

PRESENTED BY: Craig Francis

Ending Injection Vulnerabilities, Using developer defined strings.

<https://eiv.dev/>



```
$sql = 'SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ' . $_GET['id'];
```



```
$sql = 'SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = $_GET['id'];
```

```
SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = 123
```



`$sql = 'SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = $_GET['id'];`

`SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = -1 UNION SELECT * FROM admin`



```
$sql = 'SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ' . $_GET['id'];
```

```
$db->query($sql);
```





```
$sql = 'SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ?';
```

```
$db->query($sql, $_GET['id']);
```



QueryBuilder

```
$articles->where('author_id', $id);
```

```
$articles->where('author_id IS NULL');
```

```
$articles->where('DATE(published)', $date);
```




```
$articles->where('author_id', $id);
```

```
$articles->where('author_id IS NULL');
```

```
$articles->where('DATE(published)', $date);
```

```
$articles->where('word_count > 1000');
```

```
$articles->where('word_count > ', $count);
```

```
$articles->where('word_count > ' . $count);
```

```
'word_count > word_count UNION SELECT * FROM admin'
```



Doctrine QueryBuilder

```
$qb->select('u')
```

```
->from('User', 'u')
```

```
->where('u.id = :identifier')
```

```
->setParameter('identifier', $_GET['id']);
```

```
$qb->select('u')
```

```
->from('User', 'u')
```

```
->where('u.id = ' . $_GET['id']); // INSECURE
```

Demo Time

<https://laravel.examples.eiv.dev/users/example-a/>

Laravel DB

whereRaw()

```
DB::table('user')  
->where('id', '=', $id);
```

```
DB::table('user')  
->where('name', 'LIKE', $search . '%');
```


DB::table('user')

->where('CONCAT(name_first, " ", name_last)', 'LIKE', \$search . '%');



DB::table('user')

->whereRaw('CONCAT(name_first, " ", name_last) LIKE ?', \$search . '%');




DB::table('user')

->whereRaw('CONCAT(name_first, " ", name_last) LIKE "' . \$search . '%"');



DB::table('user')

->whereRaw('CONCAT(name_first, " ", name_last) LIKE "' . \$search . '%"');




Demo Time

<https://laravel.examples.eiv.dev/users/example-b/>


Laravel DB

orderByRaw()

```
DB::table('user')  
->orderBy('LENGTH(email)');
```




```
DB::table('user')  
->orderByRaw('LENGTH(email)');
```





```
DB::table('user')  
    ->orderBy('name');
```

```
DB::table('user')  
    ->orderBy('name_first')  
    ->orderBy('name_last');
```

```
DB::table('user')  
->orderBy('name_first, name_last');
```




```
DB::table('user')  
->orderByRaw('name_first, name_last');
```



```
$sort = $request->input('sort');
```


← Query String "/?sort=id"

```
DB::table('user')  
->orderByRaw('$sort ?? 'name_first, name_last');
```




```
$sort = $request->input('sort');
```

```
DB::table('user')  
->orderByRaw('$sort ?? 'name_first, name_last');
```




```
$sort = $request->input('sort');
```

```
DB::table('user')  
->orderByRaw('$sort ?? 'name_first, name_last');
```




```
$sort = $request->input('sort');
```

```
DB::table('user')  
->orderByRaw('$sort ?? 'name_first, name_last');
```





```
$sort = $request->input('sort');
```

```
DB::table('user')  
->orderByRaw('$sort ?? 'name_first, name_last');
```



```
$sort = $request->input('sort');
```

```
DB::table('user')  
->orderByRaw('$sort ?? 'name_first, name_last');
```



Demo Time

<https://laravel.examples.eiv.dev/users/example-c/?id=1>

Laravel DB

DB::select()

```
$id = $request->input('id');
```

```
DB::select('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ?', [$id]);
```


```
$id = $request->input('id');
```

```
DB::select('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ' . $id);
```




```
$id = $request->input('id');
```

```
DB::select('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ' . $id);
```



```
$id = $request->input('id');
```

```
DB::select('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ' . $id);
```



