

Introduction to Binary Exploitation

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- ▶ Don't forget to start recording
- ▶ Slides are on <https://wiki.osucyber.club>
- ▶ Some content adapted from: Nathan Percy (Purdue)

Announcements


- ▶ **Next Week:** Group solve time focusing on pwn

What is binary exploitation?

- ▶ Make a [compiled/binary] program do something it wasn't intended to do
- ▶ Usually this means the goal is arbitrary code execution
- ▶ pwn is awesome but pwn is hard. You'll eventually need a good understanding of:
 - ▶ Assembly (we'll use x86)
 - ▶ C
 - ▶ Operating systems

Why

- ▶ Native code is everywhere
- ▶ No really, EVERY APPLICATION EVER ULTIMATELY ENDS UP RUNNING MACHINE CODE



**YOUR
JAVASCRIPT CODE**

CHROME V8 JIT

X86 ISA

INTEL PROPRIETARY MICROCODE

CMOS LOGIC

Why

- ▶ GOAL: Take over ('pwn') a machine
 - ▶ We want **Arbitrary Code Execution**. If you can run whatever code you want, you can do anything the OS allows that process to do (usually anything the user can do)
 - ▶ After you have code execution, **privilege escalation** concerns exploiting (usually) the operating system to gain additional privileges (i.e. normal user root access, or sometimes directly to kernel code execution)
 - ▶ Some special programs (ie. sudo) are usually given extra privileges to run as root ("suid programs"); exploit one of these and your code runs as root
 - ▶ Examples: bug bounties like **Valve**, **Tesla**, many others

What does it look like to 'pwn' a machine?

▶ Real-life examples

- ▶ Buffer overflow in CSGO/Half-Life/TF2 client, allowing a malicious server to run code just by viewing the server's info
<https://hackerone.com/reports/470520>
- ▶ Read an arbitrary file on a Half-Life server:
<https://hackerone.com/reports/590279>

▶ Arbitrary code execution

- ▶ Often demonstrated by: getting a shell
- ▶ "popping calc"
- ▶ Sometimes in CTF problems: opening and reading a special 'flag' file is sufficient (can do with shell, or not)
- ▶ After you have code execution, you're often done unless you're the NSA or CIA

Common vulnerabilities

- ▶ Command injection
- ▶ Memory corruption: a broad category
- ▶ Off-by-one errors
- ▶ Race conditions
- ▶ (lack of) Input validation
- ▶ Miscellaneous logic bugs

Command Injection

- ▶ Programmers are lazy and often 'shell out' to run another program
- ▶ If an attacker controls part of the command being run, they can use features of the shell (usually bash) to end the previous command and inject their own

```
#include <stdio.h>
void get_log_file(char *name) {
    char cmd[50];
    sprintf(cmd, "cat log_file_%s", name);
    system(cmd);
}
```

- ▶ ie. if you can cause the program to call `get_log_file` with something like
 `; cat /etc/passwd`
then you can run other commands

Logic Bugs

- ▶ Most are unintentional, Intentional logic bugs are essentially "backdoors".
- ▶ Leaving in debug options: ex. bypass access control by adding debug=1
- ▶ Program gets confused about state when receiving packets/commands out-of-order
- ▶ An example: "[steam client] Opening a specific steam:// url overwrites files at an arbitrary location"
<https://hackerone.com/reports/667242>

Memory Corruption Bugs

- ▶ Memory is a byte-addressable array of bytes
- ▶ If a user can write somewhere they are not intended to, it can be the cause of a memory corruption bug
- ▶ Everything has a finite size


	1000	1001	1002	1003	1004	1005	1006	1007	1008	1009	1010	1011	1012	1013	1014	1015
Memory	47	6F	20	42	75	63	6B	72	00	00	00	00	E8	03	00	00
"Go Bucks", null-terminated												Addr (0x3E8) (Little endian)				

Memory Corruption Bugs

- ▶ String Functions and length-checks
 - ▶ **strcpy / strncpy:** Arguments are two pointers, copies all characters from one location to the other until it reaches a null byte
 - ▶ **gets / fgets:** Reads a string from the user (gets uses stdin, fgets can use any file)
 - ▶ **others:** Most other string functions rely on the strings being terminated by a null byte and many don't check length

Memory Corruption Bugs

- ▶ The important question is “can we overwrite anything important?”
 - ▶ To answer, need to know some things about where stuff is in memory
- ▶ Every function starts by making room for it's own local variables on the stack




Simplest example: Stack buffer overflow into another variable

```
int main() {  
    char buf1[16];  
    char buf2[16];  
  
    // get a (arbitrary-length) string from the user  
    gets(buf1);  
  
    // print the strings back to the user  
    printf("buf1: %s\n", buf1);  
    printf("buf2: %s\n", buf2);  
  
    // check for win condition  
    if (strcmp(buf2, "win") == 0) {  
        system("/bin/sh");  
    }  
}
```

Simplest example: Stack buffer overflow into another variable


- ▶ We can change the value of other variables on the stack!



OK, but we want code execution

Stack buffer overflow into return address

```
int main() {  
    char buf1[16];  
  
    // get a (arbitrary-length)  
    // string from user  
    gets(buf1);  
}
```



1990s exploitation

- ▶ You control where the program goes when the current function returns
- ▶ Just put your code somewhere you know the address of, and then overwrite the return address so that it holds the address of your code
- ▶ When the function returns, your code runs


Demo 3: Return to the 1990s + pwntools

Modern memory protections have entered the chat

- ▶ You can't just write your code onto the stack and jump to it. The stack is not normally executable.
- ▶ We need to be more creative

ROP

- ▶ We don't just control the return address, we can keep writing and we control the whole stack
- ▶ We can return to specific locations that do useful things and then return again ('gadgets')
 - ▶ `pop rdi; ret;`
 - ▶ `pop rdx; pop rax; ret;`
- ▶ Chain these together to control all registers and you can eventually make syscalls, etc.



More on ROP

- ▶ <https://docs.pwntools.com/en/dev/rop/rop.html>
- ▶ If there is interest we may do another ROP talk

More examples of memory corruption

- ▶ Some memory bugs can lead to arbitrary read/write
 - ▶ Can you overwrite an entry in the Global Offset Table (GOT) - addresses of code in dynamically-loaded libraries
 - ▶ Can you leak the address of something else important?
- ▶ Controlled array index
 - ▶ You can read/write beyond the bounds of an array, without corrupting everything in between.

Common Defenses

- ▶ ASLR - Address Space Layout Randomization
- ▶ PIE - Position Independent Executable (DEMO?)
- ▶ NX - Non-eXecutable memory
- ▶ Stack Canaries
- ▶ Many more...

Useful Tools

- ▶ GDB with GEF, pwndbg
- ▶ Ghidra and RE tools
- ▶ python3 with pwntools
- ▶ checksec, ROPGadget, Ropper

Recommended Challenges

- ▶ **speedrun series:** 8-100 points, starts from basics and gradually becomes more difficult/more modern
- ▶ **speedrun0, 0.25, 0.5, and 1** are *very* similar to what was demoed today, it progresses from there in small steps

Next Week

- ▶ **Highly Recommended:** Attempt some pwn challenges and have questions ready to go
- ▶ <https://bootcamp.osucyber.club/>