

# Cryptography

## Hash Functions

Prof. Dr. Heiko Knospe

TH Köln – University of Applied Sciences

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# Hash Functions

In general, a *cryptographic hash function* consists of a polynomial-time key generator (that takes a security parameter  $1^n$  as input) and a hash algorithm. A *keyed* hash function

$$H_k : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$$

takes a key and a binary string as input and outputs a hash value of length  $n$ .

In practice, hash functions are *unkeyed* or the key is fixed.

# Collisions and Collision Resistance

Since hash values are used as *message digests* or unique *identifiers*, their main requirement is *collision resistance*. A collision is given by two input values  $x \neq x'$  with

$$H(x) = H(x').$$

## Definition

A function  $H_k = H : D \rightarrow R$ , where  $H$ ,  $k$ ,  $D$  and  $R$  depend on a security parameter  $n$ , is called *collision resistant*, if the probability that a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary finds a collision  $H(x) = H(x')$ , where  $x, x' \in D$  and  $x \neq x'$ , is negligible in  $n$ .

# Weak Collision Resistance

There are two related requirements, which are weaker than collision resistance:

- *Second-preimage resistance* or *weak collision resistance* means that an adversary, who is given a uniform  $x \in D$ , is not able to find a second preimage  $x' \in D$  with  $x \neq x'$  such that  $H(x) = H(x')$ .
- *Preimage resistance* or *one-wayness* means that an adversary, who is given a uniform  $y \in R$ , is not able to find a preimage  $x \in D$  such that  $H(x) = y$ .

# Random Oracle Model

An ideal unkeyed hash function is called a *random oracle*. The output of a random oracle is uniformly random, unless the same input is queried twice, in which case the oracle returns the same output.

A hash function that behaves as a random oracle is required in some security theorems and proofs. However, concrete implementations of a random oracle are impossible.

# Birthday Paradox

Hash values should not be too short. In fact, the *Birthday Paradox* demonstrates that collisions occur surprisingly often:

## Theorem

*Let  $k$  be the number of independent samples drawn from a uniform distribution on a set of size  $N$ . If  $k \approx 1.2\sqrt{N}$ , then the probability of a collision is around 50%.*

If we consider hash values of length  $n$  and assume that they have a uniform distribution, then collisions occur after hashing around  $\sqrt{2^n} = 2^{n/2}$  messages.

In order to minimize the risk of random collisions, hash values should be at least 200 bits long.

# Integrity Protection

Firstly, the hash value can be used as a short *identifier* of data.


$$m \longrightarrow H(m)$$

The identifier is unique as long as the hash function is collision resistant. Hashes can be used to verify the *integrity* of messages. Note that the verifier needs access to the *authentic* message digest  $H(m)$ .

Hashes are used in the construction of *message authentication codes* (HMAC). *Signature schemes* first hash the message.

# Blockchain


A *blockchain* is a sequence of linked blocks. Each block contains the hash value of the previous block. A blockchain can be used as a *distributed ledger*, which records transactions in an efficient and verifiable way. Hash values protect the integrity of the blockchain: transactions in a block cannot be modified without changing all subsequent hash values.





# Merkle-Damgård Construction

The *Merkle-Damgård construction* has found widespread use, including the MD-SHA family. The Merke-Damgård transform is based on a *compression function*  $f : \{0, 1\}^{n+l} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ , which maps  $n + l$  input bits to  $n$  output bits. The compression function is applied recursively. A message  $m$  is padded and its length is appended, giving  $m'$ . In each step,  $l$  bits of  $m'$  are processed and the last output defines the hash value  $H(m)$ .



# SHA-1

SHA-1 is a Merkle-Damgård hash function based on a compression function

$$f : \{0, 1\}^{160+512} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{160}.$$

A 512-bit message block  $m = W_0 \| W_1 \| \dots \| W_{15}$  is subdivided into 16 words of length 32 bits. By XOR operations and a circular left shift by one position, 64 additional words  $W_{16}, \dots, W_{79}$  are generated:

$$W_j = (W_{j-16} \oplus W_{j-14} \oplus W_{j-8} \oplus W_{j-3}) \lll 1 \text{ for } 16 \leq j \leq 79$$

The 160-bit input vector  $h = H_1 \| H_2 \| H_3 \| H_4 \| H_5$  is subdivided into five 32-bit words and copied to the initial status vector:

$$A \| B \| C \| D \| E \leftarrow H_1 \| H_2 \| H_3 \| H_4 \| H_5$$

# SHA-1 Compression Function

Then, 80 rounds of the SHA-1 compression function are performed, which update the status words  $A||B||C||D||E$ . In round  $j$ , the 32-bit message word  $W_j$  is processed. A nonlinear bit-function  $F$  (defined by AND, OR, NOT and XOR operations) and a constant  $K$  are used. The function  $F$  and the constant  $K$  change every 20 rounds. The following function is used for the first 20 rounds:


$$F(B, C, D) = (B \wedge C) \oplus (\neg B \wedge D)$$

After completing 80 rounds, the compression function outputs

$$f(h, m) = (A + H_1 \parallel B + H_2 \parallel C + H_3 \parallel D + H_4 \parallel E + H_5),$$

where  $+$  denotes addition modulo  $2^{32}$ .

