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Cybersecurity of smart grid infrastructure communication

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State of the Art

Introduction

Electricity grids, commonly referred to as “grids,” play a vital role in modern energy infrastructure. They facilitate power generation, transmission, distribution, and control. Over time, grids have evolved from localized systems to interconnected networks, adapting to meet increasing demands and technological advancements. These grids contribute significantly to economic and societal progress.

Amidst dynamic changes in the energy landscape, the emergence of the “smart grid” presents transformative possibilities. Leveraging data, automation, and connectivity, smart grids enhance energy management and promote sustainability. In this chapter, we delve into the evolution of grid systems and explore the challenges and opportunities associated with smart grid technology, shaping the future of energy.

1.1 Definition smart grid

The Smart Grid is a comprehensive electrical network that employs cutting-edge communication technologies, computational intelligence, and cybersecurity protocols throughout the entire process of generating, transmitting, distributing, and consuming electricity. Its objective is to establish a system that is environmentally friendly, secure, dependable, adaptable, energy-efficient, and environmentally sustainable. While the ultimate vision of the Smart Grid is ambitious, its practical implementation demands careful evaluation of costs, rigorous testing, and validation. Introducing new functionalities can occur autonomously, with each necessitating justification and a reasonable return on investment. The compatibility of open systems facilitates smooth integration into the Smart Grid once the technologies have been validated [1]. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), operating within the U.S. Department of Commerce, has classified the smart grid into seven distinct domains, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. A concise overview of these domains and their stakeholders is provided in Table 1.1.[2]




Figure 1.1: The NIST Conceptual Model for SG [2]

Domain	Roles/Services in the Domain
1 Customer	The end users of electricity. May also generate, store, and manage the use of energy. Traditionally, three customer types are discussed, each with its own sub-domain: residential, commercial, and industrial.
2 Markets	The facilitators and participants in electricity markets and other economic mechanisms used to drive action and optimize system outcomes.
3 Service Provider	The organizations providing services to electrical customers and to utilities.
4 Operations	The managers of the movement of electricity.
5 Generation Including DER	The producers of electricity. May also store energy for later distribution. This domain includes traditional generation sources and distributed energy resources (DER).
6 Transmission	The carriers of high voltage electricity over long distances. May also store and generate electricity.
7 Distribution	The distributors of electricity to and from customers. May also store and generate electricity.

Table 1.1: Domains and their associated roles/services [2]

1.2 Smart grid attributes

Many smart grid advocates cite some or all of its following attributes as representative of its promise:

- ▶ **Efficiency:** Capable of meeting growing consumer demand without the need for additional infrastructure.
- ▶ **Flexibility:** Able to accept energy from various sources, including solar and wind, with the same ease as traditional fuels like coal and natural gas. It can integrate new technologies, such as energy storage, as they become commercially viable.
- ▶ **Empowering:** Facilitating real-time communication between consumers and utility providers, allowing consumers to adjust their energy usage based on factors like price and environmental concerns.
- ▶ **Opportunistic:** Creating new markets and opportunities by leveraging plug-and-play innovations whenever suitable.
- ▶ **Focus on Quality:** Able to deliver reliable power without disruptions, ensuring the smooth operation of digital technologies crucial to our economy.
- ▶ **Resilience:** Increasingly resistant to cyber attacks and natural disasters through decentralization and the implementation of smart grid security measures.
- ▶ **Environmental Sustainability:** Contributing to the mitigation of climate change

and offering a viable path towards reducing the environmental impact of electricity generation. [3]

1.3 Differences between Traditional grid and Smart grid

Table 1.2 offers a thorough comparison of the conventional power grid with the smart grid. In contrast to the traditional grid where customers play a passive role, the smart grid actively engages them through bi-directional communication technologies. For instance, rooftop photovoltaic solar panels produce electricity during the day, enabling customers to sell surplus energy back to the grid. At night, these panels continue to power home appliances as usual. Moreover, the smart grid incorporates innovative technologies like distributed generation, electric vehicle charging and discharging, and Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (FACTS) to improve energy distribution and management.[4]

Table 1.2: Comparison between conventional grid and smart grid [5]

