Frida hooking on nonjailbroken iOS

Tricks, possibilities and constraints

mrmacete - r2con 2024

About me

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What and Why

- Without jailbreak superpowers
 - Frida takes advantage of jailbreak capabilities
 - but works without, within limits
- In the context of an app
 - ok for testing apps (and extensions)
- Frida hooks in system library code
 - ok for exploring system libraries' internals

How

- With some help from radare2
- Simple test app and Xcode
 - all this would also apply to repackaged apps
- Live demos of techniques in 3 levels
 - Level 0: app launched via debugger
 - Level 1: no debugger
 - Level 2: no debugger and PAC target

Level 0

- Launched by a debugger
- No code sign enforcement
 - Interceptor can be used anywhere
 - we can have JIT
- Frida can inject itself dynamically
 - no need to embed the Frida Gadget
 - early instrumentation guaranteed when Frida spawns the app

Level 0: frida CLI

- Get the latest Frida gadget from https://github.com/frida/ frida/releases
- Put it in ~/.cache/frida/gadget-ios.dylib
 - make sure frida and frida-tools python packages are up to date
- Spawn the app using frida CLI
 - target must have the get-task-allow entitlement
 - Frida will spawn the app using Ildb and detach the debugger right after

Level 0: Demo

Level 1

- no debugger involved
- code signing enforced and no JIT
 - we need to embed and sign Frida Gadget
 - instrumentation as early as Frida Gadget dylib is initialized
- we're left with NativeCallback and NativeFunction
 - NativeCallback based off libffi closures (via trampoline tables)
 - and Javascript code (which is in fact data)
 - Objective-C swizzling, C++ vtables, C function pointers, some Swift
 - but beware of calling conventions
- gum-graft allows Interceptor usage with some limitations

Level: gum-graft

- Part of frida-gum
- Get it from https://github.com/frida/frida/releases

Level 1: gum-graft

```
[Segments]
nth paddr
                                    vsize perm type name
                 size vaddr
   0x00000000
                                                    ___TEXT
               0x8000 0x100000000
                                   0x8000 -r-x MAP
                                   0x4000 -rw- MAP __
                                                      DATA_CONST
   0x00008000
               0x4000 0x100008000
   0x0000c000
               0x4000 0x10000c000
                                   0x4000 -rw- MAP
                                                      DATA
                                                      FRIDA_TEXTO
   0x00010000
               0x4000 0x100010000
                                   0x4000 -r-x MAP
4
                                                    __FRIDA_DATAO
   0x00014000
               0x4000 0x100014000
                                   0x4000 -rw- MAP
   0x00018000
               0x8000 0x100018000
                                   0x8000 -r-- MAP __LINKEDIT
```

- Move __LINKEDIT down
- add code and data segments between ___DATA and ___LINKEDIT
- update all references to linkedit
 - but data references are good

Level 1: gum-graft

```
20 0x00010000 0x4000 0x100010000 0x4000 -r-x REGULAR
21 0x00014000 0x4000 0x100014000 0x4000 -rw- REGULAR
```

20.__FRIDA_TEXTO.__trampolines 21.__FRIDA_DATAO.__entries

- Code sections will hold trampolines
- Data sections will hold configuration for each of them
- As many as needed depending on number of defined hooks
- Interceptor then picks them up at runtime transparently
- This should be done for each executable in the app

Level 1: open b.txt

- Interceptor yields only the direct call to open() for a.txt
 - only calls to import stubs are routed by gum-graft
- b.txt is open via NSFileHandle
 - the call to open () happens directly within the dyld cache
- to get that too we have to swizzle some NSFileHandle method
 - ObjC.implement() uses NativeCallback under the hood
 - the app calls +[NSFileHandle fileHandleForWritingAtPath:]

Level 1: bssl hook

- we can't hook SSL_CTX_new using Interceptor
 - function called internally
- we need to overwrite a function pointer which:
 - gives us a way to access the SSL_CTX* instance
 - it's called early enough to set the logger callback before handshake

Level 1: bssl hook

SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new (const SSL_METHOD *method);

```
struct ssl_method_st {
   // version, if non-zero, is the only protocol version acceptable to ap
   // SSL_CTX initialized from this method.
   uint16_t version;
   // method is the underlying SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD that initializes the
   // SSL_CTX.
   const bssl::SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method;
   // x509_method contains pointers to functions that might deal with |X509|
   // compatibility, or might be a no-op, depending on the application.
   const bssl::SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method;
};
```

- The argument to SSL_CTX_new is a structure holding pointers to structs of function pointers
- bssl::tls_new() part of the bssl::kTLSProtocolMethod structure
 - takes a ssl_st* instance which in turn holds a pointer to SSL_CTX*


```
static const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD kTLSProtocolMethod = {
    false /* is dtls */,
    tls_new,
    tls_get_message,
    tls_next_message,
    tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data,
    tls open handshake,
    tls_open_change_cipher_spec,
    tls_open_app_data,
    tls_write_app_data,
    tls_dispatch_alert,
    tls_init_message,
    tls_finish_message,
    tls_add_message,
    tls_add_change_cipher_spec,
    tls_flush_flight,
    tls on handshake complete,
    tls_set_read_state,
    tls_set_write_state,
};
```

Level 2

- this time with PAC-capable target
- Frida by default signs with ia key and zero context
- we need to re-sign pointers when overriding them
 - get the right key and diversity from dyld cache

Level 2: PAC theory

introduced by armv8, Pointer Authentication Code



J. Ravichandran, W. Na, J. Lang and M. Yan, "PACMAN: Attacking ARM Pointer Authentication With Speculative Execution" in IEEE Micro, vol. 43, no. 04, pp. 11-18, 2023. https://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MM.2023.3273189

Level 2: PAC theory

- 2 keys for pointers to instructions (ia, ib)
- 2 keys for pointers to data (da, db)
- actual key data not accessible (handled by higher EL)
- key determined by the instruction used
 - pacia, pacib, pacda, pacdb, ...
 - autia, autib,...
 - blraa, blrab,...
- context can be anything!

Level 2: PAC context

- context can be anything!
- but compilers have patterns
 - C-style function pointers have zero context
 - C++ vtable pointers have a "diversity" constant too

```
ldr x8, [x16, 0x68]!
mov x9, x16
mov w20, 1
mov x0, x19
mov w1, 1
mov x17, x9
movk x17, 0x6181, lsl 48
blraa x8, x17
```

• blend(smallInteger): makes a new <u>NativePointer</u> by <u>NativePointer</u>'s bits and blending them with a constant, we passed to sign() as data.

Level 2: PAC metadata

- pointers signed at load time
- metadata about signed pointers in dyld cache
 - not in memory
 - but it's in the DSC file
- extract the metadata about a pointer
 - statically, using radare2
 - :iP command
 - also possible at runtime

Level 2: vtables

- hook X25519KeyShare::Offer(cbb_st*)
 - to dump the key pair used for DH key exchange
 - just an example to deal with context diversity

Thank you

questions