TEACHING POLICE ETHICS*

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Two years ago I team-taught a course on police ethics with a colleague in the School of Criminal Justice at the State University of New York at Albany, Dr. Lawrence Sherman. In this paper I would like to describe the participants and issues, the pedagogical techniques we used, and some lessons we learned. Since I had previously taught several courses on sexual morality which, like crime, generates a heated response among many students (and some faculty), I will offer some comparisons between these.

I. Participants and Issues

Half of my work in philosophy has been in the continental tradition[1] -- phenomenology and existentialism in particular. But in addition, over the past 10 years, I have taught various courses in ethics, sexual morality, morality and the law and contemporary moral problems[2] -- at both major universities and small colleges. Dr. Sherman taught a variety of courses on policing at both the undergraduate and the graduate level, served as an aide to the Police Commissioner of New York City for 2 years, and directed three major research projects on the police, dealing with corruption, educational standards and deadly force.[3]

We were easily able to reconcile our different perspectives and backgrounds by adopting the following format: Dr. Sherman would present the results of empirical research on a topic, and outline the policy options; I would then evaluate these in terms of alternative ethical theories. I used four ethical theorists -- Kant, Mill, Rawls and Sartre, outlining their theories at the outset with Frankena's ETHICS as a guide for the students. For the police portion, we used Goldstein's POLICING A FREE SOCIETY and a prescriptive package from POLICE MAGAZINE as supplementary materials.

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In general I would rate the philosophical materials available for such a course as poor.[4] To the best of my knowledge only a few articles and not a single book have been published by a professional philosopher on policing. Philosophical materials on policing are meager because philosophers in criminal justice programs are scarce. I would also add that I am not happy with Frankena's book either: it is dated, somewhat dry, and far from complete (the discussion of Rawls in the revised version is truncated). But it is short, readable and inexpensive -- three features students appreciate even when faculty do not.

I spent a good portion of the previous term surveying materials in philosophy, police science and criminal justice. One book entitled POLICE ETHICS[5] raised my hopes, only to have them dashed on discovering that one of the most pressing moral issues for Hansen is whether an on-duty officer should accept a free cup of coffee! Sociologists, like my colleague Dr. Sherman, have conducted empirical research on more serious concerns such as the forms and patterns of police corruption, police use of deadly force and affirmative action programs. But no ethical analyses, no statements of principles by philosophers are available to guide policy makers and administrators. One of the purposes of our course was to fill this gap.

Dr. Sherman and I came to the first class with our own conception of the "burning" moral issues in law enforcement. But after preliminary introductions, we decided to ask each of the students their opinions. The following list is the result of their suggestions (not in order of priority):

corruption
civil liberties
deadly force
police-community relations
poor image of the police
economic impact on crime
mail fraud
women and minorities
educational and training standards
hiring and promotion standards
use of electronic surveillance techniques
police use of discretion

The first few classes were spent familiarizing students with four major ethical theories and distinguishing the moral point of view from some alternatives -- personal, prudential, political, aesthetic, practical and scientific. One difficulty I encountered occurs in most ethics courses: combatting a kind of ethical relativism or (in some cases) skepticism. Students tend to move quickly from the liberal platitude that everyone has the right to their opinion to the conclusion that every opinion is right. They need to be convinced that their value judgments can be wrong, as well as right.

II. Pedagogical Techniques

For the first half of the course, a lecture-discussion format was used. The class was divided into four groups, each of which was asked to become an "expert" in one ethical theory. Over a four week period, each mastered all four theories. In order to facilitate discussions, decision scenarios were used analogous to those in bio-ethics texts.[5] The following are some situations in which students were asked to imagine themselves and then explain how one ethical theorist would act.

1. It is 2:00 a.m. in Albany, New York, and you are alone in your cruiser -- tired and sleepy. You come to a quiet, dead end street. Do you pull over for 40 winks?

2. You are driving down the street with your partner when someone hails you to stop. He reports that a garage attendant has been held up at gun-point by the man running down the opposite side. You leap out, shout "Police, Freeze!" but the man keeps running. Do you shoot?

3. You bust a pusher and drive him to the station for booking, with your partner in the back. When you arrive, you ask him to empty his pockets. The fifty dollars he had when you picked him up is missing and he claims your partner took it. What do you do?

