

**MARK SCHEME for the October/November 2011 question paper
for the guidance of teachers**

9697 HISTORY

9697/31

Paper 3 (International History, 1945–1991),
maximum raw mark 100

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes must be read in conjunction with the question papers and the report on the examination.

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Page 2	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

GENERIC MARK BANDS FOR ESSAY QUESTIONS

Examiners will assess which Level of Response best reflects most of the answer. An answer will not be required to demonstrate all of the descriptions in a particular Level to qualify for a Mark Band.

Band	Marks	Levels of Response
1	21–25	The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. Essays will be fully relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by very appropriate factual material and ideas. The writing will be accurate. At the lower end of the band, there may be some weaker sections but the overall quality will show that the candidate is in control of the argument. The best answers must be awarded 25 marks.
2	18–20	Essays will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. The answer will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The impression will be that a good solid answer has been provided.
3	16–17	Essays will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The answer will be largely relevant. Essays will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. Most of the answer will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence.
4	14–15	Essays will indicate attempts to argue relevantly although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis or explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively.
5	11–13	Essays will offer some appropriate elements but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis and the quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be linked effectively to the argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the answer will be unbalanced.
6	8–10	Essays will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question.
7	0–7	Essays will be characterised by significant irrelevance or arguments that do not begin to make significant points. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent. Marks at the bottom of this Band will be given very rarely because even the most wayward and fragmentary answers usually make at least a few valid points.

Page 3	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

Section A

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

- 1 How far do Sources A–E support the view that UN Secretary-General U Thant played a vital role in bringing the Cuban missile crisis to a peaceful conclusion?**

L1 WRITES ABOUT THE HYPOTHESIS, NO VALID USE OF SOURCES [1–5]

These answers will write about the UN and the Cuban missile crisis and might use the sources. However, candidates will not use the sources as information / evidence to test the given hypothesis. If sources are used, it will be to support an essay-style answer to the question.

L2 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM THE SOURCES TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [6–8]

These answers use the sources as information rather than as evidence, i.e. sources are used at face value only with no evaluation / interpretation in context.

L3 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM SOURCES TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [9–13]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves both attempting to confirm and to disprove it. However, sources are still used only at face value.

L4 BY INTERPRETING / EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [14–16]

These answers are capable of using sources as evidence, i.e. demonstrating their utility in testing the hypothesis, by interpreting them in their historical context, i.e. not simply accepting them at their face value.

L5 BY INTERPRETING AND EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [17–21]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves attempting both to confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis, and are capable of using sources as evidence to do this (i.e. both confirmation and disconfirmation are done at this level).

L6 AS L5, PLUS EITHER (a) EXPLAINS WHY EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE / SUPPORT IS BETTER / PREFERRED, OR (b) RECONCILES / EXPLAINS PROBLEMS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT NEITHER CHALLENGE NOR SUPPORT IS TO BE PREFERRED [22–25]

For (a) the argument must be that the evidence for agreeing / disagreeing is better / preferred. This must involve a comparative judgement, i.e. not just why some evidence is better, but also why other evidence is worse.

For (b) include all L5 answers which use the evidence to **modify** the hypothesis (rather than simply seeking to support/contradict) in order to improve it.

Page 4	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

CONTEXT:

Despite Soviet denials, the USA finally gained proof that Soviet nuclear weapons had been and were being installed in Cuba. President J F Kennedy's Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) was divided over what action to take. Most favoured an immediate air attack on Cuba, followed by invasion. Kennedy chose the alternative, which was to impose a naval quarantine around Cuba to prevent the Soviets from delivering additional military equipment. The USSR claimed that this was against the terms of the UN Charter and there followed heated exchanges between American and Soviet delegates to the UN. There was a real risk that US ships would attempt to intercept Soviet vessels entering the quarantine area; this could have led to war between the superpowers, a war which almost certainly would have involved the use of nuclear weapons.

Eventually, Khrushchev ordered his ships not to enter the quarantine area for a period of time to allow talks to take place in order to find a peaceful solution. Talks were held in the UN, while Kennedy and Khrushchev also exchanged letters. Agreement was reached that the USSR would remove its nuclear weapons from Cuba in exchange for an American guarantee that there would be no invasion of Cuba. The USA also (secretly) agreed to remove its Jupiter weapons from Turkey. Despite Castro's initial resistance, the USA was eventually able to secure verification that all Soviet missiles had been removed from Cuba.

