

## **CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS**

**Cambridge International Advanced Subsidiary and Advanced Level**

### **MARK SCHEME for the May/June 2015 series**

#### **9389 HISTORY**

**9389/42**

Paper 4 (Depth Study), maximum raw mark 60

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**CAMBRIDGE**  
International Examinations

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### Generic Levels of Response

<b>Level 5</b>	<b>25–30</b>	<p>Responses show very good understanding of the question and contain a relevant, focused and balanced argument, fully supported by appropriate factual material and based on a consistently analytical approach.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses might be expected to be analytical, focused and balanced throughout. The candidate will be in full control of the argument and will reach a supported judgement in response to the question.</p> <p>Towards the lower end of the level, responses might typically be analytical, consistent and balanced, but the argument might not be fully convincing.</p>
<b>Level 4</b>	<b>19–24</b>	<p>Responses show a good understanding of the question and contain a relevant argument based on a largely analytical approach.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses are likely to be analytical, balanced and effectively supported. There may be some attempt to reach a judgement but this may be partial or unsupported.</p> <p>Towards the lower end of the level, responses are likely to contain detailed and accurate factual material with some focused analysis, but the argument is inconsistent or unbalanced.</p>
<b>Level 3</b>	<b>13–18</b>	<p>Responses show understanding of the question and contain appropriate factual material. The material may lack depth. Some analytical points may be made but these may not be highly developed or consistently supported.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses contain detailed and accurate factual material. However, attempts to argue relevantly are implicit or confined to introductions and conclusions. Alternatively, responses may offer an analytical framework which contains some supporting material.</p> <p>Towards the lower end of the level, responses might offer narrative or description relating to the topic, but are less likely to address the terms of the question.</p>
<b>Level 2</b>	<b>7–12</b>	<p>Responses show some understanding of the demands of the question. They may be descriptive with few links to the question or may be analytical with limited relevant factual support.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses might contain relevant commentaries which lack adequate factual support. The responses may contain some unsupported assertions.</p> <p>Towards the lower end of the level, responses are likely to contain some information which is relevant to the topic but may only offer partial coverage.</p>
<b>Level 1</b>	<b>1–6</b>	<p>Responses show limited understanding of the question. They may contain some description which is linked to the topic or only address part of the question.</p> <p>Towards the top of the level, responses show some awareness of relevant material but this may be presented as a list.</p> <p>Towards the lower end of the level, answers may provide a little relevant material but are likely to be characterised by irrelevance.</p>
<b>Level 0</b>	<b>0</b>	No relevant, creditworthy content.

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### **Depth Study 1: Europe of the Dictators, 1918–1941**

#### **Indicative Content**

#### **1 To what extent had Lenin created a totalitarian state in Russia by 1924? [30]**

The central issue here is an analysis of the state that Lenin had created by 1924 and the extent to which it was actually a totalitarian state, or whether it was merely a state onto which Stalin was to build a totalitarian system. There is a great debate amongst critics and supporters of Lenin as to what his intentions were. His references to the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' echoing Marx, of course, does not help. The debate centres on whether he used totalitarian methods as a means to an end, or whether they were ends in themselves.

The case 'for' totalitarianism is an easy one to make with factors such as his dealings with the Constituent Assembly in 1918 and his attitude towards future elections. His brief to Dzerzhinsky makes it pretty clear that killing on a large scale was expected and the methods used by the Red Army were deliberately terrifying. What happened to the Kronstadt sailors was typical of much else that happened by 1924. War communism was little more than state looting and his treatment of all types of opposition, his use of propaganda and censorship bear all the hall marks of a typical totalitarian ruler.

However, there is another case to be made. It could be argued that, given the nature of the task and the potential strength of the Whites, he had no alternative if he was to attain what he had promised and felt that Russia needed. War communism had been replaced by the NEP which allowed greater freedom. His policy towards the other nationalities within Russia was highly tolerant and much more libertarian than what either his successor or predecessors had come up with. There was a genuine debate within the party which was tolerated and his long term intention was very obviously to give much greater freedom within a socialist framework.

#### **2 Evaluate the reasons for the failure of democracy in Italy by 1922. [30]**

What is expected here is an analysis of a range of reasons why the democratic process came to an end in Italy in 1922. There are many possible factors. The state was a new one and had undergone a long, brutal and costly war. Democracy had had little time to prove itself and Italy's social and economic divisions were deep. There was simply an absence of consensus about what the country's priorities were and how they could be solved. Italy had been invaded and humiliated by its old foe Austria, and the Italian people felt that they had been lured into the war under false pretences and never forgave the political class that they felt was responsible.