For the second half of the course, a debate format was used. The four groups were paired off, and divided into pro and con. The following are some of the resolutions we debated:

> That a minority or woman candidate should be given preferential treatment in hiring and promotion over a white male.

That police should be granted the legal right to strike.

That it is always wrong for an officer to accept a gift or gratuity from a businessman on his beat.

That use of undercover agents is a form of deception, and hence immoral.

These debates served to convey my conception of philosophy as dialogue. Through them students were able to see different or competing points of view -- if only because they were sometimes required to defend them. They also convey the importance of students' taking a stance and defending it by appeal to reason. Generally both sides managed to develop reasonable arguments and were able to apply the ethical theories outlined earlier. My one reservation about this format is that it may breed skepticism or cynicism: students may gain the impression that all sides can be equally well defended, and that in philosophy there is no "truth of the matter." A mechanistic approach in which students simply apply an ethical theory, or develop an argument to defend a position, easily leads to the conclusion that philosophy is merely casuistry -- the art of arguing. To avoid this view at the end of the course I outlined criteria for appraising alternative ethical theories.[7] The work of Lawrence Kohlberg provides another device for rank ordering ethical theories so that students do not get the impression that they are all on a par, and there is nothing to choose among them.[8]

III. Science and Policing

The work to date in the field of policing has drawn heavily on two sciences: first, forensic sciences which have helped the police in gathering evidence suitable for admission in court; and second, social sciences which have helped the police to understand their own activities more clearly as well as those of criminals, lawyers, the courts and other agents of the criminal justice system with whom they interact. Ethical issues arise in both -- in policing as a science and the scientific study of policing.

In theory a police officer's task is simply to gather evidence which a court will then use to make a legal determination of guilt or innocence. In practice, however,

police work closely with a district attorney to secure a conviction. In theory they are unbiased in their pursuit of truth, but in practice their position within the criminal justice system inclines them towards an adversarial relationship to defendants. In addition their considerably greater resources, compared to those of an individual citizen, place defendants at a strategic disadvantage, which I would categorize further as a moral handicap in the pursuit of justice. The locus of the police within the criminal justice system, their actual function, and the power they have, create an inequality -- one might almost say an immorality -- in policing, whether it be conducted in a scientific or unscientific manner.

I mention this feature of policing first because I believe it is first in importance. Prior to any ethical analysis of an activity, one must first understand it. To do so, one must situate it within its context. This context may not itself be morally neutral: the distribution of power has moral implications.

Ethical issues can also arise in the way forensic science is practiced -- that is, in the means used to gather evidence in court. The Wickersham Commission of 1931 was intent on abolishing one means -- the third degree. Since then the number of forced confessions has probably declined and the rights of the accused in the eyes of the law have increased. But what are the appropriate moral limits on the "scientific" activities of the police in their efforts to acquire knowledge? Consider the recent Abscam.

Police use of undercover agents is widespread in our society. During the 60's students protested their presence on campus, but received little sympathy from the public generally or from politicians who were authorized to restrict such practices. But in the early 80's some politicians began denouncing such practices vehemently, because they found themselves victimized. From a moral point of view such deception is difficult to defend: undercover agents misrepresent, mislead and deceive, and insofar as these practices[9] are wrong the use of undercover agents must be wrong too.

This moral condemnation presupposes a deontological principle that deliberately deceiving another person is always wrong. Those who operate on a utilitarian logic will judge an individual act or practice by its consequences. The deception and lying by any law enforcement agency

including the F.B.I. will be warranted if it serves a good end -- in this case to uncover significant patterns of abuse of political power. I do not accept this consequentialist justification of police deception, but will not argue this position here.

Rather let me note that this same issue recurs in the second relation between policing and science -- the scientific study of the police. Here, too, in the scientists' quest for knowledge deception may be a powerful tool. Let me give just one example.

In order to study carefully the activities of patrol officers, researchers wanted to ride with them in their cars. Yet clearly if the officers were told that the researchers' purpose was to observe their behavior, the experiment would be jeopardized: alerted that they were being watched, the police would carefully refrain from common but questionable practices -- such as taking 40 winks during the dead-man shift, using a slightly threatening gesture to elicit a response to a question, or running personal errands while on patrol. Accordingly the researchers decided, for the sake of gathering the truth, to be untruthful: they told the police their purpose was to observe the conduct of suspects. This ruse made their presence less disruptive, and their data more reliable -- but clearly it was deceptive. Social scientists in their research on the police may violate the moral rights of the police (e.g., not to be deceived), just as the police in their activities may violate the rights of citizens.

