

COMPUTER SCIENCE MENTORS 70

September 24 - 28, 2018

1 RSA

1.1 Introduction

Main idea: Given two large primes, p and q , and a message x (an integer), find an encryption function E and a decryption function D such that $D(E(x)) = x$. In other words, two people can encrypt and decrypt a message if they know E and D .

Mechanism:

$$N = pq$$

$$E(x) = x^e \bmod N$$

$$D(x) = x^d \bmod N, \text{ where } d = e^{-1} \bmod (p-1)(q-1)$$

The pair (N, e) is the recipient's **public key**, and d is the recipient's **private key**. The sender sends $E(x)$ to the recipient, and the recipient uses $D(x)$ to recover the original message. The security of RSA relies on the assumption that given N , there is no efficient algorithm to determine $(p-1)(q-1)$.

1.2 Questions

1. How does RSA work?

- a. Alice wants to send Bob a message $m = 5$ using his public key ($n = 26, e = 11$). What cipher text $E(m)$ will Alice send?

- b. What is the value of d (Bob's private key) in this scheme? Note that traditional RSA schemes use much larger prime numbers, so its harder to break n down into its prime factors than it is in this problem.

2. In RSA, if Alice wants to send a confidential message to Bob, she uses Bob's public key to encode it. Then Bob uses his private key to decode the message. Suppose that Bob chose $N = 77$. And then Bob chose $e = 3$ so his public key is $(3, 77)$. And then Bob chose $d = 26$ so his private key is $(26, 77)$.

Will this work for encoding and decoding messages? If not, where did Bob first go wrong in the above sequence of steps and what is the consequence of that error? If it does work, then show that it works.

2 Polynomials

2.1 Introduction

There are two fundamental properties of polynomials:

1. A non-zero polynomial of degree d has at most d real roots.
2. $d + 1$ distinct points uniquely define a polynomial of degree at most d .

We can represent polynomials in 2 ways:

1. **Coefficient Representation:** This representation is probably what you've seen before. We could represent a polynomial of degree d like this:

$$p(x) = a_d x^d + a_{d-1} x^{d-1} + a_{d-2} x^{d-2} + \dots + a_1 x + a_0$$

As you can see, we need $d + 1$ coefficients $(a_0 \dots a_d)$.

2. **Value Representation:** Using the second property of polynomials, if we have a collection of $d + 1$ distinct points

$$(x_0, y_0), (x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_d, y_d)$$

we actually would have a unique polynomial of degree at most d .

Going from coefficient to value representation is easy: evaluate the polynomial at $d + 1$ different points. The other way is slightly harder. There are 2 ways that we can do this:

1. **System of equations** We know the generic equation for a polynomial of degree d is $p(x) = a_d x^d + a_{d-1} x^{d-1} + a_{d-2} x^{d-2} + \dots + a_1 x + a_0$. So we "plug in" our $d + 1$ points into this equation to obtain $d + 1$ equations in $d + 1$ unknowns (the coefficients).
2. **Lagrange Interpolation** Solving a system of equations, especially over a modulus space can be difficult, so there's a formula that we can use to directly obtain the coefficient representation.

$$p(x) = \sum_{i=0}^d y_i \frac{\prod_{j \neq i} (x - x_j)}{\prod_{j \neq i} (x_i - x_j)}$$

You may be used to doing polynomials as functions from $\mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. In this class, we work over *Galois Field*. This means, for some prime p , our functions are from $\{0, 1, \dots, p - 1\}$ to $\{0, 1, \dots, p - 1\}$. To do this, we take the result mod p when we evaluate the function, and our only possible inputs are integers. Addition, subtraction, multiplication, and exponentiation all work the same over Galois field as they do over the real numbers, however, division is slightly different. For example, the expression $\frac{x-1}{3} \bmod 7$ would be valid in the real number space, but we can't have fractions in Galois fields. Remember that division in modulus is the same as multiplying by the inverse. So in $\text{GF}(7)$ $\frac{x-1}{3} \equiv 5(x-1) \bmod 7$.

2.2 Questions

1. Let p be a degree 2 polynomial and q be another degree 2 polynomial in $\text{GF}(7)$. Both of them go through the points $(1, 2)$, $(2, 1)$, and $(3, 4)$. Find p and q .

2. Let $P(x)$ be a polynomial of degree 2 over $\text{GF}(7)$.
 1. Suppose $P(0) = 3$ and $P(1) = 2$. How many values can $P(5)$ have? How many distinct polynomials are there?

 2. Suppose we only know $P(0) = 3$. How many possible pairs of $(P(1), P(5))$ are there? How many different polynomials are there?

 3. If we only know k different points, where $k \leq d$, of a degree d polynomial over $\text{GF}(p)$, how many possible polynomials are there?

3. Define the sequence of polynomials by $P_0(x) = x + 12$, $P_1(x) = x^2 - 5x + 5$ and $P_n(x) = xP_{n-2}(x) - P_{n-1}(x)$. (For instance, $P_2(x) = 17x - 5$ and $P_3(x) = x^3 - 5x^2 - 12x + 5$.) Show that $P_n(7) \equiv 0 \pmod{19}$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

3 Secret Sharing

3.1 Introduction

1. Set up: n officials indexed from 1 to n . Secret s is an integer. Use $GF(q)$: q is a prime number such that $q > n$ and $q > s$.
2. Scheme: Pick a random $p(x)$ of degree $k - 1$ such that $p(0) = s$. Thus,
 - (a) Any k officials can use Lagrange Interpolation to find $p(x)$, therefore s .
 - (b) Any $k - 1$ officials have no information about s .

3.2 Questions

1. Suppose the Oral Exam questions are created by 2 TAs and 3 Readers. The answers are all encrypted and we know that:
 - (a) Together, both TAs should be able to access the answers
 - (b) All 3 Readers can also access the answers
 - (c) One TA and one Reader should also be able to do the same

Design a secret sharing scheme to make this work.

2. The United Nations (for the purposes of this question) consists of n countries. A vault in the United Nations can be opened with a secret combination s . The vault should only be opened in one of two situations. First, it can be opened if all n countries in the UN help. Second, it can be opened if at least m countries get together with the Secretary General of the UN.

Propose a scheme that gives private information to the Secretary General and n countries so that s can only be recovered under either one of the two specified conditions.