

# On the Consistency Strength of Axioms for Height and Width Potentialism

Chris Scambler  
All Souls College  
University of Oxford

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## 1 Introduction

In CITE, I presented an axiom system for height and width potentialism combined. Roughly speaking the axiom system is motivated by the idea of an iterative set construction process in which two ‘acts’ are possible at each stage – firstly, that of collecting some things into a set, and secondly, that of enumerating some things in terms of the natural numbers (or, equivalently, forcing). I proved the system consistent relative to  $\text{ZFC} +$  the existence of a Mahlo, showed that the system interpreted  $\text{ZFC}$  under a restricted modal translation, and that second order arithmetic was interpretable under a more general, ‘full’ modal translation. This article improves on these results in various ways. I will show that in fact the modal theory in question is equi-consistent with second order arithmetic extended with the  $\Pi_1^1$  perfect set property, and hence also with  $\text{ZFC}$ . I will also explore the question of bi-interpretability.

## 2 The Axiom System

### 2.1 Language

The language  $\mathcal{L}_\diamond$  is multi-modal and in fact contains three modal operators,  $\diamond_\uparrow$ ,  $\diamond_\leftarrow$ , and  $\diamond$ .  $\diamond_\uparrow\varphi$  should be read as: ‘by repeated acts of collection,  $\varphi$  can be made true’; that is, by repeatedly taking some things and collecting them together into a set,  $\varphi$  can be made true. (We allow any number of repetitions, from 0 into the transfinite.)  $\diamond_\leftarrow$  can be interpreted in one of two ways: either as ‘by repeated acts of enumeration,  $\varphi$  can be made true’, where here by enumeration we mean the act of correlating some given things with the natural numbers; or alternatively ‘enumeration’ may be replaced by ‘forcing’, where this is understood as the act of introducing a filter meeting all the given dense sets of some partial order. (The resulting interpretations are equivalent in the sense

demonstrated in CITE.) The remaining modal,  $\Diamond$ , is the ‘most general’ modality, and represents possibility by arbitrary iterations of either domain expansion technique.

$\mathcal{L}_\Diamond$  is also a monadic second order language, with standard, singular ‘objectual’ variables  $x$  and second order ‘plural’ variables  $X$ ; these latter range over things taken many at a time rather than individuals; so for example the members of an orchestra and the string section are each possible values of the monadic second order variables, while the conductor and the first chair violinist would be possible values for the first order variables. In addition, we will of course use the membership symbol  $\in$  and identity relation  $=$ . Atomic formulas are of the form  $x = y$ ,  $X = Y$ ,  $x \in y$ , and  $Xx$ . Compound formulas are formed from these in the usual way, and we assume all the usual definitions, e.g. of  $\Box$  in terms of  $\Diamond$  and  $\neg$ .

## 2.2 Logic

The logical (non-set-theoretic) axioms can reasonably naturally be separated into those concerning the first-order part of the language, those that concern the modals, those that govern the second order variables, and those that concern identity.

For the first order part, we take the axioms to be any standard system of first order quantification logic, with universal instantiation weakened to its ‘free’ version, that is, with the universal instantiation axiom written in the form:

$$\forall x[\forall y[\varphi y] \rightarrow \varphi x] \quad (1)$$

With regards the modal logic, we assume S4.2 for each modal operator, which (given any standard axiom system) will imply the converse Barcan formula. We also take necessitation to be part of the system; and, in accordance with the idea that  $\Diamond$  is the most general modal at issue, we take each of the ‘weakening’ principles

$$\Diamond \uparrow \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi \quad (2)$$

$$\Diamond \leftarrow \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi \quad (3)$$

as further axioms. The standardly valid inference rule

$$\frac{\Phi_1 \rightarrow \Box(\Phi_2 \rightarrow \dots \Box(\Phi_n \rightarrow \Box\Psi)\dots)}{\Phi_1 \rightarrow \Box(\Phi_2 \rightarrow \dots \Box(\Phi_n \rightarrow \Box\forall x\Psi)\dots)}$$

will also be assumed.

