

# Memory Safety: Static vs Dynamic Analysis

**Open4Tech**

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## ***Abstract***

Clang-tidy is the go-to assistant for most C/C++ programmers looking to improve their code, whether to modernize it or to find hidden bugs with its built-in checks. Static analysis is great, but you also get tons of false positives.

Dynamic/runtime analysis, on the other hand, can catch more classes of memory vulnerabilities, but comes with its own costs.

Let's see how AddressSanitizer works behind the scenes (compiler and ASAN runtime) and analyze the instrumentation impact, both in perf and memory footprint. We'll examine a handful of examples diagnosed by ASAN and see how easy it is to read memory snapshots to pinpoint the failure.

Ask questions as we go...

Q & A

# Humans Depend on Tools



**Get to know your tools**  
**well**

# Programmers Depend on Tools

good code editor  
(or IDE)

recent compiler(s)  
[conformant/strict]

linter/formatter

perf profiler

powerful (visual) debugger

test framework

automated refactoring tools

static analyzer

build system

package manager

CI/CD service

dynamic analyzer  
(runtime)

SCM client


code reviews platform

+ fuzzing

# I'm a tool maker



**Advanced Installer**



**Clang Power Tools**

Free/OSS

 [@ciura\\_victor](https://twitter.com/ciura_victor)

## Part I

# Static Analysis



# C++ Core Guidelines Checker



[docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/code-quality/quick-start-code-analysis-for-c-cpp](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/code-quality/quick-start-code-analysis-for-c-cpp)

[docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/code-quality/code-analysis-for-cpp-corecheck](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/code-quality/code-analysis-for-cpp-corecheck)

[devblogs.microsoft.com/cppblog/new-safety-rules-in-c-core-check/](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/cppblog/new-safety-rules-in-c-core-check/)



# Static Analysis



Visual Studio integrates with:

- MSVC Code Analysis: <https://aka.ms/cpp/ca/bg>
- Clang Tidy: <https://aka.ms/cpp/clangtidy>
- VS Code Linters: <https://aka.ms/cpp/linter>

Closing the Gap between Rust and C++ Using Principles of Static Analysis

[youtube.com/watch?v=\\_pQGRr4P16w](https://youtube.com/watch?v=_pQGRr4P16w)



# clang-tidy

**300+ checks**

[clang.llvm.org/extra/clang-tidy/checks/list.html](https://clang.llvm.org/extra/clang-tidy/checks/list.html)



# clang-tidy

- `modernize-use-nullptr`
- `modernize-loop-convert`
- `modernize-use-override`
- `readability-redundant-string-cstr`
- `modernize-use-emplace`
- `modernize-use-auto`
- `modernize-make-shared` & `modernize-make-unique`
- `modernize-use-equals-default` & `modernize-use-equals-delete`



# clang-tidy

- modernize-use-default-member-init
- readability-redundant-member-init
- modernize-pass-by-value
- modernize-return-braced-init-list
- modernize-use-using
- cppcoreguidelines-pro-type-member-init
- readability-redundant-string-init & misc-string-constructor
- misc-suspicious-string-compare & misc-string-compare
- misc-inefficient-algorithm
- cppcoreguidelines-\*



# clang-tidy

- [abseil-string-find-startswith](#)
- [boost-use-to-string](#)
- [bugprone-string-constructor](#)
- [bugprone-string-integer-assignment](#)
- [bugprone-string-literal-with-embedded-nul](#)
- [bugprone-suspicious-string-compare](#)
- [modernize-raw-string-literal](#)
- [performance-faster-string-find](#)
- [performance-inefficient-string-concatenation](#)
- [readability-redundant-string-cstr](#)
- [readability-redundant-string-init](#)
- [readability-string-compare](#)

string checks

# clang-tidy checks

Tidy Checks x

Quick Search 🔍

bugprone-argument-comment	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-assert-side-effect	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-bool-pointer-implicit-conversion	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-branch-clone	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-copy-constructor-init	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
<b>bugprone-dangling-handle</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> On
bugprone-dangling-handle	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-dangling-handle	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-dangling-handle	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-forwarding-reference-overload	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-inaccurate-erase	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-incorrect-roundings	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-integer-division	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-lambda-function-name	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-macro-parentheses	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-macro-repeated-side-effects	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-misplaced-operator-in-strlen-in-alloc	<input type="checkbox"/> Off
bugprone-misplaced-widening-cast	<input type="checkbox"/> Off

**Default Checks**





# clang-tidy bugprone-dangling-handle

“ Detect dangling references in value handles like `std::string_view`

These dangling references can be a result of constructing handles from **temporary** values, where the temporary is destroyed **soon** after the handle is created.

Options:




`HandleClasses`

A semicolon-separated list of class names that should be treated as handles.  
By default only `std::string_view` is considered.

<https://clang.llvm.org/extra/clang-tidy/checks/bugprone-dangling-handle.html>

# Lifetime safety: Preventing common dangling

This is important because it turns out to be **easy** to convert **[by design]** a `std::string` to a `std::string_view`,  
or a `std::vector/array` to a `std::span`,  
so that **dangling** is almost the default behavior.



