




Free indirect discourse:
speech acts in narrative fiction

Luka Crnić

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lukacrnica.com/pdfs/fid-speech-acts.pdf

He said it so wisely, *as if he knew so well the things that happened in the world*, that she put it back at once, and then he gave her, from his own parcel, a gingerbread nut, *as if he were a great Spanish gentleman*, she [Cam] thought, *handing a flower to a lady at a window*.

Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse, 1927

Afterwards he glowed with pleasure. *By Jove, but that was something like!* He stayed the afternoon with the girl, and wanted to stay the night. She, however, told him this was impossible; *her own man would be back by dark, and she must be with him. He, Brangwen, must not let on that there had been anything between them.*

DH Lawrence, The Rainbow, 1915

(*italicized text* = free indirect discourse)

what are some salient differences between
fictional narrative and regular discourse?

case study: free indirect discourse

why are some linguistic moves accessible
in fictional narrative but not in regular discourse?

case study: perspectival shifts in free indirect discourse

the main difference between fictional narrative and regular discourse, at least from the view of free indirect discourse, is a difference in **context**

- **the narrator** is an authority over all information (in fictional narrative)
- **the speaker** is an authority only over one's own beliefs (in regular discourse)

this extensive authority of the narrator licenses **perspectival shifts** not usually available in regular discourse, through the mediation of embedded speech acts, at least to the extent this is admitted by the candidate perspectival expressions

- expressions may differ in **how they depend on context: directly vs. indirectly**; they sometimes depend on the speech act parameters, which can differ from the context parameters, more easily so in literature (due to authority)

(see Doron, 1991, Schlenker, 2004, Sharvit, 2008, Eckardt, 2014 for ancestors and inspiration)

our starting point and the basis for our conclusions are four interrelated puzzles:

- the puzzle of pronouns
- the puzzle of expressives
- the puzzle of indexical adverbs
- the puzzle of tense

in free indirect discourse



PERSON

GENDER,
EXPRESSIVES,
INDEXICAL
ADVERBS

TENSE

the puzzle of pronouns: person

Afterwards he glowed with pleasure. *By Jove, but that was something like!* He stayed the afternoon with the girl, and wanted to stay the night. She, however, told him this was impossible; *her own man would be back by dark, and she must be with him. He, Brangwen, must not let on that there had been anything between them.*

DH Lawrence, *The Rainbow*, 1915

That was one of the bonds between Sally and himself.

Virginia Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 1925

DD: The girl said: “**My** own man **will** be back by dark.”

ID: The girl said **her** own man would be back by dark.

FID: **Her** own man would be back by dark.

Abbreviations: DD = direct discourse, (F)ID = (free) indirect discourse

the puzzle of pronouns: person

this holds also for 1st and 2nd person pronouns (cf. Banfield's [priority of speaker](#))

If he was dead, I thought, I would see the reflection of the candles on the darkened blind for I knew two candles must be set at the head of a corpse.

James Joyce, Dubliners, 1914

Oh how extraordinarily nice I was, she told my father, without realizing that I was listening to their conversation.

Schlenker, 2004

DD: She said to my father: "Oh how extraordinarily nice **he** is!"

ID: She told my father that **I** was extraordinarily nice.

FID: Oh how extraordinarily nice **I** was.

the puzzle of pronouns: gender

Imagine a scenario where John looks at Bill, not knowing that he is a man (maybe since Bill is wearing a dress), and he says to himself: “She likes me, I can tell.”

DD: John thought: “She likes me, I can tell.”

ID: John thought that he likes him.

FID: She likes him, he could tell.

Sharvit, 2008

fid: person features of pronouns are interpreted from the perspective of the narrator; gender features are interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist.

the puzzle of expressives

The news affected Connie in her state of semi-stupefied well being with vexation amounting to exasperation. *Now she had to be bothered by that beast of a woman!*

DH Lawrence, Lady Chatterley's Lover, 1932

DD: Clarissa thought: "Now I have to be bothered by that **beast** of a woman!"

ID: Clarissa thought that she had to be bothered by that woman,
whom she considered to be a "beast."