Aspects	Conventional Grid	Smart Grid
Interaction between Grid and Customers	Customers passively accept service from grid	Customers participation on the grid action
Renewable Energy Integration	Having trouble with renewable penetration	Integration with renewable resources enhancement
Options for Customers	No choice for customer, monopoly market	With digital market trading, PHEV, introduce bids and competition, more choice for customer
Options on Power Quality (PQ)	No choice on power quality, no price plan options for consumers	Power quality levels for different consumers
System Operation	Ageing power assets, no efficient operation	Assets operating optimization, less power loss
Protection	Only rely on protection devices, fault detect manually	Have capability of self-healing, less damage affected by fault
Reliability and Security	Susceptible to physical and cyber attack	More reliable for national security and human safety

1.4 Major systems

1.4.1 Smart infrastructure system

The smart infrastructure system consists of three main components: the smart energy subsystem, the smart information subsystem, and the smart communication subsystem. Within the smart energy subsystem, activities such as electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption are integrated. The smart information subsystem includes functions like smart metering and advanced monitoring and management of the smart grid network. The smart communication subsystem facilitates wired and wireless communication between networks, devices, and applications to establish connectivity throughout the network [6].

1.4.2 Smart management system

The smart grid's intelligent management system offers advanced services in monitoring and control. As innovative management, monitoring, and control applications evolve, smart grid technology becomes more sophisticated, contributing actively to the advancement of a sustainable power system. Within the smart management system are functions such as enhancing energy efficiency, balancing supply and demand, controlling emissions, reducing operational costs, and maximizing utility. This system utilizes modern machine learning and optimization tools to create a resilient and efficient smart management framework [6].

1.4.3 smart protection systems

The smart protection system within the smart grid offers services related to reliability, safeguarding against failures, and ensuring security and privacy. By incorporating advanced protection devices and monitoring tools, the system enhances the reliability, security, and privacy of the network. Alongside smart infrastructure planning, efficient management, and intelligent protection systems play a role in managing operations effectively, protecting against failures, and addressing cybersecurity and privacy concerns within the network. Figure 1.2 illustrates a typical technological framework of the smart grid [6].



Figure 1.2: Classification of the Smart Infrastructure System, the Smart Management System, and the Smart Protection System [7]

1.5 Smart Grid Technologies

A smart grid employs a diverse array of technologies and communication networks to enhance the management of power generation, transmission, and distribution. It also provides customers with the ability to have real-time control over their energy consumption [8].

1.5.1 Major Smart Grid Technologies

1.5.1.1 Advanced Demand Forecasting

Utilizing data analytics and machine learning (ML), advanced demand forecasting techniques produce forecasting reports through autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) and various statistical methods.

A crucial aspect of smart grid management, ARIMA forecasting predicts both annual electricity consumption and hourly electricity prices.

Furthermore, ARIMA forecasting serves as an extra layer of verification, aiding in the identification of cyber intrusion attempts on smart meters used to measure electricity usage for residential and commercial consumers [8].

1.5.1.2 Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)

Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is a unified system comprising communication networks, data management systems, and intelligent meters designed to enhance customer service, energy efficiency, and cost management.

AMI facilitates two-way communication between customers and utilities, offering a wide array of advantages to the smart grid. These include forecasting consumption, improving revenue collection and theft detection, detecting faults and outages, measuring losses, and implementing time-based pricing [8].

1.5.1.3 Big Data

Smart grid data possesses three fundamental characteristics: high velocity, extensive volume, and diverse variety. Managing this large volume of data in a timely manner with limited resources poses a significant challenge for smart grids. This is where big data analytics becomes pivotal, offering the potential to boost asset utilization, efficiency, system reliability, and customer satisfaction.

Without big data analytics in the smart grid, the assessment of petabytes of data generated by smart grid devices would be impractical. Big data captures and analyzes unstructured data from various endpoints within a smart grid.

Moreover, big data facilitates efficient cost reduction, optimal resource distribution, and improved customer service [8].

1.5.1.4 Distributed Energy Resources (DERs)

Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) supply energy and improve local reliability, enhancing grid stability and optimizing on-site fuel utilization.

DERs encompass various technologies such as electric vehicles, solar panels, small natural gas generators, and controllable loads like electric water heaters and HVAC systems.

Efficient integration of DERs enhances grid service quality and reliability. For instance, photovoltaic systems (PVs) utilize the photovoltaic effect to convert sunlight into electricity, which is then transformed into alternating current by an inverter. The primary advantage of PV systems is reduced utility bills due to decreased reliance on grid-provided electricity [8].