CppCoreGuidelines

<https://github.com/isocpp/CppCoreGuidelines/blob/master/docs/Lifetime.pdf>

# Lifetime safety: Preventing common dangling

`[-Wdangling-gsl]` diagnosed by default since **Clang 10**

**warning:** initializing pointer member to point to a temporary object whose lifetime is shorter than the lifetime of the constructed object

```
void example()
{
    std::string_view sv = std::string("dangling");

    std::cout << sv;
}
```

<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/DiagnosticsReference.html#wdangling-gsl>

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**warning:** initializing pointer member to point to a temporary object whose lifetime is shorter than the lifetime of the constructed object

```
void example()
{
    std::string_view sv = std::string("dangling");
        // warning: object backing the pointer will be destroyed
        // at the end of the full-expression [-Wdangling-gsl]
    std::cout << sv;
}
```


<https://clang.llvm.org/docs/DiagnosticsReference.html#wdangling-gsl>

# Visual Studio 2019

## since v16.4


clang-tidy

code analysis



<https://devblogs.microsoft.com/cppblog/code-analysis-with-clang-tidy-in-visual-studio/>


# Visual Studio 2019/2022



# Visual Studio 2019/2022

## clang-tidy warnings


Error List						
Entire Solution		0 Errors	10 Warnings	0 Messages	Build + IntelliSense	
#	Code	Description	File	Line	Col	Category
1	⚠️ readability-isolate-declaration	multiple declarations in a single statement reduces readability	CMAKEDEMO.CPP	23	2	readability
2	⚠️ modernize-use-nullptr	use nullptr	CMAKEDEMO.CPP	31	7	modernize
3	⚠️ cppcoreguidelines-macro-usage	macro 'TRUE' used to declare a constant; consider using a 'constexpr' constant	CMAKEDEMO.CPP	35	9	cppcoreguidelines
4	⚠️ clang-diagnostic-unused-variable	unused variable 'local'	CMAKEDEMO.CPP	50	13	clang-diagnostic
5	⚠️ clang-diagnostic-unused-const-variable	unused variable 'pos_x'	CMAKEDEMO.CPP	36	11	clang-diagnostic
6	⚠️ clang-diagnostic-uninitialized	variable 'numLives' is uninitialized when used here	CMAKEDEMO.CPP	24	3	clang-diagnostic
7	⚠️ clang-diagnostic-return-type	control reaches end of non-void function	CMAKEDEMO.CPP	32	1	clang-diagnostic
8	⚠️ clang-analyzer-core.NullDereference	Dereference of undefined pointer value	CMAKEDEMO.CPP	24	12	clang-analyzer



<https://devblogs.microsoft.com/cppblog/code-analysis-with-clang-tidy-in-visual-studio/>

# Visual Studio 2019/2022

clang-tidy warnings also display as in-editor squiggles



Code Analysis runs automatically in the background



=



->



Free/OSS

## Clang Power Tools

[www clangpowertools com](http://www clangpowertools com)

LLVM

clang-tidy

clang++

clang-format

clang-check/query

Visual Studio

2017 / 2019 / 2022

# Static vs Dynamic Analysis

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- vicious cycle: type propagation <> alias analysis

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**0 false positives!**

# Part II

# Dynamic Analysis

ICYMI

# Control Flow Guard

/guard:cf


Enforce control flow integrity (Windows 8.1/10/11)

**CFG** is complementary to other exploit mitigations, such as:

- Address Space Layout Randomization (**ASLR**)
- Data Execution Prevention (**DEP**)

**MSVC**

**CFG** is now supported in **LLVM 10+**



C++ & Rust

<https://aka.ms/cpp/cfg-llvm>

# Sanitizers






# Sanitizers

- **AddressSanitizer** - detects addressability issues
- **LeakSanitizer** - detects memory leaks
- **ThreadSanitizer** - detects data races and deadlocks
- **MemorySanitizer** - detects use of uninitialized memory
- **HWASAN** - hardware-assisted AddressSanitizer (consumes less memory)
- **UBSan** - detects Undefined Behavior

[github.com/google/sanitizers](https://github.com/google/sanitizers)

# Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures

**Memory safety continues to dominate**



[youtube.com/watch?v=0EsqxGgYOQU](https://youtube.com/watch?v=0EsqxGgYOQU)



# Address Sanitizer (ASan)

**De facto standard for detecting **memory safety** issues**

**It's important for basic **correctness** and sometimes true **vulnerabilities****

[github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizer](https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizer)



# Address Sanitizer (ASan)

Detects:

- **Use after free** (dangling pointer dereference)
- **Heap buffer overflow**
- **Stack buffer overflow**
- **Global buffer overflow**
- **Use after return**
- **Use after scope**
- **Initialization order bugs**
- **Memory leaks**

[github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizer](https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizer)



# Address Sanitizer (ASan)

Started in **LLVM** by a team @ Google  
and quickly took off as a *de facto* industry standard  
for runtime program analysis

[github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizer](https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizer)



# Address Sanitizer (ASan)

[LLVM](#) starting with version **3.1** (2012)

[GCC](#) starting with version **4.8** (2013)


[MSVC](#) starting with VS **16.4** (2019)

# Visual Studio 2019

## since v16.4


# October 2019

# Address Sanitizer (ASan)




# [devblogs.microsoft.com/cppblog/addresssanitizer-asan-for-windows-with-msvc/](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/cppblog/addresssanitizer-asan-for-windows-with-msvc/)

# Visual Studio 2019/2022




# Visual Studio 2019/2022



ASAN is out of Experimental since v16.9

# Visual Studio 2019/2022



## ASan features:

- stack-use-after-scope
- stack-buffer-overflow
- stack-buffer-underflow
- heap-buffer-overflow (no underflow)
- heap-use-after-free
- calloc-overflow
- dynamic-stack-buffer-overflow (alloca)
- global-overflow (C++ source code)
- new-delete-type-mismatch
- memcpy-param-overlap
- allocation-size-too-big
- invalid-aligned-alloc-alignment
- use-after-poison
- intra-object-overflow
- initialization-order-fiasco
- double-free
- alloc-dealloc-mismatch

[docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/sanitizers/asan](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/sanitizers/asan)

## ASan features:

- `global` ‘C’ variables  
(in C a global can be declared many times, and each declaration can be of a different type and size)
- `__declspec(no_sanitize_address)`  
**(opt-out** of instrumenting entire functions or specific variables)
- automatically link appropriate ASan libs  
(eg. when building from command-line with `/fsanitize:address`)
- `use-after-return` (opt-in)  
(requires code gen that utilizes two stack frames for each function)

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- compiler/linker will suggest emitting `debug information` when building with ASan

# Address Sanitizer (ASan)

The screenshot shows a Visual Studio code editor window for a file named "ConsoleApplication6.cpp". The code contains a main function that declares an array of 100 integers and attempts to assign a value to the 101st element.


```
1 #include <iostream>
2
3 int main()
4 {
5     int* array = new int[100];
6     array[100] = 1; ✖
7 }
```

A tooltip window titled "Exception Unhandled" is displayed, indicating an "Address Sanitizer Error: Heap buffer overflow". It also states that full error details can be found in the output window. The tooltip includes links for "Copy Details" and "Start Live Share session...".

