## Database Announcement

- Public access database of daily time-weighted quoted spreads, dollar-weighted effective spreads, and dollar-weighted realized spreads and price impact at 1 and 5 second horizons.
- All common stocks and ETFs
- Daily data, based on TAQ daily quote, NBBO, and trade file. Beta version of database at
  - <a href="https://research.wpcarey.asu.edu/investment-engineering/spread-statistics/">https://research.wpcarey.asu.edu/investment-engineering/spread-statistics/</a>
- Updated overnight with one day lag

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#### The Anatomy of Trading Algorithms

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
# Background

- Classical models are outdated
- New models focus on HFT, ignoring buy-side
- Why?
  - No straightforward intuition (exception, LWY)
  - No data
    - Institutions don't want to release the data
    - Brokerage firms don't want to release the data
    - Ancerno-type data are essentially useless (end of day trading tickets)
    - Single-manager datasets: embedded endogenous choices, bespoke trading, generalizability issues


# Objectives

- 1. Anatomy
  - To inform price formation
  - Anatomy informs diagnosis, and if necessary, cure
    - Gross anatomy (Parent)
    - Cytology (Child)
    - Histology (Runs)
- 2. To study the tradeoff between likelihood of execution and transaction costs
  - Fundamental issue
  - Building block of order choice models and price formation

# Trading Process: Level 1 (OMS)



# Trading Process: Level 2 (EMS)



#### Data overview

- Large provider of algorithmic trading services
  - Diverse client range, from buy-side long-only managers to multi-asset hedge funds. 961 clients, 2012-2016
- Four standardized, non-bespoke single-stock algorithms.
  - Use direct exchange feeds, often white-labelled
  - All time stamps in milliseconds with FIX tags
- \$675 billion in demand, trading over 5,000 securities
- Parent -> child ->fill
- 2.3 million parent orders generate
  - 300 million child submissions
  - \$2.1 trillion in notional volume
  - \$388 billion in traded volume

## Data elements

#### Parent


- Client ID
- Algo type
- ID, Symbol, side (B, S, SS)
- Start/End time
- Order Quantity
- Price and/or volume constraints

#### Child (all, not just filled)

- ID, link to parent
- Time (send, receive)
- Order type (M, L, P)
  - Subtype (limit prices)
- Display instruction
- Exec Instr. (FIX 18)
- TIF (FIX 59)
- Venue
- Fill (Price, Quantity)
- Add/Take/Route (FIX 851)
- Fee/Rebate


# Gross Anatomy: Parent Orders

# Dollar distribution of algo usage




# Distribution of parent orders

#### By Number




#### By Dollar Volume (\$B)




# Average parent size

#### Parent size (\$000)




#### Parent / interval volume




## Parent duration


#### Mean



#### Median





# Parent constraints & cancellations





# Cytology: Child Orders

## Child orders and fills











## Child order characteristics


#### Order type



#### Marketability




# Display and Venue





## Choices and Outcomes


- 1. Choices
  - a) Price
  - b) Size
  - c) Display
- 2. Outcomes: Execution Risk vs Transaction Costs
  - a) Fill Rates
  - b) Time to fill
  - c) Cost

## Choices













## Outcome: Fill Rates










#### Outcome: time to fill


- For ex post filled orders:
  - Time-to-fill(Passive)>>Time-to-fill(marketable)
- For marketable but ex post unfilled orders:
  - Time-to-fill ~ Time-to-cancel
- For passive orders, time to fill is about ½ of time to cancel
- This is useful, but
  - Cancellations affect the conditional distribution of time-to-fill, i.e. censoring.
  - And, execution risk is a function of endogenous choice variables and random market conditions
- Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) models (Lo, MacKinlay, Zhang (2002)). Model T (the life of the order).

