End-to-end secure communication for CoAP

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Just a quick look at ...

CoAP

OSCORE

Related activities

CoAP

CoAP

Constrained Application Protocol – RFC 7252

- Web-transfer protocol, at the application layer
- Think of it as a "lightweight alternative to HTTP" for the Internet of Things

Supported transports


- Most used is UDP over IP
- TCP or WebSockets (RFC8323)
- SMS, CloT, Bluetooth, LoRaWAN, IEEE 802.15.4, ...

RESTful protocol

- What matters is the resource status on the server and its transfer
- Supported methods: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE
- More recent ones: FETCH and PATCH (RFC 8132)

CoAP

- Message exchange based on the Client-Server model
 - Request-Response exchanges
 - Some more message types for possible reliability



- Token (variable length): set by the client sending a request
 - A <u>Response</u> has the same Token value of the <u>Request</u>
 - I.e., a response matches a request by Token

CoAP message format

Very compact size

- Options (variable length)
 - Signaling extra protocol/message features
 - Encoding: Number/Length/Data

Octet 1			Octet 2	Octet 3	Octet 4
Ver	т	TKL	Code	Message ID	
Token (if any, TKL bytes)					
Options (if any)					
Payload (if any)					

- Payload (variable length)
 - If present, it starts with a 0xFF byte as marker
 - The payload ends when the datagram ends

Notable extensions

Observe (RFC 7641)


- The client sends a Request and registers as an Observer
- The server sends a Response with the current resource representation
- When the resource content changes, the server sends a Notification response
- The client can unregister or just silently forget about an observation

Blockwise (RFC 7959)

- A whole content to deliver (body) can be too big to transfer
- A sender can split the body into chunks (blocks), each sent in one CoAP message
- The recipient will re-build the whole body when received all the blocks

Proxies

- Intermediary nodes between client and server
 - Forward-proxy or reverse-proxy
 - HTTP-to-CoAP or CoAP-to-HTTP cross-proxy



Forward proxy

- The client sends a request to the proxy, indicating the origin server to target
- The proxy forwards the request to the origin server
- The server sends a response to the proxy, thinking of it as a client
- The proxy forwards the response to the client

Performance benefit


- The proxy can cache responses to GET/FETCH requests
- After the first client, next clients will get the response from the proxy


Some more features

- Support for one-to-many communication
 - Over UDP and IP multicast
 - Over any transport supporting one-to-many delivery

Message security

- Nothing natively
- Original suggestion for DTLS 1.2 (RFC 6347)
 - Security at the transport layer
 - Hop-by-hop i.e. not end-to-end
- With DTLS 1.2
 - Security terminates at a proxy, that starts a second secure session with the server
 - No support for CoAP over multicast






- Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments RFC 8613
 - End-to-end security at the application layer
 - Encryption, integrity and replay protection
 - Selective protection of CoAP messages
 - Use COSE (CBOR Object Signing and Encryption) RFC 8152


Faithful to CoAP

- Works wherever CoAP works (UDP, TCP, SMS, CloT, IEEE 802.15.4,...)
- Supports options and proxy forwarding (RFC 7252)
- Supports Observe (RFC 7641) and Blockwise (RFC 7959)
- Supports PATCH & FETCH (RFC 8132) and CoAP over TCP (RFC 8323)
- Can be used with HTTP and when translating between CoAP and HTTP


• Included in OMA LwM2M as application-layer security solution





OSCORE – End-to-End message protection



OSCORE – Security context







OSCORE – The mechanics

How it works


- OSCORE Security Context shared between the two peers
- Use signaled through the "OSCORE" CoAP option
- It wraps a CoAP message into a COSE object
- It delivers the result as a secured CoAP message

Selective encryption/authentication of CoAP fields

- Class E: encrypted via the AEAD algorithm, hidden inside the OSCORE payload
- Class I: integrity protected and visible from the outside (outer options)
- Class U: unprotected and visible from the outside (outer options)


What is protected?

- Encrypted and authenticated: original payload; original REST code; class E options
- Authenticated only: class I options; other info as Additional Authenticated Data (AAD)



OSCORE – The mechanics


- OSCORE Security Context Common, Sender and Recipient parts
 - Contexts derived from a few input parameters, to be pre-established



Related activities

Related activites (1/2)

- Methods to establish OSCORE keys
 - 1. OSCORE profile Use the ACE Framework for Authentication and Authorization
 - 2. Optimized execution of the EDHOC key establishment protocol
- Lightweight method to update OSCORE keys (KUDOS)
 - Compact, with minimal message exchanges
 - Able to preserve high-level security properties
 - Robust against node rebooting
- Advanced use for proxies
 - Caching of OSCORE-protected responses
 - Using of OSCORE also <u>at proxies</u>



Related activites (2/2)

Group OSCORE

- End-to-end security for CoAP group communication
- Adapted structures, constructs and mechanisms from OSCORE
- The same security requirements of OSCORE are fulfilled
 - Source authentication is ensured
 - Secure binding between request and responses is ensured

Key provisioning for Group OSCORE

- Coordinated by a Group Manager
- Contextual with the authorized joining of a group
- Authorization to join enforced by using the ACE framework



IETF standardization

Open standards through an open process

The mission of the IETF is to make the Internet work better by producing high quality, relevant technical documents that influence the way people design, use, and manage the Internet. [RFC 3935]

- Several IoT-related Working Groups
 - CoRE, ACE, LAKE, ...
- Join and participate!





Thanks!

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