1.5.1.5 Non-intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM)

Non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM), also known as non-intrusive appliance load monitoring (NIALM), discerns the specific energy consumption of households and industrial sites.

By disaggregating the total energy usage (from active appliances) into individual components and offering diagnostic insights, NILM aids in identifying energy-intensive or faulty appliances.

Moreover, consumers can optimize the timing of usage for energy-intensive appliances to minimize costs, and monitor and control energy expenses based on their power consumption [8].

1.5.1.6 Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G)

Also known as vehicle-grid integration (VGI), vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology transfers unused power from a vehicle into the smart grid. An electric vehicle (EV) battery is a cost-efficient form of energy storage.

V2G helps balance electricity consumption spikes and reduce overload on the power grid during peak hours.

For example, V2G can feed energy (unused battery capacity) back to the power grid from an electric car's battery to improve grid stability and maximize the benefits of renewable energy [8].

1.5.2 Established and Emerging Smart Grid Communication Networks

1.5.2.1 HAN

A smart meter supplies power to household appliances via the Home Area Network (HAN), which utilizes different technologies such as Bluetooth, Wireless Ethernet, Wired Ethernet, and Zigbee. The HAN links home appliances with the smart meter, which detects power usage and transmits this information to the server for billing purposes [8].

1.5.2.2 NAN

A Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) is an external access network that links distribution automation devices and smart meters to WAN gateways such as RF (radio frequency) collectors and field devices (like Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)). NAN allows for customer data collection and facilitates communication within the WAN-premise area [8].

1.5.2.3 WAN

A wide area network (WAN) uses fiber optics, 3G/LTE (Long Term Evolution)/GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication), or WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) for communication between a smart meter, suppliers, and the utility server. A smart meter sends notifications it receives (via HAN) from the devices to the suppliers using WAN [8].

1.5.2.4 LoRaWAN

LoRa (Long Range) is a popular IoT (Internet of Things) technology known for its long-range capability and low-power wireless platform, making it well-suited for various applications including energy management, infrastructure efficiency, and disaster prevention.

Implementing smart electricity metering solutions and smart grid networks using the LoRaWAN® (Long Range Wide Area Network) protocol allows for improved understanding of power demand, efficient detection of power outages, enhanced connectivity, and identification of underperforming assets.

Additionally, LoRaWAN is globally compatible and ensures seamless transmission without interference for remote reading of heat meter consumption data [8].

1.6 Components of the Smart Grid

There are many components, but will talk about the most important ones.

1.6.1 Smart Meters

The interplay between smart meters and smart grids is depicted in Figure 1.3. From the perspective of the smart grid, the applications primarily revolve around leveraging smart meters to facilitate the coordination of various electrical devices, thereby achieving a dependable power system. Simultaneously, these applications strive to enhance the performance and efficiency of smart metering. These objectives align with the defining characteristics of smart grids, which drive the advancement of smart meter technologies.[9]




Figure 1.3: Applications from smart grid and smart meter perspectives. [9]

1.6.2 Advanced Distribution Management Systems

An ADMS is a software platform designed to support the comprehensive suite of tasks related to managing and optimizing the distribution of electricity. It encompasses functions that automate outage recovery and enhance the effectiveness of the distribution grid. These functions being developed for electric utilities include fault location, isolation, and restoration; optimization of voltage and reactive power; energy conservation through voltage reduction; management of peak demand; as well as support for microgrids and electric vehicles [10].

1.6.3 Super conducting cables

These components are utilized for transmitting electricity over extended distances and employing automated monitoring and analysis tools. These tools have the capability to identify faults independently or predict potential cable failures by analyzing real-time data, weather conditions, and the history of outages [11].

1.6.4 Circuit breakers

The circuit breaker, a safety-conscious middle-aged individual, safeguards the power system. It evaluates smart grid scenarios against safety standards, offering recommendations. Despite occasional differences, both the smart grid and circuit breakers recognize their mutual importance. Their relationship ensures the power system's safe and stable operation.

Smart Grid occasionally proposes innovative features or adjustments to the power system. However, the breaker gently dissuades excessive risk-taking, emphasizing safety.

Through discussions and disputes, they strike a balance, ensuring reliable electricity for our lives [12].