Early histories of the crisis had an American-dominated view (inevitable, given that only American sources were available) and saw the outcome either as an unqualified triumph for Kennedy (the traditional view) or a lucky escape from the potentially disastrous consequences of American bravado (revisionist view). Recently declassified sources, many of them from the USSR and Cuba, show that both Kennedy and Khrushchev were prepared to go to considerable lengths and make substantial concessions in order to prevent nuclear war.

SOURCE A:

Context:

Recent article, benefitting from the availability of new sources, especially those from the USSR and Cuba.

Content (Face Value):

Praises U Thant greatly for his role in 'de-escalating and resolving' the crisis. U Thant is seen as mediating between the superpowers and making the proposal which led to a peaceful conclusion (non-invasion for missiles formula). Claims that U Thant secured a verification agreement with Cuba and that he was highly praised at the time both in the USA and the USSR. It was only later that historians ignored the role played by U Thant and the UN, creating the idea that American actions alone had forced the USSR to back down. ***Supports the hypothesis: U Thant is seen as playing a significant role in bringing the crisis to the peaceful conclusion.***

Content (Beyond Face Value):

Praises U Thant for his mediating role (*cross-reference with Source E*). The source claims that the traditional view that American actions had forced the USSR to back down (*cross-reference with Source C*, which is an example) is a myth created by historians who only had access to American sources (largely the personal opinions of those directly involved). However, the title of the paper suggests that the importance of U Thant's role might be over-stressed here. The source claims that U Thant 'helped secure a verification agreement', something which is strongly denied in other sources (*cross-reference with B and D*). Nevertheless, this source does give U Thant considerable credit for at least helping to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and quotes Kennedy as saying that 'U Thant has put the world deeply in his debt' (*cross-reference with Source E regarding contemporary praise for U Thant's efforts*). ***Supports the hypothesis, but there remains some doubt regarding just how vital U Thant's involvement was.***

Page 5	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

SOURCE B:

Context:

Letter from the leader of Cuba to UN Secretary-General U Thant in response to UN request to gain verification that all Soviet missiles had been removed from Cuba.

Content (Face Value):

Castro understands the conciliatory nature of U Thant's efforts. However, he refuses to allow any inspection of Cuba by any organisation, either national (e.g. USA) or international (UN) on the grounds that, as a sovereign nation, Cuba has no obligation to do so. He complains about US planes continuing to intrude on Cuban air space and makes it clear that Cuba will defend itself. **Challenges the hypothesis since U Thant's mediation was clearly not working**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

This letter was sent over two weeks after agreement had been reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and after U Thant's visit to Cuba for talks with Castro (*cross-reference with Source E*). This can also be cross-referenced to the statement in Source D that the plan for the UN supervision of the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba failed, possibly due to U Thant's failure to press Castro vigorously enough. According to Castro, US planes were continuing to encroach on Cuban air space; Castro clearly remained concerned about the possibility of an American attack. The language used is aggressive. **Challenges the hypothesis since Castro was still failing to agree to inspections to verify the removal of Soviet missiles and was still concerned about the possibility of an American attack. U Thant was not pressing Castro sufficiently on this point. However, this could also be seen as supporting the hypothesis, since Source E claims that part of the purpose of U Thant's visit to Cuba was to allow Cuban leaders 'the opportunity to let off steam', which is what Castro is doing here.**

SOURCE C:

Context:

Extract from a book focusing on Soviet Foreign Policy, published within four years of the crisis. Very few sources relating to the Cuban missile crisis would have been available to historians in 1966, most of them personal recollections and all of them American. The authors are studying Soviet foreign policy without access to Soviet sources.

Content (Face Value):

The USA responded quickly and effectively to the discovery that Soviet missiles had been placed in Cuba. Khrushchev was given little choice but to back down. No mention is made of either the UN in general or U Thant in particular. **Challenges the hypothesis; it was the speed and effectiveness of American actions which led Khrushchev to seek a solution which would enable him to 'limit his losses'.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

The source is largely conjecture. Examples include 'Among the factors that must have influenced Khrushchev...', '...must all in varying degrees have impressed the Soviet leaders', 'American preparation doubtless persuaded Khrushchev...'. No hard evidence is provided to show that Khrushchev backed down because of American actions. **Challenges the hypothesis; no mention is made of any attempt by U Thant to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. The source supports the traditional view that American actions forced the Soviets to back down (cross-reference with Source A).**

Page 6	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

SOURCE D:

Context:

Written at the time of U Thant's departure from the role of UN Secretary-General, ten years after the Cuban missile crisis. The last years of U Thant's tenure had seen many major incidents (e.g. War in the Middle East 1967, Vietnam War, antagonism between India and Pakistan) and it is a fact that the UN was increasingly being seen as ineffective in terms of peacekeeping.

