REGULAR ARTICLE

# Markets connectivity and financial contagion

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**Abstract** In this paper we investigate the sources of instability in credit and financial systems and the effect of credit linkages on the macroeconomic activity. By developing an agent-based model, we analyze the evolving dynamics of the economy as a complex, adaptive and interactive system, which allows us to explain some key events that occurred during the recent economic and financial crisis. In particular, we study the repercussions of inter-bank connectivity on banks' performances, bankruptcy waves and business cycle fluctuations. Interbank linkages, in fact, not only allow participants to share risk but also create potential for one bank's crisis to spread through the network. The purpose of the model is, therefore, to build up the dependence among agents at the micro-level and to estimate their impact on the macro stability.

**Keywords** Systemic risk · Business cycle · Volatility · Network connectivity ·
Giant component

## 1 Introduction

Historically financial markets were driven by the 'real' economy and in turn they also had a profound effect on it. Understanding the feedback between these two sectors leads to a better comprehension of the agents' performance and to a deeper understanding of the stability, robustness and efficiency of the economic system.

In recent decades, a massive transfer of resources from the productive sector to the financial sector has been one of the characteristics of our economic systems. This

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re-allocative process, known as the "financialization of the economy" (see Krippner 2005), is among those responsible for the growing financial instability, characterized by recurrent crises of increasing intensity and culminated in the current global crisis[1] (see Orhangazi 2008; Rochon and Rossi 2010). At the same time, in many economies, there has been dramatic increase in the output volatility and, therefore, greater economic vulnerability and uncertainty.[2] To jointly account for an ensemble of these facts regarding both "micro/meso" properties, such as indicators of agents financial fragility and their size distributions, together with macro aggregates including output growth rates, output volatility, business cycle phases and bankruptcy cascades, we need to analyze explicitly how agents interact with each other, how information spreads through the market and how adjustments in disequilibrium take place. From this perspective network theory is a natural candidate for the analysis of interacting social systems (see Bargigli and Tedeschi 2013). The financial sector can be regarded as a set of agents (i.e lenders and borrowers—banks and firms) who interact with each other through financial transactions. These interactions are governed by a set of rules and regulations, and take place on a graph of all connections between agents. The network of mutual credit relations between financial institutions and firms plays a key role in the risk for contagious defaults. Economic literature on contagion (see Allen and Gale 2000a,b; Iori et al. 2006; Battiston and Delli Gatti 2012a,b; Lenzu and Tedeschi 2012) has emphasized the importance of the agents connectivity and credit network topology in the analysis of sharing and systemic risk. In fact, increasing the agents' connectivity leads to the financial network less exposed to systemic risk thanks to risk sharing.

However, when the connectivity becomes too high and things go wrong, financial linkages among highly leveraged agents represent a propagation channel for contagion and a source of systemic risk. In addition, credit relationships have been pointed out as the main linkage between finance and the real economy. The credit channel involves both the balance sheet of banks and firms. While the balance sheet of credit institutions affects the potential supply of loans, due to the capital adequacy ratios, firms net worth influences the banks willingness to lend money to highly leveraged firms. The seminal papers by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that informational asymmetries in the credit markets may prevent firms to obtain credit, even those with good investment projects. Further research highlighted the so-called financial accelerator mechanism, i.e., a balance sheet channel through which monetary policy has real effects in the economy (Bernanke and Gertler 1990; Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993; Bernanke and Gertler 1995).

Following the agent-based modeling, in this paper we are explicitly concerned with the potential of the inter-bank market to act as a contagion mechanism for liquidity crises and to determine the effect of the banks connectivity on macroeconomic outcomes such as business cycle fluctuations and bankruptcies. This approach, which

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[1] Different interpretations of the current financial crisis have been shown. In a recent paper, for instance, Delli Gatti et al. (2012) propose an explanation of the crisis which emphasizes the sectoral dislocation following localized technical change in the presence of barriers to labor mobility.

[2] The literature suggests that the SD of output growth rate is a good candidate for the macroeconomic uncertainty (see Ghosal and Loungani 2000; Baum et al. 2004).

explicitly models the agents' interaction at the micro level, is thus able to emphasize the role of the investment-finance link not just as a propagator of shocks but as the main source of financial instability and business cycle fluctuations.

This work is based on an existing agent-based model (Delli Gatti et al. 2005) which, simulating the behavior of interacting heterogeneous firms and one bank, is able to generate a large number of stylized facts, but does not consider a system of multiple interactive banks. Here, instead, we introduce multiple banks which can operate not only in the credit market but also in the inter-bank system.[3] In our model, firms may ask for loans from banks to increase their production rate and profit. If contacted banks face liquidity shortage when trying to cover the firms' requirements, they may borrow from a surplus bank in the inter-bank system.[4] In this market, therefore, lender banks share with borrower bank the risk for the loan to the firm.

