

On the Consistency Strength of Axioms for Height and Width Potentialism

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1 Introduction

In CITE, I presented an axiom system for height and width potentialism combined. Roughly speaking the axiom system is motivated by the idea of an iterative set construction process in which two ‘acts’ are possible at each stage – firstly, that of collecting some things into a set, and secondly, that of enumerating some things in terms of the natural numbers (or, equivalently, forcing). I proved the system consistent relative to $\text{ZFC} +$ the existence of a Mahlo, showed that the system interpreted ZFC under a restricted modal translation, and that second order arithmetic was interpretable under a more general, ‘full’ modal translation. This article improves on these results in various ways. I will show that in fact the modal theory in question is equi-consistent with second order arithmetic extended with the Π_1^1 perfect set property, and hence also with ZFC . I will also explore the question of bi-interpretability.

2 The Axiom System

2.1 Language

The language \mathcal{L}_\diamond is multi-modal and in fact contains three modal operators, \diamond_\uparrow , \diamond_\leftarrow , and \diamond . $\diamond_\uparrow\varphi$ should be read as: ‘by repeated acts of set production, φ can be made true’; that is, by repeatedly taking some things and producing the set with them as its elements, φ can be made true. (We allow any number of repetitions, from 0 into the transfinite.) \diamond_\leftarrow can be interpreted in one of two ways: either as ‘by repeated acts of enumeration, φ can be made true’, where here by enumeration we mean the act of correlating some given things with the natural numbers; or alternatively ‘enumeration’ may be replaced by ‘forcing’, where this is understood as the act of introducing a filter meeting all the given dense sets of some partial order. (The resulting interpretations are equivalent in the sense demonstrated in CITE.) The remaining modal, \diamond , is

the ‘most general’ modality, and represents possibility by arbitrary iterations of either domain expansion technique.

\mathcal{L}_\diamond is also a monadic second order language, with standard, singular ‘objectual’ variables x and second order ‘plural’ variables X ; these latter range over things taken many at a time rather than individuals; so for example the members of an orchestra and the string section are each possible values of the monadic second order variables, while the conductor and the first chair violinist would be possible values for the first order variables. In addition, we will of course use the membership symbol \in and identity relation $=$. Atomic formulas are of the form $x = y$, $X = Y$, $x \in y$, and Xx . Compound formulas are formed from these in the usual way, and we assume all the usual definitions, e.g. of \Box in terms of \Diamond and \neg .

2.2 Logic

The logical (non-set-theoretic) axioms can reasonably naturally be separated into those concerning the first-order part of the language, those that concern the modals, those that govern the second order variables, and those that concern identity.

For the first order part, we take the axioms to be any standard system of first order quantification logic, with universal instantiation weakened to its ‘free’ version, that is, with the universal instantiation axiom written in the form:

$$\forall x[\forall y[\varphi y] \rightarrow \varphi x] \quad (1)$$

With regards the modal logic, we assume S4.2 for each modal operator, which (given any standard axiom system) will imply the converse Barcan formula. We also take necessitation to be part of the system; and, in accordance with the idea that \Diamond is the most general modal at issue, we take each of the ‘weakening’ principles

$$\Diamond \uparrow \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi \quad (2)$$

$$\Diamond \leftarrow \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi \quad (3)$$

as further axioms. The standardly valid inference rule

$$\frac{\Phi_1 \rightarrow \Box(\Phi_2 \rightarrow \dots \Box(\Phi_n \rightarrow \Box\Psi)\dots)}{\Phi_1 \rightarrow \Box(\Phi_2 \rightarrow \dots \Box(\Phi_n \rightarrow \Box\forall x\Psi)\dots)}$$

will also be assumed.

As to the second order logic, we assume full comprehension *in closed form*, so all expressions of the form

$$\Box\forall\vec{z}\Box\forall\vec{Z}\exists X\forall x[Xx \leftrightarrow \Phi(x, \vec{z}, \vec{Z})] \quad (4)$$

are axioms. Here of course X may not appear free in Φ , but we assume all variables other than x that are free in Φ occur in the lists \vec{z}, \vec{Z} . We also assume a version of the axiom of choice, to the effect that if X comprises disjoint non-empty sets then there is Y containing exactly one element of each component of

X . (Formalizing this in our language is easy enough, using the usual definitions of non-empty and disjoint in terms of \in .)

