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Carmi Merimovich

Tel-Aviv Academic College

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## Fetching from user mode routines

Safe fetching from user mode using address:

```
int fetchint(int addr, int *i);
int fetchstr(int addr, char *s);
```

Safe fetching from user mode using argument number:

```
int argint(int n, int *i);
int argptr(int n, void *p, int size);
int argstr(int n, char *s);
```

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```
if (addrs < proc->sz)
b = *(char *)addrs;
else
//
// handle the error
```

#### fetchbyte

```
int fetchbyte(uint addrs, char *cp) {
  if (addrs >= proc->sz)
   return (-1);
  *cp = *(char *)addrs;
  return (0);
}
```

#### fetchbyte

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int fetchbyte(uint addrs, char *cp) {
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```

• What changes should be done in order to get fetchshort?

#### fetchshort

```
 \begin{array}{lll} \textbf{int} & \texttt{fetchshort} \big( \textbf{uint} & \texttt{addrs} \,, & \textbf{short} & *sp \big) \, \, \{ \\ & \textbf{if} & (\texttt{addrs} >= \texttt{proc} -\!\!\!\! > \!\! \mathsf{sz} \, \mid \mid \, \texttt{addrs} + \!\!\! 1 > \!\!\! = \, \texttt{proc} -\!\!\!\! > \!\!\! \mathsf{sz} \big) \\ & \textbf{return} & (-1); \\ & *sp & = *(\textbf{short} \, *) \, \texttt{addrs} \, ; \\ & \textbf{return} & (0); \\ & \} \\ \end{array}
```

#### fetchshort

```
 \begin{array}{lll} \textbf{int} & \texttt{fetchshort} \left( \textbf{uint} & \texttt{addrs} \,,\,\, \textbf{short} & *sp \right) \, \{ \\ & \textbf{if} & \texttt{(addrs} >= \texttt{proc} -\!\!\!\!\! > \texttt{sz} \, \mid \mid \, \texttt{addrs} +\! 1 >= \, \texttt{proc} -\!\!\!\! > \texttt{sz} ) \\ & \textbf{return} & (-1); \\ & *sp & = *(\textbf{short} \ *) \, \texttt{addrs}; \\ & \textbf{return} & (0); \\ \} \end{array}
```

Do we really need both comparisons above?

#### fetchshort

```
int fetchshort(uint addrs, short *sp) {
  if (addrs >= proc -> sz || addrs +1 >= proc -> sz)
    return (-1);
  *sp = *(short *)addrs;
  return (0);
}
```


- Do we really need both comparisons above?
  - Yes.


### Fetching long from an untrusted user address


- Fetching a **long** from address **addr** means fetching four bytes from addresses **addr**, **addr+1**, **addr+2**, and **addr+3**.
- All these addresses should all be below **proc-**>**sz**.
- The **fetchint** routine returns -1 if the above is not correct.
- If it is correct, the content of the **long** is put into \*ip., and the functions returns 0.


```
int fetchint(uint addr, int *ip) {
  if (addr >= myproc()->sz || addr+4 > myproc()->sz)
  return -1;
  *ip = *(int*)(addr);
  return 0;
}
```


3567













int \$64


esp ?? eax ??










\*myproc()->tf->esp





\*(myproc()->tf->esp +4)
This is the argument!
















int \$64


esp ?? eax ??








\*myproc()->tf->esp



\*(myproc()->tf->esp +4)
This is argument 0!



\*(myproc()->tf->esp + 8)
This is argument 1!

### system call args in kernel mode


- The kernel stack replaced the user stack.
- Hence the arguemtns are NOT on the kernel stack.
- However, the user stack address was saved on the trapframe.
- Thus in the syscall routine we have:
  - arg 0 address is myproc()->tf->esp + 4.
  - arg 1 address is proc->tf->esp + 8.
  - •
  - arg n address is proc->tf->esp + 4 + 4  $\times$  n.
- proc->tf->esp was really set by the user, hence untrusted.
- Any computation derived from proc->tf->esp is also untrusted.


## Fetching the **n**-th integer argument


```
3602 int argint(int n, int *ip) {
    return fetchint (myproc()->tf->esp + 4 + 4*n, ip);
```


# Another form for argint


```
struct stackform {
 int ignore;
int arg[1]; //new compilers allow arg[]
};
int argint(int n, int *ip) {
 return fetchint(&proc->tf->esp->arg[n], ip);
```














int \$64









```
int argptr(int n, char **pp, int size) {
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    int addr;
    if (argint(n, \&addr) < 0)
     return -1:
     if ((uint)addr >= proc->sz ||
                (uint)addr+size > proc->sz)
     return -1;
    *pp = (char*)i;
    return 0;
```

### String argument

```
int argstr(int n, char **pp) {
    int addr:
    if (argint(n, \&addr) < 0)
     return -1:
    return fetchstr(addr, pp);
   int fetchstr(uint addr, char **pp) {
3278
    char *s, *ep;
    if (addr >= proc -> sz) return -1;
    *pp = (char*)addr;
    ep = (char*)proc -> sz;
    for (s = *pp; s < ep; s++)
     if (*s = 0) return s - *pp;
    return -1:
```