

Carbon Taxes, Globalization, and the Geography of Emissions*

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Abstract

This paper studies the impact of national carbon taxes on emissions. To do so, we construct a cross-country panel dataset, matching measures of emissions of carbon dioxide with information on the introduction of carbon taxes and their implied price. Importantly, we consider both measures of *territorial* emissions — emissions emitted within a country’s borders — and *consumption* emissions — emissions emitted anywhere in the world to satisfy domestic demand. Using panel local projection methods, we find that carbon taxes reduce territorial emissions over time, but have no significant effect on consumption emissions. Our estimates are robust to propensity-score weighting adjustments and are driven by countries which are more open to trade. Carbon taxes also lead to a modest increase in imports, suggesting that international trade may act as a conduit for reallocating the production of emissions away from locations where carbon is taxed. Together, our findings highlight the limitations of national carbon taxes in isolation and the importance of international cooperation in reducing global emissions.

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1 Introduction

Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO_2) are a key driver of climate change and a major threat to lives and livelihoods. While carbon emitted anywhere in the world has adverse environmental consequences for the planet as a whole, emissions of CO_2 vary widely across countries. Figure 1 shows that carbon emissions are considerably higher in some countries than others, even when taking in to account differences in population.¹ This is evident even within continents, including Europe (see Figure 2).

In response to the threat of climate change, governments around the world have introduced policies to reduce emissions of carbon, or at least slow their growth. How successful these policies have been remains an open question (Copeland, Shapiro, et al., 2022), especially as global carbon emissions continue to rise (see Figure 3). Amongst the menu of options policy makers face, carbon taxes have arguably garnered the most attention and are generally seen as an effective policy tool (Hassler et al., 2016). Skeptics, however, suggest that while carbon taxes may reduce emissions within their jurisdiction, the source of emissions may simply shift to locations in which they are not taxed, or taxed at a lower rate — the process of “carbon leakage” (Copeland, Shapiro, et al., 2022).

In this paper we estimate the effects of national carbon taxes on emissions across countries and time. Importantly, we consider both measures of domestic — or, *territorial* emissions — as well as measures which also account for the emissions emitted abroad to satisfy domestic demand — or, *consumption* emissions. The difference in effects on these two types of emissions gives us an indication of whether carbon taxation spurs international carbon leakage. To further investigate this channel, we study how our estimates vary with openness to trade, as well as the impact of carbon taxes on imports.

Our estimates show that carbon taxation has a negative, cumulative impact on territorial emissions over time, but no impact on consumption emissions. We further find that our results are largely driven by countries that are more open to trade, and that carbon taxation leads to an increase in imports. Together, these findings suggest that countries with carbon taxes

¹Emissions patterns also vary widely when normalising aggregate emissions by GDP. While there are some differences, total emissions, emissions per capita, and emissions per unit of GDP are highly correlated across countries (see, for instance, de Silva and Tenreyro, 2021). In our analyses we control for both income and population to account for these differences.

may offset the reduction in territorial emissions by outsourcing the production of emissions, shifting their source without reducing demand for them, and contributing to carbon leakage.

Our empirical analyses is motivated by a number of stylized facts that we document in this paper. First, we show that trends in emissions vary widely across countries. In particular, emissions have been flat or falling in many advanced economies which have more stringent environmental policies, including more ambitious emissions reductions targets. In contrast, emissions have been rising in many emerging market economies, particularly in China and India. Next, we show that net imported emissions — or the difference between consumption and territorial emissions — also vary widely across countries. In particular, net imported emissions in economies with more ambitious emissions reduction targets are positive and have been growing, suggesting that emissions due to domestic demand are higher than emissions emitted within their borders. In contrast, net emissions for many emerging market economies are negative and declining, suggesting that a large share of the emissions produced domestically are to satisfy foreign demand. A potential explanation for these patterns is that environmental policies, including carbon taxes, may be driving the sources of emissions from advanced to emerging market economies — the so-called “pollution haven” hypothesis.

Motivated by these stylized facts, we then turn to an empirical analysis of the impact of carbon taxes on emissions. We first build a panel dataset matching measures of territorial and consumption emissions with data on the timing and implied price of carbon taxes for a large sample of countries. In particular, our sample includes many emerging market and developing economies traditionally ignored in studies of emissions, and crucial for investigating the phenomenon of carbon leakage. We then estimate the dynamic effects of carbon taxation on emissions using panel local projection methods following [Jordà \(2005\)](#) and [Jordà and A. M. Taylor \(2016\)](#) and controlling for all time and country-specific factors that impact emissions, as well as cross country differences in income and population.

Our estimates show that national carbon taxes have a negative, cumulative impact on territorial emissions of roughly 9 % within 5 years of implementation. This corresponds to a roughly 0.1 % reduction in emissions per implied USD price of carbon. Our estimates of the impact of carbon taxes on consumption emissions, however, are much smaller in magnitude and are not significant at any conventional level of statistical significance, both

for the implementation and implied price of taxation.

