## Expectations in Finance and Macroeconomics

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CEBI PhD Course on Subjective Beliefs

## Historical Background

- Expectations are central to economic analyses
- 1940s—60s: Extensive effort to understand actual expectations
  - NBER volume led by Franco Modigliani:
     The Quality and Economic Significance of Anticipations Data (1960)
- Rational Expectations Revolution (1970s—)
  - ▶ Models dictate expectations agents should hold. Data are redundant.
  - Useful theoretical construct. Not necessarily empirical statement.
- Frictionless Benchmark:
   Full Information Rational Expectations (FIRE)

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### Recent Research

Growing empirical analyses of expectations data:

- Expectations are observable
- Expectations are important to economic decisions
- Expectations can be imperfectly rational

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- Financial markets: stock returns, bond yields, credit spreads
- Macroeconomic outcomes: inflation, GDP
- Corporate decisions: earnings & investment
- Households: income, house prices

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### Two-way interactions between data and theory:

• Data informs theory. Theory organizes & unifies empirical evidence.

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## Research Program on Expectations

- 1 Measure and analyze expectations
- 2 Develop empirically founded, portable models of beliefs
- 3 Incorporate them in macro/finance analyses

### Plan

### Part 1. Empirical Evidence on Expectations

- 1 Informativeness of Expectations Data
- 2 Empirical Structure of Expectations

### Part 2. Models of Expectations Formation

- 3 Deviations from FI in FIRE
- 4 Deviations from RE in FIRE

### Open Questions, Data Sources, and Additional References




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- Summary and Additional Resources

## **Expectations and Decisions**

- Expectations in data have significant explanatory power for decisions
  - Stock returns: Greenwood-Shleifer 14, Andonov-Rauh 18, Giglio-Maggiori-Stroebel-Utkus 20
  - Firm investment: Gennaioli-Ma-Shleifer 16, Richter-Zimmermann 19
- Both in the aggregate and at the firm/individual level
- Survey expectations are informative about decisions
  - Beyond traditional predictors
  - ► Can help differentiate models of decisions

# Investor Expectations and Stock Market Investments




Greenwood-Shleifer 14: Aggregate equity mutual fund flows

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## Investor Expectations and Stock Market Investments

Figure IV: Expected 1-Year Stock Returns and Equity Share




Giglio-Maggiori-Stroebel-Utkus 20: Individual Vanguard account holders

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# CFO Expectations and Firm Investment



Geinnaioli-Ma-Shleifer 15: Aggregate CFO expectations and investment

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# CFO Expectations and Firm Investment

$\Delta CAPX_{q_t} = \alpha + \beta E_{q_t}^* [\Delta Earnings]$	$+\lambda X_{q_t} + \epsilon_{q_t}$
--	-------------------------------------

	Realized Next 12m Investment Growth					
CFO Expectations of	0.5903	0.5853	0.2799	0.2611		
Next 12m Earnings Growth	(8.14)	(8.41)	(3.52)	(3.20)		
Q		0.0278				
		(0.37)				
Past 12m Agg. Stock Returns			0.1975			
			(4.20)			
Past 12m Credit Spread Change				-0.1035		
				(-3.82)		
Past 12m Asset Growth	0.7021	0.6645	0.4473	0.8382		
	(6.48)	(3.53)	(3.43)	(11.72)		
Observations	57	57	57	57		
R-squared	0.610	0.611	0.748	0.719		

Geinnaioli-Ma-Shleifer 15: Firm-level CFO expectations and investment

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### Explaining stock prices

- Expectations of future cash flows explain stock prices in aggregate and cross section
  - Bordalo-Gennaioli-La Porta-Shleifer 19, 20, De La O-Myers 21

### Accounting for lending and credit cycles

- Differences in expectations, not just balance sheet conditions, explain bank lending
  - Fahlenbrach-Prilmeier-Stulz 17, Richter-Zimmermann 20, Ma-Paligorova-Peydro 21
- Need deviations from rational expectations to account for credit cycles
  - ► Greenwood-Hanson 13, Baron-Xiong 17, Maxted 20, Krishnamurthy-Li 20

A Simple Illustration

Interpreting evidence from prices and returns.

