

# Unleashing 🦀 The Ferris Within

**NDC { TechTown }**


September 2024

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**Victor Ciura**  
Principal Engineer  
Rust Tooling @ Microsoft



# Abstract

"Let's rewrite it in Rust" is no longer a party joke. It's happening!

Let me share a couple of stories of learning, appreciating and rewriting stuff in Rust. How we came to love 🦀 Ferris: cargo cult or real need?


What is it like to come to Rust from two very different directions: C++ and C#? What are the gaps, the needs, the gems and the tools you should know about? Here's a real journey and the various experiments leading up towards the success stories at Microsoft.

What have we learned and can bring back to day-to-day C++?  
Want to compare notes? Let's chat.

# About me




**Advanced Installer**




**Clang Power Tools**



**Oxidizer SDK**



**Visual C++**



**Rust Tooling**

 [@ciura\\_victor](https://twitter.com/ciura_victor)  
 [@ciura\\_victor@hachyderm.io](mailto:@ciura_victor@hachyderm.io)  
 [@ciuravictor.bsky.social](https://ciuravictor.bsky.social)

# So Why Rust is Not Widely Adopted?

**Mature ecosystem:** Maturity of the safety ecosystem built around C and C++ (frameworks/standards/processes) vs Rust. Support for safety certified products in C and C++ is broad, lots of tools, lots of assessors, lots of companies to cover the liability, lots of standards.

**Lack of tooling for Rust:** Mathworks doesn't offer Rust code generation from Simulink models, for example.

**Hardware support:** most hardware provides C style APIs. For example, the AEM GlobalPlatform Trustzone API is C style, so even if your trusted execution environment supports Rust you would then have interop which is often buggy, so why not just do C?

**Existing engineering skillset:** people that work in this space know C and C++ already, but not many know Rust. New programmers add bugs; mentorship from experts required to avoid bugs.

© 2024 Robert C. Seacord



[ndctechtown.com/agenda/memory-safety-rust-vs-c](http://ndctechtown.com/agenda/memory-safety-rust-vs-c)

# Rust ❤️ C++

I'm **not** here to:

- convert anyone to 🦀 Rust
- start any language wars
- "sell the Rust snake oil"
- tell you to RiiR


So, don't throw 🍅



Rust ❤️ C++

## Engineering, not programming

*“Software engineering is programming integrated over time.”*



[abseil.io/swe-book/ch01](https://abseil.io/swe-book/ch01)

# Engineering

Bootstrapping a team/project

Finding the right combination of skills (systems, services, Rust)

Expectations, misconceptions, myths

- Why teams want Rust
- Path to Rust
  - Learning
  - Bootstrapping
  - Engineering Systems
  - RiiR
- Interop aka. "not living in a bubble"
- Problems along the way
- Early wins

# But Why?



# But Why?



# But Why?



# Safe C++?

C++ is inherently **unsafe** and there's very little\* we can do about it

We've known this for years before **NSA** 😊



[media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/10/2003112742/-1/-1/0/CSI SOFTWARE MEMORY SAFETY.PDF](https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/10/2003112742/-1/-1/0/CSI SOFTWARE MEMORY SAFETY.PDF)




National Security Agency | Cybersecurity Information Sheet


Software Memory Safety

# Microsoft CVEs

## Is CVE a Memory Safety Issue (RCE, EOP, Info Disclosure)?



# Root cause of memory safety CVEs



# Systems Language Overview

	Rust	C++	C
Object Lifetime	Statically Enforced	Not Enforced, unclear path forward.	No hope
Type Safety	Statically Enforced	Not enforced, unclear path forward.	No hope
Bounds Safety	Enforced at runtime when needed	Could be enforced for STL containers.	No hope
Uninitialized Safety	Statically Enforced	Not enforced, could be enforced w/ breaking change.	Stack could be enforced w/ breaking change.

# Bug Classes vs. Mitigations

Vulnerability Class	Deterministic or Probabilistic Mitigation	% of Memory Safety Issue CVE's
Heap Linear Overflow	Deterministic	9.5%
Heap Non-Linear Overflow	Probabilistic	12%
Use-After-Free	Probabilistic	26%
Heap Linear Overread	Deterministic	5.3%*
Heap Non-Linear Overread	Probabilistic	14%*
Uninitialized Memory	Deterministic	12%
Type Confusion	Not Mitigated	14%

We can mostly solve these.  
Uninitialized doesn't require  
memory tagging.

