

Test Cases

More than 200 custom test cases

▼ Recon Phase

- Identify web server, technologies and database
- Subsidiary and Acquisition Enumeration
- Reverse Lookup
- ASN & IP Space Enumeration and Service Enumeration
- Google Dorking
- Github Recon
- Directory Enumeration
- IP Range Enumeration
- JS Files Analysis
- Subdomain Enumeration and Bruteforcing
- Subdomain Takeover
- Parameter Fuzzing
- Port Scanning
- Template-Based Scanning(Nuclei)
- Wayback History
- Broken Link Hijacking
- Internet Search Engine Discovery
- Misconfigured Cloud Storage

▼ Registration Feature Testing

- Check for duplicate registration/Overwrite existing user
- Check for weak password policy
- Check for reuse existing usernames
- Check for insufficient email verification process
- Weak registration implementation-Allows disposable email addresses
- Weak registration implementation-Over HTTP
- Overwrite default web application pages by specially crafted username registrations. => After registration, does your profile link appears something as www.tushar.com/tushar?
 - a. If so, enumerate default folders of web application such as /images, /contact, /portfolio
 - b. Do a registration using the username such as images, contact, portfolio
 - c. Check if those default folders have been overwritten by your profile link or not."

▼ Session Management Testing

- Identify actual session cookie out of bulk cookies in the application
- Decode cookies using some standard decoding algorithms such as Base64, hex, URL, etc

- Modify cookie.session token value by 1 bit/byte. Then resubmit and do the same for all tokens. Reduce the amount of work you need to perform in order to identify which part of the token is actually being used and which is not
- If self-registration is available and you can choose your username, log in with a series of similar usernames containing small variations between them, such as A, AA, AAA, AAAA, AAAB, AAAC, AABA, and so on. If another user-specific data is submitted at login or stored in user profiles (such as an email address)
- Check for session cookies and cookie expiration date/time
- Identify cookie domain scope
- Check for HttpOnly flag in cookie
- Check for Secure flag in cookie if the application is over SSL
- Check for session fixation i.e. value of session cookie before and after authentication
- Replay the session cookie from a different effective IP address or system to check whether the server maintains the state of the machine or not
- Check for concurrent login through different machine/IP
- Check if any user pertaining information is stored in cookie value or not If yes, tamper it with other user's data
- Failure to Invalidate Session on (Email Change,2FA Activation)

▼ **Authentication Testing**

- Username enumeration
- Bypass authentication using various SQL Injections on username and password field
 - ▼ Lack of password confirmation on
 - Change email address
 - Change password
 - Manage 2FA
 - Is it possible to use resources without authentication? Access violation
 - Check if user credentials are transmitted over SSL or not
 - Weak login function HTTP and HTTPS both are available
- ▼ Test user account lockout mechanism on brute force attack

Variation : If server blocks instant user requests, then try with time throttle option from intruder and repeat the process again.

 - Bypass rate limiting by tampering user agent to Mobile User agent
 - Bypass rate limiting by tampering user agent to Anonymous user agent
 - Bypass rate limiting by using null byte
 - Create a password wordlist using cewl command
- ▼ Test Oauth login functionality

▼ OAuth Roles

- Resource Owner → User
- Resource Server → Twitter
- Client Application → Twitterdeck.com
- Authorization Server → Twitter
- client_id → Twitterdeck ID (This is a public, non-secret unique identifier_

- client_secret → Secret Token known to the Twitter and Twitterdeck to generate access_tokens
- response_type → Defines the token type e.g (code, token, etc.)
- scope → The requested level of access Twitterdeck wants
- redirect_uri → The URL user is redirected to after the authorization is complete
- state → Main CSRF protection in OAuth can persist data between the user being directed to the authorization server and back again
- grant_type → Defines the grant_type and the returned token type
- code → The authorization code twitter generated, will be like ?code= , the code is used with client_id and client_secret to fetch an access_token
- access_token → The token twitterdeck uses to make API requests on behalf of the user
- refresh_token → Allows an application to obtain a new access_token without prompting the user

▼ Code Flaws

- Re-Using the code
- Code Predict/Bruteforce and Rate-limit
- Is the code for application X valid for application Y?