We model credit and inter-bank systems as an Erdös–Renyi random graph (see Allen and Gale 2000a,b, for instance), and we study the network resilience by changing the degree of connectivity among agents. In our model, bankruptcies are determined as financially fragile firms fail, that is their net worth becomes negative. If one or more firms are not able to pay back their debts to the bank, the bank balance sheet decreases and, consequently, the firms' bad debt, affecting the equity of banks, can also lead to bank failures. As banks, in case of shortage of liquidity, may enter the interbank market, the failure of borrower banks could lead to failures of lender banks. Agents' bad debt, thus, can bring about a cascade of bankruptcies among banks. The source of the domino effect may be due to indirect interaction between bankrupt firms and their lending banks through the credit market, on one side, and to direct interaction between lender and borrower banks through the inter-bank system on the other side.

Our findings suggest that there are issues with the role that the bank system plays in the real economy and in pursuing economic growth. Indeed, our model shows that a heavily-interconnected inter-bank system increases financial fragility and leads to economic crises and distress contagion.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we describe the model with the behavior of firms and banks and the trading mechanism on credit and inter-bank system. In Sect. 3, we present the results of the simulations for different inter-bank linkages on contagion phase and on the business cycle fluctuations. Finally, Sect. 4 concludes.

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[3] To our knowledge, until now, several agent-based models have been developed with regard to single sectors of the economy (production, labor, credit, etc.), while the development of models of a multiple-market economy as a whole is still at the dawn (see for example Cincotti et al. 2010; Riccetti et al. 2011; Tedeschi et al. 2012 among the few attempts). Instead, the multiple nature of the links (financial and commercial) and the existence of direct links among all the different actors (bank-bank, bank-firms and firm-firm) would be extremely useful for understanding the propagation of systemic risk and joint failures, both among similar and different economic actors.

[4] There are great variations between banks in the use they make of interbank market. In any case, this market should make funds available quickly and efficiently to banks which have lending opportunities and should enable the banking system to adapt much more speedily and smoothly to new demands than would otherwise be possible. Interbank market is, thus, the natural channel in order to avoid the liquidity difficulties which might otherwise exist among financial institutions (see BIS 1983).

## 2 The model

In our simulated economy three markets coexist: the goods market, the credit market and the inter-bank market. The system is populated by a constant number of firms and banks, who undertake decisions at discrete time $t = 1, 2, \ldots, T$. Given the structure of the model, we are able not only to analyze the interaction among agents, but also to study their behaviors in different markets.

The goods market is implemented following the model of Delli Gatti et al. (2005) where output is supply-determined, that is firms sell all the output they optimally decide to produce. Because firms use a linear technology with capital as the only input, output follows the evolution of the capital stock, which in turn is determined by investment. Finally, investment depends on the interest rate and the firm's financial fragility, which is inversely related to the equity.

At each period, a subset of firms enter the credit market for credit. The amount of credit requested by firms is related to their investment expenditure that depends on the interest rate and firms' economic situation.

The primary goal of banks is to channel their funds through loans to firms. Consulted banks, by analyzing their own credit risk and the firm's risk, may grant the requested loan when they have enough supply of liquidity.

The supply of credit is a percentage of banks' equity because financial institutions adopt a system of risk management based upon an equity ratio. When consulted banks do not have liquidity to lend, they can enter in the interbank system, in order not to lose the opportunity of earning on investing firms. The role played by banks in our simulated inter-bank market is related to their customers business. In fact, financial institutions use this market in order not to lose the profitability coming from the loan activity to their customers.[5]

### 2.1 Firms behavior

We have a large finite population of competitive firms indexed by $i = 1, \ldots, N$. Firms are profit seekers, therefore, at any time period $t$, they try to maximize their expected profits.

As in the Greenwald and Stiglitz framework (1990, 1993), in our model firms sell all the output they (optimally) decide to produce at an individual selling price, $P_{i,t}$. This is assumed to be a random variable with expected value $P_t$, i.e., the market price, and finite variance. As a consequence, the relative price, $u_{i,t} = \frac{P_{i,t}}{P_t}$, is a random variable with expected value $E(u_{i,t}) = 1$ and finite variance. To produce a homogeneous output $Y_{i,t}$, the firm $i$ uses capital $K_{i,t}$ as the only input. The firm's production function is

$$Y_{i,t} = \phi K_{i,t}, \tag{1}$$

with the capital productivity $\phi$ constant and uniform across firms.

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[5] In the analysis of interbank markets, it is difficult to discriminate between roles played by different banks. In practice, it is not easy to distinguish interbank activity that is pure trading from that related to customer business (see Majluf and Myers 1984; BIS 1983; Affinito 2012).

In order to increase the production, the firm $i$ can finance itself via internal sources, net-worth $A_{i,t}$, or recur to bank loan[6] $L_{i,t}$. As a result, firms capital stock motion evolves according to $K_{i,t} = A_{i,t} + L_{i,t}$. With this respect, companies can endogenously choose their funding strategies among two main classes - self-financing and external financing- and, over time, change their strategies of financing (see Vitali et al. 2013).

