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# R.I.P ROP: CET Internals in Windows 20H1


 Yarden Shafir & Alex Ionescu  January 5, 2020  41 Comments

A very exciting thing happened recently in the 19H1 (Version 1903) release of Windows 10 – parts of the Intel “[Control-flow Enforcement Technology](#)” (CET) implementation finally began, after years of discussion. More of this implementation is being added in every Windows release, and this year’s release, 20H1 (Version 2004), completes support for the User Mode Shadow Stack capabilities of CET, which will be released in Intel Tiger Lake CPUs.

As a reminder, Intel CET is a hardware-based mitigation that addresses the two types of control-flow integrity violations commonly used by exploits: forward-edge violations (indirect `CALL` and `JMP` instructions) and backward-edge violations (`RET` instructions).

While the forward-edge implementation is less interesting (as it is essentially a weaker form of [clang-cfi](#), similar to Microsoft’s [Control Flow Guard](#)), the backward-edge implementation relies on a fundamental change in the ISA: the introduction of a new stack called the “Shadow Stack”, which now replicates the return addresses that are pushed on the stack by the `CALL` instruction, with the `RET` instruction now validating both the stack and shadow stack values and generating an `INT #21` (Control Flow Protection Fault) in case of mismatch.

Because operating systems and compilers must sometimes support



control flow sequences other than `CALL/RET` (such as exception unwinding and [longjmp](#)), the “Shadow Stack Pointer” (`SSP`) must sometimes be manipulated at the system level to match the required behavior — and in turn, validated to avoid this manipulation itself from becoming a potential bypass. In this post, we’ll cover how Windows achieves this.

Before diving deeper into how Windows manipulates and validates the shadow stack for threads, there are 2 parts of its implementation that must be first understood. The first is the actual location and permissions of the `SSP`, and the second is the mechanism used to store/restore `SSP` when context switching between threads, as well as how modifications can be done to `SSP` when needed (such as during exception unwinding).

To explain these mechanisms, we’ll have to delve into an Intel CPU feature that was originally introduced by Intel in order to support “[Advanced Vector eXtensions](#)” (`AVX`) Instructions and first supported by Microsoft in Windows 7. And since adding support for this feature required a massive restructuring of the `CONTEXT` structure into an undocumented `CONTEXT_EX` structure (and the addition of documented and native APIs to manipulate it), we’ll have to talk about the internals of that too!

Finally, we’ll even have to go through some compiler and PE file format internals, as well as new process information classes, to cover additional subtleties and requirements for CET functionality on Windows. We hope the Table of Contents, below, will help you navigate this thorough coverage of these capabilities. Additionally, when relevant, annotated source code for the various newly introduced functions is available by clicking the function names, based off our [associated GitHub repository](#).

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## XState Internals

The x86-x64 architecture class processors originally began with a simple set of registers which most security researchers are familiar with — general purpose registers (RAX, RCX), control registers (RIP/RSP, for example), floating point registers (XMM, YMM, ZMM), and some control, debug, and test registers. As more processor capabilities were added, however, new registers had to be defined, as well as specific processor state associated with these capabilities. And since many of these features are local to a thread, they must be saved and restored during context switches.

In response, Intel defined the “eXtended State” (XState) [specification](#), which associates various processor states with bits in a “State Mask”, and introduces instructions such as XSAVE and XRSTOR to read and write the requested states from an “XSAVE Area”. Since this area is now a critical piece of CET register storage for each thread, and most people have largely been ignoring XSAVE support due to its original focus on floating point, AVX, and “[Memory Protection eXtensions](#)” (MPX) features, we thought an


overview of the functionality and memory layout would be helpful to readers.


## XSAVE Area

As mentioned, the **XSAVE** Area was originally used to store some of the new floating point functionality like AVX that had been added to processors by Intel, and to consolidate the existing x87 FPU and SSE states that were previously stored through the **FXSTOR** and **FXRSTR** instructions. These first two legacy states were defined as part of the “Legacy **XSAVE** Area”, and any further processor registers (such as AVX) were added to an “Extended **XSAVE** Area”. In between, an “**XSAVE** Area Header” is used to describe which extended features are present through a state mask called **XSTATE\_BV**.

At the same time, a new “eXtended Control Register” (**XCR0**) was added, which defines which states are supported by the operating system as part of the **XSAVE** functionality, and the **XGETBV** and **XSETBV** instructions were added to configure **XCR0** (and potentially future **XCRs** as well). For example, operating systems can choose to program **XCR0** *not* to contain the feature state bits for x87 FPU and SSE, meaning that they will save this information manually with legacy **FXSTOR** instructions, and only store extended feature state in their **XSAVE** Areas.

As the number of advanced register sets and capabilities — such as “[Memory Protection Keys](#)” (MPK), which added a “Protection Key Register User State” (PKRU) — grew, newer processors introduced a distinction between “Supervisor State” that can only be modified by **CPL0** code using **XSAVES** and **XRSRTORS** as well as “compaction” and “optimization” versions (**XSAVEC**/**XSAVEOPT**) to complicate matters in Intel-typical fashion. A new “Model Specific Register” (MSR), called **IA32\_XSS**, was added to define which states are supervisor-only.






XSAVE area in optimized vs. not optimized formats, in a thread where AVX and CET\_U are not enabled and IPT and PKRU are enabled but were not used since the last context switch

The “optimized XSAVE” mechanism exists to ensure that only processor state which has actually been modified by another thread since the last context switch (if any) will actually be written in the XSAVE Area. An internal processor register, XINUSE, exists to track this information. When XSAVEOPT is used, the XSTATE\_BV mask now includes only the bits corresponding to states which were actually saved, and not simply that of all of the states requested.

The “compacted XSAVE” mechanism, on the other hand, fixed a wasteful flaw in the XState design: as more and more extended features were added — such as AVX512 and “[Intel Processor Trace](#)” (IPT) — it meant that even for threads which did not use these capabilities, a sufficiently large XSAVE Area needed to be allocated, and written into (full of zeroes) by the processor. While optimized XSAVE would avoid these writes, it still meant that any extended features *following* large-yet-unused states would be at large offsets away from the base XSAVE Area buffer.

With XSAVEC, this problem is solved by only using space to save the XState features that are actually enabled (and in-use, as compaction implies optimization) by the current thread, and sequentially laying out each saved state in memory, without gaps in between (but potentially with a fixed 64-byte alignment, which is provided as part of an “Alignment Mask” through CPUID). The XSAVE Area Header shown earlier is now extended with a second state mask called XCOMP\_BV, which indicates which of the requested state bits that were requested might be present in the compacted area. Note that unlike XSTATE\_BV, this mask does not omit the state bits that were not part of XINUSE — it includes all *possible* bits that *could’ve* been compacted — one must still check XSTATE\_BV to determine which state areas are actually present. Finally, Bit 63 is always set in XCOMP\_BV when the compacted instruction was used, as an indicator for which format the XSAVE Area has.

Thus, using the compacted vs. non-compacted format determines the internal layout and size of the **XSAVE** Area. The compacted format will only allocate memory in the **XSAVE** Area for processor features used by the thread, while the non-compacted one will allocate memory for all the processor features supported by the processor, but only populate the ones used by the thread. The diagram below shows an example of how the **XSAVE** Area will look like for the same thread but when using one vs. the other format.




To summarize, which states the **XSAVE\*/XRSTOR\*** family of instructions will work with is a combination of

1. What state bits the OS claims it supports in **XCR0** (set using the **XSETBV** instruction)
2. What state bits the caller stores in **EDX:EAX** when using the **XSAVE** instruction (Intel calls this the “instruction mask”)
3. If using the non-privileged instructions, which state bits are not set in **IA32\_XSS**
4. On processors that support “Optimized **XSAVE**”, which state bits are set in **XINUSE**, an internal register that tracks the actual XState-related registers that have been used by the current thread since the last transition

Once these bits are masked together, the final set of resulting state bits are written by the **XSAVE** instruction into the header of the **XSAVE** Area in a field called the **XSTATE\_BV**. In the case where “Compacted **XSAVE**” is used, the resulting state bits omitting bullet 4 (**XINUSE**) are written into the header of the **XSAVE** Area in the **XCOMP\_BV** field. The diagram below shows the resulting masks.