1.6.5 Collector nodes

Collector nodes are pivotal in the Smart Grid, serving as points of data collection and distribution between energy suppliers and customers. They enable a two-way communication network within the grid, relaying information from customer premises to the utility control center and transmission/distribution substations. Collector nodes facilitate efficient monitoring and management of energy usage [13].

1.7 Challenges and Considerations

1.7.1 Stakeholder Engagement

At the early stages of smart grid implementations, stakeholders' negative perceptions can derail even the most beneficial project, especially when the proponents fail to pay close attention to the educational aspects. Advocates need to be able explain and clearly identify the benefits of each component of the smart grid to the customers that are the potential key to service success [3].

1.7.2 Fear of obsolescence

As many technology users (computers, smart phones, etc.) are painfully aware, the adoption of new tools can open the door to new and additional costs that may only be borne by the eventual consumer. This fear can be addressed through the development of interoperability standards and backward compatibility of technologies [3].

1.7.3 Cybersecurity

Without a shred of doubt, cybersecurity stands out as one of the foremost and intricate challenges confronting IoT devices. Sensors, devices, and networks connected to the internet are persistent targets for various online threats like probing, espionage, ransomware, theft, and potential destruction. Considering that an IoT-driven smart grid can encompass potentially millions of interconnected nodes spread across extensive geographic regions, it emerges as the most susceptible to substantial cyber assaults. Consequently, a cyber-attack on such a system would have devastating consequences, leading to significant financial losses and potentially bringing entire countries to a standstill. The diagram in Figure 1.4 illustrates the number of articles reviewed per year of publication and smart

grids impacted by cyber-attacks. Hence, security stands as a major hurdle in both the deployment and operation of IoT-based smart grid networks.[14].




Figure 1.4: Estimate: cyber attacks will increase exponentially [15]

1.7.4 Data privacy

Privacy is a critical concern within smart grid networks, prompting significant questions about the creation of policies regarding user data privacy. These questions revolve around several key points: Who owns the customer data? How is access to and usage of customer data regulated? What measures exist to protect the privacy and security of customer data from potential risks like surveillance or illicit activities? Is it permissible to sell or transfer customer data, and under what circumstances and for whose benefit? In areas with retail choice, are measures necessary to ensure that competing electricity providers have equal access to customer data compared to the incumbent utility?

In competitive environments among electricity providers, access to users' electricity usage patterns and behavioral information holds significant importance. Providers or their representatives may use this data to develop business strategies and create tailored packages or offers. In an open market scenario, some data may be disclosed after offers are made public, providing a level playing field for information access. However, if privacy is compromised beforehand, with specific user data available to only certain parties, these electricity providers could potentially gain unfair advantages. Therefore, effective privacy

policies are essential to prevent the exploitation of unfair means in shaping business strategies.

The integration of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) into smart grid operations introduces various privacy concerns. Depending on how a consumer uses and recharges electricity [16].

1.7.5 Cost of Implementation:

Estimating Smart Grid costs poses challenges due to several factors. Integrating digital technology into Smart Grids introduces complexities, as the failure rates and life expectancy of embedded assets differ from traditional grid technologies. For instance, a substation transformer designed for 40 years may be coupled with information technology lasting 10, 15, or 20 years, necessitating careful cost considerations for upgrades. Additionally, the rapid obsolescence of digital tech complicates estimates, as advancing communications and computational capabilities may render Smart Grid components obsolete before their intended lifespan ends.

Moreover, the evolution of Smart Grid technologies is expected to outpace conventional tech in terms of cost reduction and advancements. However, uncertainties persist, particularly with new and unproven Smart Grid technologies. If their performance is subpar or degrades unexpectedly, it could jeopardize the entire technology's viability and business plan. As Smart Grid component costs decrease rapidly due to maturation and increased production, estimating replacement costs becomes challenging[17].