▼ Redirect_uri Flaws

- URL isn't validated at all: ?redirect_uri=https://attacker.com
- Subdomains allowed (Subdomain Takeover or Open redirect on those subdomains): ? redirect_uri=https://sub.twitterdeck.com
- Host is validated, path isn't (Chain open redirect): ?redirect_uri=https://twitterdeck.com/callback? redirectUrl=https://evil.com
- Host is validated, path isn't (Referer leakages): Include external content on HTML page and leak code via Referer
- Weak Regexes
- Bruteforcing the URL encoded chars after host: redirect_uri=https://twitterdeck.com\$FUZZ\$
- Bruteforcing the keywords whitelist after host (or on any whitelist open redirect filter): ?redirect_uri=https:// \$FUZZ\$.com
- URI validation in place: use typical open redirect payloads

▼ State Flaws

- Missing State parameter? (CSRF)
- Predictable State parameter?
- Is State parameter being verified?

▼ Misc

- Is client_secret validated?
- Pre ATO using facebook phone-number signup
- No email validation Pre ATO

▼ Test 2FA Misconfiguration

- Response Manipulation
- Status Code
- Manipulation

- 2FA Code Leakage in Response
- 2FA Code Reusability
- Lack of Brute-Force Protection
- Missing 2FA Code Integrity Validation
- With null or 000000

▼ My Account (Post Login) Testing

- Find parameter which uses active account user id. Try to tamper it in order to change the details of the other accounts
- Create a list of features that are pertaining to a user account only. Change Email Change Password -Change account details (Name, Number, Address, etc.) Try CSRF
- Post login change email id and update with any existing email id. Check if its getting validated on server side or not. Does the application send any new email confirmation link to a new user or not? What if a user does not confirm the link in some time frame?
- Open profile picture in a new tab and check the URL. Find email id/user id info. EXIF Geolocation Data Not Stripped From Uploaded Images.
- Check account deletion option if application provides it and confirm that via forgot password feature
- Change email id, account id, user id parameter and try to brute force other user's password
- Check whether application re authenticates for performing sensitive operation for post authentication features

▼ Forgot Password Testing

- Failure to invalidate session on Logout and Password reset
- Check if forget password reset link/code uniqueness
- Check if reset link does get expire or not if its not used by the user for certain amount of time
- Find user account identification parameter and tamper Id or parameter value to change other user's password
- Check for weak password policy
- Weak password reset implementation Token is not invalidated after use
- If reset link has another param such as date and time, then. Change date and time value in order to make active & valid reset link
- Check if security questions are asked? How many guesses allowed? --> Lockout policy maintained or not?
- Add only spaces in new password and confirmed password. Then Hit enter and see the result
- Does it display old password on the same page after completion of forget password formality?
- Ask for two password reset link and use the older one from user's email
- Check if active session gets destroyed upon changing the password or not?
- Weak password reset implementation Password reset token sent over HTTP
- Send continuous forget password requests so that it may send sequential tokens

▼ Contact Us Form Testing

- Is CAPTCHA implemented on contact us form in order to restrict email flooding attacks?
- Does it allow to upload file on the server?
- Blind XSS