## XState Configuration

Because each processor has its own set of XState-enabled features, potential sizes, capabilities, and mechanisms, Intel exposes all of this information through various **CPUID** classes that an operating system should query when dealing with XState. Windows performs these queries at boot, and stores the information in an **XSTATE\_CONFIGURATION** structure, which is shown below (documented in **Winnt.h**)

```
typedef struct _XSTATE_CONFIGURATION
{
    ULONG64 EnabledFeatures;
    ULONG64 EnabledVolatileFeatures;
    ULONG Size;
    union
    {
        ULONG ControlFlags;
        struct
        {
            ULONG OptimizedSave:1;
            ULONG CompactionEnabled:1;
        };
    };
    XSTATE_FEATURE Features[MAXIMUM_XSTATE_FEATURES];
    ULONG64 EnabledSupervisorFeatures;
    ULONG64 AlignedFeatures;
    ULONG AllFeatureSize;
    ULONG AllFeatures[MAXIMUM_XSTATE_FEATURES];
    ULONG64 EnabledUserVisibleSupervisorFeatures;
} XSTATE_CONFIGURATION, *PXSTATE_CONFIGURATION;
```

After filing out this data, the kernel saves this information in the **KUSER\_SHARED\_DATA** structure, which can be accessed through the **SharedUserData** variable and is located at **0x7FFE0000** on all Windows platforms.

For example, here is the output of our test 19H1 system, which supports both optimized and compacted forms of **XSAVE**, and has the x87 FPU (0), SSE (1), AVX (2) and MPX (3, 4) feature bits enabled.

```
dx ((nt!_KUSER_SHARED_DATA*)0x7ffe0000)->XState
[+0x000] EnabledFeatures : 0x1f [Type: unsigned __int64]
[+0x008] EnabledVolatileFeatures : 0xf [Type: unsigned __int64]
[+0x010] Size : 0x3c0 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x014] ControlFlags : 0x3 [Type: unsigned long]
```

```
[+0x014 ( 0: 0)] OptimizedSave      : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x014 ( 1: 1)] CompactionEnabled : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x018] Features                   [Type: _XSTATE_FEATURE [64]]
[+0x218] EnabledSupervisorFeatures : 0x0 [Type: unsigned __int64]
[+0x220] AlignedFeatures            : 0x0 [Type: unsigned __int64]
[+0x228] AllFeatureSize             : 0x3c0 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x22c] AllFeatures                [Type: unsigned long [64]]
[+0x330] EnabledUserVisibleSupervisorFeatures : 0x0 [Type: unsigned
__int64]
```

In the **Features** array, the size and offset of each of these five features can be found:

```
dx -r2 ((nt!_KUSER_SHARED_DATA*)0x7ffe0000)->XState->Features.Take(5)
[0] [Type: _XSTATE_FEATURE]
[+0x000] Offset      : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x004] Size        : 0xa0 [Type: unsigned long]
[1] [Type: _XSTATE_FEATURE]
[+0x000] Offset      : 0xa0 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x004] Size        : 0x100 [Type: unsigned long]
[2] [Type: _XSTATE_FEATURE]
[+0x000] Offset      : 0x240 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x004] Size        : 0x100 [Type: unsigned long]
[3] [Type: _XSTATE_FEATURE]
[+0x000] Offset      : 0x340 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x004] Size        : 0x40 [Type: unsigned long]
[4] [Type: _XSTATE_FEATURE]
[+0x000] Offset      : 0x380 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x004] Size        : 0x40 [Type: unsigned long]
```

Adding up these sizes gives us **0x3C0**, which is the value seen above in the **FeatureSize** field. Note, however, that since this system supports the Compacted **XSAVE** capability, the offsets shown here are not relevant, and only the **AllFeatures** field is useful to the kernel, which contains the size of every feature, but not its offset (as this will be determined based on the compaction mask used in **XCOMP\_BV**).

## XState Policy

Unfortunately, even though a processor might claim to support a given XState feature, it often turns out that due to various hardware errata, certain specific processors may not fully, or correctly, support the feature after all. In order to handle this eventuality, Windows uses an *XState Policy*, which is information stored in the resource section of a *Hardware Policy Driver* that is normally called **HwPolicy.sys**.

As the Intel x86 architecture is a combination of multiple processor vendors all competing with variants of each other's feature sets, the kernel must parse the XState policy and compare the current processor's Vendor String and Microcode Version as well as its Signature, Features, and Extended Features (namely, **RAX**, **RDX**, and **RCX** from a **CPUID 01h** query), looking for a match in the policy.



This work is done at boot by the **KiIntersectFeaturesWithPolicy** function that's called by **KiInitializeXSave**, which calls **KiLoadPolicyFromImage** to load the appropriate XState policy, calls **KiGetProcessorInformation** to get the CPU data mentioned earlier, and then validates each feature bit currently enabled in the XState Configuration through calls to **KiIsXSaveFeatureAllowed**.

These functions work with resource 101 in the **HwPolicy.sys** driver, which begins with the following data structure:

```
typedef struct _XSAVE_POLICY
{
    ULONG Version;
    ULONG Size;
    ULONG Flags;
    ULONG MaxSaveAreaLength;
    ULONGLONG FeatureBitmask;
    ULONG NumberOfFeatures;
    XSAVE_FEATURE Features[1];
} XSAVE_POLICY, *PXSAVE_POLICY;
```

For example, on our 19H1 system, the contents (which we extracted with Resource Hacker), were as follows:

```
dx @$policy = (_XSAVE_POLICY*)0x253d0e90000
[+0x000] Version      : 0x3 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x004] Size         : 0x2fd8 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x008] Flags        : 0x9 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x00c] MaxSaveAreaLength : 0x2000 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x010] FeatureBitmask : 0x7fffffffffffffff [Type: unsigned __int64]
[+0x018] NumberOfFeatures : 0x3f [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x020] Features     [Type: _XSAVE_FEATURE [1]]
```

For each **XSAVE\_FEATURE**, an offset to a **XSAVE\_VENDORS** structure is found, which contains an array of **XSAVE\_VENDOR** structures, each with a CPU Vendor String (for now, each seem to be either “GenuineIntel”, “AuthenticAMD”, or “CentaurHauls”), and an offset to an **XSAVE\_CPU\_ERRATA** structure. For example, our 19H1 test system had the following information for Feature 0:

```
dx -r4 @$vendor = (XSAVE_VENDORS*)((int)@$policy->Features[0].Vendors +
0x253d0e90000)
[+0x000] NumberOfVendors : 0x3 [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x008] Vendor          [Type: _XSAVE_VENDOR [1]]
    [0] [Type: _XSAVE_VENDOR]
        [+0x000] VendorId [Type: unsigned long [3]]
            [0] : 0x756e6547 [Type: unsigned long]
            [1] : 0x49656e69 [Type: unsigned long]
            [2] : 0x6c65746e [Type: unsigned long]
[+0x010] SupportedCpu [Type: _XSAVE_SUPPORTED_CPU]
[+0x000] CpuInfo [Type: XSAVE_CPU_INFO]
[+0x020] CpuErrata : 0x4c0 [Type: XSAVE_CPU_ERRATA *]
[+0x020] Unused : 0x4c0 [Type: unsigned __int64]
```

Finally, each **XSAVE\_CPU\_ERRATA** structure contains the matching processor information data that corresponds to a known errata which prevents the specified XState feature from being supported.