Demo Time

<https://twig.examples.eiv.dev/example-a/>

```
$html = '<p>Hi {{ name }}</p>';
```

```
$template->render($html, ['name' => $name]);
```

```
$html = '<p>Hi ' . $name . '</p>';
```

```
$template->render($html);
```

```
$html = '<p>Hi ' . $name . '</p>';
```



```
$template->render($html);
```

```
'<p>Hi <script>alert();</script></p>'
```



Context aware?



```
$html = '<a href="{{ url }}">Link</a>';
```

```
$template->render($html, ['url' => $url]);
```



```
'<a href="javascript:alert()">Link</a>'
```



Missing quotes?



```
$html = '<img src={{ url }} alt="Alt Text" />';
```



```
$template->render($html, ['url' => $url]);
```

```
'<img src=/ onerror=alert(1) alt="Alt Text" />'
```



Command Line Injection

```
$exec = 'grep "" . $search . "" /path/to/file';
```



```
grep "" /path/to/secrets; # "" /path/to/file
```



Taint Checking???

Where variables note if they are **Tainted**, or **Untainted**.



Untainted



```
$html = '<p>Hello Everybody,</p>';
```



Untainted

Untainted Tainted Untainted



```
$html = '<p>Hi ' . $name . '</p>';
```



Tainted



Untainted



Tainted Untainted



```
$html = '<p>Hi ' . htmlspecialchars($name) . '</p>';
```



Untainted



Escaped, to make it Safe :-)

```
<p>Hello &lt;script&gt;alert()&lt;/script&gt;</p>
```

Unfortunately Taint Checking incorrectly assumes escaping makes a value “safe” for *any* context.

Untainted



Tainted Untainted



```
$html = "<a href='" . htmlspecialchars($url) . "'>Link</a>";
```



Escapes & ' " < > ... Is this Safe?

```
<a href='javascript:alert()>Link</a>
```



Untainted



Tainted Untainted



```
$html = "";
```

Missing Quotes



Escapes & ' " < > ... Is this Safe?

```
<img src=/ onerror=alert() />
```



Untainted



Tainted Untainted



```
$html = "<img src='' . htmlspecialchars($url) . '' />";
```



Is this Safe?

Before PHP 8.1, single
quotes were not
encoded by default :-)



```
<img src='/' onerror='alert()' />
```



Untainted



Tainted



```
$sql = "WHERE id = " . mysqli_real_escape_string($link, $id);
```

Missing Quotes



Escaped ... Is this Safe?



```
WHERE id = -1 UNION SELECT * FROM admin
```



**Taint Checking is close,
but *escaping* should be done by a Library.**

Christoph Kern

Preventing Security Bugs through Software Design

USENIX Security 2015

AppSec California 2016

<https://youtu.be/ccfEu-Jj0as>

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Building Secure & Reliable Systems

Best Practices for Designing, Implementing
and Maintaining Systems



Heather Adkins, Betsy Beyer,
Paul Blankinship, Piotr Lewandowski,
Ana Oprea & Adam Stubblefield

Building Secure and Reliable Systems

March 2020

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Common Security Vulnerabilities

Page 266

**"Distinguishing strings from a trusted developer,
from strings that may be attacker controlled"**


Mike Samuel - 27th March 2019

We can simplify the problem, by checking for:

"strings from a trusted developer"

Safe* vs Unsafe

**When talking about
Injection Vulnerabilities**




Safe*

**A developer defined string.
(in the source code)**

Unsafe

Everything else.

???



Safe*



Unsafe



```
$sql = "... WHERE id = " . $id;
```

```
$db->query($sql);
```


Unsafe



Safe*



Unsafe




```
$sql = "... WHERE id = " . $id;
```

```
$db->query($sql);
```



???