Carbon taxes are of course not randomly allocated across countries, but rather a policy tool implemented by authorities. As such, the decision to impose a tax on carbon may be itself a function of a country’s emissions. To address this potential source of endogeneity in our estimates, we apply propensity score matching to our panel local projections in the form of inverse propensity score weighting (IPW) as in [de Silva and Tenreyro \(2021\)](#) and [Jordà and A. M. Taylor \(2016\)](#). IPW works, as all propensity score matching methods, by giving higher weights to observations based on their likelihood of being treated (introducing a carbon tax) inferred via select covariates. The aim of IPW is to give a higher weight to treatment and control observations which are more comparable in terms of observable characteristics. The pattern of results from our IPW estimations largely confirm the findings from our baseline model. The magnitude of our IPW estimated effects of carbon taxes on territorial emissions are around two-thirds as large as our baseline estimates — a roughly 6% reduction within 5 years. Our IPW estimates also find no evidence of a significant effect of carbon taxes on consumption emissions.

Our findings of a significant, negative effect of carbon taxes on territorial emissions, but no effect on consumption emissions suggest that carbon taxation leads to some degree of carbon leakage. To investigate this potential mechanism further, we look to two additional analyses. First, we study how our results vary with openness to trade as countries which are more open to trade may be better able to shift emissions outside of their borders. We proceed by splitting our sample into countries with above median openness to trade (high openness to trade) and countries with below median openness to trade (low openness to trade) in each year. We then estimate our baseline model augmented with interaction terms to uncover any heterogeneous effects with trade openness. Our results suggest that there are significant differences. We find that countries with low openness to trade see a significant reduction in both territorial and consumption emissions following carbon tax implementation. In the aggregate, the effect on consumption emissions is masked by countries with high openness to trade which see no impact of carbon taxation. Second, we study how the implementation of a carbon tax affects total imports, as carbon leakage joined by a zero effect on consumption emissions should be reflected by an increase in imports. Though noisy, we find some evidence in support of this mechanism. Our estimates suggest that imports increase by 0.1% per implied US dollar price

within two years after the introduction of a carbon tax.

This paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, we add to the literature studying the effects of carbon taxes on the environment. As emissions are a harmful externality of production, Pigouvian taxes following (Pigou, 1920) are typically seen as economists' preferred policy tool for reducing emissions (Baumol, 1972; Baumol and Oates, 1988; Hassler et al., 2016; Nordhaus, 1977). Notwithstanding concerns over their optimal price (Baumol and Oates, 1971), empirical evidence of the efficacy of carbon taxes is limited.² Studies, including Andersson (2019), de Silva and Tenreyro (2021), Känzig (2022), and Metcalf (2019), generally find that carbon pricing from taxes and cap-and-trade systems has a negative impact on emissions. Common to all of these studies, however, is a focus on territorial emissions and a disregard for the potential effects of carbon leakage. Further, most existent literature largely focuses on a limited number of regions (Green, 2021; Köppl and Schratzenstaller, 2022). Kohlscheen et al. (2021) is one exception, looking at the effects of carbon taxes on territorial emissions. This paper fills these gaps in the literature, estimating the impact of carbon taxation on measures of both territorial and consumption emissions. We do so for a large panel of countries, including many emerging market economies, typically ignored in the literature.

This paper also contributes to a literature linking trade to the environment, summarized in a recent review by Copeland, Shapiro, et al. (2022). Copeland and M. S. Taylor (1994) and G. Grossman and Krueger (1993) provide the canonical models of trade and emissions, highlighting a number of channels through which international trade can affect the environment. Within this literature, the phenomenon of carbon leakage is well-defined. Simple pollution haven models, such as Copeland and M. S. Taylor (1995) and Hémous (2016), show that differences in the stringency of environmental policies can induce trade, with emissions intensive production occurring in the country with more lenient policies. Empirical evidence of carbon leakage, however, remains limited. Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) and Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) find that the imports of carbon emissions in countries that signed the Kyoto protocol rose following ratification.³ Aldy and Pizer (2015) estimate the elasticity of

²See Green (2021) and Köppl and Schratzenstaller (2022) for recent reviews.

³Branger and Quirion (2014), however, argue that the increase in carbon-intensive imports is due to a large increase in imports from China, largely driven by other factors, including economic growth and decreasing trade costs.

US net imports in fuel-intensive industries to changes in US fuel prices. They then simulate the effects of a US carbon tax using their estimates, and find that carbon leakage would be minimal. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to provide empirical evidence of carbon leakage from carbon taxes in a cross-country setting.

Our findings have a number of important policy implications. First, for environmental policy, our paper highlights the limitations of domestic policies and the need for international cooperation and coordination to mitigate global emissions (Ferrari and Pagliari, 2021). National carbon taxes will only have a meaningful impact if the production of emissions is unable to be costlessly reallocated across borders. Climate clubs, carbon border adjustments, or a global price on carbon may help to stem carbon leakage by eliminating cross-country differences in the marginal cost of emitting. Second, our results also have implications for a broader set of economic policies. For instance, carbon leakage can affect trade balances, exchange rates, and prices more generally.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the sample of countries considered. Section 3 presents a number of stylized facts of emissions which motivate our empirical analysis. Section 4 details the empirical model and section 5 presents our results. Section 6 concludes.

2 Data

We construct an annual panel dataset at the country level spanning the years 1991-2018. The dataset combines data on greenhouse gas emissions, carbon taxation, and trade with a broad set of country characteristics and macroeconomic variables. The sample includes 54 countries which together accounted for roughly 91% of global CO₂ emissions in 2018. Importantly, our dataset includes a relatively large number (24) of non-OECD countries, in contrast to the bulk of the literature which largely focuses on advanced economies. A detailed overview of the data and their sources is provided in Table A1 in Appendix A. The countries included in the sample are listed in Table A2.