FID: Now she had to be bothered by that **beast** of a woman!

fid: **expressives** and **presuppositional elements** trigger presuppositions that are evaluated relative to the protagonist's attitudes (not the narrator's).

the puzzle of indexical adverbs

Yes, it must have been precisely here that she had stood ten years ago. There was the wall; the hedge; the tree. The question was of some relation between those masses. She had borne it in her mind all these years. It seemed as if the solution had come to her: she knew now what she wanted to do. She rejected one brush; she chose another. When would those children come? When would they all be off? She fidgeted. That man, she thought, her anger rising in her, never give; that man took.

Virginia Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*, 1927

DD: Lily said: “It must have been **here** that I stood **10 years ago**.”

ID: Lily said it must have been **there** that she had stood **in 1910**.

FID: It must have been **here** that she had stood **10 years ago**.

fid: **temporal and locational indexical adverbs** give rise to inferences that are interpreted relative to the protagonist's perspective (not the narrator's).

Tom lächelte. Morgen war der große Tag.

'Tom smiled. Tomorrow was the grand day'

Tom lächelte. Vorhin hatte er viel Geld verdient.

'Tom smiled. A little while ago, he had earned a lot of money.'

Sharvit, 2008, Eckardt, 2014

DD: Tom thought: "Tomorrow **is** the big day."

ID: Tom thought that Friday **was** / **is** the big day.

FID: Tomorrow **was** / **is** the big day.

simultaneous readings require past morphology in English (free) indirect discourse (simultaneous readings = attitude holder's attitude is about their "now").

priority of present (Banfield, 1982): the use of present tense (in English) indicates the narrator's (hence usually the reader's) "now" (but see 'historical present').

the puzzle of tense: variation


Glosses of Slovenian (Russian, Hebrew, etc) counterparts of English:

DD: Tom thought: “Tomorrow **is** the big day.”

ID: Tom thought that the next day **is** / **was** the big day.

FID: Tomorrow **is** / **was** the big day. [both fine^{*/?}]

fid, sequence of tense generalization (Sharvit, 2008): a language uses present tense for simultaneous readings in ID iff it uses* present tense for **simultaneous readings in FID**.
*or ‘can use,’ in at least Slovenian



SPEECH
ACTS

CONTEXT

language is action

The hypothesis [...] of this work is that speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior. To put it more briskly, talking is performing acts according to rules.

Searle, 1969

simple example

(1) We should be paying close attention to Trịnh Hữu Tuệ.

this could be an assertion, or a command, or a request, or a threat, etc. these are different illocutionary acts (Austin, 1962), with different illocutionary forces (Searle, 1969) – this means they are subject to different constraints (preparatory, sincerity rules), they bring about different commitments and effects in context.

		<i>Request</i>	<i>Assert, state (that), affirm</i>
Types of rule	Propositional content	Future act <i>A</i> of <i>H</i> .	Any proposition <i>p</i> .
	Preparatory	1. <i>H</i> is able to do <i>A</i> . <i>S</i> believes <i>H</i> is able to do <i>A</i> . 2. It is not obvious to both <i>S</i> and <i>H</i> that <i>H</i> will do <i>A</i> in the normal course of events of his own accord.	1. <i>S</i> has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of <i>p</i> . 2. It is not obvious to both <i>S</i> and <i>H</i> that <i>H</i> knows (does not need to be reminded of, etc.) <i>p</i> .
	Sincerity	<i>S</i> wants <i>H</i> to do <i>A</i> .	<i>S</i> believes <i>p</i> .
	Essential	Counts as an attempt to get <i>H</i> to do <i>A</i> .	Counts as an undertaking to the effect that <i>p</i> represents an actual state of affairs.
	Comment:	<i>Order</i> and <i>command</i> have the additional preparatory rule that <i>S</i> must be in a position of authority over <i>H</i> . <i>Command</i> probably does not have the 'pragmatic' condition requiring non-obviousness. Furthermore in both, the authority relationship infects the essential condition because the utterance counts as an attempt to get <i>H</i> to do <i>A</i> in virtue of the authority of <i>S</i> over <i>H</i> .	Unlike <i>argue</i> these do not seem to be essentially tied to attempting to convince. Thus "I am simply stating that <i>p</i> and not attempting to convince you" is acceptable, but "I am arguing that <i>p</i> and not attempting to convince you" sounds inconsistent.