# Address Sanitizer (ASan)

**IDE Exception Helper** will be displayed when an issue is encountered  
=> program execution will stop

ASan logging information => Output window



```

==27748==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-scope on address 0x0055fc68 at pc 0x793d62de bp 0x0055fbf4 sp 0x0055fbe8
WRITE of size 80 at 0x0055fc68 thread T0
#0 0x793d62f6 in __asan_wrap_memset d:\work\5\s\llvm\projects\compiler-rt\lib\sanitizer_common\sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:764
#1 0x77dd46e7 (C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+0x4b2c46e7)
#2 0x77dd4ce1 (C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+0x4b2c4ce1)
#3 0x75d408fe (C:\WINDOWS\System32\KERNELBASE.dll+0x100f08fe)
#4 0xa5ada0 in try_get_first_available_module minkernel\crts\ucrt\src\appcrt\internal\winapi_thunks.cpp:271
#5 0xa5ae99 in try_get_function minkernel\crts\ucrt\src\appcrt\internal\winapi_thunks.cpp:326
#6 0xa5b028 in __acrt_AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethodInternal minkernel\crts\ucrt\src\appcrt\internal\winapi_thunks.cpp:737
#7 0xa606ad in __acrt_get_process_end_policy minkernel\crts\ucrt\src\appcrt\internal\win_policies.cpp:84
#8 0xa52dc5 in exit_or_terminate_process minkernel\crts\ucrt\src\appcrt\startup\exit.cpp:134
#9 0xa52da7 in common_exit minkernel\crts\ucrt\src\appcrt\startup\exit.cpp:280
#10 0xa52fb6 in exit minkernel\crts\ucrt\src\appcrt\startup\exit.cpp:293
#11 0xa2deb3 in _scrt_common_main_seh d:\agent\_work\2\s\src\vctools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:295
#12 0x75ef6358 (C:\WINDOWS\System32\KERNEL32.DLL+0x6b816358)
#13 0x77df7a93 (C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+0x4b2e7a93)

```

Address 0x0055fc68 is located in stack of thread T0

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-scope d:\compiler-rt\lib\sanitizer\_common\sanitizer\_common\_interceptors.inc:764 in \_\_asan\_wrap\_memset  
 Shadow bytes around the buggy address:

```

0x300abf30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x300abf70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x300abf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [f8]00 00
0x300abf90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x300abfd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

```

Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):

Addressable:	00
Partially addressable:	01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone:	fa
Freed heap region:	fd
Stack left redzone:	f1
Stack mid redzone:	f2
Stack right redzone:	f3
Stack after return:	f5
Stack use after scope:	f8
Global redzone:	f9
Global init order:	f6
Poisoned by user:	f7
Container overflow:	fc
Array cookie:	ac
Intra object redzone:	bb
ASan internal:	fe
Left alloca redzone:	ca
Right alloca redzone:	cb
Shadow gap:	cc

==27748==ABORTING

## Clang/LLVM

# Snapshot File




Game changer!


Minidump file (\*.dmp) <= Windows snapshot process (program virtual memory/heap + metadata)

VS can parse & open this => Points at the location the error occurred.

+ Live Share

Changes the way you report a bug, in general





# Snapshot Loaded

# How does it work ?

**ASan is just Malware,  
used for Good** 😈

# Address Sanitizer (ASan)

## Compiler

- instrumentation code, stack layout, and calls into runtime
- meta-data in OBJ for the runtime

## Sanitizer Runtime

- hooking `malloc()`, `free()`, `memset()`, etc.
- error analysis and reporting
- does not require complete recompile => great for **interop**
- **zero** false positives

# ASan Report

```
--23364--ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x12ac01b801d0 at
pc 0x7ff6e3a627be bp 0x0097d4b4fac0 sp 0x0097d4b4fac8
WRITE of size 4 at 0x12ac01b801d0 thread T0
#0 0x7ff6e3a627bd in main C:\Asana\Asana.cpp:10
#1 0x7ff6e3a66ce8 in invoke_main D:\agent\_work\9\s\src\vctools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:78
#2 0x7ff6e3a66bcd in __scrt_common_main_seh D:\agent\_work\9\s\src\vctools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:288
#3 0x7ff6e3a66a8d in __scrt_common_main D:\agent\_work\9\s\src\vctools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:330
#4 0x7ff6e3a66d78 in mainCRTStartup D:\agent\_work\9\s\src\vctools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_main.cpp:16
#5 0x7ffee9a76fd3 in BaseThreadInitThunk+0x13 (C:\WINDOWS\System32\KERNEL32.DLL+0x180016fd3)
#6 0x7ffea97cec0 in RtlUserThreadStart+0x20 (C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+0x18004cec0)
```