As to the second order logic, we assume full comprehension *in closed form*, so all expressions of the form

$$\Box\forall\vec{z}\Box\forall\vec{Z}\exists X\forall x[Xx \leftrightarrow \Phi(x, \vec{z}, \vec{Z})] \quad (4)$$

are axioms. Here of course  $X$  may not appear free in  $\Phi$ , but we assume all variables other than  $x$  that are free in  $\Phi$  occur in the lists  $\vec{z}, \vec{Z}$ . We also assume

a version of the axiom of choice, to the effect that if  $X$  comprises disjoint non-empty sets then there is  $Y$  containing exactly one element of each component of  $X$ . (Formalizing this in our language is easy enough, using the usual definitions of non-empty and disjoint in terms of  $\in$ .)

Finally we turn to the axioms concerning identity, which also tend to involve all the other components of the language. As usual, we assume reflexivity and Leibniz law for first and second order identity; and as usual we are able to derive the necessity of identity from these in the form  $\forall x \forall y [x = y \rightarrow \Box x = y]$ , analogously for  $X$  and  $Y$ .<sup>1</sup> However, since our modal logic is not symmetric, we must add the necessity of distinctness ( $\forall x \forall y [x \neq y \rightarrow \Box [x \neq y]]$ ) ‘by hand’.

Our conception of identity for ‘plural’ variables  $X$  is in addition *strongly extensional*, meaning that plurals comprise the same things at all possible worlds. We can enforce this conception axiomatically using the following principles.

$$\forall x [Xx \leftrightarrow Yx] \rightarrow X = Y \quad (5)$$

$$\Box \forall X, x [\Diamond Xx \rightarrow \Box Xx] \quad (6)$$

$$\Box \forall X [\Diamond \exists x [Xx \wedge x = y] \rightarrow \exists x [Xx \wedge x = y]] \quad (7)$$

Given the inference rule mentioned above, the latter implies a version of the Barcan formula for  $Xx$ , and hence that pluralities do not ‘pick up’ new components from world to world. Overall, the effect is to ensure (speaking model-theoretically for a moment) that  $Xx$  holds at some possible world iff it holds at all possible worlds, and that some things are the same things as some others when and only when they are composed of the same individuals.

### 2.3 Set Theory

With the background logic in tow we can formalize the axiomatic system of height and width potentialism that will be the target of our investigations.

The set-theoretic axioms can themselves be reasonably naturally divided into two categories. First, there are those that concern the identity conditions for sets. Second, there are those that concern possible set existence, and that make assertions about the kinds of sets it is possible to produce by iterating our various construction procedures.

First, on the side of identity conditions. We would like sets to have the members they have as a matter of necessity, so that (like plurals) they have exactly the members they have at any world in all worlds (to slip into model-theoretic talk again). This can be imposed by the following pair of axioms:

$$\Box \forall x \Box \forall y [\forall z [z \in x \leftrightarrow z \in y] \rightarrow x = y] \quad (8)$$

$$\Box \forall x \exists X \Box \forall z [Xx \leftrightarrow z \in x]. \quad (9)$$

Analogues of (6) and (7) for  $\in$  can be derived using (6), (7) and (9). As a final constraint of sorts on the identity conditions for sets, we impose the standard

<sup>1</sup>Note however that this implies nothing about inexistent values of variables, which may be contingently identical given our axioms up to now. That is,  $x = y \wedge \Diamond x \neq y$  is consistent.

axiom of foundation, which says that every non-empty set has a member with which it shares no members.

As to the set-theoretic axioms, we begin with a discussion of the distinctive axioms for height potentialism, for which we will follow the development of Øystein Linnebo in CITE. Here the central axiom is

$$\Box \forall X \Diamond \exists x [Set(x, X)] \quad (10)$$

where  $Set(x, X)$  is an abbreviation for  $\forall y [y \in x \leftrightarrow Xy]$ . This axiom can intuitively be read as saying that any possible things are possibly the elements of a set; it leads to a form of indefinite extendibility of the universe of sets in light of the modal logical derivability of  $\Box \exists X \neg \exists x [Set(x, X)]$  (Russell's paradox).