▼ Product Purchase Testing

- ▼ Buy Now

- Tamper product ID to purchase other high valued product with low prize
- Tamper product data in order to increase the number of product with the same prize
- ▼ Gift/Voucher
 - Tamper gift/voucher count in the request (if any) to increase/decrease the number of vouchers/gifts to be used
 - Tamper gift/voucher value to increase/decrease the value of the voucher in terms of money. (e.g. \$100 is given as a voucher, tamper value to increase, decrease money)
 - Reuse gift/voucher by using old gift values in parameter tampering
 - Check the uniqueness of gift/voucher parameter and try guessing other gift/voucher code
 - Use parameter pollution technique to add the same voucher twice by adding same parameter name and value again with & in the BurpSuite request
- ▼ Add/Delete Product from Cart
 - Tamper user id to delete products from other user's cart
 - Tamper cart id to add/delete products from other user's cart
 - Identify cart id/user id for cart feature to view the added items from other user's account
- ▼ Address
 - Tamper BurpSuite request to change other user's shipping address to yours
 - Try stored XSS by adding XSS vector on shipping address
 - Use parameter pollution technique to add two shipping address instead of one trying to manipulate application to send same item on two shipping address
- ▼ Place Order
 - Tamper payment options parameter to change the payment method. E.g. Consider some items cannot be ordered for cash on delivery but tampering request parameters from debit/credit/PayPal/net banking option to cash on delivery may allow you to place order for that particular item
 - Tamper the amount value for payment manipulation in each main and sub requests and responses
 - Check if CVV is going in cleartext or not
 - Check if the application itself processes your card details and then performs a transaction or it calls any third-party payment processing company to perform a transaction
- ▼ Track Order
 - Track other user's order by guessing order tracking number
 - Brute force tracking number prefix or suffix to track mass orders for other users
- ▼ Wish list page testing
 - Check if a user A can add/remote products in Wishlist of other user B's account
 - Check if a user A can add products into user B's cart from his/her (user A's) Wishlist section.
- ▼ Post product purchase testing
 - Check if user A can cancel orders for user B's purchase
 - Check if user A can view/check orders already placed by user B
 - Check if user A can modify the shipping address of placed order by user B
- ▼ Out of band testing
 - Can user order product which is out of stock?

▼ Banking Application Testing

▼ Billing Activity

- Check if user 'A' can view the account statement for user 'B'
- Check if user 'A' can view the transaction report for user 'B'
- Check if user 'A' can view the summary report for user 'B'
- Check if user 'A' can register for monthly/weekly account statement via email behalf of user 'B'
- Check if user 'A' can update the existing email id of user 'B' in order to retrieve monthly/weekly account summary

▼ Deposit/Loan/Linked/External Account Checking

- Check if user 'A' can view the deposit account summary of user 'B'
- Check for account balance tampering for Deposit accounts

▼ Tax Deduction Inquiry Testing

- Check if user 'A' with its customer id 'a' can see the tax deduction details of user 'B' by tampering his/her customer id 'b'
- Check parameter tampering for increasing and decreasing interest rate, interest amount, and tax refund
- Check if user 'A' can download the TDS details of user 'B'
- Check if user 'A' can request for the cheque book behalf of user 'B'.

▼ Fixed Deposit Account Testing

- Check if it is possible for user 'A' to open FD account behalf of user 'B'
- Check if Can user open FD account with the more amount than the current account balance

▼ Stopping Payment on basis of cheque/date range

- Can user 'A' stop the payment of user 'B' via cheque number
- Can user 'A' stop the payment on basis of date range for user 'B'

▼ Status Enquiry Testing

- Can user 'A' view the status enquiry of user 'B'
- Can user 'A' modify the status enquiry of user 'B'
- Can user 'A' post and enquiry behalf of user 'B' from his own account

▼ Fund transfer testing

- Is it possible to transfer funds to user 'C' instead of user 'B' from the user 'A' which was intended to transfer from user 'A' to user 'B'
- Can fund transfer amount be manipulated?
- Can user 'A' modify the payee list of user 'B' by parameter manipulation using his/her own account
- Is it possible to add payee without any proper validation in user 'A' 's own account or to user 'B' 's account

▼ Schedule transfer testing

- Can user 'A' view the schedule transfer of user 'B'
- Can user 'A' change the details of schedule transfer for user 'B'

▼ Testing of fund transfer via NEFT

- Amount manipulation via NEFT transfer
- Check if user 'A' can view the NEFT transfer details of user 'B'

▼ Testing for Bill Payment

- Check if user can register payee without any checker approval
- Check if user 'A' can view the pending payments of user 'B'
- Check if user 'A' can view the payment made details of user 'B'