For example, in our test system, the first errata from the offset above was:

```
dx -r3 @$errata = (XSAVE_CPU_ERRATA*)((int)@$vendor->Vendor[0].SupportedCpu.CpuErrata + 0x253d0e90000)
    [+0x000] NumberOfErrata : 0x1 [Type: unsigned long]
    [+0x008] Errata         [Type: XSAVE_CPU_INFO [1]]
        [0]                [Type: XSAVE_CPU_INFO]
            [+0x000] Processor : 0x0 [Type: unsigned char]
            [+0x002] Family    : 0x6 [Type: unsigned short]
            [+0x004] Model     : 0xf [Type: unsigned short]
            [+0x006] Stepping  : 0xb [Type: unsigned short]
            [+0x008] ExtendedModel : 0x0 [Type: unsigned short]
            [+0x00c] ExtendedFamily : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
            [+0x010] MicrocodeVersion : 0x0 [Type: unsigned __int64]
            [+0x018] Reserved : 0x0 [Type: unsigned long]
```

A tool which dumps your system’s hardware policy for all XState features is available on our GitHub [here](#). For now, only one errata appears in the entire policy (the one showed above).

Finally, the following optional loader command line options (and respective BCD settings) can be used to further customize XState capabilities:

1. The **XSAVEPOLICY=#** load option, set through the **xsavepolicy** BCD option, which sets **KeXSavePolicyId**, indicating which of the XState policies to load.
2. The **XSAVEREMOVEFEATURE=#** load option, set through the **xsaверemovefeature** BCD option, which sets **KeTestRemovedFeatureMask**. This will be later parsed by **KiInitializeXSave** and elide the specified state bits from the support. Note that State 0 (x87 FPU) and State 1 (SSE) cannot be removed this way.
3. The **XSAVEDISABLE** load option, set through the **xsavedisable** BCD option, which sets **KeTestDisableXsave**, and causes **KiInitializeXSave** to set all XState related configuration data to 0, disabling the whole XState feature entirely.

## CET XSAVE Area Format

As part of its implementation of CET, Intel defined two new bits in the XState standard, called **XSTATE\_CET\_U** (11) and **XSTATE\_CET\_S** (12), corresponding to user and supervisor state, respectively. The first state is a 16-byte data structure which MSDN documents as **XSAVE\_CET\_U\_FORMAT** containing the **IA32\_U\_CET** MSR (which is where the “Shadow Stack Enable” flag is configured) and the **IA32\_PL3\_SSP** MSR (where the “Privilege

Level 3 SSP” is stored). The second, which does not yet have an MSDN definition, includes the `IA32_PL0/1/2_SSP` MSRs.

```
typedef struct _XSAVE_CET_U_FORMAT
{
    ULONG64 Ia32CetUMsr;
    ULONG64 Ia32P13SspMsr;
} XSAVE_CET_U_FORMAT, *PXSAVE_CET_U_FORMAT;

typedef struct _XSAVE_CET_S_FORMAT
{
    ULONG64 Ia32P10SspMsr;
    ULONG64 Ia32P11SspMsr;
    ULONG64 Ia32P12SspMsr;
} XSAVE_CET_S_FORMAT, *PXSAVE_CET_S_FORMAT;
```

As the field names suggest, CET-related “registers” are actually values stored in respective MSRs, which can normally only be accessed through `RDMSR` and `WRMSR` privileged instructions in Ring 0. However, unlike most MSRs which store processor-global data, CET can be enabled on a per-thread basis, and the shadow stack pointer is also obviously per-thread. For these reasons, CET-related data must be made part of the XState functionality such that operating systems can correctly handle thread switches.

Since CET registers are basically MSRs which can normally only be modified by kernel code, they are not accessible through the `CPL3 XSAVE/XRSTOR` instructions and their respective state bits are always set to 1 in the `IA32_XSS` MSR. However, what makes things harder is the fact that the operating system cannot completely block user-mode code from modifying `SSP`. User-mode code might legitimately need to update the `SSP` as part of exception handling, unwinding, `setjmp/longjmp`, or specific functionality such as Windows’ “Fiber” mechanism.

As such, operating systems need to provide a way for threads to modify CET state in XState through a system call, much like Windows provides [SetThreadContext](#) as a mechanism to update certain protected CPU registers such as `CS` and `DR7`, as long as certain rules are met. Therefore, in the next section we’ll see how the [CONTEXT](#) structure evolved into the `CONTEXT_EX` structure on more modern Windows versions in order to support XState-related information, and how CET-specific handling had to be added for legitimate exception-related scenarios, while also avoiding malicious control-flow attacks through corrupted `CONTEXT`s.

# CONTEXT\_EX Internals

In order to support the increasing number of registers that have to be saved on every context switch, new versions of Windows have the `CONTEXT_EX` structure, in addition to the legacy `CONTEXT` structure. This was needed due to the fact that `CONTEXT` is a fixed-size structure, while `XSAVE` has introduced the need for dynamically-sized processor state data that is dependent on the thread, processor, and even machine configuration policy.

## CONTEXT\_EX Structure

Unfortunately, although now used all over the kernel and user-mode exception handling functionality, the `CONTEXT_EX` structure is largely undocumented, save for the accidental release of some information in the Windows 7 header files and some Intel reference code (which might suggest Intel actually is responsible for defining this abomination). Simply take a look at this comment block and tell us if you can understand anything:

```
//
// This structure specifies an offset (from the beginning of CONTEXT_EX
// structure) and size of a single chunk of an extended context structure.
//
// N.B. Offset may be negative.
//
typedef struct _CONTEXT_CHUNK
{
    LONG Offset;
    DWORD Length;
} CONTEXT_CHUNK, *PCONTEXT_CHUNK;

//
// CONTEXT_EX structure is an extension to CONTEXT structure. It defines
// a context record as a set of disjoint variable-sized buffers (chunks)
// each containing a portion of processor state. Currently there are only
// two buffers (chunks) are defined:
//
// - Legacy, that stores traditional CONTEXT structure;
// - XState, that stores XSAVE save area buffer starting from
// XSAVE_AREA_HEADER, i.e. without the first 512 bytes.
//
// There are a few assumptions exists that simplify conversion of PCONTEXT
// pointer to PCONTEXT_EX pointer.
//
// 1. APIs that work with PCONTEXT pointers assume that CONTEXT_EX is
// stored right after the CONTEXT structure. It is also assumed that
// CONTEXT_EX is present if and only if corresponding CONTEXT_XXX
// flags are set in CONTEXT.ContextFlags.
//
// 2. CONTEXT_EX.Legacy is always present if CONTEXT_EX structure is
// present. All other chunks are optional.
//
// 3. CONTEXT.ContextFlags unambiguously define which chunks are
// present. I.e. if CONTEXT_XSTATE is set CONTEXT_EX.XState is valid.
//
typedef struct _CONTEXT_EX
{
    //
    // The total length of the structure starting from the chunk with
    // the smallest offset. N.B. that the offset may be negative.
    //
    CONTEXT_CHUNK All;
```

```

//
// Wrapper for the traditional CONTEXT structure. N.B. the size of
// the chunk may be less than sizeof(CONTEXT) in some cases (when
// CONTEXT_EXTENDED_REGISTERS is not set on x86 for instance).
// CONTEXT_CHUNK Legacy;
//


// CONTEXT_XSTATE: Extended processor state chunk. The state is
// stored in the same format XSAVE operation stores it with
// exception of the first 512 bytes, i.e. starting from
// XSAVE_AREA_HEADER. The lower two bits corresponding FP and
// SSE state must be zero.
// CONTEXT_CHUNK XState;
} CONTEXT_EX, *PCONTEXT_EX;

#define CONTEXT_EX_LENGTH ALIGN_UP_BY(sizeof(CONTEXT_EX), STACK_ALIGN)

//
// These macros make context chunks manipulations easier.
//

```

So while these headers do attempt to explain the layout of the `CONTEXT_EX` structure, the text is obtuse enough (and full of English errors) that it took us several rounds of arguments and shots until we could visualize it, and felt a diagram might be helpful.



As shown in the diagram, the `CONTEXT_EX` structure is always at the *end* of the `CONTEXT` structure, and has 3 fields of type `CONTEXT_CHUNK` called `All`, `Legacy`, and `XState`. Each of these define an offset and a length to the data associated with them, and various `RTL_` macros exist to retrieve the appropriate data pointer.