We can make progress on these  
(both detection and  
exploitability).

CastGuard solves some type  
confusion, others have no  
apparent solution.

## Ongoing efforts:

- Making a step-changes in our **SDL** operations and making additional investments to meet the evolving needs of cloud and emerging technologies
- Completing our deployment of **CodeQL**, integrated with GitHub Copilot learnings
- Continue to invest in **hardening C & C++ code**
- Standardizing on **Rust** and other memory safe languages (MSLs)
- Contribute 💰 to support the work of the **Rust Foundation**
- Assist developers making the transition from C, C++, C# to Rust
  - we will continue to invest 💰 in Rust developer tooling

C++ will never be a 100% **safe** language

- **type safety**
- **bounds safety**
- **lifetime safety**
- **initialization safety**
- **object access safety**
- **thread safety**
- **arithmetic safety**

\* but it can be much **safe(r)** with some effort and **good tooling** 

# Hardening C & C++ code

## Short term:

- tactical efforts to eliminate attack surface
- block exploit techniques
- statically analyze vulnerabilities
- dynamic analysis & fuzzing
- CLFS signing, heap mitigations, ASLR, CFG, UMFD

# Hardening C & C++ code


## Long term:

- Combination of software and hardware mitigations to detect & eliminate the most common memory safety issues classes.
- InitAll / Pool Zeroing – Zero initialize stack variables and kernel pool allocations.
- CastGuard– Prevent illegal stack downcasts (type confusion).
- Memory Tagging – Broad impact to a variety of bug classes, hardware feature.

# Hardening C & C++ code

## Memory Tagging:

- Helps developers catch bugs (eg. hardware ASAN), stops bugs from being exploitable if they ship to customers.
- Non-trivial CPU and memory overhead, but low enough to enable-by-default in production.
- Google will deploy to Android soon; Apple also expected to deploy.
- Microsoft is actively working w/ silicon partners on Memory Tagging designs that are scalable from small devices to large Azure servers.
- Goal: Enable by default for Windows to make a more reliable and secure OS.
- Goal: Support in Azure, for both Windows and Linux




# C++ is under attack...

... and the community is responding 🙌



## Software Memory Safety

[defense.gov/2022/Nov/CSI SOFTWARE MEMORY SAFETY.PDF](https://defense.gov/2022/Nov/CSI SOFTWARE MEMORY SAFETY.PDF)



accu  
2023

## REMOVING NEEDLESS UNDERFINED BEHAVIOR FOR A SAFER C++

ALISDAIR MEREDITH

### What are we going to do?

- Acknowledge the problem
- Embrace our ethical responsibility
- Get qualified
- Quantify the threat landscape
- Understand user impact
- Mitigate threats incrementally
- Work with others beyond the language
- Explore other languages



134

Tradeoffs need to be made...




# "To UB, or not to UB"

-- *Prince Hamlet*

We have not addressed C++ safety until we have eliminated **all** UB.

We can't **completely** eliminate UB from C++ (for good reasons\*).

At minimum, **unbounded** undefined behaviors (that represent a single point of failure) should be eliminated.



C++ will never be a **safe** language (guarantees)

# Choices




# Safety

An excellent essay on the subject of safety: "*If we must, let's talk about safety*"

[cor3ntin.github.io/posts/safety/](https://cor3ntin.github.io/posts/safety/)

-- Corentin Jabot

- A cakewalk and eating it too
- Borrowing the borrow checker
- But we care about safety, right?
- Dogma
- Down with Safety!
- UB
- Correct by confusion
- ++(C++) / Rust



# Lifetime Safety


- garbage collector 🚮
- dynamic memory analysis (ASan)
- statically enforce rules on references:
  - multiple immutable refs || unique mutable ref
    - by compiler/language:
    - borrow checker (Rust, Circle\*)
      - mutable value semantics (Val Hylo)
      - no direct mutation (Haskell & other pure functional languages)
      - by tooling (static lifetime analysis):
  - clang-tidy
    - MSVC
    - other commercial analyzers (plenty of them)
    -

## The new C++ "AAA"

~~AAA (almost always auto)~~

AAA (almost always analyze)

