




# CS326 – Systems Security

## Lecture 9

### **Cryptographic Hash Functions**

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# Cryptography Roadmap



# Sections of this Lecture




- Digital Signatures
- Cryptographic Hash Functions
- Passwords
- WannaCry




# **DIGITAL SIGNATURES**

# Digital Signing



# RSA




# How do I digitally sign a large file?




- Naive solution: split the message in parts and sign each one of them

(1) Signature has the length of the message  
(2) Computational overhead (several RSA computations)  
(3) Security limitations




# Cryptographic Hash Functions




**Ideally:** If message 1 and message 2 differ by one bit, then A and B differ in 50% of their bits



# Digital Signing




# Verifying Digital Signatures





# CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS

# Merkle-Damgård Construction (SHA1)



# High-level Properties




- Complicated **one-way** functions
- One-way
  - Hard to compute the message by having just the hash value (or *digest*)
  - No cryptographic keys
  - Should not be confused with invertible functions (1-1)
- Collision
  - Find a message that cryptographically hashes to a given digest H

# Basic Requirements




hard to compute  
→  $x = ?$



$h(x)$   
preimage resistance

cannot find  $x$  from  $h(x)$   
(any  $h(x)$ )


$x_1$        $x_2 = ?$



$h(x_1) = h(x_2)$   
second preimage  
resistance

cannot find  $x_2$   
such as  $h(x_1) = h(x_2)$   
(knowing  $x_1$ )

$x_1 = ?$        $x_2 = ?$



$h(x_1) = h(x_2)$   
collision resistance


Find any two  $x(x_1, x_2)$  such  
as  $h(x_1) = h(x_2)$

# Basic Requirements



- Preimage Resistance (“*One way*”)
  - If you know just the *digest* it should be computationally hard to find a message M with the same *digest*
- Second Pre-image Resistance (*input resistance*)
  - Given a message M1, it should be computationally hard to find a second message, M2, with the same *digest*
- Collision resistance
  - It should be computationally hard to find any two messages, M1 and M2, with the same *digest*

# Lifetimes of cryptographic hash functions



**More:** <http://valerieaurora.org/hash.html>

SHA256 is considered currently safe





# PASSWORDS

# Other Uses - Passwords



- Services
  - Store cryptographic hashes of passwords
  - Passwords in plaintext are deleted
- Authentication
  - Services compute and check cryptographic hashes and not plaintext passwords
- Encrypting passwords is a bad idea
  - Attacker can leak the key
- Passwords are *salted*
  - Identical plaintext passwords produce different hash keys


# Attacking Passwords




- Brute force
- Dictionary attacks
- Rainbow tables
  - Salt can make this extremely hard
- GPUs



**WANNACRY**





**Read more:** WannaKey, <https://github.com/aguinete/wannakey>

# Resources



- This lecture was built using material that can be found at
  - Chapter 10 and 11, Understanding Cryptography, <http://www.crypto-textbook.com>
  - Chapter 9, 11, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, <http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/hac/>
  - Chapter 6, 10, Serious Cryptography, <https://nostarch.com/seriouscrypto>