Lest this sound too negative, let me offer a final example that is more positive. For over 40 years the police have believed that the motor car is one of their most potent weapons in the war on crime. O. W. Wilson developed and practiced a faith in applied technology as the major means for reducing crime. Throughout this country each year millions of dollars are spent to put police in cars patrolling the streets in the belief that their presence, randomized and hence unpredictable, would deter criminals, and increase public confidence and satisfaction. This belief was tested for the first time by social scientists in a famous Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment.[10] Three patrol patterns were used: regular (randomized) patrol; no patrol; and saturated patrol. The result served to discredit the belief: the crime rate in all three areas remained the same, and so did citizens' confidence in and satisfaction with police services.

Clearly, such experiments by social scientists are critical in the formulation of a defensible policy on the allocation of limited police resources. In our value judgments about what is desirable, factual assumptions are implicit which the social scientist can test. Such tests are important in establishing the empirical basis of social policies. But they are not sufficient. A policy has two components -- the first descriptive or empirical which can be tested, and the second prescriptive or normative which can be established only through an ethical theory. Thus the alliance between science and philosophy is necessary for the development of defensible policies -- in the field of policing or indeed any other area.

III. Purposes and Responsibilities

What can a course on police ethics, or any other course in ethics, hope to accomplish? Minimally I believe any such course should sensitize students to the moral dimensions of problems to which they might otherwise remain oblivious. Teaching the language of morals enables students to recognize moral discourse when they use it or hear it. Meta-ethics is thus a necessary part of the course. So at the very least I regard teaching ethics as moral consciousness-raising.

In addition students should learn clarity in moral reasoning and a measure of moral responsibility. They should come to realize that they hold moral beliefs, and are responsible for them. Decision scenarios are one pedagogical device to force students into situations of accountability. Likewise, the debate format forces them to take a position and defend it. Frequently they are unaware of those values they have acquired, since those values have become second nature to them. Having raised their consciousness to the point of enabling them to recognize moral positions and values, especially their own, they must accept responsibility for them -- by defending them.

Admittedly, I have built a bias into the course: I have assumed that to discharge one's responsibility for one's moral values, one must offer a reasoned defense. I see no way to defend this connection between morality and rationality that is not circular, since any defense will involve arguments and hence appeal to rationality. To avoid dogmatism, the best I can do is allow a generous conception of rationality: students must qualify their moral beliefs

to the point that they are consistent and coherent. As a teacher my task is to help them with these qualifications.

One can teach ethical analysis. Repeatedly I pose the question: What would Kant (Mill, Rawls or Sartre) say to that? One can teach students how to apply different ethical theories. The application of a theory is one test of its acceptability: it enables students to choose among theories by discovering their implications.

Is it a legitimate goal of an ethics course to teach students moral truths?[11] Should the teacher try to convince students that the police should hire more women, that they should not shoot an unarmed fleeing felon? Should one measure of the success of a course be the extent to which students change their beliefs -- and perhaps even more radically, the extent to which they change their conduct?

Without answering this question, let me comment on the implicit conception of teaching ethics as behavior modification.

Camus remarks in the MYTH OF SISYPHUS that to begin to think is to begin to be undermined. I find this image striking and profound. But to be fully grasped it needs to be situated in the phenomenological tradition to which Camus was heir. The kind of thinking he has in mind is critical thinking which questions the presuppositions on which our life is based. Such thinking yanks the ground out from under us because it deprives us of the assumptions necessary to get on with "running life's errands," as Kierkegaard put it. To act is to take for granted the viability of the values embodied in one's actions. But if these values are challenged, one cannot act;[12] one lacks the conviction that what one is doing is right. Insofar as ethics challenges these values, it ossifies the individual, with potentially fatal results.

For example, if a course on police ethics questions the use of deadly force, an officer from that class may pause a split second longer before he shoots a fleeing armed felon. That pause may cost him his life. Ethics can be dangerous, and perhaps for this reason men of action avoid it.