0x12ac01b801d0 is located 0 bytes to the right of 400-byte region [0x12ac01b80040,0x12ac01b801d0) allocated by thread T0 here:

```
#0 0x7ffe83be7e91 in _asan_loadN_noabort+0x55555 (...\\bin\\HostX64\\x64\\clang_rt.asan_dbg_dynamic-x86_64.dll+0x180057e91)
#1 0x7ff6e3a62758 in main C:\Asana\Asana.cpp:9
#2 0x7ff6e3a66ce8 in invoke_main D:\agent\_work\9\s\src\vctools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:78
#3 0x7ff6e3a66bcd in __scrt_common_main_seh D:\agent\_work\9\s\src\vctools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:288
#4 0x7ff6e3a66a8d in __scrt_common_main D:\agent\_work\9\s\src\vctools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:330
#5 0x7ff6e3a66d78 in mainCRTStartup D:\agent\_work\9\s\src\vctools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_main.cpp:16
#6 0x7ffee9a76fd3 in BaseThreadInitThunk+0x13 (C:\WINDOWS\System32\KERNEL32.DLL+0x180016fd3)
#7 0x7ffea97cec0 in RtlUserThreadStart+0x20 (C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+0x18004cec0)
```

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow C:\Asana\Asana.cpp:10 in main()

Shadow bytes around the buggy address:

0x04d981eeffe0:	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x04d981eef000:	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x04d981ef0000:	fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x04d981ef0010:	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x04d981ef0020:	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x04d981ef0030:	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x04d981ef0040:	fa
0x04d981ef0050:	fa
0x04d981ef0060:	fa
0x04d981ef0070:	fa
0x04d981ef0080:	fa


Addressable:	00	
Partially addressable:	01 02 03 04 05 06 07	(of the 8 application bytes, how many are accessible)
Heap left redzone:	fa	
Freed heap region:	fd	
Stack left redzone:	f1	
Stack mid redzone:	f2	
Stack right redzone:	f3	
Stack after return:	f5	
Stack use after scope:	f8	
Global redzone:	f9	
Global init order:	f6	
Poisoned by user:	f7	
Container overflow:	fc	
Array cookie:	ac	
Intra object redzone:	bb	
ASan internal:	fe	
Left alloca redzone:	ca	
Right alloca redzone:	cb	
Shadow gap:	cc	

issues & markers

### Shadow byte legend


(one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes)

# Shadow Mapping



# Code Generation (simplified)

`*p = 0xbadf00d`



```
if (ShadowByte::IsBad(p))  
    AsanRt::Report(p, sz)
```

`*p = 0xbadf00d`

If the shadow byte is **poisoned**,  
ASAN runtime **reports** the problem and **crashes** the application


# Code Generation (simplified)

Lookups into shadow memory need to be **very fast**

ASAN maintains a **lookup table** where every **8 bytes** of user memory are tracked by **1 shadow byte**

=> **1/8** of the address space (**shadow region**)

A Shadow Byte: `*((User_Address >> 3) + 0x3000000) = 0xF8;`

  
Stack use after scope

# Code Generation (simplified)


Lookups into shadow memory need to be **very fast**

```
bool ShadowByte::IsBad(Addr) // is poisoned ?  
{  
    Shadow = Addr >> 3 + Offset;  
    return (*Shadow) != 0;  
}  
  
A Shadow Byte: *( (User_Address >> 3) + 0x30000000 ) = 0xF8;
```

Location of shadow region in memory

Stack use after scope

# Shadow Mapping




**Process Memory**

p

```
if (ShadowByte::IsBad(p))  
    AsanRt::Report(p, sz);
```


$*p = 0xf00d$




**Shadow Memory**

ShadowByte(p)

# Shadow Mapping



```
if (ShadowByte::IsBad(p))  
    AsanRt::Report(p, sz);  
  
*p = 0xbadf00d
```




ShadowByte(p)

# Heap Red Zones

malloc()



ASAN malloc()




# Heap Red Zones

ASAN malloc()



Shadow Memory




# Heap Red Zones

ASAN malloc()



When an object is **deallocated**,  
its corresponding shadow byte is **poisoned**  
**(delays reuse of freed memory)**

Shadow Memory



Poisoned memory

Detect:


- heap underflows/overflows
- use-after-free & double free

# Stack Red Zones



```
void Func()
{
    std::byte my_buffer[12];
    int my_integer = 5;
    ...
    ...
    ...
    ...
    ...
    my_buffer[12] = 0;
}
```

# Stack Red Zones




at runtime, the stack is **poisoned** when entering the function

```
void Func()
{
    std::byte my_buffer[12];
    int my_integer = 5;
    ...

    if (AsanRt::IsPoisoned(&my_buffer[12]))
        AsanRt::Report(my_buffer);
    my_buffer[12] = 0;
}
```

stack **red zones** are **un-poisoned** when exiting the function

# AddressSanitizer ContainerOverflow




with the help of **code annotations** in `std::vector`

libc++

libstdc++

<https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerContainerOverflow>

# AddressSanitizer ContainerOverflow



<https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerContainerOverflow>



# Address Sanitizer (ASan)

## Very fast instrumentation

The average slowdown of the instrumented program is  $\sim 2x$

[github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerPerformanceNumbers](https://github.com/google/sanitizers/wiki/AddressSanitizerPerformanceNumbers)

# Problems & Gotchas

**Stuff you need to know**

/ZI


## Edit and Continue (Debug)

error MSB8059:

-fsanitize=address (Enable Address Sanitizer) is incompatible with option  
'edit-and-continue' debug information /ZI



# Link /INCREMENTAL

Debug builds



error MSB8059:

-fsanitize=address (Enable Address Sanitizer) is incompatible with option  
'incremental linking (/INCREMENTAL)'



# ASan + /NODEFAULTLIB

The linker will be very mad at you

TestCommonCrt Property Pages

Configuration: All Configurations Platform: Win32 Configuration Manager...

