

# Study Outline

## Chapter 20: Foreign and Military Policy

- I. Introduction
  - A. Effects of the September 11 attacks
    - 1. Public consciousness about international terrorism
    - 2. Outbursts of patriotism
    - 3. Confidence in government
    - 4. Emergence of important fundamental questions
      - a. How to wage a "war" against terrorism?
      - b. How to hold other nations accountable?
      - c. How to act when other nations fight terrorism?
      - d. Does such a war require military to be redesigned?
    - 5. Reemergence of classic questions
      - a. Do we only support nations that are reasonably free and democratic?
      - b. Are we the world's policemen?
  - B. Democratic politics and foreign and military policy
    - 1. Tocqueville and weakness of democracy
    - 2. Others blame reckless policies of presidents
- II. Kinds of foreign policy
  - A. Majoritarian politics
    - 1. Perceived to confer widespread benefits, impose widespread costs
    - 2. Examples
      - a. War
      - b. Military alliances
      - c. Nuclear test ban or strategic arms limitation treaties
      - d. Response to Berlin blockade by Soviets
      - e. Cuban missile crisis
      - f. Covert CIA operations
      - g. Diplomatic recognition of People's Republic of China
  - B. Interest group politics
    - 1. Identifiable groups pitted against one another for costs, benefits
    - 2. Examples
      - a. Cyprus policy: Greeks versus Turks
      - b. Tariffs: Japanese versus steel
  - C. Client politics
    - 1. Benefits to identifiable group, without apparent costs to any distinct group
    - 2. Example: Israel policy (transformation to interest group politics?)
  - D. Who has power?
    - 1. Majoritarian politics: president dominates; public opinion supports but does not guide
    - 2. Interest group or client politics: larger congressional role
    - 3. Entrepreneurial politics: Congress the central political arena
- III. The constitutional and legal context
  - A. The Constitution creates an "invitation to struggle"
    - 1. President commander in chief but Congress appropriates money
    - 2. President appoints ambassadors, but Senate confirms
    - 3. President negotiates treaties, but Senate ratifies
    - 4. But Americans think president in charge, which history confirms
  - B. Presidential box score
    - 1. Presidents relatively strong in foreign affairs
      - a. More successes in Congress on foreign than on domestic affairs
      - b. Unilateral commitments of troops upheld but stronger than Framers intended
        - 1. 1801: Jefferson sends navy to Barbary
        - 2. 1845: Polk sends troops to Mexico
        - 3. 1861: Lincoln blockades Southern ports
        - 4. 1940: FDR sends destroyers to Britain
        - 5. 1950: Truman sends troops to Korea
        - 6. 1960s: Kennedy and Johnson send forces to Vietnam

7. 1983: Reagan sends troops to Grenada
  8. 1989: Bush orders invasion of Panama
  9. 1990: Bush sends forces into Kuwait
  10. 1999: Clinton orders bombing of Serbian forces
  11. 2000: Bush sends troops to Afghanistan
2. Presidents comparatively weak in foreign affairs; other heads of state find U.S. presidents unable to act
    - a. Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt unable to ally with Great Britain before World War I and World War II
    - b. Wilson unable to lead U.S. into the League of Nations
    - c. Reagan criticized on commitments to El Salvador and Lebanon
    - d. Bush debated Congress on declaration of Gulf War
- C. Evaluating the power of the president
1. Depends on one's agreement/disagreement with policies
  2. Supreme Court gives federal government wide powers; reluctant to intervene in Congress-president disputes
    - a. Nixon's enlarging of Vietnam war
    - b. Lincoln's illegal measures during Civil War
    - c. Carter's handling of Iranian assets
    - d. Franklin Roosevelt's "relocation" of 100,000 Japanese-Americans
- D. Checks on presidential power: political rather than constitutional
1. Congress: control of purse strings
  2. Limitations on the president's ability to give military or economic aid to other countries
    - a. Arms sales to Turkey
    - b. Blockage of intervention in Angola
    - c. Legislative veto (previously) on large sale of arms
  3. War Powers Act of 1973
    - a. Provisions
      1. Only sixty-day commitment of troops without declaration of war
      2. All commitments reported within forty-eight hours
      3. Legislative veto (previously) to bring troops home
    - b. Observance
      1. no president has acknowledged constitutionality
      2. Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton sent troops without explicit congressional authorization
    - c. Supreme Court action (*Chadha* case)
      1. Struck down the legislative veto
      2. Other provisos to be tested
    - d. Effect of act doubtful even if upheld
      1. Brief conflicts not likely to be affected; Congress has not challenged a successful operation
      2. Even extended hostilities continue: Vietnam and Lebanon
  4. Intelligence oversight
    - a. Only two committees today, not the previous eight
    - b. No authority to disapprove covert action
    - c. But "covert" actions less secret after congressional debate
    - d. Congress sometimes blocks covert action: Boland Amendment
    - e. Congressional concern about CIA after attacks of September 11
- IV. The machinery of foreign policy
- A. Consequences of major power status
    1. President more involved in foreign affairs
    2. More agencies shape foreign policy
  - B. Numerous agencies not really coordinated by anyone
  - C. Secretary of State unable to coordinate
    1. Job too big for one person
    2. Most agencies owe no political or bureaucratic loyalty
  - D. National Security Council created to coordinate
    1. Chaired by president and includes vice president, secretaries of State and Defense, director of CIA, chair of joint chiefs
    2. National security adviser heads staff
    3. Goal of staff is balanced view