▼ Open Redirection Testing

▼ Common injection parameters

```
/{payload}
?next={payload}
?url={payload}
?target={payload}
?rurl={payload}
?dest={payload}
?destination={payload}
?redir={payload}
?redirect_uri={payload}
?redirect_url={payload}
?redirect={payload}
/redirect/{payload}
/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?{payload}
/out/{payload}
/out?{payload}
?view={payload}
/login?to={payload}
?image_url={payload}
?go={payload}
{return={payload}
?returnTo={payload}
?return_to={payload}
?checkout_url={payload}
?continue={payload}
{return_path={payload}}
```

- Use burp 'find' option in order to find parameters such as URL, red, redirect, redir, origin, redirect_uri, target etc
- Check the value of these parameter which may contain a URL
- Change the URL value to www.tushar.com and check if gets redirected or not
- Try Single Slash and url encoding
- Using a whitelisted domain or keyword
- Using // to bypass http blacklisted keyword
- Using https: to bypass // blacklisted keyword
- Using \\\ to bypass // blacklisted keyword
- Using \W to bypass // blacklisted keyword
- Using null byte %00 to bypass blacklist filter
- Using ° symbol to bypass

▼ Host Header Injection

- Supply an arbitrary Host header
- Check for flawed validation

▼ Send ambiguous requests

- Inject duplicate Host headers
- Supply an absolute URL
- Add line wrapping

- Inject host override headers

▼ SQL Injection Testing

▼ Entry point detection

- Simple characters
- Multiple encoding
- Merging characters
- Logic Testing
- Weird characters

▼ Use SQLmap to identify vulnerable parameters

- Fill form in browser GUI submit it normally
- Go to history tab in burpsuite and find the relevant request
- Right click and select the option "copy to file"
- Save file as anyname.txt
- SQLmap command to run
- python `sqlmap.py r ~/Desktop/textsql.txt proxy= http://127.0.0.1:8080`

- Run SQL injection scanner on all requests

▼ Bypassing WAF

- Using Null byte before SQL query
- Using SQL inline comment sequence
- URL encoding
- Changing Cases (uppercase/lowercase)
- Use SQLMAP tamper scripts

▼ Time Delays

```
Oracle      dbms_pipe.receive_message('a'),10
Microsoft   WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:10'
PostgreSQL  SELECT pg_sleep(10)
MySQL       SELECT sleep(10)
```

▼ Conditional Delays

```
Oracle      SELECT CASE WHEN (YOUR-CONDITION-HERE) THEN 'a'||dbms_pipe.receive_message('a'),10 ELSE NULL END FROM dual
Microsoft  IF (YOUR-CONDITION-HERE) WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:10'
PostgreSQL  SELECT CASE WHEN (YOUR-CONDITION-HERE) THEN pg_sleep(10) ELSE pg_sleep(0) END
MySQL      SELECT IF(YOUR-CONDITION-HERE,sleep(10), 'a')
```

▼ Cross-Site Scripting Testing

- Try XSS using QuickXSS tool by theinfosecguy
- Upload file using ">.txt
- If script tags are banned, use <h1> and other HTML tags