At each time $t$, the debt commitments $\bar{L}_{i,t}$ (interest and installment) for the firm $i$ are $\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t}^{\tau} (1 + r_t^{i,j}) L_{i,t}$, where $r_t^{i,j}$ is the real interest rate that firm $i$ pays to bank $j$. We assume that a loan given at time $t$ to the firm $i$ has to be paid back by the next $\tau$ periods.

For simplicity, we furthermore assume that each firm has total variable costs equal to financing costs. Therefore, profits in real term are

$$\pi_{i,t} = u_{i,t} Y_{i,t} - \bar{L}_{i,t}, \tag{2}$$

and the expected profits are given by $E(\pi_{i,t}) = \phi K_{i,t} - \bar{L}_{i,t}$.

Assuming that all profits are retained, the firm accumulates net worth by means of profits. The net worth, therefore, evolves according to:

$$A_{i,t} = A_{i,t-1} + \pi_{i,t}. \tag{3}$$

Because of the uncertain environment, firm $i$ may go bankrupt and bankruptcy occurs if the net worth at time $t$ becomes negative $A_{i,t} < 0$. The bankrupt firm leaves the market. The enterprise's exit process is, therefore, reconnected to the financial fragility: a company leaves the system if its net-worth is so low that an adverse shock makes it become negative, or if it suffers a loss so huge as to deplete all the net worth accumulated in the past (see Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993).

The problem of the firm $i$ consists in maximizing the expected profits $E(\pi_{i,t})$ minus bankruptcy costs. As discussed by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990), bankruptcy costs are due to legal, administrative and reputational costs incurred during the bankruptcy procedure. These costs are expected to raise with the firm's size.[7] We can formulate the problem of each firm $i$ as:

$$\Gamma_{i,t} = E(\pi_{i,t}) - c Y_{i,t}^2 F\left(r_t^{i,j}, l_{i,t}\right), \tag{4}$$

where $E(\pi_{i,t})$, $c Y_{i,t}^2$ and $F\left(r_t^{i,j}, l_{i,t}\right)$ represent the expected profit, the bankruptcy cost and the bankruptcy probability of firms respectively. In particular, the bankruptcy probability of firm is an increasing function of the interest rate, $r_t^{i,j}$, and of the firm's leverage, $l_{i,t}$, which reflects the firm's financial fragility based on the amount of existing debt $\bar{G}_{i,t}$ and net-worth ratio, $l_{i,t} = \frac{\bar{G}_{i,t}}{A_{i,t-1}}$ (see Assenza and Delli Gatti 2012). From the maximization of the Eq. (4), we obtain the optimal capital stock

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[6] We are assuming that the firm $i$ is rationed on the equity market and has to rely on the bank to obtain external finance.

[7] In the formulation proposed by Delli Gatti et al. (2005), for instance, bankruptcy costs are increasing and quadratic in the level of output.

$$K_{i,t}^* = \frac{\phi}{2c\phi \left( \lambda r_t^{i,j} + (1-\lambda) l_{i,t} \right)} + \frac{c\phi A_{i,t}}{2c \left( \lambda r_t^{i,j} + (1-\lambda) l_{i,t} \right)}, \tag{5}$$

which is decreasing in both real interest rate and leverage, and increasing with financial soundness, proxied by the firm's net worth. To achieve the optimal capital stock, the firm $i$ can recur to its own net worth (internal funds) and, if needed, to new mortgaged debt (external funds). So, the demand of credit[8] is $L_{i,t}^d = K_{i,t}^* - A_{i,t}$.

## 2.2 Banks behavior

Similar to firms, we have a constant population of competitive banks indexed by $j = 1, \ldots, k, \ldots, B$. Each bank has a balance sheet structure defined as $S_{j,t} = E_{j,t} + D_{j,t}$, with $S_{j,t}$ being the credit supply, $E_{j,t}$ the equity base and $D_{j,t}$ deposits which, in this framework, are determined as a residual. The regulation of financial intermediaries (Basel I–III) allows banks to lend up to $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ their equity, to prevent bankruptcies due to unexpected losses.

For the sake of simplicity, we model this regulatory parameter assuming that banks have a credit supply which is a fraction of their equity:

$$S_{j,t} = \frac{E_{j,t-1}}{\alpha}. \tag{6}$$

This means that the credit supply for a financial institution is proportional to its equity (the smaller the banks the smaller their transactions). $\alpha$ is the fraction of external risk a bank is allowed to take within a given time-step, with respect to its own equity. Since total equity is an insufficient measure of risk, at least in the challenging context of financial crisis (see Trichet 2010), we introduce a more risk-sensitive framework for banks' risk activities (see Sornette and Becke 2011). In particular, we model a bank's risk aversion coefficient, such that the financial institution $j$ gives the requested loan to the borrower $i$ with a certain probability[9] (see Tedeschi et al. 2012):

$$p_t^{j,i} = 1 - \chi \left( \frac{\bar{G}_{i,t}}{S_{j,t}} \right)^{\psi}, \tag{7}$$

where $\bar{G}_{i,t}$ is the amount of existing debt for borrower $i$, $\psi$ is a constant elasticity parameter and $\chi \in [0, 1]$ has to be interpreted as the bank's risk aversion coefficient—the higher $\chi$, the higher the bank risk aversion. This threshold may be viewed as a risk aversion parameter, since it imposes an upper limit for a bank's risk dependent on its liquidity. It is a helpful tool to limit the bank's risk, in particular the credit risk. Moreover, according to Eq. (7), the volume of credit given by bank $j$ is proportional to