The point of my example, which admittedly overdramatizes the power of most philosophers, is to bring out the moral responsibility of the teacher. Whatever he tries to do, he may by accident or by design affect the

lives of students during or after the class. Where will the teacher be then? And how will the teacher take responsibility for those consequences? To put my point more positively, whether a philosopher offers moral truths and shapes students' conduct or not, he or she will affect some students and must accept responsibility for this.

To my mind, the way to shoulder this responsibility is through honesty and conscientiousness -- by being reasonable and compassionate, and candidly admitting one's own position, preferences or biases. When I first began teaching, I worried that I might brainwash my students: mindful of the rhetorical powers philosophers acquire, the appeal of an authority figure at the head of a class, and the susceptibility of young minds in transition, I sought to avoid imposing my views on students by admitting to no position. But the result, I discovered, was unwittingly to teach them a position I did not intend -- that there was no position. Playing the devil's advocate bedevils students' minds, leaving them with nothing to defend or act on.

Whether or not the teacher can place moral truths in the minds of students, he or she must defend them -- not so students will learn the truth (though some may), but so they will not learn falsehoods. In addition to the goals outlined earlier -- sensitizing, clarifying and analyzing -- I believe philosophers must teach by example the value of candor and honesty. To do so they must openly admit their own position and, like their students, be prepared to defend it. In addition I would have teachers convey by example a healthy toleration for alternative positions reasonably defended, and conversely an intolerance of bigotry and ignorance.

IV. Prospects and Prognoses

To the best of my knowledge, the course we offered was the only one in the country on police ethics taught by someone with a Ph.D. in philosophy. This fact reveals something significant about both policing and philosophy.

On the one hand it shows that in their quest for professional status the police have barely begun to confront the ethical issues other professionals in medicine, law, and engineering have been grappling with for several years. Policing is still trying to become a science, and has taken only small steps toward becoming a profession. Several explanations could be offered. First, only recently has a

reliable body of knowledge begun to emerge about policing under the impact of the 1967 President's Commission on Crime. Second, policing tends to be polarized by political allegiances, whereby the styles and objectives of policing are dictated by pressure groups. This second point is related to the first: the lack of a reliable body of knowledge on police conduct and effectiveness has made law enforcement agencies more vulnerable to political interference and machinations. The ensuing problems are compounded by the misinformation and ignorance of the electorate to whom the police are responsible. Their impressions are gained largely through the media which, with a few recent and notable exceptions, have tended toward dramatization if not sensationalism. In addition, the formal education system has failed dismally to educate society's future citizens about the way the criminal justice system operates and the rights of individuals who become enmeshed in it. To some extent the police themselves are to be blamed: they have concealed their practices in a shroud of secrecy that makes it almost impossible for citizens to discover their policies and their rationale.

A modest but healthy trend toward greater public accountability has recently emerged: some jurisdictions, like Philadelphia, have begun announcing publicly the policies of the police administration and thereby subjecting both the policies and administrators to challenges from citizens and review by the courts. Investigative reporters have provided informative exposes in the newspapers and documentations on television -- revealing the abuses of police power to an outraged and slowly organizing citizenry. The body of information on police practices is growing, and being disseminated more widely. Through this process the police may eventually be accorded the recognition they deserve as professionals.

But before this result can be achieved one further condition must be satisfied: higher educational and training standards. In most of the 40,000 agencies across this country, two years of college plus 240 hours of training is all that is required. Few professions have such low standards, though most once did. The recent Sherman Report[13] created a controversy with its contention that a bachelor's degree be required of all police officers. Though they possess the "dangerous knowledge" that characterizes other professions, they are typically expected to acquire it and learn how to use it in just 6 weeks -- a clearly impossible task!

So far I have chastized the media, the educational system and the police themselves for the lack of professionalism and accountability in law enforcement. Let me now turn, with a measure of chagrin, to philosophers. And let me begin by riding a hobby-horse.

During the past 13 years, approximately half a dozen people have been tried and executed by the state for capital crimes. During that same period, as many as 590 citizens have been estimated to have been shot and killed by police prior to conviction -- each year! The police are executing people far more often than courts -- not at a rate of two or three or four or even ten times higher but by a magnitude of 1000. During this same 13-year period, numerous articles were published by philosophers on the death penalty. Yet they have not published a single article on the police use of deadly force -- a practice which, when measured by its frequency, must be ranked as a far greater threat to the lives of American citizens.