- If output is reflected back inside the JavaScript as a value of any variable just use alert(1)
- if " are filtered then use this payload />
- Upload a JavaScript using Image file
- Unusual way to execute your JS payload is to change method from POST to GET. It bypasses filters sometimes
- ▼ Tag attribute value
 - Input landed -<input type="text" name="state" value="INPUT_FROM_USER">
 - Payload to be inserted -“ onfocus="alert(document.cookie)"
- Syntax Encoding payload "%3cscript%3ealert(document.cookie)%3c/script%3e"
- ▼ XSS filter evasion
 - < and > can be replaced with html entities < and >
 - You can try an XSS polyglot.Eg:-javascript:-></title></style></textarea></script></xmp><svg/onload='+/*/+onmouseover=1+//[]/+alert(1)//'>
- ▼ XSS Firewall Bypass
 - Check if the firewall is blocking only lowercase
 - Try to break firewall regex with the new line(\r\n)
 - Try Double Encoding
 - Testing for recursive filters
 - Injecting anchor tag without whitespaces
 - Try to bypass whitespaces using Bullet
 - Try to change request method
- ▼ CSRF Testing
 - Validation of CSRF token depends on request method
 - Validation of CSRF token depends on token being present
 - CSRF token is not tied to the user session
 - CSRF token is tied to a non-session cookie
 - Validation of Referer depends on header being present
- ▼ SSO Vulnerabilities
 - If internal.company.com Redirects You To SSO e.g. auth.company.com, Do FUZZ On Internal.company.com
 - If company.com/internal Redirects You To SSO e.g. Google login, Try To Insert public Before internal e.g. company.com/public/internal To Gain Access Internal
 - Try To Craft SAML Request With Token And Send It To The Server And Figure Out How Server Interact With This
 - If There Is AssertionConsumerServiceURL In Token Request Try To Insert Your Domain e.g. http://me.com As Value To Steal The Token
 - If There Is AssertionConsumerServiceURL In Token Request Try To Do FUZZ On Value Of AssertionConsumerServiceURL If It Is Not Similar To Origin
 - If There Is Any UUID, Try To Change It To UUID Of Victim Attacker e.g. Email Of Internal Employee Or Admin Account etc
 - Try To Figure Out If The Server Vulnerable To XML Signature Wrapping OR Not?

- Try To Figure Out If The Server Checks The Identity Of The Signer OR Not?
- Try To Inject XXE Payloads At The Top Of The SAML Response
- Try To Inject XSLT Payloads Into The Transforms Element As A Child Node Of The SAML Response
- If Victim Can Accept Tokens Issued By The Same Identity Provider That Services Attacker, So You Can Takeover Victim Account
- While Testing SSO Try To search In Burp Suite About URLs In Cookie Header e.g. Host=IP; If There Is Try To Change IP To Your IP To Get SSRF

▼ XML Injection Testing

- Change the content type to text/xml then insert below code. Check via repeater

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO 8859 1"?>
<!DOCTYPE tushar [
<!ELEMENT tushar ANY
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]><tushar>&xxe;</
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/hosts" >]><tushar>&xxe;</
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///proc/self/cmdline" >]><tushar>&xxe;</
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///proc/version" >]><tushar>&xxe;</
```

- Blind XXE with out-of-band interaction

▼ Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS)

- Errors parsing Origin headers
- Whitelisted null origin value

▼ Server-side request forgery (SSRF)

▼ Common injection parameters

```
"access=",
"admin=",
"dbg=",
"debug=",
"edit=",
"grant=",
"test=",
"alter=",
"clone=",
"create=",
"delete=",
"disable=",
"enable=",
"exec=",
"execute=",
"load=",
"make=",
"modify=",
"rename=",
"reset=",
"shell=",
"toggle=",
"adm=",
"root=",
"cfg=",
"dest=",
"redirect=",
"uri=",
"path=",
"continue=",
"url=",
>window=",
"next=",
"data=",
"reference=",
```

```
"site=",
"html=",
"val=",
"validate=",
"domain=",
"callback=",
"return=",
"page=",
"feed=",
"host=",
"port=",
"to=",
"out=",
"view=",
"dir=",
"show=",
"navigation=",
"open=",
"file=",
"document=",
"folder=",
"pg=",
"php_path=",
"style=",
"doc=",
"img=",
"filename="
```

Try basic localhost payloads

▼ Bypassing filters

- Bypass using HTTPS
- Bypass with [::]
- Bypass with a domain redirection
- Bypass using a decimal IP location
- Bypass using IPv6/IPv4 Address Embedding
- Bypass using malformed urls
- Bypass using rare address(short-hand IP addresses by dropping the zeros)
- Bypass using enclosed alphanumerics

▼ Cloud Instances

▼ AWS