## Accelerated Failure Time models



## Price Movements

- Canonical theory: **trades** incorporate private information and move prices
- Does expression of **trading interest** move prices?
- Passive quotes **supposedly** liquidity providing and do not contain private information
  - Brogaard, Hendershott, Riordan (2019)



#### Measurement

• Child price impact

$$cpi_{jt\tau} = q_{jt}(m_{j,t+\tau} - m_{jt}) / m_{jt}$$

- For child submissions, t is submission time.
- For fills, t is trade time.
- Horizon  $(\tau)$  issues as in Conrad and Wahal (2020).
  - $\tau = 100 \text{ ms}$ , 500 ms, 1 second, 5 second, 10 seconds post submission/fill


# Price Impact


Price Impact in bps					Price Impact in bps					
Submission Price	$100 \mathrm{ms}$	$500 \mathrm{ms}$	1 s	<b>5</b> s	<b>10</b> s	$100 \mathrm{ms}$	$500\mathrm{ms}$	1 s	<b>5</b> s	<b>10</b> s
Aggressive (Far)	1.19	1.25	1.28	1.66	2.03	0.41	0.41	0.43	0.64	0.80
$\{Far, Midpoint\}$	0.57	0.67	0.71	1.25	1.72	-0.12	-0.15	-0.16	0.09	0.26
Midpoint	0.30	0.33	0.36	0.73	1.06	-0.43	-0.49	-0.55	-0.75	-0.83
$\{{\rm Near,Midpoint}\}$	0.67	0.77	0.85	1.43	1.97	-0.91	-1.08	-1.27	-1.75	-2.02
Primary (Near)	0.08	0.14	0.18	0.51	0.84	-1.04	-1.23	-1.44	-1.82	-2.01
Unfilled Child PEG Orders Price Impact in bps										
	τ				S		Filled Ch Price 1	ild PEG Impact i		
Submission Price	100ms				s 10 s	$100 \mathrm{ms}$				10 s
Submission Price Aggressive (Far)		Price I	mpact in	n bps			Price 1	Impact i	n bps	10 s 0.14
	$100 \mathrm{ms}$	Price I 500ms	impact in	n bps 5 s	10 s	$100 \mathrm{ms}$	Price 1 500ms	Impact i	n bps 5 s	


**Unfilled Child Limit Orders** 


Filled Child Limit Orders

# Price Impact: Triple Sort









# Regressions: Limit Orders

	$\mathbf{Unfille}$	$\operatorname{ed}$	Filled			
Intercept	1.215	1.360	0.388	0.490		
(Marketable)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.009)		
{far, midpoint}	-0.634	-0.555	-0.646	-0.573		
(,)	0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.031)		
Midpoint	-0.894	-0.912	-1.404	-1.404		
•	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.050)	(0.032)		
{near, midpoint}	-0.355	-0.403	-2.372	-2.407		
, ,	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)		
Passive {near}	-1.110	-1.220	-2.458	-2.502		
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.026)		
Display	$\stackrel{}{0}.170$	0.224	$\stackrel{}{0.217}$	0.226		
	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.007)		
Scaled size	0.099	<del>-</del>	$\stackrel{\cdot}{0.151}$	_		
	(0.004)		(0.006)			
Book Asymmetry*Buy	-	0.002	-	0.001		
		(0.000)		(0.000)		
Display * Scaled size	0.005	<u>-</u>	-0.037	_		
	(0.001)		(0.007)			
$ \mathrm{Ret}_{-5.0} $	0.104	0.117	-0.024	-0.017		
-7-	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Buy	0.026	0.004	0.006	0.001		
	(0.012)	(0.014)	0.007)	(0.008)		
Average N	63,815	63,815	$45{,}125$	45,125		
Average adj- $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.103	0.076	0.110	0.104		
~ <b>~</b>						

# Regressions: PEG Orders

	Unfille	ed	Filled	d
Intercept	0.581	0.688	0.093	0.110
(Marketable)	(0.022)	0.026)	(0.015)	(0.016)
$\{far, midpoint\}$	<del>-</del>	<del>-</del>	-	-
Midpoint	-0.160	-0.199	-0.557	-0.549
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.016)
$\{ { m near, midpoint} \}$	-	- -	-	-
Passive {near}	-0.508	-0.585	-1.357	-1.660
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Scaled size	0.060	_	0.038	-
	(0.003)		(0.005)	
Book Asymmetry*Buy	-	0.003	·	0.001
		(0.000)		(0.000)
$ \mathrm{Ret}_{ ext{-5.0}} $	0.058	0.063	-0.042	-0.041
,	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Buy	0.011	-0.002	0.006	0.015
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Average N	66,478	66,478	12,228	12,228
Average $adj-R^2$	0.038	0.029	0.037	0.027

