such that $0 \le i < m$: 4
 - a. Let $h_i = b_{i0} \cdot 2^0 + b_{i1} \cdot 2^1 + b_{i2} \cdot 2^2 + b_{i3} \cdot 2^3 + b_{i4} \cdot 2^4 + b_{i5} \cdot 2^5 + b_{i6} \cdot 2^6 + b_{i7} \cdot 2^7$:
 - b. Let H_{2i} and H_{2i+1} be the unique hexadecimal digits such that $h_i = 16 \cdot H_{2i} + H_{2i+1}$.
- 5. Return $H_0 H_1 H_2 H_3 \dots H_{2m-2} H_{2m-1}$.

The formal bit-reordering function that was specified in [10]—for the KECCAK submission to the SHA-3 competition—gives equivalent conversions of byte strings, i.e., when *n* is a multiple of 8.

A.3 Object Identifiers

Object identifiers (OIDs) for SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, and SHAKE256 are posted at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto apps infra/csor/algorithms.html.

APPENDIX B: References

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