# C++ Security Technologies



[youtube.com/watch?v=i8\\_RfDAEjMs](https://youtube.com/watch?v=i8_RfDAEjMs)

`[[lifetimebound]]`

## Static Analysis lifetime annotations for C++

~NEW:



`[[clang::lifetimebound]]` and `[[msvc::lifetimebound]]`

[discourse.llvm.org/t/rfc-lifetime-annotations-for-c/61377](https://discourse.llvm.org/t/rfc-lifetime-annotations-for-c/61377)

[learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/code-quality/C26815](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/code-quality/C26815)

[youtube.com/watch?v=fe6yu9AQIE4](https://youtube.com/watch?v=fe6yu9AQIE4)

# Future of C++?



**Lifetime Safety in C++: Past, Present and Future - Gabor Horvath - CppCon 2023**

[youtube.com/watch?v=PTdy65m\\_gRE](https://youtube.com/watch?v=PTdy65m_gRE)

C++ will never be a **safe** language\*

\* but it can be much **safe(r)** with some effort and good tooling 

Just rewrite it in **Rust** 🦀



**Mark Russinovich**


@markrussinovich · [Follow](#)



Speaking of languages, it's time to halt starting any new projects in C/C++ and use Rust for those scenarios where a non-GC language is required. For the sake of security and reliability. the industry should declare those languages as deprecated.

11:50 PM · Sep 19, 2022






# Microsoft Azure security evolution: Embrace secure multitenancy, Confidential Compute, and Rust

By [Jeffrey Cooperstein](#) Partner Software Architect, Azure Security

[microsoft-azure-security-evolution-embrace-secure-multitenancy-confidential-compute-and-rust/](https://microsoft-azure-security-evolution-embrace-secure-multitenancy-confidential-compute-and-rust/)



# Microsoft Azure security evolution: Embrace secure multitenancy, Confidential Compute, and Rust

By [Jeffrey Cooperstein](#) Partner Software Architect, Azure Security



**trust compute**


[microsoft-azure-security-evolution-embrace-secure-multitenancy-confidential-compute-and-rust/](https://microsoft-azure-security-evolution-embrace-secure-multitenancy-confidential-compute-and-rust/)

# Really?

Rust in the Linux kernel (since 6.1)

-- with Linus Torvalds' blessing

The first Rust modules start to make their way into the Linux kernel (6.3+)



Ubuntu has done all the work to provide the right toolchain in the distro and custom kernel patches (SAUCE) that allow easier acquisition and build of Rust modules.



ubuntu

[wikipedia.org/wiki/Rust\\_for\\_Linux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rust_for_Linux)

\* but not getting all the love 🙃

# Really?

Rust already in the Windows 11 kernel (May 2023)

```
C:\Windows\System32>dir win32k*
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is E60B-9A9E
_rS = Rust!

Directory of C:\Windows\System32

04/15/2023  09:50  PM           708,608 win32k.sys
04/15/2023  09:49  PM          3,424,256 win32kbase.sys
04/15/2023  09:49  PM          110,592 win32kbase_rs.sys
04/15/2023  09:50  PM          4,194,304 win32kfull.sys
04/15/2023  09:49  PM          40,960 win32kfull_rs.sys
04/15/2023  09:49  PM          69,632 win32krnl.sys
04/15/2023  09:49  PM          98,304 win32ksgd.sys
                           7 File(s)      8,646,656 bytes
                           0 Dir(s)  116,366,049,280 bytes free
```

# Rusty Windows

So this happened 🥺 (public announcement, April 2023)

Ported Windows 11 core components from C++ to Rust

- DirectWrite
- GDI
- ... 🤪



# Rust in Windows


Learn by doing: **Exploration → Flighting → Production** (crawl → walk → run)

- Direct impact: **Improve security**
- Gain experience with transitioning to Rust in production
- Costs of **learning** Rust?
- Costs of **porting** to Rust?
- Costs of writing **new** Rust components?
- Is the full pipeline of **Rust tooling** ready?
- Debugging, perf, cross-platform, POGO, etc.
- Costs of maintaining a **hybrid C++/Rust** codebase?