In our empirical analyses, we focus on emissions data from the Global Carbon Project (GCP). The GCP publishes estimates of annual emissions of CO₂ from the burning of fossil fuels. Estimates of emissions are largely compiled based off of data on energy use from the

United Nations. A detailed account of the data and the underlying methodologies is given in [Andrew and Peters \(2021\)](#) and [Friedlingstein et al. \(2021\)](#).⁴ Emissions data from the GCP offers a key advantage compared with data from other sources. Namely, it contains estimates of *territorial* emissions — emissions emitted within a country’s borders — as well as *consumption* emissions — emissions emitted outside of a country’s borders that can be attributed to demand in the domestic economy. A detailed overview of the method used to derive estimates of consumption emissions is presented in [Peters et al. \(2012\)](#). Conceptually, consumption emissions for country i are given as the sum of territorial emissions in i and the emissions emitted outside of i to produce i ’s imports (imported emissions), less emissions emitted due to the production of exports in i (exported emissions).

$$\text{Consumption emissions}_i = \text{Territorial emissions}_i + (\text{Imported emissions}_i - \text{Exported emissions}_i) \quad (1)$$

The difference between consumption emissions and territorial emissions are net imported emissions. When net imported emissions are positive, and consumption emissions are greater than territorial emissions in country i , country i demands more emissions than what is produced within its borders. Based on these definitions, carbon leakage is reflected in an increase in net imported emissions, or a divergence in consumption and territorial emissions, due to environmental policies. This is the framework we apply when interpreting the results presented in Section 5.

Our data on carbon taxes are sourced from the World Bank’s Carbon Pricing Dashboard as in [Konradt and Weder di Mauro \(2022\)](#) and [Laeven and Popov \(2021\)](#).⁵ These data contain information on the year of implementation of national carbon taxes around the world. In addition, the data contain estimates of the implied USD price per ton of carbon for each country and each year. On the basis of these data, we construct two policy variables. The first is a dummy variable equal to one if a country had a national carbon tax in a certain year, and zero otherwise.⁶ The second is a continuous variable equal to the implied price

⁴See also <https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/>

⁵See <https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/>

⁶The data from the World Bank’s Carbon Pricing Dashboard also contain information on carbon taxes implemented in subnational jurisdictions, including a number of Canadian provinces and Mexican states. We exclude these carbon taxes when constructing our policy variables for a number of reasons. First, there are relatively few subnational carbon taxes. Second, the institutional background suggests that subnational carbon taxes are of secondary concern when studying national emissions patterns. In the case of Canada,

from national carbon taxes per ton of carbon in each year in 2018 USD dollars, and zero otherwise. Importantly, the national carbon taxes in our data vary not only in their implied price, but also in the scope of emissions they cover. As such, our policy variables constitute a coarse measure of carbon tax policy.

Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics of our sample in 2018. The table displays the sample mean of a number of key variables of interest for all countries in the sample (column 1), countries which had implemented a carbon tax prior to 2018 (column 2), and countries which did not implement a carbon tax in our data (column 3). Column 4 displays the p-value from a two-sided t-test of equality of means between columns 2 and 3. The table shows that countries which implement a carbon tax tend to be somewhat smaller in population, higher income, more likely to be an advanced economy, and have lower emissions in both absolute and per capita terms. Only when it comes to GDP per capita can we reject the null hypothesis of equal means at the 10% level, aligning with the findings in [de Silva and Tenreyro, 2021](#). We therefore control for population and GDP per capita in our empirical approach — in addition to time and country level fixed effects — to account for these differences.

3 Stylized Facts of Emissions Patterns

In this section we present a number of stylized facts describing patterns of CO₂ emissions across countries. The facts presented here motivate the empirical analysis which follows in Sections 4 and 5.

Our first set of stylized facts document developments in emissions over time. Figure 4 plots trends in territorial emissions of CO₂ between 1990-2018 for select countries from our sample. Panel 4(a) plots trends for a number of countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.⁷ The trends show that territorial emissions in most Annex B countries have remained relatively

most provincial carbon taxes were introduced shortly before the national carbon tax implemented in 2019. The British Columbia carbon tax introduced in 2008 is an exception, studied in [Metcalf \(2019\)](#). Though it is Canada’s third largest province, BC only accounted for a small share of Canada’s total CO₂ emissions in 2005 (8.6%; see *Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators: Greenhouse Gas Emissions (2022)*), due to the smaller share of fossil fuel related industries in the province. In the case of Mexico, the national carbon tax introduced in 2014 preceded the subnational carbon taxes introduced in Baja California, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas.

⁷The countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto protocol had pledged to meet binding emissions reductions targets following ratification.

flat or have fallen over the last three decades. Panel 4(b) plots trends for a number of major emitters not listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. The trends show that territorial emissions have increased in many non-Annex B countries, in particular in China and India. Together, the data show that (i) trends in emissions vary widely across countries and (ii) are plausibly related to the binding emissions reductions targets set by countries in the Kyoto agreement.

In terms of the total amount of emissions demanded by each country, the trends plotted in Figure 4 only tell part of the story. That’s because some countries account for greater emissions than what their territorial emissions suggest, while others account for less. Figure 5 plots trends in net imported emissions — or the difference in emissions between consumption and territorial emissions. A value above zero indicates that the country is a net importer of emissions, while a value below zero indicates that the country is a net exporter of emissions.