Content (Face Value):

U Thant is seen as the reason for the UN's decline in power and prestige. His failure to press Castro 'more vigorously' is seen as the reason why UN attempts to supervise the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba failed. **Challenges the hypothesis: the only mention of U Thant's involvement in the Cuban missile crisis is highly critical.**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

Can be cross-referenced with Source B regarding U Thant's failure to secure agreement from Castro over the issue of verifying the removal of Soviet nuclear weapons from Cuba. However, the title of the paper suggests that the source is bound to be focused on criticisms of U Thant. The statement that '*In many quarters the dominant emotion aroused by the prospect of his departure...*' would imply that not everyone would agree that his departure was a good thing. Why would U Thant be '*publicly lauded*' yet '*privately belittled*'? While the claim that U Thant was responsible for Castro's refusal to comply with the UN plan for verification comes from a creditable UN source, would the head of the UN Information Services have sufficient knowledge of events to be able to make such a statement? Cross-referencing with Sources A and E would lead to a rather different conclusion regarding U Thant's impact over the Cuban crisis. **Challenges the hypothesis, but there is some doubt regarding the reliability of the source. Were these negative views regarding U Thant's effectiveness widespread?**

Page 7	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

SOURCE E:

Context:

Article in a UN publication, 2008.

Content (Face Value):

Praises U Thant for his 'preventative diplomacy'. His appeals for restraint and negotiations enabled a peaceful conclusion to be reached. Kennedy and Khrushchev showed their appreciation of U Thant's efforts in averting a nuclear war. ***Supports the hypothesis: U Thant is seen as playing a key mediating role, thus enabling USA and USSR to reach agreement.***

Content (Beyond Face Value):

Praises U Thant for his mediating role. However, this article is from a UN publication, which is likely to stress the important role played by the UN and its Secretary-General in averting a catastrophic nuclear war. While it was U Thant who made the appeals and suggested proposals, it was the USSR which agreed to a 'voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba' and the USA which agreed to a 'voluntary suspension of the quarantine.' Both the USA and the USSR thanked U Thant for his efforts, they stress that his role was 'assisting our Governments to avert a serious threat to peace.' This source implies that both superpowers were keen to find a way out of the problem. Moreover, the source makes no reference to the outcome of U Thant's visit to Cuba; cross-referencing with Sources B and D would suggest that this visit achieved little. However, cross-referencing with Source A would suggest that U Thant did play a key role in averting a nuclear war. ***Supports the hypothesis. However it is also clear that both superpowers were keen to find a solution, bringing into question whether U Thant played a 'vital role'. The reliability of the source is doubtful given the inevitable wish of the UN to stress the importance of its own role.***

CONCLUSION:

On balance, the hypothesis is not supported. The more recent sources give more credit to U Thant than the earlier ones, while there is little doubt that the UN was highly praised for its actions at the time of the crisis. While U Thant's 'preventative diplomacy' was clearly important, the evidence suggests that both the USA and the USSR were keen to find a peaceful solution to the problem. In the final analysis, this is probably more significant than U Thant's involvement.

Page 8	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

Section B

2 'The Berlin Blockade of 1948 marked the start of the Cold War.' How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis in the question, it could be argued that the Berlin Blockade constituted the first major crisis of the Cold War, the first time that the superpowers came into direct open conflict. Fearing the plans of the USA and her European allies to re-unify Germany, and already embarrassed by the wealth of the western zones (as a result of the Marshall Plan) compared to her own, the USSR imposed the blockade. The West interpreted this as another aggressive act by Stalin and a possible pre-cursor of a Soviet attack on West Germany. This explains their determined response and the subsequent establishment of NATO.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the Cold War had started before 1948, quoting evidence such as:

- disagreements at Yalta and Potsdam
- American use of the atom bomb in Japan
- Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe
- Winston Churchill's speech (March 1946)
- Truman Doctrine (March 1947)
- Marshall Plan (June 1947)
- Cominform (September 1947)
- the uniting of the three Western zones in Germany and the introduction of a new currency and extended price controls – factors which themselves led to the Berlin Blockade