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[8] The demand of credit—or asked loan—$L_{i,t}^d$ may be different from the granted loan $L_{i,t}$ due to the trading mechanism on the credit and inter-bank market explained in Sect. 2.3.

[9] This means, for example, out of 10 different requested loans with $p_t^{j,i} = 0.1$, one loan will be given.

the financial fragility of its borrower $i$, that is an over-leveraged borrower has higher probability to be rationed than a solid one.

The primary function of banks activity is to lend their funds through loans to firms, as this is their way to make money via interest rates. The bank $j$ offers its interest rate to the borrower $i$:

$$r_t^{j,i} = \delta_j (l_{i,t})^\theta, \tag{8}$$

with $\delta_j$ being a bank specific $iid$ random variable, $l_{i,t}$ the borrower $i$'s leverage and $0 < \theta < 1$. So the interest rate is decreasing with the borrower's financial robustness. In a sense, we adopt the principle according to which the interest rate charged by banks incorporates an external finance premium increasing with the leverage and, therefore, inversely related to the borrower's net worth.[10]

### 2.3 The trading mechanism on the credit and inter-bank network

When the firm $i$ needs loan, $L_{i,t}^d > 0$, it contacts a number of randomly chosen banks with an $iid$ probability $x$. Credit linkages between firms and banks are defined by a connectivity matrix, $\Delta_t^{i,j}$. $\Delta_t^{i,j}$ is either one or zero; a value of one indicates that a credit linkage *may* exist between firm $i$ and bank $j$ and zero indicates no relationship. $x$ represents the probability that $\Delta_t^{i,j}$ is one for any two agents. At one extreme, $x = 0$ represents the case of no credit lending, while $x = 1$ represents a situation in which all firms can potentially borrow from each bank (see Erdös and Rényi 1959). The contacted banks, after checking their investment risk (Eq. 7) and their amount of liquidity (i.e $S_{j,t} \geq L_{i,t}^d$), provide an interest rate (Eq. 8). After exploring the lending conditions of the contacted banks, each firm asks the consulted banks for credit starting with the one offering the lowest interest rate. Banks deal with firms in a "first come, first served" basis.

If in the credit market, the contacted financial institutions have not enough supply of liquidity to fully satisfy the firm's loan (i.e $S_{j,t} < L_{i,t}^d$), then banks consider to use the inter-bank market.[11]

As in the credit market, the requiring bank (borrower $j_b$) asks the missing part of the loan requested by the firm from a number of randomly chosen banks (lenders $k_l$) with an $iid$ probability $\rho$. The probability $\rho$ plays the same role of the probability of credit linkages $x$. It generates random interbank linkages among banks by populating the interbank connectivity matrix $\Sigma_t^{j_b,k_l}$.

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[10] In our model the bank behaves as a lender in a Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) world characterized by asymmetric information and costly state verification. See Bernanke et al. (1999) for a comprehensive exposition of the approach.

[11] The need for an inter-bank market is related to the need for banks to adjust the volume of their assets and liabilities. In particular, large emphasis has been given to the deposits withdrawal (see, for instance, Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Iori et al. 2006). In our framework, the reasons for using this market arise from the banks need to adjust their assets in order to exploit lending opportunities. In our model, in fact, liabilities side, and in particular deposits, is determined as a residual. In a forthcoming paper, we extend the analysis allowing an endogenous deposits motion.

$\rho$ takes values between zero and one; a value of one indicates that an interbank linkage *may* exist between borrower bank $j_b$ and lender bank $k_l$ (i.e $\Sigma_t^{j_b,k_l} = 1$) and zero indicates no relationship (i.e. $\Sigma_t^{j_b,k_l} = 0$). Both credit and interbank connectivity matrices (i.e., $\Delta_t$, $\Sigma_t$) are randomly chosen at the beginning of each time step $t$.

Among the contacted banks, the banks satisfying the risk threshold in Eq. (7) and having enough supply of liquidity offer the loan to the asking bank for an inter-bank interest rate. This rate equals the credit market interest rate in Eq. (8) but it is a function of the borrower bank's leverage $l_{j_b,t}$. Among this subset of offering banks, the borrower $j_b$ chooses the lender $k_l$, starting with the one offering the lowest interest rate. When it receives the requested loan, the bank lends it to the asking firm.