```
http://instance-data
http://169.254.169.254
http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data
http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data/iam/security-credentials/[ROLE NAME]
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/[ROLE NAME]
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/PhotonInstance
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ami-id
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/reservation-id
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/hostname
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/public-keys/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/public-keys/0/openssh-key
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/public-keys/[ID]/openssh-key
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/dummy
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/s3access
http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document
```

▼ Google Cloud

```
http://169.254.169.254/computeMetadata/v1/  
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/  
http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/  
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/hostname  
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/id  
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/project/project-id
```

▼ Digital Ocean

```
curl http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/id  
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json  
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/  
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/id  
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/user-data  
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/hostname  
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/region  
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/interfaces/public/0/ipv6/address
```

▼ Azure

```
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/maintenance  
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2017-04-02  
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance/network/interface/0/ipv4/ipAddress/0/publicIpAddress?api-version=2017-04-02&form  
at=text
```

- Bypassing via open redirection

▼ File Upload Testing

- upload the malicious file to the archive upload functionality and observe how the application responds
- upload a file and change its path to overwrite an existing system file
- Large File Denial of Service
- Metadata Leakage
- ImageMagick Library Attacks
- Pixel Flood Attack

▼ Bypasses

- Null Byte (%00) Bypass
- Content-Type Bypass
- Magic Byte Bypass
- Client-Side Validation Bypass
- Blacklisted Extension Bypass
- Homographic Character Bypass

▼ CAPTCHA Testing

- Missing Captcha Field Integrity Checks
- HTTP Verb Manipulation
- Content Type Conversion
- Reusable Captcha
- Check if captcha is retrievable with the absolute path such as
www.tushar.com/internal/captcha/images/24.png

- Check for the server side validation for CAPTCHA. Remove captcha block from GUI using firebug addon and submit request to the server
- Check if image recognition can be done with OCR tool?

▼ **JWT Token Testing**

- Brute-forcing secret keys
- Signing a new token with the “none” algorithm
- Changing the signing algorithm of the token (for fuzzing purposes)
- Signing the asymmetrically-signed token to its symmetric algorithm match (when you have the original public key)

▼ **Websockets Testing**

- Intercepting and modifying WebSocket messages
- Websockets MITM attempts
- Testing secret header websocket
- Content stealing in websockets
- Token authentication testing in websockets

▼ **GraphQL Vulnerabilities Testing**

- Inconsistent Authorization Checks
- Missing Validation of Custom Scalars
- Failure to Appropriately Rate-limit
- Introspection Query Enabled/Disabled

▼ **WordPress Common Vulnerabilities**

- XSPA in wordpress
- Bruteforce in wp-login.php
- Information disclosure wordpress username
- Backup file wp-config exposed
- Log files exposed
- Denial of Service via load-styles.php
- Denial of Service via load-scripts.php
- DDOS using xmlrpc.php

▼ **Denial of Service**

- Cookie bomb
- Pixel flood, using image with a huge pixels
- Frame flood, using GIF with a huge frame
- ReDoS (Regex Dos)
- CPDoS (Cache Poisoned Denial of Service)

▼ **Other Test Cases (All Categories)**

- ▼ Testing for Role authorization
 - Check if normal user can access the resources of high privileged users?
 - Forced browsing

- Insecure direct object reference
- Parameter tampering to switch user account to high privileged user
- ▼ Check for security headers and at least
 - X Frame Options
 - X-XSS header
 - HSTS header
 - CSP header
 - Referrer Policy
 - Cache Control
 - Public key pins
- ▼ Blind OS command injection
 - using time delays
 - by redirecting output
 - with out-of-band interaction
 - with out-of-band data exfiltration
 - Command injection on CSV export (Upload/Download)
 - CSV Excel Macro Injection
 - If you find phpinfo.php file, check for the configuration leakage and try to exploit any network vulnerability.
 - Parameter Pollution Social Media Sharing Buttons
- ▼ Broken Cryptography
 - Cryptography Implementation Flaw
 - Encrypted Information Compromised
 - Weak Ciphers Used for Encryption
- ▼ Web Services Testing
 - Test for directory traversal
 - Web services documentation disclosure Enumeration of services, data types, input types boundaries and limits