The structure of the state arguably was unsuited to the needs of the times, and the electoral system, while not causing instability, certainly reflected it. Too few saw a future in democracy and there were alternatives which offered a better future on both the left and the right. Many of the ruling class despised it. The influential Church not only gave it little support, but actively undermined it at times; it had not forgiven the state for the events which led up to 1871.

Democracy had few supporters and too many opponents. The Orlando's and Giolitti's were seen to be utilising the process for their own ends and it did not seem to provide the stability and order that the small farmer, the Church, the industrialist, the army and the King wished for. Fear of the Left was endemic amongst too many of the ruling classes and Mussolini proved to be brilliant at exploiting that fear.

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**3 To what extent does Stalin’s use of his position as General Secretary of the Communist Party explain his rise to power by 1928? [30]**

It could be argued that it was only one factor amongst many. His sheer ruthlessness and ambition, coupled with a totally pragmatic approach to attaining dictatorship, were as important. His control of the party was, of course, a critical factor. Lenin’s untimely death and failure to sort out a succession issue was important. Stalin survived the will/testament episode well and potential rivals were reluctant to take advantage of it. Lenin had clearly identified Stalin as pre-eminent over Trotsky which helped as well.

Stalin was clever, had had a good ‘revolutionary’ background and a good Civil War. He quietly took over the whole party role and used it with enormous skill. His protégés were to dominate the vital Central Committee; men like Molotov, and their votes were there for him when it mattered throughout the 20s. He dominated the Party agenda from the early days through this role. He always took care, as Westwood says, to let rivals dig their own graves, just lending them a spade occasionally. Trotsky, always keen on party unity, failed to take on Stalin when he was most vulnerable, over the Georgian Question or on Lenin’s Testament. Stalin’s manipulation of others and his development of shifting alliances and rivalries were excellent, for example the use of Kamenev and Zinoviev against Trotsky, and then his use of Bukharin against them.

Trotsky was arrogant and conceited, and good at making enemies. He failed to notice in the 24<sup>th</sup> Party Congress just how much Stalin controlled the whole party and the nature of the game that Stalin was playing in the whole NEP/Socialism in One Country debate. Stalin’s canny control of the GPU and the way in which it was carefully utilised to get Trotsky first into exile and then out of Russia was clever. It was his ability to convince his rivals and potential rivals that he was not after power – until it was too late – was always a key factor. He could disguise his ambitions well.

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**4 To what extent does popular support for Nazism explain Hitler's rise to power? [30]**

The issue to be debated here is the extent to which popular support for Nazism was a factor in Hitler's accession to power. A wide range of issues need to be discussed and a prioritisation, with reasons, needs to be established. There is ample scope here also for a historiographical debate. In election terms it was vital; it put the party and Hitler very much on the map, and von Papen and the other politicians would not have put him forward unless he had a substantial number of seats in the Reichstag behind him. The depression in both industry and agriculture were vital in drawing support away from the parties of the Centre and making both Left and Right much more appealing.

The polarisation of politics was a direct result of mass unemployment and depression. The growth of the far Left raised real fears of many of the more conservative Germans. The way in which Hitler and the Nazis exploited the depression was an important factor as well. He and his ideas appealed to many of the élites in the world of business, the middle classes and the army. His management of the media and propaganda was outstanding and in Goebbels he had a master tactician.

With strong support in the regions and the valuable work of Roehm and the SA in not only dealing with the communists but in creating an atmosphere of fear and violence which he maintained he could 'solve', Hitler was in a strong position to take advantage of the crisis of the early 1930s. His care to be vague on policy issues meant he could give the impression of offering much to all. His outstanding oratorical skills and careful stage management of the rallies were also vital. Money flowed into his coffers and men like Hugenburg and the war hero Goering gave him respectability.

Certainly the inability of the Weimar leadership, ranging from the aging Hindenburg to von Schleicher and von Papen to Brüning and Brüning, failed to offer clear solutions to the crisis. The means to ban Hitler and his movement were there, and the plan that Brüning was later to implement under Hitler was ready in 1932, but the will was not there and too many of the Weimar politicians like von Schleicher and von Papen felt that they could use Hitler to further their own ends.