Safe*



Unsafe



```
$sql = "... WHERE id = " . mysqli_real_escape_string($link, $id);
```

```
$db->query($sql);
```

Unsafe



Safe*



Unsafe



```
$sql = "... WHERE id = " . mysqli_real_escape_string($link, $id);
```

```
$db->query($sql);
```



Safe*



```
$sql = "... WHERE id = ?";
```

```
$db->query($sql, $id);
```



Unsafe



Remember, only "Safe"
when talking about
Injection Vulnerabilities.



Safe*

\$path = "/";
rm -rf /



\$command = 'rm -rf ?';

shell_exec(\$command, [\$path]);



Unsafe



Special Cases

Did you remember to
ensure all were integers?

`$sql = 'WHERE id IN (' . implode(',', $ids) . ')';`

`$db->query($sql);`

`'WHERE id IN (1, 7, 9)'`

`WHERE id = (-1) UNION SELECT * FROM admin WHERE id IN (2)`



```
$sql = 'WHERE id IN (' . in_parameters(count($ids)) . ')';
```

```
$db->query($sql, $ids);
```

```
'WHERE id IN (?, ?, ?)'
```




```
$sql = 'WHERE id IN (' . in_parameters(count($ids)) . ')';
```

```
function in_parameters($count) {  
    $sql = '?';  
    for ($k = 1; $k < $count; $k++) {  
        $sql .= ',?';  
    }  
    return $sql;  
}
```

Could try to escape the field...
But should *any* field be allowed?



```
$sql = 'ORDER BY ' . $order_field;
```

```
$fields = [  
    'name',  
    'email',  
    'created',  
];
```

← List of Allowed fields

```
$order_id = array_search($order_field, $fields);
```

```
$sql = 'ORDER BY ' . $fields[$order_id];
```

↑
Array of "developer defined strings"

```
$fields = [  
    'name'    => 'u.full_name',  
    'email'   => 'u.email_address',  
    'created' => 'DATE(u.created)',  
];
```

← List of Allowed fields

```
$sql = 'ORDER BY ' . ($fields[$order_field] ?? 'u.full_name');
```

↑
Array of "developer defined strings"

How about Identifiers in SQL?

If you **cannot** use an "allow list" of developer defined strings...

```
$sql = 'SELECT * FROM {my_table} WHERE id = ?';
```


```
$db->query($sql, [$id], ['my_table' => $table]);
```



SQL, as a "developer defined string"

```
$sql = 'SELECT * FROM {my_table} WHERE id = ?';
```

```
$db->query($sql, [$id], ['my_table' => $table]);
```



Parameters (as normal)

```
$sql = 'SELECT * FROM {my_table} WHERE id = ?';
```


```
$db->query($sql, [$id], ['my_table' => $table]);
```



Identifiers,
Provided separately,
Escaped correctly,
Rarely needed.

Using this today

<https://eiv.dev>



Python, use the **LiteralString** type - Python 3.11 (October 2022, PEP 675)

Go, use an **un-exported string type** - How "go-safe-html" works.

Rust, use a **Procedural Macro** - Thanks Geoffroy Couprie

C++, use a **constexpr** annotation - Thanks Jonathan Müller

Java, use **@CompileTimeConstant** annotation - Using ErrorProne from Google

Node, use **goog.string.Const** - Using Google's Closure Library

Node, use **isTemplateObject** - With "is-template-object" by Mike Samuel

JavaScript and **PHP**...