The `Legacy` field refers to the beginning of the original `CONTEXT` structure (although the `Length` might be smaller on x86 if `CONTEXT_EXTENDED_REGISTERS` is not supplied). The `All` field refers to the beginning of the original `CONTEXT` structure as well, but its `Length` describes the totality of all the data, including the `CONTEXT_EX` itself and padding/alignment space required for the XSAVE Area. Finally, the `XState` field refers to the `XSAVE_AREA_HEADER` structure (which then defines the state mask of which state bits are enabled and thus whose data is present) and the length of the entire XSAVE Area. Due to this layout, it's important to note that `All` and `Legacy` will have negative offsets.

Since all of this math is hard, **Ntdll.dll** exports various APIs to simplify building, reading, copying, and otherwise manipulating the various data that is stored in a **CONTEXT\_EX** (some, but not all, of these APIs are internally used by **Ntoskrnl.exe**, but none are exported). In turn, **KernelBase.dll** exports documented Win32 functions which internally use these capabilities.

## Initializing a CONTEXT\_EX

First, callers should figure out how much memory to allocate in order to store a **CONTEXT\_EX**, which can be done by using the following API:

```
NTSYSAPI
ULONG
NTAPI
RtlGetExtendedContextLength (
    _In_ ULONG ContextFlags,
    _Out_ PULONG ContextLength
);
```

Callers are expected to supply the appropriate **CONTEXT\_XXX** flags to specify which registers they intend to save (and namely **CONTEXT\_XSTATE** otherwise using a **CONTEXT\_EX** does not really buy much). This API then reads **SharedUserData.XState.EnabledFeatures** and **SharedUserData.XState.EnabledUserVisibleSupervisorFeatures** and passes in the union of all the bits to an extended function (also exported) shown below.

```
NTSYSAPI
ULONG
NTAPI
RtlGetExtendedContextLength2 (
    _In_ ULONG ContextFlags,
    _Out_ PULONG ContextLength,
    _In_ ULONG64 XStateCompactionMask
);
```

Note how this newer API allows manually specifying which XState states to actually save, instead of grabbing all enabled features from the XState Configuration in the Shared User Data. This results in a **CONTEXT\_EX** structure that will be smaller and won't contain enough space for all possible XState State Data, so future usage of this **CONTEXT\_EX** should make sure to never leverage XState State Bits outside the specified mask.

Next, a caller would allocate memory for the **CONTEXT\_EX** (in most

cases Windows will use **alloca()** to avoid memory exhaustion failures in exception paths) and use one of these two APIs:

```
NTSYSAPI
ULONG
NTAPI
RtlInitializeExtendedContext (
    _Out_ PVOID Context,
    _In_ ULONG ContextFlags,
    _Out_ PCONTEXT_EX* ContextEx
);

NTSYSAPI
ULONG
NTAPI
RtlInitializeExtendedContext2 (
    _Out_ PVOID Context,
    _In_ ULONG ContextFlags,
    _Out_ PCONTEXT_EX* ContextEx,
    _In_ ULONG64 XStateCompactionMask
);
```

Just like before, the newer API allows manually specifying which XState states to save in their compacted form, otherwise all features available (based on **SharedUserData**) are assumed to be present. Obviously, it is expected that the caller specifies the same **ContextFlags** as in the call to **RtlGetExtendedContextLength(2)**, to make sure that the context structure is of the correct size as was allocated. In return, the caller now receives a pointer to the **CONTEXT\_EX** structure, which is expected to follow the input **CONTEXT** buffer.

Once a **CONTEXT\_EX** exists, a caller would likely first be interested in obtaining the legacy **CONTEXT** structure back from it (without making assumptions on sizes), which can be done with this next API:

```
NTSYSAPI
PCONTEXT
NTAPI
RtlLocateLegacyContext (
    _In_ PCONTEXT_EX ContextEx,
    _Out_opt_ PULONG Length,
);
```

As mentioned above, however, these are the undocumented and internal APIs that are exposed by the NT layer of Windows. Legitimate Win32 applications would instead simplify their usage of XState-compatible **CONTEXT** structures by using the following function(s) instead:

```
WINBASEAPI
BOOL
WINAPI
InitializeContext (
    _Out_writes_bytes_opt_( *ContextLength ) PVOID Context,
    _In_ DWORD ContextFlags,
    _Out_ PCONTEXT_EX Context,
    _Inout_ PDWORD ContextFlags
);
```

```

);

WINBASEAPI
BOOL
WINAPI
InitializeContext2 (
    _Out_writes_bytes_opt_(*ContextLength) PVOID Context,
    _In_ DWORD ContextFlags,
    _Out_ PCONTEXT_EX Context,
    _Inout_ PDWORD ContextFlags,
    _In_ ULONG64 XStateCompactionMask
);

```

These two APIs behave similarly to a combination of using the undocumented APIs: when callers first pass in `NULL` as the `Buffer` and `Context` parameters, the function returns the required length in `ContextLength`, which callers should allocate from memory. On the second attempt, callers pass in the allocated pointer in `Buffer`, and receive a pointer to the `CONTEXT` structure in `Context` without any knowledge of the underlying `CONTEXT_EX` structure.

## Controlling XState Feature Masks in CONTEXT\_EX

In order to access the `XSTATE_BV`(the extended feature mask), which is deeply embedded in the `Mask` field of the `XSAVE_AREA_HEADER` of the `CONTEXT_EX`, the system exports two APIs for easily checking which XState features are enabled in the `CONTEXT_EX`, with a corresponding API for modifying the XState mask.

Note, however, that Windows never stores x87 FPU (0) and SSE (1) states in the `XSAVE` Area, and instead uses the `FXSAVE` instruction, meaning that the `XSAVE` Area will never contain the Legacy Area, and immediately start with the `XSAVE_AREA_HEADER`. Due to this, the `Get` API will always mask the bottom 2 bits out. The `Set` API will, in addition, also make sure that the specified feature is present in the `EnabledFeatures` of the XState Configuration.

Keep in mind that if a hardcoded compaction mask was specified in `InitializeContext2` (or the internal native APIs), the `Set` API should not be used other than to elide existing state bits (since adding a new bit would imply additional, non-initialized out-of-bounds state data in the `CONTEXT_EX`, which would've already been pre-allocated without this data).



```

NTSYSAPI
ULONG64
NTAPI
RtlGetExtendedFeaturesMask (
    _In_ PCONTEXT_EX ContextEx
);

NTSYSAPI
ULONG64
NTAPI
RtlSetExtendedFeaturesMask (
    _In_ PCONTEXT_EX ContextEx,
    _In_ ULONG64 FeatureMask
);

```

The documented form of these APIs is as follows:

```

WINBASEAPI
BOOL
WINAPI
GetXStateFeaturesMask (
    _In_ PCONTEXT Context
    _Out_ PDWORD64 FeatureMask
);

NTSYSAPI
ULONG64
NTAPI
SetXStateFeaturesMask (
    _In_ PCONTEXT Context,
    _In_ DWORD64 FeatureMask
);

```

## Locating XState Features in a CONTEXT\_EX

Because of the complexity of the `CONTEXT_EX` structure, as well as the fact that XState features might be present in either compacted or non-compacted form, and that their presence is also dependent on the various state masks described earlier (especially if optimized XSAVE is supported), callers need a library function in order to quickly and easily obtain a pointer to the relevant state data in the XSAVE Area within the `CONTEXT_EX`.

Currently two such functions exist, shown below, with **RtlLocateExtendedFeature** being just a wrapper around **RtlLocateExtendedFeature2**, which supplies it with a pointer to the `SharedUserData.XState` as the `Configuration` parameter. As both are exported, callers can also manually specify their own custom XState Configuration in the latter API if they so choose.

```

NTSYSAPI
PVOID
NTAPI
RtlLocateExtendedFeature (
    _In_ CONTEXT_EX ContextEx,
    _In_ ULONG FeatureId,
    _Out_opt_ PULONG Length
);

NTSYSAPI
PVOID

```

```

NTAPI
RtlLocateExtendedFeature2 (
    _In_ CONTEXT_EX ContextEx,
    _In_ ULONG FeatureId,
    _In_ PXSTATE_CONFIGURATION Configuration,
    _Out_opt_ PULONG Length
);

```

Both of the two functions receive a `CONTEXT_EX` structure and an ID for a requested feature, and parse the XState Configuration data in order to return a pointer for where the feature is stored in the XSAVE Area. Note that they don't validate or return any actual value for the specified feature, which is up to the caller.