The picture is improving. Recently I published a paper on Police Use of Deadly Force[14] from a conference held in Philadelphia on urban crime. In the fall of 1981 Dr. Norman Bowie and I hosted a conference on Policy Issues in Criminal Justice at his Value Center at the University of Delaware, which will be published under the title ETHICS, PUBLIC POLICY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE. And most recently, Dr. Michael Feldberg and I codirected a conference on moral issues in policing at Boston University.

What makes me optimistic is not my own modest contribution to this field, but the larger trend I see in applied philosophy generally, and professional or occupational ethics in particular. The field of bio-ethics is now well-cultivated: key issues have been identified, and many excellent books and anthologies have been published.[15] The fields of business, engineering and law are being worked by philosophers[16] and again a significant body of literature is emerging. The series on occupational ethics by Prentice-Hall, in which our POLICE ETHICS will be published next year, includes not just volumes on business, government, medicine and law -- but on nursing, the military and computers as well. So I see philosophers turning to professional concerns in a wide variety of different areas, and this is a very healthy trend.

But, I am tempted to ask, what has taken philosophers so long? Perhaps the question is not, strictly speaking, a philosophical one: it may belong more to the sociology of knowledge, or the sociology of academia. But as part of our collective self-examination, it is important to be aware of factors that shape philosophical inquiry -- the issues selected, the way they are posed, and the tools used to resolve them. So let me offer a few reflections on the factors that account for the recent emergence of professional ethics generally, and police ethics in particular, or conversely the factors that explain our collective failure to address these concerns earlier.

Let me begin by making good on my earlier "promissory note" to compare sex and crime, at least as philosophers have treated them. One feature of the western tradition that is striking to me is that most of the major figures have had something to say about both subjects -- until the twentieth century. With the notable exceptions of Bertrand Russell, J.-P. Sartre and his associates de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, none of the major thinkers of our epoch have addressed either concern -- not G.E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, A.J. Ayer, Gilbert Ryle, Norman Malcolm, Edmund Husserl or Martin Heidegger. Plato has his guardians of THE REPUBLIC, and his encomium to sexual love in THE SYMPOSIUM. Augustine, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Hegel and Marx touch on these subjects. The failure of most 20th century philosophers to treat them can be traced to several factors.

First, I would point to the <u>insularization</u> of philosophy: philosophers speak mainly to philosophers. They have tended to take their peers as their primary audience, with the result that the issues selected are those of concern to the initiated. The concerns of a non-philosopher -- an engineer, doctor, lawyer or police officer -- have tended to be discounted as not worthy of serious attention.

Related to this tendency to write purely for philosophers is a second problem: preoccupation with <u>language</u>. Indeed, one major tradition in philosophy today treats all philosophical problems as problems of language. As a result, substantive ethical issues have been buried. Closely related to this orientation towards language has been a tendency toward jargon. At its best it promotes precision, removing the vagueness and obfuscation that impedes the resolution of ethical problems. At its worst it

discourages non-professionals -- that is, anyone but a philosopher -- from intruding into the territory thereby marked out.

Third, I would point to the context, physical and social, within which philosophy is practiced. Philosophers do philosophy typically in the classroom or the privacy of their study. The issues that emerge differ significantly if one shifts to the grand rounds at the hospital, a police cruiser, or an on-site safety inspection. In this context police homicide is not an issue with which philosophers can readily identify. They seldom get shot, nor do their colleagues. (Morris Schlick is a rare case.) Their middle class background restricts their encounters with the police to minor infractions like traffic violations. Because higher education draws its members from the middle classes, attention is diverted away from those concerns that impinge on the lives of the poor and oppressed.

Fourth, the tools available for philosophical inquiry affect the selection of issues. Conceptual or linguistic analysis makes the law of the books (e.g., capital punishment) more appropriate as a topic than the law in action (e.g., police homicide). Similarly, phenomenological analysis, practiced in one's study or classroom, does not apply readily to summary acts by the police if the phenomenologist rarely undergoes such experiences, and did not grow up in a neighborhood where they occurred.