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## Depth Study 2: The History of the USA, 1945–1990

### Indicative Content

#### 5 How accurate is it to describe US society in the 1950s as ‘calm and stable’? [30]

The study of US society in any particular decade needs placing in its immediate context. While the decades before and after the 1950s were times of great social change in the USA, the 1950s would seem to be a decade of comparative stability. The population continued to grow rapidly, from 152m to 180m, in part because of the post-war ‘baby boom’, but continuing economic growth enabled that growth to be provided for. The so-called ‘Great Generation’ who had won the Second World War returned home to live in the rapidly-expanding commuter towns and suburbs, such as Levittown.

The growth of national television networks such as ABC and CBS resulted in mass audiences for programmes such as *I Love Lucy* across the country. The growth of the Interstate Highway system from 1956, eventually some 40 000 miles of highway, together with low petrol prices encouraged people to get into their cars and *On the Road*. Most people bought a car and a society formed around a car-owning society with shopping malls and drive-in cinemas soon emerged. The sense of stability was reinforced by the two-term presidency of Eisenhower, a moderate Republican who was a social conservative as much as he could be, and by the Cold War, which provoked little dissent in the 1950s.

However, all was not calm. In the South, African Americans were refusing to accept the place the whites expected of them, as evidenced by Rosa Parks’ refusal to give up her seat to white passengers in 1955. The Civil Rights movement began to form to challenge the segregation of public facilities in Southern states. By the end of the 1950s, the relative calm of the society of the Southern states was greatly disrupted by the growing Civil Rights movement led by Martin Luther King. In the same few years, the young people of the USA began to upset the calm and ordered lives of their parents. The term teenager became a commonplace. Rock ‘n Roll arrived. Elvis the Pelvis scared the parents and excited the teenage children. The Beat poets received a lot of attention. The context of the Cold War and especially the growth of nuclear weapons caused the young to question the world their parents had created. The relative stability of the 1950s soon gave way to the greater turbulence of the 1960s.

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**6 How great was the impact of the oil crises of the 1970s on the USA? [30]**

There were two oil crises in the 1970s. Firstly, in 1973–74, reacting to the Yom Kippur war, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], dominated by states of the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, embargoed the sale of oil to states which had supported Israel, as a result of which the price of petrol in the USA almost quadrupled within six months. Secondly, in 1979–80, following the Iranian revolution and with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the production of oil by Iran fell dramatically. Again, prices rose, this time around threefold.

The USA was becoming dependent on oil imports as its own oil production started to decline c.1970. For a country as dependent on oil as the USA, these oil price shocks were bound to have a great impact. Its **economy** experienced **stagflation** in the mid-70s and 1979–80, i.e. high inflation plus stagnant economy, causing recession and unemployment. By 1977 the USA had a trade deficit of \$26bn; until 1971 it had always had a trade surplus. This deficit was caused in part by the import of cars from Japan especially, which used petrol much more economically.

The exact contribution of the oil crises to American economic woes is disputed, however. The cost of the Vietnam war and the end of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s were signs that the US economy was not as strong as it had been. The **political** impact of the crises was to weaken the position of presidents who were already weak: Nixon in 1973–74, Ford in 1975–76 and Carter in 1980.

The crises also affected the USA's self-image. They had a huge **psychological** impact. Americans were not used to having to queue for petrol or to pay much higher prices. Fights sometimes broke out at petrol pumps. They had to learn to keep to a speed limit of 55mph. And because the crises were external, the USA's position as the world's superpower was at risk. Jimmy Carter made a much-criticised speech which, as he called the crisis of 1979 the moral equivalent of war, seemed to blame the USA for its problems. It only helped to increase the sense of malaise and helped ensure the election in 1980 of the more optimistic Ronald Reagan.

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**7 How far did the Reagan Presidency help to improve the position of ethnic minorities during the 1980s? [30]**

By the 1980s, the position of ethnic minorities in the USA was not the major national issue it had been in the 1950s and 1960s. There was a sense that the Civil Rights war had been won with the legal reforms of the 1960s and the introduction of affirmative action from the later 1960s. In addition, the movements representing ethnic minorities had splintered, helped in part by their leadership. By the 1980s, the two leading African Americans were Louis Farrakhan and Jesse Jackson, neither attracting the support or the publicity of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King.

With the election of Reagan, the country had become more conservative. Many whites in the North were antagonised by what they saw as too many concessions to African Americans, e.g. affirmative action. Reagan never openly appealed to the white majority by criticising the African American majority. Instead, he used coded language to do so, as when he justified welfare cuts by criticising a 'Chicago welfare queen'. Reagan's appointment of conservative judges to the US Supreme Court, such as Antonin Scalia, meant that the Court was less likely to support affirmative action – though his appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor was to prove less successful in this respect. Reagan himself argued against the use of 'racial quotas', which is how many whites interpreted affirmative action.