4. Grown in influence since Kennedy but downgraded by Reagan
5. NSC rivals secretary of state
- E. Consequences of multicentered decision-making machinery
  1. "It's never over" because of rivalries within and between branches
  2. Agency positions influenced by agency interests
- V. Foreign policy and public opinion
  - A. Outlines of foreign policy shaped by public and elite opinion
    1. Before World War II, public opposed U.S. involvement
    2. World War II shifted popular opinion because
      - a. Universally popular war
      - b. War successful
      - c. United States emerged as world's dominant power
    3. Support for active involvement persisted until Vietnam
      - a. Yet support for internationalism highly general
      - b. Public opinion now mushy and volatile
  - B. Backing the president
    1. Public's tendency to support president in crises
      - a. Foreign crises increases presidential level of public approval
      - b. Strong support to rally 'round the flag for some but not all foreign military crises
    2. Presidential support does not decrease with casualties
    3. Americans support escalation rather than withdrawal in a conflict
  - C. Mass versus elite opinion
    1. Mass opinion
      - a. Generally poorly informed
      - b. Generally supportive of president
      - c. Conservative, less internationalist
    2. Elite opinion
      - a. Better informed
      - b. Opinions change more rapidly (Vietnam)
      - c. Protest on moral or philosophical grounds
      - d. More liberal and internationalist
- VI. Cleavages among foreign policy elites
  - A. Foreign policy elite divided
  - B. How a worldview shapes foreign policy
    1. Definition of *worldview*: comprehensive mental picture of world issues facing the United States and ways of responding
    2. Example: Mr. X article on containment of USSR
    3. Not unanimously accepted but consistent with public's mood, events, and experience
  - C. Four worldviews
    1. Isolation paradigm
      - a. Opposes involvement in European wars
      - b. Adopted after World War I because war accomplished little
    2. Appeasement (containment) paradigm
      - a. Reaction to appeasement of Hitler in Munich
      - b. Pearl Harbor ended isolationism in United States
      - c. Postwar policy to resist Soviet expansionism
    3. Disengagement ("Vietnam") paradigm
      - a. Reaction to military defeat and political disaster of Vietnam
      - b. Crisis interpreted in three ways
        1. Correct worldview but failed to try hard enough
        2. Correct worldview but applied in wrong place
        3. Worldview itself wrong
      - c. Critics believed worldview wrong and new one based on new isolationism needed
      - d. Elites with disengagement view in Carter administration but were replaced during Reagan and Bush administrations
    4. Human rights
      - a. Clinton had a disinterest in foreign policy and his advisors believed in disengagement.