To find the pointer, **RtlLocateExtendedFeature2** does the following:

- Makes sure that the Feature ID is above 2 (since x87 FPU and SSE states are never saved through XSAVE by Windows) and below 64 (the highest possible XState feature bit)
- Gets the `XSAVE_AREA_HEADER` from `CONTEXT_EX + CONTEXT_EX.XState.Offset`
- Reads the `Configuration->ControlFlags.CompactionEnabled` flag to know if using compaction or not
- If using the non-compacted format:
  - Reads `Configuration->Features[n].Offset` and `.Size` to learn the offset and size of the requested feature in the XSAVE Area
- If using the compacted format:
  - Reads the `CompactionMask` from the `XSAVE_AREA_HEADER` (corresponding to `XCOMP_BV`) and checks if it contains the requested feature
  - Reads `Configuration->AllFeatures` to learn the sizes of all the enabled states whose state bit comes before the requested feature ID, and calculates the offset of the requested format based on adding up these sizes, aligning

the beginning of each previous state area to 64 bytes if the corresponding bit is set in `Configuration->AlignedFeatures`, and then finally aligning the start of the area for specified feature ID if needed as well

- Reads the size of the requested feature from `Configuration.AllFeatures[n]`
- Locates the feature in the `XSAVE` Area based on its computed offset from above and returns a pointer to it, optionally alongside its respective size in the output `Length` variable.

This means that to find the address of a certain feature with the non-compacted format, it's enough to check in `SharedUserData` which features are supported by the processor. In the compacted format however, it's impossible to rely on the offsets in `SharedUserData`, making it necessary to also check which features are enabled on the thread, and to calculate the right offset for the feature based on the sizes of all the previous features.

In legitimate Win32 applications, a different API is used, which internally calls the native API above, but with some pre-processing. Since state bit 0 and 1 are never saved as part of the `XSAVE` Area in the `CONTEXT_EX`, the Win32 API handles these two feature bits by grabbing them from the appropriate Legacy `CONTEXT` fields, namely `FltSave` for `XSTATE_LEGACY_FLOATING_POINT` and `Xmm0` for `XSTATE_LEGACY_SSE`.

```
WINBASEAPI
PVOID
WINAPI
LocateXStateFeature (
    _In_ CONTEXT_EX Context,
    _In_ DWORD FeatureId,
    _Out_opt_ PDWORD Length
);
```

## Example Usage and Output

In order to make sense out of the `XState` Internals, especially when combined with the `CONTEXT_EX` data structure, we've written a simple test program, available on our GitHub [here](#). This utility demonstrates some of the API usage as well as the various offsets, sizes, and behaviors involved. Here's the output of the program (which uses AVX registers) on a system with AVX, MPX, and Intel

PT:

```
C:\Users\aione\source\repos\SimpleDll\64\Debug\SimpleApp.exe
XSTATE Enabled Feature Mask is 0x000000000000001F
XSTATE Aligned Feature Mask is 0x0000000000000000
XSTATE[0x0] Feature Size is 0x00000000
XSTATE[0x1] Feature Size is 0x00000100
XSTATE[0x2] Feature Size is 0x00000100
XSTATE[0x3] Feature Size is 0x00000040
XSTATE[0x4] Feature Size is 0x00000040
Sum of All Feature States is 0x00000320
Sum of XSAVE Feature States is 0x00000180
Total Expected XSAVE Area Size is 0x000001C0
Got allocated buffer at 0x00000206B1180000 <size = 0x000006EF>
Got Legacy CONTEXT at 0x00000206B1180000 <offset = 0xFFFFFB30, size = 0x000004D0>
Got Extended CONTEXT at 0x00000206B11804D0 <offset = 0x00000000, size = 0x00000018>
Got XSAVE Header at 0x00000206B1180500 <offset = 0x00000030, size = 0x000001C0>
Initialized AUX test vector: [27446][6817][6864][5988][28913][25180][4120][19552]
Enabled Feature Mask is 0x000000000000000F
XSAVEHEADER[XSAVEBV1] is 0x000000000000000C
XSAVEHEADER[XCOMPBV1] is 0x800000000000001C
Got XSTATE[0x0] data at 0x00000206B1180100 <offset = 0xFFFFFC30, size = 0x000000A0>
Got XSTATE[0x1] data at 0x00000206B11801A0 <offset = 0xFFFFFCD0, size = 0x00000100>
Got XSTATE[0x2] data at 0x00000206B1180540 <offset = 0x00000070, size = 0x00000100>
Got XSTATE[0x3] data at 0x00000206B1180640 <offset = 0x00000170, size = 0x00000040>
Found YMM0 vector in context: [28913][25180][4120][19552][0][0][0][0]
```

Among other things, note how the Legacy CONTEXT is at a negative offset, as expected, and how even though the system supports the x87 FPU State (1) and GSSE State (2), the XSAVEBV does not contain these bits as they are instead saved in the Legacy CONTEXT area (and hence, note the negative offsets of their associated state data). Following the XSAVE Header (itself at offset 0x30) which is 0x40 bytes, note that the AVX State (2) starts at offset 0x70 as the math would suggest.

## CONTEXT\_EX Validation

Since user-mode APIs can construct a CONTEXT\_EX which eventually gets processed by the kernel and modifies privileged parts of the XSAVE area (namely, the CET state data), Windows must guard against undesirable modifications that can be done through APIs which accept a CONTEXT\_EX, such as:

- **NtContinue**, which is used to resume after an exception, handle **longjmp** CRT functionality, as well as perform stack unwinding
- **NtRaiseException**, which is used to inject an exception into an existing thread
- **NtQueueUserApc**, which is used to hijack execution flow of an existing thread
- **NtSetContextThread**, which is used to modify the processor registers/state of an existing thread

As any of these system calls could cause the kernel to modify either

the `IA32_PL3_SSP` or the `IA32_CET_U` MSRs, as well as directly modify `RIP` to an unexpected target, Windows must validate that the passed-in `CONTEXT_EX` does not violate CET guarantees.

We'll soon cover how this is done to validate the `SSP` in 19H1 and the addition of the `RIP` validation in 20H1. First though, a small refactor had to be done to reduce the potential for misusing **NtContinue**: the introduction of the **NtContinueEx** function.

## **NtContinueEx** and **KCONTINUE\_ARGUMENT**

As enumerated above, the functionality of **NtContinue** is used in a number of situations, and for CET to be resilient in the face of an API that allows arbitrary changes to processor state, greater fine grained control had to be added to the interface. This was done through the creation of a new enumeration called `KCONTINUE_TYPE`, which is present in a `KCONTINUE_ARGUMENT` data structure that must now be passed to the enhanced version of **NtContinue** — **NtContinueEx**.

This data structure also contains a new `ContinueFlags` field, which replaces the original `TestAlert` argument of **NtContinue** with the flag `CONTINUE_FLAG_RAISE_ALERT` (`0x1`), while also introducing a new `CONTINUE_FLAG_BYPASS_CONTEXT_COPY` (`0x2`) flag which directly delivers an APC with the new `TrapFrame`. This is an optimization which was previously implemented by checking if the `CONTEXT` record pointer was at a specific location in the user-stack, which made the function assume it was being used as part of User Mode APC delivery. Callers desiring this behavior must now explicitly set the flag in `ContinueFlags` instead.

Note that while the old interface continues to be supported for legacy reasons, it internally calls **NtContinueEx** which recognizes the input parameter as the `BOOLEAN TestAlert` parameter, and not a `KCONTINUE_ARGUMENT`. Such a case is treated as a `KCONTINUE_UNWIND` for purposes of the new interface.