The trends in Panels 5(a) and 5(b) show that net imported emissions are positive in many Annex B countries, while they are negative in many non-Annex B countries. Further, the data show that net imported emissions have largely been rising in many Annex B countries and falling in many non-Annex B countries, in particular China and India. Together, these figures suggest that the source of global CO₂ emissions has shifted over the past three decades from economies with stricter environmental protection policies, towards economies with more lenient policies.

4 Model

To estimate the dynamic effects of carbon pricing on emissions of CO₂, we consider the following model following the local projections method introduced by Jordà, 2005, and adapted for panel data as in Jordà and A. M. Taylor, 2016,

$$\log(CO2_{i,t+h}) - \log(CO2_{i,t}) = \alpha_i^h + \delta_t^h + \varphi^h \Delta \log(CO2_{i,t}) + \beta^h \tau_{i,t} + X'_{i,t} \gamma^h + \epsilon_{it}^h \quad (2)$$

We estimate (2) over horizons $h = 1 \dots H$ via OLS. $\log(CO2_{i,t+h})$ is the log of carbon dioxide emissions for country i in year $t + h$. The cumulative changes in log emissions on the left hand are taken from the year of implementation as we assume that impacts will first be

felt starting in the following year as taxes are typically liable with a delay. α_i^h are country fixed effects and δ_t^h are time fixed effects. $\tau_{i,t}$ is our main policy variable of interest capturing the the taxation of carbon. $X_{i,t}$ is a vector of time-varying control variables including log GDP per capita, log GDP per capita squared, and population. We include the square of log real GDP per capita to allow for nonlinear effects of income on emissions — the so-called Environmental Kuznets curve.⁸ ϵ_{it} is the error term clustered at the country level.

We estimate (2) for both territorial and consumption emissions, and consider two different policy variables. The first is a dummy variable equal to one if country i had a tax on carbon in year t and zero otherwise. The second is a continuous variable equal to the price per ton of carbon in 2018 US dollars implied by the carbon tax. This variable takes the value of zero for countries that did not have a tax on carbon. β^h is our main parameter of interest capturing the effect of carbon pricing on emissions at horizon h . Estimates of β^h represent the cumulative percent change in emissions given a one unit increased in the policy variable, relative to the year of implementation.

5 Results

5.1 Dynamic Effects of Carbon Pricing on Emissions

Figure 6 plots the impulse response functions from equation (2) capturing the dynamic effect of carbon tax implementation on territorial (6(a)) and consumption emissions (6(b)). Tables of the underlying estimates are available in Appendix B. The estimates in Panel 6(a) show that carbon taxation has a negative impact on territorial emissions that increases over time and is significant at the 10% level. The estimated cumulative effect stabilizes around 5 years after tax implementation and corresponds to a roughly 9% reduction in territorial emissions relative to the year of introduction. This estimate is somewhat smaller in magnitude, but comparable to those found in the literature (de Silva and Tenreyro, 2021).

The estimates plotted in Panel 6(b) depict the impulse response function of carbon taxation on consumption emissions. The figure shows that, while the estimated impact is negative, it is smaller in magnitude than the impact on territorial emissions and not significant at the

⁸Evidence on the existence of the Environmental Kuznets curve is mixed. Xepapadeas (2005) provides a review. Most empirical studies do tend to find evidence of a positive, but decreasing effect of income on emissions (Frankel and Rose, 2005; G. M. Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Stern, 2017).

10% level. As the horizon increases, the estimated impact becomes somewhat more negative, but does not attain statistical significance at any conventional level. Comparing the results across Panels 6(a) and 6(b) suggests that the negative effect of carbon taxes on emissions disappears once we allocate emissions to the country in which demand for them occurs.

Figure 7 plots impulse response functions of territorial and consumption emissions to the implied price per ton of carbon from carbon taxation in 2018 US dollars. The estimates in Panel 7(a) show that territorial emissions are negatively and significantly impacted by the price of carbon. The estimated impact stabilizes around 5 years after the implementation of carbon taxation and corresponds to a 0.1% reduction in emissions per dollar of carbon pricing relative to emissions in the year of introduction. These estimates are comparable to those found in the literature (Kohlscheen et al., 2021). The estimates plotted in Panel 7(b) depict the impact on consumption emissions. As with the results considering the carbon tax dummy, the estimates show that the impact of the price for carbon on emissions is lower when we allocate emissions to the country in which demand for them occurs. The estimated impact on consumption emissions per dollar price of carbon is lower than that for territorial emissions and largely statistically insignificant across the considered time horizon.

Together, these results suggest that while carbon taxation has a negative effect on the emissions emitted within a countries borders — and subject to taxation — the emissions emitted to satisfy domestic demand are seemingly unaffected. These findings suggest that carbon taxes may lead to some degree of carbon leakage as net imported emissions increase to leave consumption emissions unaffected while territorial emissions decrease.

5.2 Addressing Potential Endogeneity using Inverse Propensity Weighting

Carbon taxes are of course not randomly allocated across countries, but rather implemented following the decisions of national authorities. As such, there may be reason to believe that the policy variable in (2) is endogenous and estimates of β^h do not have a causal interpretation. This may be the case if carbon emissions themselves have an effect on the implementation of carbon taxes.