3 How far is it true to say that, between 1950 and 1980, the Cold War consisted largely of a series of separate and unconnected regional conflicts?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that each of the main events associated with the globalisation of the Cold War had its own unique and localised causes. For example:

- Korea – essentially a civil war seeking reunification
- Cuba – caused by internal resentment against the inefficiencies and corruption of the Batista government, leading to revolution under Castro
- Vietnam – caused by the artificial (and supposedly temporary) division of Vietnam at the end of the 1946–54 war
- Latin America – growth in population, rising gap between rich and poor, leading to the development of revolutionary movements (e.g. Guatemala, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Chile)
- Southeast Asia (e.g. Laos and Cambodia, each trying to come to terms with independence)
- Africa – the economic needs of newly-independent countries such as the Congo and Ghana
- the Middle East – on-going problems associated with the creation of Israel in 1948

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the actions of the superpowers not only provide a common theme to all of the above examples, but also helped to shape the development of what were essentially local issues. The USA, with its fear of a communist 'plot' to take over the world, leading to the domino theory, adopted the policies of containment and roll back – hence US involvement in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Latin America, South-East Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The USSR (and subsequently China) was equally willing to support 'Marxist' regimes throughout the world. Both the USA and the USSR were keen to maintain their prestige, keep a high profile in strategically important regions and protect their own economic interests. Essentially local and unconnected issues became embroiled in 'proxy' wars orchestrated by the superpowers.

Page 9	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

4 'A terrible mistake.' How fair is this assessment of the USA's involvement in the Vietnam War?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that the USA's actions were conditioned by the fear of a monolithic Communist plot to take over the world, by its policy of containment and by Eisenhower's obsession with the 'domino theory'. The USA:

- unsuccessfully supported France in the original Vietnam War of independence (1946–54)
- supported South Vietnam's refusal under Ngo Dinh Diem to take part in the democratic elections originally planned for 1956
- continued to support Diem's government, despite its increasing reputation for corruption and refusal to reform
- claimed that it was trying to protect the Vietnamese people, when, in reality, its aim was to contain communism. Unlike in Korea, the USA acted alone, without the support of the UN, many of whose members were against US actions
- under Kennedy, sent advisers and military equipment to support Diem's (and his successors') security measures
- failed in its 'safe villages' policy
- increased military presence under Johnson, and bombed North Vietnam, which was supporting the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. Failed to compete with the Vietcong's guerrilla tactics, supported by North Vietnam, China and USSR
- developed the policy of Vietnamisation and bombed the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos and Cambodia under Nixon
- faced with increasing public pressure in the USA (angry at US actions, including atrocities) was forced to back down and agree a ceasefire in 1973
- had some 48,000 killed and 300,000 wounded Americans
- lost prestige; Nixon was forced to acknowledge that there was no monolithic communist plot and was forced to resign as a result of Vietnam and Watergate

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that American errors are only obvious in hindsight. At the time, fears of a communist plot to take over the world were genuine, and public opinion at the start of the war favoured strong anti-communist action. Johnson was in a difficult position; he either had to back down or continue the containment policies pursued by Eisenhower and Kennedy. At the start of her involvement in Vietnam, the USA could not have understood the difficulties they would encounter.

Page 10	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

5. 'Khrushchev was responsible for the deteriorating relations between China and the USSR after 1956.' How far do you agree?

Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, relations between China and the USSR were largely good, culminating in a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship in 1950. Relations began to deteriorate after 1956. In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that Khrushchev was responsible:

- public criticism of Stalin (and Lenin)
- claim that communism could be achieved by methods other than violent revolution
- belief in 'peaceful coexistence'
- what the Chinese considered to be Khrushchev's 'soft line' with the USA (e.g. Cuba)
- China accused Khrushchev of 'revisionism'
- Khrushchev reduced economic aid to China

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the ideological dispute between China and the USSR stemmed from the very different nature of the two countries and their routes to communism. Indeed, it could be argued that Mao was as much to blame as Khrushchev. Competition to become the perceived leader of the 'communist world' was undoubtedly a factor. There were other reasons for the Sino-Soviet split for which Khrushchev cannot be held responsible:

- frontier dispute – in 19th century, Russia had taken Chinese territory in Sinkiang Province and China wanted it back
- by late 1970s, PRC and SU were competing for US support
- by late 1970s, Vietnam supported USSR while Kampuchea supported China. Feb 1979, China attacked Vietnam in retaliation for Vietnam's attack on Kampuchea (Dec 1978)
- in 1984, China set out its grievances against the USSR; these included the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, backing of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea and the build up of Soviet troops along the Chinese borders of Mongolia and Manchuria
- relations between China and the USSR did not improve until Gorbachev came to power, culminating in a formal reconciliation in May 1989 when Gorbachev visited Beijing