The other Reagan initiative which affected ethnic minorities was his renewal of the war on drugs first started by Nixon. Following the death of a young basketball player, Len Bias, from a drug overdose in June 1986, the Democrats in Congress passed a harsh Anti-Drug Abuse Act; in an election year they had to be seen as tough on drugs as were the Republicans. Reagan signed the Act. Crack cocaine users, mainly African Americans, were punished much more harshly than powder cocaine users, mainly white. In Reagan's defence he also signed the Act which made Martin Luther King's birthday a federal holiday, though initially he opposed it on the grounds of cost. Many African Americans did benefit from the economic growth of the Reagan era. The underclass, however, remained predominantly African American.



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- 8 'The Helsinki Accords were a defeat for the USA in the Cold War in Europe.' How far do you agree? [30]**

The Helsinki Accords of 1975 were a significant, if little remembered, feature of the Cold War. In some respects, it can be seen as the treaty which marked the end of the Second World War. They were clear evidence of the policy of détente of the 1970s. The 35 states which signed the Final Treaty agreed to respect existing states borders, as established in the late 1940s. They also agreed to respect human rights, such as freedom of speech. The Accords were agreements, lacking the force of international law.

At the time, Helsinki was seen as evidence of the weakness of the USA, especially following its withdrawal from Vietnam, which paralleled the negotiations in Helsinki. The Accords can be seen as a defeat for the USA and Western Europe because they had to accept the borders which had been established during and after the end of the Second World War. In particular, Helsinki recognised the absorption into the USSR of the three states it had invaded in 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which was a departure from traditional US policy towards those states.

However, the human rights elements of Helsinki could be used to embarrass the USSR, especially as some citizens in the USSR and Eastern Europe formed opposition groups. In the USSR, a Helsinki Monitoring Group highlighted the ways in which the USSR was failing to observe the Helsinki Accords. Dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov gained international prominence. In Czechoslovakia, Charter 77 was established by Vaclav Havel and others. These individuals and groups gained much publicity in the West, resulting in more opposition to Soviet rule. The Helsinki Final Treaty gave to such groups a legitimacy which undermined the USSR and thereby helped ensure some minor victories for the USA.

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### Depth Study 3: International History, 1945–1991

#### Indicative Content

- 9 'Confused and inconsistent.' How accurate is this assessment of Khrushchev's foreign policy? [30]

In support of the view, it could be argued that Khrushchev's policy was a curious mixture of conciliatory statements and aggressive anti-western behaviour which the USA found difficult to comprehend. In terms of conciliation, he talked of '*peaceful coexistence*', agreed to relinquish Soviet military bases in Finland, lifted the Soviet veto on the admission of 16 new members to the UN, abandoned Cominform, agreed to the reunification of Austria, met with American leaders at the Geneva Summit, improved Soviet relations with Tito's Yugoslavia and accepted an invitation to visit the USA. Yet, at the same time, he strengthened the communist bloc in Eastern Europe with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, crushed the Hungarian uprising in 1956, complained bitterly when a US spy plane was shot down over the USSR, continued to enhance Soviet military capabilities, erected the Berlin Wall and practised brinkmanship over Cuba.

In challenging the view, it could be argued that '*peaceful coexistence*' did not mean that Khrushchev had abandoned the idea of a communist-dominated world, merely that this could be achieved without war against the USA. He remained sceptical and fearful of the USA's intentions, e.g. when he was denied access to Disneyland, he accused the USA of hiding rocket launching pads there, and he saw the U-2 plane incident as an example of American aggression against the USSR. He was determined to maintain control over Eastern Europe, which is why he ruthlessly put down the uprising in Hungary and built the Berlin Wall to prevent American influence leading to the reunification of Germany. He supported the reunification of Austria as a way of preventing a merger between Western Austria and West Germany. He remained keen to extend Soviet influence across the world by providing lavish economic aid. As leader of the communist world he felt that it was vital to protect Cuba's revolution from American interference.