Finally we turn to the axioms concerning identity, which also tend to involve all the other components of the language. As usual, we assume reflexivity and Leibniz law for first and second order identity; and as usual we are able to derive the necessity of identity from these in the form $\forall x \forall y [x = y \rightarrow \Box x = y]$, analogously for X and Y .¹ However, since our modal logic is not symmetric, we must add the necessity of distinctness ($\forall x \forall y [x \neq y \rightarrow \Box [x \neq y]]$) ‘by hand’.

Our conception of identity for ‘plural’ variables X is in addition *strongly extensional*, meaning that plurals comprise the same things at all possible worlds. We can enforce this conception axiomatically using the following principles.

$$\forall x [Xx \leftrightarrow Yx] \rightarrow X = Y \quad (5)$$

$$\Diamond Xx \rightarrow \Box Xx \quad (6)$$

$$\Diamond \exists x [Xx \wedge x = y] \rightarrow \exists x [Xx \wedge x = y] \quad (7)$$

Given the inference rule mentioned above, the latter implies a version of the Barcan formula for Xx , and hence that pluralities do not ‘pick up’ new components from world to world. Overall, the effect is to ensure (speaking model-theoretically for a moment) that Xx holds at some possible world iff it holds at all possible worlds, and that some things are the same things as some others when and only when they are composed of the same individuals.

2.3 Set Theory

With the background logic in tow we can formalize the axiomatic system of height and width potentialism that will be the target of our investigations.

The set-theoretic axioms can themselves be reasonably naturally divided into two categories. First, there are those that concern the identity conditions for sets. Second, there are those that concern possible set existence, and that make assertions about the kinds of sets it is possible to produce by iterating our various construction procedures.

First, on the side of identity conditions. We would like sets to have the members they have as a matter of necessity, so that (like plurals) they have exactly the members they have at any world in all worlds (to slip into model-theoretic talk again). This can be imposed by the following pair of axioms:

$$\forall z [z \in x \leftrightarrow z \in y] \rightarrow x = y \quad (8)$$

$$\exists X \Box \forall z [Xx \leftrightarrow z \in x] \quad (9)$$

where x , in the latter, is an arbitrary set parameter. Analogs of (6) and (7) for \in can be derived using (6), (7) and (9). As a final constraint of sorts on the

¹Note however that this implies nothing about inexistent values of variables, which may be contingently identical given our axioms up to now. That is, $x = y \wedge \Diamond x \neq y$ is consistent.

identity conditions for sets, we impose the standard axiom of foundation, which says that every non-empty set has a member with which it shares no members.

As to the set-theoretic axioms, we begin with a discussion of the distinctive axioms for height potentialism, for which we will follow the development of Øystein Linnebo in CITE. Here the central axiom is

$$\Box\forall X\Diamond_{\uparrow}\exists x[Set(x, X)] \quad (10)$$

where $Set(x, X)$ is an abbreviation for $\forall y[y \in x \leftrightarrow Xy]$. This axiom can intuitively be read as saying that any possible things are possibly the elements of a set; it leads to a form of indefinite extendibility of the universe of sets in light of the modal logical derivability of $\Box\exists X\neg\exists x[Set(x, X)]$ (Russell's paradox).

This axiom by itself guarantees the possible existence of each hereditarily finite set, but in the spirit of pursuing transfinite set theory in the potentialist system we will want to push things further. The axioms

$$\Diamond_{\uparrow}\exists X\Box\forall x[Xx \leftrightarrow Nat(x)] \quad (11)$$

$$\Diamond_{\uparrow}\exists X\Box_{\uparrow}\forall x[Xx \leftrightarrow x \subseteq y] \quad (12)$$

assert that it is possible, by introducing enough sets, to eventually produce all possible natural numbers (in the case of (11)), and to eventually produce all the subsets of any given set y that one can get *without forcing/enumeration* (in the case of (12)). (12) is weaker than (11) in terms of its structure since \Box_{\uparrow} is weaker than \Box , and the reason for this should be clear on the intuitive readings of the modal operators: while we cannot add natural numbers by forcing, we can in general add subsets of infinite sets in this way, so (12) is the strongest we can consistently hope for in this setting. (Can we derive the stronger thing from the weaker one??)