# Introduction to Hardware Security Modules

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- ▶ nCipher acquired by Thales 2008.



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- Tamper reactive hardware rare in HSMs; more common in things in adversarial environments like credit card terminals.

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  - Allowing backup of key material (two main approaches...)

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- Other customers are eager/paranoid security folks.
- ► FIPS 140-2 is the main standard for HSMs (and software crypto modules).
- ► Implemented crypto standards come from NIST, IEEE, ANSI, KISA, etc. usually at request of customers.

## Fin

Questions?