This axiom by itself guarantees the possible existence of each hereditarily finite set, but in the spirit of pursuing transfinite set theory in the potentialist system we will want to push things further. As a first step, consider the axiom

$$\Diamond \exists X \Box \forall x [Xx \leftrightarrow Nat(x)] \quad (11)$$

where here  $Nat(x)$  can be any of your favorite non-recursive definitions of natural number (e.g. finite von Neumann ordinal).<sup>2</sup> (11) says that by repeated acts of collection one can eventually produce all possible natural numbers, and given this a further application of (10) secures the possible existence of an infinite set.

(11) is a natural analogue of the axiom of infinity in the potentialist setting. The natural analogue of the powerset axiom would be:

$$\Box \forall y \Diamond \exists X \Box \forall x [Xx \leftrightarrow x \subseteq y] \quad (12)$$

However this axiom will be false on the intended interpretation, since even just setting  $y = \omega$  we will have that it is always possible to introduce new subsets of  $y$  in the form of enumerating functions for sets / generic filters for partial orders on sequences of naturals. But instead of giving up altogether on the infinitary mathematics that goes along with powerset, we will instead adopt the ‘restriction’ of the principle to the modality  $\Box_\uparrow$ . The idea will be that, given any arbitrary set  $y$ , by repeatedly introducing sets one will eventually get all the subsets of it that one can ever get *without using forcing*. The axiom thus reads:

$$\Diamond \exists X \Box_\uparrow \forall x [Xx \leftrightarrow x \subseteq y] \quad (13)$$

This is a kind of local powerset axiom for ‘inner models’; the precise sense in which this is true will be made apparent in more detail below.

We will also adopt the following axiom, distinctive of width potentialism. In it, we let  $D(x, X)$  abbreviate the claim that  $x$  is a partial order and  $X$  contains all the dense subsets in  $x$ ; and  $Fmeets(x, X)$  will abbreviate the claim that  $x$  is a filter that meets all the sets in  $X$ .

$$\Box \forall X, x [D(x, X) \rightarrow \Diamond \leftarrow \exists g [Fmeets(g, X)]] \quad (14)$$

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<sup>2</sup>One could also use a recursive definition, but it makes the exposition slightly more complicated.

One can show, using the other axioms, that (14) implies the negation of (12).

Finally, we adopt certain instances of the replacement axiom (really the collection principle.) To state the relevant instances, we first need a definition.

**Definition 2.1** ( $\blacklozenge$ -translation). Let  $\blacksquare$  be a modal operator, let  $\blacklozenge$  be its dual, and let  $\varphi$  be a formula in the first order language of set theory. Then the  $\blacksquare$ -translation of  $\varphi$ , written  $\varphi^\blacklozenge$ , is the result of prepending each universal quantifier in  $\varphi$  with  $\blacksquare$ , and each existential quantifier in  $\varphi$  with a  $\blacklozenge$ .

The relevant instance of replacement, then, are all the  $\blacklozenge_\uparrow$  and  $\blacklozenge$ -translations of first-order instances of replacement. In effect, we are asserting that replacement is valid both with respect to the upwards modality alone, and with respect to the modality that combines height and width potentialism.

### 3 Basic Facts

In this section we articulate some basic facts about the axiom system just presented, along with some general results that will prove useful later on.

**Lemma 3.1** (Mirroring). *Let  $\blacksquare$  be any modal operator in  $\mathcal{L}$ , and let  $\Gamma \cup \phi$  be a set of formulas in the first order language of set theory. Then  $\Gamma \vdash \phi$  in first order logic if and only if  $\Gamma^\blacklozenge \vdash_M \phi^\blacklozenge$ .*

*Proof.* See cite. □

**Lemma 3.2** (Bounded Modal Absoluteness). *Let  $\blacksquare$  be any modal operator in  $\mathcal{L}$ , and let  $\phi$  be a formula in the first order language of set theory with only bounded quantifiers. Then  $M \vdash \phi \leftrightarrow \phi^\blacklozenge$ .*