Additional Dependencies **msi.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies)**  
**Ignore All Default Libraries** Yes (/NODEFAULTLIB)

Ignore Specific Default Libraries  
Module Definition File  
Add Module to Assembly  
Embed Managed Resource File  
Force Symbol References  
Delay Loaded DLLs  
Assembly Link Resource


Configuration Properties

- General
- Advanced
- Debugging
- VC++ Directories
- ▷ C/C++
- Linker
  - General
  - Input**
  - Manifest File
  - Debugging
  - System
  - Optimization
  - Embedded IDL
  - Windows Metadata
  - Advanced
  - All Options
  - Command Line
- ▷ Manifest Tool
- ▷ XML Document Generator
- ▷ Browse Information
- ▷ Build Events
- ▷ Custom Build Step
- ▷ Code Analysis

**Ignore All Default Libraries**

The /NODEFAULTLIB option tells the linker to remove one or more default libraries from the list of libraries it searches when resolving external references.


OK Cancel Apply



# ASan + /NODEFAULTLIB

# The linker will be very mad at you:

ASan runtime assumes  
**CRT** is linked



# ASan + /NODEFAULTLIB

The linker will be very mad at you  
if you have a custom entry point  
(bypass CRT main)

TestCommonCrt Property Pages

Configuration: All Configurations Platform: Win32 Configuration Manager...

Entry Point	_MainCRTStartup
No Entry Point	No
Set Checksum	No
Base Address	
Randomized Base Address	Yes (/DYNAMICBASE)
Fixed Base Address	
Data Execution Prevention (DEP)	Yes (/NXCOMPAT)
Turn Off Assembly Generation	No
Unload delay loaded DLL	
Nobind delay loaded DLL	
Import Library	
Merge Sections	
Target Machine	MachineX86 (/MACHINE:X86)
Profile	No
CLR Thread Attribute	
CLR Image Type	Default image type
Key File	
Key Container	
Delay Sign	
CLR Unmanaged Code Check	

**Entry Point**  
The /ENTRY option specifies an entry point function as the starting address for an .exe file or DLL.

OK Cancel Apply


# Access Violation Exceptions

*Debugger* may break frequently and you may see a lot of SEH **access violation** exceptions

This is normal (x64). It's how ASAN traps memory allocations to instrument its own *shadow memory*

Just tell the *Debugger* to stop breaking on this type of exception:

uncheck 



# Mixing ASan & non-ASan modules

## Problem:

A non-ASan built executable can NOT call `LoadLibrary()` on a DLL built with ASAN.

## Reason:

ASan runtime is tracking memory and the non-ASan executable might have done something like `HeapAlloc()`

**This limitation is a problem if you're building a plugin (DLL)**

MSVC team is considering dealing with this issue in a later release

[devblogs.microsoft.com/cppblog/asan-for-windows-x64-and-debug-build-support/](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/cppblog/asan-for-windows-x64-and-debug-build-support/)

# /RTCs and /RTC1 Runtime Checks

warning C5059:

runtime checks and address sanitizer is not currently supported - disabling runtime checks

If you use `/WX` this harmless/informative warning becomes a build blocker :(

=> we had to disable `/RTCs` and `/RTC1` so we could do the ASan experiments



[twitter.com/ciura\\_victor/status/1296499633825492992](https://twitter.com/ciura_victor/status/1296499633825492992)

# Linker Trouble?

## Building a static LIB, linked into an EXE

[Debug | x64]

```
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: _calloc_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-x86_64.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: _expand_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-x86_64.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: _free_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-x86_64.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: _malloc_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-x86_64.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: _realloc_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-x86_64.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: _recalloc_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-x86_64.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(expand.obj)    : warning LNK4006: _expand already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-x86_64.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored
```

[Debug | x86]

```
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: __calloc_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-i386.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: __expand_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-i386.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: __free_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-i386.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: __malloc_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-i386.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: __realloc_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-i386.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(debug_heap.obj) : warning LNK4006: __recalloc_dbg already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-i386.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored  
>libucrtd.lib(expand.obj)    : warning LNK4006: __expand already defined in clang_rt.asan_dbg-i386.lib(asan_malloc_win.cc.obj); second definition ignored
```



+ ASan

```
>uafxcw.lib(afxmem.obj) : error LNK2005: "void * __cdecl operator new(unsigned int)" (??2@YAPAXI@Z) already defined in clang_rt.asan_cxx-i386.lib(asan_new_delete.cc.obj)
```

```
>uafxcw.lib(afxmem.obj) : error LNK2005: "void __cdecl operator delete(void *)" (??3@YAXPAX@Z) already defined in clang_rt.asan_cxx-i386.lib(asan_new_delete.cc.obj)
```


```
>uafxcw.lib(afxmem.obj) : error LNK2005: "void * __cdecl operator new[](unsigned int)" (??_U@YAPAXI@Z) already defined in clang_rt.asan_cxx-i386.lib(asan_new_delete.cc.obj)
```

```
>uafxcw.lib(afxmem.obj) : error LNK2005: "void __cdecl operator delete[](void *)" (??_V@YAXPAX@Z) already defined in clang_rt.asan_cxx-i386.lib(asan_new_delete.cc.obj)
```



**if you link statically to MFC lib**

[developercommunity.visualstudio.com/content/problem/1144525/mfc-application-fails-to-link-with-address-sanitiz.html](https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/content/problem/1144525/mfc-application-fails-to-link-with-address-sanitiz.html)



In general, if you have **overrides** for:

```
void* operator new(size_t size);
```

### Workarounds:

- set **/FORCE:MULTIPLE** in the linker command line (settings)
- temporarily set your MFC application to link to **shared** MFC DLLs for testing with ASan