It is important to stress that non-zero values of credit and interbank connectivity matrices only generate potential links among agents. In fact, given banks' constraints on their credit supply, potential links become active links only if banks meet both their liquidity and risk constraints.[12]

At the end of each period[13] $t$, after trading has taken place, financial institutions update their profits according to:

$$\pi_{j,t} = \frac{1}{\tau} \left[ \sum_{i,t-\tau \trianglelefteq t' < t} L_{i,t'} r_{t'}^{i,j} + \sum_{j,t-\tau \leq t' \triangleleft t} L_{j,t'} r_{t'}^{j,k} \right] - \bar{r}_{j,t}(D_{j,t-1} + E_{j,t-1}). \quad (9)$$

The bank's profit depends on interests on credit market (first term), on interests on inter-bank market (second term), which can be either positive or negative depending on bank $j$ net position (lender or borrower), on interests paid on deposits and equity (third term).[14] Bank net worth evolves according to:

$$E_{j,t} = E_{j,t-1} + \pi_{j,t} - \sum_{i \in \Omega_t} B_{t-1}^{i,j} - \sum_{k \in \Xi_t} B_{t-1}^{k,j}, \quad (10)$$

with the last two terms on the right hand side being firms and banks' bad debts respectively.[15] Similar to firms, financial institutions go bankrupt when their equity at time $t$ becomes negative $E_{j,t} < 0$. The failed bank leaves the market.

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[12] The advantage of our trading mechanism with respect to a supply demand in-balance approach is that exchanges are determined by the trading mechanism itself without any ad-hoc rules to reach an equilibrium. The supply demand in-balance approach shortcuts the study of the out-of-the-equilibrium dynamics by jumping to the stationary points. The trading mechanism we implement here, instead, enables us to understand how the economy behaves out of equilibrium. In particular, given the constraints on agent's risk-aversion and the excess individual demand, we are able to model rationing on both markets.

[13] In inter-bank markets maturities are short, normally between overnight and one years, although longer placements can be arranged (see BIS 1983; Affinito 2012; Dinger and Von Hagen 2007). Interestingly, the empirical analysis generally shows that long-term interbank exposures result in lower risk for borrowing banks (see Dinger and Von Hagen 2007). Following this view, in this paper, we model longer maturities.

[14] $\bar{r}_{j,t}$ is the average interest rate that bank $j$ obtains in the credit market.

[15] $i \in \Omega_t$ and $k \in \Xi_t$ are the subset of firms and banks unable to pay their debts back because they go bankrupt.

When firms and banks fail, they are replaced by new entrants, which are on average smaller than incumbents. So, entrants' size is drawn from a uniform distribution centered around the mode of the size distribution of incumbent firms/banks (see Bartelsman et al. 2005).

## 3 Simulations and results

The model is studied numerically for different values of the parameter $\rho$, which drives the inter-bank connectivity. Since the purpose of our paper is to analyze the direct effect of the inter-bank connectivity on agents' performances and macro stability, we maintain a constant credit connectivity. The probability of attachment between firms and banks in the credit market is $x = 0.05$. In this way the average number of potential firm's out-going links is $<3$.[16] The reason being that in a highly connected random network synchronisation could be achieved via indirect links. The effects of direct contagion among financial institutions are easier to be tested in a network where indirect synchronisation is less likely to arise.

We consider an economy consisting of $N = 1,000$ firms and $B = 50$ banks and study it over a time span of $T = 1,000$ periods. Each firm is initially given the same amount of capital $K_{i,0} = 100$, net-worth $A_{i,0} = 65$ and loan $L_{i,0} = 35$. The initial value of firms' equity and loan is consistent with empirical studies on newcomers[17] (see Cassar 2004).

We fix $\tau = 4$, $\phi = 0.8$, $c = 1$, $\lambda = 0.3$, $\alpha = 0.1$, $\chi = 0.8$, $\psi = 0.1$ and $\theta = 0.05$.

The robustness of our qualitative results is checked by recurring to Monte Carlo techniques. We run 100 independent simulations for different values of the initial seed generating the pseudo-random numbers. This exercise is repeated by changing the parameter $\chi$, which reflects the bank's risk aversion coefficient, starting from 0.1 to 0.7 with steps of 0.3 and $\tau = 4$, which mirrors the repayment timing, starting from 1 to 6 with steps of 1. We, then, study the moments of the distributions of the statistics of interest. Results confirm that our findings are quite robust.

We start by analyzing the effect of inter-bank linkages on the systemic risk. Then, we analyze the correlation between the financial and the real sector of the economy.

### 3.1 Banks behavior and systemic risk

The question we address here is whether phenomena of collective bankruptcies are related to connectivity. In order to answer it, we study the effects of inter-bank linkages on contagion phase in the financial market. In particular, we focus on one of the most extreme examples of systemic failure, namely bank bankruptcies. The left panel of Fig. 1 shows the average number of failed banks, over all times and all simulations as

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[16] In Erdös–Renyi random graphs, the average number of links is given by $x(n-1)$, where $x$ is the probability of attachment and $n$ the number of node. With, 50 banks, each firm has an average number of out-going links equals to 2.45.

