

## Problem Set 2




Figure 1: The  $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{eav}}$  experiment

### Problem 1: The $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{eav}}$ experiment (see Figure 2)

For each of the following scenarios, give the maximal value of  $\Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{eav}} = 1]$  and explain how it can be achieved.

- Let  $\Pi$  be the shift cipher, and let us consider an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that submits  $m_0 = a$  and  $m_1 = a$ .
- Let  $\Pi$  be the shift cipher, and let us consider an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that submits  $m_0 = a$  and  $m_1 = b$ .
- Let  $\Pi$  be the shift cipher, and let us consider an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that submits  $m_0 = aa$  and  $m_1 = bb$ .

- Let  $\Pi$  be the shift cipher, and let us consider an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that submits  $m_0 = aa$  and  $m_1 = ab$ .
- Let  $\Pi$  be the one-time-pad encryption, and let us consider an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that submits  $m_0 = aaa$  and  $m_1 = abc$ .
- Let  $\Pi$  be the monoalphabetic substitution cipher. Give an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that manages to win the  $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{eav}}$  experiment all the time, i.e. such that  $\Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{eav}} = 1] = 1$ .

### Problem 2: Negligible functions

Recall Definition 3.4: A function  $f : \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$  is called *negligible* if for every positive polynomial  $p(n)$  there exists  $N \in \mathbb{Z}^+$  such that for all integers  $n > N$ , it holds that  $f(n) < \frac{1}{p(n)}$ .

- Example 3.5 states that  $f(n) = 2^{-\sqrt{n}}$  is negligible. For the polynomial  $p(n) = 16n^4$ , give a possible  $N$  as in the definition above, i.e. such that for all integers  $n > N$ , it holds that  $f(n) < \frac{1}{p(n)}$ .
- Example 3.5 states that  $f(n) = n^{-\log n}$  is negligible. For the polynomial  $p(n) = 16n^4$ , give a possible  $N$  as in the definition above, i.e. such that for all integers  $n > N$ , it holds that  $f(n) < \frac{1}{p(n)}$ .

- ★ Let  $\text{negl}_1$  and  $\text{negl}_2$  be negligible functions. Prove that the function  $\text{negl}_3$  defined by  $\text{negl}_3(n) = \text{negl}_1(n) + \text{negl}_2(n)$  is negligible.
- ★ For any positive polynomial  $p$ , the function  $\text{negl}_4$  defined by  $\text{negl}_4(n) = p(n) \cdot \text{negl}_1(n)$  is negligible.

### Problem 3: not PRGs

For all of the following constructions, explain why they are not PRGs. Can you give an explicit description of an efficient distinguisher in each case?

- Let  $G(s)$  output  $s$ .
- Let  $G(s)$  output  $s \| s$ .
- Let  $G(s)$  output  $s \| \bigoplus_{i=1}^n s_i$ .

#### Problem 4: Basic properties of PRGs

Recall that the *image of a function*  $f : A \rightarrow B$  is the subset  $f(A)$  of  $B$ . Formally,

$$\text{im}(f) := f(A) = \{b \in B \mid \exists a \in A \text{ such that } b = f(a)\}.$$

Let  $G : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$  be a PRG.

- (a) Let us assume that  $G$  is *injective*. How many different  $2n$ -bit strings  $y$  are there in the image of  $G$ ?
- (b) What is the fraction of images of  $G$  among all  $2n$ -bit strings?
- (c) For a given  $y \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ , what is  $\Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}[G(s) = y]$ ? Express this probability in terms of  $|\{s \in \{0, 1\}^n \mid G(s) = y\}|$  and  $n$ .




Figure 2: The  $\text{PRG}_{A,G}$  experiment

#### Problem 5: Exercise 3.5 from [KL]

Let  $|G(s)| = \ell(|s|)$  for some  $\ell$ . Consider the following experiment:

The **PRG indistinguishability experiment**  $\text{PRG}_{A,G}(n)$ , see also Figure 2:

- (a) A uniform bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  is chosen. If  $b = 0$  then choose a uniform  $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  and set  $w := r$ ; if  $b = 1$  then choose a uniform  $s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  and set  $w := G(s)$ .
- (b) The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $w$ , and outputs a bit  $b'$ .
- (c) The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if  $b' = b$ , and 0 otherwise.

Provide a definition of a pseudorandom generator based on this experiment, and prove that your definition is equivalent to Definition 3.14. (That is, show that  $G$  satisfies your definition if and only if it satisfies Definition 3.14.)

#### Problem 6: Exercise 3.2 from [KL]

Prove that Definition 3.8 cannot be satisfied if  $\Pi$  can encrypt arbitrary-length messages and the adversary is not restricted to output equal-length messages in experiment  $\text{PrivK}_{A,\Pi}^{\text{eav}}$ . **Hint:** Let  $q(n)$  be a polynomial upper-bound on the length of the cipher-text when  $\Pi$  is used to encrypt a single bit. Then consider an adversary who outputs  $m_0 \in \{0, 1\}$  and a uniform  $m_1 \in \{0, 1\}^{q(n)+2}$ .

#### ★ Problem 7: Exercise 3.4 from [KL]

Prove the equivalence of Definition 3.8 and Definition 3.9 from the book [KL].

#### ★ Problem 8: Exercise 3.7 from [KL]

Prove the converse of Theorem 3.18. Namely, show that if  $G$  is not a pseudorandom generator then Construction 3.17 does not have indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper.