## Web Tracking and Fingerprinting

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It's the Internet! Of course they know you're a dog. They also know your favorite brand of pet food and the name of the cute poodle at the park that you have a crush on!

## Tracking via Cookies


Cookie: value set by Web server, automatically sent by the browser on subsequent requests to same(ish) origin

Link two sessions at same site

Link sessions between different sites (thirdparty cookies)

Can be combined with user-identifying information


## **Third-Party Tracking**



#### Third-party cookies:

Disabled by default (Safari)
Can be disabled by user
(many browsers)
Cannot be disabled (Android)
... but there are many other
tracking technologies


## **Behavioral Targeting**



#### Partial List of Ad Networks

| 24/7 Real Media         | 33Across                    | <u>Acerno</u>         | Acxiom Relevence-X           | <u>AdAdvisor</u>       | <u>AdBrite</u>                   |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Adify                   | AdInterax (Yahoo!)          | <u>AdJuggler</u>      | <u>AdShuffle</u>             | ADTECH (AOL)           | Advertising.com (AOL)            |
| Aggregate Knowledge     | <u>Akamai</u>               | <u>AlmondNet</u>      | Atlas (Microsoft)            | <u>AudienceScience</u> | Bizo                             |
| Blue Kai                | BlueLithium (Yahoo!)        | <u>Bluestreak</u>     | <u>BrightRoll</u>            | <u>BTBuckets</u>       | Burst Media                      |
| Casale Media            | <u>Chitika</u>              | ChoiceStream          | <u>ClickTale</u>             | Collective Media       | comScore VoiceFive               |
| Coremetrics             | <u>Cossette</u>             | Criteo                | Effective Measure            | <u>Eloqua</u>          | <u>Eyeblaster</u>                |
| <u>eXelate</u>          | <u>EyeWonder</u>            | e-planning            | Facilitate Digital           | <u>FetchBack</u>       | Flashtalking                     |
| Fox Audience Network    | <u>FreeWheel</u>            | Google                | <u>Hurra</u>                 | interCLICK             | <u>Lotame</u>                    |
| Navegg                  | NextAction                  | NexTag                | Mediaplex (ValueClick Media) | Media 6 Degrees        | Media Math                       |
| Microsoft               | MindSet Media               | Nielsen Online        | nugg.ad                      | <u>Omniture</u>        | <u>OpenX</u>                     |
| <u>Outbrain</u>         | <u>PointRoll</u>            | <u>PrecisionClick</u> | <u>Pulse 360</u>             | Quantcast              | Quigo (AOL)                      |
| <u>richrelevance</u>    | Right Media (Yahoo!)        | Rocket Fuel           | Safecount *                  | ScanScout              | Smart Adserver                   |
| <u>Snoobi</u>           | Specific Media              | TACODA (AOL)          | Tatto Media                  | <u>Tealium</u>         | <u>TradeDoubler</u>              |
| Traffic Marketplace     | Tribal Fusion / Exponential | TruEffect             | <u>Tumri</u>                 | <u>Turn</u>            | <u>Undertone Networks / Zedo</u> |
| <u>ValueClick Media</u> | <u>Vizu</u>                 | <u>Weborama</u>       | <u>WebTrends</u>             | Yahoo!                 | [x+1]                            |

#### **Display Advertising Technology Landscape**





### Tracking Is Pervasive

64

independent tracking mechanisms in an average top-50 website

## Your Privacy Footprint ВВС **PubMatic** LOPICOU **OpenX** criteo rightmedia


**AppNexus** 

Bashir et al. "Tracing Information Flows Between Ad Exchanges Using Retargeted Ads"

doubleclick

by Google


## Cookie Syncing




Site A informing site B about user's identity (via user's browser)

Allows aggregation across multiple trackers

## Cookie Syncing in Practice



Bashir et al. "Tracing Information Flows Between Ad Exchanges Using Retargeted Ads"



Bashir et al. "Tracing Information Flows Between Ad Exchanges Using Retargeted Ads"

#### Information Flows in RTB

Bashir and Wilson. "Diffusion of User Tracking Data in the Online Advertising Ecosystem"




Fig. 1. Examples of (a) cookie matching and (b) showing an ad to a user via RTB auctions. (a) The user visits publisher  $p_1$   $\bullet$  which includes JavaScript from advertiser  $a_1$   $\bullet$ .  $a_1$ 's JavaScript then cookie matches with exchange  $e_1$  by programmatically generating a request that contains both of their cookies  $\bullet$ . (b) The user visits publisher  $p_2$ , which then includes resources from SSP  $s_1$  and exchange  $e_2$   $\bullet$ - $\bullet$ .  $e_2$  solicits bids  $\bullet$  and sells the impression to  $e_1$   $\bullet$   $\bullet$ , which then holds another auction  $\bullet$ , ultimately selling the impression to  $a_1$   $\bullet$   $\bullet$ .

## Sticky Tracking

Subverting same origin policy (publisher also runs an ad network)

ad.hi5.com = ad.yieldmanager.com

Flash cookies



Browser fingerprinting



History sniffing

## Tracking Technologies

**HTTP Cookies** 

HTTP Auth

HTTP Etags

Content cache

IE userData

HTML5 protocol and

content handlers

HTML5 storage

Flash cookies

Silverlight storage

TLS session ID &

resume

Browsing history

window.name

HTTP STS

DNS cache


## **Everything Has a Fingerprint**















### Fingerprinting Web Browsers

User agent

HTTP ACCEPT headers

Browser plug-ins

MIME support

Clock skew

Installed fonts

Cookies enabled?