[17] Researches show a general tendency for new companies to finance themselves with equity rather than loan. The initial bank funding to new firms is around 16 % (Berger and Udell 1998).

**Fig. 1** Average number of banks bankruptcies as a function of inter-bank connectivity, over time and number of simulations (*left* side). Number of surviving banks for $\rho$ equals to 0 (*black solid*), 0.2 (*red dotted*), 0.5 (*green dashed*), 0.7 (*blue long dashed*), 1.0 (*yellow dotted dashed*) (central). Average slope of number of surviving banks as a function of interbank connectivity over time and number of simulations (*right* side). *Colors* are available on the web side version

a function of the degree of connectivity of the inter-bank network. The figure shows that modeling the inter-bank system as a Erdös–Renyi random graph, when increasing the degree of connectivity of the network, the probability of bankruptcy avalanches increases. However, this relationship is non-monotonically related with the level of $\rho$, i.e. bankruptcies decrease with the level of the connectivity up to a threshold, which can be dubbed as pseudo-optimal, and then increase. In particular, when $\rho = 0$ the average number of banks bankruptcies is equal to 5.22 (SD 1.35). It decreases to 4.90 (SD 1.33) when $\rho = 0.2$. A two-sided Welch $t$ test supports the difference in the means (t = 53,3972). Rising the connectivity, the network is less exposed to systemic risk, at the beginning, thanks to risk sharing. However, when the connectivity becomes too high, the systematic risk eventually increases (see Castiglionesi and Navarro 2007; Wagner 2010; Battiston and Delli Gatti 2012a,b, for empirical evidences and theoretical analysis.).

We now turn to the issue of contagious failures. Collective bankruptcies arise from the complex nature of agents interaction (see Rochet and Tirole 1996; Angelini 1996; Thurner et al. 2003; Lenzu and Tedeschi 2012). As emphasized in Iori and Jafarey (2001), the history of modern banking is full of examples of systemic failures at both moderate and large scales.

Since the purpose of our study, here, is to analyze the dynamic of a self-contained system with a given initial number of banks, we exclude the possibility that failing banks would be replaced by new entrants.

The result on systemic failures is analyzed in Fig. 1 (center), which shows the number of surviving banks for different values of $\rho$. As expected, a more inter-connected interbank market results in larger cascades of bankruptcies due to the larger systemic risk. In fact, when increasing the connectivity, instead of a relatively uniform decline in the number of banks over time, there is subsequent sharp decline in the time paths of surviving banks.

To better analyze this result, the right panel of Fig. 1 displays the average slope of the curve representing the number of surviving banks over time and simulation as a function of $\rho$. In particular, for each value of $\rho$, we run 100 simulations and calculate the average slope of the 100 curves representing the number of surviving banks. This graph provides the evidence of contagious failures, that is periods in

**Fig. 2** Average banks financial fragility as a function of $\rho$, over time and simulations (*left*). Bad debt size distribution of failing banks (*center*) and firms (*right*) as a function of interbank connectivity. $\rho = 0.0; 0.2; 0.5; 0.7$ and $1.0$; *black solid, red dotted, green dashed, blue long dashed* and *yellow dotted dashed lines*, respectively. *Colors are available on the web side version*

which many banks collapse together. In fact, when $\rho$ increases, not only the number of bankruptcies increases, but the time path of surviving banks also declines much more rapidly over time. Indeed, too high a level of connectivity corresponds to higher banks financial fragility, as shown by the left panel of Fig. 2. In particular, average banks financial fragility is equal to 0.56 (SD 0.045) for $\rho = 0$ and decreases to 0.50 (SD 0.03) for $\rho = 0.2$. The difference in the means is supported by a two-sided Welch $t$ test (t = 350, 82).

In line with Minsky's view (1986), the default of a bank is essentially due to an excessive amassment of debts which, in our model, increases with the linkages. So too high a connectivity generates a higher systemic risk, not offset by a lower sharing risk (see Cirillo et al. 2013 for additional evidence). Moreover, in line with many empirical studies (see Humphrey 1986; Angelini 1996; Furfine 2003; Upper and Worms 2002). Figure 2 (central and right panel) shows that the degree of contagion depends on the size of losses imposed by failing debtors on creditors in the system. The distribution of failed agents for different interbank linkages is skewed and grows faster for high levels of connectivity.

## 3.2 Contagion effects on the real economy

In this section, we aim at understanding the relationship between financial institutions and business cycle. Studying the interconnectivity enables us to emphasize the role of the investment-finance link not just as a propagator of shocks but as the main source of financial instability and business cycles (Minsky 1986; Delli Gatti et al. 2011). Moreover, thanks to the network structure we have implemented, we can explicitly analyze how systemic risk emerges from the interaction and, consequently, how small local shocks can trigger large systemic effects. Figure 3 (top left panel) displays the average growth rate as a function of the inter-bank linkage.