As part of this refactor, the following four possible types exist:

- **KCONTINUE\_UNWIND** – This is used by legacy callers of **NtContinue**, such as **RtlRestoreContext** and **LdrInitializeThunk**, which is used when unwinding from exceptions.
- **KCONTINUE\_RESUME** – This is used by **KiInitializeUserApc** when building the **KCONTINUE\_ARGUMENT** structure on the user mode stack that **KiUserApcDispatcher** will run on before calling **NtContinueEx** again.
- **KCONTINUE\_LONGJUMP** – This is used by **RtlContinueLongJump** which is called by **RtlRestoreContext** if the exception code in the exception record is **STATUS\_LONGJUMP**.
- **KCONTINUE\_SET** – This is never passed to **NtContinueEx** directly, but rather used when calling [KeVerifyContextIpForUserCet](#) from within **PspGetSetContextInternal** in response to an **NtSetContextThread** API.

## Shadow Stack Pointer (SSP) Validation

As we mentioned, there are legitimate cases where user-mode code will need to change the shadow stack pointer, such as exception unwinding, APCs, **longjmp**, etc. But the operating system has to validate the new value requested for the **SSP**, in order to prevent CET bypasses. In 19H1 this was implemented by the new [KeVerifyContextXStateCetU](#) function. This function receives the thread whose context is being modified and the new context for the thread, and does the following:

- If the **CONTEXT\_EX** does not contain any XState data, or if the XState data does not contain CET registers (checked by calling **RtlLocateExtendedFeature2** with the **XSTATE\_CET\_U** state bit), no validation is needed.
- If CET is enabled on the target thread:
  - Validate that the caller is not attempting to disable CET on

this thread by masking out `XSTATE_MASK_CET_U` from `XSAVEBV`. If this is happening, the function will re-enable the state bit, set `MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN` (which is a flag that enables the Shadow Stack feature of CET) in `Ia32CetUMsr`, and set the current shadow stack as `Ia32Pl3SspMsr`.

- Otherwise, call [KiVerifyContextXStateCetUEnabled](#), to validate that CET shadow stacks are enabled (`MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN` is enabled), that the new SSP is 8-byte aligned, and that it is between the current SSP value and the end of the shadow stack region's VAD. Note that since stacks grow backward, the "end" of the region is actually the beginning of the stack. Therefore, when setting a new context for a thread, any SSP value is valid as long as it is inside the part of the shadow stack that has been used so far by the thread. There is no limit on how far back a thread can go inside its shadow stack.
- If CET is disabled on the target thread and the caller is attempting to enable it by including the `XSTATE_CET_U` mask in the `XSAVEBV` of the `CONTEXT_EX`, only allow both MSR values to be set to 0 (no shadow stacks, and no SSP).

Any failures in the validations described will return `STATUS_SET_CONTEXT_DENIED`, while `STATUS_SUCCESS` is returned in other cases.

Enabling CET also implicitly enables *Check Stack Extents*, originally implemented in Windows 8.1 together with CFG. This is visible through the `CheckStackExtents` bit in the `ProcessFlags` field of `KPROCESS`. This means that whenever the target SSP is being validated, [KeVerifyContextRecord](#) will also be called, and will verify that the target RSP is either part of the current thread's TEB's user stack limits (or the TEB32's user stack limits, if this is a WOW64 process). These checks, implemented by **RtlGuardIsValidStackPointer** (and **RtlGuardIsValidWow64StackPointer**) have previously been documented (and shown as being insufficient) by researchers at both [Tenable](#) and [enSilo](#).

# Instruction Pointer (RIP) Validation

In 19030 another feature using Intel CET appeared – verifying that the new RIP that a caller is attempting to set for the process is a valid one. Just like SSP validation, this mitigation can only be enabled if cet is enabled for the thread. However, RIP validation is not enabled by default and must be enabled for the process (which is indicated by the `UserCetSetContextIpValidation` bit in the `MitigationFlags2Values` field of `EPROCESS`).

That being said, for the current builds, it appears that when calling `CreateProcess` and using the `PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_MITIGATION_POLICY` attribute, if the `PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY2_CET_USER_SHADOW_STACKS_ALWAYS_ON` flag is enabled, the option will be set. (Note that calling the `SetProcessMitigationPolicy` API with the `ProcessUserShadowStackPolicy` value is not valid, as CET can only be enabled at process creation time).

Interestingly, however, a new mitigation option *was* added to the mitigation map, `PS_MITIGATION_OPTION_USER_CET_SET_CONTEXT_IP_VALIDATION` (32). Toggling this (undocumented) mitigation option has the effect of enabling the `AuditUserCetSetContextIpValidation` bit in the `MitigationFlags2Values` field instead, which will be described shortly. Additionally, because this is now the 32<sup>nd</sup> mitigation option (each of which takes up 4 bits for `DEFERRED/OFF/ON/RESERVED`), there are now thus 132 mitigation bits needed, and the `PS_MITIGATION_OPTIONS_MAP` has expanded to 3 64-bit array elements in the `Map` field (which has follow-on effects to the size of the `PS_SYSTEM_DLL_INIT_BLOCK`).

The new [KeVerifyContextIpForUserCet](#) function will be called whenever a thread's context is about to be changed. It will check that both CET and the RIP mitigation are enabled for the thread, and also checks if `CONTEXT_CONTROL` flag set in the context parameter, meaning that RIP will be changed by this new context. If all these checks pass, it calls the internal



[KiVerifyContextIpForUserCet](#) function. The purpose of this function is to validate that the target RIP is a valid value, and not one used by an exploit to run arbitrary code.

First it checks that the target RIP address is not a kernel address, and also not an address in the lower 0x10000 bytes, that should not be mapped. Then it retrieves that base trap frame and check if the target RIP is the RIP of that trap frame. This is meant to allow cases where the target RIP is the previous address in user mode. This will usually happen when this is the first time **NtSetThreadContext** is called for this thread, and the RIP is being set to the initial start address for the thread, but can also happen in other, less common cases.


The function receives the **KCONTINUE\_TYPE** and based on its value, it handles the target RIP in different ways. In most cases it will iterate over the shadow stack and search for the target RIP. If it doesn't find it, it will keep running until it hits an exception and gets to its exception handler. The exception handler will check if the **KCONTINUE\_TYPE** supplied is **KCONTINUE\_UNWIND**, and if it is call [RtlVerifyUserUnwindTarget](#) with the **KCONTINUE\_UNWIND** flag. This function will try to verify RIP again, this time using more complex checks which we describe in the next section.

In any other case, it will return **STATUS\_SET\_CONTEXT\_DENIED**, which will make [KeVerifyContextIpForUserCet](#) call the **KiLogUserCetSetContextIpValidationAudit** function in order to audit the failure if the **AuditUserCetSetContextIpValidation** flag is set in the **EPROCESS**. This “auditing” is quite interesting, as instead of being done over the usual process mitigation ETW channel, it is done by directly raising a fast fail exception through the Windows Error Reporting (WER) service (i.e.: sending a 0xC000409 exception with the information set to **FAST\_FAIL\_SET\_CONTEXT\_DENIED**). In order to avoid spamming WER, another **EPROCESS** bit, **AuditUserCetSetContextIpValidationLogged**, is used.

There is one case where the function will stop iterating over the shadow stack before finding the target RIP – if the thread is terminating and the current shadow stack address is page-aligned.

This means that for terminating threads, the function will try to verify the target RIP only in the current page of the shadow stack as a “best effort”, but will not go any further than that. If it doesn’t find the target RIP in that page it will return `STATUS_THREAD_IS_TERMINATING`.


The other case in this function is when `KCONTINUE_TYPE` is `KCONTINUE_LONGJUMP`. Then the target RIP will not be validated against the shadow stack, but [RtlVerifyUserUnwindTarget](#) will be called instead with the `KCONTINUE_LONGJUMP` flag to verify RIP in the PE Image Load Configuration Directory’s `longjmp` table. We’ll describe this table and these checks in the next section of this blog post.