# Histology: Strategic Runs

# Strategic Runs

- The sequence of child orders is not random (à la Hasbrouck and Saar (2013)
  - Common goal
  - Shared codebase
- Run: a sequence of child orders from the same parent in the same price aggressiveness category
- Collapse categories into:
  - Marketable
  - Inside
  - Passive
- Parents that seek at least 1 basis point of ADV and with at least 50 child orders

# Description & Transition Matrices

	All Algos	$\mathbf{Algo}  \mathbf{A}$	Algo B	Algo C	Algo D
# parents	$812,\!132$	$50,\!582$	$82,\!903$	87,751	$590,\!896$
Runs/parent	63.09	53.59	51.65	41.23	68.76
Child per run	8.84	11.92	7.45	8.16	8.87
Run duration	566.99	102.04	452.81	158.58	683.46
Run volume	1515.26	5503.08	3024.40	3063.60	732.23
Percent runs					
Passive	45.58	40.58	42.78	42.00	46.94
Inside spread	16.04	16.34	19.98	10.94	16.21
Marketable	38.37	43.06	37.23	47.04	36.84

	All Algos		Algo A		Algo B		Algo C		Algo D		)					
	$P_{\rm t}$	${ m I_t}$	$\mathrm{M_{t}}$	$ P_{ m t} $	${ m I_t}$	$\mathrm{M_{t}}$	$ P_{ m t} $	${ m I_t}$	$\mathrm{M_{t}}$	$P_{\mathrm{t}}$	${f I}_{ m t}$	$M_{\rm t}$	$ P_{ m t} $	${ m I_t}$	$ m M_{t}$	
$\mathbf{P}_{ ext{t-1}}$	-	13.9	31.2	-	10.3	33.0	-	17.0	27.2	-	3.0	41.1	-	14.6	30.7	
$\mathbf{I}_{ ext{t-1}}$	12.9	-	5.2	9.2	-	7.1	13.7	-	6.6	2.8	-	6.9	13.9	-	4.8	
$\mathbf{M}_{ ext{t-1}}$	29.3	7.4	- 1	31.3	9.1	-	25.7	9.8	-	38.4	7.8	-	28.9	7.0	-	

# Logistic Regressions

- Does the price aggressiveness of the run depend on
  - Whether the prior run received a fill  $(Fill_{t-1})$
  - "Cost" of prior run: cumulative signed midpoint return  $(SRet_{t-1})$
- Dependent variables: Prob(Marketable), Prob(Passive)

		Algo A			Algo B		A	lgo C		Algo D			
	$Pr(M_t)$	$Pr(M_t)$	$Pr(P_t)$										
$Run_{t-1}$	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	
$Fill_{t-1}$	0.52	-0.07	0.06	0.02	-0.37	0.09	0.20	-0.02	0.36	-0.04	-1.35	0.65	
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
	[7.6]	[1.7]	[0.9]	[0.5]	[-8.3]	[1.7]	[1.1]	[-0.3]	[5.1]	[0.8]	[26.9]	[11.2]	
$SRet_{t-}$	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
	[0.1]	[0.4]	[-0.1]	[0.0]	[0.1]	[0.0]	[.04]	[0.0]	[-0.1]	[0.0]	[0.2]	[0.0]	
												I	

## Conclusions

- Central tradeoff: trading versus incurring trading costs. Thus the use of algorithms.
- To do so, they generate hundreds of child orders
- Child orders employ price, time, display priority rules to navigate the tradeoff
- Passive orders have much larger execution risk but still incur substantial price impact
- Marketable orders do not guarantee execution and generate even larger price impact