Three basic objects:

- 1 Discount rates
- 2 (Objective/statistical) expected returns
- 3 (Subjective) expectations of returns

Can be different with biased expectations.

### A Simple Illustration

Two periods: asset pays random dividend D at t = 1, discount rate R

- Expectation of D is  $\bar{D} + S$  (rational + possible bias) for half;  $\bar{D}$  (rational) for half.
- Price is P at t=0
- 1 If S = 0, R fluctuates: when P high
  - Low discount rate
  - Low objective/statistical expected returns
  - Low subjective expectations of asset returns
- 2 If S fluctuates, R stays the same: when P high
  - Same discount rate
  - ► Low objective/statistical expected returns (true for rational investors)
  - ▶ High subjective expectations of asset returns for biased investors

Why consider beliefs not just preferences?

- Data
- Predictable negative excess returns & crises (large negative returns)
  - "Instability from beliefs"
- Example: credit cycles
  - If driven by low risk aversion & risks anticipated
     Loan loss provisions should not be too low during credit booms
  - No "neglected risks"
- Other relevant issues:
  - Firms' investment/employment decisions. Business cycle fluctuations.
  - Policy designs. Economic/financial stability.

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### Expectations an essential part of dealing with an uncertain world



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
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## Structure of Expectations

- Tendency to over-extrapolate recent shocks or trends
  - Project them too much into the future
- Holds in many settings
  - ► Stock returns: Greenwood-Shleifer 14
  - ▶ Bond yields: Piazzesi-Salomao-Schneider 15, Brooks-Lustig-Katz 19
  - Credit spreads: Bordalo-Gennaioli-Shleifer 18
  - ► Firm earnings: Gennaioli-Ma-Shleifer 16, Bordalo-Gennaioli-La Porta-Shleifer 19, Richter-Zimmerman 19
  - ► Macroeconomic outcomes: Bordalo-Gennaioli-Ma-Shleifer 20
  - ► House prices: Kuchler-Zafar 18, De Stefani 19
  - ► Controlled experiment: Afrouzi-Kwon-Landier-Ma-Thesmar 20

### A. Investor Expectations of Stock Returns



Greenwood-Shleifer 14: Extrapolative expectations of stock returns

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
#### A. Investor Expectations of Stock Returns

Table 5
Relationship between model expected returns and survey expected returns

	Survey expectation							
	Gallup N = 135	Graham-Harvey N = 42	AA N = 294	II N = 588	Shiller N = 132	Michigan N = 22	Index N = 294	
Log(D/P) [p-val]	-0.328 [0.000]	-0.443 [0.003]	-0.305 [0.000]	-0.193 [0.000]	-0.554 [0.000]	-0.567 [0.000]	-0.312 [0.000]	
-Surplus C [p-val]	-0.481 [0.000]	-0.529 [0.000]	-0.283 [0.000]	-0.054 [0.191]	-0.670 [0.000]	-0.736 [0.000]	-0.298 [0.000]	
<i>cay</i> [ <i>p</i> -val]	0.025 [0.776]	0.139 [0.380]	-0.016 [0.788]	-0.185 [0.000]	0.366 [0.000]	-0.003 [0.988]	-0.133 [0.023]	
Composite ER [p-val]	-0.572 [0.000]	-0.443 [0.003]	-0.300 [0.000]	0.125 [0.003]	-0.349 [0.000]	-0.8074 [0.000]	-0.361 [0.000]	


Greenwood-Shleifer 14: Extrapolative vs. model return expectations

### B. Analyst Forecasts of Credit Spreads



Bordalo-Gennaioli-Shleifer 18: Predictable errors in credit spread forecasts

### C. CFO Forecasts of Firm Earnings



Gennaioli-Ma-Shleifer 16: Predictable errors in CFO earnings forecasts

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
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D. Professional Forecasters on Macroeconomic Outcomes

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{x}_{t+h} - F_t^i \mathbf{x}_{t+h}}_{\text{Forecast Error}} = \alpha + \beta \underbrace{\left[F_t^i \mathbf{x}_{t+h} - F_{t-1}^i \mathbf{x}_{t+h}\right]}_{\text{Forecast Revision}} + \mathbf{e}_{t+h}$$

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Bordali-Gennaioli-Ma-Shleifer 20: Predictable errors in macro forecasts

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### E. Controlled Experiments

- Forecast AR1.  $x_t = \rho x_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$ . Randomly assign to  $\rho \in \{0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1\}$ .
  - ▶ 40 obs at beginning. Forecast 40 rounds. MTurk & MIT students.