In **JavaScript**, hopefully one day you will be able to use:
isTemplateObject
or
TrustedHTML.fromLiteral

Thanks to Krzysztof Kotowicz

**In PHP,
use Static Analysis and the literal-string type...**

Using Psalm

Thanks to Matthew Brown

```
composer require --dev vimeo/psalm  
./vendor/bin/psalm --init
```

Check Psalm is at level 3 or stricter.
(level 1 is the most strict)

Use 'literal-string'
type for \$sql

```
1 <?php
2
3 $id = (string) ($_GET['id'] ?? '');
4
5 class db {
6
7     /**
8      * @psalm-param literal-string $sql
9      */
10
11     public function query(string $sql, array $parameters = []): void {
12
13         // Send $sql and $parameters to the database.
14
15     }
16
17 }
18
19 $db = new db();
20
21 $db->query('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ?', [$id]);
22
23 $db->query('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ' . $id);
24
```

```
1 <?php
2
3 $id = (string) ($_GET['id'] ?? '');
4
```

Terminal

```
craig$ ./vendor/bin/psalm
Scanning files...
Analyzing files...
```

```
ERROR: ArgumentTypeCoercion - public/index.php:23:12 - Argument 1 of db::query expects literal-string, parent type non-empty-string provided
(see https://psalm.dev/193)
```

```
$db->query('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ' . $id);
```

```
-----
1 errors found
-----
```

```
Checks took 0.00 seconds and used 4.375MB of memory
No files analyzed
Psalm was able to infer types for 100% of the codebase
craig$
```



```
19 $db = new DB();
20
21 $db->query('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ?', [$id]);
22
23 $db->query('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ' . $id);
24
```

Using PHPStan

Thanks to Ondřej Mirtes

```
composer require --dev phpstan/phpstan
```

Check PHPStan is at level:

5 or stricter when an argument uses a single type.
7 or stricter when an argument uses multiple types.

(level 9 is the most strict)

Use 'literal-string'
type for \$sql

```
1 <?php
2
3 $id = (string) ($_GET['id'] ?? '');
4
5 class db {
6
7     /**
8      * @phpstan-param literal-string $sql
9      * @phpstan-param array<int, string> $parameters
10     */
11
12     public function query(string $sql, array $parameters = []): void {
13
14         // Send $sql and $parameters to the database.
15
16     }
17
18 }
19
20 $db = new db();
21
22 $db->query('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ?', [$id]);
23
24 $db->query('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ' . $id);
```

```
1 <?php
2
3 $id = (string) ($_GET['id'] ?? '');
4
5 class db {
```

Terminal

```
craig$ vendor/bin/phpstan analyse --level 9 public
1/1 [████████████████████] 100%
```

Line	index.php
24	Parameter #1 \$sql of method db::query() expects literal-string, non-empty-string given.


[ERROR] Found 1 error

```
craig$
```


```
20 $db = new db();
21
22 $db->query('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ?', [$id]);
23
24 $db->query('SELECT * FROM user WHERE id = ' . $id);
```




A Small Problem...



2021



2022



$$23 + 8 + 2 = 33\%$$

Make it a key part of the Programming Language

PHP: rfc:literal_string

wiki.php.net/rfc/literal_string

php

Edit this pageAdminLogoutCraig Francis (craigfrancis)

Search

start › rfc › literal_string

PHP RFC: LiteralString

- Version: 2.0
- Voting Start: ???
- Voting End: ???
- RFC Started: 2022-12-27
- RFC Updated: 2023-03-16
- Author: Craig Francis, craig#at#craigfrancis.co.uk
- Contributors: Joe Watkins, Máté Kocsis
- Status: Draft
- First Published at: https://wiki.php.net/rfc/literal_string
- GitHub Repo: <https://github.com/craigfrancis/php-is-literal-rfc/blob/main/readme-v2.md>
- Implementation: <https://github.com/php/php-src/compare/master...krakjoe:literals>

Introduction

Add *LiteralString* type, and *is_literal_string()*, to “distinguish strings from a trusted developer, from strings that may be attacker controlled”.

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**"Distinguishing strings from a trusted developer,
from strings that may be attacker controlled"**

Mike Samuel - 27th March 2019

Thank You

Questions?

<https://eiv.dev/>

@craigfrancis