



# CS326 – Systems Security

## Lecture 16

### **Program Analysis and Applications**

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# Modern Software Hardening



- Techniques for defending software
  - Against an attacker with arbitrary read/write capabilities
- Can be applied directly to binaries
  - When source is not available
  - Legacy software
- Can be applied to source code
  - Needs software re-compilation
- Performance overheads


# Instrumentation

## Stack Canaries



No stack canaries	Stack canaries
leave ret	<b>mov</b> -0xc(%ebp),%eax <b>xor</b> %gs:0x14,%eax <b>je</b> 96 <authenticate_root+0x96> <b>call</b> 92 <authenticate_root+0x92> leave ret

# Control-flow Integrity (CFI)




# CFI Problems



- Hard to compute perfect Control-flow Graph
  - No source code
  - Loadable Modules
  - Dynamic code
- Performance

# Coarse-grained CFI (2 labels)



# Deployed CFI



- Supported by modern compilers
  - Control-flow Guard (CFG), Microsoft
  - VTV, LLVM/Google
- Hardware support
  - Intel has announced hardware instructions for CFI
  - Shadow stacks (return addresses are stored in a separate h/w memory)

# Instrumentation

## CFI



Target	Destination
<code>jmp ecx ; computed jump</code>	<code>mov eax, [esp+4] ; dst</code> <code>...</code>

Target	Destination
<code>; comp ID/dst</code> <code><b>cmp [ecx], 12345678h</b></code> <code>; if != fail</code> <code><b>jne error_label</b></code> <code>; skip ID at dst</code> <code><b>lea ecx, [ecx+4]</b></code> <code>; jump to dst</code> <code>jmp ecx</code>	<code><b>78 56 34 12 ; data 12345678h ;ID</b></code> <code>mov eax, [esp+4] ; dst ...</code>



# Program Analysis



- Static
  - Before execution
  - Source-based or binary-based
  - No adaptation to particular inputs
- Dynamic
  - During execution
  - Adapt to certain inputs

# Static Analysis



- Analyze the source of the program without executing it (no inputs)
  - Source can be in high-level language (C/C++)
  - Source can be bytecode
  - Source can be machine code (*binary analysis*)

# Source-based static analysis



- Usually performed at the compiler-level
- LLVM (Low Level Virtual Machine)
  - Compiler infrastructure that allows to add custom passes
  - All phases in the compilation are represented using LLVM IR (*intermediate representation*)

# Binary Analysis



- Disassemble a binary for analysis
  - Open problem for x86
  - Variable-length instructions
  - Data are mixed with code
- Recursive disassembly
  - Follow jumps and disassemble targets
- Linear disassembly
  - Linearly disassemble code
- Suggested read
  - <https://syssec.flux.re/papers/sec-2016.pdf>

# Tools



- `objdump -d`
  - Simple tool for disassembling binaries in Linux, part of `binutils`
- `otool`
  - Simple tool for disassembling binaries in OSX
- IDA Pro
  - Commercial and powerful disassembler

# Dynamic Analysis



- Analyze program while executing
  - Usually, slow
  - Analysis observes actual inputs
- The analysis' code runs *in parallel* with the program's code

# Tools



- gdb
  - A debugger which is attached to the program and can perform various tasks (breakpoints, step instruction, inspect memory, etc.)
- PinTool
  - Intel framework for dynamically instrumenting binaries
  - A *pintool* is attached to the analyzed program
  - The *pintool* can execute instructions, account for the program's instructions, inspect memory accesses, etc.

# Applications



- Program instrumentation
  - Software hardening
- Bug finding
  - Assisted *fuzzing*
- Malware identification
  - Check if a downloaded program is malware or not



# Binary Preloading



- Dynamically linked binaries
  - Code is loaded at run-time using the dynamic loader
  - `ld-linux.so` for Linux
- A symbol can be in several libraries
  - The dynamic loader uses the first found one
- We can *hook* code in library calls
  - As long as we load our code first

# Example

## Hooking `malloc()`



- Create a shared library with a custom `malloc()`
- Use `LD_PRELOAD` to load the custom library first
- Inside the custom `malloc()` you can load the *real* `malloc()`
- The custom `malloc()` can do some work and then run the *real* `malloc()`