# DWrite - DWriteCore

**DWrite** is a full stack for text analysis, layout & rendering:

- DWrite ships in Windows (`dwrite.dll`)
- DWriteCore is cross-platform: Windows, Linux, Android, iOS, macOS
- Office depends on DWrite(Core)
- Rust port work began in [2020](#). DWriteCore is now ~152 KLOC of **Rust**
- DWriteCore *internally* uses COM-like interfaces:
  - these were a good integration point for **C++/Rust**, and provided **natural boundaries** for incremental porting
- DWriteCore *public* APIs are all COM
  - Rust code is directly callable from app code, through COM interfaces



## Layout (10 KLOC)

- Line layout, justification
- Text run management: bold, italics, font face, underline, etc.
- Font fallback: Most fonts don't contain all glyphs (e.g. emoji)

## Shaping (36 KLOC) + OTLS (18 KLOC)

- Complex script-specific layout: Thai, Indic, Arabic, Hebrew, Hangul, etc.
- Mandatory for complex scripts
- Many are driven by hand-written FSMs
- Complex transformation rules stored in font files (OpenType)
- Transforms sequences of glyphs, e.g. ligatures, connected scripts

## Unicode Analysis (6 KLOC)

- Very large property tables
- Defined by Unicode standard

## Glyph Data + Glyph Rendering (24 KLOC)

- Computes vector curves, runs bytecode programs (!! from font files to adjust them
- Rasterizes vector curves to bitmaps
- Provides metrics (advance width, x-height, side bearings)
- Scales bitmaps for high-density scripts (e.g. Chinese)

# DWrite Internals

Total ported code ~= 152 KLOC  
(some modules not shown).  
(Precise counts are complicated, due to test code.)

All code is 100% safe code,  
except at C++ boundary

Not all parts of DWrite are shown; just those relevant to port

# Porting Time

- TrueType
  - ~ 2 months (1 dev, experienced in Rust) for the core functionality
  - ~ 2 months for exhaustive comparison testing and regression fixing
- Shaping + OTLS
  - ~ 2 months
  - ~ 1 month for comparison testing and regression fixing
  - ~ 2 weeks for performance improvements
- Layout
  - ~ 1.5 months
  - ~ 2 weeks for testing / regression fixing
- Unicode analysis
  - ~ 2 weeks
  - Low rate of regressions; very data-oriented

Ported the REGION components:

- Models overlapping controls (e.g., windows) in GDI
- "Leaf node" data type: few dependencies, many dependents
- Old (late 80s, early 90) and perf critical (designed for i286/i386)
- Maintenance nightmare: open-coded vector resizing and ref-counting
- Windows boots with the Rust version, and all GDI tests pass
- In flight testing, to prove viability

# Win32k GDI - Rust

- Performance of ported code is excellent
  - Office tests, micro-benchmarks
- This work has driven contributions to [upstream](#) Rust project
- Lots of calls to extern C/C++ functions => still a lot of [unsafe](#) code
- Unsafe area is reducing as we port more and more code to Rust
- Milestone: able to write a [SysCall](#) in completely safe code

# Oxidation

More oxidation 🦀 efforts in progress...



## Rust Fact vs. Fiction

### 5 Insights from Google's Rust journey


Rumor 1: Rust takes more than 6 months to learn – **Debunked**

Rumor 2: The Rust **compiler is not as fast as people would like** – **Confirmed**



Rumor 3: **Unsafe** code and **interop** are always the biggest challenges – **Debunked**

Rumor 4: Rust has amazing compiler **error messages** – **Confirmed**

Rumor 5: Rust code is **high quality** – **Confirmed**




[opensource.googleblog.com/2023/06/rust-fact-vs-fiction-5-insights-from-googles-rust-journey-2022.html](https://opensource.googleblog.com/2023/06/rust-fact-vs-fiction-5-insights-from-googles-rust-journey-2022.html)




[security.googleblog.com/2023/10/bare-metal-rust-in-android](https://security.googleblog.com/2023/10/bare-metal-rust-in-android)

Memory Safety Vulnerabilities Per Year



New Code By Language in Android 13



[security.googleblog.com/2022/12/memory-safe-languages-in-android-13](https://security.googleblog.com/2022/12/memory-safe-languages-in-android-13)

“Based on historical vulnerability density statistics, Rust has proactively prevented hundreds of vulnerabilities from impacting the Android ecosystem. This investment aims to expand the adoption of Rust across various components of the platform.”