### E. Controlled Experiments


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$$x_{t+h} - F_t^i x_{t+h} = \alpha + \beta \left[ F_t^i x_{t+h} - F_{t-1}^i x_{t+h} \right] + e_{t+h}^i$$

Afrouzi-Kwon-Landier-Ma-Thesmar 20: Predictable forecast errors in simple experiments

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
#### A. Some Short-Term Forecasts

- 1 Short-term corporate earnings (equity analysts)
  - ho eta pprox 0.16 for near-term analyst earnings forecasts (Bouchaud-Krueger-Landier-Thesmar 19)
  - $\beta \approx -0.3$  for long-term analyst earnings forecasts (Bordalo-Gennaioli-La Porta-Shleifer 19)
- 2 Short-term corporate sales (Italian firm managers)

$$\underbrace{x_{t+1}^{i} - F_{t}^{i} x_{t+1}}_{\text{Forecast Error}} = \lambda + \kappa \underbrace{\left[x_{t}^{i} - F_{t-1}^{i} x_{t}\right]}_{\text{Lagged Forecast Error}} + e_{t+h}^{i}$$

- $\kappa \approx 0.1$  (Ma-Ropele-Thesmar-Sraer 20)
- 3 Short-term interest rate forecasts (professional forecasters)
  - ► Error-revision coefficient > 0 for 3M interest rates.
  - ► Always < 0 for 10Y interest rates
  - ▶ Bordalo-Gennaioli-Ma-Shleifer 20, Wang 20, D'Arienzo 20

#### B. Unattended Shocks



Coibion-Gorodnichenko 12: Response of forecast errors to deflationary shocks

C. Consensus Macro Forecasts

$$\underbrace{x_{t+h} - \bar{F}_t x_{t+h}}_{\text{Average Forecast Error}} = \alpha + \beta \underbrace{\left[\bar{F}_t x_{t+h} - \bar{F}_{t-1} x_{t+h}\right]}_{\text{Average Forecast Revision}} + e_{t+h}$$

- $\beta > 0$  (Coibion-Gorodonichenko 15)
  - Possibly due to informational frictions
- In contrast with individual-level results above:  $\beta < 0$  for most series (Bordalo-Gennaioli-Ma-Shleifer 20)

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- In contrast with individual-level results above:  $\beta < 0$  for most series (Bordalo-Gennaioli-Ma-Shleifer 20)
- Difference arises from heterogeneous information sets across forecasts
  - ▶ People don't necessarily react to the same information
  - More on this later



# Taking Stock: Empirical Methods

Research analyzing survey data often use error-revision regressions

- Individual level:  $x_{t+h} F_t^i x_{t+h} = \alpha + \beta \left[ F_t^i x_{t+h} F_{t-1}^i x_{t+h} \right] + e_{t+h}$
- Consensus level:  $x_{t+h} \bar{F}_t x_{t+h} = \alpha + \beta \left[ \bar{F}_t x_{t+h} \bar{F}_{t-1} x_{t+h} \right] + e_{t+h}$

#### Individual level: Test RE in FIRE

- Key advantage: Do not need to know forecaster information set
  - ▶ Forecast revision as a "summary statistic" for information processed
- Limitations: Not necessarily behaved for transitory process
  - ▶ RE: FR = 0 for i.i.d. process  $\Rightarrow \beta$  not reliably estimated
- $\bullet$  Magnitude of  $\beta$  may not be easy to interpret without a given model
  - ▶ Also some path dependence given FR includes  $F_{t-1}$

### Consensus level: Affected by information frictions & FI in FIRE

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# Taking Stock: Empirical Findings

#### Individual-level forecasts:

- Tend to over-adjust to recent observations
  - "Over-extrapolation", "over-reaction"
- More pronounced when true process more transitory
- More pronounced for longer-horizon forecasts