# **ASAN Finds bugs**

## **Really !**

AddressSanitizer: **heap-buffer-overflow** on address 0x0a2301b4 pc 0x005b7a35 bp 0x011df078 sp 0x011df06c  
READ of size 5 at 0x0a2301b4 thread T0

```
#0 0x5b7a4d in __asan_wrap_strlen crt\asan\llvm\compiler-rt\lib\sanitizer_common\sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:365
#1 0x278eeb in ATL::CSimpleStringT<char,0>::StringLength MSVC\14.28.29333\atlmfc\include\atlsimpstr.h:726
#2 0x278a35 in ATL::CSimpleStringT<char,0>::SetString MSVC\14.28.29333\atlmfc\include\atlsimpstr.h:602
#3 0x274d69 in ATL::CSimpleStringT<char,0>::operator= MSVC\14.28.29333\atlmfc\include\atlsimpstr.h:314
#4 0x274d99 in ATL::CStringT<char,ATL::StrTraitATL<char,ATL::ChTraitsCRT<char>>>::operator=
MSVC\14.28.29333\atlmfc\include\cstringt.h:1315
#5 0x27469c in ATL::CStringT<char,ATL::StrTraitATL<char,ATL::ChTraitsCRT<char>>>::CStringT
MSVC\14.28.29333\atlmfc\include\cstringt.h:1115
#6 0x27641a in SerValUtil::DecryptString C:\JobAI\advinst\msicomp\serval\SerValUtil.cpp:85
#7 0x3e1660 in TestSerVal C:\JobAI\testunits\serval\SerValTests.cpp:60
#8 0x5880e5 in FunctionTest::Run C:\JobAI\testunits\Tester.cpp:71
#9 0x5889b1 in Tester::RunTest C:\JobAI\testunits\Tester.cpp:186
#10 0x586ddb in Tester::ExecuteCommandLine C:\JobAI\testunits\Tester.cpp:558
#11 0x5798d1 in main C:\JobAI\testunits\comps\TestComponents.cpp:2236
```

0x0a2301b4 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4-byte region [0x0a2301b0,0x0a2301b4)  
allocated by thread T0

# Fun with ATL::CString

```
ATL::CSimpleArray<BYTE> decrypted;
X::DecryptString(encrypted, decrypted);

ATL::CStringA decryptedStr(&decrypted[0]);
decryptedStr.ReleaseBufferSetLength(decrypted.GetSize());
```

# Fun with ATL::CString

```
ATL::CSimpleArray<BYTE> decrypted;
X::DecryptString(encrypted, decrypted);

ATL::CStringA decryptedStr(&decrypted[0]);
decryptedStr.ReleaseBufferSetLength(decrypted.GetSize());
```

# Fun with ATL::CString

Somewhere inside

```
ATL::CString::ReleaseBufferSetLength(int nLength)
{
    GetData()->nDataLength = nLength;
    m_pszData[nLength] = 0;
    ...
}
```

# Fun with ATL::CString

Classic story: null-terminated string.

**Array** of chars to **string** class - **size** has a different meaning, because of the ending **\0**

# Easy fix

```
ATL::CSimpleArray<BYTE> decrypted;  
X::DecryptString(encrypted, decrypted);  
  
ATL::CStringA decryptedStr(decrypted.GetData(), decrypted.GetSize());
```

It's actually more efficient, too.

AddressSanitizer: **stack-buffer-overflow** on address 0x00b3f766 at pc 0x00181b07 bp 0x00b3f6bc sp 0x00b3f6b0  
WRITE of size 2 at 0x00b3f766 thread T0

```
#0 0x181b06 in CommonCrt::ItoaT<wchar_t> C:\JobAI\platform\util\CommonCrt.h:402
#1 0x183e02 in CommonCrt::Itoa C:\JobAI\platform\util\CommonCrt.cpp:119
#2 0x190696 in TestCommonCrtItoa C:\JobAI\testunits\common_crt\CommonCrtTests.cpp:93
#3 0x194821 in Tester::RunTest<int (__cdecl*)(void)> C:\JobAI\testunits\common_crt\tester\Tester.h:55
#4 0x194b65 in main C:\JobAI\testunits\common_crt\main.cpp:22
#5 0x1cc142 in invoke_main crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:78
#6 0x1cc046 in __scrt_common_main_seh crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:288
#7 0x1cbeec in __scrt_common_main crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:330
#8 0x1cc1a7 in mainCRTStartup crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_main.cpp:16
#9 0x7645fa28 in BaseThreadInitThunk+0x18 (C:\WINDOWS\System32\KERNEL32.DLL+0x6b81fa28)
#10 0x773e76b3 in RtlGetAppContainerNamedObjectPath+0xe3 (C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+0x4b2e76b3)
#11 0x773e7683 in RtlGetAppContainerNamedObjectPath+0xb3 (C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+0x4b2e7683)
```

Address 0x00b3f766 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 30 in frame  
#0 0x1905ef in TestCommonCrtItoa C:\JobAI\testunits\common\_crt\CommonCrtTests.cpp:84

This frame has 2 object(s):

```
[16, 30) 'result1' <== Memory access at offset 30 overflows this variable
[32, 46) 'result2' <== Memory access at offset 30 underflows this variable
```

# Naive Test Unit

```
const LONG      kNumber1 = 21474835;
TCHAR          result1[kMaxSize];
const TCHAR *  compare1 = L"21474835";
const LONG      kNumber2 = -2100;
TCHAR          result2[kMaxSize];
const TCHAR *  compare2 = L"-2100";

CommonCrt::Itoa(kNumber1, result1);

ASSERT_EQ(CompareStrings(result1, compare1));
...
```

# Naive Test Unit

```
const LONG      kNumber1 = 21474835;
TCHAR          result1[kMaxSize];
const TCHAR *  compare1 = L"21474835";
const LONG      kNumber2 = -2100;
TCHAR          result2[kMaxSize];
const TCHAR *  compare2 = L"-2100";

CommonCrt::Itoa(kNumber1, result1);

ASSERT_EQ(CompareStrings(result1, compare1));
...
```