To address this concern, we apply the IPW method to our local projections approach following [Jordà and A. M. Taylor, 2016](#). Specifically, we estimate the following probit model for the countries in our sample

$$\tau_{i,t} = \rho \Delta \log(CO2_{i,t}) + X'_{i,t} \theta + \nu_{it} \quad (3)$$

and use the estimated parameters to calculate predicted values — or propensity scores for the policy variable, $\hat{\tau}_{i,t}$. We then construct inverse propensity score weights as follows

$$IPW_i = \left(\frac{\tau_{i,t}}{\hat{\tau}_{i,t}} \right) + \left(\frac{1 - \tau_{i,t}}{1 - \hat{\tau}_{i,t}} \right) \quad (4)$$

Causal identification of the average treatment effect using propensity score matching methods requires the assumption that subjects have a positive probability of being either in the treatment or control groups (the “positivity” assumption). To evaluate this assumption in our setting, we plot the distribution of calculated propensity scores for countries in our sample that implement a carbon tax (the treated) and those that do not (the controls) in [Figure 8](#). As expected, the distribution of propensity scores for the treated lies to the right of the distribution for the control countries. The distributions, however, exhibit significant overlap suggesting that the positivity assumption is reasonably satisfied in our setting.

[Figure 9](#) plots the IPW impulse response functions of carbon tax implementation on emissions from equation (2). Tables of the underlying estimates are available in [Appendix B](#). The IPW estimates in [Panel 9\(a\)](#) show that carbon taxation is still estimated to have a negative impact on territorial emissions. The estimated impact increases in magnitude over time and is significant at the 10% level. The estimated cumulative effect stabilizes around 5 years after policy implementation and corresponds to a roughly 6 % reduction in emissions — somewhat smaller in magnitude than the non-weighted estimates presented in [Section 5.1](#). As without weighting, [Panel 9\(b\)](#) shows that the estimated impact on consumption emissions is smaller in magnitude and not significantly different from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. Together, these results confirm the finding that the negative impact of carbon taxation on emissions seems to disappear once emissions are allocated to the country in which demand for them occurs.

5.3 Dependence on Trade Openness

One factor which may drive the results shown in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 is openness to trade. Countries that are more open to trade may be better able to shift emissions outside of their borders while leaving consumption emissions unaffected. Countries that are less open to trade may be less able to increase net imports of emissions following tax implementation and see a reduction in both territorial and consumption emissions.

To investigate this possible heterogeneity in our results, we augment our model in (2) with interaction terms as follows

$$\log(CO2_{i,t+h}) - \log(CO2_{i,t}) = \alpha_i^h + \delta_t^h + \varphi^h \Delta \log(CO2_{i,t}) + \mu^h TO_{i,t} + \beta^h \tau_{i,t} + \lambda^h (TO_{i,t} \times \tau_{i,t}) + X'_{i,t} \gamma^h + \epsilon_{it}^h \quad (5)$$

where $TO_{i,t}$ is a dummy variable equal to one if country i had a level of trade openness (the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP) greater than the sample median in year t , and zero otherwise. We label countries with above median openness to trade as “high” openness to trade countries, and countries with openness to trade at or below the median as “low” openness to trade countries. λ^h is our parameter of interest which captures the differential effect of carbon taxation on emissions due to trade openness.

Figure 10 plots the main results of our estimates of equation (5) where the policy variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a country has a carbon tax and zero otherwise. The grey area in each of the panels represents the 90% confidence intervals surrounding estimates of β^h , while the dashed lines trade out the 90% confidence intervals surrounding estimates of λ^h .

Panel 10(a) plots estimates of the effects on territorial emissions. The results suggest that the effect of carbon taxation on territorial emissions is somewhat less for countries that are more open to trade, yet this difference is not significant at the 10% level. Panel 10(b) plots estimated effects on consumption emissions. The results show that the impact of carbon taxation on consumption emissions differs significantly with openness to trade. By the fifth year after implementation, carbon taxes are estimated to reduce consumption emissions for countries with low openness to trade, illustrated by the grey area falling below the zero line.

Estimates of the interaction effect shown by the solid line suggest that countries with high openness to trade see a positive relative effect of carbon taxation on consumption emissions. Together, these estimates show that the zero effect of carbon taxation on consumption emissions shown in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 is driven by countries that are more open to trade and thus easier able to replace reductions in territorial emissions with imported emissions leaving consumption emissions unaffected. This suggests that international trade may act as a conduit for carbon leakage across borders following the implementation of carbon taxes.

5.4 Dynamic Effects of Carbon Pricing on Imports

The results presented thus far suggest that carbon taxes may lead to some degree of carbon leakage as the production of emissions is reallocated across borders, while consumption emissions remain largely unaffected. In particular, countries that are more open to trade seem to be better able to offset the reduction in territorial emissions via net imported emissions. A further indication of international carbon leakage from carbon taxes would be if countries exhibited an increase in imports following implementation. Indeed, the literature offers some evidence of this effect (Broner et al., 2012; Ederington and Minier, 2003). To investigate this channel further, we estimate (2), replacing emissions of CO₂ with total real imports of goods in 2018 US dollars.