### Consensus (average) forecasts:

- Also affected by informational frictions
  - Infrequent update/not all information is processed
  - Heterogeneous information

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# Deviations from FI: Sticky Information

Mankiw-Reis 02: Infrequent updating (stickiness)

### Basic ideas:

- Each period: updating w/ prob  $(1 \lambda)$ ; no updating with prob  $\lambda$
- Use RE conditional on updating

### Predictions:

- Individual level: if revise forecasts, forecast errors not predictable
  - Cannot be predicted by forecast revisions
  - Could be predicted by other things (not in info set)
- Consensus level: forecast revisions are insufficient
  - $\bar{F}_t x_{t+h} = (1 \lambda) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \lambda^j E_{t-j} x_{t+h}$  (some people have stale expectations)
  - ▶ Positive correlation between average forecast errors & forecast revisions

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# Deviations from FI: Noisy Information

### Woodford 03: Observe noisy signals

### Basic ideas:

- Observe noisy representation of current state:  $y_{it} = x_t + \omega_{it}$ 
  - ► Can interpret as noisy perception, or heterogeneous info.
- Forecasts formed by Kalman filtering:  $F_t^i x_t = Gy_{it} + (1 G)F_{t-1}^i x_t$ 
  - $ightharpoonup G \le 1$  is Kalman gain

### Predictions:

- Individual level: forecast errors not predictable
- ullet Consensus level: forecast revisions are insufficient (given G < 1)

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### Overview

### Models of information frictions above:

- "Under-reaction" to information neglected or imperfectly perceived
- Unbiased with respect to information processed

### Models of imperfect rationality below:

- "Over-reaction" to information being processed
- Because it's more representative (diagnosite expectations) or more available in mind (memory-based models)

# Some Earlier/Simpler Approaches

### Direct extrapolation:

$$F_t x_{t+1} = x_t + \phi(x_t - x_{t-1})$$

- Does not have "kernel of truth"
  - Forecasting rule does not adapt to property of true process.
  - $ightharpoonup \phi$  needs to vary in different settings to fit data.

### Over-estimation of persistence:

$$F_t x_{t+1} = \tilde{\rho} x_t, \quad \tilde{\rho} > \rho$$

• Need a way to specify relationship between  $\hat{\rho}$  and  $\rho$ .

Lack of adjustment to the setting, subject to Lucas critique

# Diagnostic Expectations

### Motivation: Representativeness

- Kahneman-Tversky 83: "An attribute is representative of a class if it is very diagnostic; that is, the relative frequency of this attribute is much higher in that class than in a relevant reference class."
- Assess distribution of attribute T in class G

$$h(T=t|G)$$

• Following KT, define representativeness of T = t for G as:

$$R = \frac{h(T = t|G)}{h(T = t|-G)}$$

• Subjective perception distorts h(T = t|G) by function of R

# Example of Representativeness: Stereotypes

• Hair color:  $T \equiv \{red, light, dark\}, G = lrish, -G = World\}$ 

hair colour	red	light	dark
Irish	10%	40%	50%
World	1%	14%	85%

• Given data (Irish), stereotype inflates prevalence of red hair:

$$\frac{h(\text{red hair}|\text{Irish})}{h(\text{red hair}|\text{World})} = 10$$

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- In a dynamic environment, given news:
  - ▶ Inflate future states whose objective probability goes up the most
  - ▶ The context is lagged information

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# Setup

• State of the economy  $\Omega_t$  at t follows AR1

$$\omega_t = \rho \cdot \omega_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$

• After seeing the state  $\omega_t$ , decision-maker needs to represent:

$$h(\Omega_{t+1} = \omega_{t+1} | \Omega_t = \omega_t)$$

A future state is more representative at t
 if it has become more likely in light of recent data:

$$R_t(\omega_{t+1}) = \frac{h(\Omega_{t+1} = \omega_{t+1} | \Omega_t = \omega_t)}{h(\Omega_{t+1} = \omega_{t+1} | \Omega_t = \rho \cdot \omega_{t-1})}$$