Figure 1.5: Grid Component Costs [17]

1.7.6 Regulatory Frameworks

Electric distribution systems across Europe are encountering significant hurdles stemming from climate change objectives, evolving market frameworks, and technological advancements. These factors will have a profound impact on the responsibilities of distribution system operators. The challenges' nature and magnitude are primarily influenced by Europe's vision and strategies regarding climate and energy. This research aims to identify which policies might pose obstacles to innovation in distribution grids and the adoption of advanced smart grid solutions developed within the UNITED-GRID project. Following an in-depth examination of emerging policy priorities within the energy and climate framework, as well as electricity market design, and subsequent consultations with three partner distribution system operators, five key barriers have been pinpointed. The findings indicate that ambitious decarbonisation targets and shifting expectations regarding the role of distribution system operators in the energy landscape necessitate more adaptable and efficient network management. However, rigid income frameworks, insufficient incentives for innovation, and regulatory uncertainties impede the modernisation of distribution systems. It can be inferred that these concerns heighten the risks for distribution system operators and must be taken into account by research initiatives and developers of smart grid solutions to successfully implement and achieve market adoption of the developed solutions [18].

Conclusion

The smart grid revolution is not a destination, but a continuous journey towards a more efficient, reliable, and sustainable energy future. While challenges exist, the potential benefits of the smart grid are undeniable. By embracing innovation, fostering collaboration, and empowering consumers, we can unlock the full potential of this transformative technology.

A smarter grid paves the way for a future where clean energy sources like solar and wind power are seamlessly integrated, homes and businesses actively participate in energy management, and power outages become a rarity. It's a future where we have a more secure and sustainable energy infrastructure for generations to come.

Let's continue exploring the exciting world of smart grids and work together to build a brighter energy future for all.

Contributions

Introduction

With the birth of the smart grid as the next step of evolution for grid infrastructure, with the improvements that the smart grid came with, like improved reliability, automation, and faster detection and response to failures, it also came with its own set of risks and disadvantages. mainly due to the fact that it is composed of multiple components and systems that are connected to the internet, like wireless networks and sensors, smart meters, and IoT devices, making it an easy target for hackers. independent groups or state actors whose goal is to cause as much damage as possible or to collect valuable data. On top of those components, there are legacy systems that the smart grid relies on that are known for their many and major security vulnerabilities, which are all easy targets, for example, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). As an example of those risks and weaknesses, we can look at the situation Ukraine found itself in after Russia targeted their smart grid systems in 2015, leaving 80,000 Ukrainian households without power for 3 to 6 hours. [19].

That's why it is important to protect the smart grid system from cyberattacks by employing IDS, IPS, and IDPS. as the second line of defense in case encryption and authorization were unsuccessful in stopping the cyberattack from targeting the smart grid system.

2.1 Intrusion detection systems (IDS)

An intrusion detection system is a piece of hardware or software that is responsible for detecting suspicious and malicious activity, and in a network or an information system, the anomaly can either be reported to a systems administrator or saved to a security information and event management system (SIEM), the SIEM combines the output from multiple sources, then uses some filtering techniques to decide if the reported activity is malicious. [20] An IDS on its own cannot stop intrusions; it can only detect and report them. However, with its evolution, the intrusion prevention system (IPS) or intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) can counter an attack. [21]

2.2 Intrusion detection systems architecture

Intrusion detection systems, like any complex system, are made of multiple interoperating components with a specific task assigned to each component. Although the functioning of an IDS changes vastly between different types of IDSs (different in deployment or detection methods), they all share a common general architecture, which is composed of the following components as shown in Figure 2.1 [22]:




Figure 2.1: IDS architecture [22]

- Data gathering components (sensor): tasked with collecting information from the monitored environment.

- ▶ Detector (IDS engine): analyzes the data collected by the sensor to determine the presence of suspicious activity.
- ▶ Knowledge base(database): the database that stores information collected previously by sensors about known attacks that allows the engine to determine the suspicious activity.
- ▶ Configuration component: defines settings and the behaviour of the system.
- ▶ Response component: this component is responsible for responding to the detected intrusion and either attempts to prevent the intrusion (IPS) or reports it to a human administrator (IDS).

2.3 Intrusion detection systems classification

Intrusion detection systems are classified according to two criteria of classification, which are as shown in Figure 2.2 are:

- ▶ deployment method
- ▶ detection method

[23]




Figure 2.2: IDS classification taxonomy

2.3.1 Deployment methods

2 primary are HIDS and NDIS

some more specialized methods PIDS APIDS and hybrid <https://www.ibm.com/topics/intrusion-detection-system>

2.3.1.1 NIDS

Network intrusion detection systems are the most commonly used commercial IDS. They are usually placed at the start edge of the sub-network, right after the firewall (if one exists), so they can have access to all inbound traffic to all devices on the network [24]. NIDS protects the networks from cyber attacks and threats by scanning and monitoring TCP/IP packets for known attack signatures and reporting them to the administrator [25]

Some benefits of using a NIDS are that a few well-placed NIDS can be enough to cover an entire large network. In addition, their deployment requires minimal refactoring of the network, meaning easy installation [24]. But the downsides are that they cannot detect threats with inaccurately constructed attack signatures and cannot analyze encrypted traffic, and it is hard to work with networks operating at 10 Gbps [25].