ASSERT(speaker S)(hearer H)(time T)(situation @)(proposition p) requires:

- i. S has evidence, etc, for p being true at T at @
- ii. S knows that H does not know p at T at @
- iii. S believes p at T at @

Where is this represented? A matter purely of pragmatics or also of grammar?

Performative hypothesis: speech act operators are grammatical devices, recursively embeddable, and with its own (potentially shiftable) parameters.

(e.g., Ross, 1970, Krifka, 2001, 2020, Trinh, 2023a,b)

Accordingly, a sentence like the following

We should be paying close attention to Trịnh Hữu Tuệ

may have the Logical Form:

ASSERT(S)(H)(T)(@)[We should be paying close attention to THT]

and the interpretation (simplified, the requirements are as above):

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(S, H, T, @): \Box_{t, w}(\text{we pay close attention to THT})$

Where does the information about the speaker, hearer, time, etc, come from?

If we think of the formal role played by context within the model-theoretic semantics, then we should say that context provides whatever parameters are needed. The context is a package of whatever parameters are needed to determine the referent, and thus the content [...].

Kaplan, 1989

A context is a location - time, place, and possible world - where a sentence is said. It has countless features, determined by the character of the location. [...] Any adequate grammar must tell us that truth-in-English depends not only on what words are said and on the facts, but also on features of the situation in which the words are said.

Lewis, 1980

context and speech acts: pronouns, tense, adverbs

proposal: (free) pronouns, English present depend on context; other tenses, gender, adverbs depend on speech acts for interpretation (only indirectly on context)

(2) I like you now

context dependence:

(3) $\llbracket I \rrbracket^C = \text{the speaker in } C$, $\llbracket \text{you} \rrbracket^C = \text{the hearer in } C$,
 $\llbracket \text{he/she} \rrbracket^C \neq \text{the speaker/hearer in } C$

speech act dependence:

(4) $\llbracket \text{VP}_{\text{prs-Slo/He/etc now}} \rrbracket^C = \lambda t. \text{ the time of VP overlaps with } t$

mixed dependence:

(5) $\llbracket \text{VP}_{\text{prs-En now}} \rrbracket^C = \lambda t. \text{ the time of VP overlaps with } t \text{ and the context time}$

illustration:

$$(6) \quad \llbracket \text{ASSERT}(S)(H)(T)(@)[\text{I like}_{\text{prs-Slo/He/etc}} \text{ you now}] \rrbracket^C =$$

$$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(S, H, T, @):$$

the time of **the speaker in C** liking **the hearer in C** **overlaps with** **t** in **w**

all values $S, H, T, @$ are determined in the context C . the possible determinations are constrained by the concrete situation of the speech act & the requirements of ASSERT; so usually S =the speaker, H =the hearer in the context, at time T .

importantly, though, other resolutions of speech act parameters are in principle possible. consider, for example, the **rising declaratives** in English. on one family of proposals, one substitutes at least the speech act agent in them:

(7) You smóke? And you drínk?

(8) [ASSERT(H)(H')(T)(@)[you smoke]]
and [ASSERT(H)(H')(T)(@)[you drink]]

(Trinh & Crnič, 2011, cf. Gunlogson, 2002, 2003)

again, such maneuvers are very restricted due to the strict requirements of speech acts, and they tend to require specific reactions from the speech act participants!



PERSON

Afterwards he glowed with pleasure. *By Jove, but that was something like!* He stayed the afternoon with the girl, and wanted to stay the night. She, however, told him this was impossible; *her own man would be back by dark, and she must be with him. He, Brangwen, must not let on that there had been anything between them.*

DH Lawrence, *The Rainbow*, 1915

Oh how extraordinarily nice I was, she told my father, without realizing that I was listening to their conversation.

Schlenker, 2004

direct discourse: context := speech act (that is, context parameters C are shifted to the speech act parameters; eg, the speaker in C := the speech act agent)

DD: The woman said: “My own man will be back by dark.”

$\llbracket \text{ASSERT}(W)(H')(T')(\textcircled{a})[\text{my man would be back by dark}] \rrbracket^C =$

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(W, H', T', \textcircled{a})$:

the speaker in C's man be back by dark in the future of t in w

(speech act - context identification/shift: $C = \langle W, H', T', \textcircled{a} \rangle$)

indirect discourse: context, speech act \neq attitude eventuality (no shifting)

ID: The woman said that her man will be back by dark.