*Proof.* An induction on the complexity of  $\phi$ . See Lemma 12.2 of Linnebo. □

**Theorem 3.3.**  *$M$  interprets ZFC under the  $\blacklozenge_\uparrow$ -translation.*

*Proof.* As with cite, this is a straightforward modification of Linnebo's argument from cite. It is sufficient to prove the  $\blacklozenge_\uparrow$  translations of axioms of ZFC. For example, for the powerset axiom, use (13) and (10). □

**Theorem 3.4.**  *$M$  interprets  $ZFC^-$  under the  $\blacklozenge$ -translation.*

*Proof.* Essentially the same as the previous. □

Note that we can't interpret power in the previous theorem because we don't have (12), only (13), in  $M$ . Indeed, more can be said:

**Theorem 3.5.**  *$M$  proves every set is hereditarily countable under the  $\blacklozenge$  translation.*

*Proof.* See cite. □

**Corollary 3.6.**  *$M$  interprets second order arithmetic under the  $\blacklozenge$  translation.*

*Proof.*  $ZFC^- + V = HC$  is definitionally equivalent to SOA. See Krapf, Simpson. □

## 4 The Results

### 4.1 The Correlated Theory

The first order theory with which we will show  $\mathbf{M}$  is (at least) mutually interpretable is the theory of second order arithmetic together with the perfect set property for all  $\Pi_1^1$  classes of reals. Here, a class of reals is  $\Pi_1^1$  if there is a second order parameter (real)  $R$  and a  $\Pi_1^1$  formula  $\Phi$  in the language of second order arithmetic that defines the class  $R$ ; and such a class  $R$  has the perfect set property iff it is either countable or has a perfect subclass, that is, a subclass that is closed in the standard topology on  $\mathbb{R}$  and contains no isolated points.

The development of these notions (e.g. the topology on  $\mathbb{R}$ ) *can* be done in SOA, and the study of perfect set properties and their consequences can similarly; see Simpson, cite. But it makes life slightly easier to proceed through a definitionally equivalent theory that is just first-order. We can do so by using the following modification of standard set theory: take ordinary ZFC, with replacement formulated as collection; remove the powerset axiom and replace it with an axiom saying that every set is (hereditarily) countable. The result is definitionally equivalent to second order arithmetic since sets in set theory can be coded as well-founded trees in SOA. One can now define a *real* to be a function from  $\omega$  to  $\omega$ , and a definable class of reals to be  $\Pi_1^1$  if there is a formula in normal form with a single unbounded quantifier at the front that defines it. In this setting one defines the notion of perfection of a class in terms of trees. A closed set always has a natural representation as the class of paths through a tree on  $\omega \times \omega$ ; such a closed set is perfect when the resulting tree is such that any of its elements has two incompatible extensions. See citations.

Let  $\mathbf{T}$  then be the theory of ZFC without power together with the assertion that all sets are (hereditarily) countable, and that the schema asserting the  $\Pi_1^1$  perfect set property holds. We are interested in  $\mathbf{T}$  because while on the one hand it proves all sets are countable (and hence that any set sized partial order admits a generic filter), nevertheless it interprets ZFC in lots of inner models, and more exactly, we have that  $\mathbf{T}$  proves ZFC is true in  $L[r]$  for every real number  $r$ . For a detailed proof, see Krapf cite.

These two properties suggest hopes of correlating  $\mathbf{T}$  with  $\mathbf{M}$  proof-theoretically. Intuitively, an arbitrary possible world in  $\mathbf{M}$  is a transitive set, representing all the sets we've built up to whatever point we are in construction, and a real  $r$  representing all the subsets of  $\omega$  we can 'see' at the corresponding point. We can give a parameterized interpretation of formulas in the modal language by first order formulas in the language of set theory: we interpret  $\Diamond_{\uparrow}\phi$  at parameters  $T, r$  as meaning: there is a transitive extension of  $T$  *contained in*  $L[r]$  in which the translation of  $\phi$  holds; and  $\Diamond\phi$  as simply there is a transitive extension of  $T$  in which the translation of  $\phi$  holds. The two properties cited of  $\mathbf{T}$  might then lead us to hope this will do the job: We can always climb  $L[r]$  to get a model of ZFC, but we can also always move to a 'wider' universe where anything in  $L[r]$  turns out to be countable. And it turns out that a converse interpretation is possible as well, by combining a technique of Linnebo's and a theorem of

Solovay.

