








<https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/ci/variables/>

Don't trust third party GitHub Actions

Type		Key	Value	State
Variable	⬆	KUBE_URL	https://1.2.3.4	Protected <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
File	⬆	KUBE_CA_PEM	-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE--- -- MIICyDCCAbCg	Protected <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>





Then **Envi**GitHub Actions!



CodeCov:

[https://www.wolfe.id.au/2021/04/26/
github-actions-supply-chain-attacks/](https://www.wolfe.id.au/2021/04/26/github-actions-supply-chain-attacks/)



The Evil GitHub Actions!

- Usually C.I. / C.D. system stores sensitive information.
- They need them to access to productive environments, publish artefacts, perform some checks, etc
- They, usually, store as environment vars.

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A reverse **Shell** in the Pipeline

- What if an user can execute anything in a Pipeline?
- What if the C.I. has not limited the output traffic?