Figure 11 plots estimates of the dynamic effects of carbon taxation on log total real imports of goods. The estimates plotted in Panel 11(a) show the estimated effects for the carbon dummy policy variable. The results, while noisy, provide some evidence that carbon taxes lead to an increase in imports. The estimated, cumulative impact of carbon taxes on imports is found to increase over time, yet the effects are imprecisely estimated and insignificant at conventional levels of statistical significance. Panel 11(b) shows the estimated dynamic effects of the carbon price policy variable on real total imports. The results paint a similar picture to those in Panel 11(a), yet are somewhat more precisely estimated. Namely, the price of carbon is associated with an increase in imports. By year 2 following implementation of a carbon tax, imports are estimated to rise by roughly 0.1% per US dollar price of carbon implied by carbon taxes. The imprecise nature of our estimates is perhaps not surprising, given the course nature of international trade statistics. Our data only captures the value of goods imported, and ignores the emissions contained within these. Studying the impacts of carbon taxes on the emissions contents of imports, and imports by origin seems like a fruitful

path for future research.

6 Conclusion

The threat of climate change has led to the introduction of national carbon taxes in an effort to mitigate emissions of CO_2 . Yet the efficacy of carbon taxes remains unclear, particularly when the sources of emissions can be shifted across borders to locations where they are not subject to taxation, or taxed at a lower rate. This paper estimates the effects of national carbon taxes on emissions. Importantly, we estimate the impact on country level emissions measures which take into account foreign emissions emitted to satisfy domestic demand. We find that, over time, carbon taxes reduce emissions emitted within a country's borders but have no significant effect on total emissions attributed to domestic demand. These results are driven by countries that are more open to trade. We also find some evidence that carbon taxation leads to an increase in imports. Together, our results suggest that international trade may act as a conduit for reallocating the production of emissions away from carbon taxation, resulting in carbon leakage.

This paper has a number of important policy implications. For environmental policies aimed at mitigating global emissions, our findings suggest that national carbon taxes will only have a meaningful impact in reducing global emissions if emissions cannot be costlessly shifted across borders. Our results highlight the need for international cooperation and coordination to increase the marginal cost of emitting — regardless of location. Climate clubs, carbon border adjustments, or a global price on carbon could help to stem international carbon leakage from national carbon taxes. Our results also highlight some of the lesser-known side effects of carbon taxes, including potential effects on trade balances, exchange rates, and prices via impacts on trade flows. When designing effective environmental policies, policy makers should look to consider these effects while seeking to mitigate carbon leakage.


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
Figure 1: Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) Emissions per capita, 2018



Notes:


This figure depicts total territorial emissions of carbon dioxide per capita. Countries with missing data are coloured white. Data on emissions are sourced from the Global Carbon Project. Data on population are sourced from the World Bank.

Figure 2: Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) Emissions per capita




Notes: This figure depicts total territorial emissions of carbon dioxide per capita. Countries with missing data are coloured white. Data on emissions are sourced from the Global Carbon Project. Data on population are sourced from the World Bank.

Figure 3: Global Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) Emissions, 1960-2018




Notes: This figure depicts total global emissions of carbon dioxide in millions of metric tons. Data on emissions are sourced from the Global Carbon Project.

Figure 4: Trends in Territorial CO₂ Emissions, 1990-2018




This figure plots trends in territorial emissions of CO₂ between 1990-2018. Panel 4(a): territorial emissions for select countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. Panel 4(b): territorial emissions for select countries not listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. Canada and Japan both withdrew from the Kyoto agreement, but not until 2011 which is why we assign them to the “Annex B” group.

Figure 5: Trends in Net CO₂ Emissions, 1990-2018




This figure plots trends in net imported emissions of CO₂ between 1990-2018. Panel 4(a): net imported emissions for select countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. Panel 4(b): net imported emissions for select countries not listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. Canada and Japan both withdrew from the Kyoto agreement, but not until 2011 which is why we assign them to the “Annex B” group. Net imported emissions are defined as the difference between consumption emissions and territorial emissions. A value above zero indicates that emissions accounted for by domestic demand were higher than those produced within the country.

Figure 6: Dynamic Effects of Carbon Taxation on Emissions




Notes: This figure plots impulse response functions capturing the dynamic effects of carbon tax implementation on territorial (6(a)) and consumption (6(b)) emissions from model (2) estimated via OLS. The distinction between territorial and consumption emissions is described in detail in Section 2. The solid line plots estimates of β^h for each horizon where the policy variable, $\tau_{i,t}$, is a dummy variable equal to one if a country has a carbon tax in a particular year and zero otherwise. The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals where the standard errors have been clustered at the country level (the level of treatment). The sample consists of 54 countries between the years 1992-2018 as described in Section 2.

Figure 7: Dynamic Effects of Carbon Tax Prices on Emissions




Notes: This figure plots impulse response functions capturing the dynamic effects of carbon tax implementation on territorial (7(a)) and consumption (7(b)) emissions from model (2) estimated via OLS. The distinction between territorial and consumption emissions is described in detail in Section 2. The solid line plots estimates of β^h for each horizon where the policy variable, $\tau_{i,t}$, is equal to the implied price of one ton of carbon in 2018 US dollars from carbon taxation in a country in a particular year and zero otherwise. The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals where the standard errors have been clustered at the country level (the level of treatment). The sample consists of 54 countries between the years 1992-2018 as described in Section 2.

Figure 8: Distributions of Propensity Scores for Treated and Controls




Notes: This figure plots the distributions of calculated propensity scores for countries in our sample that implemented a carbon tax (the treated) and those that did not (controls). The propensity scores are estimated via the probit model in (3).