$\llbracket \text{ASSERT}(S)(H)(T)(\textcircled{a})[\text{the } W \text{ said her man would be back by dark}] \rrbracket^C =$

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(S, H, T, \textcircled{a})$: $\forall \langle t', w' \rangle \in \text{Acc}_{\text{SAY}}(W, t^*_{\langle t, w \rangle})$:

the woman's man be back by dark in the future of t' in w

we assume there is a speech act of narration, NARR, where the agent (that is, the narrator), time, etc, is determined by the context of the literary work. accordingly, free indirect discourse then effectively introduces an **embedded speech act**

FID: **Her** own man would be back by dark.

NARR(S)(H)(T)(@)

[ASSERT(Woman)(Brangwen)(T')(@)[her man would be back by dark]]

note that the quantification of NARR is effectively vacuous here, and that $T' < T$:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(\text{Woman}, \text{Brangwen}, T', @)$:

the woman's man be back by dark in the future of t in w

(note that $\llbracket \text{her} \rrbracket^C = \text{the woman}$, licit as \neq the speaker/hearer in C)

the difference between DD and FID is that in DD the speech act is identified with the context, in FID it isn't (say, the narrator is still the speaker of the context)

FID: Oh how extraordinarily nice I was.

NARR(S)(H)(T)(@)

$\left[\text{EXC}(W)(\text{Father})(T')(@) [\text{oh how extraordinarily nice I was}] \right]$

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(\text{Woman}, \text{Father}, T', @):$


the speaker in C is extraordinarily nice at t in w

(context: $C = \langle \text{Narrator}, H, T, @ \rangle$, the speaker = the narrator)

conclusion: since the interpretation of person depends on the context directly, without the mediation of speech acts, we get the same behavior as in ID

(cf. Schlenker, 2004)

GENDER, EXPRESSIVES, & ADVERBS



Imagine a scenario where John looks at Bill, not knowing that he is a man (maybe since Bill is wearing a dress), and he says to himself: “She likes me, I can tell.”

Sharvit, 2008

DD: John thought: “**She** likes me, I can tell.”

ID: John thought that **he**/~~she~~ likes him.

FID: **She** likes him, he could tell.

The news affected Connie in her state of semi-stupefied well being with vexation amounting to exasperation. Now she had to be bothered by that beast of a woman!

DH Lawrence, Lady Chatterley’s Lover, 1932

DD: Clarissa thought: “Now I have to be bothered by that **beast** of a woman!”

ID: Clarissa thought that she had to be bothered by that woman,
whom she considered to be a “beast.”

FID: Now she had to be bothered by that **beast** of a woman!

sensitivity to features of speech acts (independently needed, cf. projection in ID)

- (9) $\llbracket \text{she} \rrbracket^C$ presupposes that **the speech act agent** takes at **the time of the speech act** the referent of the expression to indentify as female

morphology: $\text{she} \rightsquigarrow \text{she}(S)(T)\dots$

- (10) $\llbracket \text{beast} \rrbracket^C$ presupposes that **the speech act agent** has at **the time of the speech act** a negative attitude towards the elements in the denotation of the expression

morphology: $\text{beast} \rightsquigarrow \text{beast}(S)(T)\dots$

(cf. Schlenker, 2007)

DD: John thought: “**She** likes me, I can tell.”

embedded speaker, time, etc, variables are bound by ASSERT (recall that with quotation there is speech act - context identification: $C = \langle J, H', T', @ \rangle$)

$$\text{ASSERT}(J)(H')(T')(@)[\text{she}(J)(T') \text{ likes me}]$$

Presupposition:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(J, H', T', @)$: s takes at t, w the ref. of *she* to identify as female

Assertion:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(J, H', T', @)$: the referent of *she* likes John at t, w

(recall: $\llbracket \text{me} \rrbracket^C = \text{the speaker in } C = \text{John}$)

ID: John thought that **he/#she** likes him.