Page 11	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

6 To what extent can the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 be seen as a success?

It is necessary to establish 'success criteria' – the fairest criteria would appear to be the original aims and terms of the NNPT itself, the three main 'pillars' of which were:

- Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons or 'in any way to assist, encourage or induce' non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to acquire them
- NNWS agreed to allow verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEW)
- the desire of treaty signatories to ease international tension and strengthen international trust so as to create conditions in the future for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons
- allowing the transfer of nuclear technology and materials for the development of civilian nuclear energy programmes

In terms of success, it could be argued that, despite the original intention that the NNPT should last for 25 years, it is still in force and the number of recognised NWS remains relatively small (China and France added in 1992). Only four recognised states are not party to the treaty (India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea). Criticism of the NNPT centres on the fact that nuclear weapons still exist; in many ways this is unfair since it assumes that the three pillars were of equal importance – in reality, the NNPT was heavily focused on non-proliferation. Several NNPT signatories have given up nuclear weapon programmes (e.g. South Africa). Several former Soviet Republics destroyed or transferred nuclear weapons to Russia on the demise of the USSR.

In terms of failure, it could be argued that Nasser was right when he claimed that '*basically they did whatever they wanted to do before the NPT and then devised it to prevent others from doing what they had themselves been doing before.*' Examples of failure could include:

- weapon sharing by the USA – nuclear weapons deployed in other NATO states
- three states declined to sign – India, Pakistan and Israel
- signatories in 1985, North Korea withdrew in 2003 and publically declared possession of nuclear weapons in 2005
- other countries (e.g. Iran, Libya) have been found in non-compliance with NNPT
- ineffectiveness of IAEW
- Non-Aligned Movement have stated that non-proliferation cannot be sustained without 'tangible progress in disarmament'

Page 12	Mark Scheme: Teachers' version	Syllabus	Paper
	GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2011	9697	31

7 'The international economy was dominated by the USA throughout the period from 1945 to 1991.' How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that, as the strongest economy to emerge from the Second World War, the USA was bound to play the dominant role in the global economy. The USA assisted the recovery of the economy of Western Europe, gave preferential treatment to Japan and took the lead in GATT, the World Bank, Bretton Woods system etc. Even allowing for the problems which the USA faced after the 1970s, by 1991, it was still in a dominant position (though not as dominant as in the period 1945–70). For example, the sudden, dramatic fall in US share prices in 1987 led to similar falls world-wide, followed by world-wide trade recession in 1980s.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that, while the USA clearly dominated the global economy between 1945 and 1970, thereafter its dominance was seriously threatened:

- high costs of defence and the Vietnam War
- budget deficit from the late 1960s
- falling value of the dollar and the collapse of Bretton Woods system
- effects of oil crises
- recovery of West Germany and Japan; (USA was reduced to borrowing from Japan)
- development of the EEC
- rise of the Asian Tigers

8 To what extent is it true to say that decolonisation rarely led to genuine independence?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that:

- many European nations had imposed control over their colonies, exploited them and then withdrew, leaving them impoverished
- many new states had not been prepared for independence: their frontiers were often artificial ones imposed on them by Europeans; tribal differences (e.g. Nigeria and the Congo) led to civil wars; when the British withdrew from Nyasaland (Malawi), they left few schools and no industry; when the Portuguese left Mozambique, they deliberately destroyed industrial installations and machinery
- neo-colonialism – western European countries and USA still exerted a great deal of control over many new states, which continued to need the markets and investment which the west could provide; many new states were also prey for multi-national corporations
- new governments were usually run by the local political elite groups, and often had no incentive to improve the lives of ordinary people
- where new governments were prepared to reform (e.g. nationalising resources or foreign businesses) or where governments showed signs of being pro-communist, western countries disapproved and responded by cutting off aid or de-stabilising the government (e.g. Indo-China, East Timor, Chad, Angola, Mozambique, Zaire, Jamaica)
- many of the new states were economically under-developed and often relied on the export of one or two commodities, which left them open to fluctuations in world demand
- loans from abroad left many new states heavily in debt

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that some of the newly independent states did do well. Many of these were former British colonies, which inherited British systems of law and order, liberal capitalism and parliamentary democracy.