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**10 To what extent was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan responsible for the onset of the ‘Second Cold War’? [30]**

In support of the view that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was responsible, it could be argued that it led to widespread condemnation of the USSR and, to the West, was viewed as evidence of the continuation of the expansionist aims of the USSR. In retaliation, the USA withdrew from the SALT II Treaty. US President Carter was unwilling to allow the USSR to get away with another intervention in the affairs of a foreign country – he cut off trade links with Moscow, encouraged a Western boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 and increased US expenditure on arms (including nuclear weapons). Despite this, US public opinion saw Carter as weak in confronting the threat of communism, and he lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan, a staunch anti-communist right winger.

In challenging the view, it could be argued that the period of détente was effectively already over before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The USSR had continued to violate human rights agreements made at Helsinki, while Brezhnev’s failing health had done little to enhance US-Soviet relations. The development of renewed superpower hostility can be seen as early as 1976. Conservatism was regaining strength in the USA, and it viewed the increasing influence of the USSR in the Third World as further evidence of Soviet expansionism (e.g. Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia). Carter supplied US arms to anti-communist groups (e.g. El Salvador, Nicaragua) in an attempt to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. Opposition to SALT II was high in the US Senate well before the invasion of Afghanistan, and it already seemed unlikely that the USA would sign. When Islamic militants occupied the US embassy in Teheran (1979), American conservatives viewed this as evidence of the USA’s impotence in world affairs and argued that this needed to be addressed. Détente, therefore, was no longer seen as beneficial to either the USA or the USSR. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could be seen as the event which started the ‘Second Cold War’ rather than its cause.

**11 How successful was Deng Xiaoping in addressing the problems which faced China? [30]**

In terms of success, it could be argued that Deng ended the chaos caused by the Cultural Revolution, abolishing the revolutionary committee which had been established to run local government and allowing greater freedom in religion, literature and the arts. His idea of ‘market socialism’ enabled China to modernise industry, agriculture, science and technology. Capitalist-style incentives were introduced (e.g. piece work, profit-sharing) and China took loans from foreign governments and banks, joining the IMF and the World Bank in 1980.

Agricultural and industrial output were vastly increased – grain output reached a record level in 1979 and exports increased by 10% in 1984 alone. He enabled China to develop its role as a major country in terms of international affairs. While Gorbachev and other world leaders believed that it was not possible to undertake economic reform without also passing political reforms, Deng maintained China as a one-party state. He did this by carefully balancing the rival factions within the CCP, maintaining control of the army and clamping down on political dissension, such as at Tiananmen Square.

Conversely, it could be argued that Deng’s policies were responsible for the major divisions which occurred in China. Adopting capitalist-style policies had serious side effects – although exports rose, imports rose more quickly, leading to record trade deficits and a fall in China’s foreign exchange reserves. Inflation rose, reaching 22% by 1986. His social and economic reforms, together with his willingness to allow the ‘Democracy Wall’, led to calls for other reforms (e.g. political and human rights). This forced Deng to clamp down on dissidents, leading to serious splits within the CCP (between those who wanted more reforms and those who wanted to return to more Maoist-style policies). In crushing the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, Deng encouraged international condemnation of China.

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**12 How far was Nasser responsible for the outbreak of the Suez War of 1956? [30]**

The view that Nasser was responsible for the war was held by Britain, France, Israel and, to some extent, the USA, who feared his aggressive support for Arab unity and independence. His organisation of sabotage raids inside Israel, his refusal to renew the 1936 treaty allowing British troops at Suez and his deals for Soviet weaponry from Czechoslovakia all caused alarm. When the USA cancelled its grant for the Aswan Dam, fearing that the USSR was seeking to gain control of the Middle East, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, intending to use its income to finance the dam. The West saw Nasser as a Hitler-like figure, who was planning to unite the Arab world under Egyptian control and Soviet influence. This posed a serious threat to peace in the Middle East, not least because Nasser had made no secret of his desire to destroy Israel.

In challenging the view, it could be argued that Britain and France were more responsible for causing the war. This was the opinion of the communist bloc, which accused Britain and France of imperialistic tactics. Britain, France and Israel planned for Israel to attack Egypt and remove Nasser from power, arguing that this was necessary to keep the Suez Canal open to international shipping. This ignored the fact that Nasser had promised to compensate shareholders and allow ships of all nations to use the canal.

Israel actually began the war by attacking Egypt, with notable success. The USA, afraid of upsetting the Arabs and forcing them into closer links with the USSR, refused to support Britain and France. At the UN, the USA and USSR agreed on the need for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops. The Arab world blamed Israel for the war, seeing Nasser as the leader of Arab unity and the desire to remove foreign interference from the Middle East.