AddressSanitizer: **stack-buffer-overflow** on address 0x00843b3ae544 at pc 0x7ff6da711d86 bp 0x00843b3ae180  
sp 0x00843b3ae188  
READ of size 1 at 0x00843b3ae544 thread T0

```
#0 0x7ff6da711d85 in std::_Char_traits<unsigned char, long>::length MSVC\14.28.29333\include\xstring:143
#1 0x7ff6da711667 in std::basic_string<unsigned char, std::char_traits<unsigned char>, std::allocator<unsigned char> >::assign
MSVC\14.28.29333\include\xstring:3062
#2 0x7ff6da70af94 in std::basic_string<unsigned char...> MSVC\14.28.29333\include\xstring:2417
#3 0x7ff6da70c163 in TestStringUtilAsciiToUnicode C:\JobAI\testunits\strings\StringEncodingTests.cpp:26
#4 0x7ff6da98db80 in FunctionTest::Run C:\JobAI\testunits\Tester.cpp:71
#5 0x7ff6da98fb05 in Tester::RunTest C:\JobAI\testunits\Tester.cpp:186
#6 0x7ff6da98b3b4 in Tester::ExecuteCommandLine C:\JobAI\testunits\Tester.cpp:558
#7 0x7ff6da97b59e in main C:\JobAI\testunits\comps\TestComponents.cpp:2236
#8 0x7ff6dac2a8d8 in invoke_main d:\agent\_work\63\s\src\vctools\crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:78
```

Address 0x00843b3ae544 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 564 in frame

```
#0 0x7ff6da70badf in TestStringUtilAsciiToUnicode C:\JobAI\testunits\strings\StringEncodingTests.cpp:14
```

This frame has 12 object(s):

```
[32, 72) 'result1'
[48, 88) 'kTextString1'
[64, 104) 'result2'
[80, 120) 'kTextString3'
[96, 136) 'result3'
[112, 152) 'compiler temporary'
[128, 144) 'compiler temporary'
[144, 160) 'compiler temporary'
[160, 164) 'uChars'
[176, 177) 'compiler temporary'
[192, 216) 'compiler temporary'
[208, 232) 'compiler temporary' <== Memory access at offset 564 overflows this variable
```

# Naive Test Unit

```
unsigned char uChars[] = { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44 };
const basic_string<unsigned char> kTextString3(uChars);
wstring result3 = wstring(kTextString3.begin(), kTextString3.end());
if (StringUtil::AsciiToUnicode(kTextString3) ≠ result3)
    return -1;
```

# Naive Test Unit

```
unsigned char uChars[] = { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44 };
const basic_string<unsigned char> kTextString3(uChars);
wstring result;
if (StringUtil::AsciiToUnicode(kTextString3, result))
    return -1;
return 0;
```

(local variable) const std::basic\_string<unsigned char> kTextString3

Search Online

C6054: String 'uChars' might not be zero-terminated.

# Naive Test Unit

```
unsigned char uChars[] = { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44 };
const basic_string<unsigned char> kTextString3(uChars);
wstring result;
if (StringUtil::AsciiToUnicode(kTextString3, result))
    return -1;
return 0;
```

(local variable) const std::basic\_string<unsigned char> kTextString3  
Search Online  
C6054: String 'uChars' might not be zero-terminated.

It's worth paying attention to your squiggles !

VS analyzer does a pretty good job keeping you safe.

AddressSanitizer: **global-buffer-overflow** on address 0x00c158ca at pc 0x00838b91 bp 0x016fef98 sp 0x016fef8c

READ of size 2 at 0x00c158ca thread T0


```
#0 0x838b90 in StringUtil::StoreNULLSeparatedStrings C:\JobAI\platform\util\strings\StringProcessing.cpp:430
#1 0x67edfb in TestStringUtilStoreNULLSeparatedStrings C:\JobAI\testunits\strings\StringProcessingTests.cpp:563
#2 0x7e8035 in FunctionTest::Run C:\JobAI\testunits\Tester.cpp:71
#3 0x7e8901 in Tester::RunTest C:\JobAI\testunits\Tester.cpp:186
#4 0x7e6d2b in Tester::ExecuteCommandLine C:\JobAI\testunits\Tester.cpp:558
#5 0x7d9821 in main C:\JobAI\testunits\comps\TestComponents.cpp:2236
#6 0x9d92f2 in invoke_main crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:78
#7 0x9d91f6 in __scrt_common_main_seh crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:288
#8 0x9d909c in __scrt_common_main crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_common.inl:330
#9 0x9d9357 in mainCRTStartup crt\vcstartup\src\startup\exe_main.cpp:16
```

0x00c158ca is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable '**<C++ string literal>**' defined in 'StringProcessingTests.cpp:561:9' (0xc158a0) of size 42


SUMMARY:

AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow StringProcessing.cpp:430 in StringUtil::StoreNULLSeparatedStrings

# Use the full power of your Debugger



# Use the full power of your Debugger



# Excessive Test Unit

```
...
buff = L"token0\0token1\0token2\0";

list.clear();
StringUtil::StoreNULLSeparatedStrings(buff, list);

if (list.size() != 3)
    return -1;
if (list[2] != L"token2")
    return -1;

...
```

# Excessive Test Unit

```
...
buff = L"token0\0token1\0token2\0";

list.clear();
StringUtil::StoreNULLSeparatedStrings(buff, list);

if (list.size() != 3)
    return -1;
if (list[2] != L"token2")
    return -1;

...
```