embedded speaker, time, etc, variables are bound by ASSERT

$\text{ASSERT}(S)(H)(T)(@)[\text{John thought she}(S)(T) \text{ likes me}]$

Presupposition:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(S, H, T, @)$: s takes at t, w the referent of *she* to identify
as male (*with he*) / female (*with she*)

Assertion:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(S, H, T, @)$: $\forall \langle t', w' \rangle \in \text{Acc}_{\text{THINK}}(J, t^*_{\langle t, w \rangle})$:
the referent of *he/she* likes John at t', w'

FID: **She** really likes him, he could tell.

embedded speaker, time, etc, parameters are locally bound by ASSERT

$$\text{NARR}(S)(H)(T)(@) \\ \left[\text{ASSERT}(J)(H')(T')(@) [\text{she}(J)(T') \text{ likes him}] \right]$$

Presupposition:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(J, H', T', @)$: s takes at t, w the ref. of *she* to identify as female

Assertion:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(J, H', T', @)$: the referent of *she* likes John at t', w'

DD: Connie said: “Now I have to be bothered by that **beast** of a woman!”

embedded speaker, time, etc, variables are bound by EXC (recall that with quotation there is speech act - context identification: $C = \langle \text{Connie}, F, T, @ \rangle$)

$$\left[\text{ASSERT}(C)(\text{Father})(T')(@) \left[\text{I have to be bothered by that beast}(C)(T') \right] \right]$$

Presupposition:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(C, F, T, @)$: s has a negative att. towards that woman at t in w

Assertion:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(C, F, T, @)$: Connie is bothered by that woman at t in w

(recall: $\llbracket I \rrbracket^C$ = the speaker in C = Connie)

ID: Connie said that she had to be bothered by that **beast** woman.

embedded speaker, time, etc, variables are bound by ASSERT

ASSERT(S)(H)(T)(@)
[Connie said she had to be bothered by that beast(S)(T)]

Presupposition:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(S, H, T, @)$: s has a negative att. towards that woman at t in w

Assertion:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(S, H, T, @)$: $\forall \langle t', w' \rangle \in \text{Acc}(\text{Connie}, t^*_{\langle t, w \rangle})$:
 $\Box_{t', w'} (\text{Connie is bothered by that woman})$

FID: Now she had to be bothered by that **beast** of a woman!

embedded speaker, time, etc, parameters are locally bound by EXC

$$\text{NARR}(S)(H)(T)(@)$$
$$\left[\text{ASSERT}(C)(\text{Father})(T')(@) \left[\text{she has to be bothered by that beast}(C)(T') \right] \right]$$

Presupposition:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(C, F, T', @)$: s has a neg. att. towards that woman at t in w

Assertion:

$\forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(C, F, T', @)$: $\Box_{t,w}(\text{Connie is bothered by that woman})$

gender, expressive (etc.) presuppositions are filtered under speech acts (cf. attitudes). in DD/FID the protagonist is the speech act agent; in ID the speaker is.

Yes, it must have been precisely here that she had stood ten years ago. There was the wall; the hedge; the tree. The question was of some relation between those masses. She had borne it in her mind all these years. It seemed as if the solution had come to her: she knew now what she wanted to do. She rejected one brush; she chose another. When would those children come? When would they all be off? She fidgeted. That man, she thought, her anger rising in her, never give; that man took.

Virginia Woolf, *To the Lighthouse*, 1927

DD: Lily said: “It must have been **here** that I stood **10 years ago**.”

ID: Lily said it must have been **there** that she had stood **in 1910**.

FID: It must have been **here** that she had stood **10 years ago**.

sensitivity to features of speech acts

(11) $\llbracket \text{tomorrow} \rrbracket^C = \text{the day after the speech act time}$
 $\text{tomorrow} \rightsquigarrow \text{tomorrow}(T)$

(12) $\llbracket \text{ten years ago} \rrbracket^C = \text{ten years before the speech act time}$
 $\text{ten years ago} \rightsquigarrow \text{ten years ago}(T)$

(13) $\llbracket \text{here} \rrbracket^C = \text{the location of the speech act location}$
 $\text{here} \rightsquigarrow \text{here}(@)$

the narrator's location and time: T, @; Lily's utterance's loc and time: T', @'

DD: [ASSERT(L)(H)(T')(@')[must [I be **here**(@') **ten years ago**(T')]]]

ID: [ASSERT(S)(H)(T)(@)[Lily said [must [she be **there**(@) **in 1910**]]]]]

FID: [NARR(S)(H)(T)(@)
[ASSERT(L)(H)(T')(@')[must [Lily be **here**(@') **ten years ago**(T')]]]]]

temporal and location indexical adverbs are relativized to the speech act time and location, rather than context directly. this is detectable in speech act shifts.