So much for the intuitions. On to the proofs.

## 4.2 An interpretation of $\mathbf{M}$ in $\mathbf{T}$

Let  $M \models SOA + \Pi_1^1 PSP$ .

$t : \mathcal{L}_1 \times M \times \mathbb{R}^M \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_\infty, (\varphi, T, r) \mapsto \psi(T, r)$

- assign plural variables odd numbered variables  $t(X)$ , and singular variables even numbered variables  $t(x)$ .
- Membership = id, commutes with propositional connectives
- $t(Xx)(T, r) := t(x) \in t(X)$
- $t(\forall x \varphi)(T, r) := \forall x \in T[t(\varphi)(T, r)]$
- $t(\forall X \varphi)(T, r) := \forall x \subseteq T[x \in L[r] \rightarrow t(\varphi)(T, r)]$
- $t(\Box_{\uparrow} \varphi)(T, r) := \forall S \supseteq T[Tran(S) \wedge S \in L[r] \rightarrow t(\varphi)(S, r)]$
- $t(\Box_{\leftarrow} \varphi)(T, r) := \forall s[r \in L[s] \rightarrow \forall S[S \supseteq T \wedge rank(S) = rank(T) \wedge S \in L[s] \rightarrow t(\varphi)(S, s)]]$
- $t(\Box \varphi)(T, r) := \forall s, S[r \in L[s] \wedge T \subseteq Tran(S) \in L[s] \rightarrow t(\varphi)(S, s)]$

**Theorem 4.1.**  $\mathbf{M} \vdash \varphi$  implies  $\mathbf{T} \vdash \forall r, T[r \in \mathbb{R} \wedge T \in L[r] \wedge Tran(T) \rightarrow t(\varphi)(T, r)]$

*Proof.* Induction on the complexity of proofs. Axioms. Consider for example Free instantiation:  $\forall x[\forall y \varphi y \rightarrow \varphi x]$ . Suppose  $T$  and  $r$  given; this translates to  $\forall x \in T[\forall y \in T t(\varphi y)(T, r) \rightarrow t(\varphi x)(T, r)]$ . But this is trivial. Note that unfree instantiation fails since we might have counterexamples outside  $T$ .

The plural rigidity axioms are tedious but routine. As an example, consider (7). By way of interpreting the outer  $\Box$ , let  $s \in L[s]$  and  $T \subseteq S \in L[s]$ . Then for the plural quantifier we assume  $t(X) \subseteq S$ , and for the next  $\Diamond$  we take a transitive extension  $S'$  of  $S$  in  $L[s']$  ( $s \in L[s']$ ). We get as a hypothesis that there exists  $t(x) \in S'$  with  $t(x) \in t(X)$ . But since  $t(X) \subseteq S$  we must already have had  $t(x) \in S$ , and clearly  $t(Xx)(S, s)$ , since this just amounts to the given  $t(x) \in t(X)$ , as required.

For plural comprehension we can use separation in  $L[r]$ . Let  $\Phi(x, z, Z)$  be a formula with the exhibited free variables. It is readily seen (applying the clauses of the translation to (4)) to suffice to show that in any transitive extension  $S$  of  $T$  contained in some  $L[s]$  ( $r \in L[s]$ ) containing  $t(z)$  and  $t(Z)$ , the set  $\{x \in S : \Phi(x, t(z), t(Z))\}$  is a member of  $L[s]$ . But this follows immediately from the definition of  $L[s]$ . (Note that this only works because we took (4) in closed form, with quantifiers bounded and necessitated. This has the effect of restricting us to cases where the parameters are only allowed to come from  $S$  and hence in  $L[s]$ ; if this restriction is lifted, it is easy to find counterexamples

to comprehension under the translation. For example, if  $S$  contains all reals in  $L[s]$ , the instance for  $\Phi := x \in s'$  for any real  $s'$  not in  $L[s]$  will do.)