• Reference is information at t-1:  $-G = \{\Omega_t = \rho \cdot \omega_{t-1}\}$ 

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# Diagnostic Expectations

• Distorted subjective distribution  $h_t^{\theta}(\omega_{t+1})$  is:

$$\underbrace{\frac{h\left(\Omega_{t+1} = \omega_{t+1} \middle| \Omega_t = \omega_t\right)}{\text{Objective distribution}} \cdot \underbrace{\left[\frac{h\left(\Omega_{t+1} = \omega_{t+1} \middle| \Omega_t = \omega_t\right)}{h\left(\Omega_{t+1} = \omega_{t+1} \middle| \Omega_t = \rho \cdot \omega_{t-1}\right)\right]^{\theta}}_{\left[R_t\left(\omega_{t+1}\right)\right]^{\theta}} \underbrace{\frac{1}{Z_t}}$$

- $oldsymbol{ heta}$  measures the degree of representativeness bias
  - ▶ Typically estimated to be between 0.5 and 1.
- Diagnostic expectations given by:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t}^{ heta}\left(\omega_{t+1}
ight)=\int_{\mathbb{R}}\omega\cdot h_{t}^{ heta}\left(\omega
ight)d\omega$$

ullet Rational expectations: special case for heta=0 or no news  $\epsilon_t=0$ 

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# Diagnostic Expectations

When  $\omega_t$  is AR1 with normal  $(0, \sigma^2)$  shocks, the distribution  $h^{\theta}(\omega_{t+1})$  is also normal, with variance  $\sigma^2$  and mean:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t}^{\theta}\left(\omega_{t+1}\right) = \mathbb{E}_{t}\left(\omega_{t+1}\right) + \theta\left[\mathbb{E}_{t}\left(\omega_{t+1}\right) - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\left(\omega_{t+1}\right)\right]$$

Can further express  $\mathbb{E}_t^{\theta}(\omega_{t+1})$  as:


$$\mathbb{E}_{t}^{\theta}\left(\omega_{t+1}\right) = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{t}\left(\omega_{t+1}\right)}_{\text{Rational Expectations}} + \underbrace{\rho\theta\left[\omega_{t} - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(\omega_{t})\right]}_{\text{Over-reaction to Recent Shock }\epsilon_{t}}$$

Predictable forecast errors:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t}[\omega_{t+1} - \mathbb{E}_{t}^{\theta}(\omega_{t+1})] = -\rho\theta\epsilon_{t}$$

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# Subjective Probability Distribution



• Subjective distribution  $h_t^{\theta}(\omega_{t+1})$  shifts too much to news

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# **Properties**

$$\mathbb{E}_{t}^{\theta}\left(\omega_{t+1}\right) = \mathbb{E}_{t}\left(\omega_{t+1}\right) + \theta\left[\mathbb{E}_{t}\left(\omega_{t+1}\right) - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(\omega_{t+1})\right]$$

- Rational expectations as special case, when:
  - $\theta = 0$ , persistence  $\rho = 0$ , or no news
- "Kernel of truth"
  - Subjective belief incorporates features of rational beliefs and adapt to the setting of true process: "forward-looking"
  - But exaggerate impact of recent shocks
  - Not subject to Lucas critique (not mechanical dependence on past)
- Refreshes every period
  - ▶ Can add more lags beyond  $[\mathbb{E}_t(\omega_{t+1}) \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(\omega_{t+1})]$ :  $-G = \{\Omega_{t-h}\}$



### Application: Credit Cycles

Bordao-Gennaioli-Shleifer 18

### Non-fundamental reversals:

- Fundamental productivity is AR1:  $\omega_t = \rho \omega_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$ .
- Predictable reversals in expectations:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t}[\mathbb{E}_{t+1}^{\theta}(\omega_{t+2}) - \mathbb{E}_{t}^{\theta}(\omega_{t+2})]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{t}\left[(\rho\omega_{t+1} + \theta\rho\epsilon_{t+1}) - (\rho^{2}\omega_{t} + \theta\rho^{2}\epsilon_{t})\right]$$

$$= -\theta\rho^{2}\epsilon_{t}$$

• Expectations at t over-react to  $\epsilon_t$ . Expectations at t+1 do not.