- b. Clinton's strongest congressional supporters argued against the Gulf War but advocated military intervention in Kosovo.
      - c. Change in view explained by concern for human rights and belief that situation in Kosovo amounted to genocide
      - d. Conservatives who supported containment in Gulf War urged disengagement in Kosovo
    - 5. The politics of coalition building
      - a. Should the United States act "alone?"
      - b. If so, in what circumstances?
- VII. The Use of Military Force
  - A. Military power more important after collapse of Soviet Union and end of Cold War
    - 1. Military force used to attack Iraq, defend Kosovo, maintain order in Bosnia, and occupy Haiti and Somalia
    - 2. Several nations have long-range rockets and weapons of destruction
    - 3. Many nations feel threatened by neighbors
    - 4. Russia still has nuclear weapons
  - B. Majoritarian view of military
    - 1. Almost all Americans benefit, almost all pay
    - 2. President is the commander-in-chief
    - 3. Congress plays largely a supportive role
  - C. Client view of military
    - 1. Real beneficiaries of military spending--general, admirals, big corporations, members of Congress whose districts get fat defense contracts--but everyone pays
    - 2. Military-industrial complex shapes what is spent
- VIII. The defense budget
  - A. Total spending
    - 1. Small peacetime military until 1950
      - a. No disarmament after Korea because of Soviet threat
      - b. Military system designed to repel Soviet invasion of Europe and small-scale invasions
    - 2. Public opinion supports a large military
    - 3. Demise of USSR produced debate
      - a. Liberals: sharp defense cuts; United States should not serve as world's police officer
      - b. Conservatives: some cuts but retain well-funded military because world still dangerous
    - 4. Desert Storm and Kosovo campaigns made clear no escaping U.S. need to use military force
    - 5. Kosovo campaign indicated that military had been reduced too much
    - 6. Clinton and Republican Congress called for more military spending
- IX. What do we buy with our money?
  - A. Changing circumstances make justification of expenditures complex
    - 1. World War II and Cold War: big armies, artillery, tanks, ships, etc.
    - 2. War on Terrorism: small groups, special forces, high-tech communications, precision guided bombs, and rockets
    - 3. Joint operations now also seem more necessary
  - B. Secretary of defense
    - 1. Must transform conventional military for wars on terrorism
    - 2. Must budget in an atmosphere of debate and pressure from members of both the military and Congress
  - C. Debating big new weapons
    - 1. Washington folks are used to it (B-1, B-2 bombers, MX missiles, M1 tank, etc.)
    - 2. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or "Star Wars") debate particularly protracted
      - a. Major scientific and philosophical quarrels
      - b. Reluctance among the military
        - 1. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) requires more missiles and bombers
        - 2. SDI may reduce spending on missiles and bombers
      - c. Concern MAD only works against rational leaders
- X. What do we get for our money?
  - A. Personnel

1. From draft to all-volunteer force in 1973
2. Volunteer force improved as result of:
  - a. Increases in military pay
  - b. Rising civilian unemployment
3. Changes in military
  - a. More women in military
  - b. Ban of women on combat ships lifted in 1993 but Congress to be consulted if ground combat involved
  - c. "Don't ask, don't tell" compromise adopted by Clinton on homosexuals in military
- B. Big-ticket hardware
  1. Main reasons for cost overruns
    - a. Unpredictability of cost of new items
    - b. Contractor incentives to underestimate at first
    - c. Military chiefs want best weapons money can buy
    - d. "Sole sourcing" of weapons without competitive bids
    - e. Holding down budget by "stretching out" production
  2. Latter four factors can be controlled; first cannot
- C. Small-ticket items
  1. Seemingly outrageous prices come from allocation of overhead, small run of items produced
  2. Others result from "gold-plating" phenomenon
- D. Readiness, favorite area for short-term budget cutting
  1. Other cuts would hurt constituents
  2. Cuts here show up quickly in money saved
- E. Bases
  1. At one time, a lot of bases opened and few closed
  2. Commission on Base Realignment and Closure created to take client politics out of base closings
- XI. Structure of defense decision-making
  - A. National Security Act of 1947
    1. Department of Defense
      - a. Secretary of Defense (civilian, as are secretaries of the army, navy, and air force)
      - b. Joint Chiefs of Staff (military)
    2. Reasons for separate uniformed services
      - a. Fear that unified military will become too powerful
      - b. Desire of services to preserve their autonomy
      - c. Interservice rivalries intended by Congress to receive maximum information
  - B. 1986 defense reorganization plan
    1. Joint Chiefs of Staff
      - a. Composed of uniformed head of each service with a chair and vice chair appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate
      - b. Chair since 1986 principal military adviser to president
    2. Joint Staff
      - a. Officers from each service assisting JCS
      - b. Since 1986 serves chair; promoted at same rate
    3. The services
      - a. Each service headed by a civilian secretary responsible for purchasing and public affairs
      - b. Senior military officer oversees discipline and training
    4. The chain of command
      - a. Chair of JCS does not have combat command
      - b. Uncertainty whether 1986 changes will work