## Consciousness #2

## NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF THE MIND

research project 2015-2017





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#### Seminar 2

1. Recap: physicalism, materialism & naturalism

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- 2. Reductionism

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- 2. Reductionism
- 3. Emergence


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- Everything is determined by the physical
- There are non-physical things but they are entirely fixed by fixing the physical things

#### What would God have to do to create this world?



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- See also Stephan Leuenberger, 'Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism' Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2008


#### Supervenience and necessity

- Supervenience says that the physical necessitates everything else (including the mental) but the supervenience thesis is not a necessary truth
- Compare determinism: the past and the laws necessitate the future, but other futures than the actual one are possible

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- How does the physical 'underpin' the mental?
- The problem of irrelevant physical differences



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- Jaegwon Kim's 'Strong supervenience': A family of properties A supervenes on a family B iff:

Necessarily, if anything has property F in A, then there is some property G in B such that the thing has G, and necessarily whatever has G has F

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- The mental properties could be wholly distinct from anything physical

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- Supervenience does not establish a close enough connection between the mental and the physical, or between the supervenient properties and the 'subjacent' base
- What should the connection be?

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- The conceptual analysis explains the supervenience
- Necessitation is explained by entailment

### Example

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- Not: we know physicalism is true a priori

## Key texts

- David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, 'Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation' *Philosophical* Review 2001
- Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, 'Conceptual Analysis, Dualism and the Explanatory Gap' Philosophical Review 1999

Supervenience + .... other proposals

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Identity of properties

Supervenience + .... other proposals

- Identity of properties
- Some stronger metaphysical relation between properties: 'constitution', 'realisation' etc.

• Two notions of reduction

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- Ontological reduction the 'reduction' of entities
- Explanatory reduction the 'reduction' of theories

# Ontological reduction

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- What is the relation between reduction and identity?
- An ontological reduction "identifies the entities of one domain with a subclass of entities of another" Huw Price 'Ramsey, Reference and Reductionism'
- The mental 'reduces to the physical'

A relation between theories

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- NB relation to 'grounding'

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- What is emergence?

- Some say (e.g. Kim) emergence is just supervenience
- But then what is the difference between emergence and 'non-reductive' physicalism?

## Strong and weak emergence

- Weak emergence: novelty with an explanation
- Strong emergence: novelty without an explanation