

CS 276: Homework 9

Due Date: Friday November 22nd, 2024 at 8:59pm via Gradescope

1 Simulation-Sound NIZKs

We will use the Fiat-Shamir transform to convert the interactive sigma protocol from homework 8 into a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK).

We will also define the notion of simulation soundness for NIZKs, which combines soundness and zero-knowledge into one security definition. Simulation soundness essentially states that an adversary who sees simulated proofs of true and false statements of their choosing, cannot produce an accepting proof on a different false statement.

Simulation-sound NIZKs can be used to construct CCA2-secure encryption and signatures, among other applications.

The Fiat-Shamir Transform: Let us start with the sigma protocol from homework 8 and make it non-interactive by computing the verifier's message m with a random oracle \mathcal{H} applied to the partial transcript of the protocol. This is known as the *Fiat-Shamir transform*.

As in homework 8, let \mathbb{G} be a cryptographic group of prime order p , where $\frac{1}{p} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Let $d_{in}, d_{out} \in \mathbb{N}$ be the dimensions of the input and output spaces, respectively. A function F mapping $\mathbb{Z}_p^{d_{in}} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^{d_{out}}$ is *homomorphic* if for any $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}' \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d_{in}}$, $F(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{x}') = F(\mathbf{x}) \cdot F(\mathbf{x}')$. An *instance* of the language L is any tuple (F, \mathbf{y}) such that F is a homomorphic function mapping $\mathbb{Z}_p^{d_{in}} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^{d_{out}}$, and $\mathbf{y} \in \text{Im}(F)$. The corresponding *witness* is an input $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d_{in}}$ such that $F(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}$.

Additionally, let us assume that if we sample $\mathbf{x} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d_{in}}$, then $F(\mathbf{x})$ has min-entropy $\omega(\log^2(\lambda))$. In other words, for any $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{G}^{d_{out}}$,

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{d_{in}}} [F(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}] \leq 2^{-\omega(\log^2(\lambda))} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Also, let \mathcal{H} be a random oracle mapping $\mathbb{G}^{d_{out}} \times \mathbb{G}^{d_{out}} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Finally, the NIZK is a pair of algorithms (Prove, Verify), which are constructed as follows.

Prove(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}):

1. Sample $\mathbf{a} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^{d_{in}}$, and compute $\mathbf{b} = F(\mathbf{a})$.
2. Compute $m = \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{b})$.
3. Compute $\mathbf{c} = m \cdot \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{a}$ and output $\pi = (\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{c})$.

Verify(\mathbf{y}, π):

1. Compute $m = \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{b})$.
2. If $F(\mathbf{c}) = \mathbf{y}^m \cdot \mathbf{b}$, then output accept. Else output reject.

Zero-Knowledge: Let us define the notion of zero-knowledge for NIZKs.

Definition 1.1 (Zero-Knowledge Adversary and Simulator) *The zero-knowledge adversary \mathcal{A} is run in one of the following games, $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Real}}$ or $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ideal}}$, and they are not told which one. \mathcal{A} makes proof queries of the form $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d_{\text{in}}} \times \mathbb{G}^{d_{\text{out}}}$, where $F(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}$, and random oracle queries of the form $(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{b}) \in \mathbb{G}^{d_{\text{out}}} \times \mathbb{G}^{d_{\text{out}}}$, and finally they output a bit b in order to guess which game they are in.*

In the real world, $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Real}}$, the challenger samples a random oracle \mathcal{H} and responds to each random oracle query with $\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{b})$. For each proof query (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) , the challenger responds with $\pi = \text{Prove}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$.

In the ideal world, $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ideal}}$, there is a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} that handles the queries. \mathcal{S} receives each random oracle query (\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{b}) and computes the response $\mathcal{S}.\text{RO}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{b})$. For each proof query, (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) such that $F(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}$, \mathcal{S} only receives \mathbf{y} and must compute the response $\mathcal{S}.\text{Prove}(\mathbf{y})$.

Definition 1.2 (Zero-Knowledge for NIZKs) *The NIZK satisfies **zero-knowledge** if there exists a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} such that for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} ,*

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A} \rightarrow 1 \text{ in } \mathcal{G}_{\text{Real}}] - \Pr[\mathcal{A} \rightarrow 1 \text{ in } \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ideal}}]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Simulation Soundness: In the definition of zero-knowledge, \mathcal{S} is only required to output an accepting proof for a statement in the language (i.e. an (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) for which $F(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}$). Simulation soundness allows the adversary to run \mathcal{S} on false statements as well (where $\mathbf{y} \notin \text{Im}(F)$) and guarantees that the adversary cannot forge an accepting proof on a new false statement.

Definition 1.3 (Simulation Soundness Game \mathcal{G}_{SS}) *The simulation soundness adversary \mathcal{B} interacts with \mathcal{S} directly. \mathcal{B} can make proof queries of the form $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{G}^{d_{\text{out}}}$ and receives the response $\mathcal{S}.\text{Prove}(\mathbf{y})$. \mathcal{B} can also make random oracle queries of the form $(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{b}) \in \mathbb{G}^{d_{\text{out}}} \times \mathbb{G}^{d_{\text{out}}}$ and receives the response $\mathcal{S}.\text{RO}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{b})$.*

Finally \mathcal{B} outputs a statement-proof tuple (\mathbf{y}^, π^*) , which the challenger verifies by computing $\text{Verify}(\mathbf{y}^*, \pi^*)$. If Verify queries the random oracle, the challenger queries $\mathcal{S}.\text{RO}$.*

\mathcal{B} wins \mathcal{G}_{SS} if (\mathbf{y}^, π^*) was not a previous query-response pair for $\mathcal{S}.\text{Prove}$, and $\text{Verify}(\mathbf{y}^*, \pi^*)$ outputs accept, and $\mathbf{y} \notin \text{Im}(F)$ (\mathbf{y} is a false statement).*

Definition 1.4 (Simulation Soundness) *A NIZK is simulation-sound if there exists a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} such that the following hold:*

- *Zero Knowledge:* For all PPT zero-knowledge adversaries \mathcal{A} ,

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A} \rightarrow 1 \text{ in } \mathcal{G}_{\text{Real}}] - \Pr[\mathcal{A} \rightarrow 1 \text{ in } \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ideal}}]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

- *Unforgeability:* For all PPT simulation soundness adversaries \mathcal{B} ,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ wins } \mathcal{G}_{\text{SS}}] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Question: Prove that the NIZK (Prove, Verify) constructed above satisfies simulation soundness.