TENSE

Tom lächelte. Morgen war der große Tag.

'Tom smiled. Tomorrow was the grand day'

Tom lächelte. Vorhin hatte er viel Geld verdient.

'Tom smiled. A little while ago, he had earned a lot of money.'

Sharvit, 2008, Eckardt, 2014

DD: Tom thought: "Tomorrow **is** the big day."

ID: Tom thought that the next day **was** / is the big day.

FID: Tomorrow **was** / is the big day.

Glosses of Slovenian (Russian, Hebrew, etc) counterparts of English:

DD: Tom thought: "Tomorrow **is** the big day."

ID: Tom thought that the next day **is** / ~~was~~ the big day.

FID: Tomorrow **is** / **was** the big day. [both fine*/?]

present tense in English is always directly context-dependent:

ID: Tom thought that the next day is the big day.

Tom thought that the next day be the big day at the time of Tom's thinking and in the actual context

past tense does not rule out present tense (that is, entail cessation) logically. the present tense alternative competes with the past tense sentence, and is negated if stronger (entailing cessation) (Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2012).

ID: Tom thought that the next day was the big day.

Tom thought that the next day be the big day at the time of Tom's thinking

as Tom's thinking is *ex hypothesi* in the past, and the present tense alternative cannot hold in the past, negation of present tense is trivial. accordingly, we can get the simultaneous reading for the past tense.

FID: The next day was the big day

NARR(S)(H)(T)(@)

[ASSERT(Tom)(H')(T')(@)[the next day was(T') big day]]

as Tom's speech act was in the past, and the present tense alternative cannot hold in the past (recall that the English present tense is always context-dependent), negation of present tense is trivial. accordingly, we get the simultaneous reading. if present tense is used, we get a double-access reading ("priority of present").

past tense is used for simultaneous readings in the past speech act events in the same way as in indirect discourse: absence of competition with present tense.

present tense in non-sot languages is not directly context-dependent:

ID: Tom thought that the next day is the big day

Tom thought that the next day be the big day at the time of Tom's thinking and ~~in the actual context~~

so the present tense alternative more robustly competes with the past tense:

ID: Tom thought that the next day was the big day

Tom thought that the next day was the big day $\wedge \neg$ Tom thought that the next day was the big day at the time of Tom's thinking

as Tom's thinking is in the past, and the present tense alternative competes with past tense, negation yields a backwards-shifted reading.

present tense is bound by the speech act, which is shifted to the past:

FID: The next day is the big day

NARR(S)(H)(T)(@)

[ASSERT(Tom)(H')(T')(@)[the next day is(T') big day]]

$\Leftrightarrow \forall \langle s, h, t, w \rangle \in \text{Acc}(\text{Tom}, H', T', @):$

the next day (wrt t) being the big day overlaps with t

(where T' is in the past relative to the narrator's time, T)

present tense across languages is relative. if it is not also context-dependent (like in Slovenian, Hebrew, Russian), we obtain its relativization to the embedding attitude or the speech act predicate. in English, etc, due to a context-dependent present tense, one expresses simultaneity by using the past tense.



the ingredients of the analysis

- **performative hypotesis**: speech act level in grammar (since the narrator is an absolute authority, shifting of speech act parameters is possible)
- sensitivity to **context vs. speech acts**

the consequence of the ingredients

- **person** is dependent on context (hence: no perspective shifting in fid)
- **presuppositions** (gender, expressives, etc) are relativized to the attitudes of the speech act agent (hence: perspective shifting in fid)
- **tense** is relativized to the speech act time (hence: perspective shifting in fid), except with English, etc, present tense, which is also relativized to present tense (hence: no perspective shifting in fid)

in homage to Doron's, Schlenker's, Sharvit's, Eckardt's work ...

- [1] Altshuler, Daniel & Roger Schwarzschild. 2012.
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