

Problem Set 6

We will work on the following exercises together during the work sessions on Friday, 29 September 2017.

You are strongly encouraged to work together on the exercises, including the homework. You do not have to hand in solutions to these problem sets.

Problem 1: Exercise 3.20 from [KL]

Consider a stateful variant of CBC-mode encryption where the sender simply increments the IV by 1 each time a message is encrypted (rather than choosing IV at random each time). Show that the resulting scheme is *not* CPA-secure.

Problem 2: Exercise 3.28 from [KL]

Show that the CBC, OFB, and CTR modes of operation do not yield CCA-secure encryption schemes (regardless of F). Consider encryptions and decryptions of only single block messages.

Problem 3: Exercise 3.29 from [KL]

Let $\Pi_1 = (\text{Enc}_1, \text{Dec}_1)$ and $\Pi_2 = (\text{Enc}_2, \text{Dec}_2)$ be two encryption schemes for which it is known that at least one is CPA-secure (but you don't know which one). Show how to construct an encryption scheme Π that is guaranteed to be CPA-secure as long as at least one of Π_1 or Π_2 is CPA-secure. Provide a full proof of your solution.

Hint: Generate two plaintext messages from the original plaintext so that knowledge of either one reveals nothing about the original plaintext, but knowledge of both enables the original plaintext to be computed.

★ Problem 4: Exercise 3.26 from [KL]

For any function $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, define $g^s(\cdot)$ to be a probabilistic oracle that, on input 1^n , chooses uniform $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and returns $\langle r, g(r) \rangle$. A keyed function F is a *weak pseudorandom function* if for all PPT algorithms D , there exists a negligible function negl such that:

$$\left| \Pr[D^{F_k^s(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[D^{f^s(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] \right| < \text{negl}(n), \quad (1)$$

where $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $f \in \text{Func}_n$ are chosen uniformly.

- (a) Prove that if F is pseudorandom then it is weakly pseudorandom.
- (b) Let F' be a pseudorandom function, and define

$$F_k(x) := \begin{cases} F'_k(x) & \text{if } x \text{ is even} \\ F'_k(x+1) & \text{if } x \text{ is odd.} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Prove that F is weakly pseudorandom, but *not* pseudorandom.

- (c) Is CTR-mode encryption using a weak pseudorandom function necessarily CPA-secure? Does it necessarily have indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper? Prove your answers.
Hint: Consider CTR-mode using F defined above, show an attack on this encryption scheme.
- (d) Prove that Construction 3.30 is CPA-secure if F is a weak pseudorandom function.