[KeVerifyContextIpForUserCet](#) is called by one of these 2 functions:

- **PspGetSetContextInternal** – called in response to an **NtSetContextThread** API.
- [KiVerifyContextRecord](#) – called in response to **NtContinueEx**, **NtRaiseException**, and in some cases **NtSetContextThread** APIs. Before calling [KeVerifyContextIpForUserCet](#) (Only if its received `ContinueArgument` is not `NULL`), this function checks if the caller is trying to modify the CS register, and whether the new value is valid – non-WOW64 processes are only allowed to set CS to `KGDT64_R3_CODE`, unless they’re pico processes, in which case they can set CS to `KGDT64_R3_CODE` or `KGDT64_R3_CMCODE`. Any other value will make [KiVerifyContextRecord](#) force the new CS value to `KGDT64_R3_CODE`. [KiVerifyContextRecord](#) is either called by **KiContinuePreviousModeUser** or by [KeVerifyContextRecord](#). In the second case, the function validates that RSP is inside one of the process stacks (native or wow64), and that 64-bit processes will only ever set CS to `KGDT64_R3_CODE`.

All paths that call [KeVerifyContextIpForUserCet](#) to validate the target RIP first call [KeVerifyContextXStateCetU](#) to validate the target SSP and only perform the RIP checks if the SSP is determined to be valid.



# Exception unwinding and longjmp Validation

As shown above, the handling for `KCONTEXT_SET` and `KCONTEXT_RESUME` is concerned with validating that the target RIP is part of the Shadow Stack, but the other scenarios (`KCONTEXT_UNWIND` and `KCONTEXT_LONGJMP`) require extended validation through [RtlVerifyUserUnwindTarget](#). This second validation path contains a number of interesting complexities that required changes to the PE file format (and compiler support) as well as a new OS-level information class added to [NtSetInformationProcess](#) for JIT compiler support.

Already added due to enhancements to Control Flow Guard (CFG) support, the Image Load Configuration Directory inside of the PE file now includes information for branch valid targets used as part of a **setjmp/longjmp** pair, which a modern compiler is supposed to identify and pass onto the linker. With CET, this existing data is re-used, but yet another table and size is added for exception handler continuation support. While Visual Studio 2017 produces the **longjmp** table, only Visual Studio 2019 produces this newer table.

In this last section, we'll look at the format of these tables, and how

the kernel is able to authorize the last two types of KCONTINUE\_TYPE control flows.

## PE Metadata Tables

In addition to the standard *GFIDS Table* that is present in Control Flow Guard images, Windows 10 also added support for validation of **longjmp** targets through the inclusion of a *Long Jump Target Table* typically located in a PE section called **.gljmp**, whose RVA is stored in the **GuardLongJumpTargetTable** field of the Image Load Configuration Directory.

Whenever a call to **setjmp** is made in code, the RVA of the return address (which is where **longjmp** will branch to) is added to this table. The presence of this table is determined by the **IMAGE\_GUARD\_CF\_LONGJUMP\_TABLE\_PRESENT** flag in the **GuardFlags** of the Image Load Configuration Directory, and it contains as many entries as indicated by the **GuardLongJumpTargetCount** field.

Each entry is a 4-byte RVA, plus  $n$  bytes of metadata, where  $n$  is taken from the result of  $(\text{GuardFlags} \ \& \ \text{IMAGE\_GUARD\_CF\_FUNCTION\_TABLE\_SIZE\_MASK}) \gg \text{IMAGE\_GUARD\_CF\_FUNCTION\_TABLE\_SIZE\_SHIFT}$ . For this table, no metadata is defined, so the metadata bytes are always expected to be zero. Interestingly, because this calculation is the same as the one used for the GFIDS Table (which does potentially have metadata if export suppression is enabled), suppressing at least one CFG target will result in 1 byte of empty metadata being added to every entry in the Long Jump Target Table.

For example, here's an PE file with two **longjmp** targets:

```
.rdata:0000000140009300 .load_config_used dd 100h ; Size ; Size
.rdata:0000000140009300 dd 10014500h ; GuardFlags
.rdata:0000000140009300 dq offset __guard_longjmp_table; GuardLongJumpTargetTable
.rdata:0000000140009300 dq 2 ; GuardLongJumpTargetCount
```

Note the value **1** in the upper nibble of **GuardFlags** (which corresponds to **IMAGE\_GUARD\_CF\_FUNCTION\_TABLE\_SIZE\_MASK**) due to the fact this image also uses CFG Export Suppression. This tells us that one extra byte of metadata will be present in the Long Jump Target Table, which you can see below:

```

.gjmp:000000014000E000 __guard_longjmp_table dd rva loc_140001ED5
.gjmp:000000014000E000 ; DATA XREF: .rdata:_load_config_usedfo
.gjmp:000000014000E004 db 0
.gjmp:000000014000E005 dd rva loc_140002059

```

On Windows 10 20H1, this type of metadata is now included in one additional situation — when exception handler continuation targets are present as part of a binary’s control flow. Two new fields — **GuardEHContinuationTable** and **GuardEHContinuationCount** — are added to the end of the Image Load Configuration Directory, and a **IMAGE\_GUARD\_EH\_CONTINUATION\_TABLE\_PRESENT** flag is now part of the **GuardFlags**. The layout of this table is identical to the one shown for the Long Jump Target Table — including the addition of metadata bytes based on the upper nibble of **GuardFlags**.

Unfortunately, not even the current preview versions of Visual Studio 2019 generate this data, so we cannot currently show you an example — this analysis is based on reverse engineering the validation code that we describe later, as well as the **Ntimage.h** header file in the 20H1 SDK.

## User Inverted Function Table

Now that we know that control flow changes might occur in order to branch to either a longjmp target or an exception handler continuation target, the question becomes — how do we get these two tables based on the **RIP** address present in a **CONTEXT\_EX** as part of a **NtContinueEx** call? As these operations might happen frequently in the context of certain program executions, the kernel needs an efficient way to solve this problem.

You may already be familiar with the concept of the *Inverted Function Table*. Such a table is used by **Ntdll.dll** (**LdrpInvertedFunctionTable**), for finding the unwind opcodes and exception data during user-mode exception handling (to wit, by locating the **.pdata** section). Another table is present in **Ntoskrnl.exe** (**PsInvertedFunctionTable**) and is used during kernel-mode exception handling, as well as part of PatchGuard’s checks.

In short, the Inverted Function Table is an array containing all the loaded user / kernel modules their size, and a pointer to the PE Exception Directory, sorted by virtual address. It was originally created as an optimization, since searching this array is a lot faster than parsing the PE header and then searching the loaded modules linked list – a binary search on an inverted function table will quickly locate any virtual address in its respective module in only  $\log(n)$  lookups. Ken Johnson and Matt Miller, now of Microsoft fame, previously published a thorough overview as part of their [article on kernel-mode hooking techniques](#) in the Uninformed Magazine.

Previously, however, **Ntdll.dll** only scanned its table for user-mode exceptions, and **Ntoskrnl.exe** only scanned its counterpart for kernel-mode exceptions — what 20H1 changes is that the kernel will now have to scan the user table too — as part of the new logic required to handle longjmp and exception continuations. To support this, a new **RtlpLookupUserFunctionTableInverted** function is added, which scans the **KeUserInvertedFunctionTable** variable, mapping to the now exported **LdrpInvertedFunctionTable** symbol in **Ntdll.dll**.

