

## Problem set 5

### MTL 763 (Introduction to Game Theory)

**Q.1** Consider a network game with  $n = 3$  or  $n = 4$ , where the utility function of player  $i$  at network  $g$  is given by

$$u_i(g) = R_i(g) - c \cdot d_i(g),$$

where  $R_i(g)$  is the number of other players that can be reached from player  $i$  at network  $g$ , and  $d_i(g)$  is the degree (number of neighbors) of node  $i$ . What are the pairwise stable networks and efficient networks for all values of  $c$ .

**Q.2** Consider a network game where the value of network is the total number edges which is divided equally among the players. What are the pairwise stable and efficient networks?

**Q.3** Construct a network game which has Nash stable, pairwise stable, pairwise Nash stable, and efficient networks.

**Q.4** Consider a set of all feasible 4 nodes networks given by Figure 1. What are the





Figure 1: Networks in a Four Person Society.

pairwise stable, Pareto efficient, and efficient networks?

**Q.5** Construct a network game possibly with 3 or 4 nodes which has unique pairwise stable which can be reached via improving deviations.

**Q.6** Consider the symmetric connections model with three players

- What are the Nash stable and pairwise Nash stable networks for all values of  $c$ ?
- Show that the strategy profiles corresponding to a Nash stable network are Nash equilibrium in link-announcement game.

**Q.7** Consider a 4 link network in a 4-player network game where the degree of each node is 2. List out the strategy profiles in a link announcement game which generate this network.

**Q.8** Consider an  $n$ -player network formation game. The cost incurred by a player from direct link is  $\alpha > 0$ . Players also incur cost due to the distance from other nodes. Then, the cost incurred by player  $i$  at network  $g$  is given by

$$c_i(g) = \alpha \cdot K_i(g) + \sum_{j=1}^n d_{i,j}(g),$$

where  $K_i(g)$  denote the number of direct links connected to node  $i$  and  $d_{i,j}(g)$  denote the shortest distance between  $i$  and  $j$  at network  $g$ .

- (a) Find all values of  $\alpha$  for which complete network is pairwise stable.
- (b) Find all values of  $\alpha$  for which star network is pairwise stable.
- (c) For all values of  $\alpha$  find the PoA in case of 3 players.