Figure 9: Dynamic Effects of Carbon Taxation on Emissions using Inverse Propensity Score Weighting




Notes: This figure plots impulse response functions capturing the dynamic effects of carbon tax implementation on territorial (7(a)) and consumption (7(b)) emissions from model (2) estimated via OLS using the IPW method outlined in Section 5.2. The distinction between territorial and consumption emissions is described in detail in Section 2. The solid line plots estimates of β^h for each horizon where the policy variable, $\tau_{i,t}$, is a dummy variable equal to one if a country has a carbon tax in a particular year and zero otherwise. The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals where the standard errors have been clustered at the country level (the level of treatment). The sample consists of 54 countries between the years 1992-2018 as described in Section 2.

Figure 10: Dynamic Interaction Effect of Carbon Taxation on Emissions by Openness to Trade



Notes: This figure plots impulse response functions capturing the dynamic interaction effects of carbon tax implementation on territorial (7(a)) and consumption (7(b)) emissions by the level of trade openness. The grey area plots the 90% confidence intervals surrounding estimates of β^h from the model in equation (5) estimated using OLS. The solid line plots estimates of λ^h from (5) surrounded by 90% confidence intervals represented by the dashed lines. Standard errors are clustered at the country level (the level of treatment). The distinction between territorial and consumption emissions is described in detail in Section 2. The solid line plots estimates of λ^h for each horizon where the policy variable, $\tau_{i,t}$, is a dummy variable equal to one if a country has a carbon tax in a particular year and zero otherwise. The sample consists of 54 countries between the years 1992-2018 as described in Section 2.

Figure 11: Dynamic Effects of Carbon Taxation and Prices on Imports



Notes: This figure plots impulse response functions capturing the dynamic effects of carbon tax implementation (11(a)) and pricing (11(b)) on imports estimated via OLS. The solid line plots estimates of β^h for each horizon where the policy variable, $\tau_{i,t}$, is a dummy variable equal to one if a country has a carbon tax in a particular year and zero otherwise (11(a)), or the implied price of one ton of carbon in 2018 US dollars from carbon taxation in a country in a particular year and zero otherwise (11(b)). The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals where the standard errors have been clustered at the country level (the level of treatment). The sample consists of 54 countries between the years 1992-2018 as described in Section 2.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 2018

	All	CO2 Tax	No CO2 Tax	p-value
Population (mil.)	107.52	42.14	135.06	.24
GDP per capita (thsd. 2015 USD)	26.11	34.12	22.75	.07
Share advanced economies	.48	.63	.42	.18
CO2 Emissions (metric tons)	597.56	233.9	750.69	.27
CO2 Emissions per capita (metric tons)	7.13	5.59	7.78	.12
N	54	16	38	.

A Data

Table A1: Data Overview

Variable		Source		Notes
Territorial CO ₂ emissions		Global Project	Carbon	Carbon dioxide emissions from the use of coal, oil and gas (combustion and industrial processes), the process of gas flaring and the manufacture of cement attributed to the country in which they physically occur. See Andrew and Peters (2021) for more information.
Consumption CO ₂ emissions		Global Project	Carbon	Carbon dioxide emissions from the use of coal, oil and gas (combustion and industrial processes), the process of gas flaring and the manufacture of cement occurring anywhere in the world attributed to the country in which goods and services are consumed. See Andrew and Peters (2021) for more information.
Real GDP per capita		World Bank WDI		GDP in constant prices divided by population.
Population		World Bank WDI		Population in millions.
Imports		IMF DOTS		Total goods imports in US dollars.
Trade openness		IMF DOTS & World Bank WDI		Sum of total exports and imports divided by GDP.
Carbon tax dummy		World Bank Carbon Pricing Dashboard		Dummy variable equal to one if a country has a carbon tax in a particular year and zero otherwise.
Carbon price		World Bank Carbon Pricing Dashboard		2018 USD price per ton of carbon implied by a carbon tax in each country in each year.

Notes: IMF DOTS = IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. World Bank WDI = World Bank World Development Indicators.

Table A2: Countries Included in the Sample

OECD	Non-OECD
Australia	Argentina
Austria	Brazil
Belgium	Bulgaria
Canada	China
Chile	Colombia
Czech Republic	Croatia
Denmark	Cyprus
Estonia	Hong Kong
Finland	India
France	Indonesia
Germany	Malaysia
Greece	Malta
Hungary	Peru
Ireland	Philippines
Israel	Romania
Italy	Russia
Japan	Saudi Arabia
Latvia	Singapore
Lithuania	South Africa
Luxembourg	Thailand
Mexico	
Netherlands	
New Zealand	
Norway	
Poland	
Portugal	
Slovakia	
Slovenia	
South Korea	
Spain	
Sweden	
Switzerland	
Turkey	
United Kingdom	
United States	

Notes: OECD membership as of 2018.

