

Study Outline

Chapter 20: Foreign and Military Policy

- I. Introduction
 - A. Effects of the September 11 attacks
 - 1. Public consciousness about international terrorism
 - 2. Outbursts of patriotism
 - 3. Confidence in government
 - 4. Emergence of important fundamental questions
 - a. How to wage a "war" against terrorism?
 - b. How to hold other nations accountable?
 - c. How to act when other nations fight terrorism?
 - d. Does such a war require military to be redesigned?
 - 5. Reemergence of classic questions
 - a. Do we only support nations that are reasonably free and democratic?
 - b. Are we the world's policemen?
 - B. Democratic politics and foreign and military policy
 - 1. Tocqueville and weakness of democracy
 - 2. Others blame reckless policies of presidents
- II. Kinds of foreign policy
 - A. Majoritarian politics
 - 1. Perceived to confer widespread benefits, impose widespread costs
 - 2. Examples
 - a. War
 - b. Military alliances
 - c. Nuclear test ban or strategic arms limitation treaties
 - d. Response to Berlin blockade by Soviets
 - e. Cuban missile crisis
 - f. Covert CIA operations
 - g. Diplomatic recognition of People's Republic of China
 - B. Interest group politics
 - 1. Identifiable groups pitted against one another for costs, benefits
 - 2. Examples
 - a. Cyprus policy: Greeks versus Turks
 - b. Tariffs: Japanese versus steel
 - C. Client politics
 - 1. Benefits to identifiable group, without apparent costs to any distinct group
 - 2. Example: Israel policy (transformation to interest group politics?)
 - D. Who has power?
 - 1. Majoritarian politics: president dominates; public opinion supports but does not guide
 - 2. Interest group or client politics: larger congressional role
 - 3. Entrepreneurial politics: Congress the central political arena
- III. The constitutional and legal context
 - A. The Constitution creates an "invitation to struggle"
 - 1. President commander in chief but Congress appropriates money
 - 2. President appoints ambassadors, but Senate confirms
 - 3. President negotiates treaties, but Senate ratifies
 - 4. But Americans think president in charge, which history confirms
 - B. Presidential box score
 - 1. Presidents relatively strong in foreign affairs
 - a. More successes in Congress on foreign than on domestic affairs
 - b. Unilateral commitments of troops upheld but stronger than Framers intended
 - 1. 1801: Jefferson sends navy to Barbary
 - 2. 1845: Polk sends troops to Mexico
 - 3. 1861: Lincoln blockades Southern ports
 - 4. 1940: FDR sends destroyers to Britain
 - 5. 1950: Truman sends troops to Korea
 - 6. 1960s: Kennedy and Johnson send forces to Vietnam

- 7. 1983: Reagan sends troops to Grenada
 - 8. 1989: Bush orders invasion of Panama
 - 9. 1990: Bush sends forces into Kuwait
 - 10. 1999: Clinton orders bombing of Serbian forces
 - 11. 2000: Bush sends troops to Afghanistan
- 2. Presidents comparatively weak in foreign affairs; other heads of state find U.S. presidents unable to act
 - a. Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt unable to ally with Great Britain before World War I and World War II
 - b. Wilson unable to lead U.S. into the League of Nations
 - c. Reagan criticized on commitments to El Salvador and Lebanon
 - d. Bush debated Congress on declaration of Gulf War
- C. Evaluating the power of the president
 - 1. Depends on one's agreement/disagreement with policies
 - 2. Supreme Court gives federal government wide powers; reluctant to intervene in Congress-president disputes
 - a. Nixon's enlarging of Vietnam war
 - b. Lincoln's illegal measures during Civil War
 - c. Carter's handling of Iranian assets
 - d. Franklin Roosevelt's "relocation" of 100,000 Japanese-Americans
- D. Checks on presidential power: political rather than constitutional
 - 1. Congress: control of purse strings
 - 2. Limitations on the president's ability to give military or economic aid to other countries
 - a. Arms sales to Turkey
 - b. Blockage of intervention in Angola
 - c. Legislative veto (previously) on large sale of arms
 - 3. War Powers Act of 1973
 - a. Provisions
 - 1. Only sixty-day commitment of troops without declaration of war
 - 2. All commitments reported within forty-eight hours
 - 3. Legislative veto (previously) to bring troops home
 - b. Observance
 - 1. no president has acknowledged constitutionality
 - 2. Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton sent troops without explicit congressional authorization
 - c. Supreme Court action (*Chadha* case)
 - 1. Struck down the legislative veto
 - 2. Other provisos to be tested
 - d. Effect of act doubtful even if upheld
 - 1. Brief conflicts not likely to be affected; Congress has not challenged a successful operation
 - 2. Even extended hostilities continue: Vietnam and Lebanon
 - 4. Intelligence oversight
 - a. Only two committees today, not the previous eight
 - b. No authority to disapprove covert action
 - c. But "covert" actions less secret after congressional debate
 - d. Congress sometimes blocks covert action: Boland Amendment
 - e. Congressional concern about CIA after attacks of September 11
- IV. The machinery of foreign policy
 - A. Consequences of major power status
 - 1. President more involved in foreign affairs
 - 2. More agencies shape foreign policy
 - B. Numerous agencies not really coordinated by anyone
 - C. Secretary of State unable to coordinate
 - 1. Job too big for one person
 - 2. Most agencies owe no political or bureaucratic loyalty
 - D. National Security Council created to coordinate
 - 1. Chaired by president and includes vice president, secretaries of State and Defense, director of CIA, chair of joint chiefs
 - 2. National security adviser heads staff
 - 3. Goal of staff is balanced view