An increasing inter-bank connectivity does not have any positive effect on the economic growth. In fact, it does not facilitate the granting of loans to enterprises, but it merely transfers liquidity among financial institutions.[18] Instead, a higher connectivity generates a growing GDP standard deviation and , consequently, a higher macroeco-

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[18] The granted-asked loan ratio is uncorrelated with the interbank connectivity.

**Fig. 3** Average growth rate (*top left*); average kurtosis of growth rate (*top right*); average Hill exponent (*bottom left*), as a function of interbank connectivity, over 100 simulations. Autocorrelation coefficients of absolute growth rate for $\rho = 1.0$ (*black solid line*), with power law best fit estimation (*red dotted line*) (*bottom right*)

nomic uncertainty (see footnote 2). This result is better quantified by Fig. 3 (top right panel), which shows the average kurtosis of growth rate over 100 simulations as a function of the connectivity. As the inter-bank linkage is raised to more than 20 %, the output growth rate becomes leptokurtic and, then, shows heavy tails. A more precise measurement of fat tails is provided by the Hill exponent, which is a maximum likelihood estimator of the parameter $\alpha$ of the Pareto law $F(x) \sim 1/x^{\alpha}$ for large x (see Hill 1975; Lux 2001). In Fig. 3 (bottom left), we plot the Hill exponent as a function of $\rho$. Empirically the tail exponent is found to take values between 2 and 4. When $\rho < 0.5$, the tail exponent approaches the gaussian value of 4. The graph shows a reduction of the volatility when the connectivity increases from 0 to 0.2. To generate fat tails in our model we need to have a probability of attachment $\rho$ higher than 20 %. The robustness of our qualitative results is also checked by recurring to the maximum likelihood method (MLM), as in Clauset et al. (2009). This estimator calculates, on the upper tail of the output growth rate distribution, the average exponent $\alpha$ of the power law function and its standard error. Both Hill and Clauset estimators produce similar results.

The presence of cluster volatility is a well known phenomenon in economic literature (see Stanca and Gallegati 1999; Cont 2007; Tedeschi et al. 2009), and implies that large changes in variable values occur preferably at neighboring times, reflecting

**Fig. 4** Average number of recessions (*left*) and their duration (*center*); average size of the largest component (*right*), as a function of interbank connectivity over time and number of simulations

a tendency for markets to move from relative quiet periods to more turbulent ones. To check the volatility persistency, we measure the autocorrelation function of absolute growth rate for different time lags.[19] Our results show that a strongly connected inter-bank network (for $\rho = 1.0$) generates a positive and slowly decaying autocorrelation of absolute growth rate, which is well fitted by a power law (see the bottom right panel of Fig. 3).

We now turn to the issue of business cycle phases. In particular, we analyze the effect of inter-bank linkages on the GDP expansion and contractions. Given that the simulated aggregated output time series show a upward trend, we extract the trend component by means of a Hodrick–Prescott filter (see Hodrick and Prescott 1997). We, then, use the detrended series -usually known as "potential output"—to analyze the cycle phases. Figure 4 (left and central panels) displays the average number and duration of busts[20] over time and simulations as a function of interbank linkage. The results reported in Fig. 4 show that a not-too-interconnected interbank market reduces recessions and their duration.[21] The effect is reversed as the connectivity raises more than 20%, however. The turning point in Fig. 4 takes place when the sharing risk, associated to the decrease in the bank's financial fragility (see left panel of Fig. 2), is more than counteracted by the increase in systemic risk, associated to an extensive fraction of banks (nodes) joined together in a single giant component. In fact, when the inter-bank linkage increases more than 20%, more than half of financial institutions are interconnected, thus forming a large giant component (see right panel of Fig. 4). The size of the largest component $q$, as shown in Fig. 4 (right side), is obtained by solving $q = 1 - e^{-q(\frac{B^*-1}{2})\rho}$ (see Jackson 2008), where $B^*$ is the number of banks that are effectively operating in the inter-bank market. It is important to underline that not all our $B = 50$ banks are constantly operating in the inter-bank market. In fact,

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[19] Empirically it is observed that absolute growth rates are autocorrelated over lags of several years and decay slowly to zero. Several authors (see, for instance, Ding et al. 1983; Ding and Granger 1996; Cont et al. 1997), have shown that the autocorrelation functions decrease hyperbolically with the time lag.

[20] The number of recessions is calculated as the number of local minima of the filtered series. The duration consists in calculating the base of the triangle which includes the points from peak-to-trough of the output filtered series (see Harding and Pagan 2002).

[21] The average number of busts (busts duration) decreases from 8.21, SD 2.09 (20, SD 4.57) to 6.5, SD 2.80 (16,48, SD 3.02), when the inter-bank connectivity is changed from 0 to 0.2. A two-sided Welch *t* test supports the difference in the means t = 13.8462 (t = 20.1167).