This is an exciting forensic capability, as it means that you now have an easy way, from the kernel, to locate the user-mode modules that are loaded within the current process, without having to parse the PEB's loader data or enumerating VADs. For example, here's how you can see the current loaded images in **Csrss.exe**:

```
dx @$cursession.Processes.Where(p => p.Name == "csrss.exe").First().SwitchTo()

dx -r0 @$table = *
(nt!_INVERTED_FUNCTION_TABLE**) &nt!KeUserInvertedFunctionTable

dx -g @$table->TableEntry.Take(@$table->CurrentSize)
```

	(+) FunctionTable	(+) DynamicTable	ImageBase	SizeOfImage	SizeOfTable
[0]	0x7ffc3ad000	0x7ffc3ad000	0x7ffc3970000	0x1f0000	0xe094
[1]	0x7ffb6bd1a000	0x7ffb6bd1a000	0x7ffb6bd1a0000	0x7000	0x78
[2]	0x7ffc0593000	0x7ffc0593000	0x7ffc0500000	0x9d000	0x4c50
[3]	0x7ffc064a000	0x7ffc064a000	0x7ffc0640000	0xd000	0x414
[4]	0x7ffc067d000	0x7ffc067d000	0x7ffc0660000	0x21000	0x6d8
[5]	0x7ffc0695000	0x7ffc0695000	0x7ffc0690000	0x15000	0x174
[6]	0x7ffc06c2000	0x7ffc06c2000	0x7ffc06b0000	0x15000	0x708
[7]	0x7ffc06e3000	0x7ffc06e3000	0x7ffc06d0000	0x18000	0xabc
[8]	0x7ffc0676000	0x7ffc0676000	0x7ffc07e0000	0x9e000	0x4c50
[9]	0x7ffc06af000	0x7ffc06af000	0x7ffc0690000	0x2a3000	0xe220
[10]	0x7ffc06b5000	0x7ffc06b5000	0x7ffc06a0000	0x21000	0x3b04
[11]	0x7ffc165d000	0x7ffc165d000	0x7ffc1570000	0xfa000	0xafc8
[12]	0x7ffc17f7000	0x7ffc17f7000	0x7ffc1680000	0x194000	0x7c50
[13]	0x7ffc189b000	0x7ffc189b000	0x7ffc1820000	0x80000	0x2e20
[14]	0x7ffc1964000	0x7ffc1964000	0x7ffc1920000	0x4a000	0x2df0
[15]	0x7ffc1bf9000	0x7ffc1bf9000	0x7ffc1b50000	0x194000	0x6d08
[16]	0x7ffc124cb000	0x7ffc124cb000	0x7ffc123c0000	0x120000	0xc210
[17]	0x7ffc128da000	0x7ffc128da000	0x7ffc12830000	0xb2000	0x5430
[18]	0x7ffc12c99000	0x7ffc12c99000	0x7ffc129b0000	0x336000	0x29700
[19]	0x7ffc1361000	0x7ffc1361000	0x7ffc13610000	0x26000	0xbd0

That being said, there does exist, however remote, the possibility that an image does not contain an exception directory, especially on x86 systems where unwind opcodes do not exist, and `.pdata` is only created if `/SAFESEH` is used and there's at least one exception handler.

In those situations, `RtlpLookupUserFunctionTableInverted` can fail, and `MmGetImageBase` must be used instead. Unsurprisingly, this looks up any VAD that maps the region corresponding to the input RIP, and, if it's an Image VAD, returns the base address and size of the region (which should correspond to that of the module).

## Dynamic Exception Handler Continuation Targets

One final hurdle exists in the handling of `KCONTINUE_UNWIND` requests — although regular processes have static exception handler continuation targets based on the `__try/__except/__finally` clauses in their code, Windows allows JIT engines to not only dynamically create executable code on the fly, but also to register exception handlers (and unwind opcodes) for it at runtime, such as through the `RtlAddFunctionTable` API. While these exception handlers were previously only needed for user-mode stack walking and exception unwinding, now the continuation handlers become legitimate control flow targets that the kernel must understand as potentially valid values for RIP. It's this last possibility that `RtlpFindDynamicEHContinuationTarget` handles.

As part of the CET support and introduction of `NtContinueEx`, the `EPROCESS` structure was enhanced with two new fields called `DynamicEHContinuationTargetsLock` and `DynamicEHContinuationTargetsTree`, the first of which is an `EX_PUSH_LOCK` and the latter an `RTL_RB_TREE`, which contains all the valid exception handler addresses. This tree is managed through a call to [NtSetInformationProcess](#) with a new process information class, `ProcessDynamicEHContinuationTargets`, which is accompanied by a data structure of type `PROCESS_DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGETS_INFORMATION`,

containing in turn an array of `PROCESS_DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGET` entries, that will be validated before modifying the `DynamicEHContinuationTargetsTree`. To make things easier to follow, see the definitions below for these structures and flags:

```
#define DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGET_ADD    0x01
#define DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGET_PROCESSED 0x02

typedef struct _PROCESS_DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGET
{
    ULONG_PTR TargetAddress;
    ULONGLONG Flags;
} PROCESS_DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGET, *PPROCESS_DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGET;

typedef struct _PROCESS_DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGETS_INFORMATION
{
    USHORT NumberOfTargets;
    USHORT Reserved;
    ULONG Reserved2;
    PPROCESS_DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGET* Targets;
} PROCESS_DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGETS_INFORMATION,
*PPROCESS_DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGETS_INFORMATION;
```

The `PspProcessDynamicEHContinuationTargets` function is called to iterate over this data, at which point `RtlAddDynamicEHContinuationTarget` is called for any entry containing the `DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGET_ADD` flag set, which allocates a data structure storing the target address, and linking its `RTL_BALANCED_NODE` link with the `RTL_RB_TREE` in `EPROCESS`. Conversely, if the flag is missing, then the target is looked up, and if it indeed exists, is removed and its node freed. As each entry is processed, the `DYNAMIC_EH_CONTINUATION_TARGET_PROCESSED` flag is OR'ed into the original input buffer, so that callers can know which entries worked and which didn't.

Obviously, it would appear that the existence of this capability is a universal bypass of any CET/CFG-like capability, as every possible ROP gadget could simply be added as a 'dynamic continuation target'. However, since Microsoft now only legitimately supports out-of-process JIT compilation for browsers and Flash, it's critical to note that this API only works for remote processes. In fact, calling it on the current process will always fail with `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED`.

## Target Validation

Bringing all of this knowledge together, the [`RtlVerifyUserUnwindTarget`](#) function becomes quite easy to



explain.

1. Lookup the loaded PE module associated with the target **RIP** in the **CONTEXT\_EX** structure. First, try using **RtlpLookupUserFunctionTableInverted** and if that fails, switch to using **MmGetImageBase** instead, making sure that the module is < 4GB.
2. If a module was found, call the **LdrImageDirectoryEntryToLoadConfig** function to get its Image Load Configuration Directory. Then, make sure it's large enough to contain either the Long Jump or Dynamic Exception Handler Continuation Target Table and that the guard flags contain **IMAGE\_GUARD\_CF\_LONGJUMP\_TABLE\_PRESENT** or **IMAGE\_GUARD\_EH\_CONTINUATION\_TABLE\_PRESENT**. If the directory is missing, too small, or the matching table is simply not present, then return **STATUS\_SUCCESS** for compatibility reasons.
3. Get either **GuardLongJumpTargetTable** or **GuardEHContinuationTable** from the Image Load Configuration Directory, and validate the **GuardLongJumpTargetCount** or **GuardEHContinuationCount**. If there are more than 4 billion entries, return **STATUS\_INTEGER\_OVERFLOW**. If there are more than 0 entries, then call do a binary search using **bsearch\_s** (passing in **RtlpTargetCompare** as the comparator) through the table to locate the target **RIP** after converting it to an **RVA**. If it is found, return **STATUS\_SUCCESS**.
4. If the target **RIP** was not found (or if the table contained 0 entries to begin with), or if a loaded module was not found at the target **RIP** in the first place, then return **STATUS\_SET\_CONTEXT\_DENIED** for longjmp validations (**KCONTINUE\_LONGJUMP**).
5. Otherwise, for exception unwinding validations (**KCONTINUE\_UNWIND**), call **RtlpFindDynamicEHContinuationTarget** to check if this was

a registered dynamic exception handler continuation target. If yes, return STATUS\_SUCCESS, otherwise return STATUS\_SET\_CONTEXT\_DENIED.

---

## Conclusion

The implementation of CET and its related mitigations are a major step towards eliminating the use of ROP and other control flow hijacking techniques. Control flow integrity is obviously a complicated topic, which will probably get even more complex as additional mitigations are added to it in the future. Further compatibility concerns and one-off scenarios will likely result in more and more cases to be discovered that will need specific handling. That said, such a big step in mitigation technology, especially one that includes so much new functionality, is bound to have gaps and issues, and we are sure that as more research is done in this area, interesting things will be discovered there in the future.

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