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## Application: Credit Cycles

Bordao-Gennaioli-Shleifer 18

Reduced form relationships, based on Bordalo-Gennaioli-Shleifer 18:

- Long-lived risk-neutral households, lend to firms. Firms invest.
- Everyone subject to diagnostic expectations.
- Credit spread, ↓ in subjective expected productivity:

$$S_t pprox b_0 - b_1 \mathbb{E}^{ heta}_t(\omega_{t+1})$$

Investment (w/ time to build), ↑ in subjective expected productivity:

$$\mathcal{K}_{t+1} pprox \mathsf{a}_0 - \mathsf{a}_1 \mathbb{E}_t^{ heta}(\omega_{t+1})$$

# Application: Credit Cycles

Bordao-Gennaioli-Shleifer 18

• Apply diagnostic expectations. Credit spreads and investment follow:

$$S_{t} = b_{0}(1 - \rho) + \rho S_{t-1} - \rho b_{1}(1 + \theta)\epsilon_{t} + b_{1}\rho^{2}\theta\epsilon_{t-1}$$
$$K_{t} = a_{0}(1 - \rho) + \rho S_{t-1} + \rho a_{1}(1 + \theta)\epsilon_{t} - a_{1}\rho^{2}\theta\epsilon_{t-1}$$

- Over-reaction to current news, reversal of past news
- Predictable cycles in prices and quantities
  - Excess optimism after good shocks, on average wanes next period

### Biased Beliefs + Information Frictions

Diagnostic Kalman Filter: Bordao-Gennaioli-Ma-Shleifer 20

- Data generating process:  $x_t = \rho x_{t-1} + u_t$ 
  - $ho \in [0,1]$  and  $u_t \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0,\sigma_u^2
    ight)$
- Each forecaster  $i \in [0,1]$  receives noisy signal

$$s_t^i = x_t + \epsilon_t^i$$

- $ightharpoonup \epsilon_t^i \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma_\epsilon^2\right)$
- $ightharpoonup m\epsilon_t^i$  may capture inattention or heterogeneous information/interpretation (Woodford 2003)
- Distorted beliefs characterized by:

$$x_{t+h|t}^{i,\theta} = x_{t+h|t-1}^{i} + (1+\theta) \frac{\sum}{\sum + \sigma_{\epsilon}^{2}} \rho^{h} \cdot \left(s_{t}^{i} - x_{t+h|t-1}^{i}\right)$$

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# Predicting Forecast Errors with Forecast Revisions

Forecast Error on Forecast Revision Regression Coefficient

Consensus level:

$$\beta = \frac{cov\left(x_{t+h} - x_{t+h|t}^{\theta}, x_{t+h|t}^{\theta} - x_{t+h|t-1}^{\theta}\right)}{var\left(x_{t+h|t}^{\theta} - x_{t+h|t-1}^{\theta}\right)} = \left(\sigma_{\epsilon}^{2} - \theta \Sigma\right)h^{*}$$

- ▶ Sign  $\propto \sigma_{\epsilon}^2 \theta \Sigma$ . Forecasters do not react to others' private info.
- Individual level:

$$\beta^{p} = \frac{cov\left(x_{t+h} - x_{t+h|t}^{i,\theta}, x_{t+h|t}^{i,\theta} - x_{t+h|t-1}^{i,\theta}\right)}{var\left(x_{t+h|t}^{i,\theta} - x_{t+h|t-1}^{i,\theta}\right)} = -\frac{\theta(1+\theta)}{(1+\theta)^{2} + \theta^{2}\rho^{2}}$$

- ▶ Negative if  $\theta > 0$ .
- Aggregation can change the interpretation of aggregate relationships.