**Fig. 5** Decumulative distribution function (DDF) of negative cumulative growth rate for $\rho = 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.7$ and 1; *black solid, red dotted, green dashed, blue long dashed* and *yellow dotted dashed lines*, respectively (*left*) and DDF of negative cumulative growth rate for $\rho = 1$ (*black solid line*) with Weibull best fit estimation (*red dotted line*) (*right*). *Colors* are available on the web side version

Eqs. (6) and (7), by imposing restrictions on the bank credit supply, generate a mismatch between the total number of agents and the number of active agents. This produces a discrepancy between the theoretical phase transaction, which occurs at $\rho > 0.08$ with a fraction of banks in the largest component $q = 0.885$, and the effective phase transaction, which takes place at $\rho > 0.2$ with $q = 0.683$.

More generally, too high a connectivity of the interbank network implies a more severe trade-off between the stabilization effect of risk diversification and the higher systemic risk associated with bankruptcy cascades (see Fig. 1) and frequent and durable recessions triggered by stronger connectivity.

We now study the distribution of the business cycle contractions.[22] Empirical findings suggest fat tails in the distributions of macroeconomic outcomes (see Ascari et al. 2012; Di Guilmi et al. 2004, 2005). By developing simple interactive structures among agents and feedback effects, we can reproduce the source of business fluctuations: on one side, due to indirect interactions between bankrupt firms and their lending banks through the credit market and, on the other side, due to direct interactions between lender and borrower banks through the interbank system.

Figure 5 (left side) reproduces the Decumulative distribution function of the negative cumulative detrended growth rate[23] for different $\rho$. For different levels of connectivity, DDF plots display a large concavity on the right tail. To identify the distribution generating the large curvatures on the busts tails, we test, for $\rho = 1$, the hypothesis that the sample over the whole time and simulations could follow a Weibull distribution,[24] as shown by empirical studies (see Di Guilmi et al. 2004, 2005). The right

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[22] Expansions follow a similar pattern to recessions. Results are omitted.

[23] In particular, we investigate the distribution of the cumulative de-trended growth rate (potential output), where cumulative refers to the sum of consecutive raw observations sharing the same sign (see Burns and Mitchell 1946; Di Guilmi et al. 2004). We then plot the rank-ordering transformations of recessions in a log–log space (DDF plot).

[24] Weibull distribution is $F(x) = 1 - exp(-ax^b)$.

side of Fig. 5 shows the Weibull best fit estimation, which confirms that the fit is reasonable. Parameter estimations by maximum likelihood at 95 % confidence level return $a = 0.3501$ and $b = 1.1645$. In order to verify the robustness of this result, we have simulated the model using a Truncated Normal distribution of the relative price, $u_{i,t} \sim N(1, \sigma^2)$. Also in this case the best fitting distribution for contractions is Weibull with parameters $a = 0.2014$ and $b = 1.2832$. It means that the distribution of the simulated business cycle is not driven by the distribution of shocks hitting the economy. This result highlights an important feature of agent-based models, i.e., they can endogenously generate fat tails, even if they are hit by purely Gaussian uncorrelated shocks. In our case, fat tail distributed time series arise via the interactive mechanism embodied in the model, without imposing any ad hoc distribution for the exogenous shock (see Mishkin 2011; Ascari et al. 2012).

## 4 Conclusions

This work has analyzed the relationship between the organization of interaction among individuals within different components of the economy and overall aggregate behavior. The focus has been on how economic agents interact with each other and on the possible consequences of their interaction on the economic system.

By modeling a three sector economy with goods, credit and interbank market, we have been able to analyze the impact of the market connectivity on the agents performance and macro dynamics. Our results allow us to conclude that the interaction among market participants is a key element to reproduce important stylized facts about bankruptcy waves and business cycle fluctuations. In particular, we have shown that too high a bank connectivity not only increases the agent's financial fragility, but also generates larger bankruptcy cascades due to the larger systemic risk. However, we have found a non-monotonic relation between bank connectivity and micro and macro performances. Indeed, agents performance and macro activities increase with the level of the connectivity up to a threshold which can be dubbed as pseudo-optimal. On the contrary, the net effect in terms of micro and aggregate outputs is negative for any level of the connectivity exceeding the optimum threshold. Furthermore, the level of the optimal connectivity depends critically on the random network topology we have modeled. The expected structure of the random graph, in fact, varies with the value of the connectivity $\rho$. The links join nodes (i.e banks) together to form components, i.e., (maximal) subsets of nodes that are connected by paths through the network. Random graphs possess an important property, called phase transition (see Erdös and Rényi 1959), from a low-density, low-$\rho$ state in which there are few edges and all components are small, to a high-density, high-$\rho$ state in which an extensive fraction of all banks is joined together in a single giant component. When our inter-bank market reaches the phase transition, the presence of many interconnected banks suggests that the credit network is more susceptible to the domino effect. In this case, when failures occur, many agents are potentially compromised.

Our model, therefore, has shown that the linear relationship between sharing and systemic risk proposed by Allen and Gale (2000a,b) ceases to be valid when the agents connectivity is too high.

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