

ASSESSING SECURITY OF CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS: INVESTIGATED THROUGH MODBUS HIJACKING


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Introduction

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are a critical security concern where increased connectivity and data-driven practices are becoming commonplace in factories. Many industrial communication protocols, like Modbus, were designed in a time where security was not a concern. These security flaws within industrial protocols are still relevant despite advances in cyber security

Background


- A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a specialized microcontroller designed to automate factories
- A typical production line has a PLC that communicates with an interface where an operator can control the machine
- Industrial equipment is networked and supports basic TCP/IP stacks



Objectives

- Exploit a simple network composed of a PLC and sensors through a *Gratuitous Modbus Request*
- Exploit a more complex network composed of a PLC, sensors, and **Ignition** software with an *MITM attack*


Test Setup



Attack Pipeline Architecture

- *CAM Overflow*
 - Turn switch into a hub, and see all traffic flowing through the switch
- *ARP Poisoning*
 - Craft specialized ARP requests to coerce traffic through adversary
- *Modbus Hijacking*
 - Selectively drop Modbus WriteCoil requests, and craft packets to fool **Ignition** and **OpenPLC** that everything completed successfully

Modbus Hijacking Attack



Results

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
37	2.400426607	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.2	Modbus	70	Response: Trans: 6786; Unit: 0; Func: 1: Read Coils
41	2.895520002	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.3	Modbus	66	Query: Trans: 6787; Unit: 0; Func: 5: Write Single Coil
43	2.921607675	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.2	Modbus	66	Response: Trans: 6787; Unit: 0; Func: 5: Write Single Coil
45	3.203262751	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.3	Modbus	66	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] Query: Trans: 6787; Unit: 0; Func: 5: W
47	3.200455452	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.3	Modbus	66	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] Query: Trans: 6787; Unit: 0; Func: 5: W
53	3.389320364	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.3	Modbus	66	Query: Trans: 6788; Unit: 0; Func: 2: Read Discrete Inputs
55	3.836010912	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.2	Modbus	66	[TCP Spurious Retransmission] Response: Trans: 6787; Unit: 0; Func: 5: W

Wireshark - Packet 41: adversary-modbus-hijack.pcapng

Frame 41: 66 bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits) on interface enp0s3
Ethernet II, Src: Micro-St_7c:8e:15 (d8:bb:c1:7c:8e:15), Dst: NovelNo_3c:05:86 (08:00:1b:3c:05:86)
Destination: NovelNo_3c:05:86 (08:00:1b:3c:05:86)
Source: Micro-St_7c:8e:15 (d8:bb:c1:7c:8e:15)
Type: IPv4 (0x0800)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.1.2, Dst: 192.168.1.3
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1091, Dst Port: 502, Seq: 73, Ack: 97, Len: 66
Modbus/TCP
Modbus

Wireshark - Packet 47: adversary-modbus-hijack.pcapng

Frame 47: 66 bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits) on interface enp0s3
Ethernet II, Src: Micro-St_7c:8e:15 (d8:bb:c1:7c:8e:15), Dst: NovelNo_3c:05:86 (08:00:1b:3c:05:86)
Destination: Micro-St_7c:8e:15 (d8:bb:c1:7c:8e:15)
Source: Micro-St_7c:8e:15 (d8:bb:c1:7c:8e:15)
Type: IPv4 (0x0800)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.1.2, Dst: 192.168.1.3
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1091, Dst Port: 502, Seq: 73, Ack: 97, Len: 66
Modbus/TCP
Modbus

Green Box: Pre-ARP Poisoning

Red Box: Post-ARP Poisoning

Conclusions and Future Work

- The exploit was successful in a lab environment
- The exploit demonstrated that industrial protocols need to balance security and latency
- Expand this to actual PLC and industrial hardware in the future