B Additional Tables

Table B1: Dynamic Effects of Carbon Taxation and Pricing on Territorial Emissions

	(1) Log territorial emissions	(2) Log territorial emissions	(3) Log territorial emissions	(4) Log territorial emissions	(5) Log territorial emissions	(6) Log territorial emissions
= 1 if Carbon Tax	-0.023 (0.013)	-0.055** (0.026)	-0.078* (0.043)			
Carbon Tax Rate				-0.000* (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
Log GDP per capita	0.152 (0.145)	0.168 (0.233)	0.126 (0.342)	0.147 (0.145)	0.157 (0.234)	0.120 (0.342)
Log GDP per capita ²	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.020)
Log population	-0.142*** (0.045)	-0.224*** (0.078)	-0.272** (0.125)	-0.140*** (0.044)	-0.217*** (0.076)	-0.271** (0.124)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Horizon	1	3	6	1	3	6
Countries	54	54	54	54	54	54
From	1990	1990	1990	1990	1990	1990
To	2018	2016	2013	2018	2016	2013
R-squared	.116	.146	.219	.115	.145	.218
N	1566	1458	1296	1562	1456	1296

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B2: Dynamic Effects of Carbon Taxation and Pricing on Consumption Emissions

	(1) Log consumption emissions	(2) Log consumption emissions	(3) Log consumption emissions	(4) Log consumption emissions	(5) Log consumption emissions	(6) Log consumption emissions
= 1 if Carbon Tax	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.032 (0.021)	-0.018 (0.033)			
Carbon Tax Rate				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)
Log GDP per capita	0.192* (0.112)	0.273 (0.200)	0.433 (0.302)	0.189* (0.113)	0.271 (0.202)	0.426 (0.302)
Log GDP per capita ²	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.033* (0.019)
Log population	-0.105** (0.049)	-0.115 (0.118)	-0.136 (0.230)	-0.102** (0.048)	-0.113 (0.118)	-0.139 (0.230)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Horizon	1	3	6	1	3	6
Countries	54	54	54	54	54	54
From	1991	1991	1991	1991	1991	1991
To	2017	2015	2012	2017	2015	2012
R-squared	.128	.155	.225	.128	.154	.226
N	1458	1350	1188	1455	1350	1188

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B3: Dynamic Effects of Carbon Taxation and Pricing on Territorial Emissions using Inverse Propensity Weighting

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log territorial emissions	Log territorial emissions	Log territorial emissions	Log territorial emissions	Log territorial emissions	Log territorial emissions
= 1 if Carbon Tax	-0.024 (0.017)	-0.039 (0.026)	-0.067** (0.031)			
Carbon Tax Rate				-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)
Log GDP per capita	-0.193 (0.183)	-0.226 (0.228)	-0.578* (0.300)	-0.202 (0.185)	-0.241 (0.230)	-0.585* (0.303)
Log GDP per capita ²	0.011 (0.010)	0.012 (0.013)	0.026 (0.017)	0.012 (0.010)	0.012 (0.013)	0.027 (0.017)
Log population	-0.205** (0.083)	-0.335** (0.126)	-0.246** (0.108)	-0.201** (0.081)	-0.328** (0.125)	-0.244** (0.105)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Horizon	1	3	6	1	3	6
Countries	54	54	54	54	54	54
From	1990	1990	1990	1990	1990	1990
To	2018	2016	2013	2018	2016	2013
R-squared	.323	.404	.279	.324	.405	.279
N	1566	1458	1296	1562	1456	1296

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B4: Dynamic Effects of Carbon Taxation and Pricing on Consumption Emissions using Inverse Propensity Weighting

	(1) Log consumption emissions	(2) Log consumption emissions	(3) Log consumption emissions	(4) Log consumption emissions	(5) Log consumption emissions	(6) Log consumption emissions
= 1 if Carbon Tax	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.037 (0.025)	-0.022 (0.038)			
Carbon Tax Rate				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
Log GDP per capita	0.236*** (0.056)	0.400*** (0.110)	0.421* (0.210)	0.235*** (0.061)	0.402*** (0.115)	0.415* (0.211)
Log GDP per capita ²	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.029*** (0.006)	-0.035*** (0.012)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.029*** (0.006)	-0.035*** (0.012)
Log population	-0.127*** (0.041)	-0.117 (0.104)	-0.050 (0.209)	-0.119*** (0.040)	-0.110 (0.104)	-0.053 (0.209)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Horizon	1	3	6	1	3	6
Countries	54	54	54	54	54	54
From	1991	1991	1991	1991	1991	1991
To	2017	2015	2012	2017	2015	2012
R-squared	.313	.352	.378	.313	.351	.379
N	1458	1350	1188	1455	1350	1188

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B5: Dynamic Effects of Carbon Taxation and Pricing on Imports

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log imports	Log imports	Log imports	Log imports	Log imports	Log imports
= 1 if Carbon Tax	0.038 (0.039)	0.094 (0.082)	0.157 (0.134)			
Carbon Tax Rate				0.001** (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Log GDP per capita	0.231 (0.165)	0.607* (0.314)	0.697 (0.473)	0.247 (0.162)	0.612* (0.314)	0.701 (0.470)
Log GDP per capita ²	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.045** (0.021)	-0.062** (0.031)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.046** (0.021)	-0.062** (0.030)
Log population	-0.051 (0.052)	-0.089 (0.121)	0.069 (0.286)	-0.049 (0.053)	-0.092 (0.123)	0.065 (0.287)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Horizon	1	3	6	1	3	6
Countries	54	54	54	54	54	54
From	1990	1990	1990	1990	1990	1990
To	2018	2016	2013	2018	2016	2013
R-squared	.499	.562	.642	.499	.561	.641
N	1535	1427	1265	1531	1425	1265

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$