Browser add-ons

Screen resolution





Is your browser configuration rare or unique? If so, web sites

# Your browser fingerprint **appears to be unique** among the 3,435,834 tested so far

web.

Only anonymous data will be collected by this site.



A paper reporting the statistical results of this experiment is now available: How Unique Is Your Browser?, Proceedings of the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS 2010), Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science.

### Panopticlick Example

d). Plugin

Plugin 3:

84% of browser fingerprints are unique Wersion applicat 2: Good

Microsoft® Windows Media Player Firefox Plugin; np-mswmp; np-mswmp.dll; (np-mswmp; application/x-ms-wmp; \*) (; application/asx; \*) (; video/x-ms-asf-plugin; \*) (; application/x-mplayer2; \*) (; video/x-ms-asf; asf,asx,\*) (; video/x-ms-wm; wm,\*) (; audio/x-ms-wma; wma,\*) (; audio/x-ms-wax; wax,\*) (; video/x-ms-wmv; wmv,\*) (; video/x-ms-wvx; wvx,\*). Plugin 4: Move Media Player; npmnqmp 07103010; npmnqmp07103010.dll; (npmnqmp; application/x-vnd.moveplayer.qm; qmx,qpl) (npmnqmp; application/x-vnd.moveplay2.qm; ) (npmnqmp; application/x-vnd.movenetworks.qm; ). Plugin 5: Mozilla Default Plug-in; Default Plug-in; npnul32.dll; (Mozilla Default Plug-in; \*). Plugin 6: Shockwave Flash; Shockwave Flash 10.0 r32; NPSWF32.dll; (Adobe Flash movie; application/x-shockwave-flash; swf) (FutureSplash movie; application/futuresplash; spl). Plugin 7: Windows Genuine Advantage; 1.7.0059.0; npLegitCheckPlugin.dll; (npLegitCheckPlugin; application/WGA-plugin; \*).



#### Programmatic drawing in the browser

Draw shapes, add text, 3D (via WebGL)

#### Access to drawn pixels

- Array of RGBA values
- PNG-encoded data URL

### Text Rendering ...

```
<script type="text/javascript">
  var canvas =
    document.getElementById("drawing");
  var context = canvas.getContext("2d");
  context.font = "18pt Arial";
  context.textBaseline = "top";
  context.fillText("Some letters", 2, 2);
</script>
```

#### ... Text Inspection

```
<script type="text/javascript">
  var canvas =
    document.getElementById("drawing");
  var context = canvas.getContext("2d");
  context.font = "18pt Arial";
  context.textBaseline = "top";
  context.fillText("Some letters", 2, 2);

var pixels =
  canvas.toDataURL("image/png");
</script>
```

#### WebFonts

Problem: Clients ship with ugly fonts

Solution: Browsers should download fonts from

the Internet on demand!

```
@font-face { font-family: 'Sirin Stencil';
font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; src:
url(http://themes.googleusercontent.com/stat
ic/fonts/sirinstencil/v1/[...].woff)
format('woff');}
```

### 45 Ways To Sirin Stencil

context.font = "12pt 'Sirin Stencil'";

#### Windows

How quickly daft jumping zebras vex. (Also, punctuation: &/c.)

How quickly daft jumping zebras vex. (Also, punctuation: &:/c.)

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How quickly daft jumping zebras vex. (Also, punctuation: &/c.)

How quickly daft jumping zebras vex. (Also, punctuation: &t/c.)

#### OS X

How quickly daft jumping zebras vex. (Also, punctuation: &:/c.)

How quickly daft jumping zebras vex. (Also, punctuation: &:/c.)

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
#### Linux

How quickly daft jumping zebras vex. (Also, punctuation: &t/c.)

How quickly daft jumping zebras vex. (Also, punctuation: &/c.)

### **Canvas Fingerprinting**

[Mowery and Shacham. "Pixel Perfect". W2SP 2012]



#### How Pervasive?

[Acar et al. "The Web Never Forgets". CCS 2014]

Present in 5.5% of top 100,000 websites Fingerprinting code comes from 20 different domains

addthis.com by far the most popular (95%)



 $\sum$ 

**Draws** 

Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz into the canvas

Why this text?

## "Don't Worry, It's All Anonymous"

Is it?

What's the difference between

"anonymous"

"pseudonymous"

"identified"

Which technology changed data collection from anonymous to pseudonymous?

### How Websites Get Your Identity


#### Third party is sometimes the site itself Leakage of identifiers

```
GET http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/...
Referer: http://submit.SPORTS.com/...?email=jdoe@email.com
Cookie: id=35c192bcfe0000b1...
```

#### Security bugs

XSUH: cross-site URL hijacking

Third party buys your identity




## **History Sniffing**

How can a webpage figure out which sites you visited previously?

#### Color of links

- CSS :visited property
- getComputedStyle()

Cached Web content timing DNS timing



#### Do Not Track



#### **Basics**

HTTP header

• DNT: 1

Standardization

Browser support in FF4, IE9

Beginning to see adoption (AP, NAI)... or not

#### **Privacy protections**

No tracking across sites

– Who is the "third" party?

Can't be based on domain Example: amazonaws.com, ad.hi5.com ...

No intrusive tracking

Limits on regular log data

Exceptions for fraud prevention, etc.

### **DNT Adoption Issues**

"But the NAI code also recognizes that companies sometimes need to continue to collect data for operational reasons that are separate from ad targeting based on a user's online behavior. For example, online advertising companies may need to gather data to prove to advertisers that an ad has been delivered and should be paid for; to limit the number of times a user sees the same ad; or to prevent fraud."

Translation: we're going to keep tracking you, but we'll simply call it "operational reasons."

#### **Brave New World?**