# Excessive Test Unit

```
/**  
 * Creates a vector with strings that are separated by \0  
 * aBuff - buffer containing NULL separated strings  
 * aLen - the length of buffer  
 * aSection - vector that contains the strings from aBuff  
 */  
void StoreNULLSeparatedStrings(const wchar_t * aBuff, DWORD aLen,  
                               vector<wstring> & aStringList);  
  
/**  
 * Creates a vector with strings that are separated by \0 and end with \0\0  
 * aBuff - buffer containing NULL separated strings  
 * aSection - vector that contains the strings from aBuff  
 */  
void StoreNULLSeparatedStrings(const wchar_t * aBuff, vector<wstring> & aStringList);
```

# Excessive Test Unit

```
/**  
 * Creates a vector with strings that are separated by \0  
 * aBuff - buffer containing NULL separated strings  
 * aLen - the length of buffer  
 * aSection - vector that contains the strings from aBuff  
 */  
void StoreNULLSeparatedStrings(const wchar_t * aBuff, DWORD aLen,  
                               vector<wstring> & aStringList);  
  
/**  
 * Creates a vector with strings that are separated by \0 and end with \0\0  
 * aBuff - buffer containing NULL separated strings  
 * aSection - vector that contains the strings from aBuff  
 */  
void StoreNULLSeparatedStrings(const wchar_t * aBuff, vector<wstring> & aStringList);
```

OUT OF CONTRACT CALL

**Just enough to wet your appetite**

**Go explore on your own...**



## Part III


# Warm Fuzzy Feelings

# Sanitizers + Fuzzing




**Automatically generate inputs to your program to crash it.**

# Workflow



# Azure/IDE – Workflow



# Project OneFuzz

September 15, 2020

Microsoft announces new Project OneFuzz framework, an open source developer tool to find and fix bugs at scale

Justin Campbell Principal Security Software Engineering Lead, Microsoft Security

Mike Walker Senior Director, Special Projects Management, Microsoft Security

**A self-hosted Fuzzing-As-A-Service platform**

[microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/15/microsoft-onefuzz-framework-open-source-developer-tool-fix-bugs/](https://microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/15/microsoft-onefuzz-framework-open-source-developer-tool-fix-bugs/)

# A self-hosted Fuzzing-As-A-Service platform

[github.com/microsoft/onefuzz](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz)

# Project OneFuzz

## CI/CD



New unique crashes create notifications:

- **Teams**
- **ADO work items**



Azure DevOps Pipeline



GitHub Actions

[github.com/microsoft/onefuzz-samples](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz-samples)

# { ASan + Fuzzing } => Azure

The screenshot shows a web browser window with two tabs: "Bug 3496: Initial instance of bug" and "Microsoft Security Risk Detection". The "Microsoft Security Risk Detection" tab is active, displaying the "Fuzzing Jobs" page. The page title is "Fuzzing Jobs". A "Create Job" button is located in the top right corner. The main content is a table listing six fuzzing jobs:

ID	Name	OS Image	Created	Status	Results	Actions
8ee12290	Package CppConFuzzTargetVcAsan by jradigan from JRADIGAN-DELLLT	Windows Server 2019 Datacenter x64	9/18/19 1:44 PM	Fuzzing (Day 1 of 14) Started on: 9/18/19 2:09 PM	4	<span>View</span> <span>Delete</span> <span>Stop</span> <span>Details</span>
fb907d35	Package CppConFuzzTargetVcAsan by jradigan from JRADIGAN-DELLLT	Windows Server 2019 Datacenter x64	9/18/19 9:47 AM	Fuzzing (Day 1 of 14) Started on: 9/18/19 10:13 AM	5	<span>View</span> <span>Delete</span> <span>Stop</span> <span>Details</span>
b4058add	Package CppConFuzzTargetVcAsan by jradigan from JRADIGAN-DELLLT	Windows Server 2019 Datacenter x64	9/13/19 1:55 PM	Fuzzing (Day 5 of 14) Started on: 9/13/19 2:21 PM	5	<span>View</span> <span>Delete</span> <span>Stop</span> <span>Details</span>
6852ebcc	Package CppConFuzzTargetVcAsan	Windows Server 2019 Datacenter x64	9/13/19 9:11 AM	Stopped	5	<span>View</span> <span>Delete</span> <span>Stop</span> <span>Details</span>
9f1428c0	Demo - Package CppConFuzzTargetVcAsan	Windows Server 2019 Datacenter x64	9/8/19 7:27 AM	Fuzzing (Day 11 of 14) Started on: 9/8/19 7:55 AM	5	<span>View</span> <span>Delete</span> <span>Stop</span> <span>Details</span>
a3d2b069	Package CppConFuzzTargetVcAsan	Windows Server 2019 Datacenter x64	9/7/19 11:46 PM	Stopped	5	<span>View</span> <span>Delete</span> <span>Stop</span> <span>Details</span>



At the bottom of the page, there is a red banner with the text "Azure MSR service". Below the banner, there are links for "Contact us", "Privacy & cookies", "Terms of use", "Trademarks", "Third Party Notices", and "© Microsoft 2019". A green lightbulb icon is also present.

# ASAN cloud / distributed testing

You can create the **dump** on test or production infrastructure where the failure occurs, and debug it later on your **developer PC**

Crash dumps are created upon AddressSanitizer failures by setting the following environment variable:

set ASAN\_SAVE\_DUMPS=MyFileName.dmp



[docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/sanitizers/asan-offline-crash-dumps](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/sanitizers/asan-offline-crash-dumps)

Q & A

[edu@caphyon.com](mailto:edu@caphyon.com)



UNIVERSITATEA  
DIN  
CRAIOVA

# Memory Safety: Static vs Dynamic Analysis

**Open4Tech**

January 19, 2022



@ciura\_victor

**Victor Ciura**  
Principal Engineer