On to the set-theoretic axioms. First, (10). Given any transitive  $S \in L[s]$ , and any subset  $X$  of  $S$  also in  $L[s]$ , the translation follows by considering the transitive set  $S \cup \{X\} \in L[s]$ . For (11) one can use the set of natural numbers itself as the relevant transitive set, which is an element of any  $L[s]$ . As to power, given  $S \in L[s]$  of the relevant kind and any set  $x \in S$ , we can use the fact that ZFC hold in  $L[s]$  to guarantee that  $\mathcal{P}(S)^{L[s]}$  is in  $L[s]$ , and hence the transitive set  $S \cup \mathcal{P}(S)^{L[s]}$  will do the trick.

As for replacement, the  $\diamond_{\uparrow}$  translation follows from the fact that  $M$  proves replacement for each  $L[r]$ , and the  $\diamond$  translation follows from the same for the model at large. □

### 4.3 An interpretation of $\mathbb{T}$ in $\mathbb{M}$

For the converse, we already have lemma 3.6; it remains to show  $\Pi_1^1\text{-PSP}^\diamond$ .

Work in  $\mathbb{M}$ , and let  $r$  be an arbitrary real. It suffices to show  $\Pi_1^1[r]\text{-PSP}^\diamond$ .

We will use the following lemma, which is a slight modification of a theorem of Solovay.

**Lemma 4.2** (SOA). *If there are only countably many reals constructible from  $r$ , then the  $\Pi_1^1[r]\text{-PSP}$  holds.*

The proof is a minor modification of Solovay's argument.<sup>3</sup>

Using Lemma 4.2 and the mirroring theorem, to establish the desired conclusion it is sufficient to show the  $\diamond$ -translation of the hypothesis of Lemma 4.2. That is: assuming given an arbitrary real  $r$ , we must show that is possible to produce a function on the natural numbers such that, necessarily, if  $s$  is a real constructible from  $r$ , then  $s$  is in the range of  $f$ .

The strategy for doing so is simple: we first show that, given any real  $r$ , it is possible to produce the set of all possible reals constructible from  $r$  in  $M$  (in the sense of the modality  $\diamond$ ). We then invoke Lemma ??, which says that all sets are countable in  $\mathbb{M}$  (with respect the  $\diamond$  translation) to get the result.

In more detail, we first observe that by the  $\diamond_{\uparrow}$ -translation of ZFC, we the  $\diamond_{\uparrow}$  translation of the assertion that for any real  $r$ , the set of reals constructible from  $r$  exists, namely:

$$\diamond_{\uparrow} \exists x [\mathbb{R}^{L[r]}(x)^{\diamond_{\uparrow}}] \quad (15)$$

Where in (15)  $\mathbb{R}^{L[r]}(x)^{\diamond_{\uparrow}}$  is the  $\diamond_{\uparrow}$ -translation of the first order formula asserting that  $x$  is the set of reals constructible from  $r$ . The problem now is to derive from this that

$$\diamond \exists x [\mathbb{R}^{L[r]}(x)^{\diamond}] \quad (16)$$

since it is only with respect  $\diamond$ , and not  $\diamond_{\uparrow}$ , that we have (3.5).

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<sup>3</sup>The modification is that here we must use the fact that in SOA one can show that any  $\Pi_1^1$  set admits a decomposition into  $Ord$ -many Borel sets; Solovay used  $\aleph_1$  in place of  $Ord$ , but the proof works just fine without assuming  $\aleph_1$  exists.



To move from (15) to (16) we aim to use the absoluteness lemma 3.2. But to apply lemma 3.2 we need a bounded formula, while the first order formula corresponding to (15) features unbounded quantifiers, both the obvious existential and (in standard formulations) an unbounded universal in the formula  $\mathbb{R}$ . However we can solve this issue by finding a bound on all the quantifiers in the relevant expression.