– Dave Kleidermacher, Google Vice President of Engineering, Android Security & Privacy

“While Rust may not be suitable for all product applications, prioritizing seamless interoperability with C++ will accelerate wider community adoption, thereby aligning with the industry goals of improving memory safety.”

– Royal Hansen, Google Vice President of Safety & Security

[foundation.rust-lang.org/news/google-contributes-1m-to-rust-foundation-to-support-c-rust-interop-initiative/](https://foundation.rust-lang.org/news/google-contributes-1m-to-rust-foundation-to-support-c-rust-interop-initiative/)

## Rust and C++ interoperability

It's important for Rust to be able to call C++ functions in a way that meets the following criteria:

- No need for excessive `unsafe` keyword
- No overhead in the general case
- No boilerplate or re-declarations / No C++ annotations
- Broad type support - with safety
- *Ergonomics* - with safety

 There's progress in Rust community in solving some of these problems.

 [cxx](#), [autocxx](#), [bindgen](#), [cbindgen](#), [diplomat](#), [crubit](#)



# Learning Rust

# First Encounter



Lars Marowsky-Brée 😊

@larsmb@mastodon.online

@lina @mstrohm There's two reactions to someone who knows C(++) to deal with learning about Rust -  
Either you have a joyful breakdown because someone understands your PTSD and offers you a safe haven,  
Or you end up defending your PTSD because you've invested so much into the past.

Aug 31, 2024, 07:33 PM · 🌙 · Web

[mastodon.online/@larsmb/113057830402545219](https://mastodon.online/@larsmb/113057830402545219)

# Learning

## Google's Comprehensive Rust 🦀 Training

[google.github.io/comprehensive-rust/](https://google.github.io/comprehensive-rust/)

- **Rust Fundamentals:** 4 days
- + Android
  - includes interoperability with C, C++, and Java
- + Chromium
  - includes interoperability with C++ and how to include third-party crates in Chromium
- + Bare-metal: kernel & embedded development
- + Concurrency
  - classical concurrency (preemptively scheduling using threads and mutexes)
  - async/await concurrency (cooperative multitasking using futures)

### Day 1: Morning

- 3. Welcome
- 4. Hello, World
- 5. Types and Values
- 6. Control Flow Basics

### Day 1: Afternoon

- 7. Welcome
- 8. Tuples and Arrays
- 9. References
- 10. User-Defined Types

### Day 2: Morning

- 11. Welcome
- 12. Pattern Matching
- 13. Methods and Traits

### Day 2: Afternoon

- 14. Welcome
- 15. Generics
- 16. Standard Library Types
- 17. Standard Library Traits

### Day 3: Morning

- 18. Welcome
- 19. Memory Management

### 20. Smart Pointers

### Day 3: Afternoon

- 21. Welcome
- 22. Borrowing
- 23. Lifetimes

### Day 4: Morning

- 24. Welcome
- 25. Iterators
- 26. Modules

### 27. Testing

- 28. Welcome
- 29. Error Handling
- 30. Unsafe Rust

# Crates Audit

`cargo vet` ➔ `audits.toml`

Tool to help projects ensure that third-party Rust dependencies have been audited by a trusted entity.

Downsides:

- review format is too sparse
- just marking a crate version as `safe-to-run` or `safe-to-deploy`
- add optional `notes` (but no more details)
- no ability to track internal crate usage, relative to reviews

[mozilla.github.io/cargo-vet/](https://mozilla.github.io/cargo-vet/)

[googleblog.com/2023/05/open-sourcing-our-rust-crate-audits](https://googleblog.com/2023/05/open-sourcing-our-rust-crate-audits)

# Rust Crate Review System

A system that records guidance from Microsoft developers on using Rust crates, both public and internal.

Questions this system helps answer:

- What Rust crates should my Microsoft product use, or not use?
- How should I evaluate public Rust crates I'm considering using, and record the evaluation?
- What are the preferred crates for particular purposes?

# Rust Crate Review System

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- A unified, unbiased, highly automatable crate scoring system used in Microsoft.

**ONE DOES NOT SIMPLY**



**REWRITE IN RUST**

[makeameme.org](http://makeameme.org)

# Unleashing 🦀 The Ferris Within

**NDC { TechTown }**

September 2024

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