# SHA1 Compression Function



One round of the SHA-1 compression function  $f$  which updates the 160-bit state.  $W$  is a 32-bit message chunk,  $F$  is a bit function (see above) and  $K$  a constant.  $\lll$  denotes left-rotations and  $+$  is addition modulo  $2^{32}$ .

# SHA-1 Collision

In February 2017, a SHA-1 collision was found. The attack required  $2^{63}$  SHA-1 calls, and took approximately 6500 CPU years and 100 GPU years. A prefix  $P$  was chosen and two different 1024-bit messages  $M^{(1)}$  and  $M^{(2)}$  were found such that

$$H(P\|M^{(1)}) = H(P\|M^{(2)}).$$

Since  $P$  is a valid preamble for PDF documents, the collision makes it possible to fabricate two different PDF files with the same SHA-1 hash value. Impressive examples have been published.

Here is the prefix  $P$  in ASCII characters:

```
%PDF-1.3.%.....1 0 obj.<</Width 2 0 R/Height 3 0 R/Type 4 0 R/  
Subtype 5 0 R/Filter 6 0 R/ColorSpace 7 0 R/Length 8 0 R/BitsPer  
Component 8>>.stream.....$SHA-1 is dead!!!!!!./...#9u.9...<L.....
```


# SHA-2

The SHA-2 hash functions SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 are constructed in a similar way to SHA-1, but use an extended internal state and larger digests. It is assumed that SHA-2 offers better protection against collision-finding attacks. SHA-2 is now widely used in security protocols and applications.

In the following, we describe the SHA-256 variant. The SHA-2 compression function  $f$  takes as input a 256-bit status vector and a 512-bit message block and outputs an updated 256-bit status:

$$f : \{0, 1\}^{256+512} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$$

# SHA-2 Compression Function



*One round of the SHA-2 compression function  $f$ . The functions  $Maj$ ,  $Ch$ ,  $\Sigma_0$  and  $\Sigma_1$  are defined in a similar way as the function  $F$  used in SHA-1.*

The 32-bit status words  $A$ ,  $B$ ,  $C$ ,  $D$ ,  $E$ ,  $F$ ,  $G$ ,  $H$  are updated. In each of the 64 rounds, a 32-bit chunk  $W$  derived from the message block is processed.  $K$  is a 32-bit constant that depends on the round number.

# SHA-3


After a competition to construct a new secure hash function called SHA-3, *Keccak* was selected as the winner. Keccak is not of Merkle-Damgård type, but rather based on a *sponge* construction.

In 2015, the Keccak variants SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 with output lengths between 224 and 512 bits were standardized. The SHA-3 instance of Keccak uses a three-dimensional state array of  $5 \times 5 \times 64 = 1600$  bits. The unkeyed Keccak- $f[1600]$  permutation operates on the 1600-bit state array, and it is assumed that  $f$  behaves like a *random permutation*.

$$f : \{0, 1\}^{1600} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{1600}$$



# Keccak Operation



*Absorbing message blocks of length  $r$  and squeezing out the hash value.*

# SHA-3 Family

## Definition

The SHA-3 family of hash functions

$$H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$$

supports output lengths  $n \in \{224, 256, 384, 512\}$ . Depending on  $n$ , the rate  $r$  and the capacity  $c$  are fixed, where  $r + c = 1600$ . The input message  $m$  is padded such that the length is a multiple of  $r$ . The padded message  $m'$  is split into blocks  $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_N$  of length  $r$ :

$$m' = m \parallel 0110 \dots 01 = m_1 \parallel m_2 \parallel \dots \parallel m_N$$

The state  $s = s_1 \parallel s_2$  is initialized by the zero vector  $0^r \parallel 0^c$ .

# SHA-3 Family

## Definition

During the *absorbing* phase, the state is recursively updated by the message blocks  $m_i$ :

$$s_1 \parallel s_2 \leftarrow f(s_1 \oplus m_i \parallel s_2) \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq N.$$

Finally, the SHA-3 hash value is obtained by a single *squeezing* operation:  $H(m)$  is given by the leftmost  $n$  bits of the state.

# SHA-3 Family

An advantage of the sponge construction – in comparison to the Merkle-Damgård transform – is that the hash value does *not reveal the full state*, which prevents length extension attacks.

The SHA-3 standard also defines two *extendable-output functions* (XOF) called SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, with which the output can be extended to any desired length. In this case, the Keccak- $f$  function is applied multiple times during the squeezing phase in order to obtain the required number of output bits.

There are also keyed hash functions based on Keccak (KMAC128, KMAC256).