Such a bound clearly can be found, since for example in standard ZFC one can prove that  $x$  is the set of constructible reals from  $r$  is equivalent to the same assertion with quantifiers restricted to  $L[r]_{\omega_1+1^{L[r]}}$  (no new sets of naturals are formed from then on). Thus using the mirroring theorem we can show

$$\Diamond_{\uparrow} \exists y [\Diamond_{\uparrow} \exists x \in y [\mathbb{R}^{L[r]}(x)^{\Diamond_{\uparrow}}]] \quad (17)$$

and then apply 3.2 to get

$$\Diamond_{\uparrow} \exists y [\exists x \in y [\mathbb{R}^{L[r]}(x)]] \quad (18)$$

by dropping all the modal operators, and then applying the same lemma ‘in reverse’ (this time with  $\Diamond$  rather than  $\Diamond_{\uparrow}$ ) we can infer

$$\Diamond \exists y [\Diamond \exists x \in y [\mathbb{R}^{L[r]}(x)^{\Diamond}]] \quad (19)$$

$$\Diamond \exists x [\mathbb{R}^{L[r]}(x)^{\Diamond}] \quad (20)$$

that is, the  $\Diamond$  translation of the assertion that it is possible that all possible reals constructible from  $r$  exist. But now since we also have lemma 3.5, it follows that

$$(\exists x [\mathbb{R}^{L[r]}(x) \wedge \exists f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow x])^{\Diamond} \quad (21)$$

which is just the  $\Diamond$ -translation of the claim that there are only countably many reals constructible from  $r$ . Hence, by an application of mirroring, we conclude  $\Pi_1^1[r]$ -PSP. The result follows.

OK so the above is bollocks. But what you can do (?) is prove that

$$\Diamond \exists x [L[r](x) \wedge x = y] \rightarrow \Diamond_{\uparrow} \exists x [L[r](x) \wedge x = y]$$

or another better way to put it

$$\Box \forall \alpha, x, y [L[r]_{\alpha}(x)^{\Diamond} \wedge L[r]_{\alpha}(y)^{\Diamond_{\uparrow}} \rightarrow x = y]$$

For the latter we can do an induction. The idea is to use lemma 3.2 to get that  $\Diamond$ -definability with parameters over a set  $x$  is the same as  $\Diamond_{\uparrow}$ -definability with parameters over a set  $x$  (is the same as  $\Diamond_{\leftarrow}$ -definability over a set  $x$ ). The point is that membership in a given set is fixed so since everything is bound to  $x$  the modal operators don’t matter.

Better. One can prove that if ZFC without powerset proves that a formula is  $\Delta_1^1$ , then  $\mathbf{M}$  proves  $\phi^{\Diamond}$  if and only if  $\phi^{\Diamond_{\uparrow}}$ . So then we can prove that being the  $\omega_1$  of  $L[r]$  is absolute between the two modalities. For if  $x$  is  $< \omega_1$  of  $L[r]$  according to  $\Diamond$ , then we can find an  $L[r]_{\alpha}$  in the sense of  $\Diamond$  that has a bijection between  $x$  and  $\omega$ . But being the  $L[r]_{\alpha}$  according to  $\Diamond$  is the same as being the  $L[r]_{\alpha}$  according to  $\Diamond_{\uparrow}$ . So there is an  $L[r]_{\alpha}$  according to  $\Diamond_{\uparrow}$  which contains such a bijection.

#### 4.4 Bi-interpretation?

We have

**Theorem 4.3.**  $T \vdash \mathbb{R}(r) \wedge Tran(T) \wedge T \in L[r] \rightarrow t(\varphi^\diamond)(T, r) \leftrightarrow \varphi$

which is a routine induction on complexity. Things with the converse are slightly less clear. We would like to show

**Conjecture 4.4.**  $M \vdash \mathbb{R}(r) \wedge Tran(T) \wedge T \in L[r] \rightarrow t((\varphi)(T, r))^\diamond \leftrightarrow \varphi$

but the restrictions to  $L[r]$  imposed in the inner translation make for difficulties.