- 4. Grown in influence since Kennedy but downgraded by Reagan
- 5. NSC rivals secretary of state
- E. Consequences of multicentered decision-making machinery
 - 1. "It's never over" because of rivalries within and between branches
 - 2. Agency positions influenced by agency interests
- V. Foreign policy and public opinion
 - A. Outlines of foreign policy shaped by public and elite opinion
 - 1. Before World War II, public opposed U.S. involvement
 - 2. World War II shifted popular opinion because
 - a. Universally popular war
 - b. War successful
 - c. United States emerged as world's dominant power
 - 3. Support for active involvement persisted until Vietnam
 - a. Yet support for internationalism highly general
 - b. Public opinion now mushy and volatile
 - B. Backing the president
 - 1. Public's tendency to support president in crises
 - a. Foreign crises increases presidential level of public approval
 - b. Strong support to rally 'round the flag for some but not all foreign military crises
 - 2. Presidential support does not decrease with casualties
 - 3. Americans support escalation rather than withdrawal in a conflict
 - C. Mass versus elite opinion
 - 1. Mass opinion
 - a. Generally poorly informed
 - b. Generally supportive of president
 - c. Conservative, less internationalist
 - 2. Elite opinion
 - a. Better informed
 - b. Opinions change more rapidly (Vietnam)
 - c. Protest on moral or philosophical grounds
 - d. More liberal and internationalist
- VI. Cleavages among foreign policy elites
 - A. Foreign policy elite divided
 - B. How a worldview shapes foreign policy
 - 1. Definition of *worldview*: comprehensive mental picture of world issues facing the United States and ways of responding
 - 2. Example: Mr. X article on containment of USSR
 - 3. Not unanimously accepted but consistent with public's mood, events, and experience
 - C. Four worldviews
 - 1. Isolation paradigm
 - a. Opposes involvement in European wars
 - b. Adopted after World War I because war accomplished little
 - 2. Appeasement (containment) paradigm
 - a. Reaction to appeasement of Hitler in Munich
 - b. Pearl Harbor ended isolationism in United States
 - c. Postwar policy to resist Soviet expansionism
 - 3. Disengagement ("Vietnam") paradigm
 - a. Reaction to military defeat and political disaster of Vietnam
 - b. Crisis interpreted in three ways
 - 1. Correct worldview but failed to try hard enough
 - 2. Correct worldview but applied in wrong place
 - 3. Worldview itself wrong
 - c. Critics believed worldview wrong and new one based on new isolationism needed
 - d. Elites with disengagement view in Carter administration but were replaced during Reagan and Bush administrations
 - 4. Human rights
 - a. Clinton had a disinterest in foreign policy and his advisors believed in disengagement.