With a NIDS, one would ideally scan all inbound and outbound traffic; however, doing so might create a bottleneck that would impair the overall speed of the network.




Figure 2.3: NIDS [26]

2.3.1.2 HIDS

Unlike NIDS, HIDS run on individual devices in a network, making its threat detection scope more focused. They monitor all incoming and outgoing traffic and alert the administrator if suspicious or malicious activity is detected.

It is considered to be more reliable than NIDS because it has access to files in the operating system, and it can detect if a file has been tampered with by keeping snapshots of previous versions of those system files and comparing them to the current version to decide if it has been tampered with. [24]

This type of IDS uses 2 sources of information inside the device's operating system:

- ▶ system audit trails: operating system audit trails are created by the kernel making them very detailed because the kernel has access to everything in an OS. [24]
- ▶ system logs: less complex the system audit trails making them easier to understand. [24]




Figure 2.4: HIDS [26]

2.3.1.3 Other types of IDS

uncommon types with specific functions usually used together with NIDS or HIDS to augment their detection capabilities

- ▶ Protocol intrusion detection system (PIDS): this type of IDS monitors the protocol in use (like HTTP or HTTPS) between the server and the client. PIDS is usually placed at the front end of the server. [26]
- ▶ Application protocol detection system (APIDS): specialized in application security, it analyzes the packets of application-specific protocols (like MySQL) to determine the presence of suspicious activity. APIDS are usually placed on groups of servers. [26]
- ▶ hybrid detection system: it is a combination of two or more of any of the previously defined IDSs. It is more reliable than any individual IDS because it has access to the data accessible to all of the used IDSs, providing it with a network-wide view. [26]

2.3.2 Detection methods

there are 2 primary methods of detection for IDS which are anomaly-based and signature-based (which is also known as misuse intrusion detection or knowledge-based intrusion detection). [23]

2.3.2.1 Signature-based detection

SIDs define patterns in known cyberattacks and store them in a database as signatures. The SID then analyzes system activity and search for a pattern of suspicious activity that matches previously documented attacks's signatures. This method provides high detection capabilities against known attacks. even though it cannot detect new attacks. On top of that, the database of previous attacks is very large, and having to compare internet packets to this database is resource- and time-consuming. [24]

2.3.2.2 Anomaly-based detection

AIDs can identify abnormal behaviour in the environment it is used in, this type of IDS first observes and models the normal behaviours then compares the traffic to this model to determine the presence of suspicious activity. the constructed model is created based on the data collected by observing the behaviour of the system over a specific period of time of normal operation. [24]

AIDs often lead to a lot of false negatives because the normal activity varies a lot over time, although it is better than SIDs in detecting new and unknown attacks. it can also be used to provide new data for the signature-based detection systems. [24]

2.3.2.3 Hybrid detection

Hybrid IDS uses both Signature based and anomaly based detection although it's not widely used because it is still in development

2.3.2.4 Signature-based VS Anomaly-based detection

table of pros and cons sigVSano.tex

Table 2.1: An example of tables

Signature-based		Anomaly-based
Pros	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▶ simple and effective against know attacks▶ fewer false positives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▶ Ineffecitve againts new and unknown attacks▶ slow if the database is large▶ database needs to be cosntantly constanly maintained and up-dated
Cons	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▶ can detect new and unknown at-tacks▶ can provide data to Signature-based detection	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▶ more false negatives▶ needs training to build normal behaviour models

2.4 Evolutions of IDS: IPS/IDPS

The biggest disadvantage of an IDS is its inability to react to attacks and actively block malicious activity. That's why it was necessary to create a new system to overcome those drawbacks, which is IDPS, also known as IDPS, IDPS just like IDS monitores the activity of a network or a host scanning for attacks or malicious acitvity, the diffrence between them is that IDPS can activly block and prevent intrusions which it detects, IDPS can drop malicious internet packets, block traffic from a certain IP address or to a certain host, server, application or any targeted resource, it can also detect reconaissance activity like port and host scans which indecates a potential future attack. [27]

2.5 IDPS/IDPS classification

just like IDS, IDPS is calssified according to two criterias: deployment method and detec-tion method.

