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fix: prevent extracting archived files outside of target path #212

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merged 1 commit into from Apr 23, 2018

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aviadatsnyk commented Apr 22, 2018

Why this PR?

This PR is meant to fix an arbitrary file write vulnerability, that can be achieved using a specially crafted zip archive, that holds path traversal filenames. When the filename gets concatenated to the target extraction directory, the final path ends up outside of the target folder.

A sample malicious zip file named zip-slip.zip (see this gist) was used, and when running the code below, resulted in the creation of /tmp/evil.txt outside of the intended /tmp/safe target.

var AdmZip = require('adm-zip');
var zip = new AdmZip("./zip-slip.zip");
zip.extractAllTo("/tmp/safe");

There are various possible ways to avoid this issue, some include checking for .. (dot dot) characters in the filename, but the best solution in our opinion is to check if the final target filename, starts with the target folder (after both are resolved to their absolute path).

Stay secure,
Snyk Team

@cthackers cthackers merged commit 62f6400 into cthackers:master Apr 23, 2018

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