Problem Set 7

We will work on the following exercises together during the work sessions on Tuesday, 3 October 2017.

You are strongly encouraged to work together on the exercises, including the homework. You do not have to hand in solutions to these problem sets.

Problem 1: Exercise 4.1 from [KL]

Say $\Pi = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Mac}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ is a secure MAC, and for $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ the tag-generation algorithm Mac_k always outputs tags of length $t(n)$. Prove that t must be super-logarithmic or, equivalently, that if $t(n) = O(\log n)$ then Π cannot be a secure MAC

Hint: Consider the probability of randomly guessing a valid tag.

Problem 2: Exercise 4.6 from [KL]

Consider the following MAC for messages of length $\ell(n) = 2n - 2$ using a pseudorandom function F: On input a message $m_0 \| m_1$ (with $|m_0| = |m_1| = n - 1$) and key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$, algorithm Mac outputs $t = F_k(0\|m_0)\|F_k(1\|m_1)$. Algorithm Vrfy is defined in the natural way. Is $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Mac}, \mathsf{Vrfy})$ secure? Prove your answer.

Problem 3: Exercise 4.14 from [KL]

Prove that the following modifications of basic CBC-MAC do not yield a secure MAC (even for fixed-length messages):

1. Mac outputs all blocks $t_1, \ldots, t_\ell$, rather than just t_ℓ. (Verification only checks whether t_ℓ is correct.)

2. A random initial block is used each time a message is authenticated. That is, choose uniform $t_0 \in \{0,1\}^n$, run basic CBC-MAC over the "message" $t_0, m_1, \ldots, m_\ell$, and output the tag $\langle t_0, t_\ell \rangle$. Verification is done in the natural way.

★ Problem 4: Exercise 4.15 from [KL]

Show that appending the message length to the *end* of the message before applying basic CBC-MAC does not result in a secure MAC for arbitrary-length messages.