Yueran Ma (Chicago Booth) Expectations April 2021 45/65

Memory-Based Models

# Background

### Recent interests in the role of memory in belief formation

- Beliefs shaped by information available in the brain
- Many facts about memory from psychology & neuroscience
  - Kahana: Foundations of Human Memory
- Imperfect memory naturally leads to overweighting recent obs

### Recent approaches of modeling

- (1) Recall/retrieval: cued recall, costly recall. (2) Noisy memory.
- For AR1 process  $x_t = \mu + \rho(x_{t-1} \mu) + \epsilon_t$ , generally apply to biases of mean  $\mu$  (simple & effective)



#### Afrouzi-Kwon-Landier-Ma-Thesmar 20

### Model in a nutshell

$$\begin{array}{c}
x_{t} \ \widehat{\mathfrak{do}} & \longrightarrow & (x_{t-1}, x_{t-2\dots}) \\
\min_{S_{t}} \mathbb{E} \left[ \min_{F_{t} \times_{t+h}} \mathbb{E} \left[ (F_{t} \times_{t+h} - x_{t+h})^{2} | S_{t} \right] + C_{t}(S_{t}) \right]
\end{array}$$


•  $S_t$ : Retrieved info set.  $C_t(S_t)$  retrieval cost.  $C_t(S_t) \equiv \omega[\exp(2\ln(2) \cdot \gamma \cdot \mathbb{I}(S_t, x_{t+h}|x_t)) - 1]/\gamma$ 

• 
$$F_t x_{t+h} = \underbrace{E_t x_{t+h}}_{\text{rational forecast}} + \underbrace{\min \left\{ 1, \left( \frac{\omega_{\underline{T}}}{(1 - \rho^h)^2} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\gamma}} \right\} (x_t - E_t x_{t+h})}_{\text{over-reaction}} + \underbrace{\underbrace{E_t x_{t+h}}_{\text{retrieval noise}}}_{\text{retrieval noise}} + \underbrace{\underbrace{E_t x_{t+h}}_{\text{retrieval noise}}}_{\text{over-reaction}}$$

• Degree of bias larger when  $\rho^h$  smaller.


Afrouzi-Kwon-Landier-Ma-Thesmar 20

Model fit using experimental forecasts of AR1 processes



Afrouzi-Kwon-Landier-Ma-Thesmar 20

Model fit using experimental forecasts of AR1 processes



## **Noisy Memory**

da Silveira-Sung-Woodford 20

### Model in a nutshell

$$\left(\begin{array}{ccc} m_t & & & \\ & & \\ & \chi_t & \hat{\mathfrak{o}}\hat{\mathfrak{o}} & \end{array}\right) \xrightarrow{\lambda_t} \left(\begin{array}{ccc} m_{t+1} & & & \\ & & \chi_{t+1} & \hat{\mathfrak{o}}\hat{\mathfrak{o}} & \end{array}\right)$$


$$\hat{\mu}_t = \underbrace{E[\mu|m_t]}_{\text{prior}} + \underbrace{\gamma_t(x_t - (1 - \rho)E[\mu|m_t] - \rho x_{t-1})}_{\text{Kalman updating}}$$

- $\lambda_t$  affects memory cost.  $x_t$  observed after memory state  $m_t$  is formed.
- $\gamma_t$  is function of memory precision; depend on  $\lambda_t$  (optimally chosen).
- High cost/low precision  $\Rightarrow$  more weight on  $x_t$ .

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da Silveira-Sung-Woodford 20

Model fit using experimental forecasts of AR1 processes



# Taking Stocks: Models and Data

Why beliefs respond too much?

- 1 Incorrect persistence  $\hat{\rho} > \rho$ 
  - $F_t x_{t+h} = \mu + \hat{\rho}^h (x_t \mu)$
  - ▶ Unclear how  $\hat{\rho}$  varies with  $\rho$ . Bias  $\downarrow$  when  $h \uparrow$ .
- 2 Over-react to recent shocks
  - ▶ Diagnostic expectations:  $F_t x_{t+h} = E_t x_{t+h} + \theta(E_t x_{t+h} E_{t-1} x_{t+h}) = \mu + \rho^h(x_t \mu) + \theta \rho^h \epsilon_t$
  - ▶ Bias  $\downarrow$  when  $\rho \downarrow$  (same as RE when  $\rho = 0$ ). Bias  $\downarrow$  when  $h \uparrow$ .
- 3 Biases in beliefs about long-run mean (memory models)
  - $F_t x_{t+h} = (1 \rho^h) \hat{\mu}_t + \rho^h x_t$
  - ▶ Bias likely  $\uparrow$  when  $\rho \downarrow$ . Bias  $\uparrow$  when  $h \uparrow$ .
  - ▶ Parsimonious for greater bias when process transitory, horizon long

### Outline

- Empirical Evidence on Expectations
  - Informativeness of Expectations Data
  - Structure of Expectations
- Models of Expectations
  - Deviations from FI in FIRE
  - Deviations from RE in FIRE
- Summary and Additional Resources

### Summary

- Substantial information from data on expectations
  - Impact on decisions.
  - Structure of beliefs.
- Progress in unification of empirical evidence & models
  - Empirical structure increasingly clear
  - Modeling approaches taking shape
- Potential unification with biases in judgment in general
  - ► Stereotypes. Representativeness & availability heuristics.
  - Role of perception and memory.
- New venues for understanding economic activities
  - ► Credit cycles. Financial crises. Over- and under-investment...

## **Open Questions**

- 1 Expectations of fundamentals vs. output vs. prices/returns
- 2 Heterogeneity and disagreement
- 3 Beliefs about central tendencies vs. tails
  - Most expectations data so far about central tendencies
  - ▶ But beliefs about tails can be important, e.g., credit cycles, tech boom
- 4 Interaction with financial structure
  - ▶ Biased expectations can apply to firms, stock markets, credit cycles...
  - ▶ Dependence on settings and financial structure?

### Additional Practical Notes

- Testing deviations from rational expectations
  - ▶ Requires large *T*. Large *N* and small *T* is tricky.
- Kendall/Stambaugh bias (time series) & Nickell bias (panel with individual/firm fixed effects)
  - Suppose with AR1 process  $x_{t+1} = \rho x_t + u_{t+1}$ Bias in estimating  $\rho$ :  $E[\hat{\rho} - \rho] = -\left(\frac{1+3\rho}{T}\right) + o\left(\frac{1}{T^2}\right)$
  - Suppose use  $z_t$  to predict  $x_{t+1}$ , where  $z_{t+1} = \phi z_t + v_{t+1}$ Want to estimate  $x_{t+1} = \beta z_t + e_{t+1}$ Bias in estimating  $\beta$ :  $\gamma E[\hat{\rho} - \rho]$ , where  $\gamma = \sigma_{uv}/\sigma_u^2$
  - Forecast errors likely auto-correlated with overlapping horizons
- Be careful interpreting tests using average beliefs

### **Expectations Data**

- Duke CFO Survey: www.cfosurvey.org
  - Forecasts of next 12 months
  - Earnings, sales, CAPX, R&D, employment, wage, productivity, price;
     S&P 500 returns.
  - Aggregate and sectoral data. Quarterly since 1998.
- IBES Analyst (on WRDS)
  - Quarterly, annual, and long-term growth forecasts
  - Mainly EPS and sales. Firm-level data, since 1980s.
- IBES Firm Guidance (on WRDS)
  - Quarterly and annual forecasts
  - Mainly EPS and sales. Firm-level data, since 1980s.

### **Expectations Data**

### American Association of Individual Investors

- Next 6 months stock market sentiment (qualitative)
- ► Aggregate data. Weekly since late 1980s.

### Gallup

- Next 12 months stock market sentiment
- Aggregate data. Monthly since 1990s (with gaps).
- ► See Robin Greenwood's website

### Shiller

- Individual stock market confidence index
- Aggregate data. Monthly since early 2000s.
- RAND American Life Panel
  - ▶ Stock returns within range. Since 2008.



## **Expectations Data**

- Michigan Survey of Consumers
  - Inflation, consumer sentiment, stock returns (occasional)
  - Aggregate and house-hold level data. Monthly (not panel)
- New York Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations
  - ▶ Inflation, spending, unemployment rate, house prices, etc.
  - Proprietary. Monthly since late 2012.
- Survey of Professional Forecasters
  - GDP, inflation, interest rates
  - ▶ Aggregate and forecaster-level. Quarterly since late 1960s.
- BlueChip Survey
  - ► GDP, inflation, Treasury rates, AAA/BAA yield
  - ▶ Needs purchase. Aggregate and forecaster-level. Monthly.

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