- b. Clinton's strongest congressional supporters argued against the Gulf War but advocated military intervention in Kosovo.
 - c. Change in view explained by concern for human rights and belief that situation in Kosovo amounted to genocide
 - d. Conservatives who supported containment in Gulf War urged disengagement in Kosovo
 - 5. The politics of coalition building
 - a. Should the United States act "alone?"
 - b. If so, in what circumstances?
- VII. The Use of Military Force
- A. Military power more important after collapse of Soviet Union and end of Cold War
 - 1. Military force used to attack Iraq, defend Kosovo, maintain order in Bosnia, and occupy Haiti and Somalia
 - 2. Several nations have long-range rockets and weapons of destruction
 - 3. Many nations feel threatened by neighbors
 - 4. Russia still has nuclear weapons
 - B. Majoritarian view of military
 - 1. Almost all Americans benefit, almost all pay
 - 2. President is the commander-in-chief
 - 3. Congress plays largely a supportive role
 - C. Client view of military
 - 1. Real beneficiaries of military spending--general, admirals, big corporations, members of Congress whose districts get fat defense contracts--but everyone pays
 - 2. Military-industrial complex shapes what is spent
- VIII. The defense budget
- A. Total spending
 - 1. Small peacetime military until 1950
 - a. No disarmament after Korea because of Soviet threat
 - b. Military system designed to repel Soviet invasion of Europe and small-scale invasions
 - 2. Public opinion supports a large military
 - 3. Demise of USSR produced debate
 - a. Liberals: sharp defense cuts; United States should not serve as world's police officer
 - b. Conservatives: some cuts but retain well-funded military because world still dangerous
 - 4. Desert Storm and Kosovo campaigns made clear no escaping U.S. need to use military force
 - 5. Kosovo campaign indicated that military had been reduced too much
 - 6. Clinton and Republican Congress called for more military spending
- IX. What do we buy with our money?
- A. Changing circumstances make justification of expenditures complex
 - 1. World War II and Cold War: big armies, artillery, tanks, ships, etc.
 - 2. War on Terrorism: small groups, special forces, high-tech communications, precision guided bombs, and rockets
 - 3. Joint operations now also seem more necessary
 - B. Secretary of defense
 - 1. Must transform conventional military for wars on terrorism
 - 2. Must budget in an atmosphere of debate and pressure from members of both the military and Congress
 - C. Debating big new weapons
 - 1. Washington folks are used to it (B-1, B-2 bombers, MX missiles, M1 tank, etc.)
 - 2. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or "Star Wars") debate particularly protracted
 - a. Major scientific and philosophical quarrels
 - b. Reluctance among the military
 - 1. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) requires more missiles and bombers
 - 2. SDI may reduce spending on missiles and bombers
 - c. Concern MAD only works against rational leaders
- X. What do we get for our money?
- A. Personnel

1. From draft to all-volunteer force in 1973
 2. Volunteer force improved as result of:
 - a. Increases in military pay
 - b. Rising civilian unemployment
 3. Changes in military
 - a. More women in military
 - b. Ban of women on combat ships lifted in 1993 but Congress to be consulted if ground combat involved
 - c. "Don't ask, don't tell" compromise adopted by Clinton on homosexuals in military
- B. Big-ticket hardware
1. Main reasons for cost overruns
 - a. Unpredictability of cost of new items
 - b. Contractor incentives to underestimate at first
 - c. Military chiefs want best weapons money can buy
 - d. "Sole sourcing" of weapons without competitive bids
 - e. Holding down budget by "stretching out" production
 2. Latter four factors can be controlled; first cannot
- C. Small-ticket items
1. Seemingly outrageous prices come from allocation of overhead, small run of items produced
 2. Others result from "gold-plating" phenomenon
- D. Readiness, favorite area for short-term budget cutting
1. Other cuts would hurt constituents
 2. Cuts here show up quickly in money saved
- E. Bases
1. At one time, a lot of bases opened and few closed
 2. Commission on Base Realignment and Closure created to take client politics out of base closings
- XI. Structure of defense decision-making
- A. National Security Act of 1947
1. Department of Defense
 - a. Secretary of Defense (civilian, as are secretaries of the army, navy, and air force)
 - b. Joint Chiefs of Staff (military)
 2. Reasons for separate uniformed services
 - a. Fear that unified military will become too powerful
 - b. Desire of services to preserve their autonomy
 - c. Interservice rivalries intended by Congress to receive maximum information
- B. 1986 defense reorganization plan
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - a. Composed of uniformed head of each service with a chair and vice chair appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate
 - b. Chair since 1986 principal military adviser to president
 2. Joint Staff
 - a. Officers from each service assisting JCS
 - b. Since 1986 serves chair; promoted at same rate
 3. The services
 - a. Each service headed by a civilian secretary responsible for purchasing and public affairs
 - b. Senior military officer oversees discipline and training
 4. The chain of command
 - a. Chair of JCS does not have combat command
 - b. Uncertainty whether 1986 changes will work