2.5.1 Deployment methods

IPS Deployment methodes

2.5.1.1 Network-based Prevention System (NIPS)

2.5.1.2 Wireless-based Prevention System (WIPS)

2.5.1.3 Host-based Prevention System (HIPS)

2.5.1.4 Network Behaviour Analysis (NBA) System

- ▶ Network-based Prevention System (NIPS): Monitors all traffic on the network to detect malicious activity and block it, NIPS has logging, detection and prevention capabilities.
- ▶ Wireless-based Prevention System (WIPS):
- ▶ Host-based Prevention System (HIPS):
- ▶ Network Behaviour Analysis (NBA) System:

2.5.2 detection methods

the same as IDS with stateful protocol analysis being exclusive to IDPS, IDPS usually use multiple detection methods at the same time to broaden its detection rates. [27]

IDPS has 3 primary detection methods:

- ▶ Signature-based: Signature based detection is fairly similar to that of IDS with the difference being that IDPS is capable of blocking or countering the detected intrusion
- ▶ Anomaly-based: the same thing applies to Anomaly-based detection as the detection phase is the same between IDS and IDPS
- ▶ stateful protocol analysis: Stateful protocol analysis is a method used in Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) to compare predefined profiles of normal protocol activity against observed events, aiming to detect deviations. Unlike anomaly-based detection, which relies on specific profiles, stateful protocol analysis uses universal profiles developed by vendors to define how protocols should be used. This approach involves tracking the state of network, transport, and application protocols, allowing the IDPS to understand the protocol's state transitions. For instance, in a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) session, users in the unauthenticated state should only execute basic commands like viewing help information or providing login credentials. By pairing requests with responses, the IDPS can verify the success of authentication attempts and differentiate between suspicious and benign actions based on the protocol's expected behavior in different states. [28]

2.6 cyberattacks on smart grid and thier classification

the Smart grid is suseptibale to a wide variaty of cyberattacks like malicious code, jamming, spoofing, injections, traffic evesdropping, and social engineering jsut to name a few

on this project we will be looking at some of the most commonly used attacks

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2207.07738> page 13

2.6.1 cyberattack types

2.6.1.1 jamming attacks

- ▶ DDos

2.6.1.2 Malicious code

- ▶ Exploit kits:
- ▶ Viruses:
- ▶ Worms:
- ▶ Trojans:
- ▶ Malware:

2.6.1.3 injection attacks

- ▶ Malicious code injection!
- ▶ Malicious data injection:

2.6.1.4 replay of messages

categories variants assets effected

attacks - thier target - thier consequences - some solutions maybe

2.7 maybe IDS usage in smart grid

required to be able to do :

- ▶ detecting wide range of intrusions
- ▶ fast detection
- ▶ accuracy (FP/FN/TP/TN)
- ▶ resource effecient

- ▶ scalable
- ▶ easy to operate (user friendly)

2.7.1 maybe IDS requirements

2.7.2 maybe IDS importance

2.8 conclusion

Implementation

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Case study description

attacks and thier targets and consequences in the simulation

3.3 tools used

3.3.1 smart grid simulation

we use GridAttackSim co simulation which was created by Cyber Range Organization and Design (CROND) NEC-endowed chair at the Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST) in Ishikawa, Japan..... show the architecture of the gridattacksim figure

we mainly used 1 topologie in this simulation 13node73houses

- ▶ virtual box
- ▶ ubuntu 18.04
- ▶ FNCS framework
- ▶ gridlab simulation
- ▶ ns-3 network simulation
- ▶ Python scripts

3.3.2 programming languages used

- ▶ python3.11: for automating and running the simulation scenarios and attacks
- ▶ + packages used

- ▶ c++: for the ns3 network simulation
- ▶ bash scripts

3.3.2.1 various config files for ns3, gridlab and FNCS

- ▶ .glm files for gridlab (also .player files)
- ▶ .dot files for gridlab
- ▶ .txt files (for FNCS)
- ▶ .zpl files (for FNCS)

3.4 descussing results of the implemented IDS (compare old graphes with new graphes)

3.5 conclusion

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