Fifth, the academic organization of colleges and universities plays a role. Interdisciplinary work goes against the grain: the reward structure flows along departmental lines, and faculty venture beyond these at their peril. Deans do not know how to count students in team-taught courses by faculty from different disciplines. And if they should jointly publish an article, neither rather than both tend to receive credit.

Finally, I would mention a conceptual difficulty. Classical ethical theories do not easily fit the concerns of professionals. What is needed is a role-ethics which recognizes the competing rights and obligations of individuals acting in different social relationships. Such a theory may be developed as an extension of utilitarianism -- from acts through rules to roles, or it may emerge as a variation on deontological or contractarian theories. The recent work of Downie, Fried and Hampshire addresses this need.[16]

There is much to be done. The obstacles are both theoretical, practical and political. But I am hopeful philosophers will rise to the challenge.

Notes

1. In the continental tradition, I have published several anthologies: Husserl: EXPOSITION AND APPRAISALS (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1976); HEIDEGGER'S EXISTENTIAL ANALYTIC (The Hague: Mouton, 1978); JEAN-PAUL SARTRE (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981). For some inexplicable reason, the only other philosophers I know of who are teaching in a school of criminal justice share this continental background: Professor Jeffrey Reiman of American University and Professor Lucinda Van der Vort of SUNY Albany.

2. As a result of these courses, I published two anthologies, primarily to meet the needs of students for whom philosophical materials were not otherwise readily available: PHILOSOPHY AND SEX, coedited with Robert Baker (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1975); and FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY, coedited with Mary Braggin Vetterling and Jane English (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield Adams, 1978).

3. Dr. Sherman, who is the Director of Research at the Police Foundation, has published several sociological analyses of police conduct: TEAM POLICING (Washington: The Police Foundation Press, 1973); SCANDAL AND REFORM: CONTROLLING POLICE CORRUPTION (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978); "Execution Without Trial: Police Homicide and the Constitution", VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 33:1, 71-100.

4. See for example, Jeffrey H. Reiman, "Police Autonomy vs. Police Authority" in THE POLICE COMMUNITY, ed. Jack Goldsmith and Sharon S. Goldsmith (Pacific Palisades, CA: Palisades Publishers, 1974), pp. 225-233; Newton Garver, "The Ambiguity of the Police Role" in SOCIAL PRACTICE 2 (1974), and the contributions by M. C. Dillon, Paul Weiss and Roger Wertheimer in THE POLICE IN SOCIETY, ed. E.C. Viano and Jeffrey H. Reiman (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1974)

5. David A. Hansen, POLICE ETHICS (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, 1973).

6. See, for example, Ronald Munson's INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970).

7. I took the five criteria used by Irving Copi to appraise scientific theories generally, and adapted these to ethical theories: relevance, testability, compatibility with previously well established hypotheses, predictive or explanatory power, and simplicity. See his INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC, Third Edition (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. 381-386.

8. See Lawrence Kohlberg, ESSAYS IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT (Needham Heights, MA: Wexford Press, 1978).

9. For a philosophical discussion of the ethics of lying, see Sissela Bok's provocative LYING (New York: Random House, 1978).

10. See George L. Kelling et al., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1975).

11. James Rachel discusses this question in "Can Ethics Provide Answers?" in THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 10:3 (June 1980), 32-40.

12. Dostoyevsky dramatizes the paralysis of questioning in NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND (New York: Signet Books, 1968).

13. Lawrence Sherman, THE QUALITY OF POLICE EDUCATION (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1978).

14. The proceedings, edited by Stephen Lagoy, have been published under the title, PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN CRIME (Jonesboro, TN: Pilgrimage Press, 1982).

15. In addition to Munson's book cited earlier the following deserve mention: BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ed. Elsie and Bertram Bandman (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Co., 1978); CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1978); ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE, ed. Robert Hunt and John Anas (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1977); and ETHICS IN MEDICINE, ed. S.J. Reiser et al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978).

16. For example, see ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS, ed. Tom Beauchamp and Norman Bowie (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980); ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING, ed. Robert J. Baum and Albert Flores (Troy, N.Y.: Human Dimensions Center, 1978); and PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN THE LAW, ed. Kenneth Kipnis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).